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ARTICLE I.

UNIFICATION.

1. *The South.* An Address delivered by W. L. Trenholm, Esq., on the Third Anniversary of the Charleston Board of Trade. April 7, 1869. Charleston, S. C.: Walker, Evans & Cogswell.
2. *A Continental Empire, from the Polar Sea to the Isthmus of Panama, including all contiguous Islands.* *New York Herald*, May 1 to 31, 1869, inclusive.
3. *Proceedings of the Old and New School Assemblies in New York.* *New York Observer*, May 27 and June 3, 1869.

Many years ago, one of the monthly magazines published a humorous article, in which the writer affected to describe the condition of humanity in the middle of the twentieth century. The capital of the planet was located in the island of Borneo—a city of remarkable magnificence, the residence of the magnates in “The Republic of United Interests.” The central idea of the essay was the unification of the race; and the drapery of the story, ingeniously constructed and dexterously applied, exhibited this idea in all the relations of life. The great old

VOL. XX., NO. 4—1.

ARTICLE V.

BANNERMAN'S CHURCH OF CHRIST.

The Church of Christ: A Treatise on the Nature, Power, Ordinances, Discipline, and Government of the Christian Church.
By the late JAMES BANNERMAN, D. D., Professor of Apologetics and Pastoral Theology, New College, Edinburgh; Author of "Inspiration: The Infallible Truth and Divine Authority of the Holy Scriptures." Edited by his Son. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 38 George street. London: Hamilton Adams & Co. Dublin: John Robertson & Co. 1868. 2 vols., 8vo., pp. 480, 468.

The author of this work was one of the literary executors of the late Principal Cunningham, and in conjunction with Dr. James Buchanan, (Professor of Divinity in the Theological College where they had been all three associated together,) edited his works in four volumes. Dr. Bannerman survived his friend and colleague but a few short years. These two volumes are made up of the lectures delivered by him during each winter session of the New College to the students of the fourth year; and his son and editor tells us that the manuscript was left by its author in a very perfect state, so that very little modification was necessary in preparing the work for the press.

The plan of the work is as follows: First is considered the Church; under what authority constituted; what its essential nature; what its peculiar characteristics; then, how it stands related to the State. In the next place, the nature of Church power and authority is considered; its source, its limits, and its ends; then in what members of the Church this power has its primary seat. In the third place, the principles so far established are applied to the different kinds of matters respecting which the Church exercises her powers; which matters come under the three heads of Doctrine, Ordinances, and Discipline. Upon the second head, ordinances or worship, the treatise is

especially full; and those peculiar institutions, the sacraments, receive large and detailed consideration. In the fourth and last place, the persons to whom the exercise of Church power ought to be committed come to be considered, and this leads to a discussion of the scriptural form of church government.

Professor Rainy, who is a reputable authority upon such questions, says it would not be easy to point to any one work treating so thoroughly and comprehensively this class of subjects. He ventures to compare Dr. Bannerman with Voetius. He gives him a decided superiority to modern German authors on the Church, and also to English Church writers. "It is," he says, "a fresh statement of our fundamental principles in their application to the whole range of questions," and being from the Presbyterian point of view, it has for us "of course a special interest and value." For our own part, we consider that we pay Dr. Bannerman a high compliment when we state that his work appears to us to compare well with Principal Cunningham's "Discussions of Church Principles." The range of Bannerman's treatise is wider than Cunningham's, and whether he be as profound or not, he is equally clear and candid, which is saying a great deal. Indeed, we cannot withhold the expression of our admiration for the learning and the industry displayed by several of the professors of the Scotch theological colleges in the recent publication by them of so many and such valuable and important works. There are the four magnificent volumes of Dr. Cunningham, and Dr. James Buchanan's *Doctrine of Justification*, (one of the Cunningham Lectures,) and the works of Professor Fairbairn, and Professor Smeaton's *Doctrine of the Atonement as taught by Christ himself*, and Dr. Bannerman's book on *Inspiration*, besides the volumes at present under review.

Passing now to a more close inspection of the merits of this work, we may quote Dr. Rainy's testimony that the "fundamental principles laid down" are those "commonly received among Scottish Presbyterians." And we may add to this testimony a kindred one by Principal Candlish in these words: "I can testify with the utmost confidence to his being competent, and admitted on all hands to be competent, to give a fair and

full representation of the theory of Church polity, all but unanimously adopted in Scotland at and after the Reformation—not under influences from without, such as regal supremacy or Papal dictation; but inwardly and directly from the study of the divine word and the honest application of its principles to the problems of divine Providence as they came up. For that is what we claim to be characteristic of our Scottish Reformation—that in all the departments of doctrine, worship, and government, it was * * * a reconstruction of the divine plan freshly based on the old foundation. For the exposition of the doctrine of the Church upon that footing and in that view, Dr. Bannerman was eminently qualified. He was a close and thorough biblical student; and he was an authority in ecclesiastical history and law.” We make these quotations because they will tend to convince our readers what are really Scotch Presbyterian Church doctrines. Of course, we never build our doctrine of the Church upon any mere human foundations, and are far from intimating that because a certain idea prevails amongst Scotch Presbyterians, it must therefore needs be correct. But inasmuch as it is rather common to appeal to the Scotch Church as our mother, and therefore our proper teacher, our desire in making these quotations is to hold up competent testimony to this fact that Dr. Bannerman’s views are those which represent truly Scotch Presbyterianism. We suppose, indeed, that upon some points, Presbyterians on this side of the water may be in advance of their Scotch brethren and enjoy a fuller and a juster development of scriptural Presbyterianism. But if we are to appeal at all to our mother for confirmation of what we understand the Scriptures to teach, let us be sure that we refer to authorities respecting her understanding of the Scriptures who are qualified to represent her.

Having said this, we acquaint the readers that our design in this article is chiefly to introduce Dr. Bannerman to their fellowship and confidence, and that in order thereto we propose to present them with large extracts from his discussion of sundry topics.

We present, in the first place, some paragraphs from our

author on the question of the existence of a divine and authoritative

FORM OF CHURCH POLITY.

“The theory which denies the existence of a divine and authoritative form of Church polity, and leaves the whole matter to be regulated by Christian expediency or merely human arrangement, is one which has found favor with Churchmen inclined either to latitudinarian or Erastian views of the Church ; although it has been held by others also. * * *

“There is another theory, however, very different from that first mentioned, which asserts that the form and arrangements of ecclesiastical government have not been left to be fixed by the wisdom of man, nor reduced to the level of a question of mere Christian expediency ; but have been determined by divine authority, and are sufficiently exhibited in Scripture. The advocates of this view believe that in respect of its government and organisation, as well as in respect of its doctrine and ordinances, the Church is of God, and not of man ; and that Scripture, rightly interpreted and understood, affords sufficient materials for determining what the constitution and order of the Christian society were intended by its divine Founder to be. * *

“The theory which denies a divine warrant for any system of church government, and hands over the question to be settled by considerations of human expediency, is contradicted by the fact, which can be clearly established from Scripture, that the Church of Christ, in its essential and peculiar character, is a positive institution of God.

