

THE
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ART. I. *The Life of William Farel, prepared from original authorities*, by Melchior Kirchhofer, Minister at Stein on the Rhine, in the Canton Schaffhausen, &c. Vol. I. Zurich, 1831. 8vo.*

THE lives of some men are an integral part of history; and of none is this statement more emphatically true than of the Reformers. Notwithstanding its immediate and ulterior effects, the Reformation is an event which has not yet been fairly estimated by the world. The time is coming when this mighty revolution will be seen to surpass, in every attribute of grandeur, all political convulsions put together; and when those who were the instruments of bringing it about, will, by general consent, take precedence of all who have been recognised as heroes. In the mean time, it is pleasant to extend our knowledge of their personal history, especially in the case of some, with the details of whose biography we have not been familiar. Among these we may reckon that impetuous thunderbolt, and terror of the papists,

* Das Leben Wilhelm Farel's, aus den Quellen bearbeitet, von Melchior Kirchhofer, Pfarrer zu Stein am Rhein, Cantons Schaffhausen, Mitglied der Schweizerischen geschichtsforschenden Gesellschaft in Bern und korrespondirendes Mitglied der Gesellschaft zur Beförderung der Geschichtskunde zu Freyburg im Breisgau.

ART. III.—*The Racovian Catechism.*

IT is known to all students of ecclesiastical history, that Poland, and the neighbouring states of Transylvania, Bohemia, and Hungary, were the theatre of the Unitarian churches, during a considerable part of the sixteenth century. The reason why the propagators of heresy chose this region for the dissemination of their opinions, is easily explained. In all other countries of Europe, they were restrained by the laws, but here liberty of conscience was enjoyed. It may also be mentioned, that with the doctrines of the Reformation was introduced a spirit of free, unshackled inquiry into all opinions; and as was natural, from the imbecility of man, this liberty degenerated into licentiousness, and frequently terminated in downright infidelity. At first, the heterodox of Poland professed to be either Arians or Sabellians; they did not, indeed, adopt these denominations, but they held the opinions which are commonly so denominated. There were, however, numerous shades of difference among these Unitarians, and they separated into a great number of petty sects, which were usually denominated from the town or province in which the leading members respectively resided. One writer asserts, that at a particular time, about the middle of the sixteenth century, the number of Unitarian sects was above thirty, but he does not inform us in what points they differed from each other.* According to the custom of the times, many public disputations were held, and many synods were convened, by which means it was attempted, but unsuccessfully, to settle the points in controversy, between the Trinitarians and Anti-Trinitarians.

In the midst of this confusion of sects and prevalence of heresy, Faustus Socinus visited the country. His uncle, Lælius Socinus, had been there many years before; but though he left his opinions as an inheritance to his nephew, he was himself either too timid or too prudent to avow and defend the Unitarian opinions which he held. But Faustus, with equal talents and address, possessed that courage which is requisite to appear openly as the advocate of unpopular tenets. When he first came to Poland, all parties seemed to be afraid of him; for they were aware that he had pushed his Unitarianism to consequences which they were not prepared to admit. None of the sects were disposed, therefore, to receive Socinus into their communion. No doubt he was displeased at being expelled from the communion of Unitarians; but he disguised his feelings, and artfully turned all to his own

* Maimbourg.

advantage. He now professed an unwillingness to be connected with any particular sect, but declared himself to be the friend of all; and by intercourse with the leading ministers and teachers, he in a short time brought them all into one harmonious body, and induced them to embrace his peculiar opinions, which have ever since been called *SOCINIANISM*. One dispute, however, arose, which Socinus, with all his address, could never bring to a favourable conclusion. Francis Davidis, a man of learning and abilities, who had passed through many changes of theological opinion, was a leading minister among the Unitarians in Transylvania, and now began to teach and preach, that Jesus Christ being a mere man, had no more claim to divine worship than any other saint; a most legitimate conclusion from the acknowledged premises. But the broaching of this doctrine excited much uneasiness and alarm. Blandrat, who was now physician to the young prince Sigismund II., over whom he had a decisive influence, sent to Poland for Socinus, as being the only man who, by his skill and address in managing men, would be likely to prevail with Davidis to renounce his dangerous opinion. Accordingly, Socinus came, and for several months was lodged in the same house with the heretic, as he was considered by the Unitarians. But all his arguments and persuasions were ineffectual to convince Davidis of his being in an error. How could they, when the doctrine which he held is so manifestly correct upon Unitarian principles, that it is probable there is not now a Unitarian in the world who does not adopt the opinion of Davidis as correct, and dissent from that of Socinus as most unreasonable? But light does not break upon the world all at once. Even Unitarians may for a while remain in gross error and idolatry; and what to their successors is still more mortifying, they may proceed so far as to persecute those who differ from them. The young prince of Transylvania was induced to cast Davidis into prison simply on account of his pertinacious adherence to his opinion. Here the persecuted man died. We ought not, however, to be too severe in our censures of such conduct; for the doctrine of toleration was not yet well understood, even by those who pleaded for it in their own case, when they needed its shelter. We think that this case may fairly be placed as a parallel to that of Calvin. It is not clear, however, that Socinus advised this measure, although it is very certain that Blandrat directed the whole affair, as in all religious matters the prince was governed by him. So far as Socinus' own declaration will go to exculpate him from all concern in this transaction, we must acquit him of being accessory to the death of this learned man; for we recollect to have seen in some history of the churches in Poland,

that when at a large synod Socinus was accused of participating in the persecution of Davidis, he publicly denied that he had advised his imprisonment, or had any concern in the matter. But although the leading advocate of the obnoxious opinion was thus put out of the way, the doctrine of Davidis prevailed more and more. Socinus not only never changed his opinion respecting the worship of Christ, but he would hold no communion with any one who denied that Christ should be worshipped, and publicly taught and published, the opinion that those who received the doctrine of Davidis, had no just claim to the name of Christians.

