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ART. I.—*The Origin of the Episcopate in the Christian Church.* By Dr. F. C. Baur. Tübingen, 1838. pp. 187, 8vo.*
J. Addison Alexander

THE Presbyterian and Episcopalian are agreed in this, that the affairs of the primitive church were administered by Bishops, Presbyters, and Deacons; that Bishops were ministers or preachers of the gospel, of the highest rank; and that they possessed the power of ordination and of discipline. So far as these points are concerned, nothing is gained, on either side, by proving from the Scriptures or the Apostolic Fathers, that there were three orders of church-officers, and that the Bishop took precedence of the others. This is admitted and contended for, on both sides. If Clement or Ignatius says that nothing can be orderly performed without the Bishop, or insists upon his title to obedience and respect, this is nothing more than modern Presbyterians profess to teach and practice. The point, at which the parties really

* Ueber den Ursprung des Episcopats in der Christlichen Kirche. Prüfung der neuestens von Hrn. Dr. Rothe aufgestellten Ansicht. Von Dr. Ferdinand Christian Baur, ordentlichem Professor der Evangelischen Theologie an der Universität zu Tübingen.

ART. III. — *The Works of Thomas Chalmers, D. D. and LL.D., Professor of Theology in the University of Edinburgh, and Corresponding Member of the Royal Institute of France.* Volumes I—VII. New York: Robert Carter, 58 Canal Street. 1840.

By Archibald Alexander & James W. Alexander

WE should perhaps have been more in the line of our duty, if we had noticed these volumes one by one, as they issued from the press of the enterprising publisher; to whom American Presbyterians are indebted for a number of valuable orthodox works. As it is, we are startled at the amount of matter, thus subjected to our view in more than two thousand pages, and must be more cursory in our observations than we could wish. If therefore many momentous truths escape our attention, and even if errors fail to be pointed out, our readers must bear in mind the copiousness of the books, and the limits of the composition. It must be enough, for the present, that we indicate the subjects and scope of the treatises respectively; dwelling on one or two questionable points of great interest, and giving in a desultory way our impressions concerning the merits of this great luminary of the Scottish Kirk.

Without a contest, Chalmers takes his place among the very first rank, not merely of Presbyterians, or even of churchmen, but of British minds. By genius and eloquence, by patriotism and piety, by industry and courage, he has won such a standing, as leaves him no superior, and not many equals, even among the dignitaries and theologians of a peculiarly arrogant and fastidious sister-church.

The first two volumes of this series are taken up with Natural Theology. More than a hundred pages are given to Preliminary Views; among which are discussions of the Difference between the Ethics of Theology, and the Objects of Theology—the duty which is laid on men by the probability or even the imagination of a God. Here also he has an excellent chapter upon the a priori arguments for the being of a God, in general, and the celebrated argument of Doctor Clarke in particular; with which our author declares himself to be dissatisfied. Then he examines, in a special chapter, the objection of Hume to the a posteriori argument, grounded on his assertion that the world is a singular effect. No part of the volume before us demands a more careful examina-

tion than this; for Chalmers conceives that the argument of Hume has never been fully met; and especially that Reid and Stewart have taken dangerous ground, in conceding that the argument for a God, is not an experimental one, inasmuch as the inference of design from its effects is a result neither of reasoning nor experience; thus conjuring up, as he is pleased to express it, a new principle for the purpose of refuting Hume's special sophistries, and making a gratuitous and questionable addition to mental philosophy, in the shape of a distinct law of the human understanding, which had never been heard of before. Chalmers, on the other hand, attempts to show, on the principles of Hume himself, or at least with the help of no other principles than our uniform faith in the lessons of experience, that there is a fallacy in the argument. And we might as well say here, that Chalmers disposes of the famous objection of the same subtle scoffer to the evidence of miracles, in the same way; taking similar exceptions to the answer proposed by Campbell; here also falling back upon the constant faith of mankind; besides showing a contradiction between the two vaunted fallacies of the shrewd metaphysician. The argument of Dr. Chalmers, respecting the former, occupies forty pages; it strikes us as conclusive; yet for all that we can see it might have been adequately presented in the tenth part of the space. As a lecture in the divinity-schools, which it doubtless was, this repetition made it more accessible to the young men, but it is a wasteful exuberance in a printed book. The same remark applies to the treatise on Optimism, at the end of the second volume, and to most of the articles which pertain to metaphysics. Yet we must not quarrel with one who delights us, and who the more he expatiates the more carries us away into the regions of imagination and emotion.

