

CHRISTIAN ETHICS.

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CHRISTIAN ETHICS.

Apologetics proves that Christianity is the divinely originated religion. It is also ethical. Apologetics is (1) Historical and (2) Philosophical. (1.) Christianity is partly a system of religious truths, institutions &c., i. e. historical, and (2) partly philosophical, since the questions that arise stand related mainly to ethical, metaphysical, and natural science.

Christianity as an Ethical Religion.

Christian Ethics we take up as a Biblical study, obtaining facts from the moral character of Christianity partly in the Scriptures and partly in the results of the Christian religion. Christianity is not a philosophy but a religion. What do its moral results show it to be as a religion? What is Christian society? How does religion propose to deal with human society to make it Christian? Some reduce Christianity to mere morality, some to a system of truth or doctrine; it is more: we are to look at Christianity as an ethical *religion*, not as a system of morals.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES.

First: Morality is inseparably connected with religion.

Second: Christian morality is inseparably connected with the Christian religion.

Third: The only true, complete morality is the Christian morality.

Three Preliminary questions.

1. What is the place of Ethics in Philosophy?

2. What is the place of Christian Ethics in relation to theology?

3. What is the place of Christian Ethics in Philosophical Ethics?

I. WHAT IS THE PLACE OF ETHICS IN PHILOSOPHY?

By a merely nominal definition, Ethics is the science of the moral.

McCosh "The science of the laws of man's moral constitution."

It is also called the science of human conduct.

Porter: "Science of human duty."

Wayland: "Science of moral law."

These differences arise from different approaches to the subject.

The Subject of Ethics.—By common consent it is man in his moral nature and relations. Notice such terms as merit, demerit, ought, obligation, duty, right, wrong. Ethics is the department in which these are the ruling ideas.

Ought. The word *ought* introduces the mind into new regions where the material is not found. All materialistic philosophers are confronted with "ought," "right," &c. These words will not down at the bidding of evolutionists. We use Ethics in preference to moral philosophy because the latter word is ambiguous.

Sidney Smith: By the term "moral philosophy" is popularly understood, Ethics. But the term moral philosophy is misleading and is too inclusive. Moral philosophy is used in a popular sense including metaphysics, æsthetics &c., and second in a proper sense as opposed to natural philosophy.

Ethics is a more felicitous and accurate term. From the Greek, *ἠθικός* (moral from *ἠθός*.) "Morals" relates to the external. Ethics is internal. This term originated with the Greeks. While Ethics has a wide sphere and scope of its own, it does not stand alone. It is related—(1) to psychology because there are faculties to be considered, (2) to metaphysics as cause and effect, (3) to political and social science, jurisprudence and political economy.

Some of the topics that come up in these relations must be discussed.

1. The nature and origin of moral ideas.
2. Faculties by which man is made capable of moral action.
3. Relations in which he puts forth moral action.

4. Impulses by which he is urged, and obligations impelling or holding him to right action.

5. Functions of conscience in reference to moral actions.

6. Nature and bounds of duty.

7. Results to character.

8. Nature of virtue.

9. Nature of the supreme and secondary good.

The treatment of these themes will be modified according to the view we take of man as he *should* be and as he *is*.

Some of the topics relate to man as one moral being alone. Others in his relations to superiors, inferiors, equals, &c.

Philosophical Ethics discusses man's natural character, relations, obligations, &c., as reason construes them.

Theological Ethics is not confined to this. These are only elementary.

II. THE PLACE OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS IN RELATION TO CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.

One would make it a part of Historical Theology, another, of Practical Theology.

Rothe separates Ethics from dogmatics; makes dogmatics a branch of historical Ethics and puts Ethics in speculative theology. As to the assignment of Ethics to practical theology we cannot regard it a complete or correct view which treats of Ethics as something to be done in distinction from something to be believed.

In the moral life the *why* and *how* determine the *what*. In dealing with the *why* and *how* there is quite as much of the dogmatic as of the practical.

Theological science is divided thus: Exegetical, Historical, Systematic and Practical. If this be a correct division Ethics belongs to the third, which includes dogmatic and ethical theology. For two hundred years didactic and ethical theology have been treated separately for the most part.

Redemption is fully realized when we do what it is designed that we should. Therefore there should be no separation of the didactic and the ethical. On the other hand it is claimed, and rightly, that there should be a sepa-

ETHICS OF OLD TESTAMENT.

No long inspection of O. T. is necessary to show that its system is not cast in scientific form. Moreover, the O. T. mode of presenting things is different from the N. T. The former bears resemblance to Semitic and Jewish types. The religious system of the O. T. is evidently provisional, prophetic, and preparatory, not permanent and final; so the mode of presenting its Ethics is different. That may be tolerated in one condition of things which might not be in another. Judaism shows itself inferior to Christianity both in the extent and perfection of the results wrought out.

Some general characteristics of the ethical systems of O. T.

a. The ethical system of the O. T. like that of N. T., is presented to us in, with, through, by, concerning, the religion with which it is connected. O. T. knows nothing of a religion without a morality. Hence the irreligious men are the immoral men and *vice versa*. Ps. 14: 1; 10: 4-11; 94: 6, 7; Gen. 18: 19; 1 Sam. 15: 22; Is. 1: 11-17; Hos. 6: 7; Jer. 7: 9, 10; Ps. 50: 8; Prov. 15: 8.

Through the union of morality and religion, the predominant notions of religion are brought to bear on the moral.

b. It is consistent with this mode of presenting the subject that we note the entire absence from O. T. of the specific, abstract terms used in Philosophical Ethics as duty, ought, etc. These are part of the *religion* of O. T.

c. It is nowhere found, but always assumed, in O. T. that man has a moral nature, is under moral obligation, and that he knows it, and should live to secure the highest good.

General truths fundamental in O. T. as a religious and moral system.

a. The life and power of O. T. are found in its conception of God. What we are to be, is shown to us in God. The motives are drawn from him; God's unity

in opposition to polytheism, his spirituality in opposition to materialism, his personality in opposition to pantheism; these had no little power in making O. T. morality.

Neander: "The apprehension of God came out in Judaism as it could not in surrounding religions." Its *realization* of God's holiness is a more important point. When we combine with these his omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, we have a faith which will be morally effective as none other could be.

b. Its teaching of the dignity of individual human nature. Man was made in the image of God. This fact gives solemnity to his actions. It is not necessary that his likeness be sharply defined.

The dignity of man is shown, by the place assigned to him in the order of creation, and by the sharp distinction between him and the other animals. Man has dominion given him over other creatures. After the deluge man's relations are defined and ratified again. There is a repeated prohibition of man's forgetting his superiority to other animals. On the other hand he is taught to separate himself more and more from the brutes, and perfect his fellowship with God.

c. The brotherhood of man less perfectly seen in O. T. than in N. T., and yet more prominent there than in any other system. The Bible represents us as brethren in one race; not in many. 1. The O. T. ascribes the origin of the whole race to one pair, and connects propagation after the deluge with a single family. 2. The duty of sympathy and charity is based not only on the Fatherhood of God but also on the brotherhood of man both in the Law and the Prophets. Gen. 9: 4-8; Is. 58: 7. 3. The reach of God's redeeming purpose embraces all families, as seen in the promise to Abraham, prophecies concerning Gentiles, Is. 56: 6.

d. The organization of humanity is of God in all its essential relations and institutions, and the maintenance of this organization is God's deep concern, that it may accomplish his purpose. And God is concerned in the enjoyment by each individual of the advantage for which the organization is instituted. The family is the unit of this organization and must be kept pure.

e. Moral responsibility extends also to man's relations to the inferior creation. God gave man dominion over the creatures but not to use it unlawfully. It is not insured to him permanently. Man's dominion is bounded by the rights of God and of nature.

f. Man's treatment and use of himself, whether physical or spiritual, comes within the sphere of morals. The O. T. protects man from his evil self, and demands the best care and culture of himself. Sins against the body are denounced, as also spiritual sins, such as indolence, pride, etc.

g. God's concern for man's *moral* life is shown under the O. T. economy, by provision for man's culture and education. Morality is not left without culture. Left to himself man mistakes natural impulse for natural law, the agreeable for the obligatory, present excitement for permanent good.

Our nature receives no new elements. God helps us by instruction as to what man's relations are, and by what the O. T. does for refining and elevating man. He helps to regain lost purity, quickens moral sensibilities. A personal ruler is put in place of impersonal law. Man's conscience is a monitor for good and evil, to reward and punish.

h. Motives to the performance of duty are made effective by new and peculiar sanctions in the O. T. Man is not attracted to right or deterred from wrong simply by conscience. Right action secures God's approbation as well as the approbation of conscience. Man is taught that the memory of God is ever enduring.

The brotherhood of man is well brought out in the O. T., but immortality of the soul is more vague than in the N. T. By the O. T. men are taught to expect retribution and rewards *here*, hence it has been called a mercenary system. The O. T. makes more than the New, of present exhibitions of divine approval and condemnation, e. g., Job, Eccl. Men who are conscious of God's presence feel the truth, so that the perplexities of Job and Eccl. are removed by implicit confidence in God, going beyond the present to the future, appreciating God's spiritual training beyond the temporal gifts. While the O. T. encourages expectation, the sign is al-

ways less than the thing signified. *Thy favor is life.* Even in the N. T. there is promise for the life that now is, as well as for that which is to come, while in the O. T. Balaam desires to die the death of the righteous.

i. The quality of O. T. morality is displayed by the standard of excellence it sets up. Three (3) things noticeable; first the intrinsic excellence, second, the degree of conformity required of us, third, the fitness of the standard itself to promote and secure this required conformity.

The standard is the character of God and his holiness, the degree required is exact correspondence, "Be ye holy, for I am holy." There is unparalleled attractiveness as well as surpassing glory in this standard. This is the most desirable excellence. Nothing higher can be conceived of. If you lower the standard you lower its attractive power.

OBJECTIONS TO OLD TESTAMENT MORALITY.

These are in a great variety of forms. Some courteous, some offensive. Some disparage the O. T. morality in order to exalt the New. Some are philosophical or speculative.

Mill: The Old Testament system of morality is barbarous, fit only for savages.

I. FIRST OBJECTION.

The God of the O. T. is represented as partial, fickle, hateful, revengeful and otherwise morally unworthy.

Bolingbroke says, it is blasphemy to assert that the O. T. writers were inspired, when they attribute such things to Divinity as would disgrace humanity. The conclusion that such men draw is, there is a God, but I cannot conceive of him thus; or if this is the best that can be conceived of, then for me there is no God.

Answer. *a.* The representation which is *largely predominant* in O. T., by common consent, is that God is infinitely exalted, and absolutely perfect in moral excellence. The objector concedes this. If this be so, we ought to be controlled in our interpretation of doubtful passages by this fact. We are not to assume that these writers deliberately falsify their other statements. We must harmonize if possible.

b. This harmonizing interpretation must take into account the context as well as the contents of each passage, the idioms of language and the characteristics of the oriental mind. Anthropomorphic style of literature renders such representation necessary. When we have allowed for these we claim that the objection falls.

Instances. God repents, Gen. 6 : 5-7.

Is fickle, Gen. 8 : 21.

His dealings with Pharaoh, Ex. 7-14, (chs.)

(See Trench's *Hulsean Lectures*, p. 96, Hanna's *Bampton Lectures*, p. 88.)

God's anger allayed by appeals to His vanity—Ex. 32 : 9-seq. ; Num. 16 : 20-seq. ; Num. 14 : 22, 23.

God fickle with Balaam, Num. 22 ch.

Punishes people for others' sins, 2d Sam. chs. 21, 24 ; Deceives Ahab, 1 Kings 22 ; Deceives the prophet, Ezek. 14 : 9.

II. SECOND OBJECTION.

The principle of human brotherhood receives only a very partial and inconsistent treatment in O. T.

Bolingbroke urges that the particularism by which the Jews were taught to regard themselves as God's peculiar people, took them out of obligation to the rest of mankind. Ans.

a. This objection proves too much. It destroys all belief in providential distinctions which all men must observe and God is constantly making.

b. The objection mistakes or mis-states the nature, ground, and aim of the particularism of the Hebrew system. There is one God of all the earth, who has purposes of mercy toward all, though not in the same way. The Hebrews are represented in O. T. as brethren in one human race, made to differ for a time and for a purpose that good may result to all ; the favors that distinguish the Hebrews at the same time increase their responsibility. This closer relation to God is not a meritorious relation and the favors they enjoy are a means to an end. Exclusiveness has a double object, (1) Defensive ; to protect them from contamination, protecting and developing His instrumentalities on earth ; and (2) the securing more full and effectual application of God's instrumentalities

to the whole human race. The wall of partition is to be thrown down.

There is however a way open for the recognition of human brotherhood.

From the Pentateuch, Lev. 19: 33. The Jews were to treat strangers kindly. The doors of the Jewish sanctuary were guardedly opened, (i. e. to proselytes.)

Ex. 23: 9. They shall not oppress the stranger.

Num. 15: 15. As ye are, so shall the stranger be before the Lord.

Dent. 10: 18. The Lord loveth the stranger.

From the Prophets.

Micah 4: 1, 2. Many nations shall come.

Is. 56: 7. God's house a house of prayer for all people.

Is. 66: 20. God's glory to be declared among the gentiles.

Is. 60. Access to the gentiles.

These show that in the end, a richer result will be to the whole world from this temporary separation.

III. THIRD OBJECTION.

There is a divine endorsement of character not approved by our moral sense.

Ans. *a.* Divine approbation in many of these cases where God's approbation is expressed, is explicitly based on and restricted to, certain specified aspects of these characters.

b. In no case is Divine approbation extended to those qualities which provoke our moral censure.

c. In some cases Divine disapprobation is pronounced upon those points of character which we denounce, and the sins visited with severe judgments.

d. In no case should we be *with* God but in every case *against* God if we withhold our censure from these sins.

Dr. Hessey: "The Christian rejects the pleading that will not distinguish between the whole character, and special acts."

IV. FOURTH OBJECTION.

The Old Testament represents God as expressly requiring, in some instances, acts condemned by our moral

sense, e. g. : Abraham is commanded to sacrifice Isaac ; Moses deceives Pharaoh ; the borrowing of jewelry and raiment from the Egyptians ; Hosea's marriage ; falsehood of midwives of Egypt.

Reply : *a.* In each instance it belongs to exegesis to determine the meaning of the record. *Did* Hosea become an adulterer ? *Did* the Israelites borrow of the Egyptians ?

b. In the petition of Moses to Pharaoh, there is no evidence of deception. As the first step in a series of dealings a moderate request is made to allow them to go out to sacrifice. Other steps in God's purpose follow ?

c. Abraham's call to sacrifice his son. Some say it had been common for parents to sacrifice their children, so that God tempts Abraham in this way, calling him to do a wicked thing. God did not *tempt* but *tried* Abraham. It was to prove his trust in God, making the choice between parental affection and loyalty to God. He is to choose in the midst of extraordinary experiences that led him to trust in God. In dealing with God he had learned from the first not to count the cost of obedience. He left his kindred not knowing whither he went. It was the same now.