The Unitarians of Poland cultivated biblical learning with assiduity and no small success, as appears from the volumes, entitled "*Poloni Fratres, &c.*" Most of the writings of Faustus Socinus were at first anonymous; and he strongly expressed his opinion in favour of that mode of publication, because men are so prone to be influenced in forming their opinions, by prejudices arising from the name of the author. His principal work was on the person and offices of Christ, entitled "*DE CHRISTO.*" It was in answer to a treatise in support of the divinity of Christ, written in the Polish language, by a Jesuit, whose name was Wiek. This work of the Pole was, indeed, nothing else than the treatise of Bellarmine on the deity of the Saviour, translated into the Polish tongue. Socinus' book received many answers, of which it is not our purpose at present to speak. The Racovian Catechism, of which we propose to treat somewhat particularly in this article, received its name from the town of RACOW, where it was first published. It was not written by Socinus, nor published during his life, but was compiled by SMALCIUS, from his writings, and at first appeared in the Polish language, A. D. 1606. It was not long, however, before this Catechism was published in Latin by MOSCOROVIVS; and also in the German language, by Smalcus himself, who sent a copy of it to the professors of Wittenberg. Among the fathers in this cradle of the reformation, it was a matter of serious deliberation, whether an answer should be given to it or not. At length, however, it was determined, that it would not be expedient to neglect it, lest the Socinians should consider silence as a sign that they had achieved a victory, and should be led vainly to triumph in the strength of their career. In conformity with the resolution now adopted, a pious and solid theologian, Frederick Baldwin, was requested to undertake a refutation of this Catechism. An able answer was also published by that consummate theologian, Wolfgang Crellius. The attentive reader will be in no danger of confounding this orthodox theologian with another of the same name greatly distinguished among the Socinians. This work of Crellius

was unfortunately left unfinished, in consequence of the distinguished author having been called to be court preacher to the duke of Brandenburg. But there was no lack of Polemics to contend for the faith, against this summary of all heresy. Alsted, Alting, Maresius, Tarnovius, Hornbeck, John Gerhard, and others, undertook its refutation; but no refutation was so full and satisfactory, as that of N. Arnold, professor in the University of Franeker; in which he sets down the questions and answers of the Catechism, without abridgment, and gives a solid answer to each, as he goes along. Arnold took a deep interest in this controversy, not only because he considered the questions in dispute as involving the essence of Christianity, but also because he himself was a native of Poland, and was intimately acquainted with the condition of the reformed church in that country.

It is our object to give a faithful translation of a part of this work, principally for the purpose of showing by what sort of argument and exegesis the old Socinians defended their cause; and that our readers may have the opportunity of observing the similarity between the neology with which we are threatened, and the heretical opinions of those who lived two centuries ago.

The part of this work which we have selected for translation is the first part of the tenth chapter, *De Libero Arbitrio*.

Quest. 1. "IS IT IN OUR POWER FULLY TO OBEY THE COMMANDMENTS OF GOD?"

Ans. "Certainly: for it is evident, that the first man was so formed by God, that he was endued with free will; and no reason existed why he should be deprived of this power, after the fall: nor was it consistent with the justice of God that man should be deprived of free will. Accordingly, in the punishment inflicted on his sin, there is no mention made of any such loss."

Refutation by Arnold.

To obey the commandments of God, to put off the old man, to desist from sinning, not to walk after, but to mortify the flesh, to contract no evil habits, but only such as are virtuous and good, this writer asserts, is altogether in our power. But we affirm, that these things are not at all in our power; according to the declaration of our Saviour, "Without me ye can do nothing," (John, xv. 5,) and that of the apostle, "I can do all things through Christ which strengtheneth me." (Phil. iv. 13.) And the same apostle says, "For it is God which worketh in you both to will and to do of his good pleasure." (Phil. ii. 13.) Why should these things be ascribed to God and to Christ, if they are completely in the power of man?

It is true, indeed, that man when created by God was endowed with free will; but a distinction must be made between man in a state of integrity, and man as fallen. In the former, he possessed free will, and also the power of obeying all the commandments of God, and of avoiding all that was forbidden. Not that man by the fall was entirely deprived of liberty, but he became depraved, so that in things pertaining to salvation he labours under an entire blindness of intellect. "For the natural man receiveth not the things of God: for they are foolishness unto him; neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned." (1 Cor. ii. 14.) And the will of man has become so rebellious, that it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be. (Rom. viii. 7.)

When this author says that there was no reason why God should deprive man of free will, he errs, not knowing the Scriptures, which clearly teach, that God, as a just Judge, denounced to man on account of his fall, the punishment of interminable death. And this was not merely eternal death, as the Socinians pretend, but the threatening comprehended corporeal and spiritual death also; so that man is not only liable to eternal death, but to death temporal and spiritual; and is declared to be dead in trespasses and sins. Now since every kind of death is a part of the penalty incurred by sin, which a just God inflicts; who does not see, that man in just judgment is deprived of the right exercise of free will?

Hence also we may understand, what is to be thought of that declaration, that it is inconsistent with justice for a man to be deprived of free will. It certainly belongs to justice to inflict deserved punishment on the disobedient; but this deprivation is a part of the punishment. Neither have you a right to say, that other men are not chargeable with the sin of Adam; that as they never committed that sin they cannot be punished for it; for undoubtedly Adam should be considered as the head of the whole human race, and so his sin was not *personal* but *universal*. As the father and head of the whole family of man did he perpetuate this crime, and so he involved all his posterity in guilt; and thus spiritual death has come upon them, as the merited punishment of this sin, and this includes the depravation of the free will of man.

In regard to the last words of the answer to the question stated above, that there is no mention of any such punishment inflicted on Adam, it is false; for we know that the punishment of the sin of Adam was death; but death is fourfold; temporal, spiritual, eternal, and the afflictions of this life. These several species of death, it is true, are not distinctly mentioned, yet they should all be considered as comprehended in the general denunciation; and

this is rendered manifest where spiritual death is mentioned as the state of man, by reason of which he is declared to be dead in sin. But if man be dead in sin, how can his will remain upright and uninjured?

In the primeval state, the judgment of man in regard to things natural, civil, and spiritual, was correct; and the inclination of his heart was pure in the choice of the highest good; not only possessing freedom from necessity and coercion, but also an immunity from every degree of depraved disposition, and from all moral and physical evil. And this is that goodness and rectitude in which God is said to have created man. But although man in a state of integrity was in fact inclined to that which was good, nevertheless by the sovereign dispensation of the Creator, and from the very nature of a dependent creature, his will was mutable; so that it could be turned to either of two opposites, and was liable to be deceived by the false appearance of objects presented, so as to be led to embrace that which was apparent, instead of the true good; of which mutability the event furnished a certain demonstration.

But in man's fallen state, his will is despoiled of its rectitude; and although his judgment in other things may be to a certain degree correct, yet in spiritual things it is entirely blind; and his inclination is so averse to all spiritual good, and so determined to evil only, that he must be considered as entirely depraved. And, accordingly, the Scriptures represent him as being blind in his understanding, perverse in his will, and rebellious in his affections; nay, as being "dead in sin;" labouring under a complete impotence as to all spiritual good. Gen. vi. 3. Matt. vii. 13. Rom. viii. 7. 1 Cor. viii. 4. Ephes. ii. 1.

Now, although man in this state is free from the necessity of nature, and also from that of coercion, yet he is not free from the servitude of sin and death. Before his conversion, he is not only impotent, as it relates to spiritual good, but is turned away from it with aversion. The fact, therefore, is, that man can contribute nothing towards his own conversion, but simply the natural faculty of the will, without which he would neither be a man, nor would he be capable of conversion.

Quest. 2. "BUT IS NOT THE WILL OF MAN VITIATED BY ORIGINAL SIN?"

