

THE
PRESBYTERIAN QUARTERLY
AND
PRINCETON REVIEW.

NEW SERIES, No. 5.—JANUARY, 1873.

ART. I.—BERKELEY'S PHILOSOPHY.*

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THIS work has been a labor of love on the part of the editor. He has evidently spent years upon it, and we are reaping the benefit. He has taken immense pains in collating the published works of Berkeley, in searching for manuscripts, and in collecting all that can be known of the man. Much of the new matter is of no great value, as for example the letters, chiefly on business, to Mr. Prior, and his Sermons and Notes of Sermons, which are common-place enough. Others are of inestimable worth, such as his Common-Place Book, in which, as in a glass, we see the rise of his speculations. I have read it with as much interest as I felt years ago on inspecting in Dresden the first sketches which Raphael drew of his great master-pieces. The edition is already the standard one and will never be superseded. The notes of the editor, which are numerous, are sometimes simple enough, and mere repetitions of each other, but are commonly of great utility as connecting the scattered statements of his author on a particular subject. The editor's prefaces constitute a valuable introduction to the treatises. They are always anxiously thoughtful, but they do not clear up the subject. He writes as if he could, if he chose, say something decisive; but as he never chooses, one begins to doubt whether he has anything to say fitted to dispel the mystery. Prof. Fraser does not profess to be an adherent of Berkeley's philosophy, but it is evident that he is strongly prepossessed in its favor. He tells us that Berkeley

* The Works of George Berkeley, by Alexander Campbell Fraser, A M., Professor of Logic and Metaphysic, in the University of Edinburgh, in four vols.

brought about objectively by the God-man, and on the part of the individual it is wrought by faith. Mankind is neither an object of divine punishment or of infinite forbearance, but man knows himself already judged, yet in such a way that judgment is arrayed with victory. Christ, the new principle of life, is our pledge and surety that God still has something to accomplish for man; and thus by his archetype, ever animated by the Holy Spirit, all humanity are renewed, and God, at the beginning, sees in it the completion. Great care must be taken that that divine justice, the wrath of which Christ bore, be not too much obscured or neglected.

§ 53. *Transition.* In Christ's death not only his earthly work was accomplished, but the internal spiritual completion of his person was involved. Hence the profoundest depth of his external humiliation is at the same time the beginning of his exaltation.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

ART. V.—CATHOLIC AND PROTESTANT TREATMENT OF THE CHRISTIAN EVIDENCES.

By CHARLES A. AIKEN, D. D., Princeton, N. J.

According to the estimates of statisticians, a little more than one-fourth of the population of our globe is nominally Christian. Of this nominal Christianity a little more than one-fourth is reckoned as Protestant, a little more than one-half as Catholic. These two elements contain all that is really aggressive in the world's Christianity, as it confronts the more than 900,000,000 of our race who do not bear, some of whom abhor, most of whom hardly know, the name of Christian. If the Greek and the feeble Oriental Churches be classed with one or the other of the more active systems, according to their structure, history, and general affinities, they must be grouped with Catholic rather than with Protestant Christianity. The way in which they justify and maintain their own existence warrants this assignment. Such is the front which they present passively to the non-Christian world, though they may make little active demonstration against it.

How far is the nominally Christian world at one in respect to the methods by which it commends its Christianity to the non-Christian? How far is it at one in the reasons which it gives to itself and to others for being Christian? This Christianity of ours must in the first instance vindicate its own right to be. Its existence as Christianity covers less than one-third of the period of the world's history. Its persuasions have even nominally reached and gained hardly more than one-fourth of the race after eighteen centuries. What right has it to even so long an existence, and to this measure of success? Then by commission of its Founder and Lord it must continue to go forth, and "disciple all nations."

