


CHRISTIAN APOLOGETICS.



THE LECTURES CONSTITUTING THE COURSE IN

ETHICS AND APOLOGETICS.

BY

PROF. CHAS. A. AIKEN, D. D.

FOR THE

MIDDLE AND SENIOR CLASSES.

PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

EDITED FOR THE CLASS OF 1880.

PRINTED, NOT PUBLISHED.

PRINCETON:

PRESS PRINTING ESTABLISHMENT.

1879.

No man, whether learned or unlearned,
can have the faith which makes him a Christian,
without having a reason for it—*Thos. Chalmers.*

CHRISTIAN APOLOGETICS.

PROLEGOMENA.

INTRODUCTION.

“To believe in christianity, without knowing why we believe it, is not Christian faith, but blind credulity.”—Whately.

“Though we cannot always give a reason for *what* we believe, we should give a reason *why* we believe it.”—Boyle.

“Be ready always to give an answer to every one that asketh you a reason of the hope that is in you.”—1 Peter iii, 15.

To him who would approach the subject of Christian Apologetics, two introductory questions suggest themselves :

1. Why do I believe that I am a Christian ?
2. Why am I a Christian in my belief ?

These questions differ more in meaning than in language. The first looks for its answer to the past : and personal and sacred experiences are recalled. We may answer

a. From the remembrance of sudden conversion ; of a gradual tendency towards Christ from early education : From something which has opened the blind eyes, or softened the heart.

b. Our present love and obedience give us an additional source of faith in the fact that we are Christians. To the second question, why am I a Christian in belief ? and not a Jew, Pagan, Atheist, various answers may be given.

a. Providential reasons may have decided ; early education or circumstances.

But you must be able to point to some elements of Christianity which have secured your deliberate choice. You cannot say as a rational believer, that you merely follow the faith of your fathers.

b. You may say, I have adopted the faith of Christendom as that of the enlightened part of the world.

But this is no adequate reason. A Christian should be able to give some sound statement of the reason for demanding the same faith of others. Self respect requires that we give a reason. Loyalty to our fellow men demands it. The clearest intelligence on all matters of religion is essential. We cannot affect to be ignorant of these great questions. All men are in a sense becoming inquirers. Faith in Christianity involves intellectual elements, and there are *reasons* why we turn to Jesus as our Savior.

Our work gives a demand for convictions of the truths of Christianity. "I speak as to wise men: judge ye what I say" is Paul's statement. (1 Cor. 10: 15).

Three practical ends are attained by the study of Christian Apologetics.

(1.) Justification and confirmation of our own faith as Christians.

(2.) Our better qualification to commend Christianity.

(3.) Our fuller confidence to defend our faith from whatever purpose or from whatever quarter it is assailed.

Definition.—(a.) "Christian Apologetics, is that part of Theology which vindicates the right of Theology in general, and of Christian Theology in particular to exist as a science." (Lindsay in Encyclopedia Brit.)

NOTE.—This is not a full definition and provides only for Theological and not for practical purposes.

b. "That branch which sets forth the historical credentials of Christianity.

This also is but a partial definition.

(c.) "The science which sets forth the principles according to which Christianity is to be defended." (Hagenbach.)

This is an etymological definition, but is also partial.

(d.) "That branch of Theological Science, which sets forth the proofs, that the claims of Christianity, as a religion, are justified." This is the proper and correct definition. It is more than a mere defense of truth.

The term Apologetics.—This term is of strictly Scriptural derivation, but somewhat infelicitous on account of prejudices. People ask, does Christianity need an apology? Christ and the Apostles did not apologise, yet they justified and defended it. They used the term,

ἀπολογία. The verb *ἀπολογέομαι* means to defend, to vindicate, or justify, not simply to apologise.

Ἀπολογία means therefore an answer which may be aggressive as well as defensive. The Apostle Paul speaks of his answer (*ἀπολογία*) to the Jews. Acts 19 : 33 ; Acts 22 : 1 ; Acts 24 : 10 ; Acts 25 : 8-16 ; Acts 26 : 1, 2 ; Acts 26 : 24.

The relative position of Apologetics.—The scientific study of Christian Apologetics is of recent date, of this century in fact. Though there is a unanimity of opinion respecting the necessity of it, yet there is a difference in regard to its relative place in Theological study. Some would put it in Practical Theology ; the object in this view is to fit the worker for defence ; but Apologetics is not merely the training for a Christian soldier ; it is for every one. Others would combine it with Systematic Theology. Its specific object, and the fulness and variety of its material, claim for it a place of its own, and an early place in the course of theological studies ; for unless the claims of Christianity as a religion are justified the Christian doctrine can have no more authority than other systems.

Literature of Apologetics.—Many works called *apologies* are specific and defensive in form, taking up special points. Many of these aim to remove practical errors and objections, and are designed to meet a hostile state of mind. *Christian Apologetics* addresses itself to the Christian man, with this implication, that what binds the Christian should bind others. In our day religions have been compared as never before. Physical and Metaphysical Science are constantly opening new fields, or presenting old thoughts in new forms. These must be noticed in their relations to Christian Apologetics. We are not bound to run after every new theory, yet there are times when we cannot keep silence. Never has the literature of the church, so largely taken the Apologetic form, as at the present time, except during the Second Century. The Apologists of that century, aimed at practical result with the Jews and heathen, and their conversion to Christianity. So in the Middle Ages a special object was in view. (*Vide* Farrar's History of Free Thought.)

In our day specific attacks have brought out a multitude of treatises. The attention of men has been di-

rected to the divinity of Christ; again to Prophecy; again to miracles; again it has been attempted to reduce Christianity to natural religion. The XVIII. century objected that its founders were impostors; the XIX. century talks of myths and mistakes. Therefore Apologetical literature is largely specific, a body of apologizing rather than of works of a complete and comprehensive sort. The most successful way to refute, is not to try to overthrow the error, but to build the truth into a system, in which the skeptic finds himself satisfied. Our great work is to point to Christ. For our own satisfaction however, we must have both the power to refute and to build.

Apologetics, including what has been called *fundamental* apologetics, involves the whole field of science. It enters into every department of knowledge. For example, in Metaphysics we must go back to the query, is there such a thing as human knowledge? If so, what are its limitations?—Is there any knowledge of material things? Can we have any knowledge of spiritual things? Does the amount, or kind of evidence justify what religion calls for? Such are some of the questions which lie back of Christian Apologetics. In another direction an important and essential consideration is,

The kind of evidence:—What can be known? The facts of christianity are various and must be established by various kinds of evidence. Logic, as well as Metaphysics must be consulted. If there is a God, are his revelations genuine, or is doubt reasonable? Where does refusal to believe convict a man? These are questions which must be solved to get at some forms of unbelief.

We shall be largely occupied, in discussing the subject of Apologetics, with historical evidence. The world has been, and is full of religions—Christianity is one of them. In the midst of conflicting claims, and of erroneous systems, we find this to be the claim of Christianity, and this is the proposition which we are to examine:

Christianity is the true, divinely sanctioned, and authoritative religion, for us, and for all men.

CHRISTIANITY AS A RELIGION.

Christianity is a religion, but not the only religion. Judaism, Mohammedanism, Buddhism and a host of other systems are religions. All these are species. Religion in itself is more generic. We are therefore to inquire into the relative and absolute excellence of Christianity as a religion, not as a civilizing power. It would be unimportant to prove that it is a civilizing power. Christianity is to be asserted as the true religion, not a true religion. It is not to be denied that there are elements of truth in other religions, but Christianity is the true religion. It is the divinely sanctioned religion, not a divinely sanctioned religion. Other sanctions have been superseded by the sanction that has been given to Christianity. It is the authoritative religion. In one sense Christianity alone is a religion, because it alone fills out the conception of religion. Other systems do not deserve the name. But this leads us to the important question, WHAT IS RELIGION? And more specifically what is a religion?

We may give three distinct methods of reaching a definition in answering this question.

(1) The Etymological method. This advances us but a little way. Single words only set forth one side: one view. Moreover the terms have had a hidden origin, which does not increase our confidence in them. Following this method we have the term, *Religio*, according to some from *religere*, meaning "to reconsider, to review." (Cicero) This shows that the aspect of religion at that time was a careful, scrupulous, conscientious reflection on the objects, the relations, the duties with which religion is concerned. Others derive the word from *religare*, to bind back, to rebind (Augustine and Lactantius) but the former etymology is now generally accepted.

In the New Testament the corresponding word is *θρησκεία*—Vide, Acts 26:5; Colos. 2:18; Jas. 1:26, 27.

Three etymologies are given of this Greek term:

(a) From *θράξ* an obscure derivation, probably the Thracian mysteries. (b) From *Τρέω* to tremble. (c)

From *ῥοῦω* to murmur. Another word used in N. T. to designate religion is *θεισὸν δαίμονια*. Vide, Acts 17 : 22 : Acts 25 : 19.

The Old Testament contains no distinct term. It speaks of "man's walk with God," of the "ways of man," etc., and in the book of Proverbs religion is called "wisdom." Etymology then gives us little help in ascertaining the true significance of the term.

(2.) The Historical Method.

This consists in taking different religions and finding out by comparison, what is common to them all, and so forming a generic idea of religion, or in taking a single religion, and eliminating the non-religious elements and thus reaching a true idea of the term religion. The difficulty with this method is the wide difference between various systems of religion.

(3.) The Inductive Method.

This consists in studying the life of individual religions, or religion in individuals.

That is the most satisfactory definition which is produced by the combination of more than one of these methods.

Definitions of Religion. To an atheist religion is an illusion, an error. He has no definition to give to religion as a reality. A deist does not deny a God, but he reduces man's relations to God so much, that he can have little religion. From various authorities of all shades of belief we quote the following definitions of Religion.

"The observance of the moral law as a divine ordinance."—*Kant*.

"Faith in the moral order of the universe."—*Fichte*.

"An *a priori* theory of the universe."—*Herbert Spencer*.

"Religion is a mode of knowing and worshipping God."—*The Reformers*.

"Faith in the reality of the idea of God, with an appropriate state of mind and mode of life."—*Bretschneider*.

"The relation of revelation to man, and of man to revelation."—*Hartmann*.

"The relation between man and the superhuman powers in which he believes."—*Tiele*.

"Man's recognition of God, and his way of manifesting that recognition."

“Man’s life in personal communion with God.”—*Van Oosterzee*.

“A mode of knowledge, thought, feeling, action, which has the divine as its object, its ground, and its aim.”—*Nitzsch of Berlin*.

This is the best definition, and most suitable for the end and purpose we have in view. Note its excellencies.

(1.) It makes a distinction between knowledge, thought, feeling and action.

(2.) It recognizes the divine as the object of knowledge, of thought, of feeling, of action.

(3.) It is thus easily applied to specific religions, while it is a general definition.

Divisions of Prolegomena.—Religion includes (1) A subject. (2) An object, and (3) Some intercommunication between the religious being and the object of religious regard. These will be considered in their relations as follows:

I. Phenomenology of Religion.

II. Psychology of Religion.

III. Different theories of the origin of Religion.

IV. Criteria of Religion.

V. Relations of Religion to morality.

VI. Significance of Religion as an element of life and history.

I.

PHENOMENOLOGY OF RELIGION.

There are three points to be considered.

(1.) The Subject. (2.) The Object. (3.) Actual historical manifestations.

1. *The Subject of Religion.*—In whom or what does it exist? of whom is religion predicated? In answer to these inquiries we say.

A. We predicate religion of man, and only of man. We are not concerned with any beings above or below man. God's relations to man constitute religion, but we do not predicate religion of these relations. They are never called religious relations.

B. Religion is predicated of all men, not merely of some. There are those who assert that it is to be predicated only of some men: that there are some men who are not religious: this is obviously and plainly an error. Religion is not confined to any stage of progress of civilization, as the Positivist claims. There have been, and are, no men on earth, so far as we know, who are not religious. In regard to the majority of men there is no question. The only question is, (1.) with degraded classes, (2.) with men like John Stuart Mill; philosophers who claim that they are in no way religious. In regard to (1.) of these classes it is asserted that there are races who have no religious natures. In "Force and Matter," Dr. Büchner asserts that there are tribes among whom there cannot be found any idea of religion, or conception of God. Sir John Lubbock takes the same view. Sir Samuel Baker takes the same ground in regard to certain tribes in Africa. These denials are based on knowledge and unprejudiced observation. No one can deny the degraded condition of those tribes; but the number of non-religious men found, is so small thus far, that we must wait before accepting any conclusions, until more is shown in regard to them. Moreover their degradation is so great that they cannot give

any coherent ideas in regard to their own belief. People can only be said to be without religion, when they have no idea of the Infinite. "Simple lack of faith in the moral order of the world does not prove that they have no religion." (Bretschneider.)

Dr. Moffatt, the missionary, in asserting that some tribes have no religion, means it in the higher sense of the term. E. B. Tylor, in "*Primitive Culture*" Vol. I. p. 378, takes up all such statements as the foregoing, and after examination says that they do not rest on proof sufficient for an exceptional state of things. He then canvasses these assertions. He cites a case in regard to the aborigines of Australia, and denying the claim that they are without any super-natural beliefs, says, "they have most positive belief in souls, demons, and deities."

French missionaries found partially developed elements of religious belief in South Africa. Tylor explains that savages seek to hide their worship from foreigners. This accounts for many supposed absences of religious elements of life and character. Tiele, ("*Outlines of the History of Religion*," p. 6,) says in regard to these statements that they rest either on inaccurate observation, or confusion of ideas. The conclusion from all this is that so far as we have investigated, all men have religious ideas and observances.

C. Religion is an essential function and characteristic of man. It belongs to the very nature of man. There are two positions taken in regard to this.

(1.) That man became religious.

(2.) That he was made religious. Neither of them is true. Man is by nature a religious being; what is so universal and spontaneous, must be traced to his nature. The very diversity of religions strengthens the argument that religion is natural, and necessary to man.

Henry Rogers says, "man's religious instincts are ineradicably rooted in man's nature." The proof of the essential character of religion to man is the same as that for intelligence, and moral sense. Tyndal in the Preface to his Belfast Address, (2d Edition) says, "no atheistic reasoning can dislodge religion from the heart of man. Logic cannot deprive us of life, and religion is life to the religious: as an experience of consciousness it is beyond the assaults of logic."

D. Religion belongs to the conscious and voluntary phases of human life—it is not an unconscious and involuntary state. The conditions, circumstances and surroundings may have an influence in moulding man's religion but this does not prove that religion is an unconscious passive state. We never ascribe religion to any who are incompetent of voluntarily adopting it.

E. Man is a religious being by virtue of the possession, and in the use of the faculties, which constitute him a moral agent, i. e. intelligence, sensibility, and conscience. These endowments make man religious and develop religious life. Yet moral and religious relations are not identical. The spheres of the ethical and religious are to be distinguished, though the same man sustain both relations, and this, by virtue of his possessing and using the same faculties. There are those who hold the independence of morality. (The moralistic school in France.) Morality and religion require the same substratum.

2. *The Object of Religion.*—That to which religion is related as object is God. This is applicable to the higher forms of religion. For the lower forms, a wider generalization is needed. We accept from Natural Theology that there is a God. There are certain lines of reasoning whereby the existence of a God is proved. This is not however necessary: man's nature clinging, longing, reaching out for something super-human, tells him there is something, whether he may interpret it into God or gods. Men may not rightly interpret what things point to the true God: they may not reason correctly: they may not fashion any theory that approaches it, yet they have by what may be an erroneous process of reasoning, all reached some idea. The incompleteness of nature, and its teachings thus makes a revelation of some sort necessary. The supernatural then, supplements this feeling after God. God comes thus to meet man in his search, though he may not recognize the approach. Man's own natural reasonings not only come short, but they entirely miss the true God. We therefore find that the world's worship has almost always been rendered to the unworthy. Vide Acts 17: 23-30; 1 Thess. 4: 5: Colos. 1: 21; Gal. 4: 8; 1 Corinth. 12: 2.

The first chapter of Romans is far more philosophical, in saying that men did not like to retain God in their knowledge, than the skeptic, when denying revelation, in trying to explain this degradation. Notwithstanding these monstrosities, no man can attribute them to God. He has given them the means of knowing. The doctrine that man has sunk from an earlier, better state is more intelligible and defensible, than the theory of development and elevation.

Positivism insists on the insufficiency of both natural and revealed religion. The centre of the new religion is the great conception of Humanity. By it the idea of God will be superseded. The object of the worship of Positivism is not an infinite, absolute, incomprehensible being. It is reached in a scientific way: there is no mystery about it. Comte claims, that chemical, astronomical, sociological, biological tests can be applied to it. The question is, do we need these?

Perfection is in no wise claimed for it. Defects are sought for in order to be corrected. Again, the conception of the object of his worship could not be formed till after the French Revolution. Were the longings of our nature, through ages crying out after an object of worship, that could only be satisfied after the French Revolution?

Rather than for such an object as this "my heart and my flesh crieth out for the living God."

3. *The Actual Historical Manifestations of Religion.*—
A. Phenomena connected with formal public worship. Pressensé says "All ancient forms of worship are based on four institutions, viz: Sacrifices, Priesthood, Temples and Religious Festivals." These are the pillars that uphold religion. Condensed into three and changed in order they are (1) Places prescribed for public worship. (2.) Observances, and (3) Persons set apart to conduct worship—Priesthood.

(1.) Places set apart for worship. History and Sociology call attention to provisions made everywhere for places for public worship. Examples of this are the temples of Greece and Italy; the pagodas of India and China; the mosques of Mohammedan countries; the relics of Druidism in Great Britain; churches and cathedrals everywhere.

The depth of the religious convictions in man is seen in the elaborate and costly way in which these edifices are built. They are not the mere caprice of architecture; they reveal an idea and purpose as clearly as the walls of a fortress or a dungeon.

(2.) Obœrvances connected with worship. As one observes these many and varied ceremonials of different stages of civilization, he is impressed with the fact that they are the work of anxious thought. There is a *religio* evidenced. Enormous exactions are made of men, and submitted to by them. Besides, all these voluntary offerings are made, and duties assumed. Offerings not only of material wealth, but sometimes in the form of torture and fanatical sacrifices of virtue and life. Asceticism is prescribed or assumed. Pilgrimages are undertaken, that are long and wearisome. In India, in the Roman and Greek Catholic churches, in Mohammedan countries to Benares, Jerusalem, Mecca, pilgrims are always seen wending their way. The most protracted toil, the most that is sacred to self, or in self, is surrendered; wealth, life, chastity, the blood of the first born, are willingly given up.

(3.) Individuals, families, castes, are set apart for the culture of religion. The cause of this is not merely the ambitious grasping of certain men, but rather the will of the people that the deity or deities may be most effectually served or propitiated. Sacrifice is usually committed to these hands. Where the patriarchal system has passed away, it is the priest who offers sacrifice. Worship is led by this specially privileged class; even prayer is sometimes deputed entirely to priestly orders, as if it were more acceptable from his sacred office. The heart's whole meaning must be expressed; how shall this expression be made? This question is left for the priest. Yet in view of all this atheists say that the conception of God is merely human.

B. Phenomena connected with the private life of men. In the Roman home places were set apart for the family gods (*penates*). The Greeks recognized this idea of family divinity, embodied in the Goddess of the Hearth, *Ἑστία* (*Vesta*). Priestly character is ascribed to the head of the house in his own sphere. Business, however im-

portant, is arrested for the sake of worship, at the call of the *muezzin* in Mohammedan lands, and the curfew toll in Catholic countries reaches every ear and stays every hand. All these facts show that religion cannot be brought too near the individual heart, and that it is not safe to be without it. Nominal Christianity is often rebuked by heathenism in that it does not bring religion into this nearness to private and family life. It would be hard to make religion more generally persuasive, than Homer has done in his poetry, or than the Romans did when they began every new undertaking with religious observances. The verdict of all humanity is, that religion must not be worn as an ornament.

C. Phenomena in connection with faith or creeds.

These are sometimes philosophical, sometimes doctrinal, sometimes mythological, and often without any definite form whatever. All religions imply a revelation of the deity. The contents of this revelation or discovery are embodied in creeds. Men do not seem to believe that God wishes to remain unknown. This however is the intellectual element in religion, and therefore is least developed, and sometimes missing in the lower forms.

The intelligent observer sees what the followers of these lower forms believe without knowing or being able to formulate. Sometimes creeds are embodied in mythology. In these the imagination has taken the longest flights. In others, the most concentrated thought is devoted to religion. (Compare Gladstone's *Juventus Mundi*, chap. VII.) It is not true that these systems are creations of the poets. The poets give form to them, and elaborate them; but the elements of them are in the minds of average men.

The strong hold that religion has taken on man as an intellectual being, is made evident from these phenomena.

D. The social element of religion.

Men do not hold religious beliefs as isolated beings, as if each had a God of his own. They need fellowship, and communion with each other. Union and sociability in religion is one of its most marked characteristics. This points to oneness of nature and origin in one direction, and in another it points to fellowship in religion as essen-

tial. Man is concerned in man, as well as in God. Religion is sympathetic: the relations of race, nationality, social and domestic ties contribute much towards bringing religious beings together. This sociability is not due to mere pride of religion, but to the demands of man's nature.

When the religions of the world are spoken of, more or less organized forms of belief and of action are signified, in which considerable numbers of men agree. When an individual man is spoken of as of this or that religion, it is meant that by his own assertion, or observance, he agrees substantially with one or other of these organized systems. The term employed to designate any religion may be taken from some internal characteristic of the system, or from some historical or geographical feature. On the ground of a man's declared creed, or his association with those of a certain system, he may be called a religious being, though actually he is irreligious. Some religions are called historical and national: scientifically they are those which have a scientific development in history. A positive religion is one which rests on an external authority in all matters pertaining to belief or observance. They differ from natural religion whose authority is internal. Natural religion however is a misnomer. There is no such thing definitely accepted as Natural Theology except in technical theological usage.

4. *Types of the World's Religions.*

Various classifications have been proposed. These are either determined by the philosophical theory of their authors, or by some practical aim in view. The most natural and best classification, is that given by Par t. He groups the religions according to their idea and conception of the divine object of religious regard and worship. According to this classification there are two general groups of religions.

A. Those which conceive God within and of nature, called religions of nature.

B. Those which conceive God above nature,—called supernatural religions.

Nature here does not mean merely the material objects, but also the forces and phenomena, or even con-

ceptions of the human mind. No intensifying of any natural religion can make it supernatural.

A. Religions of Nature.

(1.) Non-mythological or (2.) mythological religions. These may be subdivided into various species as

(1.) Non-mythological,—comprising those in which the object of worship has no personality, but spirituality is ascribed to it in its form or modes of working.

Some of the religions of this class are,

(a.) Fetichism, as developed in Africa, among the American Indians, and in parts of Asia. The object of worship is some material substance as a stone, tree, etc., anything that represents an idea of divinity. If this object does not suit, it may be whipped, burned or destroyed. This is the lowest of all types of religion.

(b.) Shamanism as developed in central and northern Asia, and to some extent in North Europe. The objects worshipped are spirits, addressed through conquerors. It prevails extensively though the number of worshippers is comparatively small.

(c.) That in which the worship is addressed to the elements or to the heavenly bodies, fire, wind, and the sun as representative forms of the deity.

(d.) That in which the heavens and earth or some power back of them, in a general way are worshipped. It existed in China before Confucianism. Ancestor worship is associated with this type.

(2.) Mythological religions. These comprise,

(a.) Those in which the object of worship is external nature, personified and deified.

(b.) Those in which human ideas and conceptions are personified and deified. Of these again, (a) would include

(a.) Old Indian religions. The religions of the Vedas.

(β.) Religions of Western Asia, Syria, Phrygia, and Carthage. In these the prominence is given to the productive power of nature. The sun, the masculine element: the moon the feminine, and fire as the destroying agent, symbolized by Baal, Astarte and Moloch.

(γ.) The Egyptian, in which a natural principle is worshipped, symbolized by some animal, as the bull, the ibis, etc. The animal form is often combined with the

human. This religion shows how the human heart cannot be content with such objects of worship, for when the symbol dies, there is a great wailing.

(b). This class will include :

(a). Greek and Roman religions.

(β). Persian, where a large use is made of natural symbolism.

(γ). Old German, where we find ideas of moral character.

(δ). Buddhism, which calls existence itself an evil and makes salvation consist in annihilation. (*Nirvana*). This religion shows best of all that it is impossible for man to arrive at the true object of worship without revelation ; that the true religion must have been revealed, divinely founded, which leads us to consider the

B.—*Supernatural Religions* or following the same classification.

(3).—*Supra-Mythological Religions.*

These are religions of revelation, or corruptions of revealed religions. The deity is conceived of as supra-mundane and extra mundane. The unity of God is also recognized, as well as his infinity and perfection, and holiness of character. He is acknowledged to be the author of man's existence as well as of religion, and represented as coming to meet man in revelation. This class includes—

(a). The religion of the Old Testament.

(b). Christianity.

(c). Mohammedanism, a mongrel of the other two, with some elements added by Mohammed himself. The differences between Judaism and Christianity may be stated thus :

1. There is a difference in the fulness of the Divine manifestation.

2. There is a difference in the degree of doctrinal development.

3. In the measure in which the intended results are realized.

Christianity excels in all these, though the identification of Jesus as the Messiah, is the only *new* element in the New Testament. Mohammedanism is a human creation, and yet it contains a part of revealed religion. It

professed to be a reformation of Judaism and Christianity, with new revelations of which Mohammed was the organ. It recognized six great prophets, Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus, Mohammed. It is intensely hostile to idolatry and polytheism, and aims at a strict system of morality.

There are other systems of classification, with different criteria. Some set up historical tests; others suitability for universality; others influence in politics; others again the type of worship, external or internal, spiritual or material. From these religious manifestations, it is apparent that man does pay some deference to his God; that he seeks intercourse with his creator with the purpose of attaining to some good or escaping some evil. That he recognizes his whole life as coming under the power of religion.

The multiplicity of religions is bewildering. Some it moves to indifference. They say it matters not what a man's religion is, so long as he has one. This brings us to the question, what should be the type of our religion? which we shall consider under the Psychology of Religion.

II.

PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION.

Man's inner nature is actively engaged in religion, as has been made manifest by the consideration of the external phenomena of religion. What then is the nature of this inner activity? This question resolves itself into two, viz. (1.) How many and which moral faculties are in exercise in subjective religions? (2.) In what order do they come into activity?

As preliminary considerations in this discussion notice

1. The spiritual oneness of man.

2. The necessity of so generalizing as to cover all types of religion, the lowest as well as the highest.

1. *How many and which faculties are exercised?*

a. There are intellectual elements in exercise, and yet religion is not wholly intellectual. If religion have God as its end, there must be knowledge and thought of God's claims on man. One test of the highest types, though not the only one, is the degree of intelligence which they imply. There is a more vivid conception of the claims and relations of God with man in these than the lower types. Yet care should be taken not to go to the extreme of ultra intellectualism. Rationalism and supernaturalism care more to have man's views right than his heart. This would make knowledge and belief too nearly identical. Orthodoxy does not alone constitute religion. The O. T. describes religion as *wisdom*, not as an exercise of mere intelligence.

b. There are emotional elements indispensable to religion and yet religion is not wholly emotional. Hope, fear, love, trust, all find utterance in religion, but these mere sentiments are not alone religion. Schleiermacher makes godliness a determination of feeling: others make religion to consist in pious frames of mind. These belong to the ultra-emotional school of thinkers. Mysticism is as abnormal as rationalism. Faith is neither

wholly a sentiment, nor only an intellectual apprehension.

c. The will has no less really its part in subjective religion, and yet the sphere of religion is not bounded by the will. The mere spontaneous development of religious feeling is not religion. Some philosophers go to the extreme of making the will the birth place and the origin of religion, (e. g. Kant and the school which follows him). The Romish church holds this theory: that the individual has little or nothing to do in himself, but he goes to the church, as to a teacher, and thus exercises his will in following out her requirements. Hence he becomes, in this view, religious.

d. Religion calls into exercise the function of conscience, and yet it is an error to explain religion as originating and consisting merely in conscience.

Certainly conscience does not supply the conceptions of what we cherish most in religion. It is not conscience which is reverent, trustful, loving, grateful, fearful. Conscience passes judgment on our treatment of the idea and facts of religion; on the way we cherish and manifest the sensibilities; it approves or condemns the course we take, and all that we do in matters of religion.

2. *The order of Psychological development.*

Is there any order in the way in which these faculties come into exercise? Any antecedence of one to the rest? That either the will or the conscience takes the precedence in the order of Psychological development, is claimed by no one. There is a difference of opinion in regard to the relative position of the intellectual and emotional element. There are those who make the conviction of the reality of the ideas of God, truth, and immortality the root of all religious development, and that the emotional element closely follows upon this. On the contrary side, Schleiermacher and his school of thinkers claim that religion is an immediate feeling, the sense of absolute dependence. Others regarding this as too vague and unsubstantial define religion as the "consciousness of God:" others still objecting to these ideas say, that religion begins with faith. Morall, an English authority, traces religion to a distinct and separate faculty which exists as a primary element in our nature.

Jacobi, Fries, Pascal speak of a moral organ, a moral faculty by which we come to know the supersensual and divine. As to the existence of such a faculty we need not assume or concede it, if the other powers are sufficient for the development of all that belongs to religion. The true view of the order of Psychological development is, that religion implies (*a*) the discovery and at least partial identification of relations existing between man and God; but these need not all have been comprehended. It further implies (*b*) the recognition of feelings corresponding to these relations, and also the manifestation of them. In our endeavor to ascertain which is the prior faculty exercised in the development of religious ideas we will do well to emphasize

- (1.) The spiritual unity of man.
- (2.) The universality of religion.

With these points in view we must make the hypothesis we accept include and explain all actually existing circumstances. We must hence

a. Reject all explanations of the origin of religion which talk of man's *consciousness* of God. All these systems are chargeable with Pantheism. However quick our apprehension of God, we are not *conscious* of Him. He does not come to the consciousness of himself in us.

b. We must reject all theories, and forms of statement, which imply that feeling is cognitive. Feeling does not know, does not take cognizance of anything; can give no information of its own source or end. It is bewildering and misleading to ascribe intelligence to feeling. "It is a state of mind consequent on the conception of some idea," (Bowen.) Some maintain that "faith is a knowing on the ground of feeling," (Schleiermacher.) This overturns our idea of feeling. It becomes an idea. Dependency implies the idea of something above, on which we are dependent. All feeling must be able to justify itself to some idea.

c. We must recognize as equally natural to man, and in a sense equally primary and fundamental to religion, the cognition and religious sentiments belonging to it. It is no more true that the idea of God is innate in man, than that religion is a part of his nature. Both are primary. But the sentiment can only be called into exer-

cise toward its own appropriate object and cause. On the other hand, there is no religion in the mere possession of the idea of God; both are equally essential and fundamental. *Vide Bibliotheca Sacra*, October, 1876. Bowen on the "Source of the idea of God." Prof. Bowen gives a three-fold source of the idea of God, viz:

Reason, Sentiment and Conscience, neither one exclusive.

God the ruler in one way, God the lovely and just in another, and God the holy and good in another way, is the result of each of these ideas.

True and perfect religion does not exist until the right Reason, the right Sensibility and the right Conscience are exercised.

As appertaining to this subject, the *Contemporary Review* says: "The God of Philosophy is the product of speculation; the God of religion is an object of worship. In the latter case God must be conceived of as a person or power standing in a relation to the worshipper; but in the former, the deity is the first or final conclusion or proposition in a system of reasoning for truth." As against this it is claimed that God has made provision for the knowledge of himself in the natural endowment, and in the experience of every man which attests of him. He has made provision for the awakening of the religious sensibility. He has placed in us a power to express our state, and with all this the functions of conscience. Paul at Athens, found men very religious, yet their conception of God was an erroneous one. So was it among the Jews, and so in the world's religions there are many awful lacks.

III.

DIFFERENT THEORIES OF THE ORIGIN OF
RELIGION.

The old Materialistic Philosophy of Lucretius and Cicero, (*De Natura Deorum*), asserted that fear made God.

The Natural Development Theory, brings the progress of religion through seven stages of development.

(1) Atheism, (2) Fetichism, (3) Nature Worship, (4) Shamanism, (5) Idolatry, (6) Principle Worship, (7) Theism and Pantheism.

This is unscientific as well as unscriptural. It fails to account for most of the phenomena of religion. Thus Henry Buckle, in "The History of Civilization in England," says that History is the modification of man by nature and of nature by man. He excludes the supernatural, and holds that Monotheism was prior to Polytheism.

Herbert Spencer claims that "the general theories, Atheistic, Pantheistic and Theistic, are all unthinkable. All creeds imply a problem, which they attempt to solve. As we go from the lower type of creeds to the higher ones, it becomes evident that the universe and the Creator are greater mysteries. The deepest and widest of all facts, is that the power of the universe is inscrutable." To the question how did man come to the idea of God, he gives the following answer:

(a).—That man comes to an idea of dualism in nature.

(b).—That the first traceable conception of a supernatural being, is a ghost.

(c).—From the conception of a ghost, he passes to ancestor worship. (The first step in worship.)

(d).—Idolatry and Fetichism are abnormal, or aberrant developments of ancestor worship.

(e).—Animal worship, and plant worship, are further developments of the same thing, a progress away from the worship of lifeless objects.

(f).—The worship of Deities.

In regard to the Semitic conception of God he says, "that it is not to be supposed that they came by their conception in any different way from the rest of the world, i. e. by any supernatural means." This is the general natural development theory.

Specific Theories of the Origin of Religion.—These are five in number.

A. The Political Theory: That religion is a device of statesmen and rulers, to move the people to obedience to the laws of the state through fear of occult powers. Hence so called Supreme beings. This was the theory of Bolingbroke. Hobbes held, that "religion is the fear of the invisible powers that the state recognizes." "Superstition," he held to be "the fear of those invisible powers which the state does not recognize." This theory implies a susceptibility or tendency to religion of which statesmen have taken advantage; but it is a shallow and superficial explanation, because it does not see the extent of these religious apprehensions, emotions, and observances.

B. The Physical Theory.—The influence and phenomena of nature, has so powerfully affected the emotions, the reason, the imagination of man, that these excited sensibilities seek an object above and beyond nature which has aroused them. Among savage men the imagination alone prevails almost entirely; therefore, their religion is fantastic. Among civilized and enlightened men, the imagination is subject to the reason. First, there is a belief that there are occult powers; then that there are claims upon him by these occult powers, and so the actual religions are the results of the attempts made to satisfy these claims. This theory is in accord with the ancient and modern philosophy.

(*Vide* Volney and Büchner). Even some of the Christian fathers when asked to account for religion, gave this as their explanation. This, however, fails to account for the early appearance and general prevalence of religion.

C. The Selfish Theory.—Hume says, "the ignorant and uninstructed, finding their own happiness or misery depend on the secret influence, and unforeseen concurrence of external objects, regard with perpetual attention

these unknown causes that distribute pleasure and pain, good and ill to men. So, starting with mere regard for one's own welfare, men reach the higher forms of religion. While this theory might explain a few phenomena, it fails to do justice to the nobler aspects of life.