Ans. "There is no such thing as original sin; the Scripture teaches no such doctrine; and the will of man could not be vitiated by a cause which had no existence. The sin of Adam being a single act could not corrupt his own nature, much less had it power to deprave the nature of all his posterity. That this sin should be charged on them, is, as has been said, a doctrine

unknown to the Scriptures; and it is utterly incredible, that God, who is the fountain of equity, should be willing to impute it to them."

Refutation.

That the will of man is depraved by original sin, we have already declared to be our belief. Our opponent denies this, because, in his opinion, original sin has no existence, and could of course be the cause of no such depravity. The affirmative, however, is capable of being demonstrated by an appeal to facts and to the testimony of Scripture. From both these sources we shall therefore now endeavour to show, that original sin exists in every man who has derived his nature from Adam, by natural generation.

It is true the Scriptures do not express the inherent and habitual stain of our nature by using the technical phrase *original sin*; but they clearly designate the same thing, by words which have the same import. By a metonymy, it is called *flesh*. (John iii. 6.) It is called by way of eminence, *sin*, which reigneth in our mortal bodies. (Rom. vi. 12.) And *sin* that dwelleth in us—evil present with us. (Rom. vii. 17.) So also it is denominated, *the old man*, as indicating its origin from our first father, and to designate its vileness and corruption; as it is contrasted with the *new man*, which signifies something precious and excellent. It is called, "a law in our *members*," that is, a principle which binds with force like a law. It is also denominated, "*the body of sin*," by which strength and cohesion are represented as belonging to this evil principle. It is also termed "*the old leaven*," and by James, *lust*, (*επιθυμία*), by a metonymy of the subject for the adjunct. But original sin is not any one faculty, habit, or art, but a general disorder or *αταξία*.

With the fathers, original sin has various names, such as *malitradux*, a hereditary evil, *malum domesticum*, a domestic evil—*infusum et coagulatum delictorum contagium*, the concentrated contagion of all crimes. Augustine called it *naturæ vitium*, the vice of nature; also, *peccati contagium ex origine*, the original contagion of sin; and finally, *peccatum originale*, original sin; which last name, as most conveniently expressing the thing, was retained in the schools, and has been in common use till this day. The word *original* has no relation to God as the author of our being, and the first cause of all things, but altogether to the second cause, namely, our sinning first parent.

But to deny the existence of original sin altogether is the madness of the Socinians; and to assert that it cannot be proved from Scripture, is the dotage of reason. What then is that which is

said, (Gen. iii. 5.) where Adam is said to have begotten a son in his own image? In which passage we should carefully attend to the antithesis between Adam and Seth; that is, between the image of God in which Adam was created, and the image of Adam in which Seth was begotten. For as *the image of God* designated the moral excellence in which Adam was created, the wisdom of his understanding and the sanctity of his will; so the image of Adam, now fallen, signified the blindness of his mind and the depravation of his will. Adam, by his apostacy, transformed himself from the image of God to the opposite character. He could not, therefore, beget a son in the image of God in which he was created, but *in his own image*; that is, in a state of corruption.

It will not do to say, that Adam begat Seth a man like himself, as to his species, for that idea was fully expressed, when it was said, "he begat a son;" nor will it answer to say, that he begat a son in figure, form, and external lineament, like himself; for it is supposed, not proved, that such a likeness existed between the father and the son; and if it had been the fact, this was not a matter of so much consequence as that to designate it, the Holy Spirit should use the twofold expression of *similitude and likeness*, as had been done before, when it was said that Adam was made in the image of God. Certainly, in that case, the sacred writer had no respect to any external image or likeness; neither, therefore, should we suppose he had here, where he uses the same terms.

Another evasion is, that we should here understand the moral image of Adam as regenerated by the Holy Spirit; so that Seth was the heir of that renovated image; but that renovated image did not pertain to man's nature, but was altogether the effect of supernatural grace, which is never communicated by physical generation, but by a mystical regeneration.

Again, does not Job prove the doctrine of original sin, when by the Holy Spirit he says, "Who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean? Not one." (Job xiv. 5.) To which Socinus has nothing to except but this, that believers are not unclean, but washed and sanctified. It is true, believers are holy, but not as they are natural men, for "whatsoever is born of the flesh is flesh." The same doctrine appears evident from the necessity of regeneration, concerning which Christ says, "Except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God." From this it is clear, that our first birth is corrupt; for what need would there be for regeneration, if our first generation were holy? And how does it happen, if depravity is not born with us, that there should not be found a man, who by the tendency of his own nature does

not rush into the commission of sin? And if the whole mass of human nature had not become corrupt, it would never have been said of Christ that he was in all things made like to us, *sin* only excepted; for if this be not the fact, then all infants dying in infancy are as free from sin as Christ himself was.

But finally, infants die, and death is the punishment of sin; yet it cannot be the punishment of actual sin, for infants dying in infancy are incapable of committing it; they are destitute of the use of reason, and of the exercise of free will; and those who are our opponents in this question, consider it a cardinal point, that there is no sin which does not consist in the exercise of the will. Since, then, the punishment of death is not inflicted on infants for actual sin, it must be for original sin.

There is no truth nor force in what is next asserted, "that the fall of Adam did not corrupt his own nature, and therefore, could not corrupt that of his posterity." For they admit that eternal death was the punishment incurred by the sin of Adam; and why should it seem strange, that that act which subjected the transgressor to so great a penalty, should at the same time work a corruption of his nature? Surely that which could effect the greater might also produce the less. But the reason why the sin of Adam corrupted the nature of his posterity was, because it was not the sin of an individual, as your sin or my sin, but it was the sin of a whole race. It was a *universal* sin. For Adam was the stalk, the root, the head of the whole family of man.

That this corruption of nature came upon man as the punishment of sin, is evident from this, that every thing which properly comes under the name of death is the punishment of sin; for this was the penalty of the law, and it comprehended every kind of death; and this depravation of nature is expressly called by this name, by the Apostle Paul, (Ephes. ii. 1.) wherefore original sin is the punishment of the first sin.

The conclusion of this answer, "that because God is the fountain of all equity, it is altogether incredible that he should punish the posterity of Adam on account of his sin," is a mere assertion totally incapable of proof; for why should God cease to be the fountain of equity, when he punishes the posterity of Adam on account of his sin, when he has constituted him the head and representative of the whole race? The legitimate course of reasoning is, that because God does punish the posterity of the first man on account of his sin, therefore, it must be just, and should be so considered, whether we can understand it or not. Whatever he does is just, because he does it; for his will is the rule of justice.

Quest. 3. BUT ARE THERE NOT SCRIPTURE TESTIMONIES WHICH TEACH THE CERTAIN EXISTENCE OF ORIGINAL SIN, SUCH

AS THAT IN GEN. iv. 5. "And God saw that the wickedness of man was great upon the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually;" and that in Gen. viii. 21. "For the imagination of man's heart is evil from his youth?"