V. FIFTH OBJECTION.

The Old Testament represents God as expressly requiring courses of action toward nations and races that are condemned by our moral sense.

Deut. 23 : 6. Thou shalt not seek their peace nor their prosperity all thy days forever—in regard to the Canaanites.

Bolingbroke : " Nothing can be conceived more unworthy of an all perfect being than the manner in which the people were taken from Egypt and the way they got possession of Canaan."

But was such treatment of hostile tribes intrinsically immoral ? Had God no right to dispossess the Canaanites and give the land to Israel, no right to guide Israel to the land of promise, no right to protect them in the possession of it, no right to visit these idolatrous nations for their sins and that in His own way, no right to protect the world from the influence of their sins ?

Suppose no such issue be made concerning the Divine right, what shall we say as to the fitness of the method. He might have sent a pestilence.

Several things are to be considered, (Lev. 18 : 3, 24.)

a. Aggressive war was permitted and prescribed only at certain specified points and for certain specified objects. Otherwise it was merely defensive. They were left to human methods unless God interposed by miracle.

War for war's sake was never encouraged. For this reason David was denied the honor of building the temple. *b.* These wars were not waged at the instigation or for the indulgence of ferocious passions; but they were in the interest of justice, present and future holiness to Israel and others. Doing evil that good may come, says the objector.

c. As to the methods and extent of application, the people are not left to their own discretion or caprice in interpreting a commission. They were punished if they fell short of full obedience. It was not evil to protect the present and future holiness of Israel by a course to which they were strictly held. These cases were never allowed to be made precedents. They were protected while executing their commission.

VI. SIXTH OBJECTION.

The O. T. endorses expressions of individual feeling towards one's fellow-man that are offensive to moral judgments, especially the imprecatory Psalms, about fifty in number. See Ps. 35 : 4, 5, 6, 8, 26; 55 : 10, 16, 24; 58 : 7-12; 59 : 6, 7, 11-14; 69 : 23-29; 109 : 6-20; 137 : 7-9. [See Bib. Sac. Vol. I. 13, 19, Hanna's Bampton Lects. 1863, McLean's Unity of the Moral Law.]

a. These are not the unauthorized malice of private vindictiveness or passion, but inspired utterances which we must seek to harmonize.

b. These do contain expressions of human convictions and emotions, indignation at wrong, sense of justice, and desire to vindicate right. Are these wrong?

c. The Psalmists, in these utterances, are not merely the representatives of private history and experience; they are more. Their cause is God's. Opposition to it rightly arouses their indignation and sense of justice.

d. These utterances in general rest on divine denunciations and predictions with respect to evil.

e. They do reveal the spirit of a dispensation in which the reality, necessity, and meaning of law and justice had been far more perfectly disclosed than grace. Not appropriate to the N. T.

VII. SEVENTH OBJECTION.

The sanctions by which the O. T. commends and enforces what it requires are mercenary and therefore inferior if not immoral.

Bolingbroke: "God purchased as it were, the obedience of His people."

The book of Prov. is charged with motives of prudence instead of love. But

Munscher says the human agent regards the present rather than the future.

Dillman says the temporal leads man to the spiritual and invisible. Partial Ans. as before.

1. Present experiences were never designed nor found to be the exact exponent of God's esteem.

2. The favor signified was always more momentous than the sign itself.

Objection: sanctions like these, embodying good and ill, are inferior.

a. When it is said these sanctions are inferior we need have no debate with the objector, if it be conceded that abstract recommendations and precepts are made effective by sanctions. Moral sanctions may be reinforced by legal, without being superseded or necessarily weakened by them. A law not sanctioned is but advice.

At that stage of revelation sanctions drawn from a future life were imperfectly available. The objection must be against the constitution of human nature, or else against God for having kept back the knowledge of a future life.

b. As to the demoralizing tendency of this appeal to secular rewards and penalties, we should be obliged to admit the objection if certain things were true, for instance if it were true that the practice of virtue was commended merely for the sake of gain. This is not true. The appeal is chiefly to God's approbation, and

not to present gain. That the inferior motives were more palpable than the superior, would be a reason for their employment, not the contrary. God allows the wicked to prosper and chastens His own for a purpose of good, a higher law overruling. National and individual disasters, while indicating to the heathen the impotence of his gods, to Israel would indicate the reality of his God.

VIII. EIGHTH OBJECTION.

The O. T. contains positive precepts and indirect requirements and permissions that are in conflict with the teachings of the N. T. and high morality, e. g. the sanctity of marriage and monogamy, yet allows polygamy and easy divorce. The brotherhood of man, yet admits slavery; retaliation is sanctioned. Thus, the O. T. censures and sanctions the same things.

a. It is a signal merit of O. T. morality that it deals with the world as it is, existing conditions being accepted as in a certain sense limiting the immediate objects of the moral system.

b. Under the O. T. dispensation God does not deal either with existing defects, or positive evils, in a way to effect an immediate revolution. He does not employ supernatural means of conversion, but deals with all evil as in a *moral* system, in which force is out of place. The eradication of evil is the ultimate result, though gradual. The objection would show that God's wisdom is inferior to that of the objectors.

c. The legislation of the O. T. in regard to polygamy, divorce, and slavery is *regulative*. Each is found existing, not at once, always, and everywhere prohibited, but regulated. The removal is left to the slow working of the moral dispensation. Thus monogamy gradually gained almost entire ascendancy in Israel. So also divorce is restricted. Slavery in Israel, as compared with slavery in other nations, although enlightened, as Greece and Rome, is less degrading and oppressive. A bondman was a servant, not mere merchandise. Under the Mosaic law slavery is lightened and regulated, as far as it is permitted at all. Among the Jews only the Essenes and Therapeutæ put away slavery before Christ.

Retaliation, as an individual passion, is restrained. The law puts limits on the avenger. It is immoral if

God may not regard society as it is, and adapt His ways to its present state: if temporary toleration of evil is immoral. The O. T. does not purport to exhibit the ultimate or complete religion, neither should we expect in it the ultimate morality.

ETHICS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.

I. *Some General Characteristics and Truths.*

Many things true of the O. T. Dispensation are also true of the New.

1. There is the same connection between Morality and Religion.

The union is vital. Change in heart is necessary to a perfect morality.

2. Same lack of abstract terms.

3. Same quiet assumption in N. T. of the existence in man of the essential elements of moral ethics.

The moral elements of N. T. Dispensation are more conspicuous than those of O. T. The ceremonial is done away. N. T. Dispensation is for the world, and not for the theocracy alone. It is more distinctly ethical.

II. *Some fundamental Truths.*

(a.) The conception of God is central, as in O. T., only more powerful. The question, What is God? answered more fully. His moral perfections brought out more clearly. Contrast Sinai with Calvary. Law with Love.

(b.) The dignity ascribed to human nature; this dignity exalted by the work of Christ. He died to redeem it. If the image in which it was created furnished one standard, the price paid for it gives another, and union of the human and divine in Christ as the perfect man gives a third.

The whole work of Christ sets the highest value on human nature.

(c.) The Brotherhood of Men. Duties before dimly discerned now come out more vividly. N. T. not only does not cancel or obscure the O. T. teachings on this point, but adds and enforces. Christ's answer to the question, Who is my neighbor? teaches a broader view of the relations of men.

Paul's teaching the same, "God has made of one blood all nations," Acts 17: 26. Christ's redemptive work not for a multitude of races but for *the one* race.

(d.) The Organization of Humanity.

This brought out more clearly by N. T. *O. T.* deals mainly with the Jews. The history, instruction, discipline and religion were national, the new dispensation can no longer be national when the transient has effected its object. The organization of humanity is now seen to be from God, and is brought under the precepts or moulding spirit of the N. T.

(e.) Inferior Creation.

The N. T. calls attention to the use of the world which shall not be an abuse of it. Care of self enjoined in N. T. We are to develop every organ and faculty, and to use them for proper purposes. The N. T. enhances the dignity of every part of human nature, by what Christ planned and expended for the whole. Specific appeals to Christians. "Know ye not that ye are the temple of God." I. Cor. 3: 17.

"What? know ye not that your body is the temple of the Holy Ghost?" I. Cor. 6: 19.

(f.) Progressive enlightenment and elevation of men.

The *O. T.* system was preparatory. In the N. T. education and progress are prominent. The N. T. system not thus preparatory: not to give place to a new system? it is the *final* system. The moral results of the Gospel are reached by education from infancy to maturity. As in the individual, so in the world, there is a gradual appreciation of and instruction in morality.

(g.) The Sanctions of N. T. system are more generally spiritual and less temporal than those of the *O. T.* There is less appeal to the present. "Having promise of the life that now is and that which is to come." I. Tim. 4: 8.

The N. T. holds us to faithfulness in the present, and makes God's favor the best reward and highest aim. Immortality is brought to light in the Gospel. The N. T. finds the sanction in God's estimate of human action and the signs by which God chose to express this. It rises above the *O. T.* in making the rewards unseen and eternal in a greater measure. Even in the *O. T.* there are appeals to the future. Isaiah is better understood when quoted by Paul.

(*h.*) The Standard is the same, viz : Holiness.

We are to be like God. To prevent discouragement in achieving this effect the N. T. brings in the life and example of Christ to help us. Perfect holiness has appeared on earth, and the power of His helping hand is offered to us.

PECULIARITIES OF N. T. MORALITY.

The nature of the moral life may appear from three points of view. (1.) What is demanded of a moral life? Duty.

(2.) What should moral life and action be in quality and character?

Virtuous.

(3.) What should moral life aim at as its dominant object?

The supreme good.

Hence the three cardinal ideas of Ethics, duty, virtue and the virtues, and the supreme good.

Three questions arise.

1. Do the revelations of the N. T. add anything to the extent or exactness of man's knowledge of duty?

2. Does the N. T. teach anything new in regard to the power by which or the subjective conditions in which duty is done.

3. Does the N. T. modify our conception of the supreme good? i. e. of the results aimed at, anticipated and attained where Christian virtue exists and Christian duty done.

Duty.—A religious morality is more complete and effective than a non-religious morality. Man needs to be under personal influence.

A morality based on revealed religion will be higher than one based on a revelation of nature, and a morality based on God's last and highest revelations will be higher than one based on preparatory revelations. We should therefore expect the morality of the N. T. to include all that natural religion, philosophy and the O. T. include.

A. As compared with the O. T. Dispensation, Christianity makes less of the legal aspects of duty, and lays more stress on its self-evidencing nature. Christianity attempts no metaphysical explanations of duty. It is

practical: its object is to show man what he has to do so as to best secure his doing it.

It never argues the question of the conformity of the duty to man's nature or his relations. The N. T. announces its requirements as being so transparently right and reasonable as not to need argument. God's will is not stated so much in a legal way as in the O. T. Duties are presented as self-justifying. Arguments are sometimes used to remove misapprehension or overcome prejudices.

Two extremes are to be avoided. One would exhibit duty as the mere product of God's arbitrary will, the other finds the approving source of duty in the conscience of man himself. It deals with right as abstract and disregards God. N. T. goes to neither extreme. What God commands commends itself. Right reason and conscience approve it. More use is made of simple authority in O. T.; less appeal to the understanding. Duties of the N. T. justify themselves as soon as the facts of it are seen, e. g. love and obedience to Christ are evidently duties as soon as the facts in regard to Christ are known. How does Christianity lift man up to this plane of duty? By increasing our knowledge of Him; teaching us more fully what is His will. Philosophical Ethics must rely upon the validity of moral ideas and hence influences only the few, because they only can apprehend them. The N. T. makes God best known, so exhibiting His nature and character as to render the duties enjoined self-evidencing.

B. The N. T. rearranges human relations, readjusts duty by connecting all with its new relations of God.

We have not a multitude of new verbal statements in the N. T., but of facts—things God has *done*, e. g. Incarnation. Christ acts as and for God. Something more specific is revealed, viz., that the world was created by God through the Logos. The greatest advance is made in the manifestation of the love of God.

C. Into the substance of duty the N. T. introduces a new simplicity and unity, by making the great all-embracing duty to be *love*, and the obedience of love.

O. T. being a dispensation of law—presented duty in detail, but in N. T. the oneness of all duty is better understood. Our love must be appropriate and com-

mensurate with the object. Toward God our duty is supreme love. Under O. T. man could not understand the fullness of this claim because that love was not yet fully revealed. Likewise our duty to our fellow-men is more clearly revealed. Dent. vi: 5. cf. Matt. xxii: 36, 40; Mk. xii: 28, 31. Our Lord makes this duty more self-justifying and efficient than it was before. Instead of going into detail N. T. says "love is the fulfilling of the law."

D. To those duties which result from man's original constitution and his permanent relations as man, Christianity adds a group of duties which grow out of man's actual moral state, and what God has done for that moral state.

N. T. tells us we are sinners. New duties come with the appearing of Christ. These duties are contingent in a sense; not growing out of our nature—not absolute duties. They are now universal—for all men whom God has in view. They have also become primary duties in their importance. The items and order of duty differ from those for a holy race. So the items and order of duty for a race which Christ came to save, will differ from those for a race whom he did not come to save. Two things modify the duty, viz.: the state in which we have come and what God has done for us in that state e. g. *Repentance* is a duty of fallen man, no matter what God has done or not done. The system of theoretical Ethics might point repentance as a hypothetical duty, i. e. *if* a man sins, he should repent, but in Scripture it is a universal duty.

Faith does not become a primary duty in an evangelical sense until God commands it. That God could forgive and redeem was for Him to reveal. As soon as this revelation is made in Christ, a new form of faith becomes obligatory, not mere confidence in God. Our duty is to exercise a most specific faith in what God commands through His Son. All the new objects, institutions and agencies that come in the train of this redeeming work become in turn new centres of obligation, e. g. ministry, sacraments &c. of the church.

They are secondary and contingent yet real and imperative. They may properly be called Evangelical duties

because they come with the Glad-tidings. They first find their full recognition in the N. T. though shadowed in the O. T.

Among Evangelical duties the N. T. makes faith a necessary antecedent to the acceptable performance of any and all man's general duties. We mean faith in a Christian sense. Faith not merely retrospectively but prospectively indispensable. Rom. 14: 23, "Whatsoever is not of faith is sin." Paul means by faith more than mere confidence in God. More than a clear conscience that what we do will please God. According to the N. T. the spring of all right action is faith. The sinner is not in a right relation to God until he believes fully according to the light given him. Christian Ethics presupposes a Christian man. The primary duty therefore is faith.

Virtue.—The idea of virtue contains two elements. One is made prominent in the non-ethical idea, the other in its philosophical idea. In the first, virtue is presented as an activity or power, *αρετη*—*virtus*, manliness, vigor, power, energy. This continued to be their meaning until philosophy applied them to moral acts.