D. The theory that religion originates in a primitive, supernatural revelation.—This theory was held by many early theologians, Catholic as well as Protestant; according to it, man had the endowments of religious possibilities in his nature, but no religion until God began the supernatural endowment of man, with religion. There could have been no development without this supernatural revelation. According to the Scriptures, however, God's witness in his own behalf in nature, is sufficient for religious obligation and religious life. Man's neglect of this, brings on him the guilt of ungodliness.

Revelation was not meant to supply a defect of nature, and make the religious life possible. It was to guide man to the right religious life. A supernatural revelation would have been unintelligible to one who knew nothing of religion.

E. The theory that religion began, in God's revelation of it to man, in nature.—Antecedent to the Supernatural intervention, there is provision made for the revelation of a system of religion, in nature. There are agencies in nature which are reinforced by Supernatural agencies, in the organization of religion. According to this theory, man starts to find God in the way of nature. God comes to meet him in the way of grace. Notice in this connection (1) How much more is told and known of God than nature can tell; (2) How abundantly all man's natural impulses are justified. (3.) How desirous God is to be rightly known and revered.

IV.

THE CRITERIA OF RELIGION.

The tests by which the excellencies of any religion may be tried, are to be considered next in our order of investigation. When asked to accept one, or to reject another, or to choose from a number of religions, the question becomes a practical one. The ancient lawgivers and philosophers recognized three tests, and used them to justify existing religions, or to eradicate errors.

(1). The traditional or prescriptive right of any religion to exist.

(2). Truth to reason.

(3). Truth to the great claims of morality.

(When the ancients spoke of morality they usually meant social and political morality). To these may be added two other tests.

(4). The practical effects, and

(5). The special and direct divine attestations in behalf of one system above all others.

(1). *The test of traditional or prescriptive right.*—Plato appeals to the νόμος πάτριος, the custom or usage of the state—(*mos civitalis*)—τὰ ἔθνη, (Acts 6: 14). This was used by the Jews when they were condemning Stephen. There are many things which support such systems. National pride, reverence to ancestors, respect for sages and for what they have respected and accepted. All these tend to strengthen this test. The approved usage may be called into question; in such cases in ancient times the oracles were appealed to; pontiffs were recognized as arbiters. The Romans permitted the introduction of other systems of religious worship, if these were not exclusive. In the conquered states, free course was allowed to the native religions, but it was only as a matter of political expediency. They kept secret the name of their protecting god; while they wished to avail themselves of the protection of other patrons, they did not wish others to avail themselves of their advantages. It is always the case that the new faith as an in-

truder has to overcome the traditional faith. This argument is used by Catholicism as against Protestantism, and at times by Christianity. (*Vide* Archb. Whately on the fallacy of believing in a faith, only because it is old). This is a *presumptive* argument, though it cannot be made a *prime* argument in favor of Christianity.

(2.) *Truth to Reason.*—The application of this test may bring on the rejection of a system, or its correction in those elements which are deemed irrational, or it may result in the confirmation of its claims. Some of the Greek Schools of Philosophy rejected their mythologies, others refined and allegorized them by simply using this test. Christianity itself invites in many ways the application of it. It asks acceptance as a reasonable system. It also concedes the right of judgment in regard to other systems, on the same criteria. It is not meant that this test should be applied to each individual doctrine, but only to the basis on which the whole system rests. Paul at Athens makes this appeal. He compares Christianity with heathenism on rational grounds. In using this test such questions as the following should be answered (a.) Is the system in its different parts consistent with itself? (b.) Do its revelations harmonize with the simpler elements which it takes from natural religion? (This question can only be asked of a system which claims to be revealed.) (c.) Does the system harmonize with the constitution of the world which it must suit? (d.) Is the system suited to man's constitution? Is it worthy of man as a religious being? Does it promise to meet his real and pressing wants? Does it give the remedial needs which his nature requires? All these questions bring out the internal evidences of the truth of a system.

(3.) *Truth to our Moral Nature.*—The old Greeks recognized this test and protested against the immoralities of the mythological gods. In this respect however the Greek and Roman religions were better than those of the farther east, Assyrian, etc. A system should neither condemn nor be indifferent to, but it should promote moral interests. This was recognized by Greek philosophers, though in their idea of evil they emphasized what was æsthetically wrong, rather than what was contrary to the holiness of God. As used by them the test

included taste as an element in morality. A religion ought not to commend by example, or by ordinance, or by institution, anything which is inconsistent with the moral consciousness of man. But every religion should consent to be tried by this test of its truth to man's moral nature.

Of these three tests the first would be used by the people, while the use of the last two would to a certain extent be limited to men of thought and reason especially with a view to refining and elevating their national religion. The old heathen systems were not aggressive, therefore it is that the ancients did not ask whether these systems were suitable for others: the question with them was, what is right for us? What they put in the first place of importance we put in the last and thus make more use of the *rational* and *moral* tests, taking care to admit the right of reason and moral nature to estimate the merits of a religion already given us, but not to *create* a religion. The appearance of Christianity necessitated comparison. It claims to come with evidence that will overbear all other faiths. At first it had the weight of the traditional or prescriptive test against it, but soon presented other grounds of excellence—and thus developed

(4.) *The practical test*; the practical effects of a religion as a valid and vital test of the reality and strength of its claims. By practical effects are meant (a) Effects on the intelligence. The intellectual conceptions belonging to a religion cannot be barren or confined merely to outward observances; they must be prolific and that not in a temporary, but permanent manner. A true religion should invigorate the mind, while error always has the opposite effect. If the mind be not thus consolidated the religion does not bear the test. Compare Polytheism and Monotheism, Idolatry and the worship of a spiritual God; Pantheism and the worship of a personal God; Fatalism and free intelligent worship of a Being who rules by moral law; Materialism with supernaturalism in their effects on the intelligence of man.

(b.) Effects on the emotional tastes and sensibilities. If the results are mischievous in this respect the religion

fails to bear the test. If they are salutary the religion is salutary also. In examining the effects on the emotions, we should ask, (1.) what emotions are developed? (2.) in what degree and proportion are they called forth? (3.) to what purpose they are elicited, (4.) how does the indulgence excited react upon the moral nature of man, e. g. humility is developed, but it may be developed too much. It may become servility. Admiration, consecration, love, fear, confidence, gratitude should be developed by religion. We ask can they be developed by the contemplation of such religious objects as the gods of Polytheism; or if they are, to what extent and purpose are they developed.

(c.) Effects on the æsthetic nature of man. The sublime and beautiful should find their climax in true religion.

(d.) Other practical effects. It should be asked, how does a religion influence the conduct of its votaries? What things do men do when they give themselves up to the influence of their religion? These practical effects may be classed (1.) Religious observances called for: (2.) general activities of life: compare in regard to the former, the effects of the formalism of many types of religion, with those of true heart religion. The God who will accept formal and perfunctory worship is not worthy of even that. In regard to the latter, compare those religions where cruelty, licentiousness, and passion are indulged, or intensified, with those under whose influence they are curbed or crushed, and instead of them the domestic and social activities are elevated. This test was applied to the old heathen religions, by such of the ancient apologists, as Arnobius, Lactantius, Clement of Alexandria, etc. It is legitimate and applicable to all religions.

The four foregoing tests may be applied to all religions equally. But as soon as a distinction is made between natural and supernatural religions, then it is necessary to use the fifth, or,

5. *Special Divine attestations in favor of one form of religion.*—The presence or absence of these is a test of the absolute and comparative claims of a religion. The special attestations must be of the nature of general com-

munications, made and authenticated by God, or of expressive and significant acts performed in behalf of the religion which the divinity would have men accept as true. It has been argued against Christianity that revelation is superfluous; that it is impossible; that it cannot be sustained by human testimony; that it cannot be sustained by the evidence of the senses; that in all its alleged forms it is unreliable, having been tampered with or altered unconsciously. If these positions are defensible, all religions are concerned in the issue. There are three steps in establishing the claim of divine attestation:

(a). To prove that such attestations can be regarded as possible under any circumstances.

(b). That they are probable under certain circumstances, and

(c). That they are attested in any given system.

A. That such attestations can be regarded as possible under any circumstances.

(1). Against the revealed religions it has been argued that revelation is superfluous. That such attestation would not be superfluous, appears from the entire religious history of the world, as well as its present religious condition. A correct interpretation of nature is not and never has been common. This is granted by even those who estimate man's abilities most highly. No nation, nor even a solitary philosopher, has come to a full knowledge of the true religion of nature without help from revelation. It is agreed on all hands, that the religions of the world have been signally defective and false. If these divine attestations are not real, then they are worse than superfluous, because they are an invasion of man's prerogative, vitiating the spontaneous and natural conceptions to which he would have come without this alleged help. But the burden of proof falls on those who make the claim, that man need not be helped by his God, and that religion is rendered higher without such help.

It is not necessary now to ask why man has failed. It is enough to know that he has failed, that he needs help, and that therefore revelation is not superfluous.

(2). That an appropriate and sufficient attestation to the true and accepted religion by a deity desiring and

delighting in worship and service, seems certain, if it be possible, is indicated by the constitution of man, and adaptation of nature. He who has inclined us to look after him, will not stop at the rudimentary knowledge that we thus acquire, unless there is a sufficient reason for it. If he has any delight in any particular type of religion, he will signify that preference by further instruction and sufficient attestation. It is objected, however, that this argument proves too much; "if God desires to be worshipped, and if attestation to some form of worship as preferable to all others is needed by us, and possible to Him, He will provide such attestation as will convince and persuade men. He will supply such attestation as will have an actual efficiency, as would be conclusive to all, and everywhere, and to the fullest extent." In answer to this; notice that the objector goes beyond any warrant, unless it can be shown that the actual and universal effectiveness of these further attestations, will not unduly encroach on human freedom, impair or degrade virtue, and imperil some other moral interest. We hold it impossible that such results can be shown. God makes a revelation, provides for it attractions, and furnishes evidences which facilitate its spread. We have no right to say that if there is a revelation it must be universal; that because it is given as limited it is not genuine. If revelation is not discoverable everywhere it may be discoverable somewhere. We are led to look for a revelation somewhere, by preliminary and partial revelations in nature. We should not therefore require of a revelation that it be necessarily effective.

(3). That direct and positive attestations to the positive and even to the exclusive excellence of some religious system above others, seem to be entirely possible. There is no difficulty lying in the way of revelation so far as we can see. That God should express his preference does not seem to be a task for his omniscience and omnipotence. There is no baffling or limiting element in the *end* to be reached through such an expression, and as for the *means*, it is not fitting or possible for us to say in advance what kind of measure of sanctioning evidence must be given to convince us; nor is it our province to say that this or that line of evidence will be sufficient for

à priori reasoning. The very fact that the probability of revelation is proved, ought to make our attitude that of the patient, expectant, eager, interested inquirer. It is not a matter of indifference as if it did not concern us whether there were an attestation from God or not. Perfect mental equity and the impartiality of indifference, are not to be confused the one with the other.

B. It is claimed in behalf of some religions that they have received such special divine attestations, and that they are supported by them. In one group we find Mohammedanism, Judaism and Christianity, with the Patriarchal type of religion.

Candor, simple love of truth and integrity require us to examine the evidences for such an attestation. Some systems claim to have revelations without accompanying attestation. All these must be examined. We must inquire whether it be only an alleged, or a real divine sanction. It is not necessary to wait for new claims; the first considered may seem so conclusive as to demand our faith. Yet he who loves truth will not refuse subsequent claims brought to his mind, but will consider them. A Jew was bound to remain such until God had shown him a new system, until Christianity presented to him its conclusive warrant for its claims.

V.

RELATIONS OF RELIGION TO MORALITY.

These are—

(1). Historical. (2). Theoretical, and (3). Practical.

1. *The Historical Relations of Religion and Morality.*—

There are some things to be considered in regard to the historical relations of the world's religions to the world's morality. The problem is to ascertain and to estimate the connection that has existed between the morality and the religions of the world. What each of these two systems has been to the other, or done for the other. The examination of this question would bring up,

(1). The *fact*, in answer to the question has religion had any relation to morality?

(2). The *nature* of this relation, and

(3). The *direction* and *measure* of their reciprocal influence.

In all religions of human origin, men have undoubtedly fashioned their objects of worship largely in their own moral likeness. The religions code and ritual, have taken their character from the character of the people.

The moral nature of man may force him to put some restraint on himself; a restraint which by nature he would not bear. Naturally he is neither disposed nor able to fashion a religion which will be powerfully and radically antagonistic to evil. For the most part the religions of man's devising confine and intensify his existing moral state. Even revelation comes to the eye of man, through the moral state in which the recipient is found, unless he that gives the revelation accompanies it with influences potent enough to prevent this. It is historically true, that man's moral state has corrupted his religion. The moral elements are wanting in Fetichism, according to Herbert Spencer; so other lower religions lack these moral elements; therefore it is inferred that in the earliest stages of civilization, there was no moral element in religion, but that it was gradually developed. But it is hard to ascertain just where it makes its ap-

pearance. It is not developed from within, it must come from without. We must admit a powerful reciprocal influence between a people's morality and their religion. Let either be reduced to a minimum, and the influence on the other is powerfully felt. Both are too deeply rooted in the constitution of our nature, and too vitally connected to allow us to grant their historical separation. History accords with the teaching of Scripture in regard to this.

Spencer says that "we read history through the lens of our religious faith." It may be said of him, that he reads history through the lens of his philosophy.

2. *Theoretical or essential relations of Religion and Morality.*—Religion and morality are not identical phenomena. They, may, however, be connected in the possession and use by man of certain faculties. The moral faculties do not deal with precisely the same objects, under the same impulse, and in precisely the same way as the religious faculties. They differ in the method of their development, as well as in their essential nature. We define morality to be the ordering of a man's life according to his moral ideas; that is of obligation and duty, of right and wrong. These conceptions may be incomplete, or incorrect; the subjection of the life to them may be slight, fitful; yet there is something conceived of as right, and man orders his life according to this conception. The life then has a moral character; morality is predicated of it.

In the stricter sense, morality is predicated of a life in which the application of these moral ideas to conduct is evident and consistent. By religion is meant an ordering of human life in which the desire is the object, ground and aim, of knowledge, thought, feeling and action. All religion has some moral quality, and all ideas of morality are involved in a religious life in its every part. Whether the facts and principles of religion have in like manner and degree as much to do with morality is debatable. To say that religion is not moral, would be to say that the conscience has nothing to do with it. It would reduce it to a physical basis. "The ethical or moral, ideally is, that which it is normal for man to will and to do." (Martensen). "The human will's consent

to, or concurrence with what is normal," is his practical definition of the ethical or moral in man. The former is the morality that ought to be, the latter fairly represents that which is realized. This definition has the advantage of covering many of our restricted and qualified uses of the term, and exposes the falsity of its abuses and perversions, by calling attention to the false standard of morality. The normal standard by which man is to be morally judged, will vary in different parts of his life, or as his life is viewed in different aspects. *Philosophical* or *Theoretical* ethics finds its standard in reason, or the constitution of our common humanity; *Christian* Ethics finds it in the facts and principles, and in the spirit of Christianity as modifying what before seemed to be good and right; *Social* Ethics finds it in man's relations to society; *Political* Ethics in his relations to the State; *Legal* and *Medical* Ethics in what, according to a right conception of those branches of science is normal, or is made normal. The most fundamental element in morality is the sense of obligation. There is that which our life ought to be, all moral sensibilities assert that the moral life is not a necessitated life, or an aimless life. It is not a life directed and moulded by chance, or self-determination. We know and feel ourselves to be under obligation in respect to the mode and quality of our life, both as a whole, and in its parts.

(a). When this personal sense of obligation comes to deal with the details, the idea of *duty* is evolved.

(b). When dealing with the quality of our moral states and acts, the idea of *virtue* is developed.

(c). When directed towards the ends which we should seek in life, it gives us the idea of *subordinate* and *supreme* good. These three ideas may be arranged in different orders, but they are indispensable. They may be elaborated incompletely, directed wrongly, but never set aside.

We ask now, what are the relations of religion and morality to each other? To Atheism religion has no right to exist at all, and sustains no relation. It has less warrant than the creations of the novelist or poet. On the ground of Theism there are six different theories that may be held in regard to these relations.

A. One of the two may be regarded as including and absorbing the other.

(1.) Morality may be conceived of as merged in religion, so as to have only a nominal existence. This is the theory of consistent mysticism. Devotion to, contemplation of, and love for God, is according to this system, the all embracing duty.

(2.) Religion may be merged into morality. This is the general tendency of the extreme forms of rationalism. (The Illuminism of the last century; the Masonic systems, etc.).

B. (3.) Religion and Morality may be held to be essentially distinct and different, so that either may exist in its entirety without the other. That each must justify its existence and maintain its right on its own ground. This is the theory of the Naturalistic Schools of Philosophy. There is a French school which advocates morality fully developed, without any recognition of God whatever.

C. Both morality and religion may be conceived of, as having a rightful existence, but one decidedly subordinate to the other.

(4.) Religion is conceived of as fundamental and primary: morality as subordinate and secondary. This has been a common view with theologians in so far forth as they have been disposed to recognize the validity of the results of philosophical research. Dr. Wardlaw in "Christian Ethics" chapter VII, makes Religion and Morality substantially equivalent. Morality, is Religion in practice, and Religion is morality in principle. *Vide* Dr. McCosh "Divine Government" (p. 405.)

(5.) Morality conceived of as more primary and fundamental, and religion subordinate. This is Kant's philosophical theory. The rationalistic theology of Kant, derives our belief in God, from our moral ideas, as well as well as our belief in immortality.

D. (6.) Religion and morality may be conceived of as equally necessary and in a sense equally primary, and therefore as co-ordinate developments in human life, closely and vitally connected, yet not identical; not practically separable, if either is to become true, full and complete; yet the true life is influenced by considerations

of different kinds, belonging to each of these two spheres: in morality duty to right: in religion duty to God.

We now pass to the consideration of some points at which morality and religion either agree or diverge the one from the other.

(1.) Both have their ground in our constitution as human beings. They are primary elements in our nature: original impulses. Both are called for and necessary for a full complete development of manhood.

(2.) Both have reference to objects external to ourselves, whose claims upon us are real and valid, and must be met if we would be true and just men. There is a call from without for a moral and religious life, not only from within. As we come to meet these claims they are not annulled, but become wider and stronger. There ought to be progress in religion: a Christian ought not to be satisfied with what contented him in the beginning of his religious life.

As differences between the two spheres of life may be noted,

(3.) In respect to the relative position of the objects with which they have to do. To religion God is the central object, and all other things take their places about Him: their relations to man depend on their relations to God. From Him they acquire their significance. Life is a circle, the centre of which is God. All things are referred to this centre and treated accordingly. Morality has not necessarily this object. It deals with each object on its own merits, emphasizing the claim of right with regard to everything. Life is a plane, in which all these things lie, and each must be separately treated and considered. There is an intrinsic right in every separate case; therefore an atheist may have a system of morality, treating everything directly and immediately and ignoring God.

(4.) In the quality of the claim which they assert, and exercise over man. In religion it is the will of a personal God which comes constantly into consideration. He *is*, and is Lord, and whatever we ought to be in consequence of religious relations, we ought to be in consequence of our relation to Him. In morality the claim is the abstract claim of an abstract right; something desirable,

fitting, obligatory. In this view right is not conceived as something anterior or superior to God. On the other hand it is not created or contingent. Both the claims of right, and the absolute claim of God are real. God has so made us that by the constitution of our being we recognize right and wrong. We feel that we owe allegiance to both. We do not conceive of God as more primary. If so there would be a time when it could not have been predicated of him. God however creates the relations which bring right into manifestation. Men may unwarranted deny one of these claims, or divorce them unnaturally while professing to admit both, or regarding them as valid separately. Ethics and morality are incomplete without the knowledge of God and his claims. Therefore Ethics must recognize natural and revealed religion. In morality the power working for good is a power wholly within the moral agent. It depends on the nature of the individual and is kept alive by abstract considerations. It is influenced by the training, education, inclinations and sensitiveness of the moralist. Pride, hatred of religion may prompt the moralist to a vigilance, a steadfastness, an earnestness which a Christian may lack.

Usually however where the claims of religion are recognized, there is a more healthful, a more effective effort; then the voice of conscience becomes the voice of God. The double call makes men more earnest and more successful.

3. *What should be the practical relations of religion and morality.*—It is evident that they both have their place in life. The question is, what should each do for the other. In answer, notice that religion should reach over into morality, in order to make itself more complete and perfect, and to lift morality to its true place and dignity. And morality too, will be misproportioned in its development, and incomplete in its results, unless it reaches into constant relation with religion.

Morality cannot, and should not be content with recognizing God merely as one of many co-ordinate objects, that have claims on men. The small and great, the eternal and transient, the fundamental and superficial should not thus be considered alike. There is no

equity in treating all claims as equal. If our sense of right is to be vigorous and effective, it is essential to have it in constant relation with God. A religion that would live secluded from the common claims of morality, will run into Mysticism or Formalism, and a morality that would divorce itself from religion, becomes hard and cold, censorious, self-righteous, ostentatious and punctilious.

VI.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF RELIGION IN LIFE
AND HISTORY.

Under this head we consider the significance of religion as a phenomenon in life, and the importance of reaching the true religious faith. We are confronted with wide-spread irreligion of the world, and its free-religionism. We are asked (1) of what consequence is it that we be religious, and (2) of what consequence is it that we be rightly religious. Great multitudes all over Christendom are irreligious. Are they at fault, and if so, to what extent? This answered, we are met by the free-religionists, who claim that all men are divine travelers, traversing the same road, their faces set toward the same object, the same light on them, if they but see. We take up the first question :

(1.) What consequence is it that we be really religious? To this we answer, if man is by nature a religious being, irreligion is in the lowest view of it, a neglect, and a dishonor of a natural and an essential part of the true, full human life. Manhood is dethroned where religion is left out of it. Because man's highest powers, his noblest, purest sensibilities are the objects with which religion deals. He who would be a complete man, must be positively and energetically religious. Irreligion is explained in various ways.

It may be (*a*) the effect of a besotted and brutalized life; or (*b*) due to indifference, levity and negligence; or (*c*) due to greater vividness in the pressure of material occupations, secular interests; or (*d*) it may be traced to a positive disinclination or aversion to the claims of a religious life; or (*e*) it may be the result of a reaction against prevalent religious abuses and errors; or finally (*f*) the legitimate and logical result of false speculative reasoning. Against irreligion from whichever source it may arise, we should press the claims of God, and of right. We should not, however, treat all irreligious

people alike, but discriminate with a view to the origin of their irreligion.

(3). Of what consequence is it that we be rightly religious? It is claimed that the intrinsic difference between truth and error, is a very little thing. It is hardly worth while to find out error, say the objectors, for God is so indifferent to all forms of religion, that it matters not which we embrace. Exclusiveness, according to this view, is the only unpardonable sin. (Col. Higginson.) In answer, notice, if He who has made us religious beings is not a prodigy of indifference, there is, there must be, a right form of religion, which it is of the highest importance that we identify. There is a right and a wrong way and side in everything else. It is monstrous to assert that religion is an exception to this general rule. "To admit the possible reality of the objects and relations with which religion deals, necessitates the utmost perseverance in seeking the truth in regard to such relations." (Thos. Chalmers). Even natural religion, if its leadings are followed, presses upon us the necessity and duty of ascertaining if God, who gave his revelation in nature, has given us any larger, or fuller, or final one.

Having discussed the several heads of the Introduction at length, we now come to the consideration of our System of Christian Apologetics as already defined and stated.

CHRISTIAN APOLOGETICS.

II.

CHRISTIANITY IN PARTICULAR.

Christianity claims to be the only true, divinely sanctioned, and authoritative religion for us and for all men. What is meant by Christianity? It is that religion whose nature and claims are set forth in the Christian Scriptures of the Old and New Testament. It belongs to Systematic Theology to examine the details of doctrine; for the purpose of Apologetics it is enough to identify the system as follows: Christianity is the system, whatever it may be found to be on examination, which, in regard to its details, in the Scriptures, is as their complete and final result, announced, established and provided for. So far forth as it is a form of thought, or feeling, or action, in reference to the divine, it is the Scriptures which are to direct us how to think or act.

Characteristics of Christianity.—(1.) *Christianity is a revealed religion.* If this claim cannot be established, its great distinctive characteristic is given up. It has no gratitude for those who call it the best, but not the revealed religion.

(2.) *Christianity is a historical religion* not merely in the looser sense, that it has figured conspicuously in history, or influenced history, but that it has a prolonged, minute historical account to give of itself; a historical progress and a communication of it to men. It has an unfolding and an account of this unfolding. And this is not merely a human account of a divinely given system, but a divine account. It is closely and vitally identified with certain documents. Its claims are dependent largely on the historical accuracy and nature of these documents.

(3.) *Christianity is a positive religion.* It does not merely commend itself to us, by intrinsic excellencies,

but it commands authoritatively man's acceptance of it and man's compliance with it. It is however, winning and attractive. It has the divine as its ground and source, as well as its object; it derives its authority from God.

(4.) *Christianity is a rational religion.* Not as originating in human reason; there are systems which can claim nothing farther than this; not as professing to bring all its elements into the comprehension of human reason; but simply as submitting its credentials to the adjudication of reason. It challenges the right of reason to impeach its mysteries; it never admits that it could have originated in human reason, but it claims that as God made man a rational creature, He does not contradict reason in Christianity. It demands of men, that they act on its mysteries, as well as on those things which reason comprehends. It claims that reason is honored and not reproached by bowing to it.

(5.) *Christianity is an Ethical Religion.*—It not only presents, but invites moral tests. It is based on moral instinct, sensibilities and the conscience. It claims to promote all the interests of morality. It throws light on the moral decisions, increases precision and promptness in moral judgments; it claims to refine the motives, to make the sensibilities delicate, steady and harmonious. It adds to the significance of the sanction of morality. But as religion has the divine as its aim, Christianity claims to bring man into living union with the divine.

(6.) *Christianity is a world religion.*—There are not many religions that make this claim, or could maintain it. Christianity has a basis of facts, which adapt it to the needs of all. It makes provision for what all men are, and for what they need. Its methods to accomplish the fulfillment of man's needs are suited to all. It has been tried more widely than any other religion, and its adaptation has been proved more variously and widely. This is not a mere accidental result, but one which was contemplated. Those who pronounce it a religion intended for a single type of men, or devised to meet any local or transient state of society and of man, mistake its whole scope. It is not merely a Jewish religion, nor merely suited to the time of Christ. It claims and expects to be widely spread and to suit every class of men.

(7). *Christianity is distinctly adapted to a special, intellectual and moral condition of the race.*—It is universal, because it is specific. It does not propose to give relief to a few men only, or to provide for the imaginations of a few. Christ indeed absolves the righteous, but considers that if any think themselves righteous, they are worthy of condemnation.

The revelations of Christianity concern all men. Its provisions are needed by all, and its summons are addressed to all, because the moral condition of all is the same. All men are hopelessly ignorant unless enlightened by Christianity. If one per cent. of the human race were in a condition not needing Christianity, it would fail in its claim. It is specifically adapted to a certain moral condition, but this condition is universal. No other religion addresses all men and offers to make of them what they should be.

(8). *Christianity traces its earthly origin to a personal founder, in a sense and to an extent which is true of no other religion.*—Some religions are growths, such as Brahmanism, and the Greek and Roman Mythologies; others are institutions, such as Mohammedanism, Confucianism, Buddhism.

Christianity as compared with all institutions, is unique in the place which its founder assumed, and which the system ascribes to him. In the other systems the founders stand outside and point to them as finished rules of faith. Christ places himself in the centre of his system. Faith in Mohammed does not occupy the same place in the system of Mohammed which faith in Christ occupies in Christianity. When Christ is rejected, the very essence of Christianity is rejected, so that in one sense, popularly speaking, Christianity is Christ.

The object of the system is accomplished, when a special relation with Christ is effected or established. There are those who say that Christianity was founded by Paul. That Christ would have earnestly disclaimed what men believe concerning him, under the guidance of Paul. We do not find this to be true; forms of speech may differ, but when we compare what Christ claimed and what Paul taught about him, we find them the same.

(9.) *Christianity closely confines its doctrinal and its vital elements.*—What it requires of men to do, is the result of what it asks them to believe. While it insists on a new life, it builds the right life on truth as distinguished from error. One cannot live the life which Christianity requires, except for the reasons that it gives.

Some of its facts lie within the sphere of visible things, others within the sphere of invisible things. The latter are to be received on faith, Christianity cannot be communicated without a right apprehension of its doctrines. The outcry against dogma, rests on the absurd assumption, that one can live just as well with one conception of truth as with another. All the doctrinal elements of Christianity are vital, but dogma implies abstruse reasoning. The body of doctrine and the quality of faith, or the objective and subjective work of the Holy Spirit are inseparable.

(10.) *Christianity is an exclusive religion.*—Modern free-thinkers consider this a reproach. Christianity claims it as a distinction. They say Christianity is a sect. We accept the issue, “neither is there salvation in any other.” Christianity would stultify itself if it were not exclusive; if it admitted that its precious sacrifice had nothing definite about it. The charity of the free-thinkers is to be distrusted. It is not genuine catholicity.

(11.) *Christianity is the final religion.*—This is denied by the free religionists. They say that analogy leads us to expect, that the end of all revelation has not passed. Hence there may be another change; God has not exhausted his resources. Moreover, it is a disparagement of ourselves to say that we are not as worthy as the Jews to receive a new religion. In answer, notice:

(a.) That all the rightful antecedents of Christianity pointed to it. It points to no successor.

(b.) It reaches the utmost wants of man. The preceding revelations did not meet all these wants.

(c.) It was brought to the world, by the Son of God. Who that is higher can bring a better revelation. It was established and extended by the Holy Spirit: what more exalted agency shall establish and extend another system?

EVIDENCES OF CHRISTIANITY.

GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

1. Is the establishment of the proof of Christianity within the reach of evidence? It is sometimes said, that religious truth is not within the reach of evidence. The question belongs to Metaphysics and Natural Theology. It is again said that though religious truth is not altogether inaccessible to our faculties, yet no religion is supported by sufficient evidence. The certainty of religious truth cannot be reached. The world possesses as yet no adequate logic for that department of thought which lies beyond our immediate experience. Therefore no imaginable evidence can be sufficient to support any religion. A sincere theorist ought to have no difficulty in giving a definite answer on this point.

The God whom Natural Theology makes known to us is surely competent to indicate the way in which we are to think of Him. On the other hand, the human mind which is capable of appreciating God in nature, can appreciate additional religious knowledge. There is no more intrinsic difficulty in God's saying "this is my beloved Son," than in his saying through nature, "I am what I am." (R. H. Hutten.)

(2.) If the establishment of truth is not beyond the reach of evidence, what kind of evidence will establish it? There are three kinds of evidence:

(a.) Intuitive Evidence.

(b.) Demonstrative Evidence.

(c.) Experimental, Probable, or Moral Evidence; more generally known as Moral Evidence. This latter kind of evidence differs from the former two kinds.

(1.) In that it depends partly or fully on experience; (2.) In that it admits of degrees of conclusiveness; (3.) In that it may involve the balancing of truths seemingly opposed to one another; (4.) In that it involves moral elements in the act of the inquirer or reasoner. It calls forth the use of the voluntary power of attention; it

involves a responsibility for taking and treating things as they are taken and treated.

The truth of Christianity is not an intuitive truth; therefore the source of evidence must be experiential, or empirical. The sources of this class of evidence are (*a.*) consciousness; (*b.*) The senses; (*c.*) The memory; (*d.*) Testimony. Reasoning may combine the items given by these sources. The truth of Christianity cannot be established by consciousness, or the senses, or memory. The chief source therefore of evidence for Christianity is testimony. But under what conditions, and to what extent can the facts of testimony be said to be certain. The existence of testimony is a direct and necessary result of our constitution, and social relations. It is not as Hume claims, on the ground of experience alone that it is accepted. We receive testimony as social beings; it has a necessity within us. Faith in it cannot be unlimited; it requires qualifications. A fact alleged on testimony stands as a contingent truth. The question then arises, when is testimony reliable? when does it become certain? According to Ueberweg, every historical assertion is to be treated as a hypothesis, which must be confirmed, in the following way:

(*a.*) That it alone explains the shape which the report took in the subsequent course of events.

(*β.*) That it coincides with what was to be expected, as a consequence of the nature of circumstances, and of previous occurrences.

(*γ.*) The trustworthiness of the testimony must be tested by the rules which govern conditional or contingent inferences.

There are two things involved in historical credibility; (1) the subjective credibility and (2) the objective credibility of the fact. For any reputed fact various hypotheses may be formed to account. These are:

(*a.*) That the testimony may have for its ground the fact that the event did happen and was observed.

(*b.*) That the observation was influenced by a false apprehension.

(*c.*) That the report was influenced by a false apprehension.

(*d.*) That the recollection is untrue.

(e.) That the transmitters of the testimony were influenced by imagination.

(f.) That the occurrence may be recorded in the spirit and for the purpose of romance.

(g.) That the report may be circulated for the deliberate purpose to deceive.

Relative Value of Different Kinds of Testimony.—An eye-witness, known or credibly believed to have been so, may be trustworthy, provided, (a) he was able to apprehend, strictly and truly, the event as it occurred; and (b) he was able to give a true statement, and (c) he had the disposition to take care to do so, viz: competence, opportunity and character, are requisite for the credibility of an eye-witness. The very best kind of testimony is that wherein there is an agreement of several witnesses, provided, (1) they are independent; (2) they are not influenced by the same deception; (3) they have not been affected by the same prejudice.

When there is no testimony from eye-witnesses, the value of the testimony of *secondary witnesses*, even if they be contemporaries, is determined, partly by their intelligence and critical capacity, and partly and chiefly by their relation to the immediate witnesses, viz., character, opportunity and sincerity, are essential to secondary witnesses. When these requisites are found, the testimony acquires a high degree of probability; therefore, it is important to discover the *genealogy* of the testimony.

The testimony of later witnesses, by common consent is rejected, when there is anything which is suspicious in it, viz., (1). When there is a personal interest, doctrinal or practical. (2). When there is a lack of competence, opportunity and character. If neither of these grounds for rejection exists, then the *objective probability* of the facts must be ascertained. Rawlinson, (*Bampton Lectures*), gives the following canons for determining the value of testimony.

A. When the record which we possess of an event is the writing of a contemporary, he being a credible witness, and having the means of observing the facts to which he testified, the testimony is to be accepted as possessing the first, or highest historical credibility.

B. When the event recorded is one which the writer may be reasonably supposed to have obtained directly

from those who witnessed it, we should accept it as probably true, unless it be in itself very improbable. Such evidence constitutes the second degree of historical credibility.

C. When the event recorded is removed considerably from the age of the recorder, and there is no reason to suppose that he obtained it from a contemporary writing, and when it is probable that his source of information was tradition, still if the event be one of great importance, of public notoriety, if it affected the national life or prosperity, especially if it was of a nature to have been at once commemorated by the establishment of any rite or practice, then it has a claim to belief, as probably true, at least in general outline.

D. When we have a tradition of one race corroborated by that of another, especially if it be a distant and hostile race, the event which has this double testimony obtains a high degree of probability, and unless very improbable in itself, thoroughly deserves acceptance. The weight of this kind of testimony exceeds that of the third class and nearly approaches that of the second.

3. *What degree of assurance can moral evidence give?*

(*a.*) It does not give that philosophical certitude which belongs to axiomatic truths intuitively discerned or even truths established demonstratively by rigorous logic.