It is not proposed now to compare the two great types of nominal Christianity in respect to the external methods and appliances which they adopt in executing Christ's commission, but rather to inquire how far they agree, and in what they differ, in their conception and presentation of the evidences of Christianity. We are not to survey the field of apologetic literature, and compare the formal or popular treatises on Apologetics that have come from these two sections of Christendom. We might select a Pascal, a Chateaubriand and a Von Drey for comparison with a Lardner, a Paley, a Sack and a Delitzsch. We choose rather to compare the modes of presenting the evidences that are set before us in doctrinal and practical treatises. It will not be unfair to take as authorities on the Catholic side the Canons of the Tridentine and Vatican Councils, and the writings of such men as Perrone, Gousset, Nampon, Hettinger, Wiseman and Manning.

If the object of our present inquiry were to ascertain by what right, and with what relative justice, the two systems lay claim to the Christian name, one method of investigation would be plainly indicated. Three things would require to be first defined and then compared,—Catholicism, Protestantism and Christianity.

The two systems, holding much in common, do stand and have long stood before the world bearing the Christian name. It will not be disputed that, as a historical fact, these are forms which Christianity has assumed. How fully Christianity is in either,—what beside Christianity may have been or may be in either, it is aside from our present purpose to inquire.

A generation ago in Germany, on occasion of the appearance of Möhler's *Symbolik*, the questions at issue between the churches were canvassed with an earnestness and power hardly surpassed since the Reformation. Prof. K. I. Nitzsch, one of the most eminent of the Protestant champions, laid down, as a basis for any profitable discussion, his statement of the positions in which the two churches would be declared to agree. "Christ provided eternal redemption; in him the world is reconciled to God; out of him is no salvation. Every man's concern now is to appropriate this salvation. Word and Sacrament are the Holy Spirit's means, which the redemption, wrought in Christ, brings with it and sets in operation, by the use and effect of which salvation is brought to the sinner. The operation of these means of the Spirit is partly preparatory, partly converting and preserving, imparting and developing a new principle of life. This essential change is called regeneration. It is grace that makes man righteous, holy, blessed. Where there is forgiveness of sins there must be sanctification; where the calling righteous there the making righteous. The functions in which the received grace manifests itself are repentance, faith, love, hope." So far the agreement extends.* To the comparison that is to occupy us we may pass on in the spirit of Irenic rather than of Polemic Theology, entertaining and expressing the hope that what the two systems thus hold in common may prove to have had great saving power over the souls of men.

Each system, so far forth as it deserves the Christian name to which it lays claim, earnestly asks individual men to become Christian. However strongly persuaded of its own right, even though the persuasion were to go so far that the right should be maintained as exclusive, neither would say that the appeals, "Be a Christian" and "Be a Catholic," or "Be a Christian" and "Be a Protestant," were absolutely and in all respects identical. Even the highest claim of Catholicism allows that Catholic is the epithet and Christianity the substance.

Let us make for a time the violent supposition that the two confessions forget each other. By what methods does each vindicate Christianity? By our supposition each is to suppress, at

**Studien und Kritiken*, 1834, III. 498. Nitzsch, *Gesammelte Abhandlungen*, I. 227.

the outset, the possessive (and exclusive) *its*. On what grounds does it appeal to men to become Christians?

In the third chapter of the *Constitutio Dogmatica de Fide Catholica*, promulgated by Pope Pius IX. with the approbation of the Vatican Council, the doctrine of Catholicism on the point before us is thus defined: "Nevertheless, in order that the obedience of our faith might be in harmony with reason, God willed that to the interior help of the Holy Spirit, there should be joined exterior proofs of his revelation, to wit: divine facts, and especially miracles and prophecies, which, as they manifestly display the omnipotence and infinite knowledge of God, are most certain proofs of his divine revelation, adapted to the intelligence of all men. . . And that we may be able to satisfy the obligation of embracing the true faith and of constantly persevering in it, God has instituted the Church through his only begotten Son, and has bestowed on it manifest notes of that institution, that it may be recognized by all men as the guardian and teacher of the revealed Word; for to the Catholic Church alone belong all those many and admirable tokens which have been divinely established for the evident credibility of the Christian Faith."* The reach and bearing of these definitions will be evident as we proceed.