Ans. "These testimonies treat of voluntary sin; therefore, from them original sin never can be proved. For as to the text first cited, Moses teaches that it was sin of that kind, which caused God to repent that he had made man, and which provoked him to bring a deluge upon the world; but who would venture to assert that this was done on account of original sin inherent in the nature of man? And in the other passage, it is declared that the sin of man should not again be the cause of the destruction of the world by a deluge, which certainly cannot relate to original sin, or inherent depravity."

Refutation.

That the doctrine of original sin is inculcated in these kindred passages, is evident from several considerations. The corruption of man is represented as being universal, habitual, and unceasing. What could more clearly indicate that the principle of human actions was vitiated? What sort of proof could be more convincing, that this depravity was born with us? Our opponent, however, replies, that the sacred historian is here speaking of actual sins, on account of which God overwhelmed the world with a deluge. I grant that actual sins are referred to in these passages, but I deny that they alone are intended to the exclusion of original sin: for the Holy Spirit makes a plain distinction between the wickedness which was external and actual, and the imaginations of the heart which are internal and habitual; otherwise there would be here a mere tautology, and the very same thing, without necessity, would be repeated. Another decisive evidence that inherent natural depravity is included in the account is, that infants who were incapable of actual sin, were nevertheless swallowed up in the deluge as well as adults. Now this judgment was sent upon them justly or unjustly; if the first, then they are chargeable with sin, and grievous sin too, to deserve such a punishment; but this of necessity must be original sin, for as we have seen, they are not capable of actual sin. But if this punishment should be pronounced unjust, then we do no less than accuse the Governor of the world of acting the part of an unjust judge, in bringing such a calamity unjustly upon his innocent creatures; which would be blasphemy.

In these passages, it was the design of the Holy Spirit not only to indicate actual sin, but to trace it up to its internal cause; namely, original sin. For the declaration is universal, in relation

to all the thoughts and imaginations of the heart; and to give it the greater force, it is exclusive of every thing of an opposite kind. "Every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil, and that continually." Surely, if this be a just description of the moral condition of man, his whole soul must be depraved. Total depravity could not be more emphatically represented. The evil is universal—*every imagination of the thoughts of the heart*. It is exclusively of all good—and *only evil*. And it is the same at all times—and *that continually*. The true source of evil thoughts of every kind is designated by Christ, where he says, "Out of the heart proceed evil thoughts." When, therefore, we refer the second cause to the first, the stream to its fountain, the effect to its cause, the Socinian has no right to complain. To the eye of God both the cause and the effect are equally manifest; the evil tree as well as the bad fruit. This last was, indeed, the immediate cause of the deluge, but the former was the cause of this. As infants perished in the deluge, and God is here giving the reason why the deluge was sent, it must be comprehensive enough to include them, and therefore must include original as well as actual sin; unless any one will choose to maintain that infants were punished without any fault; which, as was before shown, would be an impious impeachment of the character of God. But if it be alleged that they could not be guilty of actual sin, then it follows, that they were punished on account of original sin. So much for the first testimony. As to the second, our opponent says, "that it is merely declared that the sin of man shall not again be the cause of a deluge for the destruction of the world; but this can have no relation to original sin." But why not? We have seen, that both on account of original and actual sin, God brought the deluge on the world; so now in this parallel passage, he makes known his will, that in time to come, the sin of man both original and actual, should not induce him again to destroy the world by a deluge. As the form of expression is nearly the same as in the former text, the argument will be the same; and as there it was shown that original might fairly be inferred from the universality and constancy of the prevalence of actual sin; so the same conclusion may be deduced from the words now under consideration,

Quest. 4. "BUT WHAT DO YOU THINK OF THAT DECLARATION OF DAVID, (PSALM li. 5.) 'BEHOLD I WAS SHAPEN IN INIQUITY, AND IN SIN DID MY MOTHER CONCEIVE ME.' " ?

Answ. "It should be remembered, that David is not here speaking about every man, but concerning himself alone, and that not simply, but in relation to his fall; and he uses that method of speaking, of which he himself furnishes an example in Psalm

lviii. 4. 'The wicked are estranged from the womb; they go astray as soon as they be born, speaking lies.' Wherefore, neither can original sin be evinced by this testimony."

Refutation.

When David says, "Behold I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me," from the consideration of the actual sin committed by him, he ascends to the origin of all his sins, and laments the proneness of his nature to sin; and this inherent depravity he represents as coeval with his existence; a corrupt mass in which he was conceived and born, and which he had derived from his parents; all which, taken together, can signify nothing but original sin.

Against this interpretation, Socinians make many objections, as may be seen in the work of Volkelius, *De Vera Religione*; all which, however, have been fully discussed and refuted by our Spanheim, in his "Collection of Theological Disputations." It is alleged that David is not speaking here concerning the conception of his own nature, but of the conception of sin. But the unreasonableness of this gloss is too manifest to need any refutation. This would be referring what is said about the subject to the act; what is said about the sinner to his sin. Certainly David was not here speaking of the mother of his sin, but of his own mother.

Again it is alleged, "that David is not here speaking of original sin, but of the actual sin of his parents, and especially of his mother." Now this is frivolous. David was not here confessing the sins of his parents, but his own sins. Moreover, his parents were in all probability, dead long before this time, as David was the youngest of Jesse's sons, who was an old man when Samuel anointed David to be king; and this Psalm was composed when David was past middle life. And for what purpose should he drag his mother's sins into public notice, in this manner? Besides, there is not the smallest evidence that David's mother was remarkable for her transgressions. The sin of which David complains is that from which he prays to be cleansed, and from which he entreats that God would hide his face; but who does not see that these were his own sins, and not those of his parents?

A third interpretation given to this passage is, "That from it, not even actual sin can be proved, much less original sin; for it is possible that one might be conceived in iniquity, and yet not be a sinner, just as one might be conceived and born in blindness, who was not himself blind." But that a person should be shapen in iniquity, and yet not be a sinner, is a palpable contradiction. If it be meant, that we may derive our being from a sinner without being infected with sin, as the child of a blind man need not

be blind, the error consists in comparing things of an unequal kind. Individual properties are not indeed communicated by ordinary generation; but qualities which affect the whole species are transmitted, of which nature is original sin.

They allege again, "that if it had been the design of David, in this passage, to designate the innate corruption of our nature, he would have ascended from his own sin to that of the first man; but since he does not do this, but stops with the mention of his immediate parents, and especially of his mother, it is a clear indication, that he did not mean here to speak of original sin." To which it may be replied, that there was no need of David's ascending to the sin of Adam, for he was not now speaking of the first origin of sin, but of original sin itself; not of *the originating sin*, as we say in the schools, but of *sin originated*; although indeed the latter supposes the existence of the former. It fully answered the purpose of the penitent psalmist, to describe that inbred corruption, which he was deeply convinced dwelt within him, and also the immediate source from which it was derived to him, which was by natural descent from his parents; and this was substantially the same, as if he had traced this corruption up to his first parent.