In the other phase virtue is that state of inner excellence which alone makes the former external excellence possible. Man's competence to do the work of life consists in a right inner condition. This is something belonging to the dispositions. The harmony of the inner nature with the right, the true and the good is first necessary. Moral worthiness did not enter into the heathen idea of virtue.

The O. T. furnishes no discussion of what this virtue is, like philosophy. Socrates found all good in knowledge and evil in ignorance and error. Hence all wisdom is virtue.

Plato makes virtue to be pleasure in the good, and love to the good, because the good is the truly beautiful and to be loved on that account. It showed itself in four forms, wisdom, courage, temperance, justice. These are the cardinal virtues.

Aristotle found good in the harmony and just proportion of things, hence virtue is due regard to this harmony. More especially, virtue is the true mean between

all extremes. It has emotional or intellectual forms. Zeno (Stoic) found virtue in living in conformity to nature. Happiness will be the result.

Epicurus put happiness in the foreground. The keenest enjoyment of the present is virtue. Individual enjoyment is the good aimed at and the highest good. To the lower classes this would be something sensual, to the wise man, something refined. The N. T. found these ideas of virtue existing. It does not enter upon any definition or analysis of virtue. It tells what man is to do and to be. Its main care is that man should adopt and practice faith, hope and charity.

The word *αρετη* occurs five times in the N. T. Four times translated virtue, Phil. 4: 9; 2 Peter 1: 3-5, used twice in verse 5; 1 Peter 2: 9, translated "praises."

Etymological idea is that which gives man his worth or value. Moral excellence is also expressed by *δικαιοσύνη*, Eph. 5: 9; 4: 24; Luke 1: 75; Rom. 6: 13, rendered "righteousness."

Also by *δξωσύνη* and *ἀγαθωσύνη*, 1 Thes. 3: 13; 2 Cor. 7: 1; Rom. 15: 14; Eph. 5: 9; *ευσεβεια* and *χαρισμα* are also used. While the N. T. uses no one term but many to express this idea of moral excellence, it is not to be thought that it is vague in its idea of virtue. Call to mind the exterior ideas of virtue and you find both recognized in N. T. virtue.

Christian Virtue.

A. Christian virtue and virtues have and must have a supernatural origin.

They are not found in man as he is. He has neither the state nor the power of producing them. No new faculties are needed. The foundation is in his nature, but since the fall man has failed to reach this virtue. He lacks both the disposition and the power for the exercise of this virtue. There is no provision in nature to regain this lost power.

This is the teaching of the Bible, which addresses man as he is in a fallen state. It declares that emancipation and regeneration are both necessary, and cannot be effected within the enslaved and vitiated nature. Conscience supplies the motives but not the power. It merely approves and disapproves.

B. While Christian virtue and virtues are supernatural in their origin, the N. T. represents them as natural to the new man.

They are not merely accredited to him but are his, belonging to his new nature. They distinguish him as a new man. He is not a mere figure on which God displays the costume and drapery of virtue. God works in him, but he does his own will, impelled from within and not merely from without. It is a moral disposition, wrought by the Spirit, more than mere natural endowments, from which this virtue proceeds.

C. In answer to the question—what element in moral condition or action makes or proves them right? the N. T. answer is, conformity to the will of God.

The N. T. does not ask why this is right. The aim of Scripture is to secure a practical religious life. It does not enter into the metaphysical, philosophical or psychological questions in regard to these things. In the line of religious revelation we can see why it is, God being what he is declared to be in the Bible, that conformity to the will of God is the standard of moral action. It is not the mere product of that will which is the ground of right, but the intrinsic rightness thereof. Two practical reasons for this standard:

(a) To make right influential over man he needs to have its attractions and constraints multiplied.

(b) If not only abstract but personal, if manifold and not single, if concurrent and not separate, the power drawing us to goodness is greatly increased.

If there were no taints of corruption within us, the mere abstract command would be sufficient.

Our moral relations are personal, to God and not merely to right and wrong. The right is intrinsically right, conformity to the will of God, and profitable; e. g. thankfulness is right in itself when a favor is received, and right according to the will of God in Christ Jesus. (Eph. 5: 20.)

(c) This mode of presenting virtue is a needed and powerful corrective of man's ungodliness.

Man is naturally averse to the will of God and has a tendency to resist it. This tendency needs to be powerfully counteracted.

D. Christian virtue not being created by full development, perfects itself in the advancing activities and deeper experiences of the Christian life. The germs of virtue only are planted by a supernatural power. Growth in Christian virtue is secured by the use of what we have, and by the help of God. Hence some writers speak of a means of virtue, i. e., those acts by which virtue is guarded from hindrances, established against them, and advanced in its inner growth. They do not mean that virtue can be originated by these "means."

That which is sanctification in the theological phrase is, in ethical phrase, the developing and perfecting of Christian virtue. If it were developed and perfect at first, there would be no need of sanctification.

N. T. expressions indicating this growth :

Gal. 5 : 25. Walk in the Spirit.

1 Cor. 1 : 2. Called to be saints.

Positive and negative expressions.

1 Peter 2 : 24. Being dead to sin should live unto righteousness.

Rom. 12 : 2. Not conformed but transformed.

Matt. 16 : 24. Deny thyself, take up cross.

Luke 14 : 33. Forsake all, be my disciple.

Gal. 5 : 24. Crucify the flesh. Col. 3 : 5.

Eph. 4 : 24. Put on the new man. Col. 3 ; 10.

Rom. 13 : 14. Put on the Lord Jesus Christ.

Eph. 4 : 13, 15. Growing up into a perfect man.

Col. 2 : 6, 7. Built up in Christ.

1 Cor. 15 : 58. Abounding in the work of the Lord.

Col. 3 : 12 ; Heb. 12 : 14 ; 1 Peter 1 : 13.

Agency.

1 Thes. 5 : 23. Sanctified by God.

1 Cor. 1 : 2. Sanctified in Christ Jesus.

1 Peter 1 : 2. Sanctified by the Spirit.

John 17 : 17. Sanctified by Truth.

Results.

Rom. 6 : 22. Fruit unto holiness.

Rom. 6 : 19. Yield your members unto holiness.

Rom. 8 : 10. Life because of righteousness.

2 Cor. 4 : 16. Renewed day by day.

Palmer. "All divine training is fruitless unless I train myself." In some Ethical treatises this is called "Ascetics," in others "Discipline."

E. When most effective as a power, and most perfected as a moral state, Christian virtue is not meritorious in the Romish sense. Our work is so dependent on God, that there is no ground for a demand of reward.

For Romish doctrine see 32nd Canon of 6th Session Council of Trent. "Deserve eternal life, increase of grace, &c."

Calvin, Institutes, chap. xv. Book iii; Turretin, topic 17, question 5.

South, Sermon 25th, lays down four conditions of merit.

- (1) That the action be not due.
- (2) That that action may add something to the state of him of whom it is to merit.
- (3) That the action and reward be of equal value.
- (4) That the action be done by the man's sole power, without help of him of whom he is to merit.

In all these points Christian virtue can merit nothing.

F. Christian virtue where it exists cannot show itself merely in general excellence, but must appear in the form of specific virtues, and these when apparently identical with certain natural virtues have a quality which is peculiarly their own.

Christian life is always seen as concrete. Its objects are definite, its conditions positive, so that the phenomena must be specific. Individual acts must be seen to be right.

Two inferences from individual right acts :

(1) With regard to the individual disposition from which the act springs.

(2) With regard to the general state of the soul of which this is one of the dispositions.

Christian virtue will then be seen and known mainly in the Christian virtues.

We must avoid several errors :

(1) That of individualizing and isolating them too much.

(2) That of seeking and finding them in outward action rather than in the disposition.

(3) That of judging them by the test of civil law, or public opinion.

Remember,

(a) That the virtues have a central principle which gives them unity and each has a strong affinity for every other.

(b) That they belong to the disposition more than the visibly active life.

(c) That the test of all other dispositions must be man's disposition toward God.

Plato's classification was accepted by the Christian Fathers, and passed into many modern systems. He makes the cardinal virtues wisdom, justice, fortitude, temperance. We can't put wisdom in the first place even if we mean by wisdom a moral excellence.

Ambrose and Augustine added faith, hope and charity to Plato's four, making seven. Thus justice seemed to be done to philosophy and Scripture, and the sacred number seven had its signification.

Ambrose and Augustine put charity first instead of wisdom, but the scheme is arbitrary and based on a wrong principle.

Calvin based his analysis on Titus 2:12. He makes the virtues sobriety, justice, piety.

Sobriety regulating all belonging to self.

Justice, all belonging to our fellow men.

Piety referring to God.

Schleiermacher's: wisdom, love, prudence, perseverance.

Wüttke's is simple, logical and complete. Faithfulness, justice, temperance and courage.

These he treats as phases of love, in different relations and toward different objects. Their mutual affinity is strong.

Faithfulness.—*πιστις*, in a broad sense. It resembles God's self-consistent and unvarying faithfulness to Himself. In man the love that God implants is true to self. Love true to self looking toward God, is faith in God: toward men it will show itself as self-consistent fidelity.

Perseverance, patience, earnestness, fixedness of character, sincerity, simplicity, and constancy are manifestations of it.

Justice. In this scheme this is construed as a uniform readiness to respect and concede the rights of each and all with whom we have to do. Its counterpart in God is rectitude. It reaches far beyond calculating equity.

Gratitude is justice toward God as bountiful and gracious. To be ungrateful is to be unjust. Compassion toward needy men is another form of justice. It would owe no man anything. This leaves no place for works of supererogation, Rom. 13 : 7, 8. It is the golden rule which is the Christian law of justice.

Temperance.—Is a due regulation of self and involves in its broadest sense a just reputation of self. Keeping oneself within right moral bounds. It includes *σωφροσύνη* plus *ἐγκράτεια*. *σωφ.* well balanced, healthful mind; *εγκ.* keeping under control. In its first aspect temperance will appear to be negative or prohibitory, restraining and keeping back. But this restraint has a most positive result. It forbids excess in order to secure the best use of one's powers and energies. It regulates our feelings and desires, moderating one's estimate of himself; hence produces humility, which is the regulation of our judgment with regard to ourselves.

Humility is preëminently a Christian virtue. The old tendency was to exaggerate one's own worth. Sin in self and grace in God's dealing are factors which ancient philosophy never admitted. This temperance will also show itself in self-renunciation and contentment. Pride, arrogance and undue self-assertion will have no place.

Courage.—Not *ἀνδρεία*, Greek bravery or courage, but *παρρησία*, confidence, boldness and hopefulness, which impels to and sustains in the conflicts of the Christian life. Boldness in anticipation of death and judgment. Its basis can never be a consciousness of personal worth or ability. Its basis is hope and faith in God, thus differing from all natural courage. Nothing in life or death can daunt him whose faith is staid in God.

These particular virtues are to be looked for as signs of the general virtue. These are to be developed as individual virtues, studied and nourished with proper motives; yet Christian virtue has its unity and all go hand in hand. We are to know the ground on which each rests and to see that all are found in our character.

In Christian Ethics Love is the central and radical virtue as well as the central duty, not one among co-ordinate virtues: so faith may be called the primary virtue as it is the primary duty.

G. What has Christian Ethics to say of the natural virtues, such as parental and filial affection, generosity, honesty, &c., found in unsurpassed excellence in some who have never experienced the work of grace in the heart?

Christianity neither denies that they are virtues nor that they are natural, nor that they are largely in actual existence among men, and in some degree and in some form and measure all but universally present in human life and character. To deny this would be to say that all virtue is the fruit of regeneration. If either class are natural it is those which have their root in man's constitution and depend not on a second work, regeneration.

Chalmers: "God's word is not in conflict with the consciousness of men. There *are* then natural virtues. There is a social and a divine standard of morality." (Institutes Am. Ed. Vol. 1, pp. 2 and 3.)

The precepts of the Old and New Testaments show that natural virtues and dispositions are enjoined, as having a basis in nature and not necessarily in regeneration Gen. 4: 7, 2: 7; Acts, 10: 34; Rom. 2: 14.

What has the Bible to say of the presence and worth of these in unrenewed men? Under what condition and to what extent does the Bible deny to man the right to congratulate himself on the possession and manifestation of these virtues, and to content himself therewith apart from regeneration.

2. Man's disposition is to regard only two parties as concerned in the existence and manifestation of virtues, viz. himself and his neighbor. The Bible recognizes three parties. God is the third, 1 Cor. 10: 31, Whether therefore ye eat or drink, do all to the glory of God. See also Col. 3: 22, 23; Eph. 6: 6. Titus 2: 10, Servants, masters and God are concerned. 1 Tim. 5: 8, If any provide not for his own, &c., he is worse than an infidel. Rom. 13: 1-5 civic loyalty Eph. 6: 1, the Obedience of children. Eph. 5: 22, Obedience of wives. We see that in all relations, God the third party is recognized. In all or any of the natural virtues, even when justice has been fully done so far as two of the parties are concerned, it is not perfect unless it has taken account of the third, i. e. God.

1 Cor. 13: 3, charity without godliness is not recognized. Phil. 4: 8, Sincerity as a mere impulse is not enough.

3. We may get the N. T.'s estimate of the natural virtues by examining the epithets and phrases by which it describes character and indicates the ground of its judgment.

One group of these so often found in the N. T. is:—*σαρκικος φυχικος πνευματικος*. Sometimes all of these and sometimes only two are brought into contrast. 1 Cor. 2: 12. 3: 4; Gal. 6: 1; Rom. 7: 14; Jas. 3: 15; Jude 19.

The third, *πνευματικος*, is always and only approved—the others always and only condemned. The first two are substantially identical morally, though not psychologically; the ruling principle being within the man and not from God, as in the third. These terms are used differently in the N. T. Greek from their classic use. Ascendancy and control does not belong to that part of our nature, the *σαρξ*, even when pure. The *ψυχη* has still greater control but no absolute and supreme right even in fallen man. The natural virtues spring from this higher nature the *ψυχη*—but impulse, reason and conscience are alike amenable to the law of God, and cannot have commendation unless controlled by the Spirit of God.

(a.) So far forth as they spring from man's original, unvitiated constitution they are appropriate virtues.

(b.) So far as they have respect to their proper objects, they are right.

(c.) So far as the sanction of conscience, as God's representative is regarded, they are commended.

(d.) So far as they are rooted in and spring from a right moral disposition, they are endorsed and commended. But they are censured so far forth as cherished and manifested without regard to God. So far as man relies on his own judgment and impulses. A life that shall please God and satisfy us must proceed from a divine principle.

The Supreme Good.—Does the N. T. modify our view of the supreme good to be aimed at, anticipated and attained?

To the Brahmins and Buddhists, it is the disappearance of the individual being and absorption in the universal being.