“This principle is applicable to the Church in all its aspects : to its doctrine and its ordinances ; to its constitution and its faith ; to its inward life and its outward organisation ; to the spiritual grace which it imparts and the external form which it bears. All is equally and alike of positive appointment by God ; being, in the strict sense of the terms, a divine institution, not owing its origin or virtue to man, and not amenable to his views of expediency, or determined by his arrangements. Looking at the Church of Christ as an express and positive ordinance

of God, it is clear that man is neither warranted nor competent to judge of its organisation. * * * *

“The three marks laid down by George Gillespie, in the parallel case of church rites and ceremonies, may serve also to indicate what, in the matter of church government, is left to the determination of reason according to its views of Christian expediency. First, it must be a matter belonging not to the substance of ecclesiastical organisation, but only to the circumstances of it. Second, it must be a matter not determinable from Scripture. And third, it must be a matter to be decided in one way or other; and for the decisions of which in *this* particular manner, rather than in a different, a good reason can be assigned. With the help of these tests, it will not often be a difficult matter in practice to say what in the order and arrangements of the ecclesiastical society is or is not left free to be determined by human wisdom.” Vol. II., pp. 202, 211.

In the next place, let us hear this representative of the Free Church of Scotland make his statement of the Presbyterian doctrine of

TWO ORDERS OF OFFICE-BEARERS

in the Church as against the Prelatic theory of *three orders*:

“The two orders of presbyters and deacons, acknowledged by all the three parties, are held by Presbyterians and Independents to be the *only* ranks of standing office-bearers divinely instituted in the Church; while Episcopalians contend that, in addition to these, there is a *third* order, superior in place and authority to both, and forming part of the permanent arrangements of the ecclesiastical society. In addition to presbyters and deacons, the advocates of Prelacy assert, against the view both of Presbyterians and Independents, that there is an order of bishops or prelates distinct from the former two, and equally of standing authority in the Christian Church. * * *

“The distinctive peculiarity of the system of *Episcopacy*, as opposed to Presbyterianism, lies in the assertion by Episcopalians of the existence of a third order of office-bearers in the Church, possessed of powers appropriate to themselves, and

denied to the rest. These are the *potestas ordinationis*, or the right, denied to presbyters, of ordaining to office in the Church, and the *potestas jurisdictionis*, or the right, also denied to presbyters, of exercising government and dispensing discipline in the Church. According to the Prelatic theory, as explained by almost all who hold it, the power of ordination and the power of ruling are peculiar to bishops, and so characteristic of the office that they cannot be separated from it. Where the right to ordain or to rule can be proved to exist, as belonging to any one in the Church, there the office and presence of a bishop are to be recognised; and where these can be proved to be wanting in the case of any office-bearer, there the functions of a presbyter or deacon, but not of a bishop, are to be acknowledged. Now, this principle, necessarily implied in any system of Prelacy, properly so called, affords an easy and certain test to enable us to bring to the bar of Scripture the pretensions put forth by its adherents. Is the twofold right of ordination and of government in the Christian Church one which, according to Scripture, rightfully appertains to a distinct class of men, holding ordinary and permanent office in the Church and separate from presbyters; or does the right of ordination and government form one commonly and statedly exercised by presbyters?" (Vol. II., p. 260-1, 280-1.) "But this evidence is greatly strengthened by the consideration that, included in the general class of presbyter or elder, there is a special kind of presbyter or elder set apart more peculiarly to the exercise of the office of ruling in the Christian Church. The Scriptures seem to point to three sorts of office-bearers, all belonging to the one common order of the eldership, but distinguished from each other by the peculiar functions discharged by them respectively. First, there is the preaching elder, so often spoken of in Scripture under the name of 'pastor' and other titles, significant of his distinctive work of preaching the word and dispensing ordinances. Second, there is the teaching elder, spoken of under the name of 'teacher,' and apparently to be distinguished from the pastor in Scripture as more especially devoted to the duty of teaching or explaining and interpreting the truth of God. And third, there is the

ruling elder, to be discriminated from both by having it as his peculiar function to administer rule or government in the Church of Christ. Standing upon the same footing, as all belonging to the order of elder, there are these three varieties in the order to be distinguished in Scripture. * * * *

“But the decisive evidence for the office of ruling elder is to be found in the well known passage in the First Epistle to Timothy: ‘Let the elders that rule well be counted worthy of double honor, especially they who labor in the word and doctrine.’ A vast deal of minute and labored criticism has been expended on this passage, in order to make it bear a meaning against its obvious sense. But the very explicit testimony which it bears to two classes of elders—the one of whom ruled exclusively, the other of whom, in addition to ruling, exercised also the ministry of the word—is so strong and conclusive that not a few, both among Episcopalians and Independents, have been led to acknowledge the force of it. Nothing but a very dangerous kind of wresting of the plain meaning of the text will suffice to get rid of such an interpretation of it as carries conclusive evidence in favor of the class of ruling, as separate from preaching and teaching elders. The strong fact, then, of the institution of a distinct class of presbyters for the express purpose of government in the Christian society, in addition to the general order of presbyters who both preach and rule, serves very greatly to confirm the evidence we have from Scripture against the Congregationalist principle of a distribution of the power of government between office-bearers and members in the Church.” Vol. II., pp. 305–307.

The next topic on which we propose to let Dr. Bannerman set before us the views current in the Free Church, is the measure and limits of the

DISCRETIONARY POWERS OF THE CHURCH IN RESPECT TO HER WORSHIP AND GOVERNMENT.

“There can be no mistake as to the doctrine held and inculcated by the authorised standards of our Church with respect to the exercise of Church power about the public worship of

God. In the twentieth chapter of the Westminster Confession, under the head of 'Christian Liberty and Liberty of Conscience,' the power of the Church, not only in regard to matters of faith, but also in regard to matters of worship, is expressly excluded as not binding on the conscience, in any thing beyond the limits of what is laid down in Scripture. 'God alone,' says the Confession of Faith, 'is Lord of the conscience, and hath left it free from the doctrines and commandments of men which are in any thing contrary to his word, or beside it, in matters of faith and worship; so that to believe such doctrines or to obey such commandments out of conscience is to betray true liberty of conscience; and the requiring of an implicit faith, and an absolute and blind obedience, is to destroy liberty of conscience and reason also.' The direct object of the Confession in this passage is no doubt to assert the right and extent of liberty of conscience; but along with that, it very distinctly enunciates the doctrine that neither in regard to faith nor in regard to worship has the Church any authority beside or beyond what is laid down in the Bible; and that it has no right to decree and enforce new observances or institutions in the department of scriptural worship, any more than to teach and inculcate new truths in the department of scriptural faith. In entire accordance with this statement of the Confession is the doctrine announced in the Larger and Shorter Catechisms. In the Larger Catechism, the answer to the question, 'What are the sins forbidden in the second commandment?' tells us that 'the sins forbidden in the second commandment are all devising, counselling, commanding, using, and in any wise approving, any religious worship not instituted by God himself;' . . . 'all superstitious devices, corrupting the worship of God, adding to it, or taking from it, whether invented and taken up of ourselves, or received by tradition from others, though under the title of antiquity, custom, devotion, good intent, or any other pretence whatsoever.' In answer to a similar question, the Shorter Catechism declares that 'the second commandment forbiddeth the worshipping of God by images, or any other way not appointed in his word.' The doctrine, then, in regard to the

exercise of Church power in the worship of God held by our standards is sufficiently distinct. The Church has no authority in regulating the manner, appointing the form, or dictating the observances of worship, beside or beyond what the Scripture declares on these points—the Bible containing the only directory for determining these matters, and the Church having no discretion to add to or alter what is there fixed.