(*b.*) Moral Evidence may produce certainty in the popular or moral sense of the term. Such certainty as may be affirmed of all truths of whatever kind in whatever way acquired, which are supported by a decided preponderance of evidence satisfactory in its kind and sufficient in its amount.

NOTE.—The terms *certainty* and *evidence* are used in a subjective and in an objective sense. *Objective* certainty may be predicated of the object of knowledge and it exists whether known or not. So there may exist *objective* evidence independently of the mind's estimate of it.

Subjective certainty is a condition of the mind in regard to and depends on and corresponds with the evidence as the mind is able to discern and comprehend it. Certain things may and are often denied.

(*c.*) Moral evidence is the only evidence with which moral responsibility and probation may be connected; by

the use of which character may be formed, developed or tested. In its nature, when of satisfactory kind and of sufficient amount, it is convincing enough to warrant the most momentous responsibilities. If religious truths were intuitive religion would be removed from the responsible or *moral* life. If any historical or positive religion were to be presented to men so that the evidence should not constitute a great part of its foundation then its historical and positive elements would have to be brought before every individual. This would require a greater miracle than Christianity claims for itself. Therefore it is not *against* Christianity but *for* it that a great portion of its evidence comes second hand. It is of the nature of moral evidence that it does not preclude doubt, and it is unreasonable to ask or expect any other kind of evidence for religion otherwise, it would have to be placed on intuitive or demonstrative evidence. Judge Greenleaf on the "Testimony of the Evangelists" discusses this question from a point of jurisprudence, and says "the subject of inquiry is a matter of fact; the truth of matters of fact rests on moral evidence alone. It makes no difference whether they relate to this life or the next. A proposition may be said to be proved when the evidence is satisfactory in amount and quality in favor of it. The only legal test is the sufficiency of circumstances to satisfy the mind and conscience of a man of common prudence and discretion, and so to convince him that he would venture to act upon that conviction in matters of the highest importance to his own interests.

4. *What mental conditions are essential to the proper estimating of moral evidences?*

The species of truth and the process by which it is elicited, make this consideration very important. (*Vide* Hamilton's Logic Chap. 32.) These conditions are:

(a.) Attention; i. e., an effort to apprehend the phenomena in their bearings and relations.

(b.) An effort to apprehend and rightly estimate other connected phenomena.

(c.) Vigilance, to guard against the arrest, or perversions of this intellectual process at any point, in any way, or in any other interest than that of the truth.

(d.) Equity in balancing the various evidence that may seem to point in opposite directions. Common experience shows that such balancing is constantly necessary. The senses, the memory, the witnesses, often are contradictory. Where there is no direct conflict of testimony there may be real or alleged improbabilities, or impossibilities. Evidence has to be taken into account for the improbability.

“The grounds of disbelief, are a state of mind in which we are fully persuaded that some opinion or assertion is not true, even though great evidence in its favor is brought to bear upon the case, there may be reasons for disbelief. The generalization of one group of facts may be set against another.” (*Vide* Jno. Stuart Mill, *Logic*; Chap. XXV.)

This will be more fully considered in connection with the discussion of miracles. It is sufficient to notice here, that the probabilities on both sides must be taken into account.

5. *What moral conditions are essential to the right treatment of moral evidence?*

To this we answer:

(a.) An apprehension of the moral responsibility which always rests upon us in weighty evidence. The moral responsibility begins before a conclusion is reached, and in the process of reaching it.

(b.) Humility as opposed to Self-confidence in view of our own infirmities, and the magnitude of the issues involved, in collecting the facts, treating them properly and then striking the balance.

(c.) Prayerfulness even in the light of natural religion.

(d.) Willingness to abide by the result. The resolute refusal to forestall the conclusions, or wrest the truth, forcing it to an issue which we wish to reach. The motive to the construction of confused notions and the use of ambiguous terms, lies commonly in a half perceived divergence between the facts and the claims of the system. The will controls science very much; the purity of conscience is necessary to science as well as a continued loyalty of the will.

6. *What kinds of moral evidence are offered for our decision on the claim of Christianity?*

As commonly presented the evidences of Christianity are grouped under three heads ;

(a.) *Internal* ; (b.) *External* ; (c.) *Collateral*.

(a.) *By Internal Evidence* has been and is meant generally, the evidence of the divinity of Christianity supplied in and by its substance and structure. Christianity is contemplated as a religion purporting to come from God. We ask, what in the system itself supports this claim ? We compare it with what we have elsewhere learned of God.

(b.) *External Evidence*, is supplied by something distinctive and characteristic in the way in which the Christian Religion was introduced into the world. Christianity claims to have been communicated to, and not discovered by man ; what is the proof of this claim ? Our attention is at once called to the methods by which it was introduced ; to extraordinary powers and knowledge given to its early propagators. Miraculous and prophetic powers are said to be exercised by those who ushered in Christianity. External evidence does not include all evidence outside of the internal. It has reference only to those peculiar, historical elements already referred to.

(c.) *Collateral or auxiliary evidence*.

This term is convenient for covering all other evidence, which is not included in the two former classes. There may be proofs found in the extent of the results, in the influence of the work, and the quality of the agencies which contributed to the issue. The apostles were the small human instrumentalities, whereby the inherent power of Christianity effected its results. God has been operating with it and in it, making whatever was hostile to it, contribute to its progress.

This collateral evidence is allied to internal evidence in so far forth as what Christianity accomplishes proceeds from what it is. On the other hand it is allied to external evidence in that it was outside of the substance and structure of Christianity. It is external to Christianity as a system of truth, but internal to it as a dispensation.

The comparative measure of the strength of these classes of evidence is variously estimated. Some disparage external evidence ; others (Mozeý ; Bampton Lec-

tures) emphasize the practical results of Christianity as an evidence.

Generally the internal evidences are of a philosophical sort: the external evidences are of an historical sort. The former are founded on the fitness of Christianity to do what it claims to do; the latter are matters of history and fact. The internal evidences cannot be established without the historical. Some of the doctrines themselves involve historical facts, and the external evidences are not worth much if nothing is known of the system to which they attest. The terms are arbitrary; they have no special relation to religion. The evidences ought to grow out of religion, and to be so grouped as to immediately suggest to the mind, their essential, applied character. It is for this reason therefore, that this system of the classification of evidences has fallen into disuse. Apologetics is now treated as a distinct branch of Christian Science, having two departments, viz. (1.) The Philosophical, and (2.) the Historical. Christianity is in part a body of historical facts, and in part a system of religious truths, moral precepts. We are to inquire into the credibility of the historical facts, and into the reasonableness of the precepts, then its consequences. If this be a true history what follows? These two branches are to be investigated by special methods.

THE HISTORICAL BRANCH.

The nature and claims of Christianity as a historical Religion.

Looked at from a historical point of view what reason is there for believing that Christianity is the true, authoritative and divinely sanctioned religion, for us and for all men? Assuming that there is a superiority in Christianity over all other religions, is it so great as to establish its claim of divine origin? Is it of such a kind as to justify this claim? Christianity cannot be satisfied with a mere comparison with other systems; it contrasts itself with them; it insists that the results of this comparison shall be a contrast so clear, so true, so distinct as to convince all that it is *the* true religion. Is there anything in Christianity to prove it to be the true religion, historically? When this is established the examination of it as a philosophical system follows.

Reasons for first considering the historical aspects of Christianity.

(1.) The idea of Christianity came into the world, through its historical facts. Without these historical occurrences the world would never have had the idea of Christianity.

(2.) Many of the elements in the idea of Christianity are in themselves historical facts; not merely metaphysical concepts, or moral precepts; e. g. sin, ruin, incarnation, and the atonement are not merely conceivable elements but actual facts. If the philosophical argument shall have power, it must be founded on historical facts.

(3.) The philosophical argument itself viewed as such will be more earnestly and hopefully conducted, when the historical truth of the facts with which it is concerned is exhibited to the mind. The whole moral nature is concerned with Christianity; it needs facts to establish faith.

(4.) Christianity is an actual reality. It is not a mere system of truth; it has a historical existence which must be accounted for. The Scriptures exist; their produc-

tion, reception and influence must be accounted for, and even those ideas or facts which are least historical in their character come to our knowledge with facts that are historical.

(5.) It is the experience with those portions of Christendom in which the historical character of Christianity has been most denied, or lightly esteemed, that the whole Christian argument is most lightly treated. The practical power of Christianity has suffered beyond estimate. The argument for the divinity of Christianity suffers when it is attempted to vindicate it, on any other than its historical basis.

“Not the facts, but the idea of Christianity, are the objects of faith.” (Hedge.) This is the rationalistic way of reasoning; as against this, we claim, that we get the ideal from the real and historical Christianity. It seems then, to be of the greatest consequence to determine first whether there is a historical Christianity and then, to proceed to the philosophical argument.

Historical Christianity as a fact to be accounted for.—Christianity now exists. It has existed for eighteen hundred years. These are historical phenomena for which we are bound to seek an explanation. Secular, hostile testimonies carry the origin of Christianity back into the first century. It is well attested that it then had a definite character; that it sustained very remarkable relations, both to the Jewish and to the Roman world. It had very positive, historical beliefs. Its great historical characteristics stood in relation to these historical facts. The historical existence of Jesus Christ is not disputed. The fact that the church was what it was, on the ground of what it believed in regard to Him, is conceded, as also the fact that this ground is historical.

Four epistles of Paul, are admitted even by the Tübingen school as genuine. (Romans, Galatians and I. and II. Corinth.) In these there are facts regarding Christ. Compare Rom. 15: 18-19; 2 Corinth. 12: 12; Gal. 3: 5; 1 Corinth. 12: 4-11; 1 Corinth. 14; Romans 15: 18.

These allusions have to be accounted for; there are also events in the life of Christ referred to as within the belief and knowledge of those to whom they write. (Comp. 1 Cor. 15; Rom. 6: 4-9; Rom. 8: 34; 2 Cor. 4: 14;

Gal. 3 : 13 ; Gal. 6 : 14). How had these facts come to be believed by men of Jewish and Pagan antecedents when so few influences favored their acceptance and so many opposed ? Row (in "The Supernatural in Christianity") presents five indisputable facts in regard to the beginnings of Christianity, viz. (a.) That at the year 25 A. D. the Christian society had no existence. (b.) In 40 A. D. it was in vigorous growth. (c.) It was founded by Jesus Christ. (d.) The crucifixion of Christ by the Roman governor caused a temporary collapse of this society. (e.) That an event of some kind which took place shortly after his death imparted to it a new life which it never lost and which gave it a power not possessed by any other community we know.

These were abundantly open to verification and every interest and scruple called for the most searching scrutiny before belief. In the first Christian Apology by Quadratus some of these aspects of Christianity are alluded to in connection with these historical truths. There were other things supersensual the acceptance of which was not asked of any man except on the previous belief of the historical facts. The Christian church then, would have been insignificant if there had not been produced in it a profound historical conviction ; but this conviction is found not only in those who received Christianity, but also in others who while admitting the facts, refused to follow them to their logical conclusion.

After this time there were several sources from which these facts could have been derived. viz. (1.) Personal observation ; (2.) Oral tradition ; (3.) Written documents ; (4.) Monumental institutions, observances and emblems ; e. g. the Sabbath, sacraments ; the dove as the symbol of the Holy Ghost ; the vine found in Christian art very early, in the Catacombs, etc. (5.) Significant changes and omissions. The cessation of sacrifice is explained on the ground of the Christians' belief that the death of Christ meant something in relation to sacrifice. There may be several hypotheses to explain these facts.

A. The hypothesis of the reality of the things believed in. This affords a simple and adequate explanation of the facts of their influence.

B. Other hypotheses. There are four in number, viz. : 1. The legendary ; 2. the mythical ; 3. that of

innocent and unconscious deception, and 4. that of willful deception by those who were the authors of Christianity.

1. *The Legendary Hypothesis.*—This theory supposes that the early historical belief rests to a considerable extent on vague and reputed, unverified and unverifiable body of legends. It starts with the fact that there is in every people a mass of unwritten information in regard to the past. Antecedent to the existence of written history, tradition must be the source of history. It assumes in regard to the gospel narrative that it must have arisen in this way, and that it soon became and is now impossible to tell which is the historical nucleus in this mass of legends. There would have been more plausibility in this theory, if there had been a lapse of one or two centuries between the time of Christ and the establishment of the church; if the definite record had not been made at once, or having been made had perished; or if these events had occurred at a time and under circumstances which prevented the making of a record at once.

But the church was in existence within ten years of the death of Christ; can it be explained that it came then to be what it was on the ground of a legend? (See 1 John 1: 1.) This was neither in the Jewish or Roman world, a legendary age. According to the most critical schools there were letters written by Paul to churches at Rome, Corinth, Galatia; these churches were well developed; they contained Gentile elements, not predisposed to accept Jewish legends. The writer of these epistles would not make use of legends; there is hardly a mind known to us in modern or ancient times, who is less likely to do so. On the supposition that these books were not written till in the second century, the existence of the church is unaccountable.

2. *The Mythical Hypothesis.*—This theory must accomplish three things if it is to succeed as against Christianity; (a.) It must dispose of the gospel narrative as a narrative; (b.) It must dispose of the gospel history in the narrative; (c.) It must explain away the character of Christ himself. It must prove Christ to be not real, but an idea fashioned to express certain ideals, not historical.

reality. (Geo. Matheson on "The Originality of Christ" in Contemporary Review.) (*a.*) The attempt to dispose of the gospel history. This theory admits a nucleus, but does not define how much. It claims that about this nucleus there is gathered an envelope of approximate facts, such as might result from oral tradition. But aside from this material it finds a considerable amount of narrative historical in form but not in reality. It admits three elements, truth, approximate truth, and myth. It draws an analogy from the mythical periods in Greece and Rome; also from the apocryphal gospels of the centuries. It exonerates the original authors from the intention of deception; even those who incorporated these myths into the Scripture narrative, did not mean to deceive; they were simply wanting in discrimination. This theory meets with two difficulties. (1.) It cannot account for the existence of the myths. (2.) The myths would not account for the facts:

(1.) It seems impossible to account for the origination or acceptance of the alleged myths.

(*a.*) It is an assumption that the beginning of historical movements calls into exercise the myth creating spirit; (*b.*) It is equally an assumption that Christianity beginning when and where, and as it did, must have called into exercise these myth making tendencies. It did not begin in the early mythical age of Greece, nor were the men and circumstances such as to warrant this assumption. (*c.*) It is an assumption further, that the Apocryphal books show the actual existence and working of this myth making spirit at the time, place, and on the theme of the gospel narrative. The very shallowness of the Apocryphal books shows that they are counterfeits of historical fact. They are legendary in their character, rather than mythical. (*d.*) The question arises where did the friends and followers of Christ, being plain and prosaic men, get such ideas as made the germ of these alleged myths. The Christ of the gospel is not the Christ of the Jews. Did they bring these peculiar ideas to embellish the Christ of history; or did they receive them from Him? How did they attach these noble ideas to a character which was so much like others? How did they come to convince others who had seen the real Christ, of the truth of these ideal conceptions.

(e.) In regard to the acceptance of this hypothesis after the myths had been created; it is evident that if there would be a difficulty of one kind at one time, during the life of Christ, there would be a difficulty of another kind in displacing the original true account at a later day, and substituting this fanciful mythical story. All traces of such a struggle between two narratives if there was any, have vanished; the men who imposed their account succeeded in erasing every evidence that there was a struggle.

(2.) The myths cannot account for the facts. If it is difficult to understand how Christianity was developed in several generations; if it is based on fiction, it is still harder to see how it was established within ten years. Then there is the difficulty of transforming the earlier church which grew on a basis of facts, to the later Christianity which is based on myths; and the accomplishing of this without any apparent difficulty and with a complete obliteration from all the records, of the abandoning of the real for the ideal and mythical.

3. *The Hypothesis of Deception in regard to many and cardinal facts.*—There are two forms of this hypothesis (1.) Uneconscious and innocent deception. (2.) That of wilful deception. In each the hypothesis may be so constructed as to place the deception in Christ, or in the early disciples.

(a.) So far as the hypothesis relates to Christ himself, we are asked to believe that Christianity was built on a foundation of deceptions, of which Christ was either the innocent, or the designing author. In the first case, our feeling towards Him would be that of pity. In the second that of aversion and abhorrence; and in both cases, we would be thrown into the greatest perplexity with regard to the early account of Christ in the gospels. How could this deluded enthusiast have produced such impressions as have influenced the world? The reconciliation of the theory of deception and the facts is impossible. Both in quantity, and in quality, the results of the impressions produced are beyond any expectation from either an enthusiast or an impostor. But Christ gained immediate success with His enemies, as well as with His friends and dupes. If He was an impostor He

completely dwarfed all other men in history. We throw back with indignation this hypothesis of a deceived or a deceiving Christ.

The older rationalism said, that the gospel history was truthful in intention, but not in fact. It made a distinction between facts and the narration of facts. It offered naturalistic explanations of the supernatural; but was set aside as shallow. This theory is obliged to transform the faith of the early church which faith was "in Jesus," to a "faith of Jesus," transferred to His disciples. The more intentional deception introduced by Strauss and Renan is still more incapable of accounting for the facts, and therefore more repulsive.

(b.) So far as it relates to the early followers of Christ and the authors of the New Testament, we are asked to believe that they were the dupes of some strange influence or else participators in the deception. If the first supposition be true we can but be sorry for them, if the second we reject them, but in either case we have the gospel history to account for with its marvellous appearance of honesty. We have the conduct of the men to explain as well as the admitted facts of early Christianity. Renan asserts that during the middle and latter part of his career Christ was constrained inwardly and outwardly to claim Messianic attributes which He knew he did not possess. The difficulty is again, to explain how the disciples succeeded in hiding what they knew to be true. They seem to have duped their own generation who had other independent sources of information. We shall also need to account for the extraordinary religious doctrines which they taught. How could they teach such pure morality, while following a false Christ. If the characters themselves were under the power of this deception then Christianity is the product of a misunderstanding. (*Vide* Uhlhorn; "Modern Representations of the Life of Christ.") Fitzgerald says ("Aids to Faith") "the theory amounts to this, that they had no origin at all." To illustrate the nature and difficulties of these four hypotheses, let them be applied to the doctrine of the resurrection of Christ. The church stakes its existence on this event, and the account given of it in the Scriptures. It is believed to be a true occurrence. This

hypothesis accounts for (1.) the narrative (2.) the character and conduct of the first disciples; (3.) the establishment and rise of Christianity and its progressive triumphs. The narrative of the gospels; the life and institutions of the Christian church; the hopefulness and steadfastness of the disciples imply a belief in the resurrection, and the belief implies the certainty of the event. How is it with the other hypotheses. (a.) Did the belief in the resurrection grow out of a legend or myth? When the avowedly genuine Epistles of Paul appeared, it was twenty-two to twenty-nine years after this event had occurred. In these Epistles Paul alludes to the resurrection; consents to be called a false witness, to give up everything, if the resurrection is proved a false event; he also reasons on the ground of it. When he wrote these allusions, his active ministry had been extended over twenty years, so that the event took place, within ten years of his ministry.

He appeals to other witnesses of the event; to hundreds of believers; he asserts that the churches of Jerusalem and Antioch were founded in it. When, where and how did the myth of the Resurrection grow up? How did this new belief so completely obliterate any previous belief, that there remains no trace of it; any previous belief that might have been in existence, back of the myth. How did the myth or legend of a risen Christ arise? Why was the old belief given up? "The resurrection is never presented as the embodiment of a great hope, or the consequence of some preconceived idea of the Messiah," (Westcott "The Gospel of the Resurrection.") The fact came first, not the hope or doctrine.

(a.) Did the belief grow out of deception, either conscious or innocent?

The supposition of a designed deception, is so violent, that it has no longer any credence. Christ himself could not have originated this belief, except he revived after a fainting and exhaustion, but did not die on the cross.

The deceit in this case would be in his not having been dead: but after his restoration, is it credible that a half dead man, needing a physician, could produce on the minds of his disciples the impression that he had

risen again, and this after having disappeared for a few days? Strauss admits the validity of this reasoning. If the conscious deception is in some other way the foundation of a risen Christ, the church rests on a falsehood. If it was an unconscious deception it could have been wrought in one of two ways; (1.) either the disciples thoroughly mistook somebody else for Christ, for forty days, and repeatedly, and went away hopeful, confident to persuade men to believe in His resurrection, and to die for it; or (2.) they mistook the hallucinations, phantoms of their imagination. They saw a vision, having no objective reality. This is the favorite theory now among many Germans. It is said that the disciples were so excited, that they thought they perceived Jesus risen. That hundreds simultaneously and at repeated instances saw visions, and in consequence changed their lives, and influenced the world, would be a greater miracle than the real miracle of the resurrection. There are reasons why we should have special evidences of this fact, and we do have such evidence; in fact considering the weight of these special evidences, the difficulties in the way of receiving either one of the above accounts are greater than the historical difficulties in the way of belief in the resurrection. Some (Baur and Zeller) altogether discard the miraculous from history, no matter what the evidence may be.

Christianity professes to give an account of itself in historical documents. These are the authoritative standing sources of our knowledge of its historical character. Some critics say, that we cannot ascribe reliably a single sentence to Christ. The New Testament, it is said, correctly sets forth the faith of the 2d century; but we have no evidence that it describes the facts of the 1st. What evidence then have we to trust any part of the Christian Scriptures? This leads us to the consideration of the nature and value of the Christian Scriptures as a source of information concerning Christianity.

THE CHRISTIAN SCRIPTURES.

The nature and value of the Christian Scriptures as a source of information concerning Christianity.

(1.) The Christian Scriptures are not our *only* source of information. We may derive some information from the Christian life as now exhibited; some concerning the past, from ecclesiastical and secular history. If we go back far enough, we would find a tradition—strongly emphasized still by the oriental and Romish churches. But for the existence of the Scriptures we may admit, that tradition would have been in some degree reliable. We must remember that for a brief period, men depended entirely on tradition for their ideas of Christianity. The Scriptures are not *merely* a source of information.

(2.) Their entire value does not consist in, and is not bound by their character as sources of historical knowledge. They profess to express to us, the present mind of God; they are a permanent and present divine instrument for promoting God's purposes, yet their value in these and other respects is bound up largely with their reliableness as a source of information for matters of history.

(3.) Christianity as it exists and has existed in the earth owes its existence very largely to the conviction which the church has had in regard to the Scriptures and the use which it has made of them. What Christianity has been and done is due to the opinion of believers in regard to these books, and the estimation in which they were held. It is true Christianity existed for twenty-five years without them; just as the old dispensation existed long before it had its Scriptures. But undoubtedly Christianity would have changed greatly without them.

(4.) We cannot so separate Christianity from the reliableness of testimony as that the decision which men reach in regard to the trustworthiness of the Scriptures, be a matter of indifference. The defense of Christianity is imperilled by looseness, not by strictures in regard to our belief concerning the Scriptures. Therefore, this point should be emphasized as against those who advise

us to confine our defense to Christianity as a system ; to drop the advocacy of the Scriptures and preach Christ.

(5.) The Scriptures have on legal principles a presumptive value, and a reliableness, as a source of information concerning Christianity. Judge Greenleaf ("Testimony of the Evangelists" pp. 26, 27,) writing as a Jurist, says ; "the first inquiry when a document is offered as evidence in court is, whether it comes from the proper repository ; whether it is found in the place, and under the care of persons with whom it might reasonably be expected to be found. This custody gives authenticity to the documents which come from such a place and bear no evident marks of forgery,—the law presumes their genuineness. It lies with the objector to disprove them. This is precisely the case with the Christian Scriptures. They have been received from time immemorial, and are found in the right custody. If it be said that the originals are lost, the law provides that copies are to be accepted, when the multiplication of such copies was a publicly known fact, in the faithfulness of which, all the community had an interest. On matters of general and public interest every man must be presumed to be conversant, and supposed to be cognizant of them. The prevailing current of assertion is resorted to in such matters as evidence. The persons who multiplied the copies are agents of the public, for whose use the copies are made. Thus made, the copies are entitled, on the ground of credit due to the men who made them, to an extraordinary degree of confidence, and as in the case of official registers, it is not necessary that they should be further confirmed or sanctioned.

2. *Historical criticism in relation to the Christian Scriptures.*—The documents which form the Christian Scriptures from their very form, as well as by much of their contents, invite criticism. For the most part they are not vague and general, teaching truths which had been known long before, but definite ; most of the truths given in them are written under historical conditions which are known. In the case of many of the documents, the form which they take is produced by the age, the places, the persons connected with them. If there are positive, divine dispensations, instituted and main-

tained, these must have been under historical conditions. Communications were made at different times to different men. All these were made through human instrumentality, and what is human and historic in their composition, must be dealt with in a human way. And yet we must insist that the other essential characteristics of the Scriptures shall not be overlooked. What then are some of the recognized principles of historical criticism which should be applied to the human side of the Christian Scriptures. Von Sybel says; "the examination of the authors of an historical statement, and the examining of the facts according to their connection in time and space and causal relation; these are the two necessary conditions of historical criticism." Prof. Droysen more exactly and analytically defines: "the province of criticism is to ascertain in what relation the historical material stands to those acts of which it bears witness." The form of criticism is determined by the relation of the material to its authorship. The main inquiries therefore in criticism are four in number.

(1.) In regard to Authenticity; (2.) Integrity; (3.) Correctness and (4.) Sufficiency and Completeness.

A. The first inquiry is whether the material submitted to us is really what it is supposed or claimed to be.

The demonstration of the spuriousness of any document is complete when we can show the time, the origin and the aim of it to be different from what it claims to be. Yet a spurious document may indirectly be valuable to history. *Diplomatics* as a department of criticism judges of the authenticity of documents by external signs such as the writing materials, the styles of writing, etc., etc. *Higher criticism* answers the question, is the document such as might have been written under the historical circumstances. In other words it judges by internal signs.

B. Whether the material before us is in unchanged form; in the form in which it was produced and was meant to remain; or if it has been changed, what alterations may be detected and eliminated. This is the criticism of integrity.

C. Whether the document when produced did give and can give that which it claims to establish; or; on the other hand

whether at the time of its production it could have been, or claimed to have been partially or relatively correct. The answer is given by the criticism of correctness, i. e. Credibility. There are four inquiries involved in this question of credibility. (1.) Whether what is refuted, is *per se* possible, in so far forth as human experience gives us any criteria; (2.) Whether in given conditions and circumstances it is possible; (3.) Whether in the motives, the aims, the personal narration of the narrator, we can discover anything that should warp his statements; (4.) Whether incorrectness is unavoidable in consequence of the inadequacy of the writer's means of observation. Here we need to inquire into (a.) the capacity and opportunity; and (b.) the disposition, purposes and circumstances, or either, or both of the narrator. In judging of the sources of criticism we should ask what they profess to give; what coloring the document took, from the peculiarities of the author himself, or of the place or age in which he wrote it.

D. Whether the material before us contains all the elements of that of which we are seeking to gain knowledge, or whether it is incomplete, and if so in what degree. All historical material is more or less fragmentary. Therefore there should be a constructive criticism, after the destructive processes as above enumerated. Here it is that modern criticism is at fault. It does not attempt to tell how much is reliable and true, and how much is to be rejected. Historical criticism claims to apply these principles to the Scriptures. But in doing this, great care should be taken, in so far as there is much at stake on the question.

Our means of ascertaining the reliability of these books.

If the Scriptures are to supply an adequate explanation of the phenomena of historical Christianity, they must be composed of authentic documents in regard to the life and teachings of Jesus Christ, as well as in regard to the first forms of doctrine and of life in the early Apostolic church. The historical is the doctrinal itself; the essence of Christianity is precisely its historical part (Schelling.) The fact of the resurrection is the cardinal doctrine, and the doctrine of the incarnation is the fundamental fact in the Christian Scriptures. (Lee, on "*Inspiration.*") The

final question] in regard to the Scriptures is that of their credibility. Can we believe them?

Genuineness, authenticity, integrity and credibility are terms used ambiguously. There is some confusion in regard to their exact respective meanings. R. Sole, "*English Synonyms*," gives authentic as (1.) real, veritable, uncorrupt as opposed to that which is spurious and fictitious: (2.) Equivalent to reliable, trustworthy, worthy of belief, as opposed to the incredible. The first definition has reference to the form, the second to the contents of the document. Where the usage is conflicting it is best to follow one definite use consistently.

Three terms are sufficient to express the various qualities which criticism demands of a document. These are, Authenticity, Integrity, Credibility. Genuineness is included in Authenticity. *Authenticity* then would signify that these documents are the productions of the authors or at least of the age and class of persons to whom they are severally distributed and reputed by the church.

Integrity would show that they are incorrupt in form. *Credibility*, that they are reliable in the statement of facts. These terms are in point of fact mutually inferential. The credibility is increased when the authenticity is proved. When we know the competency of the author; his uprightness of purpose; his opportunities for observing facts, etc., then we rely on his sayings. Humanly speaking we must know the individual witnesses, and we must know favorably of them. When the testimony is anonymous, we want some ample equivalent in the form of endorsement by the early church. In regard to the New Testament history we have to a very large extent the testimony of eye-witnesses provided the documents are authentic and uncorrupt. Compare Acts 1: 21-22; Jno. 1: 14; Jno. 21: 24; 1 Jno. 1: 1-3; Luke 1: 1-2; 1 Cor. 15: 3-12; Heb. 2: 3.

To what documents are we to apply these principles of historical criticism? We go back fifteen hundred years, and find that a certain number of books are accepted, and form the New Testament Canon. What is the Canon?

I.—THE NEW TESTAMENT CANON.

1. *Definition.*

“The Canon is the collection of Books which constitute the original, written rule of the Christian faith.” (Westcott; “*Canon of the New Testament*.” Fourth Edition, London, p. 1. note.)

“The original meaning of *κανών* (connected with Heb. *Kaneh*. *כַּנֶּה, כְּנֶהֱ*, canna [canalis, channel,] cane, cannon) is a straight rod, as a ruler, or rarely the beam of a balance; and this with the secondary notion either (1.) of keeping anything straight, as the rods of a shield, or the rod, (*licetorium*) used in weaving; or (2.) of testing straightness as a carpenter’s rule, and even improperly a plumb line. From a sense of literal measurements naturally followed the metaphorical use of *κανών* (like *regula, norma, rule*,) to express that which serves to measure or determine anything; whether in Ethics, as the good man (Ar. *Eth. Nic.* 111, 4, 4) or in Art, as the Doryphorus of Polycleetus, (*κανών*;) or in Language as the “Canons of Grammar.” (Westcott, *ibid*, p. 499.)

2. *Authorship.*

This involves two questions (*a.*) by whom was this collection made as a collection of books; (*b.*) by whom was the collection invested with its authority as the written rule of faith. In answer to the first question,

(*a.*) By whom was this collection made, we answer,

(1.) The church and no individual man;

(2.) The church as a whole, and not the church as constituted at some one particular time, or represented in some particular place;

(3.) The church acting gradually, not summarily and decisively at any one point of time;

(4.) The church guided by the instincts of its own spiritual life, without a miraculous intervention, but by the guidance of the Holy Spirit. He whose inspiration gave to the separate books their form, we believe has also guided the church to the selection of these and no others out of the mass of writings as human productions, and the process of their selection a human process.

(*b.*) By whom or by what was this collection invested with its authority?

It was not the church, for the church could not have created an authority over itself. Some Catholic theologians have maintained, that there is nothing divine in the Scriptures, except what the church has given them. They hold that the relation of the church to the authority of the Scriptures, is that of recognition and subjection, but not creation. The authority of the canon is intrinsic. It grows out of the nature of the book. That this was the view taken of the canon by the early church is seen from the usages and observances known to have existed in the church. At first the New Testament was received in the same way that the Old Testament was used in the synagogue. Basilides (130 A. D.) gives the earliest testimony in regard to the fact that the Old and New Testament Scriptures are placed on the same level. "The Epistles of Saint Paul are called Scriptures;" "quotations from them are introduced by the well known form 'it is written.'" (Westcott, pp. 288-91.)

On what principle the credit of canonical authority was given to these writings we learn in three ways:

(1.) From the language used by the early church with regard to the separate documents universally accepted.

(2.) The language used in regard to those which for the time being were doubtful.

(3.) The way in which the completer canon was treated by the church. The church received no productions which were not believed to be those of apostles or of apostolic men, prepared for the guidance of the church. Yet they were not received as human productions, but as the productions of these men, writing as they were moved by the Holy Ghost. Herein then we have a double criterion; (*a*) the *human* or apostolic authorship, and (*β*) the *divine* or inspiration. When the first of these unique writings appeared there had been a believing church for a generation. These writings were called forth to meet the wants of the church then existing; before their appearance the church had to depend entirely on oral tradition. It was a living church that accepted and recognized them, appealing to them as authoritative documents.

3. *Relations of the New Testament to the Old Testament canon.* Consider under this head,

(a.) What was the attitude of the original christian church toward the Scriptures of the O. T.?

(b.) Why did the church need any other Scriptures than those already recognized? and how was it brought to recognize precisely these writings which became the New Testament canon, as having dignity and authority? To these inquiries we give the following answers:

(a.) Attitude of the early church. The attitude of the early church would naturally and plainly be determined by the attitude of Christ and his apostles. We find that the Old Testament Scriptures were the original rule of written faith, so far as that rule was unfolded. Christ and his apostles speak of it as such. They remonstrated against the traditions which had been added to them. They denied all other literature co-ordinate authority; constantly assumed that the Old Testament points to a continuation of a revelation. The continuity of this revelation is therefore the first thing to be established.

Christ and the apostles, and the Jews agree in regard to the Old Testament; but he parts company with them in claiming that He is entitled to continue the revelation, which claim they reject. According to Josephus, the Old Testament canon closed, because there was no longer a reliable line of prophets. The Jews did not believe that God had ceased to work, but they held that only the Messiah would be entitled to add to the Old Testament canon.

(b.) Why did the church need other Scriptures than those already existing, and how was it brought to recognize those writings which became the New Testament canon?

(1.) If the question be what want there was of any other Scriptures than those already received, the answer would be, that whenever the fulfillment of the Old Testament predictions should come, and God should resume special and fresh communications with men, the church and the world would want the proof and the full benefit of these communications. If the fulfillment had now come in Christ, as he himself claimed, and as the apostles and the early church believed, the church and

the world wanted argumentative and practical evidence of it. The argumentative evidence must be derived from the Scriptures of the Old Testament; the practical proof could only be given in the life of Christ. He must show himself to be one opening communication with God. It is thus that Christ argues from the Scriptures to himself, and from himself to the Scriptures. He gives first, to personal hearers and eye witnesses sufficient evidence of his divine mission. But some sufficient evidence is needed for others, who could not be personal hearers and eye witnesses. This evidence must be definite and reliable, which oral traditions could not be. It is thus that the definite, well attested body of documents was formed.

(2.) If the question be how the authentic words of Christ Himself first as orally transmitted, and then as fixed in writing, gained a like authority with the Scriptures of the Old Testament, the answer must be, that these men believed that Jesus Christ was their promised Messiah. Confirmation of this faith, and the means of spreading it were needful. (Heb. 1 : 1.) If God had spoken in these later times by His Son, there is no question but that the words of the new communication are of equal authority with those of the Old Testament.