To the ancient Greeks, the doctrines of God and fate so baffled their aspirations and endeavors that the supreme good was never known. They were subject to the impulses and caprice of too many gods and they and their gods alike were liable to be crossed in all their plans by unknown decrees of fate. Socrates made wisdom the supreme good. Plato, harmony, Aristotle, soundness and symmetry of self in all its activities. Epicurus, happiness. The Stoics, conformity to nature, including reason. Kant, the union of happiness with virtue. Through this we get an idea of God and immortality.

Schleiermacher, the complete mastery of nature or the interpretation of nature by reason. Hegel's system includes no Ethics. Spinoza admits of no moral element and hence precludes anything but physical Ethics.

The Christian view of the supreme good is best given by Augustine and Aquinas.

Augustine—return to God and reunion with God by likeness to himself.

Thos. Aquinas—that absolutely perfect life of the rational creature found in fellowship with God.

Schmidt—moral principle introduced and made real in the world of realities. Shaping of the world around us in harmony with the divine will and divine law; our will acting in conformity with the divine will. This is an improvement on Schleiermacher.

Wüttke, twofold definition.

Formal and material.

Formal, defining it by that in which it appears.

Material, by that of which it consists.

Formal def.—It is the highest perfection of his rational personality, i. e. the perfect exhibition of his likeness to God, or the complete agreement of the reality of the entire human life with the will of God.

Material def.—The actual fellowship of life with God which secures the outward appearance.

Remarks.—(1.) This conception of the supreme good commends itself by the intrinsic excellence of the end proposed. Nothing higher can be conceived of than likeness to God and fellowship with him.

(2.) The end thus proposed to us, plainly is and has been an end with God—viz., our fellowship of life with himself. That which we are to seek, he has been seeking. He sought it in creation, much more in regeneration.

(3.) The supreme good thus conceived of combines two things of great importance :

(a.) The highest incitement to aspiration and endeavor on our own part, with (b) encouragement of help from him upon whom our success depends. To have chosen this is to have been prompted by God, because no man of himself aspires to this. God will not disappoint his own prompting.

(4.) This conception includes and provides for all subordinate forms of good. This is what none of the other conceptions did. It is the only certain guarantee of wisdom, for in union with God we find the highest wisdom. It insures constant happiness of the highest type. "Ye shall be as gods knowing good and evil" is only realized thus.

(5.) This supreme good is not exhibited as something to be desired and hoped for as the final attainment of a distant future but as something with which a right moral life begins ; to possess it, makes duty and virtue possible. 2 Peter 1 : 4. "Partakers of the divine nature."

THE MOTIVE POWER OF CHRISTIANITY.

We must now consider the working force of Christianity. What provision does it make for calling into play man's moral power? Does Christianity hold before us anything better than the best philosophy? Does it give promise and prospect of attaining something more than we could otherwise? The motive power of Christianity is being more and more considered by the best thinkers. See Blakie's "Four Phases of Morals;" Principal Sharp, "Studies on Poetry and Philosophy." He says, what is the dynamic power in the moral life? Calderwood's "Handbook of Moral Philosophy" approaches the same subject from the side of philosophy.

The practical problem is to restore the moral power which we have lost. What motive power does Christianity supply which shall make duty, virtue and the supreme good more than barren ideas?

A. The ambiguity of the word motive leads us to indicate its sense as used by us.

(1) It belongs to every conception of moral action and life that the moving power shall dwell and act within man's own nature.

The term motive can be applied only in a secondary sense to anything exterior to the man himself, e. g., gold.

Prof. Calderwood: "A motive is an internal force which moves and excites the mind toward a single definite action."

(2) In every intelligent agent the power thus moving him consists of two elements:

(a) The views which he takes, and, (b) The dispositions or the judgments and dispositions. Dispositions include desires and affections. The dispositions are non-rational, acting by impulse. The judgments are rational, supplying both impulse and regulation. They respect truth as truth, and recognize it in its relations to us as a rule of life. These two motive powers may concur or conflict. When they conflict, the control and decision must belong to the higher and rational element, the judgment. The dispositions cannot be trusted to regulate themselves.

B. The motive power of Christianity must be sought on the one hand in the convictions, beliefs and knowledge which it gives to us to be motives, and which it makes the rule of life: on the other hand, it will be found partly in the dispositions which it develops towards its central objects, and through these toward all other related objects. It cannot be found in either, exclusive of the others. Neither can it be found in enlightenment only; consequently those systems which work only through excited sensibilities are at fault.

C. The rational motives which are distinctive of Christianity, and which give it power and effectiveness, are mainly those which gather about its revelation of the nature, character, relations and purposes of God, especially in Christ.

Our knowledge of secondary relations and duties stand in the most vital connection to these facts and truths. This is *the* power to regulate us above all others. Secondary duties are not disparaged when subordinated to these higher duties.

D. The rational motive power by which Christianity seeks to accomplish its results, is found in the view which it gives, the belief which it creates, the knowledge which it imparts, of the love of God.

This does not disparage the knowledge of his other attributes. It does not draw us from any other duty, nor is there less regulative than motive power in these facts concerning the love of God. Nothing so secures fidelity, vigilance, perseverance. Nothing so exalts virtue as this love.

E. The motive object in which God's love is found most fully embodied and expressed, is the person and work of Jesus Christ.

A motive object is that toward which the mind is called to act. Christianity presents this motive object in three ways as adapted to influence us.

(1) *As a new test* to show us what we are ourselves—sinners.

(2) *As a new point of departure* in our whole religious and moral life. We see what we have not been, and what we ought to be; and from the time we take Christ we begin again, or if rejecting him go on to worse.

(3) *As a new source and reservoir of motive power*, exciting our affections.

Illustrations.

(a) A man sees himself as never before when Christ is fully before him. His power to love the truth, his inclination and willingness to follow it are then tested.

(b) Christ becomes a point of departure, heavenward or hellward, according as they receive or reject Him.

(c) There is no more vital, practical, winning truth than this. All the rights and powers of God are brought so near us, and to bear upon us in Christ. There can be nothing more done to move us.

F. Christianity traces the new moral and religious life to the work of the Holy Spirit, and offers this as a motive power to all.

The Holy Spirit is really the motive power in Christianity, an almighty power not added, but entering into all our work. Not that we live, but Christ by his Spirit living in us.

When Christ has been received, neither the rational or moral convictions alone actuate a man. (1 John

2: 20.) The dispositions are of divine origin; no man can call Jesus, Lord, but by the Holy Spirit.

Summary.

(1) The new and characteristic motive object that Christianity brings and holds before the mind and heart, is the most influential conceivable.

(2) Every other object with which the moral life is concerned, has its import and power enhanced by the relation into which it comes to God in Christ.

(3) In all who are brought rightly to apprehend and respond to this revelation of God in Christ, there is a peculiar and powerful divine inworking, as well as co-working of God in man. Faith overcomes the world.

Objections urged against the morality of Christianity:

1. The Ethical system of Christianity is not scientific, nor presented in scientific form.

If this is anything more than a pedantic, frivolous objection it rests on the misconception, that the Bible is a scientific book. If it be scientific to take the only complete view of man's condition and relations, then Christian Ethics is scientific.

If scientific to locate and arrange and define duty as never before, then the morality of Christianity is scientific.

If it be scientific to perfect man's conception of virtue, and to set before man the highest good any system has yet presented; if to show the possibility of reaching this high excellence, and to supply the moral power necessary, then Christian morality is scientific.

2. Another group of objections.

The requirements and standards of Christian morals are too high for such a world as this. Too transcendental, too easily exaggerated and distorted by us in our apprehension of it.

(a) *Standard too high.*

What should the best system aim at? Would that be a better system of morals which should aim at anything less than likeness to God? Would it be an improvement to lower the standard, so that we might hope to reach it?

(b) *Requirements visionary and transcendental.*

E. g., "Whosoever shall smite thee on thy right

check, turn to him the other also." "Charity that thinketh no evil."

But we must take into consideration the circumstances and the spirit in which it is uttered. The objection lies often against the form of statement; when we study all together the visionary and transcendental disappears.

(c) *The system too delicate and liable to distortion.*

It presents its requirements so vividly that men run into asceticism. Zeal in good works is apt to make no account of knowledge, and to lose the proper balance and proportion of true living.

True, it has sometimes led to perversion; development has been unsymmetrical. True, men have been called upon to extirpate what Christianity would regulate. We might say the fault is in human nature, but this is not a sufficient answer, because the system is given to us in our present condition.

It grows out of the very nature of a moral system, working by motives, that it does not effectually protect itself against the infirmities of human nature. It is not to be expected that it would constrain man always and everywhere. The motives are set before us, and the responsibility of seeing the truth, and doing the right, is left to us.

Would the system be better if shorn of its power, robbed of the vividness of its presentation, and less urgent in its appeals? These become the occasions of exaggeration and distortion; shall we therefore take them away? It is evident that this very character of the Gospel is its power, and secures the measure of Christianity that exists.

Some make so much of truth as to become dogmatists; some make so much of ceremony as to become formalists. These are exceptions. The misuse of a principle does not do away with its right use.

3. Another group of objections charges the moral system of Christianity with positive and serious incompleteness. John Stuart Mill says, the O. T. must be used to complete the morality of the N. T., and that of the O. T. is bad enough.

He says it is a reaction against certain things that are

wrong. Its character is negative rather than positive. It makes obedience the only valuable thing, and thus takes away a man's dignity.

Answer: It is no disparagement that the Old and N. T. morality must be taken together to complete a perfect system. Both were instituted of God for different times.

To the objection that Christian morality is passive rather than active, innocence rather than nobleness, absence from evil rather than active power to good, Principal Shairp answers, "this is ignorance or obstinacy, not to be expected from Mill." The precepts and teachings of the N. T. prove this objection totally unfounded.

Then as to the loss of self-respect, obedience to God is not humiliating or degrading. Who has a greater right to respect himself than the man who is a child of God?

4. Christianity as an Ethical system, it is said, fails to recognize adequately some of man's most important relations, and is positively unfriendly to some of his highest interests.

Prof. Newman says, Christianity cramps human freedom. It treats the instinct or love of knowledge and beauty as illegitimate. In regard to family and private rights decisions are given which are seeds of pernicious errors. It disparages or omits duties to the state. It ignores the rights of men and nations, though it says much of the rights of kings and rulers. It supports lamentable superstitions, adverse to the progress of civilization.

(a) *Cramps freedom.* Answer: Christianity guards and guides, as well as maintains, human freedom. It rebukes and restrains license; it holds man to his place as a finite creature; does demand faith as the condition of certain kinds of knowledge. But within proper bounds Christianity protects man's freedom from his own and other's abuse of it, prescribes laws for it, and conditions of its working. It regulates the love and desire for knowledge and beauty.

Christianity is not to be held responsible for all the narrowness and short-sightedness exhibited by its exponents.

(b) *Pernicious errors.* E. g. Undue authority given to husbands, fathers and mothers at the expense of wives, children and servants, disparaging more than half of the human race, and robbing them of their freedom. True Christianity does not sanction modern philosophies which break down all distinctions. But it would not be hard to show how Christianity has formed and protects the Christian home. Because the precepts of N. T. are given to Christians, it is no reason why other men are not to be bound by them also. All men ought to be Christians. The historical effect of Christianity does not sustain these charges.

(c) Christianity represented as unfavorable to patriotic feeling and service to one's country. It either takes no notice of or disparages our duty to the state. (Lecky, Mill, Newman.)

True it does make less of the state than ancient philosophies. It does not say that man is a political animal, but this is to its credit. True that early Christians could not be faithful to the demands of the state, and at the same time to Christ.

They could not take part in idolatry and oaths contrary to Scripture. But where they were not called on to sacrifice principle they were most faithful. The charge now rests, chiefly upon there being little said in the N. T. about our duty to the state. Moreover it is said that obedience is exhorted to rulers rather than the state. It recognizes kings, however tyrannical, as ordained of God, but not nations or communities.

Lecky says, that patriotism as a duty has never found a place in Christian morals. He asserts,

(1) That strong religious feeling tends to divert the mind from terrestrial things; (2) that an organized church with a government of its own, an interest and a policy, and a frontier intersecting national boundaries, is unfavorable to national sentiment. Many denominations increases the difficulty.

(3) The saintly and heroic characters which represent the ideals of Christianity are essentially different. Religion develops the saintly and undermines the heroic.

Answer: We may admit that small space is given to this, and that Christianity does recognize two worlds,

the spiritual and secular. Yet we repel the charge and claim that no devotion to the state is so pure, no service so great, as that of the Christian.

Luthardt says, the man who is true to all his obligations in the higher sphere, will be truest to all the obligations of the lower. Christianity exhibits a better type of love than that of fellow country-men. All human affections are subordinated to love to Christ.

Francis William Newton in his "Phases of Faith," says, "the rights of those in authority are preserved and advanced by the morality of Christianity, at the expense of the nation or the individual subject. Christianity is always a main stay of tyranny and oppression."

Answer: Christianity does emphasize the sentiments that are most likely to be deficient, guards the rights most likely to be ignored. It aims to secure the stability of society. This is not gained by teaching men to always and everywhere insist on their *own* rights. Men must learn to give up much for the good of others.

Christianity throws its influence on the side which needs supporting. Yet it does not ignore the rights of subjects. It impresses rulers also, with a sense of their duties. Being ordained of God only shows their responsibility to God. The remedy for contempt of authority can come kindly, and efficiently, only from the side of religion.

Christianity not being a political system does not go into detail as to political duties. With its principle of love it inculcates also that of self-sacrifice, which supplies the underground for freedom, courage, and faithfulness.

(d.) It is charged that Christianity supports superstitions. Belief in ghosts, witchcraft.

We are willing to accept the responsibility of promoting belief in the existence of evil spirits, their malicious activity and our exposure to them, and the use of this belief to warn us. We don't deny the abuse of this teaching. We simply say it is neither equitable nor scientific in view of the great power of Christianity for good to make these charges. It is not Christians who abuse this belief.

(e.) Religious toleration.

What does Mr. Newman mean by toleration? He would have religious indifference. If he means that Christianity would encourage forcible interference in other men's beliefs, we deny it. If, that we interest ourselves in other's beliefs, in correcting the wrong, and spreading the truth, we admit it. He says, Christianity is favorable to intolerance because it teaches that God will visit with fiery vengeance those who hold an erroneous creed, hence Christians will come to have the same feeling toward those who do not so believe.

But that Christians have any warrant for this or have ever taken it, we deny.

(f.) Christianity is said to be adverse to the progress of civilization.

One form of this charge is from Matthew Arnold. He speaks of Hebraisms and Hellenisms. Hebraism i. e. Christianity, does less complete justice to man than Hellenism, i. e. culture.

Religion exercises and develops certain elements of man to the neglect of others. Hellenism is characterized by spontaneity of action and breadth of culture. The governing idea of culture is complete, symmetrical development. He admits in developing a full manhood that *discipline* should occupy the first place, which braces the moral powers, and furnishes a solid basis of character. The fault of religion is that it stops there. We want a fuller and more harmonious development of our humanity.