“The Church of Rome holds a doctrine in regard to the extent and limits of Church power in connection with the worship of God the very opposite of this. It assigns to ecclesiastical authority a right to regulate and enjoins to an unlimited extent the manner and the ordinances of Church worship—making what additions it deems fit to the institutions, the observances, the rules enjoined upon the worshippers, without regard to the intimations of Scripture on the subject. * * *

“There is a third theory upon this point, intermediate between the doctrine laid down in the Westminster Confession and the doctrine embodied in the pretensions of the Church of Rome. This third theory is held by the Church of England. It differs from the views of the Westminster standards, inasmuch as it ascribes to the Church the power to enact rites and observances in the public worship of God. But it differs also from the practice of the Church of Rome, inasmuch as it professedly limits and restricts the power of ordaining ceremonies to those matters which are not forbidden in the word of God. * * *

“There is a marked and obvious difference between this statement and the declaration of our Church's standards on the same subject. The doctrine of the Church of England is, that whatsoever is not forbidden expressly by the word of God, it is lawful for the Church to enact by her own authority, the only restriction upon that authority being that what it declares or enjoins in the worship of God shall not be contradictory to Scripture. Within the limitation thus laid upon the exercise of Church power in matters of worship, there remains a very wide field indeed open to the Church, in which it is competent to add to the ordinances and institutions of religious service. The doctrine of the Westminster standards and of our Church is.

that whatsoever is not expressly appointed in the word, or appointed by necessary inference from the word, it is not lawful for the Church in the exercise of its own authority to enjoin; the restriction upon that authority being that it shall announce and enforce nothing in the public worship of God, except what God himself has, in explicit terms or by implication, instituted. Under the limitation thus laid upon the exercise of Church power in matters of worship, there is no discretion or latitude left to the Church, except to administer and carry into effect the appointments of Scripture. In the case of the Church of England, its doctrine in regard to Church power in the worship of God is, that it has a right to decree every thing except what is forbidden in the word of God. In the case of our own Church, its doctrine in reference to Church power in the worship of God is, that it has a right to decree nothing, except what expressly or by implication is enjoined by the word of God." Vol. I., pp. 336, 340.

"The second concession to be made to those who deny that there is any thing laid down in Scripture sufficient to be a rule to the Church, in its government and discipline and administration generally, is this: that although there is not any discretion allowed to the Church itself in regard to its laws or its institutions, yet there is a discretion permitted to the Church in regard to matters simply of 'decency and order.'

"There is a distinction, in short, which all must acknowledge at one point or other, wherever the line may be drawn, between principles essential to the existence and administration of the Church, and points accidental to the existence and administration of the Church. With regard to the former, or what is essential to the existence and use of Church power, the Scripture contains a rule complete and sufficient for all the purposes contemplated, and expressed either in direct precepts, or by particular examples, or through the announcement of general principles all bearing on the subject. With regard to the latter, or the points accidental and not essential to the existence and administration of the Church, there is nothing expressed in Scripture directly: and something is to be left to the discretion

of the Church and its office-bearers. Where and how the line is to be drawn between these two kinds of things, marking on the one side what is fundamental and distinctive in the laws and administration of the Church, and therefore revealed; and what, on the other side, is accidental and not peculiar, and therefore not revealed; it may be sometimes difficult to determine. But that after the laws and institutions of the Church had been directly or indirectly revealed and appointed by Christ, there was some power left to the Church itself to fill in the details of arrangement and order and propriety, not essential but expedient to the former, there can, I think, be no doubt, both from the statements and the silence, the utterances and the reserve of Scripture on the subject. As to such matters of order or expediency, as, for example, the hour of public worship on the Sabbath, the order of the service, the number of the diets each Lord's day, the length of time appropriated to each, and such like,—all conducive more or less to the proper discharge of the duty connected with them, and all requiring to be fixed and arranged in one way or other,—there can be no doubt that a discretionary power in determining them has been left open to the Church. To have fixed by positive law such details, would have been contrary to the whole analogy of Scripture, which deals far more largely in general principles than in special regulations or precepts." Vol. I., pp. 215–217.

“It is plain, then, both from the nature of the rule itself and from the circumstances in which it was given, that the general canon for Church worship, ‘Let all things be done decently and in order,’ while it gives no authority to the Church in the matter of the rites and ceremonies and institutions of divine service, except to administer them, does give authority to the Church in the matter of the circumstances of divine service common to it with civil solemnities, in so far as is necessary for decency and to avoid disorder. There is a broad line of demarcation between these two things. In what belongs strictly to the institutions and ceremonies of worship, the Church has no authority, except to dispense them as Christ has prescribed. In what belongs to the circumstances of worship necessary to its being dispensed

with propriety, and so as to avoid confusion, the Church has authority to regulate them as nature and reason prescribe. On the one side of the line that separates these two provinces are what belong to Church worship, properly so called—the positive rites and ceremonies and institutions that enter as essential elements into it; and here the Church is merely Christ's servant to administer and to carry them into effect. On the other side of that line are what belong to the circumstances of worship as necessary to its decent and orderly administration—circumstances not peculiar to the solemnities of the Church, nor laid down in detail by Christ, but common to them with other civil solemnities, and left to be regulated by the dictates of reason and nature; and here the Church is the minister of nature and reason, and her actions must be determined by their declarations. In regard to, not the circumstances of worship, but its ceremonies, the Church has no discretion, but must take the law from the positive directory of Scripture. In regard again to, not the ceremonies, but the circumstances of worship, the Church has the discretion which nature and reason allow, and must be guided by the principles which they furnish as applicable to the particular case." Vol. I., p. 352.

"In the very acute and masterly treatise of George Gillespie, entitled '*A Dispute against the English Popish Ceremonies*,' he lays down three marks by which to distinguish these matters of decency and order, which it is necessary and lawful for the Church at the dictate of reason and nature to regulate, from those parts or elements of public worship in regard to which she has no authority but to administer them.

"'Three conditions,' he says, 'I find necessarily requisite in such a thing as the Church hath power to prescribe by her laws: First, it must be only a circumstance of divine worship and no substantial part of it—no sacred, significant, and efficacious ceremony.' There is plainly a wide and real difference between those matters that may be necessary or proper *about* church worship and those other matters that may be necessary and proper *in* worship; or, to adopt the old distinction, between matters *circa sacra* and matters *in sacris*. Church worship is itself

an express and positive appointment of God; and the various parts or elements of worship, including the rites and ceremonies that enter into it, are no less positive divine appointments. But there are circumstances connected with a divine solemnity no less than with human solemnities, that do not belong to its essence, and form no necessary part of it. There are circumstances of time and place and form, necessary for the order and decency of the service of the Church, as much as for the service or actions of any civil or voluntary society; and these, though connected with, are no portion of divine worship. *When* worship is to be performed on the Sabbath, for example,—*where* it is to be dispensed,—*how long* the service is to continue,—are points necessary to be regulated in regard to the action of the Church as much as in regard to the action of a mere private and human society; and yet they constitute no part of the worship of God. And they are to be regulated by the Church in the same way and upon the same principles as any other society would regulate these matters, namely, by regard to the dictates of natural reason, which have not been superseded, but rather expressly called into exercise in the Christian society for such purposes.

“‘Second. The circumstances left to the Church to determine by the dictate of natural reason, and according to the rule of decency and order, ‘must be such as are not determinable by Scripture.’ Of course, whatever in the worship of God is either appointed expressly by Scripture, or may be justly inferred from Scripture, cannot be left open to the jurisdiction of the Church, or to the determination of men’s reason. It is only beyond the express and positive institutions or regulations of Scripture that there is any field for the exercise of the Church’s authority and judgment. Within the limits of what strictly and properly belongs to public worship, the directory of Scripture is both sufficient and of exclusive authority; and the service of the Church is a matter of positive enactment, suited for and binding upon all times and all nations. But beyond the limits of what strictly and properly belongs to divine worship, there are circumstances which must vary with times and nations; and for

that very reason, they are circumstances not regulated by Scripture, but left to be ordered by the dictates of natural reason, such as would be sufficient to determine them in the case of any other society than the Church. In addition to the test of their being merely circumstances and not substantial of worship, they are also to be distinguished by the mark that from their very nature they are 'not determinable from Scripture.'