But it is still objected, "that, if the words of David are taken literally, they can by no means be referred to any person but himself, for he speaks of no other: if they are to be understood figuratively, then, according to all just rules of interpretation, they cannot be the foundation of an argument." Take them as you will, if they have any meaning at all, they must be considered as evincive of the fact, that David himself was infected with original sin; and if it existed in him, what reason can be assigned why it should not be in others? And as to a figurative interpretation, the words do not appear susceptible of such an explanation without being subjected to great violence: for what can it be supposed that he intended to represent by saying that he was shapen in iniquity and conceived by his mother in sin?

The author of this Catechism, perhaps distrusting such evasions as these, confines himself to two particulars in his attempts to break the force of the argument derived from these words. The first is, that David was here discoursing of himself alone, and that he had special reference to his own disgraceful fall, and did not design to speak of the sin of other men. But this subterfuge takes for granted that David alone was infected with birth-sin, which, for the best reasons, is utterly denied. Moreover, this exposition concedes the main point in controversy; namely, that at least one man has been born in original sin; for it is admitted, that David was shapen in iniquity, and conceived by his mother

in sin. Now this is precisely what we assert; only we argue from the fact, that if this was the origin of David, it must also be of every other man; and the argument cannot be invalidated as long as the fact is admitted; for what imaginable reason can be assigned, why David, above all other men, should be conceived in sin? There is the less reason to think that David would speak thus of his origin, as being in a peculiar manner polluted, when it is considered, that he was born in lawful wedlock, and was descended from pious parents, as appears by the sacred history. But it would be easy to show, if this were the proper place, that what David so emphatically declares respecting his own sinful origin, the Holy Ghost, in other passages, teaches to be the condition of all men. See Psalm, xiv. 4. Job, xiv. 2. Ephes. ii. 3.

The second evasion, to which our Catechist resorts, is, that the words ought to be understood hyperbolically, just as we must understand those words of the same author in Ps. lviii. 4. "The wicked are estranged from the womb, as soon as they are born, they go astray speaking lies." So in this place, David, under the strong feelings of repentance, exaggerates his sin; and, therefore speaks of it as if it was coeval with his existence. These people blow hot and cold with the same breath. What is here said about exaggerating his sin, is in direct opposition to what we read in the Institutes of Ostorodus, who asserts that these words were spoken by David not with a view to exaggerate his criminality, but to extenuate his sin, as proceeding from a constitution born with him. But who that has ever read attentively the whole Psalm, can believe, that the royal penitent had the least thought of extenuating his sin? If then it should be considered a hyperbole, in which David exaggerates his sin, I would retort the argument, and say, if his object was to speak in the strongest terms of the greatness of his actual sin, he was led by the same motive to designate as its source, his original corruption; and how could he have more effectually represented his guilt, than by ascending from his actual transgressions to his original corruption?

The reference to the passage cited from the fifty-eighth Psalm, can be of no service to the cause. The cases are entirely different; the passages are by no means parallel. It is one thing for a pious man, descended from pious parents, to declare 'that he was shapen in iniquity, and conceived by his mother in sin,' and another to say, that the wicked go astray and speak lies from the womb. These last words evidently relate to voluntary, personal acts; but this can by no means be said of the former. I deny, however, that even in these last words, there is any thing hyper-

bolical; for the object was to describe the depravity of the wicked, both in relation to act and habit. But admitting that there is a hyperbole in the words from the 58th Psalm; yet that would not prove that the same must be the fact, in regard to the passage in the 51st Psalm. Therefore, I must, after impartially considering all the evasions to which Socinians have had recourse, consider the doctrine of original sin, as fully established by this single text, if there were no other in the Bible.

“Quest. 5. BUT DOES NOT PAUL SAY, ROM. V. 12. “THAT ALL MEN HAVE SINNED IN ADAM?””

“Answ. It is not declared in the text quoted, that all men sinned in Adam; for the words in Greek $\epsilon\varphi\ '\omega$, which are every where rendered in Latin by *in quo*, *in whom*, may with more propriety be rendered *because that*, or *since*, as in the parallel passages Rom. viii. 3. $\epsilon\nu\ '\omega$ *in that*. Phil. iii. 12. $\epsilon\varphi\ '\omega$ *that for which*. Heb. ii. 13. $\epsilon\varphi\ '\omega$ *in that*. 2 Cor. v. 4. $\epsilon\varphi\ '\omega$ *because that*. It is evident, therefore, that the doctrine of original sin cannot be built on this passage.”

Refutation.

The passage of Scripture which the Catechism here brings into view is certainly the most decisive for the proof of the doctrine of original sin of any in the Bible. “As by one man sin entered into the world, and so death passed upon all men because that (in whom) all have sinned.” In the Latin vulgate, the latter part of this phrase is rendered *in whom* all have sinned. The apostle in this place institutes a comparison and contrast between Adam and Christ, and shows that the righteousness of Christ avails to the justification of all who are united to him, just as the fall and disobedience of Adam was the cause of the sin and condemnation of all his posterity. He then proceeds to show that death had actually invaded the whole human race in consequence of their connexion with their first father. The fact is undeniable that all die, not even excepting infants; and it is vain to allege that all became voluntarily sinners by the imitation of Adam, for to the majority of men, the first sin was unknown, and as to infants, it is certain they could not become sinners by imitation; nevertheless they are obnoxious to death as much as adults, and in circumstances of as much bodily pain and distress; which can only be accounted for by supposing that they are partakers of the blame and punishment of the first offence. The apostle goes on to declare the reason why all are infected with the pollution of sin and are exposed to its punishment, which is, that in this first man, all have sinned. The phrase $\epsilon\varphi\ '\omega$ ought in this place to be considered as of the same import with $\epsilon\nu\ '\omega$ in 1 Cor. xv. 22, where we

have ἐν τῷ Ἀδὰμ *in Adam* all die, so ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ *in Christ*, shall all be made alive. And in Mark ii. 4. this identical phrase is used in this sense, "They let down the couch ἐφ' ᾧ *on which*, the paralytic lay." But if we take this phrase, as our adversaries wish, to designate, not the *subject*, but *the cause*, it will come to the very same thing. For the reason is here assigned by the apostle why death has passed upon all men, and according to this interpretation, the reason is, "because all have sinned;" but this cannot be understood of actual sin; for in this sense all who die have not sinned, since infants are incapable of sinning actually. The meaning, therefore, must be that all have sinned in their first father and representative. If they had not sinned in him, they would not have been subjected to the punishment of his first transgression. And that condemnation comes on the race on account of this one sin, is so clearly taught in the following verses, that there is no room left for any reasonable doubt, that the apostle meant to teach that this sin was imputed; or that hence condemnation was incurred by all men. It is repeatedly declared that by the *one sin* of the *one man* many *had died—had come into condemnation—had been constituted sinners*, &c.: it seems, therefore, most natural and reasonable, to suppose that the apostle in the 12th verse, where he assigns a reason for the death of our whole race, means the same which he evidently does in the subsequent verses. This interpretation renders the whole context consistent with itself; whereas, if by πάντες ἡμαρτων, we understand the actual sinning of all, not only will infants, who also suffer death, be excluded; but the reason assigned for the death of all will be different from what it is in the following verse: 'Guilt has, by one man, come upon all men to condemnation, not in effect merely, but in righteous judgment.'