Celsus charged Christians long before with being indifferent to wisdom. "With holding that the wisdom that is in the world is an evil."

But Canon Farrar says Christianity made culture possible and saved the intellect of the world from selfishness, and an intoxicated form of pride, by putting it lower than the affections.

Culture cannot be perfected until a higher end than self is put before it. The N. T. insists that religion is to preside over and encompass all culture.

How shall a man make the most of himself? What shall he do with his culture, and why should he cultivate himself at all? Religion must answer these questions, not culture.

Some allege that the influence of Christianity is adverse to civilization. This is stronger than Arnold who holds that Christianity needs to be supplemented. In answer, we say, that no civilization has risen above Christian civilization.

Frothingham, and others, charge that Christianity teaches men to undervalue riches, and the industries which are the sources of civilization, and snaps the springs of human enterprise. It teaches man to keep the eye on the future life. *Ans.* If human industries are so selfish as this theory maintains they need to be snapped. Moreover we challenge them to prove that enterprises are not developed when men are laboring for something beside self. If man is to rise to the highest manhood, we claim he must live for God and a higher life.

5th. It is said that many of the assumptions, arguments and appeals of Christianity do not address themselves to man as man, but are only of force on the condition that Christianity is true.

If it contained fewer questioned truths and debated propositions, it would be better fitted to move all men. Many do not grant its postulates. It ought to take truths universally conceded if it would influence men. E. g. Christianity assumes that man is a fallen sinner. But here is a man who denies this, hence it is said Christianity has no force for him, and therefore it is not calculated to be the universal religion.

Ans. Are the communications of Christianity unnecessary or false? Is it to her discredit that she tells us we did not know? Tells us things we resent? Would its moral basis be improved, and its effectiveness increased if all that men would willingly receive as true were excinded? Is it not to its credit that it reveals us to ourselves even though the revelation is unwelcome?

There is practical need of more knowledge of ourselves, our wants and destiny. Here man is addressed as man needing Christianity. And in that condition which makes Christianity essential to him. We must be told the truth, disagreeable as it may be.

6th. The great Christian doctrine of Justification by Faith leads men to neglect an active and resolute morality and even to tolerate immorality.

We of course admit that this doctrine has been abused. Christianity teaches that the best works are not done for sake of being justified by them wholly or in part. That is not the truest love which goes forth to show itself as love. That is not the most genuine generosity which is always complimenting itself.

Benevolence loses itself in its object. So of all good affections and good works.

Some like Gregg hold that a better morality is secured when men are taught that there is no forgiveness. That sin has no punishment except natural consequences, yet these are inevitable hence cannot be forgiven. Teach men this and they have some inducement to guard against sinning. Brahmanism also teaches this.

It is only from revelation that man knows of other consequences of sin than the natural, but these men do not admit revelation. From the nature of things also, it is only from revelation that a hope of forgiveness is raised.

It is hard to see how a better morality would be secured by telling men that there is no forgiveness.

That after the first sin there is nothing but despair.

When the scriptures are so explicit in guarding this doctrine of justification by faith from abuse and teaching pure holiness, we are authorized in denying that it is the servant of sin.

7th. The Christian system influences men, too prominently and exclusively by considerations drawn from a future life; and so its powers are impaired over the moralities of this life. Gregg urges in his Creeds of Christendom that a "morbid condition of the soul is produced" and "insincere professions," a loss of earnestness in taking hold of the evils around us.

(a.) Christianity teaches only this, that a just proportion should be observed between things visible and invisible—things temporal and eternal. Keeping these in their proper ratio. It allows earthly things a place but demands that they be kept in their proper place.

Nature needs subduing only because, and in so far as, man is disposed to disregard this proportion.

(b.) Christianity teaches that when this just proportion is observed, the near, the visible, the temporal, receive

better care than when they are treated as man's chief and only concern.

The motives by which his actions are determined, and the laws by which they are regulated and the results achieved are better when this proportion is observed.

(c.) The fact that life is probationary, instead of lowering, exalts it. The fact that men deal here as stewards and not owners makes their actions more responsible and sacred, and brings to bear new motives.

(d.) Practically no men have discharged their temporal and social duties with more *consistent* and *persistent* diligence and fidelity, than those moved by the power of

ARGUMENTS FOR THE DIVINITY OF CHRISTIANITY DRAWN
FROM ITS MORAL CHARACTER.

Usually placed among the internal evidences, but so far are objective—since they belong to external evidences.

All the proofs of Christianity are moral, not demonstrative or intuitive.

Question. Does Christianity show in moral substance and structure such characteristics that we and our fellow men must accept it as the true, the authoritative and divinely sanctioned religion?

I. *First Argument.* The superiority of Christianity as a moral system appears in the precision and completeness with which it exhibits the facts that concern man's moral life.

The word superiority is used here in a very emphatic sense. It indicates a divine not a human authority. In this higher sense we claim a superiority. It is exhibited in three groups of facts.

(a.) Facts in reference to man's own nature, both in its design and in its actual condition.

(b.) Facts with reference to the relation which man sustains. Relations to all beings and things toward which he can act morally.

(c.) Facts with reference to the end to be secured in and by these relations, and by man's right moral action in them.

II. The superiority of Christianity appears in the way in which it awakens keeps, alive, and develops the sense of duty in most perfect symmetry. Instruction and en-

lightenment would avail little without the help of Christianity, arousing and purifying the moral impulses.

(a.) Man is continually confronted with the moral rectitude of God. This is one of the ways in which duty is kept alive.

(b.) The reach of man's responsibility is disclosed in Christianity as nowhere beside.

(c.) The sanctions and gracious provisions of Christianity are designed, among other things, to discipline and invigorate the moral sense.

III. Third argument formed by a combination of the two former. The superiority is manifested,

(a.) In the duties emphasized.

(b.) The basis on which it puts them.

(c.) The order in which it presents and urges them.

(d.) The mode in which it presses them upon us, so that by this very process which brings duty to view the moral sensibilities are awakened, and invigorated to the highest degree.

IV. In view of man's abnormal condition as a sinner, the superiority of Christianity is apparent in its exhibition of the conditions on which, and the means by which, a man may attain the end of his existence as a moral being.

The fact of man's ruin is presented most vividly, but along with it Christianity shows what God has done to lift him out of it, and hence man is not driven to despair, but is shown that the highest attainment of morality is the greatest and necessary proof of his grateful love, and the proper fruit of faith.

V. Superiority appears also in the motives which it employs for the attainment of its ends.

(a.) In general, as virtue is exhibited as conformity to the will of God, and supreme good, as consisting in fellowship or life with God. To set up the will of God as a standard secures immutability, elevation and consistency in the standard.

(b.) It is more characteristic of the motive elements and power of Christianity that it reveals the great love of God in Christ, so that whatever we do, we are to do it unto the Lord.

(c.) This superiority appears in its enhancing the significance and importance of all duty done here, and

all failure to do duty here, by connecting this life so closely with the future life, so that whatever we do here rightly has eternal recognition and reward and all failure and sin brings retribution and punishment eternal.

VI. Another token of superiority may be found in the fact that it insists so strenuously on the inward rather than the outward as essential in morality.

The disposition and intent. It demands the outward as the complexion of the inward, it does not begin with it. Incidentally this characteristic of Christianity secures the culture of self-examination—humility and sincerity.

VII. Another peculiar feature of the superiority of Christian Ethics is that the system makes chief use of the facts of individual experience and of history rather than of speculative and theoretical truths.

Prof. Blackie in his "*Four Phases of Morals*" compares Socrates and Christ. The one a help and guide, the other a foundation of faith and fountain of life.

Its general historical character and specific historical elements contribute much to the moral attractiveness and power of Christianity.

VIII. If we look distributively at the chief departments of practical and applied morals, at what has been called theistic, social and individual Ethics, we find still other proofs of the superiority of the Christian system and of its divine origin.

(a.) In regard to its exhibition of the duties which man owes to God we notice :

(1.) Its fuller disclosure of vital facts concerning God. His nature, relations and work with reference to us. This gives a broader and more solid basis to that class of duties which are specifically duties to God, as well as a greater definiteness, vividness and power to the duties themselves.

(2.) There is no duty that has not a side turned Godward.

God is recognized as having not only originally ordained, but as having a present concern in all man's duties.

(b.) The duties man owes to his fellow-man are put by Christianity distinctly on the basis of the universal Fatherhood of God—the common Brotherhood of man and the redeeming work of Christ.

(1.) All the relations of man to man are essential and permanent, are ordinances of God from the beginning; and are continually recognized and regulated in His dealings with men in all the successive stages of revelation. They are frequently dealt with by direct precept.

(2.) All the most transient relations of man to man, so far as legitimate, are brought under, and may be maintained under, the sanctions of His Word. A relation which cannot so exist and accomplish its purpose is shown to be wrong.

(3.) Christianity always accomplishes its main work in society through principles better than through precepts.

Every relation can be thus regulated by principles. These principles run through both dispensations, giving flexibility to the system and showing it suited to every age and human condition.

(4.) Christianity works for the regeneration of society, through the regeneration of the individual.

(c.) Man's duties to himself are not left on any merely selfish or utilitarian basis. The excellence of Christianity here appears.

(1.) In the dignity ascribed to man's origin.

(2.) In its representation of the expenditure of divine thought, love and sacrifice, of which it declares man the object.

(3.) In that which Christianity proposes to make of man. The future glory which awaits him. In one sense we cannot think too highly of ourselves.

IX. The weight of these moral arguments for the Divinity of Christianity is cumulative. It is to be estimated by the combined force of all. The combination being multiplicative, the conclusiveness of these arguments in such a combination, is more than their sum.

The moral results of Christianity as illustrations of its nature and proof of its divinity:

Chas. C. Hinnel: "It is not easy to say whether Christianity has done more good or evil in the world." He imputes to Christianity asceticism, and whatever other evils have passed under its name. He attributes to civilization much that we ascribe to Christianity. There is great difficulty in eliminating what is due to

Christianity in the great forces which combine to produce results. The problem is a complex one. But the unquestionable fruits of Christianity, leaving out the doubtful, are enough to prove our point.

Prof. Lecky gives three criteria of judging of progress in the moral condition of a country. (1) The changes that have taken place in the moral standard. (2) In the moral type. (3) The degree in which the ideal of moralists has been realized among the people. By moral standard, he means the degree in which in different ages, recognized virtues have been enjoined and practiced. By moral type, the relative importance attached to different virtues in different ages. The moral results of Christianity are tested:

1. With reference to the changes wrought by it in the moral judgments that have prevailed among men.

2. With respect to the changes wrought in the visible life of the world.

MORAL JUDGMENTS.

General remarks:—

A. We are prepared to expect that Christianity will work changes in the moral judgments of men, from the more intimate and indissoluble connection which it establishes between religion and morality.

Man's relation to God, in Homer and other classical writers, is legal and temporal rather than moral. There is no reference to the inmost spirit and dispositions. Religious motives were supplied for civic virtues, not for inward impurity.

Montesquien: "Paganism forbade only certain gross crimes, restraining the hand but neglecting the heart."

B. There is not only a more intimate relation established between religion and morality, but it is a religion of mutual helpfulness. The more powerful influence goes forth from religion.

Schmid traces the moral importance of Paganism:

(1) To the nature of Polytheism, which detracts and weakens both religion and morality.

(2) To the low and corrupting representations which crowded mythology, art and worship.

Lecky: "Ancient Rome produced many heroes but no saints." Such was the influence of paganism, while that of Christianity is directly and powerfully helpful to morality, sensibility and judgment, penetrating to the moral essence of sin and holiness; bringing new meaning and power to the old terms evil, good, conscience, &c.

C. Group 1st. Illustrations of the new moral judgments developed by Christianity:

I. We notice the new estimate which Christianity led each individual man to put on himself and others. It is the claim of Christianity to have created the idea of humanity. It first declared what it was to be a man. This new estimate led to greater self-respect, and also to the renouncing of unholy conceit and pride, because we constantly see how far short we fall of the standard. This would and did prevent men from putting their powers to low uses, and from sinking into degrading associations:

a. New views are given to man of the sanctity of human life. Suicide had been commended by ancient religions, philosophies and examples. But Christianity pronounced it self-murder. Abortion and infanticide were very prevalent crimes, justified by legislators. Lycurgus said that weaklings should be put out of the way. Christianity stamps this as murder. Paganism sanctioned gladiatorial combats, which Christianity from the first resisted and condemned. Lecky regards the abolition of this amusement as one of the most signal triumphs of Christianity.

b. Christianity taught the world to attach a new value to *chastity*. The ancient religions had contributed to the demoralization of society. The system of slavery and other agencies led to every imaginable form of pollution. Christianity came, demanding purity everywhere; in the home and marriage relations; between man and man. The human body was made more sacred by the incarnation of Christ. Men and women are exhorted to become fit temples for the Holy Ghost. Purity was made essential to self-respect.

c. Christianity taught men to put a new value on *veracity*. The self-respect of the individual man and the interests of society were thus enhanced and guarded.

Plato and the Stoics under certain conditions justified lying. Lecky says, that the influence of Christianity is not entirely favorable to veracity. He makes three forms of veracity :

(1) Industrial, i. e., fidelity to engagements and statements. It touches the practical industries of life.

(2) Political, which, in matters of controversy and public interest, would have all opinions, arguments and facts fairly stated.

(3) Philosophical, which pursues truth for its own sake. It desires to estimate truth for just what it is. It cultivates a judicial spirit in controversy. These forms are emphasized in proportion to the growth of civilization.

He represents the theological spirit as an adversary to progress, in retarding the growth of the last two forms. It prompts the repression of all opinions and facts not in accord with common faith. "Indeed," he says, "Christian veracity deserves to rank with Punic faith." But the very reverse is true. Christianity has exalted veracity to what it was not before. The Roman satirists comment on this want of good faith in their time. Pliny says, the oath of the Christian was to avoid theft, adultery and falsehood.

(d) Christianity creates the new virtue of *humility*. Life acquires a new sacredness, so that man has reason to think more of himself. Christianity never suffers man to reproach himself, nor reproaches him with the fact that he is a dependent creature. It does show him to be a sinner, and charges him to humble himself on that account; requiring him in this regard to consent to the verdict of reason and conscience. Modest estimates of self were seldom inculcated in heathen philosophy, but even then, it was for natural and moral reasons. Appollonius.

D. Group 2nd. Changes which Christianity produced in man's estimate of certain common and often inevitable conditions of human life.

LABOR was regarded as a hindrance to public life, degrading and impairing virtue. Plato, Aristotle, Socrates and the historians all notice and comment on this. They said that labor was remanded to a particular class ;

that it blunted virtue and intelligence, and must be done by slaves. Christianity reinstates labor in the respect of the world, and shows it worthy of men of all ranks. No redistribution of property could have been as valuable to the world as this exaltation of labor. This view of it was commended by eminent Christian examples. Adam, unfallen, was put in the garden to care for it. The Apostles inculcated the duty and the honor of labor. It was brought into close connection with Christian charity and so ennobled. It is the Christian's duty to labor that he may have something to give.