“‘Third. The circumstances left open to the judgment of the Church to regulate according to the rule of decency and order, must be those for the appointment of which she is ‘able to give a sufficient reason and warrant.’ This third mark is necessary, in order that the canon of Church order under consideration may not be interpreted so widely as to admit of the indefinite multiplication of rules and rubrics, even in matters that stand the two other tests already mentioned—that is to say, in matters merely circumstantial, and not determinable from Scripture. Even in the instance of such, there must be a sufficient reason, either in the necessity of the act or in the manifest Christian expediency of it, to justify the Church in adding to her canons of order, and limiting by these the Christian liberty of her members. There must be a sufficient reason, in the way of securing decency or preventing disorder, to warrant the Church in enacting regulations even in the circumstances of worship as contradistinguished from its ceremonies. Without some necessity laid upon it, and a sufficient reason to state for its procedure, the Church has no warrant to encroach upon the liberty of its members. And without this, moreover, there could be no satisfaction to give to the consciences of those members who might scruple as to the lawfulness of complying with its regulations. Even in matters lawful and indifferent, not belonging to divine worship itself, but to the circumstances of it, the Church is bound to show a necessity or a sufficient reason for its enactments.’

“All these three tests of George Gillespie's are combined in the singularly judicious and well-balanced statement of the Confession of Faith on this point. After laying down the fundamental position that ‘the whole counsel of God concerning

all things necessary for his own glory, man's salvation, faith, and life, is either expressly set down in Scripture, or by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture, unto which nothing at any time is to be added, whether by new revelations of the Spirit or traditions of men,' the Confession proceeds: 'Nevertheless, we acknowledge the inward illumination of the Spirit of God to be necessary for the saving understanding of such things as are revealed in the word; and that *there are some circumstances concerning the worship of God and government of the Church, common to human actions and societies, which are to be ordered by the light of nature and Christian prudence, according to the general rules of the word, which are always to be observed.*' Every word in this brief but pregnant sentence has been well weighed by its authors, and deserves careful consideration from us. The things in connexion with public worship which it is lawful for the Church to regulate must be '*circumstances,*' not *parts* of divine service; they must be '*concerning* the worship of God,' not elements *in* it; they must be '*common to human actions and societies,*' not *peculiar* to a *divine* institution; they must be things with which reason or '*the light of nature*' is competent to deal; they are 'to be ordered by *Christian prudence,*' which will beware of laying needless restraints upon the liberty of brethren in the faith; and they are to be regulated in accordance with '*the general rules of the word,*' such as the apostolic canons referred to in the proofs of the Confession: 'Let all things be done unto edification,' and 'Let all things be done decently and in order.'

"By such tests or marks as these, it is not a matter of much difficulty practically to determine what matters connected with the worship of God are and what are not within the apostolic canon, 'Let all things be done decently and in order.' They are the very things which reason is competent to regulate; which cannot be determined for all times and places by Scripture; which belong not to Church worship itself, but to the circumstances or accompaniments common to it with civil solemnities; and which must be ordered in the Church, as in any other society, so as to secure decency and to prevent confusion. The

power which the apostle gives to regulate such matters is no power to enter within the proper field of divine worship, and to add to or alter or regulate its rites and ceremonies and institutions. It has often indeed been argued as if the apostolic canon gave such authority. It has been maintained that the authority ascribed to the Church to regulate all things according to the law of decency and order, is an authority to deal with matters *in sacris*, and not merely *circa sacra*. But it is clear, both from the nature of the apostolic rule and also from the application made of it in respect of the scandals in the Church at Corinth, that no such peculiar authority to intermeddle with the provisions of worship set up by Christ in his Church was ever intended." Vol. I., pp. 354, 358.

"Such plainly is the limitation set to the exercise of Church power in worship by the authority of Christ. In the department of the rites and institutions of divine service, his authority is supreme and exclusive; and if it is to be kept entire and untouched, there is no room for the entrance into the same province of the Church's power at all. This principle plainly excludes and condemns every ecclesiastical addition to the worship of God, and every human invention in its observances. It shuts up the Church to the simplicity of the Scripture model, and forbids every arrangement within the sanctuary, and every appointment in holy things, of whatever nature it be, which does not find its precedent and warrant there. It condemns the impious and superstitious observances which the Church of Rome has unlawfully introduced into the worship of God: its spurious sacraments; its worship of the Virgin and the saints and the host; its fasts and penances and pilgrimages; and all the rest of its unwarranted and unscriptural impositions upon its members unknown to the word of God and opposed to it.

"But the principle now laid down does more than condemn the ceremonies in worship which Popery has imposed and which are often as revolting to all right Christian taste and feeling as they are superstitious and unscriptural. It condemns no less those rites and ceremonies introduced into worship by the Church of England, and considered by her to be not only innocent, but

subservient to its spiritual effect. Whether such rites and ceremonies may or may not conduce to the spiritual edification of those who make use of them in worship, is not the question to be determined—although a right answer to this question would not be difficult to find, and it would militate strongly against the expediency of their introduction. But the only proper question is, Have these rites and ceremonies been appointed or not by the authority of Christ ruling alone and exclusively in his house? If not, then they are all unlawful encroachments upon that authority. It cannot be pretended that they are made no part of the ordinary worship of the Church, but rather belong to those outward circumstances of administration which fall under the apostolic canon, and are necessary to the order and decency of its celebration. It cannot be pretended that the sign of the cross is necessary to avoid indecency or prevent confusion in the administration of the sacrament of baptism. It cannot be pretended that turning of the face towards the east is essential to the orderly and decent performance of any part of public prayer. It cannot be pretended that the use of a white surplice in some parts of divine service, and not in others, is necessary to the right discharge of the one or the other. It cannot be pretended that the consecration of buildings in which public worship is conducted, or of ground in which the burial of the dead is to take place, is a ceremony dictated by natural reason, and absolutely necessary to give effect to the apostolic canon. It cannot be pretended that the bowing of the head at the repetition of the name of Jesus, and not at the repetition of the name of God, is decent and orderly in the one instance and not in the other. These ceremonies and rites cannot be, and are not alleged to form, any part of the circumstances of decency and order necessary to the due discharge of divine worship, as they would be necessary to the due discharge of any civil solemnity in like circumstances. And if not, if they are not introduced into Church worship as essential to preserve decency or prevent disorder, then they must be introduced into Church worship as parts of it, considered to be necessary, or at least conducive, to its full or better effect. Viewed in this light, we are warranted to say in

regard to them, without at all requiring to enter on the question of whether they contribute to the edification of the worshipper and the better effect of the worship or not, that they are unwarranted by the authority of Christ as revealed in his word, and are therefore unlawful interferences with his power and rights as the only head of ordinances in his Church." Vol. I., pp. 365-367.

"In the department of worship, as well as in the department of doctrine, the Church has no latitude beyond the express warrant of Scripture, and is forbidden as much to administer a worship not there revealed as to preach a gospel not there revealed. The single fact that the rule of Church power in the worship of God is the rule of Scripture, is decisive of the whole controversy in regard to rites and ceremonies, and ties up the Church to the ministerial office of administering a directory made for it, instead of presumptuously attempting to make a new directory for itself. The worship not enjoined in the word of God is "will-worship," (*ἰθελωθρησκεία*) and as such neither lawful nor blessed.