The second book presents the proofs visible in the dispositions of matter. That is, the main evidence for a God, as far as this can be collected from visible nature, lies not in the existence of matter, nor in its laws, but in its *dispositions*. Here Chalmers finds himself called upon to lay out his greatest strength in grappling with the atheistical argument of La Place. We cannot venture to give a sample-brick from such an edifice. The treatise shows the close acquaintance of its author with the most recent conclusions of mathematicians and astronomers, and his remarkable turn for inquiries of this sort. He then goes into the proofs for a beginning of our present world, as deduced from Geology.

The third chapter of this book, is one of very pleasing recapitulation; and as the author seems to have felt, at every step, the striking dissimilarity between his own lofty, indistinct, and oratorical manner, and the homely greatness and exactness of Paley, he glides, with the easy permission that he is ready to give himself at all times, into a portrait of his celebrated predecessor. Though we regard this as very far from doing justice to the greatness of its subject, we give it at length.

“A writer,” thus he characterizes him, “of whom it is not too much to say, that he has done more than any other individual who can be named, to accommodate the defence both of the Natural and the Christian Theology to the general understanding of our times. He, in particular, has illustrated with great felicity and effect the argument for a God from those final causes which may be descried in the appearances of nature—and, although he has confined himself chiefly to one department, (that is, the anatomical,) yet that being far the most prolific of this sort of evidence, he has altogether composed from it a most impressive pleading on the side of Theism. He attempts no eloquence; but there is all the power of eloquence in his graphic representation of natural scenes and natural objects,—just as a painter of the Flemish School may without any creative faculty of his own, but on the strength of his imitative faculties only, minister to the spectators of his art all those emotions both of the Sublime and Beautiful which the reality of visible things is fitted to awaken. And so without aught of the imaginative, or aught of the ethereal about him—but in virtue of the just impression which external things make upon his mind, and of the admirable sense and truth wherewith he reflects them back again, does our author by acting merely the part of a faithful copyist, give a fuller sense of the richness and repletiness of this argument, than is or can be effected by all the elaborations of an ambitious oratory. Of him it may be said, and with as emphatic justice as of any man who ever wrote, that there is no nonsense about him—and so, with all his conceptions most appropriate to the subject that he is treating, and these bodied forth in words each of which is instinct with significancy, and strikingly appropriate—we have altogether a performance neither vitiated in expression by one clause or epithet of verbiage, nor vitiated in substance by one impertinence of prurient or misplaced imagination. His predominant faculty is