POVERTY.—A no less prominent and beneficent change was wrought by Christianity in the idea of poverty. Greece and Rome pronounced it dishonorable. Juvenal's third satire expressed the common opinion of his age. "The gods waste no thunderbolts on a poor man." Plato taught that the children of poor men were no better than bastards, and a poor man has no right to increase his class. The poor, as poor, are not entitled to relief, for to show kindness to a poor man was only to prolong his misery.

Schmid says, that it was necessary to reinstate manhood and to rehabilitate labor; to teach the rich to respect the poor, and the poor to respect himself, and to be content with his lot. Christ ennobled poverty, for he was poor. Christianity works in two ways: first, inwardly in the hearts of the poor themselves; second, outwardly in producing sympathy, respect and charity. It removes the stigma from poverty. "To the poor the Gospel is preached."

E. Group 3rd. New estimates put on man's relations and duties to his fellow man.

Illustrations may be taken from three departments:

a Christianity implied, demanded and promoted a new value of family relations and duties, and of the nature and work of home; especially the place of the wife and mother in the home. Not only among savages, but under Grecian and Roman culture, woman was greatly disparaged and despised. Her physical feebleness and incapacity to serve the state, put her down with the children, the slaves and the poor. She was endured because of her sex and not for her hu-

manity. In the family which existed for the perpetuation of the state, she had no influence, or value, except as a necessity for this end.

Some have attributed the ruin of ancient civilization to the low estimate of woman. It was one of the chief causes. Among the Hebrews she had a higher place.

Christianity gives her the respect due to her as made in the image of God, redeemed by the blood of Christ and made the temple of the Holy Ghost. In her human relations, she is represented not as the burden, but as the glory of man, sharing with him the honors and responsibilities of home.

Monogamy is insisted upon; adultery and concubinage denounced. Gratitude had something to do with the welcome given to Christianity by woman.

(b) Christianity developed new interpretations of *justice* and *equity*, wherever their principles found application among men. Not only in the family, but everywhere, it gives new force to these ideas.

Justice and equity are not measured by the law or by the standard of a community. Man is to live righteously as well as soberly and godly. There are three elements of Christianity which contribute to this change:

1. The new views which Christianity takes and demands of the nature and intrinsic worth of the parties in any transaction.

2. The new aspect given to the fact that God has instituted these relations, and has a purpose in them.

3. In the new spirit and principle implanted in man to interpret his responsibilities.

Christianity disclosed, in a sense created, the very idea of humanity, and all the relations of Christianity were made in relation to the good of humanity. Love is made the impelling, regulating principle of life. Justice and equity are to be construed by love. Who is my neighbor, if all are alike in creation, in redemption, in dependence on grace?

Christianity regulates our use of our freedom, what we may or may not do. The transient duties are distinguished from the permanent. We are to love our neighbors as ourselves. The selfish idea of measuring

duty by mere justice is done away. It is not mere legal indebtedness. Love is made the expounder of written as well as unwritten obligation.

In the state, Christianity taught new lessons of what rulers owe to subjects, and what subjects owe to rulers. It does not presume to prescribe the form of government; it strikes at selfishness and caprice in the interpretation of the rights of rulers, and at the lawlessness and servility of subjects. The state is made a means, not an end. Old systems made it the end to which even the family was subordinate. As rulers, men exist for God and the people, and not for self.

It is objected that between the consideration demanded by Christianity for all men as men, and the specific and intense love demanded of Christians for Christian brethren, the breath of life is crushed out of patriotism.

In the provision made for the mutual fidelity of ruler and ruled, we have the best safeguard of patriotism. In the family, Christianity defined more perfectly and consecrated more fully all the existing relations, and the mutual obligations of its members. (Troplong, "Influence of Christianity among the Romans.")

Christianity strikes with the same blow, adultery which provokes divorce, and divorce which provokes adultery, and puts the conjugal bond above the caprice of man.

One of the sternest judgments which Paul passed on the heathen world was that it is without natural affection; and this is justified. Children were a species of property. Troplong says, the relation of blood is dead and passive. Vico says, that in order that parentage may make itself heard, it must put on the civil mask. The mere relation of father is important.

Schmid: "The children belonged to the father and he was to consult only the public interest. He might sell or capitally punish them. Christianity confers rights on children, and duties on parents and *vice versa*."

Troplong pictures the conflict between a father on the one hand, and children, wife and slaves on the other, under the empire when the father had been stripped of much of his authority. Hence Christianity was charged with teaching the insubordination of wife and children,

subverting order, loosening the bonds between slave and master, child and parent. This charge in the face of the fact that love was already beginning, as a new bond, to exert its reforming influence in the family.

Into the mutual relation between masters and servants, new ideas are introduced. In the old Roman law the most valuable property was lands, slaves, and beasts used in assisting men.

Cato: "Our slaves are our enemies." Nero, strange to relate, is the first to recognize rights of slaves; he charged magistrates to receive complaints of slaves against their masters. Seneca alone, in his day, vindicated the humanity of slaves. Paul: (Col. 4:1) "Masters give unto your servants that which is just and equal; knowing that ye also have a Master in heaven." (Comp. Eph. vi, 9.)

It has been said that the master needed Christianity more than the slave.

Schmid: In a society in which all men are equal and actuated by love, free service will be one effect, and slavery an accident, which, under the principle at work, will gradually be removed.

Lecky: Slavery was recognized, but Christianity introduced three principles: the new order of relation between master and slave, the moral dignity which attaches to the slave, and the moral impetus to enfranchisement of the slave.

Christianity so transformed and developed, that it may almost be said to have *created*, charity.

In the least remarkable form it led men to relieve the wants of the brethren. Even this was unknown before; for the conception of a moral obligation to relieve those of the same faith was new to heathendom. But charity reached far beyond the bounds of common faith and owned the bonds of a simple human brotherhood, manifested in its strongest form in love to *enemies*.

Fruits of Christian principle appeared and those watching testified to their wide-spread influence, so that heathen observers wondered. During the persecution in Carthage, Christians relieved those dying of the plague, imperiling their own lives.

Julian said: These godless Galileans nourish not only

their own poor, but also ours, inviting them to their love feasts and attracting them as children with cakes.

Tertullian : To love friends is common to all ; to love *enemies* peculiar to Christians alone.

This teaching of Christianity grew out of the new views which Christianity exemplified and inculcated with regard to the very nature of charity.

Heathenism did not cherish charity even in the family. Christianity wonderfully refined the sensibilities, and purified the emotional nature. Charity was built on the deeper foundation of principle, love to God being the general motive, love to Christ the more specific.

Aristotle, in his Ethics, says, that friendship cannot exist without mutual love, which cannot be conceived of on the part of the Supreme Being. It would sound strangely for one to say he loved Zeus.

Christ's identification of himself with the poor and the poor with himself, gave new meaning to charity. Christianity, Lecky says, effected a complete reformation by showing the identification of the poor with its founder.

Human brotherhood has been a dream of some heathen philosophers but never a reality ; we find feeble indications of it in the classics.

Terence : " I am a man, and nothing that belongs to man do I count foreign to myself."

" Christo in pauperibus," an old inscription testifying to the union of the poor with Christ.

Christ had shown that the love of enemies was not a mere negative thing, but a positive love.

The Indian books which are extolled by free religionists, are found on examination to be very defective, and the virtues commended, they could not make vital.

On the other hand Christians began immediately to practice, not merely to quote the teachings of Christ.

II. Is there anything to show that the ideal has been realized ; that Christianity wrought actual changes in the life of men ? Was it true that men merely gained a new conception of virtue, and not the power to practice it ?

What changes have been wrought in the visible life of the world?

What was an *ideal* good, has been made a *real* good. The world is no more what it was before Christianity came. It is not necessary to show either that nothing but Christianity was tending in the direction of this improvement, or that the designed result was at once or is yet fully reached.

We need only show that Christianity has done something toward great changes, not attempted before. It is enough if we cannot account for these beneficial results without Christianity, while on the other hand we can account for the incompleteness of the results without making Christianity responsible.

Some considerations.

a. The estimate put on man as man.

(1) Did Christianity practically, and not merely in theory teach that life is sacred? Lecky (not over fond of Christianity) pronounces it one of the most important services of Christianity, that it definitely and dogmatically asserted the sinfulness of all destruction of human life. (European Morals, vol. ii, p. 21.)

(2) As to chastity, the world is much purer than it was without Christianity. Sanctity and purity are secured to the marriage relation by Christianity.

(3) Veracity, fidelity. Illustrated by a single fact. The European Constantine Chloras, father of Constantine the Great, surrounded himself with Christians because of their fidelity. To test them, he one day gave them the alternative of renouncing their faith, or losing their position. Most kept their faith. These he restored to their positions, while he dismissed the others, saying, that those who would betray their God would betray man.

(4) *Humility*.—Christianity did not merely add humility to the catalogue of virtues, but gave it as an actual power.

Lecky says, that humility is the crowning grace of all the saintly type of graces. Though he thinks there is another type of graces, a wholesome pride. There was a danger of humility leading to servility. This is questionable. James says, that God resisteth the proud.

Philosophical pride is not the parent and guide of so many virtues as Mr. Lecky claims. Man cannot wear two faces, humble toward God and proud toward man.

Christianity had a double victory to gain, not merely to conquer the defects and shams of society, but chiefly to gain a victory over every heart, to enable each man to conquer himself.

b. The change wrought by Christianity in the world's estimate of labor and poverty. Consult Neander, Church History, i, §3; also Memorials of Christian Life; Merivale's Conversion of the Roman Empire, also Conversion of Northern Nations (Boyle Lectures); Pressensé's Martyrs and Apologists of Christianity.

c. To what extent Christianity wrought a change in man's relation to man. (See Pliny's Letter to Trajan.)

Free religionists call attention to the tenderness of Hindooism toward animals, and some German replies that it builds hospitals for sick cows, but burns widows and throws children into the Ganges.

Bearing of Christian missions on the evidence that Christianity is from God.

There are two questions.

(1) Are Christian missions a normal characteristic, and necessary outgrowth of Christianity?

If so (2) what do missions prove as to Christianity?

1. The work undertaken and prosecuted in the precise line of the parting commission of Christ to his church, as well as in the line of other teachings of His. (Matt. 28: 19, 20.)

One essential feature is the acknowledgment of Christ's supremacy and what he says is to be done, for he is not only Redeemer but Lord. The church is not to be merely a preaching and teaching church, but a going church.

Not merely to teach, and preach to those lying hardening in sin, about our doors or within a Sabbath day's journey, but to go into all the world. So far forth as the church is doing this, she is doing what is an *essential* part of Christianity.

Effectual doors are opened by Providence. The church must be ready to enter in when the door is opened, and not be taken by surprise.

2. The work of missions is a fitting and necessary manifestation of the spirit of Christ, as imparted to the church and dwelling in it.

This spirit would prompt the church to mission work, even without the commission; if any man have not the spirit of Christ he is none of His, so also of the church.

Where this spirit is the same motives and aims must prevail as were in Christ. Not merely *must* I go, but *may* I go.

3. The work of Christian missions is a work of intelligent obedience to Christ and Christ-like love of men, directed towards and adapted to advance the Christian dispensation.

The Christian dispensation is the manifestation of the glory of God, of the glory of God's grace, of God's grace in saving, grace in saving men, saving men through Christ, through Christ to everlasting salvation.

4. Those who receive the Gospel hold it in part as a trust for others. Paul was a debtor to the Jews and Gentiles. So every disciple owes the Gospel to others. Christian intelligence regards it as due to others.

5. Another proof is found in the fact that the early church full of the Spirit of the Lord and fresh from the teachings of Christ was pre-eminently a mission church. So every church in proportion to its fullness of the spirit of Christ.

The English church was charged by a Pope as not being a true church because it was not a missionary church. (This was some years ago.)

It is not so much the presence of the mission spirit and work that needs to be accounted for, as the absence of it when wanting.

The church that is not going and preaching must tell why.

Objections against this view of the vital and essential union of missions with Christianity.

Objections from Catholicism (1) the Catholic church asserts that the Protestant body not being the church of Christ, has neither the right nor the divine call, so that the work must be spurious. (2) It calls upon Protestants to unity of faith before they go out to disturb the nations with diverse beliefs.

It is not necessary to answer the objection that such work must be begun "from Jerusalem," since Christ commanded them "beginning from Jerusalem." The work at home must not be perfected before a foreign is begun. Where should we be if the church had always taken care only of the work at home. *It is further objected*, missions are an artificial graft on the original stock of the Reformed Church, alien to its nature arising from narrow views of man's condition without the gospel. They are peculiar to one type of the Reformed faith—the pietistic—originating with Wesley and Whitefield. As to the age of missions they are as old as the apostles, and as to their being alien to the spirit of the Reformation it only shows that the Reformation needed reforming, if it were true, which it is not. Modern Protestant missions date from the Reformation.

When, if these views are antiquated, did they become so? They are the views of the Apostle Paul. In whose judgment are these views of the appropriateness of the gospel to all narrow views?

As catholicism denies the call of the church to missionary effort, rationalism denies its *duty*. Rationalism maintains that it is not the duty of Christians, that even if it were, Christianity is not adapted to accomplish the desired result.

II. What do missionary results as so far developed prove in regard to Christianity?

1. The gospel message can be carried to all nations. The commission so far as it concerns the delivery of the message in the speech that men use, can be fulfilled.

Many languages have first been reduced to writing in order to carry the gospel.

A Danish writer calls attention to the fact that but 60 years ago translations had been made only in the Semitic languages, Greek, Latin, Lithuanian, Celtic &c., while now in almost every language and dialect. Dr. Moffatt found words among the lowest classes in South Africa that had had a purer and better meaning. No language of earth refuses to have the story of the cross told in it.

Philologists often have to come to the Christian missionary for information in their field and sometimes only to turn around against the mission cause.

The question how shall I preach the gospel is rightly answered only when localized and individualized.

If the gospel is in the heart a way will be found to express it. You must first have the gospel in your own heart, then find out where among the people the altar "to the unknown god" is.

2. The gospel message can reach and move the hearts of men all the world over.

This shows it is from God. Though not co-extensive with the earth it is broad enough to allow the induction. Renan scoffs at the idea of disturbing the South-Sea Islanders in their simplicity. A strange innocency!

3. The gospel message when received can produce its legitimate and appropriate fruit on every soil under heaven. The gospel is full of vital and regenerating power, and missionaries are encouraged to send it further on, beyond their own stations. Societies are formed among converts. It must not be forgotten how long it took Christianity to revolutionize the German and Celtic nations. The work of purifying is slow of necessity. The cause for amazement is not that it is so slow but so rapid.

4. Secondary and secular results of the reception of the gospel message are a boon whose equal cannot be found in connection with any other agency.