(3.) If the question be, how the word of the Apostles as distinguished from that of Christ Himself, could ever have been put on equal authority with that of the Lord, the answer is, that the apostolic words must have been regarded as authorized by the Lord, and in some adequate way exalted to a divine dignity and authority. This end would be attained, if the Holy Spirit promised and sent by Christ, prompted and guided the Apostles. Hence we find the church recognized the fulfillment of the promise of the Holy Spirit in these utterances.

Christ left no written word Himself. If we find that the church regarded the words of the Apostles and apostolic men, as of equal authority with the Old Testament, then they regarded them as virtually the word of Christ.

(4.) If the question be, what practical necessities would have called forth the canon, and have been met

by its early formation, may be answered in two ways; first, the habit of reading what was recognized as Scripture in public assemblies for instruction and edification would explain it in part; and second, the need of an authoritative standard of appeal in controversy with heretics. To appeal to the Apostles as expressing the mind of the Lord, would be the highest authority. The recognition of this fact by heretics is also valuable, as showing the estimation in which the Scriptures were held. It is a noticeable fact that the oldest reference we have to the Scriptures, is made in the writings of a heretic (Basili-des, A. D. 130.) *Vide* Westcott on the canon, p. 288.

4. *Composition of the canon.* The completion of the canon was gradual, both for physical and moral reasons. It was necessarily a work of time. Some of the documents were originally specific; limited and local in their immediate aim. There was no reason why they should come to the notice of remoter portions of the church. They were writings of divers kinds, narrative, epistolary, prophetic; among the letters there were some addressed to single churches, others to individuals, and others to dispersed believers. On the assumption of the authenticity of these documents they had all been composed before the end of the first century. *The apostolic fathers* make clear reference to all the Gospels and at least to twelve of the Epistles. Within the next half century (120-170) *the Greek Apologists* mention every volume in the present canon, and use them with abundant attestation and recognition of their authority. *The early versions*, belonging to the same period give us nearly the same result. The Peshito contains twenty-two of the twenty-seven. It omits 2nd and 3rd John, 2nd Peter, Jude and the Revelation. The old Latin version lacks 2nd Peter and James. *The heretics* of the same period make reference to these books. Before the end of the second century, we find twenty books were attested, six recognized in a more limited way, and only one, as yet not recognized (2 Peter.)

The formation of the canon was one of the first instincts of the Christian Society. The collection was at first imperfect, as the church was imperfect, but as the church attained a fuller growth, the canon was more and

more clearly defined and recognized, and by the end of the fourth century we find it established as it now exists. As for the books which for a time received only a partial and local recognition, it can be proven that they were known from the very first, although not universally known. Their limited circulation is easily explained. As they became more and more widely known, they became more generally received. The attitude of the church towards them was from principle, that of caution on account of heresies within and enemies without; so that those books which failed to gain acceptance at the end of the second century, were recognized or had to make their way into the canon more slowly, but by the end of the fourth the canon was complete.

Objections to the composition of the Canon. Dr. Donaldson says that not a few of the books were not fully received by the early church, because they were regarded as differing in value. An unscrupulous age broke down the discrimination and included them all. The third century he characterizes as discriminate; the fourth as indiscriminate. He advises the church to follow the third century. In answer, notice; (a) The methods of the early church were not those of the critical schools. (b) The spirit of the early church was not that of the critical schools. There was much more moral earnestness in it, and no such unreasonable demands, as Strauss and other critics make, in demanding testimony of eye-witnesses. No such ostentatious presumptions were made, as are made by those who refuse to apply the historical method to books containing the records of miracles. (c) The acceptance in the fourth century of the writings which at first had secured only partial or local recognition admits of easy explanation. All the objections to the canon, and those to the Epistles especially involve misunderstanding, or misrepresentation of the condition and character of the early church.

THE AUTHENTICITY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT SCRIPTURES.

The main inquiry in regard to this subject belongs to New Testament Introduction. Apologetics recalls the principles and methods by which it is determined that these documents can be confidently ascribed to the authors, whose names they bear.

1. At the end of the second century there were in the possession of the early church documents confessedly of very high sacredness, honored as of actual or virtual apostolic authorship, bearing the names of our Scriptures of the New Testament, and corresponding with them in description. There are two points to be established; (1.) The identity of the books in our Scriptures with those of the fourth century; (2.) the evidence of the authenticity of those.

2. The general identity of our Scriptures of the New Testament with those of the early church, is to be determined by the examination of the early manuscripts, the early versions, and all the definite citations by early writers.

3. Our inquiry in regard to the authenticity of the early Scriptures, reduces itself to this; first, in what sense and second, with what reason the church of the second century accredited these books to the authors whose names they bear. Was it a mere convenient and conventional way of designating them, or did it imply a conviction that the assumption was correct? Strauss says, that the early writers published their works under the name of some popular person, without intending any harm, or deceit. Bleek says, it was a lawful thing to do; it was understood on all hands, and we find that these books which the church repudiated belonged to this class of writings. Rawlinson (sixth Lecture) says that there is no proof for such assertions. In that period the writers received no encouragement in covering their individuality under great names. The church rejected a great number of pseudepigraphic writings. It rejected thirty-eight such gospels, thirteen books of Acts, nine Revelations, ten Epistles. Out of the whole number of books claiming recognition, it rejected at least seventy, accepted twenty-seven. The alternative is, that these writings which were received were authentic, or that they were forgeries, perpetrated successfully within an hundred years of the apostolic period. That the documents were regarded as authentic appears from the fact that they were used by early Christian writers, early heretics, pagan antagonists of Christianity, and that they are embodied in early versions.

Considerations confirming the judgment of the church of the second century in regard to these documents.

As a preliminary consideration in this connection notice, that seventeen of the twenty-seven books of the New Testament contain the name of their author, in the substance of the writing, not merely in a title prefixed or in an appendage. Thus the best opportunity for tracing and verifying their authenticity is furnished. So far as the title is concerned, the ascription of it to a certain authorship expresses the judgment of the early church founded on tradition or internal evidence, or both. Strauss says, that little reliance can be placed on these titles. Rawlinson answers, that the church could not have prefixed them unless the belief had previously existed.

A. It was not merely a literary satisfaction to the church, but a vital necessity, for its own faith, and for its propagation, that it should possess and be able to convey to others the assurance, that the essential facts and doctrines of Christianity were faithfully recorded. This follows from the historical nature of Christianity.

B. These documents were very early transcribed, interchanged among the churches, sometimes by apostolic authority; (Colos. 4 : 16;) they were accumulated by individual churches, publicly read in worship as Scripture. The eye of the whole body of Christians was upon them. The interest of the whole Christian society was enlisted in the question of their acceptance or rejection. It was not the trained intelligence of the few, but the practical intelligence of the many, which was brought to exercise and judge them.

C. Different sections of the church which after Jerusalem had perished, recognized no superior body, but followed out their own distinct sources of information, agree in the result of their investigations. Ewald says, "it cannot be said, that any one part of the church led the way in accepting these new writings. It was a simultaneous movement of the whole church.

D. As a literary phenomenon the production and introduction into the Christian church of such forgeries, is highly unnatural and improbable. It needs a greater credibility to believe that the church, passing through fiery persecution could produce, and be occupied with

such books. It cannot be believed that at that time men could be found, who could produce such accurate productions, wonderful in what they say and what they omit, and in their delicate agreement of book with book.

E. Add to this the moral improbability that any one could attempt to pass off, as the productions of an apostle or of an apostolic author, such forgeries, and succeed when confronted with the moral purity and truth of the Christian system. That he could make this purity his own, and yet pass off the counterfeit. No secular scheme, no ecclesiastical or religious results justify the use of such means to secure such ends. That a man could carry through such a work as this, working against such motives and risks, without exciting suspicion, can be believed only by the credulous skeptics.

F. These considerations are corroborated and strengthened by important negative evidence. The writings before us, when their exposure would have been easy, excited great attention, created great interest, made great demands, aroused great hatred, and were generally accepted. We have even from those who refuse to accept the religion which they taught, the concession of their authenticity. This is evidence more ample and varied than can be cited for any other historical documents. B. H. Cowper, (*Popular Lectures on Christian Evidence*) thus presents the negative proof in favor of these documents.

(1.) No historians can be found who wrote after the death of Christ, who do not mention Him if they might be reasonably expected to do so.

(2.) No Greek or Roman author within three centuries after the promulgation of Christianity denies the authenticity of the gospels.

(3.) No Jewish writer of the same period, denies the authenticity of the gospels.

(4.) Neither Jewish, nor Gentile writers of the same period deny the miracles of Christ.

(5.) The earliest heretics did not deny the genuineness of the gospels.

(6.) No one of these authors mentions the four gospels as first received in his own time.

(7.) No ancient author says that the orthodox Christians received more or fewer than four gospels.

(8.) Our four gospels were translated out of the Greek into other languages, before 150 A. D.

(9.) If these writings were not authentic, why did no one discover or expose the forgery, when they first appeared?

(10.) Why did not the enemies of Christianity attempt to disprove their authenticity, if it was doubted?

(11.) Myriads of enemies were converted to the faith of the gospels at an early day.

(12.) Multitudes of Christians suffered death, rather than deny the truth of the gospels.

THE INTEGRITY OF THE CANONICAL WRITINGS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.

Are our gospels, Acts, Epistles, Apocalypse, the works described by corresponding names in the lists which were in circulation in the early church. This problem can be investigated in two ways.

1. There are external means of determining the correspondence of the Scriptures of the early church, with our own. These are the oldest manuscripts; the early versions, and the oldest citations.

(a.) *The Oldest Manuscripts*; the date of these cannot be accurately determined, but some of them are certainly as old as the fourth century; (b.) *the old versions* are the Peshito, the Latin, and the Gothic. But the oldest manuscripts of these versions are of the fourth, fifth and sixth centuries; (c.) *the citations* are not in original documents but in transcripts. Combining the result of these texts we reach the approximate correct text.

2. There are internal means of determining this correspondence of the Scriptures of the early church with our own. These are very often abused, but they should certainly not be rejected on that account. They are,

(a.) The internal fitness of a document, or any part of it, to the source to which it is ascribed, and the professed objects of its author.

(b.) The harmony of subject and style, discoverable within the document, or existing between it and other writings credibly ascribed to the same author.

(c.) The presence or absence of connecting links between the parts admitted to be authentic, and the parts

said to be doubtful. The result of the application of external tests, leaves very few passages doubtful, it is necessary that these internal tests be applied.

CREDIBILITY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT SCRIPTURES.

What reason have we for believing what the New Testament writers say, as true? And under what limitations shall we receive them as such?

There are two preliminary considerations in regard to this subject.

(1.) That the lapse of time, as such, has nothing to do, with the conclusiveness of moral evidence. That which justifies belief at one time, does so a thousand years later. Testimony once good is forever good; time does not touch the intrinsic value of our warrant for belief.

(2.) The credibility which we are considering includes largely the element of personal confidence. The attempt is often made to put this proof on scientific grounds. This is unjust. We are not estimating the preponderance of probabilities. The early church especially received these evidences as a ground of personal trust, not merely of opinion. We also should resist the attempt of modern science to eliminate this element.

The proofs of credibility are grouped under two heads; as

(1). Attested and (2) Presumptive.

(1). *The Attested Proofs.*—In many particulars the credibility of the New Testament, is what may be called an attested credibility. There are many confirmations from without.

(a) Many things asserted by the New Testament writers are demonstrable by reason. Such are the truths of natural religion; the existence of God, etc. All the new facts brought to knowledge are congruous with those which we already have from natural religion.

(b). The credibility, or truthfulness of the central and essential facts of the New Testament, is confirmed by the results which follow their hearty reception as true. Truth believed works certain results, which error believed cannot work. Therefore the results of the reception of the New Testament facts, are an important corroboration of their credibility.

(c.) Many of the statements of the New Testament writers, are corroborated by independent, external testimonies, and even from foreign and historical quarters. The concurrence of independent and various sources of testimony, strengthens credibility. All the testimony of the Jewish writers where they speak of the same things, invariably harmonizes with that of the New Testament writings. Chalmers urges the pertinence of using the testimony of one book to confirm that of another. He denies the propriety of rejecting the testimony of a believer because he is such. It is not necessary that one should be a heathen in order to be believed. The New Testament contains twenty-seven books from at least eight authors, who wrote independently, and hence their agreement is a proof of their truthfulness.

(d.) The most effective attestation to the credibility of the New Testament, at least in its historical parts, is found in the fact, that these things were known, and believed by large numbers of men, and the only natural explanation is that they had fully satisfied themselves of the truth of what they believed.

2. *The Presumptive Proofs.* The credibility of the New Testament in regard to the great body of its historical facts is presumptive. When no external corroboration can be found, an assurance is found, by internal or implicit signs, of the credibility of statements.

A. This is illustrated by considerations drawn from the nature of the facts to which the record relates.

(1.) These facts were to a large extent accessible to the scrutiny of others, as well as the narrators. Against this it is objected, (a) that some of the most important facts of the life of Jesus were witnessed by only three persons; (b) that the fact of Christ's repeated reappearance after his resurrection, is attested only by his disciples. To this it is answered; that there is no reason to believe, that if the witnesses were others more or fewer, their testimony would be worth more.

(2.) These facts are numerous and by their number give an opportunity for denial or disproof, if not true.

(3.) These facts are minutely described, and by their minuteness confirm the belief that they are narrated by eye-witnesses.

(4.) These facts are of such a nature, as to make the most imperative demands for the most searching scrutiny. They are not matters of indifference; on the contrary they take hold on the deepest instincts and influence a whole life.

B. This presumptive credibility is further confirmed by considerations drawn from the character and circumstances of the witnesses. There are three elements to be regarded by all witnesses; opportunity for knowing, competence for judging, and character. When we lack the testimony of original witnesses, we must thoroughly test the substitutes, and inquire as to what access they had to eye-witnesses or documents. On the supposition that we could establish no more than the fact that these books came from apostolic times and men, we have,

(1.) The testimony of witnesses, numerous and diverse, who are not in their writings making the first announcement to the church of the facts therein recorded; they are narrating what had been accepted for a generation or more, and widely believed. They are writing to churches composed of members who had been eye-witnesses, not in order to create belief, but in order to inform those already believing; to increase and perpetuate the definiteness of their belief. They therefore run the risk, and challenge the denial of thousands who had been either eye-witnesses, or otherwise believers.

(2.) The testimony of men who are in spirit apparently as far removed as possible from deceit, who taking all things into consideration are incapable of such fabrications, and intellectually and morally, without any motive or opportunity to use such a capacity if they had had it.

(3.) The testimony of men who held to the most simple and truthful recording of what they believed, by every consideration drawn from regard to self, regard to their master, and regard for his cause. There is no cause whatever, so far as can be discovered, why they should further such a pure, noble cause, by means of a fabrication. A historical falsehood so easily detected as this would be, would suffice for the condemnation of such a cause.

C. The presumptive credibility of the narrative in its minor parts, is immensely strengthened, by the

consideration of the utter impossibility that the central figure can be an invention.

The nature, the character and the life of Christ, could not have been fabricated. They are beyond the reach of the imagination. The minor facts are grouped about this central figure in a harmonious way. The style also is the style of truth; the power is the power of truth.

Attention has been called of late in an especial manner to the character of Jesus Christ. Compare Bushnell, "*Character of Jesus*;" Albert Barnes, VIII "*Lectures on Christ*;" Philip Schaff on "*The Person of Christ*."

It is objected that the Apocryphal Gospels have the same central figure, and skeptics ask why it does not prove them to be credible.

Westcott on the canon (appendix C.) shows wherein the character of Jesus in the Apocrypha differs from the character of Jesus in the Gospels. In the Gospels Christ is brought out in strong contrast with the expectation of the Jews. In the Apocrypha He is nearer to the Jewish expectation. He is, in a looser sense, a human Christ.

D. Another confirmation of the presumptive credibility is found in the coexistence of a general and strong harmony of representation, with clear signs of individuality and independence in the collection and use of material. In all historical accounts discrepancies in detail within certain bounds, increase the presumption of general correctness by showing that we have independent witnesses. If our Gospels were transcripts of one original document, they would not have varying accounts of some things. As for oral testimony, without a miracle, it is hardly conceivable that they should have the same details. In regard to disagreements in detail there should be on our part: (*a*) candor, in admitting what difference may exist; (*b*) honesty in locating and defining such difference, and (*c*) on the other hand, equal candor in allowing full weight to the historical evidence. The scantiness of material should warn us against assuming that all possible solutions have presented themselves, and that if they fail the difficulty is

insurmountable. When some difficulty cannot be explained, let it remain as a mystery, and set over against it the accumulation of evidence for credibility.

E. The presumptive historical credibility is increased by the miraculous element in the New Testament History.

This narrative does not purport to be a common secular history. It is extraordinary in its character; it is not an account of transactions between man and man, but between God and man. It is an account of the origin of what claims to be a new final religion. So far therefore from counting miracles a difficulty in the historical narrative, (e. g. Zeller, Renan, Strauss, Baur, etc.) we should regard the absence of signs and miracles as strange and remarkable. They are the worthy accompaniment of such a narrative. If there is to be a communication of God to man, it should be accompanied by wonderful events.

F. All these considerations in regard to the credibility of the New Testament narrative are advanced to the highest signification and conclusiveness, by the evidence that these writers did not make their record merely as human witnesses and narrators, but under the inspiration of the Holy Ghost. This argument is the climactic one because the veracity of the authors of these documents must be first established in order that their claim of inspiration may be acknowledged and its force in this connection be admitted.

II. THE OLD TESTAMENT SCRIPTURES.

Why should we want the Old Testament Scriptures as witnesses in favor of Christianity? This is a question naturally asked in beginning the examination of the Old Testament canon. We may in answer say; the New Testament dispensation is not the first, divinely accredited dispensation. It announces itself as a successor, a later and a final system in a series of true, divinely sanctioned and authoritative religions. As such it may be regarded in a two-fold aspect. (1.) A revelation of God to men by which He makes Himself known. (2.) For the purpose of guiding, aiding and unfolding a religious life. For a knowledge of the

stages which preceded it, Christianity refers us to the Old Testament. For the mere purpose of historical knowledge then, we must resort to the earlier canon. Moreover, Christianity claims to be consistent with these antecedent stages of revelation; we need to examine them in order to verify its claim.

(a.) Christianity needs the Old Testament in order to understand what God has done and said to its antecedents.

(b.) It represents them in a course as provisional and preparatory. It differs from them in containing some things which they lack. It claims to be so complete as to supersede them.

(c.) The reception and usage of these Scriptures is commended by the language of Christ, the Apostles and the early church. These make them to us what they were to the early church.

THE CANON OF THE OLD TESTAMENT.

The question is what was the canon to which Christ and the Apostles gave their sanction. Not how it grew, but what in the day of Christ, to the Jews constituted the rule of faith, or the oracles of God. The phrase "Scripture" occurs about thirty times in the New Testament; the plural "Scriptures" occurs about twenty times; the phrase "Sacred Scriptures" once or twice; the "Law" (not in the sense of the law of Moses) three times; the "Law and Prophets" once; the "Law and Prophets and Psalms," once. What is meant by these expressions? A few generations before Christ the question might have been debatable, but even sceptics admit that the references in Matthew 23 : 35 and Luke 11 : 57 are to the whole canon, from Genesis to 2 Chronicles. Not every book is either quoted or referred to, from the Old Testament. The books of Judges, Ecclesiastes, Song of Solomon, Esther, Ezra, Nehemiah are not mentioned. Some would include in this list Obadiah and Nahum; the Apocryphal book Ecclesiasticus mentions three groups of books, and discriminates between them, viz., the Law, the Prophets, and the Hagiographa, and makes a distinction between them and all other books. Josephus makes the same division; mentions the num-

ber of books as twenty-two (the number of letters in the Hebrew Alphabet.) He says, "it is inbred in the Jews to esteem these books as *θεῖα δόγματα* i. e. divinely sanctioned doctrines, and to abide by them, and die for them if need be. The Septuagint contains books not found in our canon. In some parts of the church Deutero-canonical authority is assigned to them. According to some modern writers, there is only a chronological discrimination made between these books and our canon. (De Weett, Fürst.) Ecclesiastes 12:11 indicates a large and wearisome literary productiveness, and it can hardly be supposed that most of this literature perished between the composition of Ecclesiastes and the time of Christ, especially if Ecclesiastes is as late as these critics claim. In 2 Maccabees 2:4 reference is made to the work of Judas Maccabaeus and Nehemiah in forming a library. It is but reasonable to suppose this comprised a number of volumes of the existing literature.

The canonical collection of the Old Testament Scriptures is composed of the Law, in five (5) books; the Prophets, including the historical books written by the prophetic school, twenty-one (21); and the Hagiographa in thirteen (13) books. In regard to the Old Testament Canon, there are two views opposed to the common evangelical view:

- (1.) The looser Protestant view, and
- (2.) The Catholic view.

The first of these views is held by those who aim to depreciate the canonical books, and exalt some of those we call Apocryphal. They hold it impossible to make a solid and binding discrimination between the books which are, and which are not canonical. So far as the argument for this view is historical it is based, (a) on the Septuagint version; (b) on the difference between the Palestinian and Alexandrian canon; (c) on the early Greek and Latin Fathers; (d) on the modern church divergences on the subject.

The Catholic view includes the Apocrypha in its canon. This is embodied in the decision of the Council of Trent. After enumerating the books as contained in the Vulgate, the decree reads, "but if any one refuses to receive the whole of these books, with every part of

them, as they are read in the Catholic church, and contained in the ancient edition of the Vulgate Latin, as sacred and canonical, or knowingly and deliberately despises the traditions before mentioned, let him be anathema." (*Vide* Townley's *Biblical Literature*, vol. II., p. 156.) The Westminster view is, "The Books commonly called the Apocrypha, not being of divine inspiration, are no part of the canon of the Scripture; and therefore are of no authority in the church of God, nor to be any otherwise approved, or made use of, than other human writings." (*The Confession of Faith of the Presbyterian Church*; chap. I., sec. 3.)

Arguments for the Looser View.—(1.) Not all the canonical books of the Old Testament are quoted or clearly alluded to in the New Testament. In answer we say:

(a.) There was no occasion to quote or use them. There need be no other explanation than this.

(b.) The absence of quotation by no means proves the absence of the books from the collection.

(2.) We do find in the New Testament express citations from Jewish literature, not comprised in our present canon, and quotations made by the use of the same formulas. Instances of such quotations are the following: Jude 9-14; James 4:5; 1 Cor. 2:9; Luke 11:49; Jno. 7:38. All these with one exception are from Apocryphal books, which cannot be identified. Jude 9 is supposed to be from a book of the "Assumption of Moses." James 4:5 is from some lost book; so the quotations in 1 Cor., Luke and John, are supposed to be from lost Apocryphal books. In fact if closely compared these passages are seen to be free citations of the substance of some passage found in some canonical book. Whether Jude 14 is from Enoch, or *vice versa*, is not known. Eph. 5:14 and 4:8 are also referred to in this argument.

(3.) That in the case of most of the Apocryphal books, we do find in the New Testament undoubted reference to their contents and clear traces of their influence, on the style of representation and language. 1 Peter 1:6-7 is an undoubted reference to Wisdom 3:5, 6, 7; James 1:9 is a reference to Ecclesiasticus 5:11; 4:29; Hebrews 4:12-13 is a reference to Wisdom 7:

22-24; Romans 1:20-22 is a condensed reproduction of chaps. 13, 14, 15 of Wisdom. Such is the claim of this class of thinkers.

These on examination are found to be unsubstantiated. All that requires explanation is explained by the admitted general use of the Septuagint and its influence on the writers of the New Testament. That the New Testament writers were familiar with the Septuagint is not to be denied. Of the three hundred and fifty (350) quotations, three hundred (300) are traced to the Septuagint, rather than to the Hebrew text. But so long as not one instance of clear citation from the Apocrypha can be adduced, there remains no argument for the canonicity of those books.

Arguments for the Catholic View.—The Catholic church so far as it deigns to explain its position, says that we have the same reason for receiving the deuterocanonical books, as we have for the proto-canonical ones. The reasons given are:

(a.) A tradition in the church, running back to the Apostles.

(b.) The concurrent belief of the Greek and Latin churches.

(c.) The authority of the Roman church.

When asked to give reasons for the non-appearance of these books in the Palestinian canon, they give three reasons:

(1.) Some of these books had not appeared when the Jewish canon closed.

(2.) Others though in existence had not yet come to the knowledge of the Jewish people after their return from the Babylonish captivity.

(3.) The Synagogue had not yet enough information in order to decide whether they were canonical or not.

The Protestant view as distinguished from these two opposing views rests mainly on the clear and deep distinction made by Christ and the Apostles. (*Vide* Smith's "*Dictionary of the Bible.*" Art. Apocrypha.)

REASONS FOR REJECTING THE APOCRYPHAL BOOKS.

(1.) The confessed absence from them of the prophetic element.

- (2.) The deterioration in poetic dignity and power.
- (3.) In the historical parts,
 - (a.) A manifest presence of fiction and legend;
 - (b.) The assumption of false names to give weight to authorship.
 - (c.) The incorporation of forged documents as genuine.
 - (d.) Gross historical inaccuracies.
- (4.) In doctrine a frequent subservience to the technical and formal Judaism, and to novelty of beliefs.

THE AUTHENTICITY AND INTEGRITY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT CANON.

It is evident that we cannot examine the Old Testament books in the same way as those of the New Testament, in respect to individual authorship. The Old Testament covers a period of thirty-five hundred years; the books constituting it were composed within one thousand (1000) or twelve hundred (1200) years. The New Testament covers a period of less than one century, and were composed within forty years. With regard to the Old Testament we have no quotations by Fathers; no early versions; the oldest manuscripts are much more remote from the original than those of the New Testament. More of the Old Testament books are anonymously written, than in the New Testament. In some cases when they bear a name, it is doubtful whether the author was a principal character or mere historian. The evidence for the authenticity of the Old Testament is grouped under (1.) Internal and (2.) External Evidence.

1. *General Internal Evidence of the virtual authenticity, and substantial integrity of the Old Testament Scriptures.*

A. There is a marked congruity between the alleged authorship when indicated, and the subjects treated.

B. In many cases characteristics of style confirm the assertion or tradition by which a book is ascribed to a certain age or even to a given author.

C. The general spirit of these books is that of authentic words rather than that of conscious fabrications.

D. As far as we have at any point parallel accounts within the Scriptures themselves, (Kings and Chronicles) the general structure of several narratives agrees with

the supposition of authenticity, rather than with the theory of spurious authorship.

2. *External Evidence of the virtual authenticity and substantial Integrity of the Old Testament Scriptures.*—These are :

A. The faith of the Jews. The Jews cherished this belief and were more concerned than any other nation in identifying them. They had reasons to scrutinize them. The nature of the books, made it important for them to know of their authenticity. Therefore their faith must be a warrant to us.

B. Allusions made by Christ and the Apostles. These books are referred to, quoted by regular formulæ. They were regarded by Christ and the Apostles with even more reverence than by the Jews. Some allege that when Christ quotes Moses, Isaiah, David, etc., he does not mean to sanction the belief that these books were written by those authors; but as He desired to guard against controversy He admitted and did not contradict their claim, although it was erroneous. We do not believe in such a Christ. We have not so learned Him, as to accredit Him with commonplace ignorance, or to impute to Him such craftiness as to suppose that out of misunderstandings He made arguments more convincing.

THE CREDIBILITY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT SCRIPTURES.

Here too we have not the same advantage as in the New Testament. We shall notice,

(1.) That these historical facts in the Old Testament are connected with, and recorded because they are connected with an alleged series of divine communications, having the highest aim, the widest reach, the most intense effect. Christianity appeared among the Jewish people, whose history is recorded in these Old Testament Scriptures. It drew its explanation and justification from them. It declares itself to be the completion of the system partly developed in the Old Testament. When we keep in mind what was the purpose of God in preserving the Jewish people; when we find the continuity and consecutiveness, we infer a reliableness which other records cannot have. The presence of the

miraculous in such a history is to be expected; its absence would be more surprising and perplexing: therefore it is one of the considerations that commend the history as a whole to us as credible.

(2.) Many of the signs of the authenticity of the documents are likewise signs of the credibility of the narrative. We do not know the authorship of many of the books, but so far as we do know them, they are worthy of credit. If they are from their accredited authors, a great many minutiae are explained; so far forth as they can be identified, the authors are eye-witnesses, or claim to have used documents, as sources of information, to which they refer. They have the three requisites of opportunity, competence and character. The authorship of these books was subject to the scrutiny of all the nation. Where the authors are not known we are referred to authentic documents, and these documents composed by public men, under official, national sanction, or by schools of prophets, are such as any critic should wish to have. No other records are written with such care and sufficiency. The world may be challenged to show a history more unshrinking in the description of the disgrace, shame and ruin, of the nation.

(3.) The credibility of the Old Testament is confirmed at some points, in some particulars by external corroboration.

(a) Confirmations are to be found in Jewish observances, whose existence is carried back to certain historical statements; is explained by them, and remains unexplained on any other hypothesis. Many of the rites of the Jews had a spiritual import; many, a commemorative meaning. They were instituted to commemorate certain historical facts. It is said that these may have originated in a different way. There is however a great difficulty in the way of this theory. It is the supposition that the people should have mistaken the object of their commemoration; that they should have been persuaded to adopt a new explanation for them. Borssuet says: "there were in a certain sense, two histories of Moses; one in the books which bear his name; another in the institutions which he established."

(b) The existence of Christianity, and some of the forms under which it is set forth, confirm in important particulars the credibility of the Old Testament Scriptures. That Christianity exists at all is a confirmation. The Old Testament Scriptures point to it; some of the forms of Christianity confirm the old record. Christianity is not a philosophy coming to supersede another philosophy; it is an historical religion, coming to supplant another historical religion. It takes its element from the Old Testament. The God of Christianity is the God of the Old Testament. The phraseology used to describe its observances, facts, doctrines are of the same general type.

(c) The discovery of numerous and important confirmations of the Jewish Scriptures, from foreign, secular sources, are some of the richest results of modern scholarship. Egyptian, Assyrian records surprisingly confirm the credibility of the Old Testament. This is the more surprising, because they were beyond the reach and anticipation of the Old Testament writers. (*Vide* Rawlinson's Bampton Lectures on the "*Historical Evidences of Christianity*;" Gillett on "*Ancient Cities and Empires*;" Pratt's "*Scripture and Science not at Variance*;" Saville, "*Truth of the Bible*."

(4.) The highest and most conclusive proofs of the credibility of the Old Testament are the proofs of its inspiration. All the former arguments refer to the human side. If the human writings are so confirmed, shall inspired writers not be believed? (2 Peter 1:21.) Whatever *θεόπνευστος*, 2 Tim. 3, 16, may mean it certainly implies credibility. Christ and the Apostles appeal to the Old Testament so deferentially; "it cannot be broken," could not have been said of a mere human writing.

Some ask to what extent are the Old Testament Scriptures credible. There are three positions in regard to this question.

(a) The Old Testament Scriptures are credible in whatever they contain as matters of revelation.

(b) That the credibility extends to the greater historical statements connected with these matters of revelation.

(c) That it covers the whole of the books.

If the credibility of these Scriptures is good in great matters, why should it fail in the minutiae. The guarantees of character reach over the whole extent. No reason can be given for the restriction. Moreover, no line of discrimination as to which are great and which are small can be drawn. We are told that it is a part of the moral probation of every man to draw this line. If this is so, why are we not informed, charged and warned of it? Would it not be a tantalizing gift to know that the word of God was somewhere in the Scriptures, and not be able to find it? It is however for those who take this ground to prove it. The phraseology of the Bible seems to point to the whole as inspired.

HISTORICAL DIFFICULTIES.

(1.) We are asked on historical evidence to believe that which is impossible, intrinsically incredible; in other words miraculous. What we are asked to believe on historical testimony is, that something occurred. In the same way as for any other historical fact we take the testimony of those who saw the occurrence. In ordinary events the causes of the occurrence are known; in extraordinary events, they are unknown. It belongs to history, to examine testimony for external events; to philosophy to inquire into the cause.

(2.) We are asked to believe on historical evidence things having contrary accounts. It is an irrational mode of dealing, to throw aside every thing of which there are disagreeing accounts. Even if there are points which cannot be harmonized, we ought to admit them, but at the same time remember the weight of evidence on the other side.

(3.) We are asked to believe historical accounts, the most conspicuous element in which is their faulty chronology.

It may be admitted that there are errors by copyists; that there are some numbers (e. g. forty years) which seem to indicate that the writers speak in general terms, rather than definitely. It is said that the whole period ascribed to certain long series of events in the Old Testament, is too short, and inconsistent with known facts

of secular history. The differences are cited between the Septuagint, the Hebrew Scriptures, the Samaritan version and Josephus, as follows:

FROM CREATION TO DELUGE.

<i>Heb. Scrip.</i>	<i>Samaritan.</i>	<i>Josephus.</i>	<i>Septuagint.</i>
1656.	1307.	2365.	2242.
			2262.

FROM THE DELUGE TO THE BIRTH OF ABRAHAM.

<i>Heb. Scrip.</i>	<i>Samaritan.</i>	<i>Josephus.</i>	<i>Septuagint.</i>
292.	942.	1002.	1172.
			1072.

THE WHOLE PERIOD.

<i>Heb. Scrip.</i>	<i>Samaritan.</i>	<i>Josephus.</i>	<i>Septuagint.</i>
1948.	2249.	3267.	3414.
			3334.

The discrepancies may have been increased by errors in copying, the more easily as the Hebrew letters are very easily mistaken.

(4.) In the Old Testament especially we find exaggeration and extravagance, especially in regard to the number of the children of Israel when they came out of Egypt; the large flocks which went through the wilderness. All that can be asked is, that these objectors see what is recorded, and implied in the text.

It is not merely to satisfy critics that we have made this investigation. The historical character of the Scriptures demanded it. It is moreover for the interest of an intelligent faith. Historical criticism is only one of the many means of examination, and for much of its work our material is meagre. In regard to the internal criticism the results are greatly modified by the state of mind of the critic, as well as by the methods which he uses. All come with a bias on one side or another, to this inquiry. Historical criticism must at the best be incomplete and problematical. Most of our objections to the Scriptures originate with men who when they begin are prejudiced against the Bible, and therefore deny expressly its uniqueness. When we remember how far they are from establishing any point against the claims of the Bible we may rest assured, and the books which

criticism passes by admitting them invulnerable are enough to establish all the Christian doctrine.

HISTORICAL EVIDENCES.

The historical evidences of the divine origin and authority of Christianity.—They are

- I. The Scriptures themselves.
- II. Jesus Christ as delineated in the Scriptures.
- III. The miracles therein recorded.
- IV. The prophecies therein recorded, with their declared or demonstrable fulfillment.
- V. The results of Christianity, the earliest of which are recorded therein.

I. THE ARGUMENT FROM SCRIPTURE.

This is partly negative and partly positive. Whatever characteristics of the Scriptures are inconsistent with the idea of their human origin, will be proof of their divine origin. This will be supplemented by all evidences afforded by discoverable analogies between Scripture, and whatever else we believe to be the work of God.

General Characteristics of Scripture.

A. The general theme of the Scripture and the way in which it is presented show that the Scriptures are from God. The natural relations and the gracious relations existing between man and God, the relations designed to exist and those which have resulted from man's corrupt nature are all accurately described in the Scriptures. Man's present relations are complex to this extent that correct and adequate exhibitions of these relations are to be presented only from above. The book which truly exhibits these complex relations therefore must be of divine origin.