Among recent expositors of Catholic Theology none is of higher authority than Perrone, the Jesuit Professor of Theology in the College at Rome. The first volume of his *Prælectiones Theologicæ* (5th edition, Turin, 1839—with which may be compared the *Præl. theol. in Compendium redactæ*, 27th edition, Paris, 1861, pp. 45–103, 212–255) treats "*De vera Religione*." No writer would be accepted as a better expositor of the Tridentine Canons, as none had more to do directly and indirectly with moulding those of the Vatican Council. In his larger work, to meet the case of the two classes of men who oppose true religion, he presents his subject in two parts; the first, pointed *adversus incredulos*, aims to refute and convince those who hold all revelation to be superfluous and a human invention; the second is turned *adversus heterodoxos*, against whom, admitting revelation, and revelation in Christianity, but impairing and

* For this and other documents of the Council, with the translation from which we have cited, see the Appendix to Archbishop Manning's Letter on "The Vatican Council and its Definitions." (London, 1870.)

undermining it by handing it over for interpretation and application to private judgment, there must be established and maintained the divinely constituted authority of the Church, with which God has chosen to deposit his revelation, and under whose guardianship and instruction alone we can possess it entire and inviolate, and reach a germane interpretation of it.

In dealing with the former class of the opponents of Christianity the natural endeavor is to prove a supernatural, divine revelation possible, necessary, actual, and actual in its full and perfect form in Christianity alone. The tribunal addressed, the general method pursued, the main arguments employed, are determined by the natural and unvarying conditions of the problem, and can be substantially no other than those recognized and used in our own treatises on the Evidences. In Perrone's treatise there are found a compactness, sharpness of discrimination, and frequent felicity of arrangement and expression that are worthy both of admiration and of imitation. Thus, after discussing the possibility (1) of an immediate revelation, (2) of a mediate revelation, and (3) of a revelation of mysteries,—after illustrating, by various reasonings, the necessity of a supernatural, divine revelation,—Perrone proceeds to consider the marks by which such a revelation is to be identified if given. The chief marks he declares to be, by common consent, miracles and prophecy. These he finds indisputably present in and about the revelation made in the New Testament by Jesus Christ. The divine and supernatural mission of Christ is invincibly confirmed by the excellence and sanctity of evangelical doctrine. The wonderful propagation of Christianity, viewed in all its adjuncts, the testimony of Christian martyrs, when all its adjuncts are duly weighed;—these too supply arguments that cannot be evaded or refuted.

In connection with each of these points, difficulties and objections, theoretical and practical, speculative, historical and scientific, are canvassed with great vigor and point. With some modification in phraseology, shading and proportion, the argument might be gladly and profitably accepted and used by many a Protestant apologist. It is true, that if this were attempted the author would become in his turn a most decided protestant. For he emphatically denies that the subsidiary arguments, derived from the propagation and preservation of Christianity and

the testimony of its martyrs, can be used by heretics without destroying their own cause. The facts on which these arguments, at least, are based, can be found true only in the Catholic Church. And yet, in presenting the case of Christianity thus far as against unbelievers, it need hardly have been suggested that there are opposing claimants to the name of Christianity. A Protestant pressing these pleas would hardly remember his Protestantism, but only his Christianity. A Catholic like Perrone will with difficulty limit himself to the silent assumption, that the true religion, whose paramount rights he has been vindicating, is found only within a visible and localised organization. Church is plainly ever in his mind, and written at least between the lines. Illustration of this inherent and inevitable tendency of Catholic Christian Apologetics, will accumulate as we proceed.