Good that culture never could accomplish. Gospel alone can be relied on to produce endurance and persistent struggles against evil. (So Prof. Nitzsch shows.) See Dr. Ellinwood's "Great Conquest."

Objections. 1. From scientific anthropology. The whole theory and practice of foreign missions rests on false views concerning the relations of human races.

Such persons hold to the inequality of the human races, frank enough to renounce Christianity with missions. Since missions assume that God has made of one blood all nations, and Christianity also rests on this, then the overthrow of the one involves the other.

This objection, in an unscientific form, is as old as Celsus; he asked, who can believe it possible that the same religion is suited to Europe, Asia and Africa?

2. It is foolish to carry Christianity before civilization. First civilize then carry the gospel.

a. The word "civilize" Christ failed to introduce into his great commission.

b. Experience proves that civilization is not necessary. Among some savage nations the gospel has more effect, so that these objectors turn around and say it is suited only for savages.

c. Christianity is the only effectual civilizer. The testimony of the report of the committee appointed by the House of Commons, of learned Englishmen, who searched history for many years and reported that there never has been a satisfactory civilization apart from Christianity.

3. Practically, Christianity has proved itself in connection with mission work, to be ill adapted to heathen nations. They put their heathen idols under the altar. The restraints of Christianity is killing off the natives.

4. Practically Christianity has made but little impression on the stronger nations, viz: India and China.

Some time ago there was some truth in this, but not now. We should remember that in China we have but one missionary to every one and a half million.

5. As compared with some other religions, Christianity has shown greatly inferior power for impressing men, especially in Asia and Africa. True to some extent—and this is an argument in favor of Christianity which does not pander to human depravity.

6. Economical — Christianity involves tremendous expense. A person objected to the writer that it cost \$50,000 to convert one soul in India. It is not true, for facts show that in proportion to the outlay, foreign missions are more successful than the home work. But if true, Christ set a higher value than that on a human soul.

FINIS.

ANALYSIS OF APOLOGETICS.

PROLEGOMENA.

INTRODUCTION.

Preliminary questions.

1. Why do I believe I am a Christian ?
2. Why a Christian in belief ?

Answer to 1 lies (a) in past experience, (b) in present. Answer to 2, from (a) early education, (b) enlightened choice.

Reasons for Study of Apologetics.

(a) Self-respect. (b) Loyalty to fellow-men. (c) For our times especially, it is the question of the day. (d) Personal composure and confidence.

Practical Aims of Apologetics.

1. Justification and confession of our faith.
2. Better qualification to commend.
3. Fuller confidence in defending.

Definition of Apologetics.

(a) "That part of Theology which vindicates the right of Theology in general, and of Christian Theology in particular, to exist as a science." (Partial.) (b) "That which sets forth the historical credentials of Christianity." (c) Science which sets forth the principles according to which Christianity is to be defended. (d) That branch of Theol. Science which sets forth the proofs that the claims of Christianity as a religion are justified. Term *Apologetics* ambiguous.

Relative Position of Apologetics.

Some : In Practical Theology. Others : before Systematic Theology.

Literature.

Specific Apologetics for each age. Scientific and Practical Apologetics. Fundamental Apologetics and Christian Apologetics proper.

Kind of Evidence.

Logical ; metaphysical ; historical.

THESIS : *That Christianity is the true divinely sanctioned and authoritative religion for us, and for all men.*

II.

CHRISTIANITY AS A RELIGION.

Christianity not the only religion. What is a religion? Definition reached.

(1) Etymologically—*religio*—from *religere*, to reconsider, rather than from *religare*, to refind. ῥησικεία from either (a) θράς, (b) τρέω, (c) θρέω. O. T. gives no specific term.

(2.) Historically. Examine religions.

(3.) Philosophically—by induction of facts.

Definitions of Religion.

1. PHILOSOPHICAL.

“Observance of moral law as Divine ordinance.”—(Kant.) “Faith in moral order of universe.”—(Fichte.) “A priori theory of universe.”—(H. Spencer.)

2. THEOLOGICAL.

“A mode of knowing and worshipping God. Relation of Revelation to man, and of man to it. Relation of man to superhuman powers in which he believes.”

“Man’s life in personal communion with God.”

“A mode of knowledge, thought, feeling, action, which has the divine for object, ground and aim.” (Proper and complete).

Advantages of last defence (a) includes all particulars, (b) recognizes divine as object, (c) general yet applicable to specific religions.

Divisions of Prolegomena.

- I. Phenomenology of Religion.
- II. Psychology.
- III. Different theories of origin.
- IV. Criteria.
- V. Relations to morality.
- VI. Significance.

I. PHENOMONOLOGY OF RELIGION.

1. *Subject of Religion.*

- A. Man—not other creatures.
- B. All men—not some only.
- C. Essential characteristics of man.
- D. Belongs to conscious voluntary phases of human life.
- E. Belongs to man as moral agent.

2. *Object of Religion.*

The Divine. God of the SS, not of Positivism.

3. *Actual Manifestations of Religion.*

- A. Phenomena of public worship.
 - (1.) Places set apart to worship.
 - (2.) Observances of worship.
 - (3.) Priesthoods.

III.

- B. Phenomena in private life. Household gods—family worship.
- C. Creeds :—Philosophical, doctrinal, mythological, without any form.
- D. The social element in Religion. The *world's* religions.

4. *Types of the world's Religions.*

Principle of classification : conception of the divine as an object of worship.

A. RELIGIONS OF NATURE.

(1.) *Non-mythological.*

- (a). Fetichism.
- (b). Shamanism.
- (c). Element worship.
- (d). Power worship in nature, and ancestor worship.

(2.) *Mythological.*

(a). Objects of worship : external nature personified and deified. *A*.—Old Indian rels. *B*.—Baal, Astarte, Moloch-worship. *C*.—Egyptian religion.

(b). Human ideas personified and deified. *A*.—Greek and Roman religions. *B*.—Persian relig. *C*.—Old German rel. *D*.—Buddhisam.

A. SUPERNATURAL RELIGIONS.

(3.) *Super-mythological.*

- (a) Judaism.
- (b) Christianity.
- (c) Mohammedanism.

Differences between (a) and (b). (1). In fulness of divine manifestation. (2). In degree of doctrinal development. (3). In measure of realization of intended results.

Other classifications ; criteria ; Historical development, suitability, political influence, nature of worship.

II. PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION.

Preliminary—(a). spiritual oneness of man. (b). Necessity of generalizing to cover all religions.

1. *How many and which faculties exercised.*

- (a). Intelligence : guard against ultra intellectualism,
- (b). Emotion : but guard against ultra emotionalism.
- (c). Will : yet will not the seat of religion.
- (d). Conscience : yet religion does not originate in conscience.

2. *The order of Psychological development.*

Question between Intelligence and Emotion. True order : (a). Discovery of relations between man and God. (b). Recognition of feelings corresponding to the relations.

Guard against : (a). Theories tending to Pantheism.

(b). Theories implying that feeling is cognitive.

(c). Theories ignoring or subordinating either cognitions or sentiments in religion.

III. THEORIES OF ORIGIN OF RELIGION.

The Natural Development Theory.

(2). Atheism. (2). Fetichism. (3). Nature worship. (4). Shamanism. (5). Idolatry. (6). Principle worship. (7). Theism and Pantheism. This unscientific as well as unscriptural.

IV.

- Herbert Spencer*: (a). Man comes to dualism in nature.
(b). To idea of supernatural in ghosts.
(c). To Ancestor worship.
(d). Idolatry and Fetichism.
(e). Animal and plant worship.
(f). Worship of Deities.

Specific Theories.

- A. Political Theory.
B. Physical Theory.
C. Selfish Theory.
D. Theory of primitive supernatural revelation.
E. Theory of Supplemental Revelation.

IV. CRITERIA OF RELIGION.

(1). *The traditional or prescriptive right of any religion to exist.*

(2). *Truth to Reason.*

(a). Is the system consistent in itself? (b). Does it harmonize with the world's constitution? (c). Does it meet the needs of man?

(3). *Truth to Moral Nature.*

Additional modern tests.

(4). *Practical Test.*

(a). Effects on the intelligence. (b). On the emotional nature. (c). On Æsthetical nature. (d). Other practical effects.

(6). *Special Divine Attestations.*

Objected that attestations are superfluous, impossible, improbable, not sustained by evidence.

(a). Not superfluous: from history of world and present condition.

(b). Not impossible: from Omnipotence of God.

(c). Not improbable: from Benevolence of God exhibited in provisions in nature.

V. RELATIONS OF RELIGION AND MORALITY.

1. *Historical.*

(a) That there are such relations. (b) What they are. (c) Their measure and direction.

2. *Theoretical.*

Define Religion and Morality in their mutual relation, according to Martensen. This varies and so we have *Philosophical* ethics; *Theoretical* ethics; *Christian* ethics; *Social* ethics; *Political* ethics; origin of ideas (a). of duty, (b). of virtue, (c). of supreme and subordinate good.

What are the Relations of M. and R.?

6 views.

A. one includes the other.

(1). Morality merged in religion.

(2). Religion merged in morality.

B. (3). Each held distinct and essential and independent of each other.

- C. Both fundamental and primary, yet one subordinate to the other.
 (4). Religion fundamental, morality subordinate.
 (5). Morality primary, religion secondary.
 D. (6). Both as essential and necessary to each: therefore co-ordinate.

Points of Agreement and Divergence.

AGREEMENT.

- (1). Both in having their ground in human constitution.
 (2). Both refer to external objects with real, valid claims.

DIFFERENCES.

- (3). In respect of relative position of their objects.
 (4). In quality of their claim. Will of a person in religion: Abstract right in morality.

3. *Practical Relations.*

Religion and morality to supplement and support each other.

VI. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF RELIGION.

1. *Of what consequence is it that one should be religious?*

Completeness of manhood demands it.
 Causes of irreligion.

(a). Brutalized life. (b). Indifference. (c). Vividness of pressure of material and secular interests. (d). Positive disinclination to religious life. (e). Reaction against prevalent abuses. (f). Legitimate logic of false speculative reasoning.

2. *Of what consequence that one should be rightly religious?*

There is a right and wrong in everything else, much more so in religion; natural religion points to right religion.

CHRISTIAN APOLOGETICS.

Christianity in Particular.

Christianity is the system announced, established, provided for in Scriptures.—Characteristics.

1. Christianity is a revealed religion.
2. Christianity is a historical religion.
3. Christianity is a positive religion.
4. Christianity is a rational religion.
5. Christianity is an ethical religion.
6. Christianity is a world's religion.
7. Christianity distinctly adapted to special conditions.
8. Christianity claims a Personal Founder in a special sense.
9. Christianity combines its doctrinal and vital elements.
10. Christianity is an exclusive religion.
11. Christianity is the final religion.

OBJECTIONS.

(1). God has not exhausted his resources. (2). Disparaging to ourselves. Ans.—(a) All rightful antecedents point to Christianity; it and no successor. (b) It reaches the utmost wants of men. (c) Brought to the world by the Son of God. Who shall bring a better religion.

EVIDENCES OF CHRISTIANITY.

General Considerations on Evidence.

1. Is the establishment of the proof of Christianity within the reach of evidence? No intrinsic difficulty in God's revealing or man's apprehending revelation.

2. What kind of evidence will establish it? There are three kinds: (a) Intuitive; (b) Demonstrative; (c) Experiential, probable or moral evidence.

Last differs from others (1). In depending on experience. (2) Admitting of degrees of conclusiveness. (3). Involving balancing of contrary proofs. (4). Involving responsibility.

Christianity not to be known intuitively as demonstrating therefore established by experimental evidence. Sources of this: (a) Consciousness. (b) The Senses. (c) Memory. (d) Testimony. Chief source of evidence for Christianity must be Testimony. Testimony is received by a law of our nature not from experience. Criteria of a historical assertion. (a) That it alone explains the report. (b) That it is what should be expected. (c) To be tested by rules of conditional or continuing influences. (Ueberweg).

Various hypotheses tenable to account for historical assertions. (a). That the event did happen and was observed. (b). That the observation influenced by false apprehension. (c). That report influenced by false apprehension. (d). Recollection untrue. (e). Imagination influenced transmitters. (f). Recorded in spirit and for purpose of romance. (g). Purpose to deceive.

Relative value of kinds of testimony.

(1). Eye witness trustworthy provided he has (a). competence, (b). opportunity and (c). character. Many eye witnesses better than one when (1). they are independent. (2). Not influenced by same deception. (3). Not affected by same prejudice.

(2). Secondary witnesses judged partly by same tests but chiefly by their relations to original eye witnesses.

(3). Later witnesses untrustworthy when (a), there is a personal interest, (b). a lack of competence, opportunity or character.

RAWLINSON'S CANONS.

I. Record by contemporary and credible witness is of highest historical credibility.

II. Record by one reasonably supposed to have obtained directly from those who witnessed is of second degree of historical credibility.

III. Record by later writers source of information being chiefly tradition if event is of nature of public transaction notorious and affected propriety of national life it is probably true at least in general outline.

IV. Tradition of one race corroborated by another especially distant or hostile, constitutes third degree of credibility less than first class of evidence and nearly equal to second.

3. *What degree of assurance can moral evidence give?*

a. Not philosophical certitude. b. But certitude in moral or popular sense.

Note. Distinction between *subjective* and *objective* certitude and subjective and objective evidence.

c. Moral evidence only void, entailing moral responsibility.

4. *What mental conditions necessary to estimating moral evidence?*

(a). Attention. (b). Effort to apprehend. (c). Vigilance, to guard against perversion. (d). Equity.

5. *What moral conditions essential to treatment of moral evidence?*

(a) Apprehension of moral responsibility. (b) Humility. (c) Prayerfulness, even in the light of nature alone. (d) Willingness to abide by result.

6. *What kind of moral evidence offered in favor of Christianity?*

Old classification: (a) Internal. (b) External. (c) Collateral.

New classification:

A. Historical.

B. Philosophical.

HISTORICAL EVIDENCES.

1. *Nature and claim of Christianity as a Historical Religion.*

2. *Reasons for first considering Historical Evidence.*

- (1). The *idea* of Christianity came to the world historically.
- (2). Many elements in *idea* are historical facts.
- (3). Philosophical argument more earnestly conducted after the establishment of historical truth.
- (4) Christianity an actual reality; historical fact to be explained.
- (5.) Christianity suffers where historical claims are not urged.

3. *Historical Christianity as a fact to be accounted for.*

Christianity exists and has existed. Historical existence of Christianity is not disputed. Paul's four epistles, (Rom., Gal., I and II Cor.) admitted. Facts alluded to: How came these to be believed? Five indisputable facts.

- (a). That in 25 A. D., Christian society had no existence.
- (b). In 40 A. D., it was in vigorous growth
- (c). It was founded by Jesus Christ.
- (d) Crucifixion by Roman governor caused a collapse in this society.
- (e) An event taking place soon after imparted new life.