In this passage, then, we are clearly taught, first, the universal and total corruption of all men; secondly, that this corruption is derived from the first man, not by imitation of his first sin, concerning which many knew nothing, and of which others were incapable, but by a participation of the crime of the first man. Hence all men are bound to suffer death, although not guilty of actual sin; for according to the nature of the apostle's argument, the participation and propagation of sin and death, must be derived from one man, just as the participation and propagation of righteousness and life are derived from another, even Christ. In a word, the argument may be stated simply thus: 'As by Christ alone, life and righteousness are introduced, so by Adam, sin and death. And as all who are justified and receive the gift of life, are indebted for these benefits to Christ alone; so as many as sin and die, do all sin and die in Adam alone. Therefore, original

sin exists, as is evident from the fact that infants [die, who are altogether incapable of actual sin.

The objection which they make, "that it is not asserted, that all men die in Adam is of no force; for the contrast which is here set up between the first and second Adam requires, that the words of the apostle should be understood in this sense. The same thing is necessarily implied in those words, "As in Adam all sin, so in Christ shall all be made alive," for evidently, if all die in Adam, all must have sinned in him. It is repugnant to every idea of divine justice, that any should be subjected to the punishment due to another, without any participation in his sin.

Where the Catechist asserts that εφ' ω should be rendered *because that* or *inasmuch*, in accordance with the use of the same particles in other passages, he gains no help to his cause, for I have shown, that admitting this interpretation, still an unanswerable argument for original sin may be derived from this passage. But I deny that the words ought to be thus translated: and our opponent has adduced no reasons for his interpretation; unless that, elsewhere, these words are thus rendered; which reason makes just as much for us as it does for him. We might, therefore, argue thus, the particles εφ' ω elsewhere signify *in which*, or *in whom*, therefore they ought to be so understood here; but our opponent would not admit this conclusion, because "*a particulari ad particulare non valet consequentia*:" that is, we cannot draw the conclusion from the use of a particle, in one place, that its signification is the very same in another. Well, we can make the very same objection to his argument. It is not, therefore, a satisfactory reason that εφ' ω should signify *inasmuch*, or *because that*, merely because passages may be found where the words are thus used. Besides, the places alleged, are not in point, for in Rom. viii. 3. the phrase is not the same: it is εν' ω. In 2 Cor. v. 4. we do indeed read εφ' ω, yet the particles are here used *subjectively*, that is, in a sense corresponding with our interpretation for τω σκηνηι is evidently the antecedent to which the relative refers. And in Heb. ii. 18. the phrase is εν' ω, and, therefore, although it be taken *casually*, it does not affect the interpretation of the words now under consideration. But while we judge, that the Latin version is correct, in rendering this passage (in quo) *in whom all have sinned*; yet we are not of opinion, that the force of the argument for original sin, is at all invalidated by the other interpretation; for as we have shown above, it comes eventually to the same thing, whether you take these words as expressive of the *subject*, or the *cause*.

As to the exception of Ostorodus, that in this passage the word "sinners" does not denote those who were really such, but per-

sons who are spoken of as if they had been sinners, is too unreasonable to require a moment's consideration; but it is enough forever to silence this objection, that these persons are *really* subject to the penalty of death; if therefore, they are liable to death, which is the wages of sin, they must be sinners; otherwise there would be no correspondence between the crime and punishment. If the crime was merely supposititious, and the punishment real, how could God be a just judge when he treated those as real sinners who were only putatively such?

Quest. 6. "AS YOU HAVE TAUGHT THAT MAN'S FREE-WILL IS NOT VITIATED BY ORIGINAL SIN, EXPLAIN ALSO, HOW FAR THE POWER OF FREE-WILL EXTENDS?"

Answ. "Generally, the strength of human nature in regard to those things which God requires, is very small; yet for those duties which we are bound to perform, the will by which they may be performed exists in all men; so that human ability is not so small, but that if any one sincerely desires to exert his power in obeying the commandments of God, he, by divine assistance, will not make his efforts in vain. This divine aid, God never withholds from any man to whom he has communicated the revelation of his will; otherwise He could never justly chastise or punish the rebellious; but we know he does both."

Refutation.

Although in man there is remaining some light of reason and conscience, and some liberty of will, in relation to actions of a merely moral, civil, or political nature; yet in regard to things spiritual, and those which concern our salvation, the strength of human nature is not only, as the Catechist acknowledges, "very small," but is absolutely nothing at all; for man in his state of destitution and ruin, is "dead in trespasses and sins." Now, we know that in death there is not merely *little* strength, but not any strength. This is the fact in regard to all those who have fallen under the power of corporeal death, as it relates to natural actions; and the same is true of spiritual death, as it relates to spiritual actions. And as the man who is naturally dead, is altogether impotent to put forth the actions of a living man; so, he who is spiritually dead, is equally unable to put forth those acts which appertain to the spiritual life. For although there remains in man the natural faculty of willing, yet in this faculty there is no ability of willing that which is good, and of refusing that which is evil, of a spiritual kind. But what is this which our opponent teaches? "That human strength is not so very small, but that if a man will exert what he has, by the divine aid which will be granted, he will not fail of obeying the will of God."

This is purely Pelagian. It is as if you should say, "a man who is naturally dead, if he will exert the strength which he has, may by divine aid, put forth the acts of a living creature. But we know that a man naturally dead can do nothing toward his own resuscitation; and the same is equally true respecting spiritual death. No man can produce strength in himself, if the cause and principle of that kind of action be wanting. If he can, it must be either in dependence on God, or independently of him. If the former, it is not man but God who produces the effect; if the latter, the creature is independent of his Maker, for at least one good thing which he possesses. He produces ability in himself by his own effort, and does not receive it from above; but this pretension approaches near to atheism, and is blasphemous. This is for a man to attribute to himself, what the Scriptures expressly ascribe to God, namely, the power "to will and to do;" and the apostle asserts, "That we are not sufficient of ourselves to think any thing as of ourselves; but our sufficiency is of God." (2 Cor. iii. 5.) And if the words of Christ himself are true—and we know they are truth itself—"Without me you can do nothing." The assertion of our adversary is altogether false, when he asserts, that a man without the help of God, or previous to that aid, can produce strength in himself to perform the will of God. Indeed, his aid he will deny to none of those to whom he has revealed his will. But this is true only of those who, understanding his will, implore aid from God. Thus in Psalm l. 15. "Call upon me, and I will deliver thee;" and in Luke xi. 9. "Ask and it shall be given you." But the passage which best suits our purpose is that in the 13th verse: "How much more will your heavenly Father give the Holy Spirit to them that ask him?" But even to ask aright, and to implore divine aid sincerely, are not in the power of man until by the operations of grace those groanings which cannot be uttered are excited in him. For until the spirit of prayer is given to a man by God, he cannot truly call Jesus, Lord; nor can he with the spirit of adoption cry Abba, Father. It is true then, that God does not withhold his aid from those to whom he not only externally makes known his will, but whom he internally persuades; for, indeed, that the aids of grace are denied to many who externally have the will of God preached to them, can be doubted by none except such as are ignorant, that "God heareth not sinners," and that their prayers are an abomination unto Him; but he will hear the petitions of the righteous, and his ear is ever open to their cry.