The *way* these relations are set forth, partly historical, partly didactic in appropriate proportions and relations, is also divine.

B. The aim of the Scriptures and the way in which the accomplishment of this aim is sought are proof of its divine origin. The aim of imparting information is knowledge, but the biblical idea of knowledge is different from that of the historian or scientist. Its aim is to raise us from and by the knowledge which it gives us

about God to knowing God. The *way* in which the accomplishment of this is sought is distinctive of the Scriptures. It is not merely to reach the understanding by instruction, or the emotions, or the conscience or the will by appeals, but to show that if all this were done there is still something which could not be remedied. So that while our aim in one sense is to set in motion every power in another it is to point to man his only possible hope.

C. Their unity considered in connection with their progressive development and production.

Historical criticism disintegrates the Scriptures and overlooks their unity; it takes them book by book, chapter by chapter, and verse by verse. The sixty-six books written by about forty men, through fifteen or sixteen hundred years, are one production, but their unity is not uniformity. We must ascribe these books to the power which ruled their time. We discern a unity and progress in the Old Testament, but much more cogent is this demonstration, when we pass to the New Testament Scriptures. The Old Testament lays its stress on forms, the New on principles. There is a unity and progressiveness, which denotes superhuman origin. Man's advancing attainments and interests will not account for it.

D. The comprehensiveness of Scripture in respect to themes, considered in connection with the subordination of all individual themes to the one great subject and end. Scripture deals with a great variety of subjects, yet in another sense it has but one subject. Matters political, ethical, economical, historical, religious, are all treated with more or less frequency yet all are subordinate to one theme. Men cannot pass by what the Scriptures have to say on these subjects, if they would handle their subjects fairly and exhaustively; yet while the Bible is thus encyclopedic, its aim is not to touch briefly, and yet effectively the greatest variety of subjects, but to show the importance of one great subject, viz., the religious. God is the being to whom all is subordinate. The revelation of the Creator, and of the Providential and Moral Governor, is subsidiary to God as Redeemer. The first disclosures are the foundation of what afterwards was to be revealed. What God was to the world, what the

world was to Him; what the world has become to God, and God to it, this is disclosed in order to show what it will become to Him and He to it, in redemption.

E. The provisions which the Scriptures make for promoting man's religious interest of every kind, it gathers about and offers in one great central form, the God-man Jesus Christ. No other religious book does such a thing; the Bible is the Book of the Messiah. Messiah needed, Messiah come; this is the main story of the Bible. That God has made the provision needed and with which man should be satisfied is the purpose of the Bible to unfold. The more this system is compared with others, the more this distinctive character of the Bible stands out. Furthermore; the Bible reaches an experience in the Christian's heart which to him is convincing, though he may not be able to make it felt by others. Offering Christ is the Bible's way of solving the religious problem. This book is not of earth; it is divine by negative and positive proof; divine because it *cannot* be human, and because it is so superior to all others of human origin.

II. JESUS CHRIST AS DELINEATED IN THE NEW TESTAMENT.

The delineation of Christ which the Scriptures give is a proof of the divine origin of Christianity. There are two forms of this argument:

(1.) Looking at the delineation and saying it is not human, and

(2.) Looking at the person.

(1.) The delineation is not human.

(a) The delineation must have had a subject.

(b) In the delineation of that subject divine power is seen; it was divinely moulded. The delineation of Christ is not an ideal picture, but a real one; a true portrait.

Man never showed either the disposition or the ability to form such a sketch; in all the range of literature there is nothing parallel. It is too broadly human and too unhuman to be a creation of the human mind. Least of all, could one of such a strong nationality as the Jew, have conceived of such a nature, character and work as that of Christ. If Christ was before the biog-

raphers, they could not have pictured him with a human power. Their account is divinely moulded. The very informality, simplicity, sobriety and want of exaggeration of the portraiture show it to be divine; for such would not have been the style of men, writing of one whom they thought divine.

(2.) The person whom the Scriptures foretell and predict as the Christ, proves the record divine, whose theme and founder He was. He is so central that in a sense He is Christianity. The evidence by which all other doctrines must stand or fall is centered on Him.

(a) The correspondence between the predicted and real Christ is one element in this convincing evidence. The predictions are so various and different that no pretender would have known what to be, or how to act, in order to fulfill them; but Christ fulfilled all because He was the Christ.

(b) The unique nature and character of Christ can be nothing less than divinely moulded and divinely evidential. Compare the incarnation of Christ with all fabled incarnations, and this is clearly seen. Christ does not so much say, "learn what I teach," as "learn of me;" not so much "live as I live," as "live in me." That He should thus connect the true religion with Himself is peculiar to him. His character is such, that we must accept all he says as true, both in regard to Himself and to others.

The words, work and life of Christ, whether considered in aggregate or in detail; whether we examine those elements which seem most spontaneous, or those which have in them most of forethought; whether in themselves or in their power to influence men, the decision is the same in every case,—they are divine. The naturalness, the harmony pervading all, the spirit and purpose in all, the personal in Christ, standing related to all that is most permanent in Christianity, prove it to be divine. He spoke as He did, He wrought as He did, because He was what He was,—divine.

Christ cannot be accounted for, by any or by all the forces which work in history to make men what they are. He was not the product of His time; He must have been divine.

III. PROPHECY AND ITS FULFILLMENT.

Prophecy Classed as an External Evidence of Christianity.

External evidence is of that character which consists in those marks of credibility which we observe in looking to the witnesses of the message and methods of their delivery. *Internal* evidences are those which are found in the contents themselves. Paley places prophecy among the auxiliary evidences. We drop the old grouping of external and internal. The Christian Religion consists in part of historical facts, in part of religious truths, moral principles, and positive institutions connected with the religious life of men. Proofs are mainly of the historical kind, because they come by historical record.

The prophecies and their fulfillment belong to the way in which Christianity was introduced into the world, and are not essentially of the nature and essence of the Christian religion. The Christian religion might have been all it is now had no prophecies been uttered; therefore we discuss this proof among the historical evidences.

1. *The Meaning of Prophecy in Apologetics.*—When we speak of prophecy as supplying a proof, we mean in a limited, specific sense, a real foretelling of future events such as shows that divine omniscience has come to the aid of the finite knowledge of men.

But the prophets had a much wider work than this; many of them foretold nothing. They were the representatives of God among the people; to teach, warn, rebuke, illustrate godliness. The term prophet is usually employed in the narrow sense. The prophetic institution alone without prediction might be framed into a powerful argument for the divine origin of Christianity.

2. *The occurrence of predictive Prophecy in O. T. and N. T.; the fact and its declared purpose.*

The church believes there have been such prophecies. Historical criticism says it is remarkable forecasting but not foretelling. This opposition often springs from avowed hostility to the supernatural.

These critics do not hesitate to attack Christ and his Apostles when they admit prophecy in the O. T.

In others it comes from a rationalistic unwillingness to admit anything that transcends unaided human power, and thus the number of prophecies is reduced to a minimum. Some orthodox writers go too far in deference to this destructive criticism. (See Princeton Review, July, 1878, Prophets and Prophecy, Dr. W. H. Green.)

The object of prophecy was not to arrest attention, nor to satisfy curiosity; it was one aim of these communications to accredit the men as servants of God by whom the prophecies were made. The accrediting would be in part to the cotemporaries of the prophets, but more after the fulfillment. Christ and Christianity were predicted.

3. *The Conditions of Validity: proof from Alleged Prophecy.*

a. The real futurity of the event. But critics aim to show that there is deception, e. g., Daniel not written by Daniel but long after.

b. The event must be beyond the reach of mere human discernment, e. g., Burke foresaw the French Revolution.

c. The subsequent occurrence of the event with minute and specific exactness as foretold. Otherwise an event cannot carry conviction as a fulfillment of prophecy.

d. The event must not involve collusion between the person foretelling and those accomplishing it, nor be dependent upon the prediction for its fulfillment.

It usually comes to pass in the Bible without any knowledge on the part of the actors that they were fulfilling prophecy except in the case of Christ. In many cases enemies to God and Christ are the ones who fulfil prophecy, the last thing they would knowingly do.

e. There must be in the prediction an *obvious design* to predict, and a distinct challenging of attention to it at the time. It is not necessary that the prophet comprehend fully his own prediction. He utters the message received from God. Thus is met the objection to the possibility of specific prophecies. Some say that individual terms, as Cyprus, Bethlehem, etc., are only general terms. Answer. This is begging the question.

f. In many cases we discover a divinely proportional blending of vagueness with precision in the particulars

of the prediction; so as on the one hand to secure the identification of the fulfillment, while on the other hand it prevents the possibility of pretended fulfillment. In this case the prophet must have had knowledge.

4. *Other uses of Predictive Prophecy besides the Evidential.*

One purpose was to make evident the purpose of God. It makes more vivid the fact of God's relation to his church, it excites devout expectation, stimulates the desire, and sustains the faith of the church. It awakens anxiety and fear. The prophets were preachers of righteousness, and predictive prophecy aided the didactic and hortatory presentation of truth and duty by God's servants to men. The prophet must have the confidence of the people.

Object of Prophecies in Regard to Christ.

a. To give certain signs by which the Messiah might be identified when he came.

b. To keep alive the belief that the promise would be fulfilled.

c. To arouse the minds of men to a lively expectation that "the latter days" spoken of by the prophets had come.

To illustrate and confirm the teachings of the past, to emphasize the duties of the present, as really as to create expectation for the future; these were a part of the design of prediction in relation to other parts of Scripture.

5. *To whom would Predictive Prophecy carry its Evidential Message?* Ans. Only those to whom the fulfillment became known would have this part of the proof. A prophecy unfulfilled lacks just so much as the fulfillment constitutes.

Davidson on Prophecy: "Indications of design, fitness, wisdom, and internal truth will coalesce with the fulfillment as evidence for prophecy." (See Fairbairn on Prophecy.)

6. *What are the great Truths involved in and emphasized by each instance of authenticated Prophecy?*

a. In respect to God's attributes each fulfillment involves and emphasizes his immutability, omniscience, power, etc.

b. His general, providential and moral government of the world. He has a present as well as a future object in the prophecy.

c. God's special providential government. He must have a specific object in foretelling at a particular time, place, etc.

d. God has a specific design, to accredit his human agent to whom and through whom the prediction is made.

e. The things predicted are usually such as have a peculiar place in God's regard.

7. *The special bearing of Prophecy on Christianity.*

The most extraordinary prophecies on record are found extended through thousands of years and concern Christ and His kingdom.

When the fulfillment came, a new endorsement for Judaism, and every prophet as a servant of God, follows. Judaism was fully endorsed only when its work was done.

The language of John the Baptist applies to Judaism also, "He must increase but I must decrease." Prophecies are miracles of knowledge. We now come to miracles of power.

IV. MIRACLES.

The miracles that are historically recorded in the Scriptures are proof of divine origin and authority of Christianity.

There are three terms used in the Scriptures, *τέρατα*, *δυνάμεις*, *σημεία*.

Design of miracles: to accredit those who wrought them, showing superhuman power and authority of mission.

Questions: (1) According to the principles of human belief are such events possible? We call them violations of nature's laws. (2) Are they under any particular circumstances probable, or at least not improbable? (3) Are they credible? Does the evidence suffice in amount and conclusiveness? (4) Suppose them possible, probable, credible—is the conclusion we are asked to draw warranted by the fact?

Through many centuries miracles were received undisputed, ascribed to magic, art, or spirits. The fact

was not denied, but wrongly interpreted. Now unbelief denies the fact.

1. *Possibility of Miracles.*

Def. (Hodge) "An event in the external world brought about by the immediate efficiency of God." It must stand out from the ordinary course of events in such a way as to convince men that God's efficiency is the agency at work, otherwise it will not attract proper attention. How shall men be led to ascribe true miracles to God.

(1.) It may be by the amount or quality of power displayed.

(2.) By the purpose or wisdom shown.

Sometimes it may resemble what men have seen before, e. g., healing. In that case it must differ from ordinary cases, no remedies used. Christ healed by a word. Some of these events are wholly without analogy.

Another definition of miracle: "An event in manifest opposition to all the hitherto experienced laws of created nature which are affected by the miracle. The event has no true material or physical cause, no human cause, as the will, no superhuman created cause, as spirits; but is wrought by God."

Is such an event possible?

a. A miracle appears to be wholly within the original reach of omnipotence. The events cannot be shown to be any more difficult than those occurring every moment.

b. It does not appear that when God instituted the course of nature that he put limitations on his own omnipotence. By "course of nature" we mean the way in which the sequences of causes and effects is regularly and uniformly developed in created nature according to ordinary experience, observation and reason.

Did he incorporate into nature all the forces that were ever to work in the original scheme of nature? The objector must prove that He did, before our faith is shaken.

c. It does not appear that God's *immutability* renders it impossible for him to work in nature in any new way. Belief in miracles does not require us to believe that in unchanged conditions, God changes his method. But

under peculiar conditions, God does introduce new causes.

d. It does not appear that God's omniscience interferes with his working a miracle. God does not substitute new methods and agencies for the old, but to accomplish a particular end in a particular contingency he does interpose.

e. That God makes the uniformity of nature, a truth apparent as well as important, sensible and indisputable, does not make it impossible that in special circumstances and on worthy occasions God should work miracles.

f. It does not appear that God has imparted his own immutability to the works of his own created power. It cannot be shown that any thing restricts him to a certain line of working.

2. *Are Miracles Probable?*

If we can establish that they are not improbable, we neutralize an objection. If we can go further and show that they are calculated to do good we increase the probability. The burden of proof will always be on the side of apparent or alleged interruption. The occasion of the interruption must always be a worthy one. Miracles are offered to us as authenticating a divine communication; to authenticate a divine messenger and his mission. Is not this a worthy occasion?

Which would be the greater, loss to human belief, expectation, hope, etc., the loss of divine communication and its benefits, or the loss of just so much confidence in the uniformity of nature, as results from a single infraction, for so wise a purpose.

The communication comes from God and must be accredited as such. If in order to this it must be accompanied by such signs of divine origin is it improbable that such events would occur?

3. *Credibility of Miracles.*

Of a miracle said to have occurred, is the evidence sufficient? Hume says, no amount of evidence could convince a reasonable mind that such an event occurred. Mill: All that Hume has made out is that there are no evidences to prove miracles to any who have not believed in a Being of supernatural power. Hume: They are contrary to all experience, and hence not to be proved by any known laws of evidence.

If not impossible nor improbable, they are not intrinsically incredible. Is there then any thing in the accompanying circumstances to make them incredible? Were those who saw them deceived? The question turns on the credibility of the witnesses. Could they trust their senses?

Objection: They were mistaken. Ans. There were hundreds of Jews present sometimes. Could they have been deceived? Often unfriendly witnesses were obliged to believe.

In later ages the credibility depends on testimony. Is this reliable? The question turns on validity in general, and, in particular, of the kind in hand.

Objection: Testimony itself could not decide in such a case, and further, others admit the force of testimony, but not the kind and degree given.

Hume: The validity of testimony rests on experience alone. We say it does not, but on the validity of the testimony. The relation of language to thought creates in us a disposition to rely on testimony. The element of experience determines the conditions of true testimony.

Hume: The best result that can be obtained is absolute rest or equilibrium. Ans. The improbability that such testimony is false is greater than that the miracle occurred in the given circumstances. It may be highly irrational to receive such testimony as this.

How is it in regard to the N. T. miracles? The witnesses were eye-witnesses, usually many, of mixed prepossessions and sympathies. The *facts* are numerous, clear, public, easily tested. The momentous nature of the issues involved was such as called for the greatest scrutiny, and strong prejudices had to be overcome in those who believed the facts and accepted their interpretation. Those who did not believe the evidence of these miracles, appear not to have denied the facts, but the way in which they were brought about. Some of the miracles are internal, and essential to Christianity; not external corroborations merely; e. g., the resurrection.

We do not maintain that there are no difficulties in believing these miracles, nor that a perfect belief will be

attained in any case. Those who reject them have imperfect views of inspiration, doubt as to an overruling Providence, prayer, creation, and even the existence of a personal God.

4. *The Evidential Bearing and Power of Miracles.*

If in a given instance or series of instances evidence valid in kind and in amount be advanced, so that we as believers in nature and in God are satisfied, then what follows? What credit accrues to the messenger, his message, or the dispensation to which he belongs.

Objection. Natural phenomena can prove no spiritual truth. The physical cannot prove the spiritual.

Ans. It is not claimed that something is made true by a miracle which was not true before, nor that an argument is made correct, nor a demonstration apparent. God by these means accredits the messengers. The truth is in the miracle, the agent, and the system or dispensation with which he is connected are accredited by the miracle. In fact the agent is accredited to himself as God's agent.

Internal evidence is always better than external. It cannot so immediately arrest attention as the external. By many it is less perfectly appreciated. In Heb. ii, 4, see the design of miracles, viz., the witness God gave to his messengers to convince men that these were his agents. Is this sufficient for, and adapted to its purpose? Is it efficient or should it be? Dr. Mozley (Bampton Lectures, 1865.) The visible supernatural is the appropriate witness of the invisible supernatural. This goes straight to the point. A token being wanted of divine communication, this is that token. A fitting sign would naturally take a form analogous to creative work, and such are miracles. The production of works that seem opposed to all former experience in like circumstances is analogous to creation. It is an intervention by God. Prof. Nitzsch says: Jesus is the Christ. Is that doctrine or fact? It is fact. Salvation has come into the world. Is that doctrine or fact? It is fact. Miracles are in connection with fact.

Objection: The alleged miracles were not convincing to those who saw them, and were near them. Why then should we believe? What mode *has* persuaded all

men to receive evidence from God? It is essential to moral evidence that there be a possibility of disbelieving. It is never compulsory.

As to lying wonders, as in Egypt, they were counterfeits suffered by God, to be tested by their connection and manifest spiritual teaching. Pharisees said Christ wrought by Beelzebub. Christ replied, "Satan cannot cast out Satan."

Miracles are thoroughly consistent with the system they purport to attest. The most important of them are internal and vital (e. g., Resurrection.)

But some will not look at the evidence of miracles. Strauss: Miracle had a subjective origin. People had made up their minds, that Christ must do this and that so they made up miracles enough to identify him.

Renan: The men of those times were ignorant and credulous, this fact is to be presupposed wherever miracles are believed in.

Strauss does not implicate Christ. Renan does, in deception.

Zeller: Miracles and the historical investigation of a subject are mutually exclusive. If you have one you must give up the other.

We admit that miracles are outside the pale of common experience, but we deny his right as a historian to refuse, in advance, the examination of historical testimony. The church challenges comparison of the historical evidence for miracles with the evidence for any other historical event, e. g., Resurrection of Christ and the assassination of Julius Cæsar.

V.—RESULTS OF CHRISTIANITY.

The results, the earliest of which are recorded in the scriptures are a proof of its divine origin. This has been considered auxiliary to the internal evidence. It is also akin to the external. The system does not pretend to reveal all its results in this life, some are to be revealed only in the future life.

Mozley regards this as the strongest argument for Christianity.

[Consult Pressenfe, Martyrs and Apologists; Farrar's Witness of History to Christ. Newman's Grammar of Assent. Luthardt's Fundamental Truths of Christianity.]

We may examine the proof in three lines of argument.

a. The extent of the results.

b. The certain significance of individual results.

c. The utter disproportion of the results to the terrestrial agencies that were employed in bringing them about.

These can be accounted for in no other way than by extraordinary inherent power in Christianity and by divine aid and origin.

Each of these may be considered with respect to

(1.) Facts connected with the external propagation and prevalence of Christianity.

(2.) Facts connected with intellectual influence of Christianity on the world.

(3.) Facts connected with moral and social influence.

(1.) *Facts concerning propagation.*

Trajan, Pliny, Tacitus supplement the Acts and Epistles. Justin Martyr, Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria, Epistle of Diognetus. From Britain to India, from Pro-Consular Africa to Scythia, Christianity spread within ten (10) generations and over much of this region in five (5.)

The significance of this must be judged in connection with the shortness of the time and the opposition encountered, its intensity, ingenuity and persistence. The customs, literature, political condition and organization of nations were all arrayed against Christianity. Roman toleration did not allow the old religion to be superseded—Christianity insisted on superseding. Followers of Christ were vilified, persecuted, and accused of treason, having one Jesus, looking, not to Cæsar. The Pride and Enmity of the natural heart was an obstacle, even if the great of the earth had promulgated Christianity. It was not so with Mohammedanism, which had much that pleased the natural heart.

The endurance and changed lives of Christians attracted the attention of all men. The blood of the martyrs is the seed of the Church, "*semen est sanguis.*" We can see now how everything was ready for Christianity, but we must wonder at the results of early Christianity. The world was ruled by one sceptre, the

Roman, and under one culture, the Greek. A crucified Jew was the founder of Christianity. Where was the human adequacy of such an origin, to accomplish such results.

What earthly advantage could it offer as an inducement to receive it. The cross was the emblem of a slave's infamy, this was held up to challenge the love, reverence, and faith of men, to be a continual reminder of the Master, and the possible experience of those who embraced Christianity. Men listened to the preachers of the Cross because of their pure lives, and honored their religion because of their death. Preaching and living are inadequate to such results without divine aid (see Barnes on Evidences of Christianity—Lecture 4th.) Newman says: Christianity was to accomplish its destiny by the novel means of sanctity and suffering: but what was this without the might of God.

(2.) *Intellectual Influence of Christianity.*

These facts are less palpable in themselves and more open to different constructions. Christianity can be shown to be the world's intellectual regenerator. The Golden Age of Greece had passed centuries before decline and corruption had begun in Rome. For some centuries after Christianity began, all advanced vigorous thinking and writing came from it. It furnished new themes, new philosophy, new legislation and jurisprudence, new impulse in education, especially in science, which has now turned against its own foster mother. Guizot, "the organizing power of the church did a great deal to improve the organization of society. It made the loftiest ideas the common property of humanity. Ideas which before were reserved for the Platos". Such influence cannot have come from any system of ancient philosophy, imposture, or enthusiasm. It must have come from God.

(3.) *Facts connected with the moral and social influence of Christianity.*

This is more easily traced. We know the condition of man when Christianity came, when the true idea of humanity arose, what woman had been and is now what labor had been and has become through Christianity, also how lofty and uncompromising the morality of

Christianity, how Christianity exalts and refines every virtue the world had known, how it added to the list; for example meekness, humility, love, benevolence; how it transformed social, civil and political relations. Can the religion which from the first, began to work such changes be traced to Galilean fishermen, or to any source but God.

CHRISTIAN ETHICS.

EDITED BY THE CLASS OF 1879.

CHRISTIAN ETHICS.

Apologetics proves that Christianity is the divinely originated religion. It is also ethical. Apologetics is (1) Historical and (2) Philosophical. (1.) Christianity is partly a system of religious truths, institutions &c., i. e. historical, and (2) partly philosophical, since the questions that arise stand related mainly to ethical, metaphysical, and natural science.

Christianity as an Ethical Religion.

Christian Ethics we take up as a Biblical study, obtaining facts from the moral character of Christianity partly in the Scriptures and partly in the results of the Christian religion. Christianity is not a philosophy but a religion. What do its moral results show it to be as a religion? What is Christian society? How does religion propose to deal with human society to make it Christian? Some reduce Christianity to mere morality, some to a system of truth or doctrine; it is more: we are to look at Christianity as an ethical *religion*, not as a system of morals.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES.

First: Morality is inseparably connected with religion.

Second: Christian morality is inseparably connected with the Christian religion.

Third: The only true, complete morality is the Christian morality.

Three Preliminary questions.

1. What is the place of Ethics in Philosophy?
2. What is the place of Christian Ethics in relation to theology?
3. What is the place of Christian Ethics in Philosophical Ethics?

I. WHAT IS THE PLACE OF ETHICS IN PHILOSOPHY ?

By a merely nominal definition, Ethics is the science of the moral.

McCosh "The science of the laws of man's moral constitution."

It is also called the science of human conduct.

Porter: "Science of human duty."

Wayland: "Science of moral law."

These differences arise from different approaches to the subject.

The Subject of Ethics.—By common consent it is man in his moral nature and relations. Notice such terms as merit, demerit, ought, obligation, duty, right, wrong. Ethics is the department in which these are the ruling ideas.

Ought. The word *ought* introduces the mind into new regions where the material is not found. All materialistic philosophers are confronted with "ought," "right," &c. These words will not down at the bidding of evolutionists. We use Ethics in preference to moral philosophy because the latter word is ambiguous.

Sidney Smith: By the term "moral philosophy" is popularly understood, Ethics. But the term moral philosophy is misleading and is too inclusive. Moral philosophy is used in a popular sense including metaphysics, æsthetics &c., and second in a proper sense as opposed to natural philosophy.

Ethics is a more felicitous and accurate term. From the Greek, *ἠθικός* (moral from *ἠθος*.) "Morals" relates to the external. Ethics is internal. This term originated with the Greeks. While Ethics has a wide sphere and scope of its own, it does not stand alone. It is related—(1) to psychology because there are faculties to be considered, (2) to metaphysics as cause and effect, (3) to political and social science, jurisprudence and political economy.

Some of the topics that come up in these relations must be discussed.

1. The nature and origin of moral ideas.
2. Faculties by which man is made capable of moral action.
3. Relations in which he puts forth moral action.

4. Impulses by which he is urged, and obligations impelling or holding him to right action.

5. Functions of conscience in reference to moral actions.

6. Nature and bounds of duty.

7. Results to character.

8. Nature of virtue.

9. Nature of the supreme and secondary good.

The treatment of these themes will be modified according to the view we take of man as he *should* be and as he *is*.

Some of the topics relate to man as one moral being alone. Others in his relations to superiors, inferiors, equals, &c.

Philosophical Ethics discusses man's natural character, relations, obligations, &c., as reason construes them.

Theological Ethics is not confined to this. These are only elementary.

II. THE PLACE OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS IN RELATION TO CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.

One would make it a part of Historical Theology, another, of Practical Theology.

Rothe separates Ethics from dogmatics; makes dogmatics a branch of historical Ethics and puts Ethics in speculative theology. As to the assignment of Ethics to practical theology we cannot regard it a complete or correct view which treats of Ethics as something to be done in distinction from something to be believed.

In the moral life the *why* and *how* determine the *what*. In dealing with the *why* and *how* there is quite as much of the dogmatic as of the practical.

Theological science is divided thus: Exegetical, Historical, Systematic and Practical. If this be a correct division Ethics belongs to the third, which includes dogmatic and ethical theology. For two hundred years didactic and ethical theology have been treated separately for the most part.

Redemption is fully realized when we do what it is designed that we should. Therefore there should be no separation of the didactic and the ethical. On the other hand it is claimed, and rightly, that there should be a sepa-

ration, one being God's side of the question of redemption and the other man's. Doctrine and practice however may be, and often are, too widely separated. They have a reciprocal relation to each other.

III. WHAT IS THE RELATION OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS TO PHILOSOPHICAL ETHICS ?

Kahnis : " Ethics is the systematic exhibition of Christian morality."

Martensen : " The science of the moral life, determined by Christianity."

Neander : " That science which develops the laws for human action out of the nature of Christianity."

Christian Ethics points man to the source of his power—God. Philosophical Ethics points man to what he ought to do of himself, by reason. These two should harmonize.

Dorner : " Philosophical Ethics takes its starting point in the first creation ; man as he was before the fall. Christian Ethics in the new creation ; man as restored by grace."

Where shall we find the best exhibition of Christianity as an ethical religion ? In Christ. But we follow God's order, beginning with the preliminary exhibition or preparation for it in the patriarchal and Jewish systems.

ETHICS OF OLD TESTAMENT.

No long inspection of O. T. is necessary to show that its system is not cast in scientific form. Moreover, the O. T. mode of presenting things is different from the N. T. The former bears resemblance to Semitic and Jewish types. The religious system of the O. T. is evidently provisional, prophetic, and preparatory, not permanent and final; so the mode of presenting its Ethics is different. That may be tolerated in one condition of things which might not be in another. Judaism shows itself inferior to Christianity both in the extent and perfection of the results wrought out.

Some general characteristics of the ethical systems of O. T.

a. The ethical system of the O. T. like that of N. T., is presented to us in, with, through, by, concerning, the religion with which it is connected. O. T. knows nothing of a religion without a morality. Hence the irreligious men are the immoral men and *vice versa*. Ps. 14: 1; 10: 4-11; 94: 6, 7; Gen. 18:19; 1 Sam. 15: 22; Is. 1: 11-17; Hos. 6: 7; Jer. 7: 9, 10; Ps. 50: 8; Prov. 15: 8.

Through the union of morality and religion, the predominant notions of religion are brought to bear on the moral.

b. It is consistent with this mode of presenting the subject that we note the entire absence from O. T. of the specific, abstract terms used in Philosophical Ethics as duty, ought, etc. These are part of the *religion* of O. T.

c. It is nowhere found, but always assumed, in O. T. that man has a moral nature, is under moral obligation, and that he knows it, and should live to secure the highest good.

General truths fundamental in O. T. as a religious and moral system.

a. The life and power of O. T. are found in its conception of God. What we are to be, is shown to us in God. The motives are drawn from him; God's unity

in opposition to polytheism, his spirituality in opposition to materialism, his personality in opposition to pantheism; these had no little power in making O. T. morality.

Neander: "The apprehension of God came out in Judaism as it could not in surrounding religions." Its *realization* of God's holiness is a more important point. When we combine with these his omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, we have a faith which will be morally effective as none other could be.

b. Its teaching, of the dignity of individual human nature. Man was made in the image of God. This fact gives solemnity to his actions. It is not necessary that his likeness be sharply defined.

The dignity of man is shown, by the place assigned to him in the order of creation, and by the sharp distinction between him and the other animals. Man has dominion given him over other creatures. After the deluge man's relations are defined and ratified again. There is a repeated prohibition of man's forgetting his superiority to other animals. On the other hand he is taught to separate himself more and more from the brutes, and perfect his fellowship with God.

c. The brotherhood of man less perfectly seen in O. T. than in N. T., and yet more prominent there than in any other system. The Bible represents us as brethren in one race; not in many. 1. The O. T. ascribes the origin of the whole race to one pair, and connects propagation after the deluge with a single family. 2. The duty of sympathy and charity is based not only on the Fatherhood of God but also on the brotherhood of man both in the Law and the Prophets. Gen. 9: 4-8; Is. 58: 7. 3. The reach of God's redeeming purpose embraces all families, as seen in the promise to Abraham, prophecies concerning Gentiles, Is. 56: 6.

d. The organization of humanity is of God in all its essential relations and institutions, and the maintenance of this organization is God's deep concern, that it may accomplish his purpose. And God is concerned in the enjoyment by each individual of the advantage for which the organization is instituted. The family is the unit of this organization and must be kept pure.

e. Moral responsibility extends also to man's relations to the inferior creation. God gave man dominion over the creatures but not to use it unlawfully. It is not insured to him permanently. Man's dominion is bounded by the rights of God and of nature.

f. Man's treatment and use of himself, whether physical or spiritual, comes within the sphere of morals. The O. T. protects man from his evil self, and demands the best care and culture of himself. Sins against the body are denounced, as also spiritual sins, such as indolence, pride, etc.

g. God's concern for man's *moral* life is shown under the O. T. economy, by provision for man's culture and education. Morality is not left without culture. Left to himself man mistakes natural impulse for natural law, the agreeable for the obligatory, present excitement for permanent good.

Our nature receives no new elements. God helps us by instruction as to what man's relations are, and by what the O. T. does for refining and elevating man. He helps to regain lost purity, quickens moral sensibilities. A personal ruler is put in place of impersonal law. Man's conscience is a monitor for good and evil, to reward and punish.

h. Motives to the performance of duty are made effective by new and peculiar sanctions in the O. T. Man is not attracted to right or deterred from wrong simply by conscience. Right action secures God's approbation as well as the approbation of conscience. Man is taught that the memory of God is ever enduring.

The brotherhood of man is well brought out in the O. T., but immortality of the soul is more vague than in the N. T. By the O. T. men are taught to expect retribution and rewards *here*, hence it has been called a mercenary system. The O. T. makes more than the New, of present exhibitions of divine approval and condemnation, e. g., Job, Eccl. Men who are conscious of God's presence feel the truth, so that the perplexities of Job and Eccl. are removed by implicit confidence in God, going beyond the present to the future, appreciating God's spiritual training beyond the temporal gifts. While the O. T. encourages expectation, the sign is al-

ways less than the thing signified. *Thy favor is life.* Even in the N. T. there is promise for the life that now is, as well as for that which is to come, while in the O. T. Balaam desires to die the death of the righteous.

i. The quality of O. T. morality is displayed by the standard of excellence it sets up. Three (3) things noticeable; first the intrinsic excellence, second, the degree of conformity required of us, third, the fitness of the standard itself to promote and secure this required conformity.

The standard is the character of God and his holiness, the degree required is exact correspondence, "Be ye holy, for I am holy." There is unparalleled attractiveness as well as surpassing glory in this standard. This is the most desirable excellence. Nothing higher can be conceived of. If you lower the standard you lower its attractive power.

OBJECTIONS TO OLD TESTAMENT MORALITY.

These are in a great variety of forms. Some courteous, some offensive. Some disparage the O. T. morality in order to exalt the New. Some are philosophical or speculative.

Mill: The Old Testament system of morality is barbarous, fit only for savages.

I. FIRST OBJECTION.

The God of the O. T. is represented as partial, fickle, hateful, revengeful and otherwise morally unworthy.

Bolingbroke says, it is blasphemy to assert that the O. T. writers were inspired, when they attribute such things to Divinity as would disgrace humanity. The conclusion that such men draw is, there is a God, but I cannot conceive of him thus; or if this is the best that can be conceived of, then for me there is no God.

Answer. *a.* The representation which is *largely predominant* in O. T., by common consent, is that God is infinitely exalted, and absolutely perfect in moral excellence. The objector concedes this. If this be so, we ought to be controlled in our interpretation of doubtful passages by this fact. We are not to assume that these writers deliberately falsify their other statements. We must harmonize if possible.

b. This harmonizing interpretation must take into account the context as well as the contents of each passage, the idioms of language and the characteristics of the oriental mind. Anthropomorphic style of literature renders such representation necessary. When we have allowed for these we claim that the objection falls.

Instances. God repents, Gen. 6 : 5-7.

Is fickle, Gen. 8 : 21.

His dealings with Pharaoh, Ex. 7-14, (chs.)

(See Trench's *Hulsean Lectures*, p. 96, Hanna's *Bampton Lectures*, p. 88.)

God's anger allayed by appeals to His vanity—Ex. 32 : 9-seq. ; Num. 16 : 20-seq. ; Num. 14 : 22, 23.

God fickle with Balaam, Num. 22 ch.

Punishes people for others' sins, 2d Sam. chs. 21, 24 ; Deceives Ahab, 1 Kings 22 ; Deceives the prophet, Ezek. 14 : 9.

II. SECOND OBJECTION.

The principle of human brotherhood receives only a very partial and inconsistent treatment in O. T.