judgment—and therefore it is, that he is always sure to seize on the relevancies or strong points of an argument, which never suffer from his mode of rendering them, because, to use a familiar but expressive phrase, they are at all times exceedingly well put. His perfect freedom from all aim and all affectation, is a mighty disencumbrance to him—he having evidently no other object, than to give forth in as clear and correct delineation as possible, those impressions which nature and truth had spontaneously made on his own just and vigorous understanding. So that, altogether, although we should say of the mind of Paley that it was of a decidedly prosaic or secular cast—although we should be at a loss to find out what is termed the poetry of his character, and doubt in fact whether any of the elements of poetry were there—although never to be found in the walk of sentiment or of metaphysics, or indeed in any high transcendental walk whatever, whether of the reason or of the fancy—yet to him there most unquestionably belonged a very high order of faculties. His most original work is the *Horæ Paulinæ*, yet even there he discovers more of the observational than the inventive; for, after all, it was but a new track of observation which he opened up, and not a new species of argument which he devised that might immortalize its author, like the discovery of a before unknown calculus in the mathematics. All the mental exercises of Paley lie within the limits of sense and of experience—nor would one ever think of awarding to him the meed of genius. Yet in the whole staple and substance of his thoughts there was something better than genius—the home-bred product of a hale and well-conditioned intellect, that dealt in the *ipsa corpora* of truth, and studied use and not ornament in the drapey wherewith he invested it. We admit that he had neither the organ of high poetry nor of high metaphysics—and perhaps would have recoiled from both as from some unmeaning mysticism of which nothing could be made. Yet he had most efficient organs notwithstanding—and the volumes he has given to the world, plain perspicuous and powerful, as was the habitude of his own understanding—fraught throughout with meaning, and lighted up not in the gorgeous colouring of fancy but in the clearness of truth's own element—these Volumes form one of the most precious contributions which, for the last half century, have been added to the theological literature of our land.

“It has been said that there is nothing more uncommon

than common sense. It is the perfection of his common sense which makes Paley at once so rare and so valuable a specimen of our nature. The characteristics of his mind make up a most interesting variety, and constitute him into what may be termed a literary phenomenon. One likes to behold the action and re-action of dissimilar minds—and therefore it were curious to have ascertained how he would have stood affected by the perusal of a volume of Kant, or by a volume of lake poetry. We figure that he would have liked Franklin; and that, coming down to our day, the strength of Cobbett would have had in it a redeeming quality, to make even his coarseness palatable. He would have abhorred all German sentimentalism—and of the *a priori* argument of Clarke, he would have wanted the perception chiefly because he wanted patience for it. His appetite for truth and sense would make him intolerant of all which did not engage the discerning faculties of his soul—and from the sheer force and promptitude of his decided judgment, he would throw off *instantly* all that he felt to be uncongenial to it. The general solidity of his mind, posted him as if by gravitation on the *terra firma* of experience, and restrained his flight into any region of transcendental speculation. Yet Coleridge makes obeisance to him—and differently moulded as these men were, this testimony from the distinguished metaphysician and poet does honour to both.”

The Third Book presents the Proofs for the Being of a God in the Constitution of the Human Mind. It is plainly a favourite part of the author's labours. He believes, that the mental phenomena speak more distinctly and decisively on this subject, than the material phenomena of creation. At the same time, the immensity of the field allows the discursive genius of Chalmers to draw into the train of his argument a great variety of subjects, between which and his main point other minds might have discerned little alliance. Among these we do not, however, class his admirable chapter on the Supremacy of Conscience; which we assure ourselves cannot be read by any right-minded Christian moralist without a thrill of pleasure. After declaring, what we believe none who have any knowledge of the literature of Ethics need to be told, that it was Bishop Butler, who first “made the natural Supremacy of Conscience the subject of a full reflex cognizance”—and by this achievement alone became the author of one of the most important contributions

ever made to moral science—he shows with characteristic purity of sentiment and fervour of affection, how clearly this sets forth, as a God of righteousness, Him who hath made his creatures of such a moral constitution. The same course is pursued with regard to the inherent pleasure of the virtuous, and misery of the vicious affections; and the power and operation of Habit. Here the author finds a great argument on the undeniable truth, that by every act of virtue we become more powerful for its service; and by every act of vice we become more helplessly its slaves.