"There is no possibility of evading this argument, except by denying that the Scriptures are the only rule for worship, or by denying that they are a sufficient one. Neither of these denials can be reasonably made. The Scriptures are the only rule for worship as truly as they are the only rule for the Church in any other department of her duties. And the Scriptures are sufficient for that purpose, for they contain a directory for worship, either expressly inculcated or justly to be inferred from its statements, sufficient for the guidance of the Church in every necessary part of worship. There are, first, express precepts contained in Scripture, and designed to regulate the practice of divine worship in the Church as to ordinances and services; second, there are particular examples of worship in its various parts recorded in Scripture, and both fitted and intended to be binding and guiding models for subsequent ages; and third, when neither express precepts nor express examples are to be met with, there are general scripture principles applicable to public worship, enough to constitute a sufficient directory in the

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matter. Any thing beyond that directory in the celebration of worship is unwarranted and superstitious. And the danger of tampering with uncommanded rites and observances is not small. Let the evil of 'teaching for doctrines or duties the commandments and ordinances of men' be once introduced into the Church and a departure from the simplicity of Scripture worship once begun, and superstitions will strengthen and grow apace. In point of safety as well as in point of principle, it is the duty of the Church to adhere with undeviating strictness to the model of Scripture, and to shun the exercise of any power in Church worship beyond the limits of that directory expressly laid down in the word of God." Vol. I., pp. 365-367.

We apprehend that our readers will not fail to observe the complete identity of these principles with those enunciated in an article in our number for January of this year. The writer of that article we know had never seen this work, but both in ideas and in language there is a strong resemblance, greater even in some portions not quoted by us than in the extracts above given. It is but the one voice of truth speaking in two hemispheres.

We propose to let the reader now hear Dr. Bannerman on

THE DOCTRINE OF THE SACRAMENTS,

believing that there are some difficulties on the subject current amongst us, which he may be able, with the blessing from above, to remove. We shall offer no other remark here, except that Dr. Bannerman makes no qualification whatever in the praise he awards to Calvin as the one amongst Reformers who had most clearly and perfectly set forth the scripture doctrine on the subject of the sacraments. And yet, as one editor of Dr. Cunningham's works, he of course must have observed how that author discounts sensibly from Calvin's claim to put forth sound scriptural views upon this point. It is regarding the sacraments that Cunningham finds "the only blot on Calvin's fame as a public teacher" in his peculiar theory of the Lord's supper. It would seem that Dr. Bannerman must have differed from his friend and colleague.

“In exact accordance with the practice universal in one shape or other among men, and expressly sanctioned by the example of God himself in the Old Testament Church, we affirm that the sacraments of the New Testament are parts of a federal transaction between the believer and Christ; and visible and outward attestations or vouchers of the covenant entered into between them. In addition to being signs to represent the blessings of the covenant of grace, they are also seals to vouch and ratify and confirm its validity. * * * * *

“No doubt that [new] covenant in itself is sufficiently secure without any such confirmation, resting as it does on the word of God. That word alone, and without any further guarantee, is enough. But in condescension to the weakness of our faith, and adapting himself to the feelings and customs of men, God has done more than give a promise. He has also given a guarantee for the promise—has vouchsafed to bestow an outward confirmation of his word in the shape of a visible sign, appealing to our senses, and witnessing to the certainty and truth of the covenant. In the case of the sacraments, God has proceeded on the same principle as is announced by the Apostle Paul in reference to his oath: ‘God, willing more abundantly to show unto the heirs of promise the immutability of his counsel, confirmed it by an oath; that by two immutable things, in which it was impossible for God to lie, we might have a strong consolation, who have fled for refuge to lay hold upon the hope set before us.’ The word of promise was itself enough to warrant and demand the belief of God’s people. But more than enough was granted: he has not only said it, but also sworn it. By two immutable things—his word and his oath—is the faith of the believer confirmed. The oath is the guarantee for his word. And more than this still: in the visible seal of the sacraments, God would add another and a third witness—that at the mouth, not of two, but of three witnesses, his covenant may be established. He has not only given us the guarantee of his word, and confirmed that word by an oath, but also added to both the seal of visible ordinances. There is the word preached to declare the truth of the covenant to the unbelieving heart.

More than that—there is the oath sworn to guarantee it. More than that still—there is the sign administered in order to vouch for all. Christ in the word, unseen but heard, is ours, if we will receive that word with the hearing ear and the understanding heart. Over and above this, Christ, both seen and heard in the sacrament, is ours, if we will see with the eye or hear with the ear.* The sacraments are the outward and sensible testimony and seal of the covenant, added to the word that declares it. This is the grand peculiarity of sacramental ordinances, separating them by a very marked line from ordinances not sacramental. They are federal acts—scals and vouchers of the covenant between God and the believer. They presuppose and imply a covenant transaction between the man who partakes of them and God; and they are the attestations to and confirmations of that transaction, pledging God by a visible act to fulfil his share of the covenant, and engaging the individual by the same visible act to perform his part of it. Other ordinances, such as the preaching of the word, presuppose and attest no such personal engagement or federal transaction between the indi-

* ["What mister (need) is there that thir sacraiments and seals suld be annexed to the word? Seeing we get na new thing in the sacrament, but the same thing quhilk we gat in the simple word, quherefore is the sacrament appointed to be hung to the word? It is true certainly, we get na new thing in the sacrament, nor we get na other thing in the sacrament nor we gat in the word; for quhat mair walde thou crave nor to get the Son of God, gif thou get him weil? Thy heart cannot wish nor imagine a greater gift nor to have the Son of God, quha is King of heaven and earth. And therefore I say, quhat new thing walde thou have? For gif thou get him, thou gettest all things with him. Quherefore, then, is the sacrament appointed? Not to get thee a new thing. I say it is appointed to get thee that same thing *better* nor thou gat it in the word. The sacrament is appointed that we may get a better grip of Christ nor we gat in the simple word; that we may possess Christ in our hearts and minds mair fully and largely nor we did of before in the simple word; that Christ might have a larger space to make residence in our narrow hearts nor we could have by the hearing of the simple word. And to possess Christ mair fully it is a better thing; for suppose Christ be ae thing in himself, yet the better grip thou have of him thou art the surer of his promise." BRUCE, *Sermons on the Sacraments*, Wodrow Soc. Ed., Edin., 1843, p. 22.]

vidual and God. Christ in the word is preached to all, and all are called upon to receive him; but there is no personal act on the part of the hearer that singles him out as giving or receiving a voucher of his covenant with his Saviour. * * *

“It is carefully to be noted that they presuppose or imply the possession of grace in the case of those who partake of them; but they are also made the means of adding to that grace. They are seals of a covenant already made between the soul and Christ—attestations of a federal transaction before completed—confirmations, visible and outward, of engagement between the sinner and his Saviour previously entered into on both sides. They presuppose the existence of grace, else they could not be called seals to it. * * * But from the very peculiarity that attaches to their distinctive character as seals of a personal covenant between God and the believer, sacraments may reasonably be supposed to be more effectual than non-sacramental ordinances in imparting spiritual blessings. The spiritual virtue of sacraments is more and greater than other ordinances, just because, from their very nature, they imply more of a personal dealing between the sinner and his Saviour than non-sacramental ordinances necessarily involve. * * *

“What is the nature and extent of the supernatural grace imparted in the sacraments, in what manner they work so as to impart spiritual benefit to the soul, it is not possible for us to define. As visible seals of God's promises and covenant, we can understand how they are naturally fitted, in the same way as the vouchers of any human engagement or covenant are naturally fitted, to attest and confirm them. But beyond this, all is unknown. The blessing of Christ and the working of his Spirit in sacraments we cannot understand, any more than we can understand the operation of the same supernatural causes in respect of other ordinances. They have a virtue in them beyond what reason can discover in them, as naturally fitted to serve the purposes both of signs and seals of spiritual things.” Vol. II., pp. 10–14.