Let it be supposed that the reasoning thus far employed with the unbeliever has accomplished its object, and that he has been convinced that Christianity is the true religion. The case as pending before the tribunal of reason has made some progress. But let us not overestimate the results. The facts presented are precisely and only "*motiva credibilitatis*;" they are at the best merely "*præambula fidei*," "*extrinseca*," "*prærequisita*," "*non tamen absolute necessaria*." They evince credibility, and move to its practical recognition; they are external to faith, preliminaries, prerequisites, yet not in such a sense but that faith may be wrought independently of them. Unless the convinced unbeliever in the existence of revelation, and revelation in Christianity, is now to be left to opinion or doubt, he must be pressed with a second line of argument, which, although directed "*adversus heterodoxos*," may be no less fitly used to save him from becoming a heretic, than to refute or reclaim him when already entangled in error. It must now be made to appear, first, that an extraordinary divine revelation already made, whether committed to writing or orally transmitted, ought, in order either to its identification or its interpretation, to be guarded and propounded by an authority divinely instituted and infallible. If this first proposition be accepted the series is made up with a beautiful and remorseless consecutiveness, and leaves the intelligent and wilful rejecter of the claim of the one visible and perpetual Catholic Church without hope of salvation. As a piece

of reasoning the argument well rewards study, and teaches more than one salutary lesson.

Julius Müller, in his Essay on "The Principles of the Evangelical Church on its Formal Side," (*Dogmatische Abhandlungen*, p. 52) says of this aspect of the Catholic argument: "If the Evangelical Christian once suffers himself to be surprised by that bold *petitio principii* which is everywhere characteristic of the Catholic Church, if he once concedes to her that the first and most needful thing after the appearance of the Son of God on earth, is the existence of a closely-organized ecclesiasticism clothed with binding authority, how defenceless he stands over against it!"

The first part of the Catholic argument as Perrone presents it (*adversus incredulos*) does not in form shut one up to the Catholic faith; yet he cannot dismiss even this part of his discussion without announcing some corollaries, declaring that the Catholic Church alone exhibits an entire Christianity, and that the argument which makes one a Christian makes him a Catholic. Where in another connection he is disproving the antagonism and asserting the helpfulness of faith to reason (*Compendium*, I. 244), he rests his argument partly on the preparations which faith demands (apart from the gracious condescension of the Spirit to the needs of the ignorant) before it can itself exist. Among these he enumerates preliminaries, like the divine existence, providence, etc.,—then the discussion and justification of the *motiva credibilitatis*, and the setting them in such a light as to produce evidence,—then the material for maintaining the exclusive truth of the Church founded by Christ, and establishing its constitution, distinctive work, prerogatives and endowments, and finally for the full justification of the supreme visible head of the Church whom Christ has set up. All this must, when such intelligence is possible, precede and prepare the way for faith.

The catholicity of feeling with which we entered on the comparison of the apologetic methods of the two churches, cannot be in the least reciprocated. Our friends claim sole right to the Catholic name, and leave us to cherish the sentiment under difficulties, when at the close of the second line of argument they deny us salvation, and pronounce religious toleration impious and absurd. (See Perrone, *Prelectiones*, edit. 5, I, 268, sq.)

Another of the standard treatises of modern Catholicism,

which may serve to illustrate to us its method and spirit, is the *Théologie Dogmatique* of Gousset, late Archbishop of Rheims and a cardinal of the Church. The first division of the work discusses Scripture and tradition, two of the three sources from which theology must derive its proofs. The third source, the decisions of the Church, which is both depositary and interpreter of Scripture and tradition, is discussed in the third division, after the second has set forth the nature of religion in general, of revelation in general, and then of the three successive stages through which divine revelation has actually passed, viz., primitive, Mosaic, and evangelical or specifically Christian revelation. The three revelations belong to one and the same religion, the Christian, which is as ancient as the world. This view of the author's distribution of his material, will explain the position, force and bearing of his apologetic argument in behalf of Christianity. His method is the positive, as distinguished from the scholastic which is followed by Perrone. Testimony and authority supply the basis of knowledge and the warrant for confidence. Hence the sources of pertinent and adequate testimony must first be identified, their competence established, and their bearing indicated. As the author's aim is didactic and not controversial he justifies himself in departing from a severely logical order. Otherwise he could hardly have introduced the minute characterization and vindication of the Scriptures before discussing, at least in a general way, religion and revelation.