The Fourth Book is upon the Evidences for a God in the Adaptation of External Nature to the Mental Constitution of Man. He considers this adaptation first in general, and then in certain special instances; treats of those special affections which conduce to the civil, political and economic well-being of society; and holds up to view the capacity of our world for making a virtuous species happy; and the argument deducible from this, both for the character of God, and the immortality of man. Under these heads, the author finds occasion to apply himself, with more than a casual touch, to some points which thus appear for the first time as we suppose in a system of Natural Theology:—such are the Poor Rates—Malthus on Population—the Tithe System of England, and the Origin of Property. The opulence of the author's mind, and his burning zeal for the well-being of his church and kingdom, are the causes of this seeming incongruity; it is only a seeming one. Out of a multitude of 'adaptations,' some must needs be selected, and the selection has been directed by the strong tendencies of the writer's mind, and the imperative claims of the circumstances amidst which his book was to be read.

The Fifth Book is on the Inscrutability of God's Counsels and ways, and on Natural Theology viewed as an Imperfect System, and as a Precursor to the Christian Theology. It is not in the author's view, a 'terminating science,' but a science *in transitu*, and its lessons are those of a preparatory school.

The Third and Fourth Volumes are on the Evidences of Christianity: of these the germ is the Treatise first published in the New Edinburgh Encyclopaedia, and then in a volume, and which established the fame of the author. The field in which Dr. Chalmers has done best service is that of Apologetic Theology, the defence of the outworks of Christianity against Atheism, Deism, and general Scepticism. It was for

this that his early learning, mathematical and physical, fitted him; to this his early efforts were directed; and in this his arm is still almost unrivalled. Hence it is not uncommon for him to turn aside from the discussion of positive doctrines, in revealed religion, to expend his greatest strength upon the objections of the infidel. And as this is his favourite department, so it is that in which he is most satisfactory; as he uniformly contributes less to the amount of our distinct knowledge, in proportion as he advances into the citadel of the faith. But we are willing to omit many things which it would be interesting to notice in the first four volumes, for the sake of dwelling with a little more particularity on the Fifth, which is taken up with Discourses on Moral and Mental Philosophy. We had understood that this subject had occupied much of Dr. Chalmers's attention, and this was natural enough, as he was sometime Professor of Moral Philosophy in the university of St. Andrews. It is doubtless known to many of our readers that the two subjects go together in Scotland. Dr. Chalmers argues however with great force, that Ethics may be investigated without the least acquaintance with the Philosophy of the Mind, and that there is no more real and necessary connexion between these two departments of philosophy than between others which are always separated.

With characteristic and unnecessary diffuseness Dr. Chalmers sets forth the difficulties which attend the prosecution of Mental Philosophy. His presentation of the subject is less remarkable for novelty than strength. In his very laborious attempts to explain the precise meaning of some of the principal terms, he has encumbered himself by adopting the whole nomenclature of Dr. Thomas Brown; which, however philosophical, is unwieldy, and little used by any even of his followers, except Payne. It was not without solicitude that we observed the name of Brown here and there in the pages of Chalmers, and we looked with some avidity to discover whether, in the face of the orthodox clergy of Scotland, whose leader he is understood to be, he would adopt the philosopher's theory of Cause and Effect. The utmost that we can find is a strong recommendation of the Treatise on Cause and Effect, unaccompanied by any word of caution or suspicion. From this we might conclude that he agrees with Brown upon this subject. Yet as he has not discussed it in detail, nor even declared an opinion explicitly, we do not feel called upon to examine it; especially as we

have already done this at large, in a former volume.* It is but just however, to a writer who follows no leader, to add that Chalmers does not scruple to dissent from Brown's opinions in several important particulars, while he places him far above all who have treated this branch of science; a pre-eminence due to Brown, so far as originality and genius are concerned. In giving an exact analysis of human thought and feeling, he has so far exceeded others that there is scarcely room for comparison. But this praise receives a great limitation, when we add that he has defended opinions which are extremely dangerous. Hence we cannot for a moment follow Dr. Chalmers in recommending his Treatise without a caution to young men, nor do we think his Lectures should be read by them except under the direction and animadversion of a judicious teacher.