“1. The sacraments of the New Testament are regarded by one party as signs, and no more than signs, of spiritual things—

symbolical actions fitted to represent and impress upon the minds of men gospel truths. The Socinian party have made this doctrine peculiarly their own. According to their views, a federal transaction between the believer and Christ, founded on his atonement, is no part of the gospel system at all; and hence the sacraments of the New Testament can be no seals appointed and designed to ratify such a covenant. The Socinian doctrine concerning the nature of the sacraments allows to them no more than a twofold object and design. They are not essentially distinct from other ordinances, as set apart by themselves to be the seals of the one great covenant between the believer and Christ, at his entrance into the Church at first, and from time to time afterwards, as occasion justifies or demands. But, in the first place, they are signs in which something external and material is used to express what is spiritual and invisible—the only virtue belonging to them being what they are naturally calculated to effect, as memorials, or illustrations, or exhibitions of the important facts and truths of the gospel; and in the second place, the sacraments are solemn pledges of discipleship on the part of those who receive them, discriminating them from other men, and forming a public profession of or testimony to their faith as Christians. These are the two grand objects, which, according to the Socinian view, the sacraments were intended to serve: and such, according to their theory, is the nature of the ordinance. * * * *

“The same system in the substance, making, as it does, sacraments entirely or essentially teaching and symbolical signs, has been adopted by many who disown the tenets of Socinianism in regard to the gospel system generally. The theory of the sacraments now described has been and is held by not a few in the Church of England of somewhat latitudinarian views—the representative of such, as a class, being Bishop Hoadly. It is avowed and advocated in the present day by a very large proportion of the Independent body, who count the sacraments to be no more than symbolical institutions, and who are ably represented by Dr. Halley in his work entitled *An Inquiry into the Nature of the Symbolic Institutions of the Christian Religion, usually called the Sacraments.* * * *

“Dr. Halley alleges that the sacraments, if they are considered as the cause or the means, or even the seals, of spiritual and saving grace, would be opposed to the great Protestant doctrine of justification by faith without works. Now, it is readily admitted that if sacraments are regarded as the causes or means of justification, they are utterly inconsistent with the Protestant doctrine of justification by faith alone; and in this point of view, the objection is true and unanswerable, when directed against some of those theories of the sacraments which we may be called upon to consider by and by. But it is denied that the objection is true when directed against the theory of the sacraments which maintains that they are not causes and not means of justification, but seals of it and of other blessings of the new covenant. The sacraments as seals, not causes of justification, cannot interfere with the doctrine of justification by faith, for this plain reason, that before the seal is added, the justification is completed. * * * * *

“II. The sacraments of the New Testament are regarded by another party as in themselves, and by reason of the virtue that belongs to them, and not through the instrumentality of the faith or the Spirit in the heart of the recipient, effectual to impart justifying and saving grace directly, in all cases where it is not resisted by an unworthy reception of the ordinance. This general opinion may be held under various modifications; but all of them are opposed to the doctrine I have already laid down, that the sacraments are seals of a justifying and saving grace already enjoyed by the recipient, and not intended for the conversion of sinners; and that they become means of grace only in so far as the Spirit of God, by the aid of the ordinance, calls forth the faith of the recipient, and no further.

“The doctrine of the efficacy of sacraments directly and immediately of themselves, and not indirectly and mediately through the faith of the receiver, and through the Spirit in the receiver, is advocated in its extreme and unmodified form by the Church of Rome. * * *

“This doctrine of the inherent power of sacraments in themselves to impart grace, held by the Church of Rome, is also the

system maintained, although with some important modifications, by another party beyond the pale of that Church, the representatives of which, at the present day, are to be found in the High Churchmen of the English Establishment. * *

“But they agree with the Romish Church in the grand and fundamental principle which belongs to its doctrine of the sacraments, namely, that they communicate grace from the sacramental virtue that resides in themselves,—or, as some prefer to put it, that invariably accompanies them by Christ’s appointment,—and by their own immediate influence on the soul, and not instrumentally by the operation of the Spirit of God on the worthy recipient and through the medium of his faith. This is the characteristic principle that is common both to the Popish and the High Church theories of sacraments. * *

“There are four different tests by which we may try the merits of this sacramental theory, whether held in its extreme form by Papists, or in its more modified form by High Churchmen of other communions.

“First. Tested by Scripture, which constitutes the rule for the exercise of Church power, there is no warrant for asserting that there is an inherent and independent virtue in sacraments to impart justifying or saving grace. * * *

“Second. The theory of an inherent power, physical or spiritual, in the sacraments, is inconsistent with the supreme authority of Christ, from whom all Church power is derived. * * *

“Third. The theory of the sacraments which ascribes to them an independent virtue or power, is inconsistent with the spiritual liberties of Christ’s people. * * *

“Fourth. The sacramental theory we have been considering is inconsistent with the spirituality of the Church, and of the power exercised by the Church for the spiritual good of men.” Vol. II., pp. 20–41.

There remains only to be considered what certainly is one of the most interesting, able, and important discussions of this whole treatise, viz., the Church in its relations to the State and the duty of the State towards religion. This is unquestionably

a very nice and difficult question, although by many who stand at both extremes of some of the issues involved, it seems to be supposed that there is no difficulty at all in the subject. Whatever faults any of our readers may have to find with Dr. Bannerman's opinions on these points, they may as well be reminded, just here, that there is a certain value and importance due to them, if on no other ground, because they are the opinions of the Free Church generally. In the negotiations for union now going on between that Church and the United Presbyterian Church, these very opinions form one of the main obstructions. They are maintained with zeal and with ability by many living ministers of the highest character in that Church, and they were earnestly contended for by both Chalmers and Cunningham during their life-time.

We begin by stating the opinions of our author relative to

THE ESSENTIAL DISTINCTION AND MUTUAL INDEPENDENCE OF
CHURCH AND STATE.

“First, the State and the Church are essentially different in regard to their origin.” Vol. I., p. 97.

Upon this point, our author explains that civil government originates with God as universal Sovereign and Ruler, but the Church with Christ as Mediator. Nor does he admit that this fundamental difference is cancelled by the fact of the civil governments of the earth being all subordinated to Christ as Redeemer for his own ends as such. This is a new character superinduced upon the original character, which does not at all affect or supersede it. The State now delegated to Christ is still as much the appointment of God, the God of nature, as the creation of God is still such, though it also is subordinated to Christ for the interests of his people.

“In the second place, the State and the Church are essentially distinct in regard to the primary objects for which they were instituted.” Vol. I., p. 98.

Here Dr. Bannerman explains that the one is ordained to promote, as its primary object, the outward order and good of society, whether in Christian or heathen lands; and without

civil government, human society could not exist at all; but the other was instituted to promote the work of grace upon the earth, and is limited to this as its primary object. Still he says both have secondary objects, which both are bound to subserve. "The State as the ordinance of God can never be absolved from its allegiance to him, and can never be exempted from the duty of seeking to advance his glory and to promote his purposes of grace on the earth." On the other hand, the Church is adapted to promote the mere temporal and social well-being of society. But still the grand distinction cannot be overlooked, that the two were instituted for widely different ends and must not be confounded.

"Thirdly, the State and the Church are essentially distinct and independent in regard to the power which is committed to them respectively by God." Vol. I., p. 99.

Here Dr. B. explains that the State has the power of the sword, while the Church has only spiritual weapons.

"Fourthly, the State and the Church are essentially distinct and independent in regard to the administration of their respective authorities." Vol. I., p. 100.