The apologetic argument for the evangelical revelation is presented in an order somewhat new. The proofs of the divine mission of Jesus Christ are: (1) the accomplishment of the ancient prophecies in his person; (2) the predictions of which he is himself the author; (3) miracles; (4) his resurrection; (5) the miracles of the apostles; (6) the establishment of Christianity; (7) the sublimity and holiness of Christ's doctrine. We have here the familiar "external, internal and subsidiary evidences," presented, in accordance with the general scope of the work, in an expository rather than a controversial way. With less of sharpness and precision than characterizes Perrone, the author develops his arguments and illustrations with no little attractiveness and rhetorical effect. The Catholicism of the apologist, while never disguised, is less obtrusively manifest. The reasoner waits more contentedly for the proper time to show

that the Christianity whose claims he has been defending and pressing is issued under divine patent only from Rome.

The aim and right effect of the evidences, Gousset thus states (p. 7): "In Catholic instruction the motives of faith accompany the truths which are its object; hence in learning what he ought to believe, the Christian learns also, and by the same means, what are the foundations of his belief; and as the proofs of revelation are within the reach of all intelligences, man can grasp them in proportion as the instruction is unfolded, without needing to suspend his judgment to wait for new motives. . . . Revelation rests on facts and testimonies which can be comprehended without effort, like all proofs of the same kind, and then the motives of conviction (*i. e.*, which should produce conviction) always precede or accompany knowledge, and consequently legitimate immediate adhesion to the objects of faith," etc.

Changing our authorities, let us consult two of hardly less eminence in another quarter, men representing their church before the English mind, Cardinal Wiseman and Archbishop Manning. We will quote from popular treatises, combining reasoning, apology, and persuasion,—Wiseman's discussion of the rule of faith in his "Lectures on the Doctrines of the Church," and Manning's "Grounds of Faith." Wiseman in his third lecture gives this popular summary of the apologetic argument for Christianity: "We are disposed to investigate the authority on which the faith rests; we begin naturally with Scripture, we take up the gospels and submit them to examination. We abstract for a moment from their inspiration and divine authority: we look at them simply as historical works, intended for our information, writings from which we are anxious to gather truths useful for our instruction. We find in the first place, that to these works, whether considered in their substance or their form, are attached all those motives of human credibility which we can properly require. We find a body of external testimony sufficient to satisfy us that these are documents produced at the time when they profess to have been written, etc. As these eye witnesses in their lives and characters give us the strongest security of their veracity, we conclude all they have recorded to be certain and true. We thus arrive at the discovery, that besides their mere narrative, they unfold to us a system of religion, preached by One who wrought the most stu-

pendous miracles to establish and confirm the divinity of his mission. In other words, we are led by the simple principle of human investigation, to an acknowledgment of the authority of Christ to teach, as one who came from God; and we are thus led to the necessity of yielding implicit credence to whatever we find him to have taught. So far the investigation, being one of outward and visible facts, cannot require anything more than simple historical or human evidence." And as the Cardinal goes on to argue, one proceeds "by mere historical reasoning" "from the word of Christ whom those historical motives oblige him to believe, to acknowledge the existence of a body depository of doctrines which he came to establish among men." Having reached the Church "he is in possession of an assurance of divine authority, and has no need to turn back by calling in once more the evidence of man."

Manning's argument is substantially this: The knowledge which God has given us of himself is definite and certain. That this certainty may descend to us, we need an outward or historical authority, upon which the certainty of revelation as a fact in history may be known to us, and an inward and intrinsic, *i. e.*, supernatural and divine authority, which shall ultimately be "no less than the perpetual presence of our Lord Jesus Christ, teaching always by his spirit in this world." This two-fold authority is and can be only the authority of the one, holy, Catholic, Apostolic Church, out of which two things cannot be found, reality and certainty. Within the proper sphere for historical testimony, "this one moral person*" (the Church) alone can say: 'When the Word made flesh spake, I heard; when the tongues of fire descended from heaven, I saw; with my senses I perceived the presence of God; with my intelligence I understood his voice; with my memory I retain to this hour what I then heard and saw; with my changeless consciousness I testify to what was spoken.'" And to meet us at the point at which we stand in need of a supernatural, divine authority, like that of Christ himself, "the Teacher whom He hath sent comes, not with labored disquisitions, not with a multitude of books, not with texts drawn from this passage and from that treatise, but with the