Bolingbroke urges that the particularism by which the Jews were taught to regard themselves as God's peculiar people, took them out of obligation to the rest of mankind. Ans.

a. This objection proves too much. It destroys all belief in providential distinctions which all men must observe and God is constantly making.

b. The objection mistakes or mis-states the nature, ground, and aim of the particularism of the Hebrew system. There is one God of all the earth, who has purposes of mercy toward all, though not in the same way. The Hebrews are represented in O. T. as brethren in one human race, made to differ for a time and for a purpose that good may result to all ; the favors that distinguish the Hebrews at the same time increase their responsibility. This closer relation to God is not a meritorious relation and the favors they enjoy are a means to an end. Exclusiveness has a double object, (1) Defensive ; to protect them from contamination, protecting and developing His instrumentalities on earth ; and (2) the securing more full and effectual application of God's instrumentalities

to the whole human race. The wall of partition is to be thrown down.

There is however a way open for the recognition of human brotherhood.

From the Pentateuch. Lev. 19: 33. The Jews were to treat strangers kindly. The doors of the Jewish sanctuary were guardedly opened, (i. e. to proselytes.)

Ex. 23: 9. They shall not oppress the stranger.

Num. 15: 15. As ye are, so shall the stranger be before the Lord.

Deut. 10: 18. The Lord loveth the stranger.

From the Prophets.

Micah 4: 1, 2. Many nations shall come.

Is. 56: 7. God's house a house of prayer for all people.

Is. 66: 20. God's glory to be declared among the gentiles.

Is. 60. Access to the gentiles.

These show that in the end, a richer result will be to the whole world from this temporary separation.

III. THIRD OBJECTION.

There is a divine endorsement of character not approved by our moral sense.

Ans. a. Divine approbation in many of these cases where God's approbation is expressed, is explicitly based on and restricted to, certain specified aspects of these characters.

b. In no case is Divine approbation extended to those qualities which provoke our moral censure.

c. In some cases Divine disapprobation is pronounced upon those points of character which we denounce, and the sins visited with severe judgments.

d. In no case should we be *with* God but in every case *against* God if we withhold our censure from these sins.

Dr. Hessey: "The Christian rejects the pleading that will not distinguish between the whole character, and special acts."

IV. FOURTH OBJECTION.

The Old Testament represents God as expressly requiring, in some instances, acts condemned by our moral

sense, e. g. : Abraham is commanded to sacrifice Isaac ; Moses deceives Pharaoh ; the borrowing of jewelry and raiment from the Egyptians ; Hosea's marriage ; falsehood of midwives of Egypt.

Reply : *a.* In each instance it belongs to exegesis to determine the meaning of the record. *Did* Hosea become an adulterer ? *Did* the Israelites borrow of the Egyptians ?

b. In the petition of Moses to Pharaoh, there is no evidence of deception. As the first step in a series of dealings a moderate request is made to allow them to go out to sacrifice. Other steps in God's purpose follow ?

c. Abraham's call to sacrifice his son. Some say it had been common for parents to sacrifice their children, so that God tempts Abraham in this way, calling him to do a wicked thing. God did not *tempt* but *tried* Abraham. It was to prove his trust in God, making the choice between parental affection and loyalty to God. He is to choose in the midst of extraordinary experiences that led him to trust in God. In dealing with God he had learned from the first not to count the cost of obedience. He left his kindred not knowing whither he went. It was the same now.

V. FIFTH OBJECTION.

The Old Testament represents God as expressly requiring courses of action toward nations and races that are condemned by our moral sense.

Dent. 23 : 6. Thou shalt not seek their peace nor their prosperity all thy days forever—in regard to the Canaanites.

Bolingbroke : " Nothing can be conceived more unworthy of an all perfect being than the manner in which the people were taken from Egypt and the way they got possession of Canaan."

But was such treatment of hostile tribes intrinsically immoral ? Had God no right to dispossess the Canaanites and give the land to Israel, no right to guide Israel to the land of promise, no right to protect them in the possession of it, no right to visit these idolatrous nations for their sins and that in His own way, no right to protect the world from the influence of their sins ?

Suppose no such issue be made concerning the Divine right, what shall we say as to the fitness of the method. He might have sent a pestilence.

Several things are to be considered, (Lev. 18 : 3, 24.)

a. Aggressive war was permitted and prescribed only at certain specified points and for certain specified objects. Otherwise it was merely defensive. They were left to human methods unless God interposed by miracle.

War for war's sake was never encouraged. For this reason David was denied the honor of building the temple. *b.* These wars were not waged at the instigation or for the indulgence of ferocious passions; but they were in the interest of justice, present and future holiness to Israel and others. Doing evil that good may come, says the objector.

c. As to the methods and extent of application, the people are not left to their own discretion or caprice in interpreting a commission. They were punished if they fell short of full obedience. It was not evil to protect the present and future holiness of Israel by a course to which they were strictly held. These cases were never allowed to be made precedents. They were protected while executing their commission.

VI. SIXTH OBJECTION.

The O. T. endorses expressions of individual feeling towards one's fellow-man that are offensive to moral judgments, especially the imprecatory Psalms, about fifty in number. See Ps. 35 : 4, 5, 6, 8, 26; 55 : 10, 16, 24; 58 : 7-12; 59 : 6, 7, 11-14; 69 : 23-29; 109 : 6-20; 137 : 7-9. [See Bib. Sac. Vol. I. 13, 19, Hanna's Bampton Lects. 1863, McLean's Unity of the Moral Law.]

a. These are not the unauthorized malice of private vindictiveness or passion, but inspired utterances which we must seek to harmonize.

b. These do contain expressions of human convictions and emotions, indignation at wrong, sense of justice, and desire to vindicate right. Are these wrong?

c. The Psalmists, in these utterances, are not merely the representatives of private history and experience; they are more. Their cause is God's. Opposition to it rightly arouses their indignation and sense of justice.

d. These utterances in general rest on divine denunciations and predictions with respect to evil.

e. They do reveal the spirit of a dispensation in which the reality, necessity, and meaning of law and justice had been far more perfectly disclosed than grace. Not appropriate to the N. T.

VII. SEVENTH OBJECTION.

The sanctions by which the O. T. commends and enforces what it requires are mercenary and therefore inferior if not immoral.

Bolingbroke: "God purchased as it were, the obedience of His people."

The book of Prov. is charged with motives of prudence instead of love. But

Munscher says the human agent regards the present rather than the future.

Dillman says the temporal leads man to the spiritual and invisible. Partial Ans. as before.

1. Present experiences were never designed nor found to be the exact exponent of God's esteem.

2. The favor signified was always more momentous than the sign itself.

Objection: sanctions like these, embodying good and ill, are inferior.

a. When it is said these sanctions are inferior we need have no debate with the objector, if it be conceded that abstract recommendations and precepts are made effective by sanctions. Moral sanctions may be reinforced by legal, without being superseded or necessarily weakened by them. A law not sanctioned is but advice.

At that stage of revelation sanctions drawn from a future life were imperfectly available. The objection must be against the constitution of human nature, or else against God for having kept back the knowledge of a future life.

b. As to the demoralizing tendency of this appeal to secular rewards and penalties, we should be obliged to admit the objection if certain things were true, for instance if it were true that the practice of virtue was commended merely for the sake of gain. This is not true. The appeal is chiefly to God's approbation, and

not to present gain. That the inferior motives were more palpable than the superior, would be a reason for their employment, not the contrary. God allows the wicked to prosper and chastens His own for a purpose of good, a higher law overruling. National and individual disasters, while indicating to the heathen the impotence of his gods, to Israel would indicate the reality of his God.

VIII. EIGHTH OBJECTION.

The O. T. contains positive precepts and indirect requirements and permissions that are in conflict with the teachings of the N. T. and high morality, e. g. the sanctity of marriage and monogamy, yet allows polygamy and easy divorce. The brotherhood of man, yet admits slavery; retaliation is sanctioned. Thus, the O. T. censures and sanctions the same things.

a. It is a signal merit of O. T. morality that it deals with the world as it is, existing conditions being accepted as in a certain sense limiting the immediate objects of the moral system.

b. Under the O. T. dispensation God does not deal either with existing defects, or positive evils, in a way to effect an immediate revolution. He does not employ supernatural means of conversion, but deals with all evil as in a *moral* system, in which force is out of place. The eradication of evil is the ultimate result, though gradual. The objection would show that God's wisdom is inferior to that of the objectors.

c. The legislation of the O. T. in regard to polygamy, divorce, and slavery is *regulative*. Each is found existing, not at once, always, and everywhere prohibited, but regulated. The removal is left to the slow working of the moral dispensation. Thus monogamy gradually gained almost entire ascendancy in Israel. So also divorce is restricted. Slavery in Israel, as compared with slavery in other nations, although enlightened, as Greece and Rome, is less degrading and oppressive. A bondman was a servant, not mere merchandise. Under the Mosaic law slavery is lightened and regulated, as far as it is permitted at all. Among the Jews only the Essenes and Therapeutæ put away slavery before Christ.

Retaliation, as an individual passion, is restrained. The law puts limits on the avenger. It is immoral if

God may not regard society as it is, and adapt His ways to its present state: if temporary toleration of evil is immoral. The O. T. does not purport to exhibit the ultimate or complete religion, neither should we expect in it the ultimate morality.

ETHICS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.

I. *Some General Characteristics and Truths.*

Many things true of the O. T. Dispensation are also true of the New.

1. There is the same connection between Morality and Religion.

The union is vital. Change in heart is necessary to a perfect morality.

2. Same lack of abstract terms.

3. Same quiet assumption in N. T. of the existence in man of the essential elements of moral ethics.

The moral elements of N. T. Dispensation are more conspicuous than those of O. T. The ceremonial is done away. N. T. Dispensation is for the world, and not for the theocracy alone. It is more distinctly ethical.

II. *Some fundamental Truths.*

(a.) The conception of God is central, as in O. T., only more powerful. The question, What is God? answered more fully. His moral perfections brought out more clearly. Contrast Sinai with Calvary. Law with Love.

(b.) The dignity ascribed to human nature; this dignity exalted by the work of Christ. He died to redeem it. If the image in which it was created furnished one standard, the price paid for it gives another, and union of the human and divine in Christ as the perfect man gives a third.

The whole work of Christ sets the highest value on human nature.

(c.) The Brotherhood of Men. Duties before dimly discerned now come out more vividly. N. T. not only does not cancel or obscure the O. T. teachings on this point, but adds and enforces. Christ's answer to the question, Who is my neighbor? teaches a broader view of the relations of men.

Paul's teaching the same, "God has made of one blood all nations," Acts 17: 26. Christ's redemptive work not for a multitude of races but for *the one* race.

(d.) The Organization of Humanity.

This brought out more clearly by N. T. O. T. deals mainly with the Jews. The history, instruction, discipline and religion were national, the new dispensation can no longer be national when the transient has effected its object. The organization of humanity is now seen to be from God, and is brought under the precepts or moulding spirit of the N. T.

(e.) Inferior Creation.

The N. T. calls attention to the use of the world which shall not be an abuse of it. Care of self enjoined in N. T. We are to develop every organ and faculty, and to use them for proper purposes. The N. T. enhances the dignity of every part of human nature, by what Christ planned and expended for the whole. Specific appeals to Christians. "Know ye not that ye are the temple of God." I. Cor. 3: 17.

"What? know ye not that your body is the temple of the Holy Ghost?" I. Cor. 6: 19.

(f.) Progressive enlightenment and elevation of men.

The O. T. system was preparatory. In the N. T. education and progress are prominent. The N. T. system not thus preparatory: not to give place to a new system? it is the *final* system. The moral results of the Gospel are reached by education from infancy to maturity. As in the individual, so in the world, there is a gradual appreciation of and instruction in morality.

(g.) The Sanctions of N. T. system are more generally spiritual and less temporal than those of the O. T. There is less appeal to the present. "Having promise of the life that now is and that which is to come." I. Tim. 4: 8.

The N. T. holds us to faithfulness in the present, and makes God's favor the best reward and highest aim. Immortality is brought to light in the Gospel. The N. T. finds the sanction in God's estimate of human action and the signs by which God chose to express this. It rises above the O. T. in making the rewards unseen and eternal in a greater measure. Even in the O. T. there are appeals to the future. Isaiah is better understood when quoted by Paul.

(h.) The Standard is the same, viz : Holiness.

We are to be like God. To prevent discouragement in achieving this effect the N. T. brings in the life and example of Christ to help us. Perfect holiness has appeared on earth, and the power of His helping hand is offered to us.

PECULIARITIES OF N. T. MORALITY.

The nature of the moral life may appear from three points of view. (1.) What is demanded of a moral life? Duty.

(2.) What should moral life and action be in quality and character?

Virtuous.

(3.) What should moral life aim at as its dominant object?

The supreme good.

Hence the three cardinal ideas of Ethics, duty, virtue and the virtues, and the supreme good.

Three questions arise.

1. Do the revelations of the N. T. add anything to the extent or exactness of man's knowledge of duty?

2. Does the N. T. teach anything new in regard to the power by which or the subjective conditions in which duty is done.

3. Does the N. T. modify our conception of the supreme good? i. e. of the results aimed at, anticipated and attained where Christian virtue exists and Christian duty done.

Duty.—A religious morality is more complete and effective than a non-religious morality. Man needs to be under personal influence.

A morality based on revealed religion will be higher than one based on a revelation of nature, and a morality based on God's last and highest revelations will be higher than one based on preparatory revelations. We should therefore expect the morality of the N. T. to include all that natural religion, philosophy and the O. T. include.

A. As compared with the O. T. Dispensation, Christianity makes less of the legal aspects of duty, and lays more stress on its self-evidencing nature. Christianity attempts no metaphysical explanations of duty. It is

practical: its object is to show man what he has to do so as to best secure his doing it.

It never argues the question of the conformity of the duty to man's nature or his relations. The N. T. announces its requirements as being so transparently right and reasonable as not to need argument. God's will is not stated so much in a legal way as in the O. T. Duties are presented as self-justifying. Arguments are sometimes used to remove misapprehension or overcome prejudices.

Two extremes are to be avoided. One would exhibit duty as the mere product of God's arbitrary will, the other finds the approving source of duty in the conscience of man himself. It deals with right as abstract and disregards God. N. T. goes to neither extreme. What God commands commends itself. Right reason and conscience approve it. More use is made of simple authority in O. T.; less appeal to the understanding. Duties of the N. T. justify themselves as soon as the facts of it are seen, e. g. love and obedience to Christ are evidently duties as soon as the facts in regard to Christ are known. How does Christianity lift man up to this plane of duty? By increasing our knowledge of Him; teaching us more fully what is His will. Philosophical Ethics must rely upon the validity of moral ideas and hence influences only the few, because they only can apprehend them. The N. T. makes God best known, so exhibiting His nature and character as to render the duties enjoined self-evidencing.

B. The N. T. rearranges human relations, readjusts duty by connecting all with its new relations of God.

We have not a multitude of new verbal statements in the N. T., but of facts—things God has *done*, e. g. Incarnation. Christ acts as and for God. Something more specific is revealed, viz., that the world was created by God through the Logos. The greatest advance is made in the manifestation of the love of God.

C. Into the substance of duty the N. T. introduces a new simplicity and unity, by making the great all-embracing duty to be *love*, and the obedience of love.

O. T. being a dispensation of law—presented duty in detail, but in N. T. the oneness of all duty is better understood. Our love must be appropriate and com-

mensurate with the object. Toward God our duty is supreme love. Under O. T. man could not understand the fullness of this claim because that love was not yet fully revealed. Likewise our duty to our fellow-men is more clearly revealed. Dent. VI: 5. cf. Matt. XXII: 36, 40; Mk. XII: 28, 31. Our Lord makes this duty more self-justifying and efficient than it was before. Instead of going into detail N. T. says "love is the fulfilling of the law."

D. To those duties which result from man's original constitution and his permanent relations as man, Christianity adds a group of duties which grow out of man's actual moral state, and what God has done for that moral state.

N. T. tells us we are sinners. New duties come with the appearing of Christ. These duties are contingent in a sense; not growing out of our nature—not absolute duties. They are now universal—for all men whom God has in view. They have also become primary duties in their importance. The items and order of duty differ from those for a holy race. So the items and order of duty for a race which Christ came to save, will differ from those for a race whom he did not come to save. Two things modify the duty, viz. : the state in which we have come and what God has done for us in that state e. g. *Repentance* is a duty of fallen man, no matter what God has done or not done. The system of theoretical Ethics might point repentance as a hypothetical duty, i. e. *if* a man sins, he should repent, but in Scripture it is a universal duty.

Faith does not become a primary duty in an evangelical sense until God commands it. That God could forgive and redeem was for Him to reveal. As soon as this revelation is made in Christ, a new form of faith becomes obligatory, not mere confidence in God. Our duty is to exercise a most specific faith in what God commands through His Son. All the new objects, institutions and agencies that come in the train of this redeeming work become in turn new centres of obligation, e. g. ministry, sacraments &c. of the church.

They are secondary and contingent yet real and imperative. They may properly be called Evangelical duties

because they come with the Glad-tidings. They first find their full recognition in the N. T. though shadowed in the O. T.

Among Evangelical duties the N. T. makes faith a necessary antecedent to the acceptable performance of any and all man's general duties. We mean faith in a Christian sense. Faith not merely retrospectively but prospectively indispensable. Rom. 14: 23, "Whatsoever is not of faith is sin." Paul means by faith more than mere confidence in God. More than a clear conscience that what we do will please God. According to the N. T. the spring of all right action is faith. The sinner is not in a right relation to God until he believes fully according to the light given him. Christian Ethics presupposes a Christian man. The primary duty therefore is faith.

Virtue.—The idea of virtue contains two elements. One is made prominent in the non-ethical idea, the other in its philosophical idea. In the first, virtue is presented as an activity or power, *αρετη*—virtus, manliness, vigor, power, energy. This continued to be their meaning until philosophy applied them to moral acts.

In the other phase virtue is that state of inner excellence which alone makes the former external excellence possible. Man's competence to do the work of life consists in a right inner condition. This is something belonging to the dispositions. The harmony of the inner nature with the right, the true and the good is first necessary. Moral worthiness did not enter into the heathen idea of virtue.

The O. T. furnishes no discussion of what this virtue is, like philosophy. Socrates found all good in knowledge and evil in ignorance and error. Hence all wisdom is virtue.

Plato makes virtue to be pleasure in the good, and love to the good, because the good is the truly beautiful and to be loved on that account. It showed itself in four forms, wisdom, courage, temperance, justice. These are the cardinal virtues.

Aristotle found good in the harmony and just proportion of things, hence virtue is due regard to this harmony. More especially, virtue is the true mean between

all extremes. It has emotional or intellectual forms. Zeno (Stoic) found virtue in living in conformity to nature. Happiness will be the result.

Epicurus put happiness in the foreground. The keenest enjoyment of the present is virtue. Individual enjoyment is the good aimed at and the highest good. To the lower classes this would be something sensual, to the wise man, something refined. The N. T. found these ideas of virtue existing. It does not enter upon any definition or analysis of virtue. It tells what man is to do and to be. Its main care is that man should adopt and practice faith, hope and charity.

The word *αρετη* occurs five times in the N. T. Four times translated virtue, Phil. 4: 9; 2 Peter 1: 3-5, used twice in verse 5; 1 Peter 2: 9, translated "praises."

Etymological idea is that which gives man his worth or value. Moral excellence is also expressed by *δικαιοσυνη*. Eph. 5: 9; 4: 24; Luke 1: 75; Rom. 6: 13, rendered "righteousness."

Also by *αγαθη* and *αγαθη*, 1 Thes. 3: 13; 2 Cor. 7: 1; Rom. 15: 14; Eph. 5: 9; *ευσεβεια* and *χαρισμα* are also used. While the N. T. uses no one term but many to express this idea of moral excellence, it is not to be thought that it is vague in its idea of virtue. Call to mind the exterior ideas of virtue and you find both recognized in N. T. virtue.

Christian Virtue.

A. Christian virtue and virtues have and must have a supernatural origin.

They are not found in man as he is. He has neither the state nor the power of producing them. No new faculties are needed. The foundation is in his nature, but since the fall man has failed to reach this virtue. He lacks both the disposition and the power for the exercise of this virtue. There is no provision in nature to regain this lost power.

This is the teaching of the Bible, which addresses man as he is in a fallen state. It declares that emancipation and regeneration are both necessary, and cannot be effected within the enslaved and vitiated nature. Conscience supplies the motives but not the power. It merely approves and disapproves.

B. While Christian virtue and virtues are supernatural in their origin, the N. T. represents them as natural to the new man.

They are not merely accredited to him but are his, belonging to his new nature. They distinguish him as a new man. He is not a mere figure on which God displays the costume and drapery of virtue. God works in him, but he does his own will, impelled from within and not merely from without. It is a moral disposition, wrought by the Spirit, more than mere natural endowments, from which this virtue proceeds.

C. In answer to the question—what element in moral condition or action makes or proves them right? the N. T. answer is, conformity to the will of God.

The N. T. does not ask why this is right. The aim of Scripture is to secure a practical religious life. It does not enter into the metaphysical, philosophical or psychological questions in regard to these things. In the line of religious revelation we can see why it is, God being what he is declared to be in the Bible, that conformity to the will of God is the standard of moral action. It is not the mere product of that will which is the ground of right, but the intrinsic rightness thereof. Two practical reasons for this standard:

(a) To make right influential over man he needs to have its attractions and constraints multiplied.

(b) If not only abstract but personal, if manifold and not single, if concurrent and not separate, the power drawing us to goodness is greatly increased.

If there were no taints of corruption within us, the mere abstract command would be sufficient.

Our moral relations are personal, to God and not merely to right and wrong. The right is intrinsically right, conformity to the will of God, and profitable; e. g. thankfulness is right in itself when a favor is received, and right according to the will of God in Christ Jesus. (Eph. 5:20.)

(c) This mode of presenting virtue is a needed and powerful corrective of man's ungodliness.

Man is naturally averse to the will of God and has a tendency to resist it. This tendency needs to be powerfully counteracted.

D. Christian virtue not being created by full development, perfects itself in the advancing activities and deeper experiences of the Christian life. The germs of virtue only are planted by a supernatural power. Growth in Christian virtue is secured by the use of what we have, and by the help of God. Hence some writers speak of a means of virtue, i. e., those acts by which virtue is guarded from hindrances, established against them, and advanced in its inner growth. They do not mean that virtue can be originated by these "means."

That which is sanctification in the theological phrase is, in ethical phrase, the developing and perfecting of Christian virtue. If it were developed and perfect at first, there would be no need of sanctification.

N. T. expressions indicating this growth:

Gal. 5 : 25. Walk in the Spirit.

1 Cor. 1 : 2. Called to be saints.

Positive and negative expressions.

1 Peter 2 : 24. Being dead to sin should live' unto righteousness.

Rom. 12 : 2. Not conformed but transformed.

Matt. 16 : 24. Deny thyself, take up cross.

Luke 14 : 33. Forsake all, be my disciple.

Gal. 5 : 24. Crucify the flesh. Col. 3 : 5.

Eph. 4 : 24. Put on the new man. Col. 3 ; 10.

Rom. 13 : 14. Put on the Lord Jesus Christ.

Eph. 4 : 13, 15. Growing up into a perfect man.

Col. 2 : 6, 7. Built up in Christ.

1 Cor. 15 : 58. Abounding in the work of the Lord.

Col. 3 : 12; Heb. 12 : 14; 1 Peter 1 : 13.

Agency.

1 Thes. 5 : 23. Sanctified by God.

1 Cor. 1 : 2. Sanctified in Christ Jesus.

1 Peter 1 : 2. Sanctified by the Spirit.

John 17 : 17. Sanctified by Truth.

Results.

Rom. 6 : 22. Fruit unto holiness.

Rom. 6 : 19. Yield your members unto holiness.

Rom. 8 : 10. Life because of righteousness.

2 Cor. 4 : 16. Renewed day by day.

Palmer. "All divine training is fruitless unless I train myself." In some Ethical treatises this is called "Ascetics," in others "Discipline."

E. When most effective as a power, and most perfected as a moral state, Christian virtue is not meritorious in the Romish sense. Our work is so dependent on God, that there is no ground for a demand of reward.

For Romish doctrine see 32nd Canon of 6th Session Council of Trent. "Deserve eternal life, increase of grace, &c."

Calvin, Institutes, chap. xv. Book iii; Turretin, topic 17, question 5.

South, Sermon 25th, lays down four conditions of merit.

(1) That the action be not due.

(2) That that action may add something to the state of him of whom it is to merit.

(3) That the action and reward be of equal value.

(4) That the action be done by the man's sole power, without help of him of whom he is to merit.

In all these points Christian virtue can merit nothing.

F. Christian virtue where it exists cannot show itself merely in general excellence, but must appear in the form of specific virtues, and these when apparently identical with certain natural virtues have a quality which is peculiarly their own.

Christian life is always seen as concrete. Its objects are definite, its conditions positive, so that the phenomena must be specific. Individual acts must be seen to be right.

Two inferences from individual right acts:

(1) With regard to the individual disposition from which the act springs.

(2) With regard to the general state of the soul of which this is one of the dispositions.

Christian virtue will then be seen and known mainly in the Christian virtues.

We must avoid several errors:

(1) That of individualizing and isolating them too much.

(2) That of seeking and finding them in outward action rather than in the disposition.

(3) That of judging them by the test of civil law, or public opinion.

Remember,

(a) That the virtues have a central principle which gives them unity and each has a strong affinity for every other.

(b) That they belong to the disposition more than the visibly active life.

(c) That the test of all other dispositions must be man's disposition toward God.

Plato's classification was accepted by the Christian Fathers, and passed into many modern systems. He makes the cardinal virtues wisdom, justice, fortitude, temperance. We can't put wisdom in the first place even if we mean by wisdom a moral excellence.

Ambrose and Augustine added faith, hope and charity to Plato's four, making seven. Thus justice seemed to be done to philosophy and Scripture, and the sacred number seven had its signification.

Ambrose and Augustine put charity first instead of wisdom, but the scheme is arbitrary and based on a wrong principle.

Calvin based his analysis on Titus 2:12. He makes the virtues sobriety, justice, piety.

Sobriety regulating all belonging to self.

Justice, all belonging to our fellow men.

Piety referring to God.

Schleiermacher's: wisdom, love, prudence, perseverance.

Wüttke's is simple, logical and complete. Faithfulness, justice, temperance and courage.

These he treats as phases of love, in different relations and toward different objects. Their mutual affinity is strong.

Faithfulness.—*πιστις*, in a broad sense. It resembles God's self-consistent and unvarying faithfulness to Himself. In man the love that God implants is true to self. Love true to self looking toward God, is faith in God; toward men it will show itself as self-consistent fidelity.

Perseverance, patience, earnestness, fixedness of character, sincerity, simplicity, and constancy are manifestations of it.

Justice. In this scheme this is construed as a uniform readiness to respect and concede the rights of each and all with whom we have to do. Its counterpart in God is rectitude. It reaches far beyond calculating equity.

Gratitude is justice toward God as bountiful and gracious. To be ungrateful is to be unjust. Compassion toward needy men is another form of justice. It would owe no man anything. This leaves no place for works of supererogation, Rom. 13 : 7, 8. It is the golden rule which is the Christian law of justice.

Temperance.—Is a due regulation of self and involves in its broadest sense a just reputation of self. Keeping oneself within right moral bounds. It includes σωφροσύνη plus ἐγκράτεια. σωφ. well balanced, healthful mind; εγκ. keeping under control. In its first aspect temperance will appear to be negative or prohibitory, restraining and keeping back. But this restraint has a most positive result. It forbids excess in order to secure the best use of one's powers and energies. It regulates our feelings and desires, moderating one's estimate of himself; hence produces humility, which is the regulation of our judgment with regard to ourselves.

Humility is preëminently a Christian virtue. The old tendency was to exaggerate one's own worth. Sin in self and grace in God's dealing are factors which ancient philosophy never admitted. This temperance will also show itself in self-renunciation and contentment. Pride, arrogance and undue self-assertion will have no place.

Courage.—Not ἀνδρεία, Greek bravery or courage, but παρρησία, confidence, boldness and hopefulness, which impels to and sustains in the conflicts of the Christian life. Boldness in anticipation of death and judgment. Its basis can never be a consciousness of personal worth or ability. Its basis is hope and faith in God, thus differing from all natural courage. Nothing in life or death can daunt him whose faith is staid in God.

These particular virtues are to be looked for as signs of the general virtue. These are to be developed as individual virtues, studied and nourished with proper motives; yet Christian virtue has its unity and all go hand in hand. We are to know the ground on which each rests and to see that all are found in our character.

In Christian Ethics Love is the central and radical virtue as well as the central duty, not one among co-ordinate virtues: so faith may be called the primary virtue as it is the primary duty.

G. What has Christian Ethics to say of the natural virtues, such as parental and filial affection, generosity, honesty, &c., found in unsurpassed excellence in some who have never experienced the work of grace in the heart?

Christianity neither denies that they are virtues nor that they are natural, nor that they are largely in actual existence among men, and in some degree and in some form and measure all but universally present in human life and character. To deny this would be to say that all virtue is the fruit of regeneration. If either class are natural it is those which have their root in man's constitution and depend not on a second work, regeneration.

Chalmers: "God's word is not in conflict with the consciousness of men. There *are* then natural virtues. There is a social and a divine standard of morality." (Institutes Am. Ed. Vol. 1, pp. 2 and 3.)

The precepts of the Old and New Testaments show that natural virtues and dispositions are enjoined, as having a basis in nature and not necessarily in regeneration Gen. 4:7, 2:7; Acts, 10:34; Rom. 2:14.

What has the Bible to say of the presence and worth of these in unregenerated men? Under what condition and to what extent does the Bible deny to man the right to congratulate himself on the possession and manifestation of these virtues, and to content himself therewith apart from regeneration.

2. Man's disposition is to regard only two parties as concerned in the existence and manifestation of virtues, viz. himself and his neighbor. The Bible recognizes three parties. God is the third, 1 Cor. 10:31, Whether therefore ye eat or drink, do all to the glory of God. See also Col. 3:22, 23; Eph. 6:6. Titus 2:10, Servants, masters and God are concerned. 1 Tim. 5:8, If any provide not for his own, &c., he is worse than an infidel. Rom. 13:1-5 civic loyalty Eph. 6:1, the Obedience of children. Eph. 5:22, Obedience of wives. We see that in all relations, God the third party is recognized. In all or any of the natural virtues, even when justice has been fully done so far as two of the parties are concerned, it is not perfect unless it has taken account of the third, i. e. God.

1 Cor. 13: 3, charity without godliness is not recognized. Phil. 4: 8, Sincerity as a mere impulse is not enough.

3. We may get the N. T.'s estimate of the natural virtues by examining the epithets and phrases by which it describes character and indicates the ground of its judgment.

One group of these so often found in the N. T. is:—*σαρκικός ψυχικός πνευματικός*. Sometimes all of these and sometimes only two are brought into contrast. 1 Cor. 2: 12. 3: 4; Gal. 6: 1; Rom. 7: 14; Jas. 3: 15; Jude 19.

The third, *πνευματικός*, is always and only approved—the others always and only condemned. The first two are substantially identical morally, though not psychologically; the ruling principle being within the man and not from God, as in the third. These terms are used differently in the N. T. Greek from their classic use. Ascendancy and control does not belong to that part of our nature, the *σάρξ*, even when pure. The *ψυχή* has still greater control but no absolute and supreme right even in fallen man. The natural virtues spring from this higher nature the *ψυχή*—but impulse, reason and conscience are alike amenable to the law of God, and cannot have commendation unless controlled by the Spirit of God.

(a.) So far forth as they spring from man's original, unvitiated constitution they are appropriate virtues.

(b.) So far as they have respect to their proper objects, they are right.

(c.) So far as the sanction of conscience, as God's representative is regarded, they are commended.

(d.) So far as they are rooted in and spring from a right moral disposition, they are endorsed and commended. But they are censured so far forth as cherished and manifested without regard to God. So far as man relies on his own judgment and impulses. A life that shall please God and satisfy us must proceed from a divine principle.

The Supreme Good.—Does the N. T. modify our view of the supreme good to be aimed at, anticipated and attained?

To the Brahmins and Buddhists, it is the disappearance of the individual being and absorption in the universal being.

To the ancient Greeks, the doctrines of God and fate so baffled their aspirations and endeavors that the supreme good was never known. They were subject to the impulses and caprice of too many gods and they and their gods alike were liable to be crossed in all their plans by unknown decrees of fate. Socrates made wisdom the supreme good. Plato, harmony, Aristotle, soundness and symmetry of self in all its activities. Epicurus, happiness. The Stoics, conformity to nature, including reason. Kant, the union of happiness with virtue. Through this we get an idea of God and immortality.

Schleiermacher, the complete mastery of nature or the interpretation of nature by reason. Hegel's system includes no Ethics. Spinoza admits of no moral element and hence precludes anything but physical Ethics.

The Christian view of the supreme good is best given by Augustine and Aquinas.

Augustine—return to God and reunion with God by likeness to himself.

Thos. Aquinas—that absolutely perfect life of the rational creature found in fellowship with God.

Schmidt—moral principle introduced and made real in the world of realities. Shaping of the world around us in harmony with the divine will and divine law; our will acting in conformity with the divine will. This is an improvement on Schleiermacher.

Wüttke, twofold definition.

Formal and material.

Formal, defining it by that in which it appears.

Material, by that of which it consists.

Formal def.—It is the highest perfection of his rational personality, i. e. the perfect exhibition of his likeness to God, or the complete agreement of the reality of the entire human life with the will of God.

Material def.—The actual fellowship of life with God which secures the outward appearance.

Remarks.—(1.) This conception of the supreme good commends itself by the intrinsic excellence of the end proposed. Nothing higher can be conceived of than likeness to God and fellowship with him.

(2.) The end thus proposed to us, plainly is and has been an end with God—viz., our fellowship of life with himself. That which we are to seek, he has been seeking. He sought it in creation, much more in regeneration.

(3.) The supreme good thus conceived of combines two things of great importance :

(a.) The highest incitement to aspiration and endeavor on our own part, with (b) encouragement of help from him upon whom our success depends. To have chosen this is to have been prompted by God, because no man of himself aspires to this. God will not disappoint his own prompting.

(4.) This conception includes and provides for all subordinate forms of good. This is what none of the other conceptions did. It is the only certain guarantee of wisdom, for in union with God we find the highest wisdom. It insures constant happiness of the highest type. "Ye shall be as gods knowing good and evil" is only realized thus.

(5.) This supreme good is not exhibited as something to be desired and hoped for as the final attainment of a distant future but as something with which a right moral life begins ; to possess it, makes duty and virtue possible. 2 Peter 1 : 4. "Partakers of the divine nature."

THE MOTIVE POWER OF CHRISTIANITY.

We must now consider the working force of Christianity. What provision does it make for calling into play man's moral power? Does Christianity hold before us anything better than the best philosophy? Does it give promise and prospect of attaining something more than we could otherwise? The motive power of Christianity is being more and more considered by the best thinkers. See Blakie's "Four Phases of Morals;" Principal Sharp, "Studies on Poetry and Philosophy." He says, what is the dynamic power in the moral life? Calderwood's "Handbook of Moral Philosophy" approaches the same subject from the side of philosophy.

The practical problem is to restore the moral power which we have lost. What motive power does Christianity supply which shall make duty, virtue and the supreme good more than barren ideas?

A. The ambiguity of the word motive leads us to indicate its sense as used by us.

(1) It belongs to every conception of moral action and life that the moving power shall dwell and act within man's own nature.