Here the author explains that God's word enjoins no particular form of government, and sanctions neither despotism nor democracy as such. But, on the contrary, the Church has a form of government laid down in the New Testament, and office-bearers with a divine sanction in the rightful discharge of the duties of their office. And his conclusion is that these two institutes of divine appointment have a separate existence, a distinct character, and an independent authority; and that it is impossible to identify them or make one dependent on the other. And these principles he applies, first, to expose the fallacy of Erastianism; and secondly, to expose the fallacy of Popery, which subordinates the civil power to the spiritual. (Vol. I., pp. 97-106.)

But our author, while insisting upon the essential distinctiveness and mutual independence of the two institutes, has no objection whatever to the idea of

A CONNECTION AND A FRIENDLY CO-OPERATION BETWIXT CHURCH
AND STATE ;

and he argues that there is a foundation for such alliance—

First, in the fact of the twofold character which Christ sustains of "Head of the Church," and also of "Head over all things to the Church." Originally separate and still essentially distinct, being jointly under Christ's dominion as Head over both, he considers that each may be made serviceable and advantageous to the other. Even if the State were to be identified with the world as ungodly, still Christ can use it as an instrument to benefit his Church. But the State is not to be identified with the world, which lieth in wickedness. It is an ordinance of God, good in itself and appointed for good. The very end for which it has been placed under Messiah is that it may be made instrumental to promote his kingdom of grace. "Church and State, because equally the servants of Christ, are helps made and meet for each other."

In the second place, he finds the same foundation in the fact of important ends in common. Besides the primary end of each, each has secondary ends, and these often meet and unite the two in one. None can deny that the duties of the second table of the law are the concern of the State as well as of the Church. The life of man, the ordinance of marriage, rights of property, the oath which is the cement of society, the obligations of honesty and justice between man and man,—all these are common concerns of State and Church. Here is common ground where they may—nay, *must*—meet.

In the third place, Dr. Bannerman argues that there is a foundation for friendly coöperation between the State and the Church, in that they may and do consist of the same individual persons.

In the fourth place, he urges the fact that the friendly alliance under consideration is actually exemplified in Scripture with the direct sanction and approbation of God himself. Under the Jewish dispensation, Church and State were not merged in one, but remained separate and independent, and yet there was a close and intimate union betwixt them. And here he insists that

we find warrant by God himself for "the alliance of things civil and sacred, for the connection and coöperation of the king and the priest, of the throne and the altar." There were peculiarities, he admits, in the case both of the Church and of the State among the Jews; but there was no peculiarity about the Jewish Church, such as to render it no Church at all; and there was no peculiarity about the Jewish State, such as to render it no State at all; and so the fact of the union of Church and State amongst them, with the divine approbation, can not be gotten rid of. (Vol. I., pp. 112-119.)

And here Dr. Bannerman encounters a theory maintained by Erastus, but denied by Beza; debated earnestly and long in the Westminster Assembly; Selden, Lightfoot, and others, maintaining the position of Erastus, but Gillespie and Rutherford conclusively answering them;—the theory that the distinction of Church and State was unknown before Christ, and that amongst the Jews the two were one and the same. Our author urges here five arguments: I. The Church and the State amongst the Jews were distinct in respect of their origin: for the State was a theocracy, and God, the ruler of all the nations, was in a special sense Ruler of the Jewish nation; but the Jewish Church, which is the same as the Christian Church, had the second Person of the Trinity for its founder and Head. II. The Church and the State among the Jews were distinct in respect of their objects and ends. This same distinction separates the two institutes now—the one had spiritual, the other temporal ends. III. The two were separated amongst the Jews, as they are now amongst us, by the nature of the power which they respectively exercised. True, a few individuals, as Moses, were commissioned to unite in their own persons civil and ecclesiastical functions. But these were wholly exceptional cases. The Jewish State wielded purely civil, and the Jewish Church purely ecclesiastical and spiritual powers. IV. The two were distinct in respect of the administration of the power. Rulers and judges were distinct altogether from priests and Levites. The elders of the city were not the elders of the synagogue. "The matters of the Lord" over which "Amariah the chief priest" was to

preside, were most undeniably separated from "the king's matters," over which, in the civil Sanhedrim, "Zebadiah, the son of Ishmael, the ruler of the house of Judah," was appointed. V. The two were distinct in respect of members. Then, as now, the nominal membership of the Church and State may at some periods have nearly coincided, but the conditions of membership of the two bodies were by no means identical. The uncircumcised, the temporarily unclean, the persons under synagogue censure, were excluded from membership of the Church while yet members of the State. On the other hand, "proselytes of righteousness" were members of the Jewish Church, but not of the State. (Vol. II., pp. 119-124.)

Let us pause here to remark that our author appears to us to trip in arguing that the temporarily unclean and the censured man were excluded from *membership* of the Church; but we shall not enlarge on this point.

Proceeding now to insist that it is not only lawful for Church and State to coöperate in the service of God, but endeavoring also to evince

THE DUTY OF THEIR CONNECTION,

our author finds it necessary to draw a most important distinction: "There is an important difference between the recognition of the Church by the State and the maintenance of the Church by the State. For the State to recognise the Church as a divine institution, to acknowledge its origin and claims to be from God, to confess that the doctrine which it teaches is the truth of God, and that the outward order and government of the Christian society are his appointment,—this is one thing; and it is, we believe, an incumbent duty on the part of a Christian State at all times. For the State to go beyond a public recognition and acknowledgment of the Church, and to lend its aid in the way of pecuniary support. * * * this is another thing, and a duty that may be incumbent on a Christian State or not, according to circumstances."

Carrying this important distinction along with him, our author urges the duty of friendly coöperation in the service of God betwixt the Church and the State, on the ground—

VOL. XX., NO. 4—7.

1. That both these are to be accounted moral parties, responsible to God. They both have a distinct moral personality. Duty can be predicated of them both. They are both directly accountable to God. There is a subtle misapprehension current on this subject. Whatever moral responsibility belongs to a man, considered as an individual merely, is added to, not diminished, when he becomes a citizen or church member. This character of citizen or church member augments his personal responsibility, and the body which he joins derives from its members a moral character in its corporate and collective capacity, and becomes itself responsible for all its actions. The members of such a society do not sink their individual responsibility in their membership; but, on the contrary, they impart that responsibility also to the society itself. There is an individual responsibility attaching to every man; there is a collective responsibility attaching to every society, as a society.

2. That, in consequence of this responsibility to God, both Church and State are bound to own and recognise his revealed word.

It is admitted that there is a material difference between the Church and the State in that the former was founded for the express purpose of being a witness for the truth of God, whereas the State was founded for other immediate objects. But the duty of the Church to profess the true religion, although more immediate and direct, rests ultimately on the same footing as the duty of the State in this regard. They are both moral and responsible creatures of God, and so bound to own his name and acknowledge his truth.

But it is affirmed that the State has nothing to do with religion, and must be neutral between the profession and the denial of Christianity. If this doctrine means any thing, it signifies that the State, as a corporate body, is not responsible to God at all. To say that the civil magistrate, as such, is not bound to receive and submit to God's will, is to say that he, alone of all moral creatures, is free from the law which binds all moral creatures to own and honor God in all they do. Admit the civil magistrate to be, in his official character, a moral and responsi-

ble agent, and he necessarily incurs obligations in reference to that official character, the same as belong to every other moral and responsible person and position. It cannot be alleged that the State or the magistrate, officially as such, is incompetent to own and recognise the revelation of God in the same sense that the irrational and irresponsible creatures are incompetent. On the contrary, there is involved, in the very idea of the moral responsibility which belongs to them, both understanding and will and conscience; and unless you deny altogether the responsibility of States to God, you must admit that the very first and chiefest act for which a State is responsible is the act of owning or rejecting the revelation God has given of his will. It is freely admitted by all that the State has a moral responsibility in reference to other States, in its tactics of war and peace; in its covenants fiscal and commercial; that it is capable of right and wrong-doing in its dealings with its own subjects or citizens, in its internal laws and regulations. Is it then only in relation to God and his revelation that the State is divested of its moral character and responsibility, having no duty and no accountability? Is the State, alone of all God's moral creatures, under no law to God and free to disown him?