* This description of the Church as a "moral person," is also found in Perrone, (e. g. *Prælectiones*, I. p. 281, § 331), and has its rhetorical as well as its doctrinal uses. The rhetorical use is well illustrated by Manning, as quoted above.

voice of God saying 'this is the Catholic faith, which unless man believe faithfully, he cannot be saved.' It comes with the voice of authority appealing to the conscience, leaving argument and controversy to those who have too much time to save their souls, and speaking to the heart in man, yearning to be saved." (*Grounds of Faith*, pp. 65-6.)

The difference between Catholics and Protestants, then, in their view of the scope, issue and sequel of all apologetic arguments for the divinity of Christianity, is this, as Wiseman states it: "To a certain point we may both go step by step through the same process. We both take up this sacred volume, on human and historical testimony, and we receive all that Christ has in it taught us. So far we march together, and then we diverge. We take for *our* guide those texts which appoint the Church to teach; the others take the proposition that the Bible is to be the rule of faith." (*u. s.*, p. 67.)

But there is a still shorter and bolder way of reaching this ultimate and distinctive position of Catholicism which demands our first real faith for the Church, faith in Christ being only subsequent. Let our human and historical investigations have followed whatever course they will; let our convictions in regard to revelation in general, and revelation in Christianity, have been developed in what order they may; this is the invariable order for the exercise of faith: first in the Church, then in Scripture and tradition, and last toward Christ. The Church is the nearest authority, the first of whose existence we can be satisfied. Faith must be exercised virtually toward a person—and here is this "moral person," challenging our obedience. The authority with which she has been invested is the first by submission to which we can demonstrate faith. In no other order and by no other route can one make his way to Christ and salvation.

The authority over us which belongs by absolute right to God, is that in relation to which faith is ultimately exercised. The Jesuit Father Nampon, in his Geneva Conferences on "Catholic Doctrine, as defined by the Council of Trent" (the American edition of which was issued in 1870, under the expressed approbation of Archbishops Spaulding, McCloskey and _____ and was recommended to us personally by a high ecclesiastic as one of the best modern presentations of Catholicism), defines

faith (see p. 22) as "the submission of the human to the divine intelligence; a submission which becomes obligatory, and consequently reasonable and secure, as soon as the obligation of believing is manifested to the conscience; that is to say, as soon as a man conceives the supreme authority of God to be actually exercised upon him, and only then." But this authority God may exercise, and has chosen to exercise, mediately; therefore no man has a right to conceive this supreme authority to be otherwise exercised over him. God is represented here on earth by the one, holy, Catholic, Apostolic, Roman Church, in which we must believe on the ground of its superhuman credentials. As Nampon says again (p. 72): "The fact of her superhuman existence is, therefore, of itself alone a sufficient foundation and justification of the obligation it imposes on us of believing her teaching, her creed, her Scriptures." (Would the Father be willing to add to the inventory of the Church "her Christ"?)

Protestantism is quite content that this shall be the issue between the churches. It has been common to speak of the two fundamental principles of Protestantism, the material (justification by faith alone), and the formal (the paramount authority of the Holy Scriptures as teacher and guide for man). Neander, in his *Katholicismus und Protestantismus*, p. 30, with logical insight and to great practical advantage maintains: "This is the only principle, the exclusive reference of the religious consciousness to Christ; a principle which develops itself in two directions; Christ the only source of salvation, and Christ the only source of the knowledge of salvation. . . . The main antithesis between the two Churches is this: The immediate relation of the religious consciousness to Christ (on the one side); and, on the other side: This relation resting on mediation through an outward Church."