The term motive can be applied only in a secondary sense to anything exterior to the man himself, e. g., gold.

Prof. Calderwood: "A motive is an internal force which moves and excites the mind toward a single definite action."

(2) In every intelligent agent the power thus moving him consists of two elements:

(a) The views which he takes, and, (b) The dispositions or the judgments and dispositions. Dispositions include desires and affections. The dispositions are non-rational, acting by impulse. The judgments are rational, supplying both impulse and regulation. They respect truth as truth, and recognize it in its relations to us as a rule of life. These two motive powers may concur or conflict. When they conflict, the control and decision must belong to the higher and rational element, the judgment. The dispositions cannot be trusted to regulate themselves.

B. The motive power of Christianity must be sought on the one hand in the convictions, beliefs and knowledge which it gives to us to be motives, and which it makes the rule of life: on the other hand, it will be found partly in the dispositions which it develops towards its central objects, and through these toward all other related objects. It cannot be found in either, exclusive of the others. Neither can it be found in enlightenment only; consequently those systems which work only through excited sensibilities are at fault.

C. The rational motives which are distinctive of Christianity, and which give it power and effectiveness, are mainly those which gather about its revelation of the nature, character, relations and purposes of God, especially in Christ.

Our knowledge of secondary relations and duties stand in the most vital connection to these facts and truths. This is *the* power to regulate us above all others. Secondary duties are not disparaged when subordinated to these higher duties.

D. The rational motive power by which Christianity seeks to accomplish its results, is found in the view which it gives, the belief which it creates, the knowledge which it imparts, of the love of God.

This does not disparage the knowledge of his other attributes. It does not draw us from any other duty, nor is there less regulative than motive power in these facts concerning the love of God. Nothing so secures fidelity, vigilance, perseverance. Nothing so exalts virtue as this love.

E. The motive object in which God's love is found most fully embodied and expressed, is the person and work of Jesus Christ.

A motive object is that toward which the mind is called to act. Christianity presents this motive object in three ways as adapted to influence us.

(1) *As a new test* to show us what we are ourselves—sinners.

(2) *As a new point of departure* in our whole religious and moral life. We see what we have not been, and what we ought to be; and from the time we take Christ we begin again, or if rejecting him go on to worse.

(3) *As a new source and reservoir of motive power*, exciting our affections.

Illustrations.

(a) A man sees himself as never before when Christ is fully before him. His power to love the truth, his inclination and willingness to follow it are then tested.

(b) Christ becomes a point of departure, heavenward or hellward, according as they receive or reject Him.

(c) There is no more vital, practical, winning truth than this. All the rights and powers of God are brought so near us, and to bear upon us in Christ. There can be nothing more done to move us.

F. Christianity traces the new moral and religious life to the work of the Holy Spirit, and offers this as a motive power to all.

The Holy Spirit is really the motive power in Christianity, an almighty power not added, but entering into all our work. Not that we live, but Christ by his Spirit living in us.

When Christ has been received, neither the rational or moral convictions alone actuate a man. (1 John

2 : 20.) The dispositions are of divine origin; no man can call Jesus, Lord, but by the Holy Spirit.

Summary.

(1) The new and characteristic motive object that Christianity brings and holds before the mind and heart, is the most influential conceivable.

(2) Every other object with which the moral life is concerned, has its import and power enhanced by the relation into which it comes to God in Christ.

(3) In all who are brought rightly to apprehend and respond to this revelation of God in Christ, there is a peculiar and powerful divine inworking, as well as co-working of God in man. Faith overcomes the world.

Objections urged against the morality of Christianity :

1. The Ethical system of Christianity is not scientific, nor presented in scientific form.

If this is anything more than a pedantic, frivolous objection it rests on the misconception, that the Bible is a scientific book. If it be scientific to take the only complete view of man's condition and relations, then Christian Ethics is scientific.

If scientific to locate and arrange and define duty as never before, then the morality of Christianity is scientific.

If it be scientific to perfect man's conception of virtue, and to set before man the highest good any system has yet presented; if to show the possibility of reaching this high excellence, and to supply the moral power necessary, then Christian morality is scientific.

2. Another group of objections.

The requirements and standards of Christian morals are too high for such a world as this. Too transcendental, too easily exaggerated and distorted by us in our apprehension of it.

(a) *Standard too high.*

What should the best system aim at? Would that be a better system of morals which should aim at anything less than likeness to God? Would it be an improvement to lower the standard, so that we might hope to reach it?

(b) *Requirements visionary and transcendental.*

E. g., "Whosoever shall smite thee on thy right

cheek, turn to him the other also." "Charity that thinketh no evil."

But we must take into consideration the circumstances and the spirit in which it is uttered. The objection lies often against the form of statement; when we study all together the visionary and transcendental disappears.

(c) *The system too delicate and liable to distortion.*

It presents its requirements so vividly that men run into asceticism. Zeal in good works is apt to make no account of knowledge, and to lose the proper balance and proportion of true living.

True, it has sometimes led to perversion; development has been unsymmetrical. True, men have been called upon to extirpate what Christianity would regulate. We might say the fault is in human nature, but this is not a sufficient answer, because the system is given to us in our present condition.

It grows out of the very nature of a moral system, working by motives, that it does not effectually protect itself against the infirmities of human nature. It is not to be expected that it would constrain man always and everywhere. The motives are set before us, and the responsibility of seeing the truth, and doing the right, is left to us.

Would the system be better if shorn of its power, robbed of the vividness of its presentation, and less urgent in its appeals? These become the occasions of exaggeration and distortion; shall we therefore take them away? It is evident that this very character of the Gospel is its power, and secures the measure of Christianity that exists.

Some make so much of truth as to become dogmatists; some make so much of ceremony as to become formalists. These are exceptions. The misuse of a principle does not do away with its right use.

3. Another group of objections charges the moral system of Christianity with positive and serious incompleteness. John Stuart Mill says, the O. T. must be used to complete the morality of the N. T., and that of the O. T. is bad enough.

He says it is a reaction against certain things that are

wrong. Its character is negative rather than positive. It makes obedience the only valuable thing, and thus takes away a man's dignity.

Answer: It is no disparagement that the Old and N. T. morality must be taken together to complete a perfect system. Both were instituted of God for different times.

To the objection that Christian morality is passive rather than active, innocence rather than nobleness, absence from evil rather than active power to good, Principal Shairp answers, "this is ignorance or obstinacy, not to be expected from Mill." The precepts and teachings of the N. T. prove this objection totally unfounded.

Then as to the loss of self-respect, obedience to God is not humiliating or degrading. Who has a greater right to respect himself than the man who is a child of God?

4. Christianity as an Ethical system, it is said, fails to recognize adequately some of man's most important relations, and is positively unfriendly to some of his highest interests.

Prof. Newman says, Christianity cramps human freedom. It treats the instinct or love of knowledge and beauty as illegitimate. In regard to family and private rights decisions are given which are seeds of pernicious errors. It disparages or omits duties to the state. It ignores the rights of men and nations, though it says much of the rights of kings and rulers. It supports lamentable superstitions, adverse to the progress of civilization.

(a) *Cramps freedom.* Answer: Christianity guards and guides, as well as maintains, human freedom. It rebukes and restrains license; it holds man to his place as a finite creature; does demand faith as the condition of certain kinds of knowledge. But within proper bounds Christianity protects man's freedom from his own and other's abuse of it, prescribes laws for it, and conditions of its working. It regulates the love and desire for knowledge and beauty.

Christianity is not to be held responsible for all the narrowness and short-sightedness exhibited by its exponents.

(b) *Pernicious errors.* E. g. Undue authority given to husbands, fathers and mothers at the expense of wives, children and servants, disparaging more than half of the human race, and robbing them of their freedom. True Christianity does not sanction modern philosophies which break down all distinctions. But it would not be hard to show how Christianity has formed and protects the Christian home. Because the precepts of N. T. are given to Christians, it is no reason why other men are not to be bound by them also. All men ought to be Christians. The historical effect of Christianity does not sustain these charges.

(c) Christianity represented as unfavorable to patriotic feeling and service to one's country. It either takes no notice of or disparages our duty to the state. (Lecky, Mill, Newman.)

True it does make less of the state than ancient philosophies. It does not say that man is a political animal, but this is to its credit. True that early Christians could not be faithful to the demands of the state, and at the same time to Christ.

They could not take part in idolatry and oaths contrary to Scripture. But where they were not called on to sacrifice principle they were most faithful. The charge now rests, chiefly upon there being little said in the N. T. about our duty to the state. Moreover it is said that obedience is exhorted to rulers rather than the state. It recognizes kings, however tyrannical, as ordained of God, but not nations or communities.

Lecky says, that patriotism as a duty has never found a place in Christian morals. He asserts,

(1) That strong religious feeling tends to divert the mind from terrestrial things; (2) that an organized church with a government of its own, an interest and a policy, and a frontier intersecting national boundaries, is unfavorable to national sentiment. Many denominations increases the difficulty.

(3) The saintly and heroic characters which represent the ideals of Christianity are essentially different. Religion develops the saintly and undermines the heroic.

Answer: We may admit that small space is given to this, and that Christianity does recognize two worlds,

the spiritual and secular. Yet we repel the charge and claim that no devotion to the state is so pure, no service so great, as that of the Christian.

Luthardt says, the man who is true to all his obligations in the higher sphere, will be truest to all the obligations of the lower. Christianity exhibits a better type of love than that of fellow country-men. All human affections are subordinated to love to Christ.

Francis William Newton in his "Phases of Faith," says, "the rights of those in authority are preserved and advanced by the morality of Christianity, at the expense of the nation or the individual subject. Christianity is always a main stay of tyranny and oppression."

Answer: Christianity does emphasize the sentiments that are most likely to be deficient, guards the rights most likely to be ignored. It aims to secure the stability of society. This is not gained by teaching men to always and everywhere insist on their *own* rights. Men must learn to give up much for the good of others.

Christianity throws its influence on the side which needs supporting. Yet it does not ignore the rights of subjects. It impresses rulers also, with a sense of their duties. Being ordained of God only shows their responsibility to God. The remedy for contempt of authority can come kindly, and efficiently, only from the side of religion.

Christianity not being a political system does not go into detail as to political duties. With its principle of love it inculcates also that of self-sacrifice, which supplies the underground for freedom, courage, and faithfulness.

(d.) It is charged that Christianity supports superstitions. Belief in ghosts, witchcraft.

We are willing to accept the responsibility of promoting belief in the existence of evil spirits, their malicious activity and our exposure to them, and the use of this belief to warn us. We don't deny the abuse of this teaching. We simply say it is neither equitable nor scientific in view of the great power of Christianity for good to make these charges. It is not Christians who abuse this belief.

(e.) Religious toleration.

What does Mr. Newman mean by toleration? He would have religious indifference. If he means that Christianity would encourage forcible interference in other men's beliefs, we deny it. If, that we interest ourselves in other's beliefs, in correcting the wrong, and spreading the truth, we admit it. He says, Christianity is favorable to intolerance because it teaches that God will visit with fiery vengeance those who hold an erroneous creed, hence Christians will come to have the same feeling toward those who do not so believe.

But that Christians have any warrant for this or have ever taken it, we deny.

(f.) Christianity is said to be adverse to the progress of civilization.

One form of this charge is from Matthew Arnold. He speaks of Hebraisms and Hellenisms. Hebraism i. e. Christianity, does less complete justice to man than Hellenism, i. e. culture.

Religion exercises and develops certain elements of man to the neglect of others. Hellenism is characterized by spontaneity of action and breadth of culture. The governing idea of culture is complete, symmetrical development. He admits in developing a full manhood that *discipline* should occupy the first place, which braces the moral powers, and furnishes a solid basis of character. The fault of religion is that it stops there. We want a fuller and more harmonious development of our humanity.

Celsus charged Christians long before with being indifferent to wisdom. "With holding that the wisdom that is in the world is an evil."

But Canon Farrar says Christianity made culture possible and saved the intellect of the world from selfishness, and an intoxicated form of pride, by putting it lower than the affections.

Culture cannot be perfected until a higher end than self is put before it. The N. T. insists that religion is to preside over and encompass all culture.

How shall a man make the most of himself? What shall he do with his culture, and why should he cultivate himself at all? Religion must answer these questions, not culture.

Some allege that the influence of Christianity is adverse to civilization. This is stronger than Arnold who holds that Christianity needs to be supplemented. In answer, we say, that no civilization has risen above Christian civilization.

Frothingham, and others, charge that Christianity teaches men to undervalue riches, and the industries which are the sources of civilization, and snaps the springs of human enterprise. It teaches man to keep the eye on the future life. *Ans.* If human industries are so selfish as this theory maintains they need to be snapped. Moreover we challenge them to prove that enterprises are not developed when men are laboring for something beside self. If man is to rise to the highest manhood, we claim he must live for God and a higher life.

5th. It is said that many of the assumptions, arguments and appeals of Christianity do not address themselves to man as man, but are only of force on the condition that Christianity is true.

If it contained fewer questioned truths and debated propositions, it would be better fitted to move all men. Many do not grant its postulates. It ought to take truths universally conceded if it would influence men. E. g. Christianity assumes that man is a fallen sinner. But here is a man who denies this, hence it is said Christianity has no force for him, and therefore it is not calculated to be the universal religion.

Ans. Are the communications of Christianity unnecessary or false? Is it to her discredit that she tells us we did not know? Tells us things we resent? Would its moral basis be improved, and its effectiveness increased if all that men would willingly receive as true were excised? Is it not to its credit that it reveals us to ourselves even though the revelation is unwelcome?

There is practical need of more knowledge of ourselves, our wants and destiny. Here man is addressed as man needing Christianity. And in that condition which makes Christianity essential to him. We must be told the truth, disagreeable as it may be.

6th. The great Christian doctrine of Justification by Faith leads men to neglect an active and resolute morality and even to tolerate immorality.

We of course admit that this doctrine has been abused. Christianity teaches that the best works are not done for sake of being justified by them wholly or in part. That is not the truest love which goes forth to show itself as love. That is not the most genuine generosity which is always complimenting itself.

Benevolence loses itself in its object. So of all good affections and good works.

Some like Gregg hold that a better morality is secured when men are taught that there is no forgiveness. That sin has no punishment except natural consequences, yet these are inevitable hence cannot be forgiven. Teach men this and they have some inducement to guard against sinning. Brahmanism also teaches this.

It is only from revelation that man knows of other consequences of sin than the natural, but these men do not admit revelation. From the nature of things also, it is only from revelation that a hope of forgiveness is raised.

It is hard to see how a better morality would be secured by telling men that there is no forgiveness.

That after the first sin there is nothing but despair.

When the scriptures are so explicit in guarding this doctrine of justification by faith from abuse and teaching pure holiness, we are authorized in denying that it is the servant of sin.

7th. The Christian system influences men, too prominently and exclusively by considerations drawn from a future life; and so its powers are impaired over the moralities of this life. Gregg urges in his Creeds of Christendom that a "morbid condition of the soul is produced" and "insincere professions," a loss of earnestness in taking hold of the evils around us.

(a.) Christianity teaches only this, that a just proportion should be observed between things visible and invisible—things temporal and eternal. Keeping these in their proper ratio. It allows earthly things a place but demands that they be kept in their proper place.

Nature needs subduing only because, and in so far as, man is disposed to disregard this proportion.

(b.) Christianity teaches that when this just proportion is observed, the near, the visible, the temporal, receive

better care than when they are treated as man's chief and only concern.

The motives by which his actions are determined, and the laws by which they are regulated and the results achieved are better when this proportion is observed.

(c.) The fact that life is probationary, instead of lowering, exalts it. The fact that men deal here as stewards and not owners makes their actions more responsible and sacred, and brings to bear new motives.

(d.) Practically no men have discharged their temporal and social duties with more *consistent* and *persistent* diligence and fidelity, than those moved by the power of

ARGUMENTS FOR THE DIVINITY OF CHRISTIANITY DRAWN
FROM ITS MORAL CHARACTER.

Usually placed among the internal evidences, but so far are objective—since they belong to external evidences.

All the proofs of Christianity are moral, not demonstrative or intuitive.

Question. Does Christianity show in moral substance and structure such characteristics that we and our fellow men must accept it as the true, the authoritative and divinely sanctioned religion?

I. *First Argument.* The superiority of Christianity as a moral system appears in the precision and completeness with which it exhibits the facts that concern man's moral life.

The word superiority is used here in a very emphatic sense. It indicates a divine not a human authority. In this higher sense we claim a superiority. It is exhibited in three groups of facts.

(a.) Facts in reference to man's own nature, both in its design and in its actual condition.

(b.) Facts with reference to the relation which man sustains. Relations to all beings and things toward which he can act morally.

(c.) Facts with reference to the end to be secured in and by these relations, and by man's right moral action in them.

II. The superiority of Christianity appears in the way in which it awakens keeps, alive, and develops the sense of duty in most perfect symmetry. Instruction and en-

lightenment would avail little without the help of Christianity, arousing and purifying the moral impulses.

(a.) Man is continually confronted with the moral rectitude of God. This is one of the ways in which duty is kept alive.

(b.) The reach of man's responsibility is disclosed in Christianity as nowhere beside.

(c.) The sanctions and gracious provisions of Christianity are designed, among other things, to discipline and invigorate the moral sense.

III. Third argument formed by a combination of the two former. The superiority is manifested,

(a.) In the duties emphasized.

(b.) The basis on which it puts them.

(c.) The order in which it presents and urges them.

(d.) The mode in which it presses them upon us, so that by this very process which brings duty to view the moral sensibilities are awakened, and invigorated to the highest degree.

IV. In view of man's abnormal condition as a sinner, the superiority of Christianity is apparent in its exhibition of the conditions on which, and the means by which, a man may attain the end of his existence as a moral being.

The fact of man's ruin is presented most vividly, but along with it Christianity shows what God has done to lift him out of it, and hence man is not driven to despair, but is shown that the highest attainment of morality is the greatest and necessary proof of his grateful love, and the proper fruit of faith.

V. Superiority appears also in the motives which it employs for the attainment of its ends.

(a.) In general, as virtue is exhibited as conformity to the will of God, and supreme good, as consisting in fellowship or life with God. To set up the will of God as a standard secures immutability, elevation and consistency in the standard.

(b.) It is more characteristic of the motive elements and power of Christianity that it reveals the great love of God in Christ, so that whatever we do, we are to do it unto the Lord.

(c.) This superiority appears in its enhancing the significance and importance of all duty done here, and

all failure to do duty here, by connecting this life so closely with the future life, so that whatever we do here rightly has eternal recognition and reward and all failure and sin brings retribution and punishment eternal.

VI. Another token of superiority may be found in the fact that it insists so strenuously on the inward rather than the outward as essential in morality.

The disposition and intent. It demands the outward as the complexion of the inward, it does not begin with it. Incidentally this characteristic of Christianity secures the culture of self-examination—humility and sincerity.

VII. Another peculiar feature of the superiority of Christian Ethics is that the system makes chief use of the facts of individual experience and of history rather than of speculative and theoretical truths.

Prof. Blackie in his "*Four Phases of Morals*" compares Socrates and Christ. The one a help and guide, the other a foundation of faith and fountain of life.

Its general historical character and specific historical elements contribute much to the moral attractiveness and power of Christianity.

VIII. If we look distributively at the chief departments of practical and applied morals, at what has been called theistic, social and individual Ethics, we find still other proofs of the superiority of the Christian system and of its divine origin.

(a.) In regard to its exhibition of the duties which man owes to God we notice :

(1.) Its fuller disclosure of vital facts concerning God. His nature, relations and work with reference to us. This gives a broader and more solid basis to that class of duties which are specifically duties to God, as well as a greater definiteness, vividness and power to the duties themselves.

(2.) There is no duty that has not a side turned Godward.

God is recognized as having not only originally ordained, but as having a present concern in all man's duties.

(b.) The duties man owes to his fellow-man are put by Christianity distinctly on the basis of the universal Fatherhood of God—the common Brotherhood of man and the redeeming work of Christ.

(1.) All the relations of man to man are essential and permanent, are ordinances of God from the beginning; and are continually recognized and regulated in His dealings with men in all the successive stages of revelation. They are frequently dealt with by direct precept.

(2.) All the most transient relations of man to man, so far as legitimate, are brought under, and may be maintained under, the sanctions of His Word. A relation which cannot so exist and accomplish its purpose is shown to be wrong.

(3.) Christianity always accomplishes its main work in society through principles better than through precepts.

Every relation can be thus regulated by principles. These principles run through both dispensations, giving flexibility to the system and showing it suited to every age and human condition.

(4.) Christianity works for the regeneration of society, through the regeneration of the individual.

(c.) Man's duties to himself are not left on any merely selfish or utilitarian basis. The excellence of Christianity here appears.

(1.) In the dignity ascribed to man's origin.

(2.) In its representation of the expenditure of divine thought, love and sacrifice, of which it declares man the object.

(3.) In that which Christianity proposes to make of man. The future glory which awaits him. In one sense we cannot think too highly of ourselves.

IX. The weight of these moral arguments for the Divinity of Christianity is cumulative. It is to be estimated by the combined force of all. The combination being multiplicative, the conclusiveness of these arguments in such a combination, is more than their sum.

The moral results of Christianity as illustrations of its nature and proof of its divinity:

Chas. C. Hinnel: "It is not easy to say whether Christianity has done more good or evil in the world." He imputes to Christianity asceticism, and whatever other evils have passed under its name. He attributes to civilization much that we ascribe to Christianity. There is great difficulty in eliminating what is due to

Christianity in the great forces which combine to produce results. The problem is a complex one. But the unquestionable fruits of Christianity, leaving out the doubtful, are enough to prove our point.

Prof. Lecky gives three criteria of judging of progress in the moral condition of a country. (1) The changes that have taken place in the moral standard. (2) In the moral type. (3) The degree in which the ideal of moralists has been realized among the people. By moral standard, he means the degree in which in different ages, recognized virtues have been enjoined and practiced. By moral type, the relative importance attached to different virtues in different ages. The moral results of Christianity are tested:

1. With reference to the changes wrought by it in the moral judgments that have prevailed among men.
2. With respect to the changes wrought in the visible life of the world.

MORAL JUDGMENTS.

General remarks:—

A. We are prepared to expect that Christianity will work changes in the moral judgments of men, from the more intimate and indissoluble connection which it establishes between religion and morality.

Man's relation to God, in Homer and other classical writers, is legal and temporal rather than moral. There is no reference to the inmost spirit and dispositions. Religious motives were supplied for civic virtues, not for inward impurity.

Montesquieu: "Paganism forbade only certain gross crimes, restraining the hand but neglecting the heart."

B. There is not only a more intimate relation established between religion and morality, but it is a religion of mutual helpfulness. The more powerful influence goes forth from religion.

Schmid traces the moral importance of Paganism:

(1) To the nature of Polytheism, which detracts and weakens both religion and morality.

(2) To the low and corrupting representations which crowded mythology, art and worship.

Lecky : "Ancient Rome produced many heroes but no saints." Such was the influence of paganism, while that of Christianity is directly and powerfully helpful to morality, sensibility and judgment, penetrating to the moral essence of sin and holiness; bringing new meaning and power to the old terms evil, good, conscience, &c.

C. Group 1st. Illustrations of the new moral judgments developed by Christianity :

I. We notice the new estimate which Christianity led each individual man to put on himself and others. It is the claim of Christianity to have created the idea of humanity. It first declared what it was to be a man. This new estimate led to greater self-respect, and also to the renouncing of unholy conceit and pride, because we constantly see how far short we fall of the standard. This would and did prevent men from putting their powers to low uses, and from sinking into degrading associations :

a. New views are given to man of the sanctity of human life. Suicide had been commended by ancient religions, philosophies and examples. But Christianity pronounced it self-murder. Abortion and infanticide were very prevalent crimes, justified by legislators. Lycurgus said that weaklings should be put out of the way. Christianity stamps this as murder. Paganism sanctioned gladiatorial combats, which Christianity from the first resisted and condemned. Lecky regards the abolition of this amusement as one of the most signal triumphs of Christianity.

b. Christianity taught the world to attach a new value to *chastity*. The ancient religions had contributed to the demoralization of society. The system of slavery and other agencies led to every imaginable form of pollution. Christianity came, demanding purity everywhere; in the home and marriage relations; between man and man. The human body was made more sacred by the incarnation of Christ. Men and women are exhorted to become fit temples for the Holy Ghost. Purity was made essential to self-respect.

c. Christianity taught men to put a new value on *veracity*. The self-respect of the individual man and the interests of society were thus enhanced and guarded.

Plato and the Stoics under certain conditions justified lying. Lecky says, that the influence of Christianity is not entirely favorable to veracity. He makes three forms of veracity:

(1) Industrial, i. e., fidelity to engagements and statements. It touches the practical industries of life.

(2) Political, which, in matters of controversy and public interest, would have all opinions, arguments and facts fairly stated.

(3) Philosophical, which pursues truth for its own sake. It desires to estimate truth for just what it is. It cultivates a judicial spirit in controversy. These forms are emphasized in proportion to the growth of civilization.

He represents the theological spirit as an adversary to progress, in retarding the growth of the last two forms. It prompts the repression of all opinions and facts not in accord with common faith. "Indeed," he says, "Christian veracity deserves to rank with Punic faith." But the very reverse is true. Christianity has exalted veracity to what it was not before. The Roman satirists comment on this want of good faith in their time. Pliny says, the oath of the Christian was to avoid theft, adultery and falsehood.

(d) Christianity creates the new virtue of *humility*. Life acquires a new sacredness, so that man has reason to think more of himself. Christianity never suffers man to reproach himself, nor reproaches him with the fact that he is a dependent creature. It does show him to be a sinner, and charges him to humble himself on that account; requiring him in this regard to consent to the verdict of reason and conscience. Modest estimates of self were seldom inculcated in heathen philosophy, but even then, it was for natural and moral reasons. Appollonius.

D. Group 2nd. Changes which Christianity produced in man's estimate of certain common and often inevitable conditions of human life.

LABOR was regarded as a hindrance to public life, degrading and impairing virtue. Plato, Aristotle, Socrates and the historians all notice and comment on this. They said that labor was remanded to a particular class;

that it blunted virtue and intelligence, and must be done by slaves. Christianity reinstates labor in the respect of the world, and shows it worthy of men of all ranks. No redistribution of property could have been as valuable to the world as this exaltation of labor. This view of it was commended by eminent Christian examples. Adam, unfallen, was put in the garden to care for it. The Apostles inculcated the duty and the honor of labor. It was brought into close connection with Christian charity and so ennobled. It is the Christian's duty to labor that he may have something to give.

POVERTY.—A no less prominent and beneficent change was wrought by Christianity in the idea of poverty. Greece and Rome pronounced it dishonorable. Juvenal's third satire expressed the common opinion of his age. "The gods waste no thunderbolts on a poor man." Plato taught that the children of poor men were no better than bastards, and a poor man has no right to increase his class. The poor, as poor, are not entitled to relief, for to show kindness to a poor man was only to prolong his misery.

Schmid says, that it was necessary to reinstate manhood and to rehabilitate labor; to teach the rich to respect the poor, and the poor to respect himself, and to be content with his lot. Christ ennobled poverty, for he was poor. Christianity works in two ways: first, inwardly in the hearts of the poor themselves; second, outwardly in producing sympathy, respect and charity. It removes the stigma from poverty. "To the poor the Gospel is preached."

E. Group 3rd. New estimates put on man's relations and duties to his fellow man.

Illustrations may be taken from three departments:

a Christianity implied, demanded and promoted a new value of family relations and duties, and of the nature and work of home; especially the place of the wife and mother in the home. Not only among savages, but under Grecian and Roman culture, woman was greatly disparaged and despised. Her physical feebleness and incapacity to serve the state, put her down with the children, the slaves and the poor. She was endured because of her sex and not for her hu-

manity. In the family which existed for the perpetuation of the state, she had no influence, or value, except as a necessity for this end.

Some have attributed the ruin of ancient civilization to the low estimate of woman. It was one of the chief causes. Among the Hebrews she had a higher place.

Christianity gives her the respect due to her as made in the image of God, redeemed by the blood of Christ and made the temple of the Holy Ghost. In her human relations, she is represented not as the burden, but as the glory of man, sharing with him the honors and responsibilities of home.

Monogamy is insisted upon; adultery and concubinage denounced. Gratitude had something to do with the welcome given to Christianity by woman.

(b) Christianity developed new interpretations of *justice* and *equity*, wherever their principles found application among men. Not only in the family, but everywhere, it gives new force to these ideas.

Justice and equity are not measured by the law or by the standard of a community. Man is to live righteously as well as soberly and godly. There are three elements of Christianity which contribute to this change:

1. The new views which Christianity takes and demands of the nature and intrinsic worth of the parties in any transaction.

2. The new aspect given to the fact that God has instituted these relations, and has a purpose in them.

3. In the new spirit and principle implanted in man to interpret his responsibilities.

Christianity disclosed, in a sense created, the very idea of humanity, and all the relations of Christianity were made in relation to the good of humanity. Love is made the impelling, regulating principle of life. Justice and equity are to be construed by love. Who is my neighbor, if all are alike in creation, in redemption, in dependence on grace?

Christianity regulates our use of our freedom, what we may or may not do. The transient duties are distinguished from the permanent. We are to love our neighbors as ourselves. The selfish idea of measuring

duty by mere justice is done away. It is not mere legal indebtedness. Love is made the expounder of written as well as unwritten obligation.

In the state, Christianity taught new lessons of what rulers owe to subjects, and what subjects owe to rulers. It does not presume to prescribe the form of government; it strikes at selfishness and caprice in the interpretation of the rights of rulers, and at the lawlessness and servility of subjects. The state is made a means, not an end. Old systems made it the end to which even the family was subordinate. As rulers, men exist for God and the people, and not for self.

It is objected that between the consideration demanded by Christianity for all men as men, and the specific and intense love demanded of Christians for Christian brethren, the breath of life is crushed out of patriotism.

In the provision made for the mutual fidelity of ruler and ruled, we have the best safeguard of patriotism. In the family, Christianity defined more perfectly and consecrated more fully all the existing relations, and the mutual obligations of its members. (Troplong. "Influence of Christianity among the Romans.")

Christianity strikes with the same blow, adultery which provokes divorce, and divorce which provokes adultery, and puts the conjugal bond above the caprice of man.

One of the sternest judgments which Paul passed on the heathen world was that it is without natural affection; and this is justified. Children were a species of property. Troplong says, the relation of blood is dead and passive. Vico says, that in order that parentage may make itself heard, it must put on the civil mask. The mere relation of father is important.

Schmid: "The children belonged to the father and he was to consult only the public interest. He might sell or capitally punish them. Christianity confers rights on children, and duties on parents and *vice versa*."

Troplong pictures the conflict between a father on the one hand, and children, wife and slaves on the other, under the empire when the father had been stripped of much of his authority. Hence Christianity was charged with teaching the insubordination of wife and children,

subverting order, loosening the bonds between slave and master, child and parent. This charge in the face of the fact that love was already beginning, as a new bond, to exert its reforming influence in the family.

Into the mutual relation between masters and servants, new ideas are introduced. In the old Roman law the most valuable property was lands, slaves, and beasts used in assisting men.

Cato: "Our slaves are our enemies." Nero, strange to relate, is the first to recognize rights of slaves; he charged magistrates to receive complaints of slaves against their masters. Seneca alone, in his day, vindicated the humanity of slaves. Paul: (Col. 4 : 1) "Masters give unto your servants that which is just and equal; knowing that ye also have a Master in heaven." (Comp. Eph. vi, 9.)

It has been said that the master needed Christianity more than the slave. •

Schmid: In a society in which all men are equal and actuated by love, free service will be one effect, and slavery an accident, which, under the principle at work, will gradually be removed.

Lecky: Slavery was recognized, but Christianity introduced three principles: the new order of relation between master and slave, the moral dignity which attaches to the slave, and the moral impetus to enfranchisement of the slave.

Christianity so transformed and developed, that it may almost be said to have *created*, charity.

In the least remarkable form it led men to relieve the wants of the brethren. Even this was unknown before; for the conception of a moral obligation to relieve those of the same faith was new to heathendom. But charity reached far beyond the bounds of common faith and owned the bonds of a simple human brotherhood, manifested in its strongest form in love to *enemies*.

Fruits of Christian principle appeared and those watching testified to their wide-spread influence, so that heathen observers wondered. During the persecution in Carthage, Christians relieved those dying of the plague, imperiling their own lives.

Julian said: These godless Galileans nourish not only

their own poor, but also ours, inviting them to their love feasts and attracting them as children with cakes.

Tertullian : To love friends is common to all ; to love *enemies* peculiar to Christians alone.

This teaching of Christianity grew out of the new views which Christianity exemplified and inculcated with regard to the very nature of charity.

Heathenism did not cherish charity even in the family. Christianity wonderfully refined the sensibilities, and purified the emotional nature. Charity was built on the deeper foundation of principle, love to God being the general motive, love to Christ the more specific.

Aristotle, in his Ethics, says, that friendship cannot exist without mutual love, which cannot be conceived of on the part of the Supreme Being. It would sound strangely for one to say he loved Zeus.

Christ's identification of himself with the poor and the poor with himself, gave new meaning to charity. Christianity, Lecky says, effected a complete reformation by showing the identification of the poor with its founder.

Human brotherhood has been a dream of some heathen philosophers but never a reality : we find feeble indications of it in the classics.

Terence : " I am a man, and nothing that belongs to man do I count foreign to myself."

"Christo in pauperibus," an old inscription testifying to the union of the poor with Christ.

Christ had shown that the love of enemies was not a mere negative thing, but a positive love.

The Indian books which are extolled by free religionists, are found on examination to be very defective, and the virtues commended, they could not make vital.

On the other hand Christians began immediately to practice, not merely to quote the teachings of Christ.

II. Is there anything to show that the ideal has been realized ; that Christianity wrought actual changes in the life of men ? Was it true that men merely gained a new conception of virtue, and not the power to practice it ?

What changes have been wrought in the visible life of the world?

What was an *ideal* good, has been made a *real* good. The world is no more what it was before Christianity came. It is not necessary to show either that nothing but Christianity was tending in the direction of this improvement, or that the designed result was at once or is yet fully reached.

We need only show that Christianity has done something toward great changes, not attempted before. It is enough if we cannot account for these beneficial results without Christianity, while on the other hand we can account for the incompleteness of the results without making Christianity responsible.

Some considerations.

a. The estimate put on man as man.

(1) Did Christianity practically, and not merely in theory teach that life is sacred? Lecky (not over fond of Christianity) pronounces it one of the most important services of Christianity, that it definitely and dogmatically asserted the sinfulness of all destruction of human life. (European Morals, vol. ii, p. 21.)

(2) As to chastity, the world is much purer than it was without Christianity. Sanctity and purity are secured to the marriage relation by Christianity.

(3) Veracity, fidelity. Illustrated by a single fact. The European Constantine Chloras, father of Constantine the Great, surrounded himself with Christians because of their fidelity. To test them, he one day gave them the alternative of renouncing their faith, or losing their position. Most kept their faith. These he restored to their positions, while he dismissed the others, saying, that those who would betray their God would betray man.

(4) *Humility*.—Christianity did not merely add humility to the catalogue of virtues, but gave it as an actual power.