3. That a proper regard to itself and to the other objects for which it exists, binds the State to recognise the true religion.

Religion forms the main and only foundation on which the authority of States can rest; the only sanction sufficient to enforce right and deter from wrong; the only force able to insure obedience and respect for law; the only bond that can unite the discordant elements of society. To assert, then, that the magistrate, as such, must have no care for religion, is to say that he must forego the chief stay of his own authority.

4. That a proper regard for the Church, as God's ordinance, binds the State to countenance it and advance its interests.

The magistrate finds from the revealed will of God that there is another society of divine appointment coördinate with the State, but different from it in its nature and its powers. And what remains but for him to ask how the State can properly assist this other society, its own co-servant of God? That there

are ways of aid proper to both, cannot be doubted. The State may give the Church the protection of law, and may embody its confession in the national statute book. It may recognise the Sabbath as a day sacred to worship, and throw round it the fence of law. It may endow the gospel ministry so far as the nation's resources and the true interests of the Church will allow.

5. That this duty of the State to recognise and it may be endow the Church, is undeniably countenanced by the whole tenor of Scripture.

It is a striking fact that the only form of civil polity ever framed by God himself was in close connection with his Church, which surely proves the lawfulness of such a connection. Nor does the New Testament repeal the Old Testament law on this subject; but contrariwise, when heathen magistrates in sundry cases gave countenance to the Church of God by pecuniary aid and otherwise, the deed was sanctioned by the approbation of God. And, moreover, the future millennial state of the Church is described as one in which the kings of the earth shall all bring their gold and other honors unto it, and become the great instruments of promoting its spiritual interests. (Vol. I., pp. 124—135.)

But our author proceeds a step further, and argues not only that coöperation, as the servants of one common Lord, is the DUTY of Church and State, but that there is absolutely

A NECESSITY FOR THIS CONNECTION.

His argument here is that the civil and the religious elements in society are so interwoven that they must necessarily tend either to establish or to destroy each other. There can be no such thing as neutrality betwixt them. The Church will be either the ally of the State for its good, or an aggressor encroaching on its rights and dangerous to its supreme authority. The State will be either the Church's friend and protector, or else its secret or avowed enemy. The fundamental maxim of the Voluntaries is: "The State, as the State, has nothing to do with religion." But the State, as the State, *must* have to do with religion—if not in the way of friendly coöperation, then in the way of hostility and opposition. Here Dr. Bannerman quotes

Dr. Wardlaw's celebrated saying relative to the province of the magistrate in regard to religion, that "*his true and legitimate province is to have no province at all.*" But he proceeds to point to several matters with which both the civil and the spiritual powers are so concerned as to demonstrate the error of Dr. Wardlaw.

The first of these is the oath, which is the bond and seal of human society. This is more than a civil engagement—it is a religious one superinduced upon the civil. It appeals to the central truth of religion—the existence of God to aid man in binding his fellow-man. Now, deny or disown the religious obligation of the oath, and you unloose the whole bonds of civilised society. And now, shall we say "the State has nothing to do with religion," or shall we not rather say she cannot disown religion without returning to the state of savage nature?

It will not do to say the oath is a matter not of revealed but natural religion—common to nature and not peculiar to Christianity. This is true. But the doctrines of natural religion, as much as of revealed, are upon the voluntary theory excluded from the office of the magistrate; and there are atheists in the world, as well as deists, who upon that theory are as much entitled to object against the recognition by the magistrate of the truths of natural religion as of the doctrines of revealed religion.

Nor will it do to allege that the oath is a mere civil transaction; for over and above the civil engagement, there is in it the solemn appeal to God, as present witness of the truth and as future avenger of the falsehood.

In the next place, Dr. B. refers to the right inherent in the Church of Christ to propagate the gospel in every nation under heaven. This is a right which cannot be recognised by any State constituted on the principle that it has nothing to do with religion. The right to take possession of this world in the name of Christ, to the exclusion of every other form of faith and worship, is what Christianity demands. How can any State concede this demand, so long as it maintains absolute neutrality; or how protect the Church in its exclusive claims, while strictly impartial and indifferent both to truth and falsehood? The truth is

not only exclusive, but aggressive. For three hundred years, Christianity was in perpetual collision with the State, because it was an exclusive and aggressive system. And history teaches that no State not Christian can grant the exclusive claims which Christianity sets up. So that, if the State be not a friend, it must be a foe—if not a protector, it must be an enemy and a persecutor. It cannot be neutral.

In the third place, the law of marriage illustrates the position that civil and religious elements are so bound up together in society that where they do not coöperate, they must injure one another. Marriage has its origin in nature, yet revelation deals with its rights and duties. The State cannot avoid legislating about it, and so does Christianity. Now, how is collision between them to be avoided—collision fraught with evil to the peace, if not the existence, of society? The family is the root of the State. It is the unit of combination for the whole body politic. But unless there be, on the part of the State, a distinct acknowledgment of the word of God as the law to which its marriage laws must conform,—unless the State be here at one with religion,—the difference must deeply injure, if not fundamentally damage, the one or the other.

A fourth illustration is the case of the Sabbath. By this law, God confers on every man the right to demand, at the hands of his fellow-man, the free and undisturbed use and enjoyment of the day. But it is well-nigh impossible for an individual to keep the Sabbath as it ought to be kept, without the aid and advantage of the State making the outward observance of the Sabbath a national thing. But a State acting on the principle of indifference alike to truth and error, to the religion of God and the falsehoods of men, must needs disown any such appointment as the Sabbath; and disowning it, illustrate the general position that when religion and civil government do not unite and coöperate, the separation must be fatal to the highest interests of the one or the other. (Vol. I., pp. 135–148.)

These extracts will suffice to acquaint our readers with this work. Dr. B.'s opinions, we must again be allowed to remark, are not those of an isolated or an unimportant individual, but of

a representative man—and a representative man in the Free Church of Scotland. And let not the reader forget, while he peruses the observations of the author upon the last topic especially, that the Free Church therein represented is not to be regarded as tinctured in the slightest degree with an Erastian spirit. Her noble exodus from all connexion with the State, rather than submit to its interference with her rightful powers as an independent spiritual commonwealth, must forever entitle her and her representative men to speak their views respecting all the relations of Church and State, without being liable to any suspicion of such tendencies. We may or we may not be able to accept her teachings on this difficult subject; but she has proved herself too honest and conscientious not to be heard patiently and respectfully by all who desire more light upon intricate questions.

ARTICLE VI.

FOREIGN MISSIONS.

Foreign Missions—Their Relations and Claims. By RUFUS ANDERSON, D. D., LL.D., late Foreign Secretary of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. Charles Scribner, New York.

We know of no volume that comprises in so short a compass as much solid and valuable information in relation to the great work of foreign missions as the one before us. It is the substance of a series of lectures delivered by the author to the students of a number of the Northern theological seminaries during the last winter, and is now published for more extended circulation. We give it a hearty welcome, and have no doubt that it will do a great deal to promote the cause of missions. We have long regarded Dr. Anderson as one of the greatest men of the age. Certainly no man living, either in this country or