These facts were abundantly verifiable: Late sources of information. (1). Recorded personal observation (2) oral tradition, (3) written documents, (4) monumental institutions, observances and emblems, (5) significant charges and omissions.

Hypotheses propounded to account for these facts.

- A. That of their reality.
- B. Other hypotheses, viz: 1. Legendary. 2. Mythical. 3. Innocent deception. 4. Willful deception,

1. *Legendary Hypothesis.*

Historical belief rests to great extent on vague, unverified body of legends. Argument: Fact that there is in every people a body of oral legends. Answer: Christianity not based on oral statements but written documents. Paul, 10 years after death of Christ, could not have used legends as he does facts of Christianity.

2. *Mythical Hypothesis*

Must (a) dispose of gospel narrative, (b) of gospel history in narrative (c) of character of Christ.

In regard to (a) the theory is unsatisfactory. (1). Cannot account for myths.

(a.) Assumption that historical movements excite myth-making spirit.

(b) Christianity beginning where, when and as it did not call forth myth-making.

(c) Apocryphal books do not show this tendency.

(d) Where did Christ's followers get such ideas as made the germ of the alleged myths.

(e) After myths had been created, there would be a difficulty to impose them.

(2). The myths cannot account for the facts. The change wrought in ideas of Messiah.

3. *The hypotheses of deception.*

(1). Unconscious deception.

(2). Wilful deception.

(a). So far as refers to Christ. Unconscious deception; reconciliation to facts is impossible. Wilful deception also.

(b). So far as it refers to Apostles in either case the conduct of the men is to be accounted for; the difficulties in their way; the character, circumstances, marvelous appearance of honesty.

Apply these hypotheses to the resurrection. The hypothesis of reality accounts for: (1). The narrative. (2). The character and conduct of first disciples. (3). The rise of Christianity.

(a). The theory of legend or myth cannot account for when, where and how the narrative arose and how it supplanted the original and true record without leaving traces of the struggle.

(b). The theories of deception, that of designed deception is too violent and therefore universally abandoned; that of unconscious deception assumes either, (1). that the disciples mistook somebody else for Christ for a long time or (2). that they mistook the hallucination, of their imaginations. This last is the favorite. Assumes a greater miracle than that of the resurrection.

THE CHRISTIAN SCRIPTURES.

1. *The SS. as a source of information concerning Christianity.*

(1). They are not the only source of information.

(2). They are not merely a source of information.

(3). Christianity is closely identified with them.

(4). Decision in regard to them can't be a matter of indifference.

(5). They have on legal principles a presumptive value.

2. *Historical criticism in relation to the Christian SS.*

Christian SS. invite criticism. Christians must ascertain relations of material to authorship of SS. Four questions.

A. Whether material is what it claims to be; *question of authenticity*.

B. Whether it is in unchanged form; *question of integrity*.

C. Whether when produced it did and can give what it claims to establish; *question of correctness*.

D. Whether it contains all the elements of knowledge; *question of completeness*.

Genuineness, authenticity, integrity, credibility are ambiguous terms; use three, Authenticity, Integrity, Credibility. They are interrelated and mutually helpful.

I. THE N. T. CANON.

1. *Def.* "Collection of books which constitutes original written rule of Christian faith." (Westcott).

2. *Authorship.*

(1). By whom was this collection made. (2). By whom invested with its authority.

In answer to (1).

(a). The church, no individual.

(b). The church as a whole.

(c). The church gradually.

(d). The church guided by instinct, not Holy Ghost.

In answer to (2).

Not the church, for it could not have created an authority over itself, but intrinsic—the authority grows out of nature of book.

On what principle credit of canonical authority given to these book, we learn:

(1). From language used by early church in regard to books accepted.

(2). From language in regard to doubtful books.

(3). The way in which complete canon was treated. Elements recognized, (a). human; apostolic authorship. (b). divine: inspiration of Holy Ghost.

3. *Relations of N. T. to O. T. canon.*

(a). Attitude of early church towards O. T. determined by that of Christ and apostles.

(b). Why did church need other SS.

(1). O. T. predictions point to them: proof and full benefit must be used for the church and world.

(2). Jesus Christ was the promised Messiah, therefore his sayings acquired like authority as O. T.

(3). Apostolic words were regarded as authorized by Christ.

(4). Practical necessities. (a). Habit of reading in public worship.

(b). Authoritative standard caused early writing down of the N. T.

4. *The Composition of Canon.*

A work of time necessarily. Testimony to it by apostolic fathers 120–190 Greek apologists. Early versions. Heretics.

5. *Objections to the Composition of Canon.*

The books were regarded as differing in value in early church during 3d and 4th centuries. Ans. (a). The methods of the early church not those of critical schools. (b). The spirit of the early church different. (c). The difference admits of easy explanations.

THE AUTHENTICITY OF N. T. SCRIPTURES.

1. At the end of 2d century there were in possession of early church books, bearing names of our scriptures.
2. Identity determined by MSS. early MSS. and citations.
3. Inquiry: In what sense and with what reason church attributed them to apostles.

Considerations confirming Judgment of Church.

Out of 27 books 17 bear name of author, in substance of writing, not merely title.

- A. Not merely a literary satisfaction to church but a necessity to have SS.
- B. These documents transcribed and interchanged among churches by apostolic authority.
- C. Different sections of church agree in result.
- D. As a literary phenomenon forgery is here unnatural.
- E. Morally improbable that any could forge them.
- F. Negative: Exposure would have been easy.

INTEGRITY OF THE CHRISTIAN SS.

1. External means of ascertaining Integrity.

(a) MSS. (b) VSS. (c) Citations.

2. Internal.

(1). Fitness of document to alleged source. (2). Harmony of subject, style to author. (3). Presence or absence of connecting links between parts admitted to be authentic, and doubtful parts.

CREDIBILITY OF N. T. SS.

Preliminary: 1. Lapse of time does not affect credibility. 2. Cred. includes element of personal trust. Attesting and Presumptive credibility.

1. *Attesting Proofs.*

- (a). Many things asserted in N. T. are demonstrable by reason.
- (b). By results which follow their reception.
- (c). By external independent evidence.
- (d). Most important attestation that the historical parts of N. T. at least have been received by large numbers of men who were satisfied of their truth.

2. *Presumptive Credibility.*

- A. Illustrated by considerations drawn from facts recorded.
 - (1). They were accessible to scrutiny.
 - (2). They were numerous.
 - (3). They were minutely described.
 - (4). Invited scrutiny by extraordinary nature.
- B. Confirmed by considerations of circumstances and witnesses.
 - (1). Witness numerous and diverse.
 - (2). Apparently far removed from deceit in spirit.
 - (3). No cause whatever why they should further such a cause by false means.
- C. Utterly impossible that the central figure can be a fabrication.
- D. Co-existence of harmony in representation, and clear signs of individuality in recorders.

THE O. T. SCRIPTURES.

- (1). Christianity needs the O. T. SS., in order to understand its antecedents. (2). The O. T. Scriptures are preparatory and provisional. (3). Christ and the Apostles command their use.

1. *Canon of O. T.* : Composed of Law, 5 books; Prophets and Historical books written by prophets, 21 books; Hagiographa, 13 books.

Two views held: (1). Looser Prot. view; (2). Roman Catholic view. Both opposed to evangelical view.

- (1). Not all canonical books of O. T. are quoted or alluded to in N. T.

A. Argument for looser view.

Ans: (a). No occasion to quote all. (b). Absence of quotation does not prove absence from canon.

(2). Express citations from other writings by same formulas. Ans: Cannot be identified; probably *substantial* references to O. T.

(3). References to Apocryphal books and influence of Apocrypha, on N. T. books. Ans: The first unsubstantiated; the second admitted proves nothing.

B. Arguments for Catholic view.

(a). A tradition in the church traced to Apostles.

(b). Concurrent belief of Greek and Latin churches.

(c). The authority of the Roman church.

Reasons for non-appearance of books in canon.

(1). Some of them had not appeared at close of Jewish canon.

(2). Others had not come to knowledge of Jews after Babyl. captivity.

(3). Synagogue had not enough information to decide.

C. Reasons for rejecting Apocrypha.

1. Confessed absence of Prophetic element.

2. Deterioration in poetic dignity and power.

3. In historical parts.

(a). Manifest presence of fiction.

(b). Assumption of false names to give weight.

(c). Incorporation of forged documents.

(d). Gross historical inaccuracies.

4. In doctrine, subservience to technical Judaism.

2. The Authenticity of O. T. Canon.

(1). General internal evidences.

A. A marked congruity between authorship and subjects treated.

B. Characteristics of style in many instances.

C. The general spirit is authentic.

D. Parallel accounts within them.

(2). External evidences.

A. Faith of Jews.

B. Allusions by Christ and apostles.

3. The Credibility of O. T. Scriptures.

(1). Historical facts of O. T. are connected with divine communications.

(2). Many signs of authenticity are signs of credibility.

(3). External corroborations.

(a). In Jewish observances.

XII.

- (b). The existence and some forms of Christianity.
 - (c). Foreign and secular sources of information.
 - (4). Inspiration.
- Extent of credibility: positions.
- (a). Limited to matters of revelation.
 - (b). To greater historical statements connected with revelation.
 - (c). That it covers the whole of these books.

4. *Historical Difficulties.*

- (1). Contains impossibilities: miracles.
- (2). Contradictions.
- (3). Faulty chronology.
- (4). Exaggerations and extravagance.

HISTORICAL EVIDENCES.

- I. The Scriptures themselves.*
- II. Jesus Christ as delineated in the Scriptures.*
- III. The Miracles therein recorded.*
- IV. Prophecies with declared or demonstrable fulfilment.*
- V. The Results of Christianity.*

I. THE ARGUMENT FROM THE SS.

Partly negative, partly positive.

General characteristics.

- A. The general theme and way in which it is presented show the SS. to be of divine origin.
- B. The aim and the way in which it is accomplished are proof of divine origin.
- C. Their unity considered in connection with progressive development and production.
- D. Comprehensiveness in themes, and subordination of individual themes to one subject.
- E. Provisions made for promoting religious interest of every kind.

II. JESUS CHRIST DELINEATED IN THE N. T.

- 1. Look at the delineation: it is not human.
 - (a). The delineation must have had a subject.
 - (b). Divine power seen in delineation of subject.
- 2. The person predicted as Christ proves the system divine.
 - (a). The correspondence between predicted and real Christ is one element in this convincing evidence.
 - (b). The unique nature and character of Christ is nothing less than divinely moulded and divinely evidential.

III. PROPHECY.

Prophecy classed as an external evidence of Christianity. Compare external and internal evidence.

- 1. The meaning of prophecy in Apologetics.
- 2. The occurrence of predicted prophecy in O. T. and N. T. fact and its purpose.
- 3. The condition of validity: proof from alleged prophecy.

XIII.

- (a). The real futurity of event.
 - (b). Event beyond conjecture.
 - (c). Subsequent occurrence as specifically foretold.
 - (d). Must not involve collusion between persons foretelling and those accomplishing it.
 - (e). Obvious design necessary.
 - (f). Blending of vagueness with precision.
4. Other uses of predictive prophecy besides evidential, in regard to Christianity specially.
- (a). To give certain signs of Messiah.
 - (b). To keep alive the belief in fulfilment.
 - (c). To arouse a divine expectation.
5. To whom would predictive prophecy carry its evidential message.
- Ans: To those who knew fulfilment.
6. What truths involved and emphasized by each instance of authenticated prophecy?
- (a). God's immutability, omniscience, power, &c.
 - (b). His general providential government of world.
 - (c). His specific providence.
 - (d). A specific design to accredited agent.
 - (e). Things predicted usually have peculiar place in God's regard.
 - (f). The special bearing of prophecy on Christianity.

IV. MIRACLES.

Three terms designate them in SS.

Design: To accredit those who wrought them.

Questions: 1. Are they possible? 2. Probable? 3. Credible? 4.

Is conclusion drawn from them warranted?

1. *Possibility of Miracles.*

Def. Hodge's. How ascribe miracles to God?

(1). By amount and quality of power displayed.

(2). By purpose or wisdom shown.

Are they possible?

- a. Wholly within reach of original omnipotence.
- b. God did not limit his original omnipotence.
- c. God's immutability does not render impossible.
- d. God's omniscience does not interfere.
- e. Uniformity of nature not consistent.
- f. Created things are not immutable.

2. *Probability of Miracles.*

Calculated to do good. Communications from God justify them.

3. *Credibility of Miracles.*

If not impossible or improbable they are credible.

Question: Are witnesses credible? Ans. In cases of Christian miracles, hundreds of witnesses, could they have been deceived.

Objection. Testimony could not decide in such a case. Ans. More improbable that testimony is false, than that the miracles occurred.

4. Evidential Bearing: Credit to messenger or dispensation to which he belongs. Obj. 1. That phenom. can't prove spiritual truths. Ans. Not claimed that something is made true but divine mission attested. Obj. 2. Alleged miracles were not convincing to those who saw them. Ans. Moral evidence implies possibility of disbelieving

XIV.

V. RESULTS OF CHRISTIANITY.

Earliest results proof of divine origin. Examine 1. Extent. 2. Significance and 3. Utter disproportion of results to terrestrial agencies employed in bringing them about. Each of these can be considered in relation to.

1. Facts concerning propagation.
2. Intellectual influence of Christianity.
3. Facts connected with moral and social influence of Christianity.

ERRATA.

Apologetics.

- Page 37, line 32: For "desire" read "divine."
 Page 39, line 26: For "disposed" read "indisposed."
 Page 48, line 1: For "confines" read "combines."
 Page 49, line 27: For "Experimental," read "Experiential."
 Page 81, line 26, *et seq*: For "attested," read "attesting."
 Page 95, line 6: For "Josephus 2365," read "2265."
 Page 108, line 40: For "Presenfe," read "Pressensè."
 Page 109, line 39: Read "*Semen est sanguis.*"
 Page 101, line 13: For colon after "validity," read "of."
 Page 101, line 41: For "proportional," read "proportioned."

Ethics.

- Page 4, line 25: For "mos," read "mos."
 Page 18, line 1: For "same," read "some."
 Page 31, line 22: For "fallen," read "unfallen."
 Page 33, line 24: For "Blakie," read "Blackie."
 Page 33, line 36: for "Sharp," read "Shairp."
 Page 40, line 9: For "Newton," read "Newman."
 Page 44, line 12: Insert "Christianity" at end of line.
 Page 47, line 37: For "Hinnal," read "Hennell."
 Page 48, line 38: For "importance," read "impotence."
 Page 48, line 39: For "detracts," read "distracts."
 Page 50, line 2: Read "Christianity is," at end of line.
 Page 51, line 35: For "work," read "worth."
 Page 54, line 28: Insert (*c*) for notation.
 Page 56, line 27: For "Europeans," read "Emperor."
 Page 57, line 28: After "the work," insert "is."
 On Page 47, the sentence "The moral results." &c., should be in small cap. heading as on page 44.