Lecky says, that humility is the crowning grace of all the saintly type of graces. Though he thinks there is another type of graces, a wholesome pride. There was a danger of humility leading to servility. This is questionable. James says, that God resisteth the proud.

Philosophical pride is not the parent and guide of so many virtues as Mr. Lecky claims. Man cannot wear two faces, humble toward God and proud toward man.

Christianity had a double victory to gain, not merely to conquer the defects and shams of society, but chiefly to gain a victory over every heart, to enable each man to conquer himself.

b. The change wrought by Christianity in the world's estimate of labor and poverty. Consult Neander, Church History, i, §3; also Memorials of Christian Life; Merivales's Conversion of the Roman Empire, also Conversion of Northern Nations (Boyle Lectures); Pressensé's Martyrs and Apologists of Christianity.

c. To what extent Christianity wrought a change in man's relation to man. (See Pliny's Letter to Trajan.)

Free religionists call attention to the tenderness of Hindooism toward animals, and some German replies that it builds hospitals for sick cows, but burns widows and throws children into the Ganges.

Bearing of Christian missions on the evidence that Christianity is from God.

There are two questions.

(1) Are Christian missions a normal characteristic, and necessary outgrowth of Christianity?

If so (2) what do missions prove as to Christianity?

1. The work undertaken and prosecuted in the precise line of the parting commission of Christ to his church, as well as in the line of other teachings of His. (Matt. 28: 19, 20.)

One essential feature is the acknowledgment of Christ's supremacy and what he says is to be done, for he is not only Redeemer but Lord. The church is not to be merely a preaching and teaching church, but a going church.

Not merely to teach, and preach to those lying hardening in sin, about our doors or within a Sabbath day's journey, but to go into all the world. So far forth as the church is doing this, she is doing what is an *essential* part of Christianity.

Effectual doors are opened by Providence. The church must be ready to enter in when the door is opened, and not be taken by surprise.

2. The work of missions is a fitting and necessary manifestation of the spirit of Christ, as imparted to the church and dwelling in it.

This spirit would prompt the church to mission work, even without the commission; if any man have not the spirit of Christ he is none of His, so also of the church.

Where this spirit is the same motives and aims must prevail as were in Christ. Not merely *must* I go, but *may* I go.

3. The work of Christian missions is a work of intelligent obedience to Christ and Christ-like love of men, directed towards and adapted to advance the Christian dispensation.

The Christian dispensation is the manifestation of the glory of God, of the glory of God's grace, of God's grace in saving, grace in saving men, saving men through Christ, through Christ to everlasting salvation.

4. Those who receive the Gospel hold it in part as a trust for others. Paul was a debtor to the Jews and Gentiles. So every disciple owes the Gospel to others. Christian intelligence regards it as due to others.

5. Another proof is found in the fact that the early church full of the Spirit of the Lord and fresh from the teachings of Christ was pre-eminently a mission church. So every church in proportion to its fullness of the spirit of Christ.

The English church was charged by a Pope as not being a true church because it was not a missionary church. (This was some years ago.)

It is not so much the presence of the mission spirit and work that needs to be accounted for, as the absence of it when wanting.

The church that is not going and preaching must tell why.

Objections against this view of the vital and essential union of missions with Christianity.

Objections from Catholicism (1) the Catholic church asserts that the Protestant body not being the church of Christ, has neither the right nor the divine call, so that the work must be spurious. (2) It calls upon Protestants to unity of faith before they go out to disturb the nations with diverse beliefs.

It is not necessary to answer the objection that such work must be begun "from Jerusalem," since Christ commanded them "beginning from Jerusalem." The work at home must not be perfected before a foreign is begun. Where should we be if the church had always taken care only of the work at home. *It is further objected*, missions are an artificial graft on the original stock of the Reformed Church, alien to its nature arising from narrow views of man's condition without the gospel. They are peculiar to one type of the Reformed faith—the pietistic—originating with Wesley and Whitefield. As to the age of missions they are as old as the apostles, and as to their being alien to the spirit of the Reformation it only shows that the Reformation needed reforming, if it were true, which it is not. Modern Protestant missions date from the Reformation.

When, if these views are antiquated, did they become so? They are the views of the Apostle Paul. In whose judgment are these views of the appropriateness of the gospel to all narrow views?

As catholicism denies the call of the church to missionary effort, rationalism denies its *duty*. Rationalism maintains that it is not the duty of Christians, that even if it were, Christianity is not adapted to accomplish the desired result.

II. What do missionary results as so far developed prove in regard to Christianity?

1. The gospel message can be carried to all nations. The commission so far as it concerns the delivery of the message in the speech that men use, can be fulfilled.

Many languages have first been reduced to writing in order to carry the gospel.

A Danish writer calls attention to the fact that but 60 years ago translations had been made only in the Semitic languages, Greek, Latin, Lithuanian, Celtic &c., while now in almost every language and dialect. Dr. Moffatt found words among the lowest classes in South Africa that had had a purer and better meaning. No language of earth refuses to have the story of the cross told in it.

Philologists often have to come to the Christian missionary for information in their field and sometimes only to turn around against the mission cause.

The question how shall I preach the gospel is rightly answered only when localized and individualized.

If the gospel is in the heart a way will be found to express it. You must first have the gospel in your own heart, then find out where among the people the altar "to the unknown god" is.

2. The gospel message can reach and move the hearts of men all the world over.

This shows it is from God. Though not co-extensive with the earth it is broad enough to allow the induction. Renan scoffs at the idea of disturbing the South-Sea Islanders in their simplicity. A strange innocency!

3. The gospel message when received can produce its legitimate and appropriate fruit on every soil under heaven. The gospel is full of vital and regenerating power, and missionaries are encouraged to send it further on, beyond their own stations. Societies are formed among converts. It must not be forgotten how long it took Christianity to revolutionize the German and Celtic nations. The work of purifying is slow of necessity. The cause for amazement is not that it is so slow but so rapid.

4. Secondary and secular results of the reception of the gospel message are a boon whose equal cannot be found in connection with any other agency.

Good that culture never could accomplish. Gospel alone can be relied on to produce endurance and persistent struggles against evil. (So Prof. Nitzsch shows.) See Dr. Ellinwood's "Great Conquest."

Objections. 1. From scientific anthropology. The whole theory and practice of foreign missions rests on false views concerning the relations of human races.

Such persons hold to the inequality of the human races, frank enough to renounce Christianity with missions. Since missions assume that God has made of one blood all nations, and Christianity also rests on this, then the overthrow of the one involves the other.

This objection, in an unscientific form, is as old as Celsus; he asked, who can believe it possible that the same religion is suited to Europe, Asia and Africa?

2. It is foolish to carry Christianity before civilization. First civilize then carry the gospel.

a. The word "civilize" Christ failed to intrude into his great commission.

b. Experience proves that civilization is not necessary. Among some savage nations the gospel has more effect, so that these objectors turn around and say it is suited only for savages.

c. Christianity is the only effectual civilizer. The testimony of the report of the committee appointed by the House of Commons, of learned Englishmen, who searched history for many years and reported that there never has been a satisfactory civilization apart from Christianity.

3. Practically, Christianity has proved itself in connection with mission work, to be ill adapted to heathen nations. They put their heathen idols under the altar. The restraints of Christianity is killing off the natives.

4. Practically Christianity has made but little impression on the stronger nations, viz: India and China.

Some time ago there was some truth in this, but not now. We should remember that in China we have but one missionary to every one and a half million.

5. As compared with some other religions, Christianity has shown greatly inferior power for impressing men, especially in Asia and Africa. True to some extent—and this is an argument in favor of Christianity which does not pander to human depravity.

6. Economical—Christianity involves tremendous expense. A person objected to the writer that it cost \$50,000 to convert one soul in India. It is not true, for facts show that in proportion to the outlay, foreign missions are more successful than the home work. But if true, Christ set a higher value than that on a human soul.

FINIS.

ANALYSIS OF APOLOGETICS.

PROLEGOMENA.

INTRODUCTION.

Preliminary questions.

1. Why do I believe I am a Christian?
2. Why a Christian in belief?

Answer to 1 lies (a) in past experience, (b) in present. Answer to 2. from (a) early education, (b) enlightened choice.

Reasons for Study of Apologetics.

(a) Self-respect. (b) Loyalty to fellow-men. (c) For our times especially, it is the question of the day. (d) Personal composure and confidence.

Practical Aims of Apologetics.

1. Justification and confession of our faith.
2. Better qualification to commend.
3. Fuller confidence in defending.

Definition of Apologetics.

(a) "That part of Theology which vindicates the right of Theology in general, and of Christian Theology in particular, to exist as a science." (Partial.) (b) "That which sets forth the historical credentials of Christianity." (c) Science which sets forth the principles according to which Christianity is to be defended. (d) That branch of Theol. Science which sets forth the proofs that the claims of Christianity as a religion are justified. Term *Apologetics* ambiguous.

Relative Position of Apologetics.

Some: In Practical Theology. Others: before Systematic Theology.

Literature.

Specific Apologetics for each age. Scientific and Practical Apologetics. Fundamental Apologetics and Christian Apologetics proper.

Kind of Evidence.

Logical; metaphysical; historical.

THESIS: *That Christianity is the true divinely sanctioned and authoritative religion for us, and for all men.*

II.

CHRISTIANITY AS A RELIGION.

Christianity not the only religion. What is a religion? Definition reached.

(1) Etymologically—*religio*—from *religere*, to reconsider, rather than from *religare*, to refind. *Θρησκεία* from either (a) *θράς*, (b) *τρέω*, (c) *θρέω*. O. T. gives no specific term.

(2.) Historically. Examine religions.

(3.) Philosophically—by induction of facts.

Definitions of Religion.

1. PHILOSOPHICAL.

“Observance of moral law as Divine ordinance.”—(Kant.) “Faith in moral order of universe.”—(Fichte.) “A priori theory of universe.”—(H. Spencer.)

2. THEOLOGICAL.

“A mode of knowing and worshipping God. Relation of Revelation to man, and of man to it. Relation of man to superhuman powers in which he believes.”

“Man’s life in personal communion with God.”

“A mode of knowledge, thought, feeling, action, which has the divine for object, ground and aim.” (Proper and complete).

Advantages of last defence (a) includes all particulars, (b) recognizes divine as object, (c) general yet applicable to specific religions.

Divisions of Prolegomena.

- I. Phenomenology of Religion.
- II. Psychology.
- III. Different theories of origin.
- IV. Criteria.
- V. Relations to morality.
- VI. Significance.

I. PHENOMONOLOGY OF RELIGION.

1. *Subject of Religion.*

- A. Man—not other creatures.
- B. All men—not some only.
- C. Essential characteristics of man.
- D. Belongs to conscious voluntary phases of human life.
- E. Belongs to man as moral agent.

2. *Object of Religion.*

The Divine. God of the SS, not of Positivism.

3. *Actual Manifestations of Religion.*

- A. Phenomena of public worship.
 - (1.) Places set apart to worship.
 - (2.) Observances of worship.
 - (3.) Priesthoods.

- B. Phenomena in private life. Household gods—family worship.
 C. Creeds:—Philosophical, doctrinal, mythological, without any form.
 D. The social element in Religion. The *world's* religions.

4. *Types of the world's Religions.*

Principle of classification: conception of the divine as an object of worship.

A. RELIGIONS OF NATURE.

(1.) *Non-mythological.*

- (a.) Fetichism.
 (b.) Shamanism.
 (c.) Element worship.
 (d.) Power worship in nature, and ancestor worship.

(2.) *Mythological.*

(a.) Objects of worship: external nature personified and deified. *A*—Old Indian rels. *B*.—Baal, Astarte, Moloch-worship. *C*.—Egyptian religion.

(b.) Human ideas personified and deified. *A*.—Greek and Roman religions. *B*.—Persian relig. *C*.—Old German rel. *D*.—Buddhism.

A. SUPERNATURAL RELIGIONS.

(3.) *Super-mythological.*

- (a.) Judaism.
 (b.) Christianity.
 (c.) Mohammedanism.

Differences between (a) and (b). (1). In fulness of divine manifestation. (2). In degree of doctrinal development. (3). In measure of realization of intended results.

Other classifications; criteria; Historical development, suitability, political influence, nature of worship.

II. PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION.

Preliminary—(a). spiritual oneness of man. (b). Necessity of generalizing to cover all religions.

1. *How many and which faculties exercised.*

- (a). Intelligence: guard against ultra intellectualism,
 (b). Emotion: but guard against ultra emotionalism.
 (c). Will: yet will not the seat of religion.
 (d). Conscience: yet religion does not originate in conscience.

2. *The order of Psychological development.*

Question between Intelligence and Emotion. True order: (a). Discovery of relations between man and God. (b). Recognition of feelings corresponding to the relations.

Guard against: (a). Theories tending to Pantheism.

(b). Theories implying that feeling is cognitive.

(c). Theories ignoring or subordinating either cognitions or sentiments in religion.

III. THEORIES OF ORIGIN OF RELIGION.

The Natural Development Theory.

(2). Atheism. (2). Fetichism. (3). Nature worship. (4). Shamanism. (5). Idolatry. (6). Principle worship. (7). Theism and Pantheism. This unscientific as well as unscriptural.

- Herbert Spencer*: (a). Man comes to dualism in nature.
 (b). To idea of supernatural in ghosts.
 (c). To Ancestor worship.
 (d). Idolatry and Fetichism.
 (e). Animal and plant worship.
 (f). Worship of Deities.

Specific Theories.

- A. Political Theory.
 B. Physical Theory.
 C. Selfish Theory.
 D. Theory of primitive supernatural revelation.
 E. Theory of Supplemental Revelation.

IV. CRITERIA OF RELIGION.

(1). *The traditional or prescriptive right of any religion to exist.*

(2). *Truth to Reason.*

(a). Is the system consistent in itself? (b). Does it harmonize with the world's constitution? (c). Does it meet the needs of man?

(3). *Truth to Moral Nature.*

Additional modern tests.

(4). *Practical Test.*

(a). Effects on the intelligence. (b). On the emotional nature. (c). On Æsthetical nature. (d). Other practical effects.

(6). *Special Divine Attestations.*

Objected that attestations are superfluous, impossible, improbable, not sustained by evidence.

(a). Not superfluous: from history of world and present condition.

(b). Not impossible: from Omnipotence of God.

(c). Not improbable: from Benevolence of God exhibited in provisions in nature.

V. RELATIONS OF RELIGION AND MORALITY.

1. *Historical.*

(a) That there are such relations. (b) What they are. (c) Their measure and direction.

2. *Theoretical.*

Define Religion and Morality in their mutual relation, according to Martensen. This varies and so we have *Philosophical* ethics; *Theoretical* ethics; *Christian* ethics; *Social* ethics; *Political* ethics; origin of ideas (a). of duty, (b). of virtue, (c). of supreme and subordinate good.

What are the Relations of M. and R.?

6 views.

A. one includes the other.

(1). Morality merged in religion.

(2). Religion merged in morality.

B. (3). Each held distinct and essential and independent of each other.

- C. Both fundamental and primary, yet one subordinate to the other.
 (4). Religion fundamental, morality subordinate.
 (5). Morality primary, religion secondary.
 D. (6). Both as essential and necessary to each: therefore co-ordinate.

Points of Agreement and Divergence.

AGREEMENT.

- (1). Both in having their ground in human constitution.
 (2). Both refer to external objects with real, valid claims.

DIFFERENCES.

- (3). In respect of relative position of their objects.
 (4). In quality of their claim. Will of a person in religion: Abstract right in morality.

3. *Practical Relations.*

Religion and morality to supplement and support each other.

VI. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF RELIGION.

1. *Of what consequence is it that one should be religious?*

Completeness of manhood demands it.

Causes of irreligion.

(a). Brutalized life. (b). Indifference. (c). Vividness of pressure of material and secular interests. (d). Positive disinclination to religious life. (e). Reaction against prevalent abuses. (f). Legitimate logic of false speculative reasoning.

2. *Of what consequence that one should be rightly religious?*

There is a right and wrong in everything else, much more so in religion; natural religion points to right religion.

CHRISTIAN APOLOGETICS.

Christianity in Particular.

Christianity is the system announced, established, provided for in Scriptures.—Characteristics.

1. Christianity is a revealed religion.
2. Christianity is a historical religion.
3. Christianity is a positive religion.
4. Christianity is a rational religion.
5. Christianity is an ethical religion.
6. Christianity is a world's religion.
7. Christianity distinctly adapted to special conditions.
8. Christianity claims a Personal Founder in a special sense.
9. Christianity combines its doctrinal and vital elements.
10. Christianity is an exclusive religion.
11. Christianity is the final religion.

OBJECTIONS.

(1). God has not exhausted his resources. (2). Disparaging to ourselves. Ans.—(a) All rightful antecedents point to Christianity; it and no successor. (b) It reaches the utmost wants of men. (c) Brought to the world by the Son of God. Who shall bring a better religion.

EVIDENCES OF CHRISTIANITY.

General Considerations on Evidence.

1. Is the establishment of the proof of Christianity within the reach of evidence? No intrinsic difficulty in God's revealing or man's apprehending revelation.

2. What kind of evidence will establish it? There are three kinds: (a) Intuitive; (b) Demonstrative; (c) Experiential, probable or moral evidence.

Last differs from others (1). In depending on experience. (2) Admitting of degrees of conclusiveness. (3). Involving balancing of contrary proofs. (4). Involving responsibility.

Christianity not to be known intuitively as demonstrating therefore established by experimental evidence. Sources of this: (a) Consciousness. (b) The Senses. (c) Memory. (d) Testimony. Chief source of evidence for Christianity must be Testimony. Testimony is received by a law of our nature not from experience. Criteria of a historical assertion. (a) That it alone explains the report. (b) That it is what should be expected. (c) To be tested by rules of conditional or contingent influences. (Ueberweg).

Various hypotheses tenable to account for historical assertions. (a). That the event did happen and was observed. (b). That the observation influenced by false apprehension. (c). That report influenced by false apprehension. (d). Recollection untrue. (e). Imagination influenced transmitters. (f). Recorded in spirit and for purpose of romance. (g). Purpose to deceive.

Relative value of kinds of testimony.

(1). Eye witness trustworthy provided he has (a). competence, (b). opportunity and (c). character. Many eye witnesses better than one when (1). they are independent. (2). Not influenced by same deception. (3). Not affected by same prejudice.

(2). Secondary witnesses judged partly by same tests but chiefly by their relations to original eye witnesses.

(3). Later witnesses untrustworthy when (a), there is a personal interest, (b). a lack of competence, opportunity or character.

RAWLINSON'S CANONS.

I. Record by contemporary and credible witness is of highest historical credibility.

II. Record by one reasonably supposed to have obtained directly from those who witnessed is of second degree of historical credibility.

III. Record by later writers source of information being chiefly tradition if event is of nature of public transaction notorious and affected propriety of national life it is probably true at least in general outline.

IV. Tradition of one race corroborated by another especially distant or hostile, constitutes third degree of credibility less than first class of evidence and nearly equal to second.

3. *What degree of assurance can moral evidence give?*

a. Not philosophical certitude. b. But certitude in moral or popular sense.

Note. Distinction between *subjective* and *objective* certitude and subjective and objective evidence.

c. Moral evidence only void, entailing moral responsibility.

4. *What mental conditions necessary to estimating moral evidence?*

(a). Attention. (b). Effort to apprehend. (c). Vigilance, to guard against perversion. (d). Equity.

5. *What moral conditions essential to treatment of moral evidence?*

(a) Apprehension of moral responsibility. (b) Humility. (c) Prayerfulness, even in the light of nature alone. (d) Willingness to abide by result.

6. *What kind of moral evidence offered in favor of Christianity?*

Old classification: (a) Internal. (b) External. (c) Collateral.

New classification:

A. Historical.

B. Philosophical.

HISTORICAL EVIDENCES.

1. *Nature and claim of Christianity as a Historical Religion.*

2. *Reasons for first considering Historical Evidence.*

(1). The *idea* of Christianity came to the world historically.

(2). Many elements in *idea* are historical facts.

(3). Philosophical argument more earnestly conducted after the establishment of historical truth.

(4) Christianity an actual reality; historical fact to be explained.

(5.) Christianity suffers where historical claims are not urged.

3. *Historical Christianity as a fact to be accounted for.*

Christianity exists and has existed. Historical existence of Christianity is not disputed. Paul's four epistles, (Rom., Gal., I and II Cor.) admitted. Facts alluded to: How came these to be believed? Five indisputable facts.

(a). That in 25 A. D., Christian society had no existence.

(b). In 40 A. D., it was in vigorous growth

(c). It was founded by Jesus Christ.

(d) Crucifixion by Roman governor caused a collapse in this society.

(e) An event taking place soon after imparted new life.

These facts were abundantly verifiable: Late sources of information. (1). Recorded personal observation (2) oral tradition, (3) written documents, (4) monumental institutions, observances and emblems, (5) significant charges and omissions.

Hypotheses propounded to account for these facts.

A. That of their reality.

B. Other hypotheses, viz: 1. Legendary. 2. Mythical. 3. Innocent deception. 4. Willful deception,

1. *Legendary Hypothesis.*

Historical belief rests to great extent on vague, unverified body of legends. Argument: Fact that there is in every people a body of oral legends. Answer: Christianity not based on oral statements but written documents. Paul, 10 years after death of Christ, could not have used legends as he does facts of Christianity.

2. *Mythical Hypothesis*

Must (a) dispose of gospel narrative, (b) of gospel history in narrative (c) of character of Christ.

In regard to (a) the theory is unsatisfactory. (1). Cannot account for myths.

(a.) Assumption that historical movements excite myth-making spirit.

(b) Christianity beginning where, when and as it did not call forth myth-making.

(c) Apocryphal books do not show this tendency.

(d) Where did Christ's followers get such ideas as made the germ of the alleged myths.

(e) After myths had been created, there would be a difficulty to impose them.

(2). The myths cannot account for the facts. The change wrought in ideas of Messiah.

3. *The hypotheses of deception.*

(1). Unconscious deception.

(2). Wilful deception.

(a). So far as refers to Christ. Unconscious deception; reconciliation to facts is impossible. Wilful deception also.

(b). So far as it refers to Apostles in either case the conduct of the men is to be accounted for; the difficulties in their way; the character, circumstances, marvelous appearance of honesty.

Apply these hypotheses to the resurrection. The hypothesis of reality accounts for: (1). The narrative. (2). The character and conduct of first disciples. (3). The rise of Christianity.

(a). The theory of legend or myth cannot account for when, where and how the narrative arose and how it supplanted the original and true record without leaving traces of the struggle.

(b). The theories of deception, that of designed deception is too violent and therefore universally abandoned; that of unconscious deception assumes either, (1). that the disciples mistook somebody else for Christ for a long time or (2). that they mistook the hallucination, of their imaginations. This last is the favorite. Assumes a greater miracle than that of the resurrection.

THE CHRISTIAN SCRIPTURES.

1. *The SS. as a source of information concerning Christianity.*

(1). They are not the only source of information.

(2). They are not merely a source of information.

(3). Christianity is closely identified with them.

(4). Decision in regard to them can't be a matter of indifference.

(5). They have on legal principles a presumptive value.

2. *Historical criticism in relation to the Christian SS.*

Christian SS. invite criticism. Christians must ascertain relations of material to authorship of SS. Four questions.

- A. Whether material is what it claims to be; *question of authenticity*.
 B. Whether it is in unchanged form; *question of integrity*.
 C. Whether when produced it did and can give what it claims to establish; *question of correctness*.
 D. Whether it contains all the elements of knowledge; *question of completeness*.

Genuineness, authenticity, integrity, credibility are ambiguous terms; use three, Authenticity, Integrity, Credibility. They are interrelated and mutually helpful.

I. THE N. T. CANON.

1. *Def.* "Collection of books which constitutes original written rule of Christian faith." (Westcott).

2. *Authorship.*

(1). By whom was this collection made. (2). By whom invested with its authority.

In answer to (1).

(a). The church, no individual.

(b). The church as a whole.

(c). The church gradually.

(d). The church guided by instinct, not Holy Ghost.

In answer to (2).

* Not the church, for it could not have created an authority over itself, but intrinsic—the authority grows out of nature of book.

On what principle credit of canonical authority given to these book, we learn:

(1). From language used by early church in regard to books accepted.

(2). From language in regard to doubtful books.

(3). The way in which complete canon was treated. Elements recognized, (a). human; apostolic authorship. (b). divine: inspiration of Holy Ghost.

3. *Relations of N. T. to O. T. canon.*

(a). Attitude of early church towards O. T. determined by that of Christ and apostles.

(b). Why did church need other SS.

(1). O. T. predictions point to them: proof and full benefit must be used for the church and world.

(2). Jesus Christ was the promised Messiah, therefore his sayings acquired like authority as O. T.

(3). Apostolic words were regarded as authorized by Christ.

(4). Practical necessities. (a). Habit of reading in public worship.

(b). Authoritative standard caused early writing down of the N. T.

4. *The Composition of Canon.*

A work of time necessarily. Testimony to it by apostolic fathers 120–190 Greek apologists. Early versions. Heretics.

5. *Objections to the Composition of Canon.*

The books were regarded as differing in value in early church during 3d and 4th centuries. Ans. (a). The methods of the early church not those of critical schools. (b). The spirit of the early church different. (c). The difference admits of easy explanations.

THE AUTHENTICITY OF N. T. SCRIPTURES.

1. At the end of 2d century there were in possession of early church books, bearing names of our scriptures.
2. Identity determined by MSS. early MSS. and citations.
3. Inquiry: In what sense and with what reason church attributed them to apostles.

Considerations confirming Judgment of Church.

Out of 27 books 17 bear name of author, in substance of writing, not merely title.

- A. Not merely a literary satisfaction to church but a necessity to have SS.
- B. These documents transcribed and interchanged among churches by apostolic authority.
- C. Different sections of church agree in result.
- D. As a literary phenomenon forgery is here unnatural.
- E. Morally improbable that any could forge them.
- F. Negative: Exposure would have been easy.

INTEGRITY OF THE CHRISTIAN SS.

1. External means of ascertaining Integrity.

(a, MSS. (b) VSS. (c) Citations.

2. Internal.

(1). Fitness of document to alleged source. (2). Harmony of subject, style to author. (3). Presence or absence of connecting links between parts admitted to be authentic, and doubtful parts.

CREDIBILITY OF N. T. SS.

Preliminary: 1. Lapse of time does not affect credibility. 2. Cred. includes element of personal trust. Attesting and Presumptive credibility.

1. *Attesting Proofs.*

- (a). Many things asserted in N. T. are demonstrable by reason.
- (b). By results which follow their reception.
- (c). By external independent evidence.
- (d). Most important attestation that the historical parts of N. T. at least have been received by large numbers of men who were satisfied of their truth.

2. *Presumptive Credibility.*

- A. Illustrated by considerations drawn from facts recorded.
 - (1). They were accessible to scrutiny.
 - (2). They were numerous.
 - (3). They were minutely described.
 - (4). Invited scrutiny by extraordinary nature.
- B. Confirmed by considerations of circumstances and witnesses.
 - (1). Witness numerous and diverse.
 - (2). Apparently far removed from deceit in spirit.
 - (3). No cause whatever why they should further such a cause by false means.
- C. Utterly impossible that the central figure can be a fabrication.
- D. Co-existence of harmony in representation, and clear signs of individuality in recorders.

THE O. T. SCRIPTURES.

(1). Christianity needs the O. T. SS., in order to understand its antecedents. (2). The O. T. Scriptures are preparatory and provisional. (3). Christ and the Apostles command their use.

1. *Canon of O. T.*: Composed of Law, 5 books; Prophets and Historical books written by prophets, 21 books; Hagiographa, 13 books. Two views held: (1). Looser Prot. view; (2). Roman Catholic view. Both opposed to evangelical view.

(1). Not all canonical books of O. T. are quoted or alluded to in N. T.

A. Argument for looser view.

Ans: (a). No occasion to quote all. (b). Absence of quotation does not prove absence from canon.

(2). Express citations from other writings by same formulas. Ans: Cannot be identified; probably *substantial* references to O. T.

(3). References to Apocryphal books and influence of Apocrypha, on N. T. books. Ans: The first unsubstantiated; the second admitted proves nothing.

B. Arguments for Catholic view.

(a). A tradition in the church traced to Apostles.

(b). Concurrent belief of Greek and Latin churches.

(c). The authority of the Roman church.

Reasons for non-appearance of books in canon.

(1). Some of them had not appeared at close of Jewish canon.

(2). Others had not come to knowledge of Jews after Babyl. captivity.

(3). Synagogue had not enough information to decide.

C. Reasons for rejecting Apocrypha.

1. Confessed absence of Prophetic element.

2. Deterioration in poetic dignity and power.

3. In historical parts.

(a). Manifest presence of fiction.

(b). Assumption of false names to give weight.

(c). Incorporation of forged documents.

(d). Gross historical inaccuracies.

4. In doctrine, subservience to technical Judaism.

2. The Authenticity of O. T. Canon.

(1). General internal evidences.

A. A marked congruity between authorship and subjects treated.

B. Characteristics of style in many instances.

C. The general spirit is authentic.

D. Parallel accounts within them.

(2). External evidences.

A. Faith of Jews.

B. Allusions by Christ and apostles.

3. The Credibility of O. T. Scriptures.

(1). Historical facts of O. T. are connected with divine communications.

(2). Many signs of authenticity are signs of credibility.

(3). External corroborations.

(a). In Jewish observances.

XII.

- (b). The existence and some forms of Christianity.
- (c). Foreign and secular sources of information.
- (4). Inspiration.
- Extent of credibility: positions.
- (a). Limited to matters of revelation.
- (b). To greater historical statements connected with revelation.
- (c). That it covers the whole of these books.

4. *Historical Difficulties.*

- (1). Contains impossibilities: miracles.
- (2). Contradictions.
- (3). Faulty chronology.
- (4). Exaggerations and extravagance.

HISTORICAL EVIDENCES.

- I. The Scriptures themselves.*
- II. Jesus Christ as delineated in the Scriptures.*
- III. The Miracles therein recorded.*
- IV. Prophecies with declared or demonstrable fulfilment.*
- V. The Results of Christianity.*

I. THE ARGUMENT FROM THE S.S.

Partly negative, partly positive.

General characteristics.

- A. The general theme and way in which it is presented show the S.S. to be of divine origin.
- B. The aim and the way in which it is accomplished are proof of divine origin.
- C. Their unity considered in connection with progressive development and production.
- D. Comprehensiveness in themes, and subordination of individual themes to one subject.
- E. Provisions made for promoting religious interest of every kind.

II. JESUS CHRIST DELINEATED IN THE N. T.

- 1. Look at the delineation: it is not human.
 - (a). The delineation must have had a subject.
 - (b). Divine power seen in delineation of subject.
- 2. The person predicted as Christ proves the system divine.
 - (a). The correspondence between predicted and real Christ is one element in this convincing evidence.
 - (b). The unique nature and character of Christ is nothing less than divinely moulded and divinely evidential.

III. PROPHECY.

Prophecy classed as an external evidence of Christianity. Compare external and internal evidence.

- 1. The meaning of prophecy in Apologetics.
- 2. The occurrence of predicted prophecy in O. T. and N. T. fact and its purpose.
- 3. The condition of validity: proof from alleged prophecy.

XIII.

- (a). The real futurity of event.
 - (b). Event beyond conjecture.
 - (c). Subsequent occurrence as specifically foretold.
 - (d). Must not involve collusion between persons foretelling and those accomplishing it.
 - (e). Obvious design necessary.
 - (f). Blending of vagueness with precision.
4. Other uses of predictive prophecy besides evidential, in regard to Christianity specially.
- (a). To give certain signs of Messiah.
 - (b). To keep alive the belief in fulfilment.
 - (c). To arouse a divine expectation.
5. To whom would predictive prophecy carry its evidential message.
- Ans: To those who knew fulfilment.
6. What truths involved and emphasized by each instance of authenticated prophecy?
- (a). God's immutability, omniscience, power, &c.
 - (b). His general providential government of world.
 - (c). His specific providence.
 - (d). A specific design to accredited agent.
 - (e). Things predicted usually have peculiar place in God's regard.
7. The special bearing of prophecy on Christianity.

IV. MIRACLES.

Three terms designate them in SS.

Design: To accredit those who wrought them.

Questions: 1. Are they possible? 2. Probable? 3. Credible? 4. Is conclusion drawn from them warranted?

1. *Possibility of Miracles.*

Def. Hodge's. How ascribe miracles to God?

(1). By amount and quality of power displayed.

(2). By purpose or wisdom shown.

Are they possible?

- a. Wholly within reach of original omnipotence.
- b. God did not limit his original omnipotence.
- c. God's immutability does not render impossible.
- d. God's omniscience does not interfere.
- e. Uniformity of nature not consistent.
- f. Created things are not immutable.

2. *Probability of Miracles.*

Calculated to do good. Communications from God justify them.

3. *Credibility of Miracles.*

If not impossible or improbable they are credible.

Question: Are witnesses credible? Ans. In cases of Christian miracles, hundreds of witnesses, could they have been deceived.

Objection. Testimony could not decide in such a case. Ans. More improbable that testimony is false, than that the miracles occurred.

4. Evidential Bearing: Credit to messenger or dispensation to which he belongs. Obj. 1. That phenom. can't prove spiritual truths. Ans. Not claimed that something is made true but divine mission attested. Obj. 2. Alleged miracles were not convincing to those who saw them. Ans. Moral evidence implies possibility of disbelieving

XIV.

V. RESULTS OF CHRISTIANITY.

Earliest results proof of divine origin. Examine 1. Extent. 2. Significance and 3. Utter disproportion of results to terrestrial agencies employed in bringing them about. Each of these can be considered in relation to.

1. Facts concerning propagation.
2. Intellectual influence of Christianity.
3. Facts connected with moral and social influence of Christianity.

ERRATA.

Apologetics.

- Page 37, line 32: For "desire" read "divine."
 Page 39, line 26: For "disposed" read "indisposed."
 Page 48, line 1: For "confines" read "combines."
 Page 49, line 27: For "Experimental," read "Experiential."
 Page 81, line 26, *et seq*: For "attested," read "attesting."
 Page 95, line 6: For "Josephus 2365," read "2265."
 Page 108, line 40: For "Presente," read "Pressensè."
 Page 109, line 39: Read "*Semen est sanguis*."
 Page 101, line 13: For colon after "validity," read "of."
 Page 101, line 41: For "proportional," read "proportioned."

Ethics.

- Page 4, line 25: For "*wos*," read "*mos*."
 Page 18, line 1: For "same," read "some."
 Page 31, line 22: For "fallen," read "unfallen."
 Page 33, line 24: For "Blakie," read "Blackie."
 Page 33, line 36: for "Sharp," read "Shairp."
 Page 40, line 9: For "Newton," read "Newman."
 Page 44, line 12: Insert "Christianity" at end of line.
 Page 47, line 37: For "Hinnal," read "Hennell."
 Page 48, line 38: For "importance," read "impotence."
 Page 48, line 39: For "detracts," read "distracts."
 Page 50, line 2: Read "Christianity is," at end of line.
 Page 51, line 35: For "work," read "worth."
 Page 54, line 28: Insert (*c*) for notation.
 Page 56, line 27: For "Europeans," read "Emperor."
 Page 57, line 28: After "the work," insert "is."
 On Page 47, the sentence "The moral results," &c., should be in small cap. heading as on page 44.