Dr. Chalmers reasons forcibly against the opinion of Brown, Mill, and others, that desire and will are identical; and, as we think, exhibits this point in its true light. We would gladly transfer to our pages what is said upon this subject, but space is wanting.

On another important point, where Chalmers dissents from Brown, we are constrained to agree with the philosopher against the theologian. It is a topic not merely interesting to the metaphysician, but lying at the foundation of morals. This must be our apology for dwelling upon it more than we have done on any that have been mentioned. And in order to clear the way, let it be here premised, that Chalmers uses the word *emotion* to signify all our feelings, desires, and affections; distinguishing these, however, from *volitions*, which Brown included under the same category, because he admitted no distinction between desire and will. We have been accustomed to use the word *emotion* in the old sense, as designating that class of mental operations which consist in being felt, and which though they have a cause, have no object; such are surprise, joy, grief, and the like. In the present case, however, to avoid further explanation, we shall use the term in the same sense as the respected professor. As it regards *volition*, he employs the word, as we have been used to do, to signify a determination to put forth some act, mental or corporeal.

We are now prepared to state the doctrine maintained by Dr. Chalmers. It is this: that morality can be ascribed to

* Biblical Repertory for 1829, p. 326.

no feeling or emotion unless it be the consequence of volition, or some how connected with volition. This he regards as arising from the universally admitted maxim, that no action is morally good or bad, which is not voluntary. He supposes that a man can be accountable for his emotions, only by having the power to place himself in a situation in which he knows they will arise; that this is done by an act of the will; and that the praise or blame properly attaches not to the involuntary emotion, but to the volition. It will be remembered, that Brown distinguished our emotions into such as have a moral character, and such as have not; and that he does not make the morality of emotions to depend on volition.

As we cannot follow the author through the wilderness of words, employed in preliminary explanation, we shall merely state the result to which he comes, in his own terms: "That an action, then," says he, "be the rightful object either of moral censure or approval, it must have the consent of the will to go along with it. It must be the fruit of volition, else it is utterly beyond the scope, either of praise for its virtuousness, or of blame for its criminality. If an action be involuntary, it is as unfit a subject for any moral reckoning as are the pulsations of the wrist." Again: "We think that Dr. Brown has made a wrong discrimination, when he speaks of certain of the emotions, which involve in them a moral feeling, and certain others of them which do not. There is no moral designation applicable to any of the emotions, viewed nakedly and in themselves. They are our volitions, and our volitions only, which admit of being thus characterized; and emotions are no further virtuous or vicious than as volitions are blended with them, so far as to have given them their direction and their birth."

Dr. Chalmers does not, however, consider the mere voluntariness of an action sufficient to give it a moral character. He says: "There is a second axiom as indisputable as the first, and without the aid of which we should not be able to complete our estimate on the morality of the emotions. For a thing to be done virtuously, it must be done voluntarily; but this is not enough—it is not all. The other condition is, that it must be done because of its virtuousness; or its virtuousness must be the prompting consideration which led to the doing of it. It is not volition alone which makes a thing virtuous, but volition under a sense of duty; and that only is a moral performance to which a man is urged by the sense

or feeling of moral obligation," &c. We introduce this last element of morality, not because it has any immediate connexion with the question before us, but that entire justice may be done to Dr. Chalmers's views of the nature of virtue.

As the whole matter rests upon an undisputed maxim, that all moral actions must be voluntary, there is no room for mistake, except in the true meaning and proper application of this maxim; but there is no more fruitful source of error, than misapprehending and misrepresenting the true import of self-evident principles of truth.