In answer to what this writer says in the last place, "That God cannot justly punish the rebellious unless man is endued with the power of free-will to obey, is of no force, because God most

righteously punishes that impotency, which the first man incurred for his posterity. For the devils themselves are evidently unable to do any thing truly good; and yet who would deny that they are justly punished for their wickedness? They who urge this argument allege, that if you take away free-will, you take away all punishments and all rewards. But this is not true, as we know from the case of the blessed angels, whose will is not in a state of indifference between two opposites, which is the Socinian notion of liberty, but the will of the angels is unchangeably determined to that which is good, and to that alone; so that they cannot will that which is evil; and yet who would deny, that these holy beings are deserving of praise, for the perfection of their obedience? And this inclination of theirs only to that which is good, God is pleased to crown with a gracious reward of everlasting felicity.

Quest. 7. "BUT WHAT IS THAT DIVINE AID OF WHICH YOU HAVE MADE MENTION?"

Ans. "Divine aid is twofold, internal and external."

Quest. 8. "WHAT IS THAT DIVINE AID WHICH IS EXTERNAL?"

Ans. "The principal is the word of God, especially its promises and threatenings; but of these, the promises have much greater force than the threatenings. Here also, it may be remarked, that under the new covenant the promises are far more excellent than under the old. Moreover, it is much easier to do the will of God under the new, than it was under the old covenant."

Refutation.

I observe, in the first place, that our author makes external aid to consist in the promises and threatenings of God's word. Now these may indeed furnish strong motives to induce a man to accept the good proposed, and to reject the evil; but there seems to be no propriety in calling this by the name of "aid," unless we give to the term an acceptation much broader than usual. But that which is most objectionable in this statement is, that divine aid is confined to the external promises and threatenings; whereas God not only promises good and threatens evil in his word, but graciously operates within us, and by divine energy renders these motives effectual; which, without such an internal operation would produce no effect whatever; for the good contained in the promise is neither apprehended nor desired, much less enjoyed, until the mind is illuminated and excited by divine power. And what else is that which we read in so many perspicuous texts of sacred Scripture, where God is said to enlighten those who are spiritually blind, as in Ephes. i. 17, 18—to regenerate

and renew those who are carnal, as in John iii. 5, 6. 1 Cor. iv. 15. Pet. iii. 7. To quicken the dead in sin, as in Ephes. ii. 1. 5. To soften the hard heart, as in Ezek. xi. 19—xxxvi. 16. To convert us to himself, as in Jer. xxxi. 13. 19. To draw us effectually, as in John vi. 44. To create within us a clean heart, and renew a right spirit within us, as in Psal. li. 12. To open our understanding to understand the Scriptures, as in Luke xxiv. 31. 45. To confer upon us saving faith, as in Phil. ii. 9. To excite good thoughts and volitions, as in 2 Cor. iii. 5. Phil. ii. 13. To cause us to walk in his statutes, as in Ezek. xxxvi. 27, and to fear his name, as Jer. xxxii. 39, and to love the Lord, as Deut. xxx. 6. From all these texts, and numerous others which might be added, it is manifest that “divine aid” consists in God’s efficient and gracious operation within us; and not in the bare proposition of promises and threatenings. For without a divine agency to illuminate our minds and cause us to understand the promises, so as spiritually to apprehend the good which they contain, the mere exhibition of them will never produce any saving effect. Unless God incline our will to embrace the good revealed in the word, with all our strength, we shall continue to be unaffected by it. “For the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto him, neither can he know them; because they are spiritually discerned.” The writer, while he describes both promises and threatenings, under the name of “divine aid,” intimates that the former are much more powerful in their operation on the mind, than the latter; concerning which however, we are constrained to doubt, since there are many more who hate and avoid sin, through fear of punishment, than from the love of virtue. Again, that the promises of the New Testament are much more excellent than those of the Old; and that the duties of the new covenant are much more easily performed than those of the old, is asserted but not proved, by our author. We say, that in substance, the promises of the Old and New Testament are the same, namely, Christ and his benefits, together with eternal life; so that, in substance, there is nothing promised in the new covenant which was not also promised in that of the former dispensation. It is true, however, that the blessings promised are much more clearly exhibited under the Gospel, than they were under the Law. In regard to clearness and sweetness, it may be said, that the promises of the New Testament are more excellent; but not as it relates to the substance of the things promised.

We are aware, however, that Socinians believe that the Old and New Testaments differ, not merely in circumstances, but in essence.

Quest. 9. "WHAT IS THAT 'DIVINE AID' WHICH YOU CALL INTERNAL?"

Ans. "It is this; that God seals on the hearts of those who obey him, whatever he has promised."

Refutation.

Wonderful theology! This sealing, which the catechist calls "divine aid" of the internal kind, is produced by a consideration of the divine promises and threatenings; that is to say, the seal of a thing which is sealed, is "aid." But sealing is an act, the object of which is merely to produce a more perfect confirmation. When, therefore, God is said to aid a man by sealing the promises, it is nothing else than for God to certify to a man, running of his own accord in the right way, a prosperous issue to all his efforts. According to this view of the helps of grace, there is not in works of piety any such thing as the preventing, co-operating, or accompanying agency of God; but only a certain sealing of the work consummated by man, to assure him that his labour shall not be in vain. Simply to state the Socinian theology, in relation to this point, is a sufficient refutation. For if there be any truth in the Scripture doctrine of grace, it is God who first excites us to works of piety, then co-operates with us in our spiritual exercises, and enables us to persevere in the performance of the good thus commenced.

Ques. 10. "IF THE WILL OF MAN REMAIN FREE, [AND UNHURT BY THE FALL,] WHY IS IT THAT SO MANY HAVE SET THEMSELVES IN OPPOSITION TO THIS DOCTRINE!"

Ans. "They are induced to do so, from entertaining the opinion that there are certain testimonies of Scripture which they are confident teach that man is no longer possessed of free will."