Perhaps no other recent Catholic contribution to apologetic literature can be compared in completeness, attractiveness and varied value with Hettinger's *Apology of Christianity*.* The learned and accomplished professor of theology at Würzburg received on the first appearance of his work the special commendation and benediction of Pope Pius IX., and has had from

* *Apologie des Christenthums*, 4te Auflage, Freiburg im Breisgau, 1871: including I. 1, 2: *Der Beweis des Christenthums*; II. 1, 2, 3: *Die Dogmen des Christenthums*.

the religious and learned public the commendation conveyed in the call for a fourth edition, within seven years, of a work of some 2,500 pages. The twelfth chapter is entitled "The Way of Rational Faith," and discusses very felicitously and eloquently the way to faith and the way of faith. He starts with the fact that man cannot ignore Christianity, deny, hate, oppose, attack it, as he may. Let him believe or disbelieve, he cannot escape that examination of the foundations of Christianity, which it is distinctive of Christianity to demand. Revelation claims to prove itself under the given circumstances credible, and so credible that natural reason demands faith with an assurance which excludes every contrary opinion. After a rapid and brilliant review of the evidence, the author goes on to say: "All these signs, all the facts and all the doctrines of Christianity, if only the spirit has estimated them free from all prejudice, touched by no excitement of passion, full of love to the truth, and with the resolve to follow it wherever it leads, and to devote itself to it without reserve and even with sacrifices, lead one with quiet, mighty power to faith—to the threshold of its sanctuary. They bring him certainty, undoubting certainty of the credibility of the Christian revelation." All this, however, is only "external and mediate—no internal and immediate evidence." Faith, which is "a free act, an act of the will, the highest moral act," "a virtue, the first and highest virtue, on which all others rest," is not yet secured. All this is natural; to know the supernatural there is need of a supernatural power—a second birth, the birth from God—a power of grace, and a supernatural motive (source) of certainty, God's authority." "Although the evidence of the credibility of revelation of itself moves in the sphere of nature, and our reason, after previous investigation of the criteria of revelation, is able in and of itself to recognize it, still it is grace that enlightens the spirit and moves the will, so as thus prepared to institute the supernatural act of faith, to which the natural powers of intelligence and will are not adequate, standing in no proportion to it." (*u. s.*, I, 2, pp. 122-164.)

The author's discussion of the Church occurs in the 17th and 18th sections of the second volume, in its natural place among the Christian doctrines. It would be difficult to find either more thorough Catholicism in doctrine, or more vigorous, dexterous and plausible presentation of the doctrine. Whatever

Christ has offered us of truth and grace, he has offered in and through his holy Church. We know no Christianity outside of and apart from the Church. A Christianity without the Church is only the product of thought, a dead shadowy abstraction, that is not and never was. Christianity is the Church and the Church is Christianity. The same act by which Christ founded his religion, founded also his Church. Without the Church there are no Scriptures, for the Scriptures were composed within, in the presence of, and for the Church. Without the Church there is no understanding of the Scriptures; without the Church, no authority in the Bible; without the Church, no faith; without the Church no relation of Christianity to the individual. Such as these are the propositions that crowd the discussion.

And now an infallible Pope has been set at the door of the indispensable, visible Church, through which alone one can be made possessor of the Scriptures; and these may not speak to me directly and in their own behalf of Christ, but I must go back through the Church to the Pope to be informed what communication has been made to me by the Saviour of my soul.

As we gather up the results of our comparison of the apologetic methods of the two Churches, we conclude that, whatever place Catholicism may nominally assign, whatever volume or structure it may give, to its exhibition of the evidences of Christianity, its apology is logically first and mainly for the Church, and itself as Church. Before Christianity and in order to Christianity, I must have the Church. Before and in order to any religion but the most rudimentary, I must be within this visible organization. No acceptable manifestation of religious aspiration, impulse or endeavor can go up from me to God but through these conduits. No token of his compassion or his bounty may I expect to receive for the solace, joy, strength of my soul, but through these visible media. There is, doubtless, a side of human nature that craves and rejoices in the external, visible, audible; in material and mechanical helps. If this were all, or the highest and best in human nature—or if God's word made it somewhat more apparent that there is no more direct access for the longing soul to God, there would be more plausibility in this which should be the logical apologetic order and method of Catholicism. It seems to meet the wants of the soul to canvass so thoroughly and

candidly, at the outset, the evidences of the true religion. But is not my guide laughing in his sleeve as he leads on my unwary steps? The true religion is far removed from any direct and immediate inspection or access of mine. I must be fast within the true fold before I can be put in possession of it. I am innocently supposing that the results of this scrutiny of evidence will put it within my power at once to satisfy, reform, perfect my religious life, in direct dealing with God. The essence of religion I have supposed to be intercommunication and communion between my soul and God. Let my officious helper show a better warrant.

In a certain sense religion must have a body as well as a spirit, but a spirit first, a spirit more than a body. If I were only a creature, and not also a sinner, I should have less need of a mediation or mediator. As it is, I must have one all-mighty, all-worthy mediator, standing with one hand clasped in the hand of God, and the other stretched downward to lay hold on me, and to invite, to encourage, and, so far as may be, ensure my laying hold on him. But what want can my needy, longing soul discern of more than one? If I may have him, the fewer other objects, processes, persons interpose between my religious life and its supreme object the more reasonable and the more satisfactory. On his clear authority I will gratefully avail myself of whatever he may declare essential, and really promotive of that for which I was made a religious being. But I must be in communication with him before I can recognize and defer to this clear authority, and must be in the exercise of joyful faith in this deference. Apart from this undoubted direction from him I shrink from any mediation but his own. I want no intermediate mediators, that cannot be ever efficient and all sufficient. I want just that, and nothing but that, which will put me into and keep me in the most direct, constant, refreshing, invigorating, fruitful intercourse with God.

So Protestantism construes religion and Christianity, and so sets forth its apology. Thus it judges of Church and Word and Sacrament. In its sense Christianity exists in order to the Church; the true Church, the invisible Church, gathering up those in whom Christianity is working out and has wrought out its results. The Catholic philosophy makes the organism exist before its elements—the Church before any individual Christianity. Protestantism does not “keep the word of promise

to the ear and break it to the hope" by proclaiming salvation by Christ alone, while insisting that the soul in its extreme need can identify him, reach him, and become partaker of his salvation, only through a prior and indispensable faith in other mediation. If this precedent faith, though not called saving faith, must be exercised before I can exercise any that shall reach Christ, who is my Saviour? the Son of God, or the hierarchy of Rome?

ART. VI.—WHY ARE NOT MORE PERSONS CONVERTED
UNDER OUR MINISTRY?

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THE QUESTION which we have placed at the head of this article is one that is often asked by thoughtful, anxious ministers; and the fact which it indicates, serves often to depress the spirits and weaken the hands of those who are toiling in the Master's vineyard. In what we shall say, we aim to present an aspect of the subject very needful, we think, to be carefully examined by all who are called upon to preach the gospel. The suggestions we offer were prepared for an association of ministers, who during several meetings had the matter under earnest consideration.

In answer to the inquiry, Why are not more persons converted under our ministry? we first remark, that any answer which, in its elements, legitimately tends to abate the fidelity of the ministry is a wrong answer. Such a tendency would be a signal and sure test of its error and worthlessness.

The peculiar form in which the question is put suggests these two inquiries: (1) Is not success in converting souls made, by implication at least, a criterion of fidelity? and (2) Is not the relation of the stated pastor to the church somewhat overshadowed by the prominence given to his relation to the world?

Now, fidelity, fidelity to God, to God's truth and to souls, is the one paramount, ever-present and ever-pressing duty of the minister. The *discharge of duty*, honestly, earnestly, scripturally, should be our one great concern, our supreme anxiety. And this duty consists chiefly in two things: 1st, Preaching the