Quest. 11. "BUT WHAT ARE THOSE SCRIPTURE TESTIMONIES ON WHICH THEY DEPEND?"

Ans. "They are of two kinds. The first are such, as that from them, they suppose this doctrine can be fairly inferred: the others are thought to contain express declarations, that free will does not now exist in man."

Refutation.

It is not with the orthodox a mere matter of conjecture or opinion, that the will of man, since the fall, is enslaved to sin; but it is a truth which is capable of being confirmed by the clearest demonstration; and we not only *suppose* that we have texts of Scripture from which it can be deduced that the will of man is entirely indisposed to all spiritual good, but we do actually accomplish what we profess, as will appear, when we come to the

consideration of the particular passages, on which this doctrine rests.

Here we must, for the present, close our extracts from ARNOLD'S REFUTATION of the Racovian Catechism. The writer proceeds in the following questions, in this tenth chapter, *De Libero Arbitrio*, to treat largely of predestination. We should be pleased, if our space would permit us, to follow this learned and solid theologian through the whole discussion; but what we have extracted may serve as a specimen of the manner in which theological discussion was conducted nearly two centuries ago. One thing must have struck the reader as remarkable, namely, that the modern arguments, by which error attempts to defend her cause, are precisely the same as those employed for centuries past. We know, indeed, that those who now adopt and advocate these opinions, greatly dislike this comparison of modern theories with ancient heresies, and denounce it as invidious. But why should it be so considered? Or why should they be unwilling to acknowledge the conformity of their opinions with those of ancient times, when the agreement is so manifest, not only in the doctrines themselves, but in the arguments and interpretations of Scripture, by which they attempt to support them? If the "New Divinity" be correct, then certainly many who were formerly condemned by the majority of Christians, as heretics, ought to be considered the true church, and their doctrines as orthodox; while those who censured and condemned them, ought to be considered as a set of unreasonable bigots, who by their numbers and influence were able to suppress the cause of true Christianity.

Certainly, then, they who are now so confident that they have received new light, ought not to be ashamed of their brethren, who struck out this same light, hundreds of years before they were born, and defended their opinions by arguments as ingenious, and by exegesis as learned, as any of those now living have a right to pretend to. It is, however, a fact, that these theologians who long maintained the character of being orthodox, are very reluctant to be classed with Arminians, Pelagians, and Socinians, even when they are conscious that their opinions coincide with those designated by such denominations. This does not arise from any real abhorrence of the sects so denominated; but they are aware that the Christian public, with which they are connected, entertain strong prejudices against these sects; and it requires no small degree of moral courage to stem the torrent of popular prejudice. There has been, therefore, in our "new light" theologians, an unusual solicitude to persuade the religious community that they were not contemplating innovations

upon the ancient creed of the orthodox, but that they had merely adopted a more rational philosophy, by which they were able to explain the knotty points in Calvinism, so as to render doctrines naturally offensive to human reason, if not entirely palatable, yet in a great degree free from objection. These attempts at reconciling the new opinions with the commonly received doctrines of the church have been pushed so far, that even some who have gone far into the "new divinity," have been ashamed of the want of candour and ingenuousness, which has sometimes been manifested. And now, at length, the character and tendency of these modern theories have created alarm even in the largest body of professed Arminians on earth. I mean the Methodist Episcopal church. The tables are strangely turned upon us. Formerly, we shrunk from contact with this increasing body of zealous Christians, lest we should receive some taint of Arminianism; but now they are lifting up a warning voice to their widely extended disciples, not against our Calvinism—for against this they have uttered their anathemas long enough—but against our Pelagianism; that is, against the Pelagian character of the "New Divinity;" for they are at no loss to identify the system which is now so zealously maintained and propagated with that of John Taylor of Norwich. But while the affinity of the "New Divinity" with Pelagianism has been well understood by considerate men for some time past, it has not been commonly believed that there is also a striking resemblance in the modern theories to the doctrines of the ancient Socinians. This will, however, be remarkably evident by a perusal of the *Racovian Catechism*, which contains the acknowledged standard of Socinian doctrine—and even from the extracts here given, the coincidence between the two systems is exceedingly manifest. This, however, ought to be asserted with some exception; for it is a fact, that in several points, the Socinian creed stops far short of the "New Divinity." This last makes no scruple to assert the complete ability of man, in all respects, to do the will of God, and that by the exercise of his own free agency; but in the *Catechism* which we have had under consideration it is taught that the strength or ability of man is very small; and it is not pretended that he can do any thing without divine aid: and although they fall far short of the truth, yet they admit that there is need, not only of external divine aid, but of that which is internal also.

Whether the "New Divinity" will maintain the consistency of the Socinianism of Poland, remains to be proved: but there is much reason to apprehend, that although the theologians who now advocate it, will not have the courage to carry it out, in its legitimate consequences, yet their successors will be less timid,

and will feel, that in self-defence, it is necessary to go a great deal further in the line of deviation from orthodoxy than has yet been done. Whoever lives to see another generation of men rising to maturity, will see that the "New Divinity" is the stepping-stone to German neology.

ART. IV.—*A Treatise on the Millennium; in which the prevailing theories on that subject are carefully examined; and the true Scriptural Doctrine attempted to be elicited and established.* By George Bush, A. M. Author of '*Questions and Notes upon Genesis and Exodus.*' New York, J. & J. Harper. 1832. Pp. xii. 277. 12mo.

WE have long wished to see the peculiar gifts which Mr. Bush possesses fairly exercised in such a way as to command attention. This end will in some degree, we trust, be answered, by the work before us; for whatever may be thought of its hypotheses and reasonings and interpretations, it has literary merits quite sufficient to preserve it from neglect. Were it only as a writer, Mr. Bush deserves distinction, though we fear that his profession, and the theme which he discusses, will prevent his ever gaining it among mere men of taste. Our literary journals and our current works of fancy might be searched in vain for finer specimens of rich and nervous English than we have met with in this slender duodecimo. Both its merits and its faults are, indeed, of a kind almost unknown to our American reviewers, bards, and novelists. The perfection of fashionable excellence at present seems to consist in a stereotype monotony of thought, and perfect weakness of expression. Now of these faults Mr. Bush is seldom guilty. If his style ever languishes, it is not from debility, but plethora. He often wastes enough on one distended paragraph to furnish, if adroitly spun and woven, the entire material of a tolerable Annual; and we sometimes find more poetry in one of his expressive solecisms, than falls to the lot of many a poet by profession. There are passages in this book which, if found in the pages of a novel or review, would be completely daubed with eulogy; but which, as they stand, are not likely to be even read by many except theologians. This, so far from lowering our own estimation of the treatise, is, in part, our motive for reviewing it at all. We are not disposed to acquiesce in the monopoly of literary honours so ambitiously asserted by the witlings of the world. As the church has in times past sent her giants and her mighty men into the amphitheatre,