In this case, Dr. Chalmers has, we think, mistaken the true import of the maxim on which his theory is built; and when applied as it is by him, it will not be sanctioned by the common judgment of unbiassed men. This maxim, that all moral actions must be voluntary, was never received as true in reference merely to volition. Under the term *voluntary* were included all spontaneous acts. And by spontaneous acts, we mean the desires and affections of the mind. These have ever been considered as susceptible of a moral nature as much as acts of volition; nay more than these acts. And it is so far from being correct that emotions of this kind derive their moral quality from preceding or accompanying acts of volition, that the very contrary is true; namely, that volitions derive all their moral character from the emotions from which they proceed, and by which they are prompted. And here we confidently appeal to the common sense of all men. When we have traced an action up to the volition which was the immediate cause of it, we have not yet arrived at the true source of its morality; we must go one step further, and inquire into the motives, that is, the emotions from which the volition arose, and by which it was prompted and governed. Two men perform the same external action, let it be the giving money to a needy fellow creature. The action being the same, the volition by which they respectively performed the action must be the same; yet the one action may be bad, and the other good; because the motive in the one may have been vain-glory, and in the other a sincere desire to obey God by promoting the happiness of a fellow creature. Mere volition, then, is not the true and only source of virtuous or vicious action, but the volitions, according to the judgment of mankind in every age and country, take their moral character from what Dr. Chalmers calls the emotions: that is, all men agree that the moral character of the action must be determined

by the motive which produced it; and all virtuous and vicious motives are of the nature of emotions. The unbiassed judgment of men can no where be better learned than by attending to their proceedings in courts of justice, when life and property are brought into jeopardy, and when they who express opinions are acting under the solemnity of an oath. A man, let us suppose, is arraigned for the act of killing a fellow creature. The evidence of the fact is undoubted; indeed he does not deny the fact. Here is an action in which the hand took hold of a deadly weapon, and so directed it with force that it put an end to the life of him on whom the stroke fell. Now as there is no question about the outward act, so there can be none about the volition which produced the act. Whatever might be the motive, the volition was the same, a determination to exert the cause in such a direction, and with such a force; but this determines nothing as to the moral character of the act. The whole investigation therefore is intended to detect the motive from which the act was performed. Suppose the accused makes it appear that the act was purely in self-defence; or that it was in obedience to law; or suppose his friends set up the plea that he was labouring under insanity: in all these cases the act was not vicious, yet the volition producing it was the same. If however the court and jury be of opinion that the motive was malice prepense, then the act is judged to be criminal, entirely from the motive.

But will it be said, that the motives are always included with the volition when we make voluntariness the whole ground of virtue or vice? This is precisely what we maintain, that the emotions are comprehended in the will, when we assert that all moral acts, whether good or bad, are voluntary. There was no foundation, then, for distinguishing between the morality of volitions and emotions; they go together, and when there is an external act, both must exist as producing it, and giving it moral character. Much less is there any just ground to assert that all morality consists in mere volition, and that emotions have no morality, except as derived from volition. On the contrary, we maintain, that all virtuous and vicious actions derive their quality primarily from the emotions.

If it should be alleged, that in the exercise of the emotions of love and hatred, benevolence and ill-will, there is an accompanying act of volition, this would be a gratuitous assumption, having no foundation in our conscience and expe-

rience. But Dr. Chalmers's method of bringing the emotions into the circle of morality is by supposing a previous act of the will, by which the moral agent determines to put himself into a situation in which he knows that certain emotions will arise, and thus he would make him indirectly responsible for his emotions. But if we apply the maxim, that actions must be judged by their motives, we might still ask, What motive prompted him to come to that determination? and so we are back again at the same point as before, that all volition receives its moral character from the motives which led to it; that is, that volition is no otherwise moral than as connected with the emotions.

Dr. Chalmers has accomplished nothing by showing that there are emotions for which we are not accountable, and which have no moral character; we could set off against these innumerable acts of volition which have no moral character. Dr. Brown, therefore, as we have already intimated, distinguished, with philosophical accuracy, between those emotions which involve a moral feeling and those which do not. It would indeed be an untenable ground, that all our emotions have a moral character; but no one within our knowledge has taken such a position.

That volition is moral on account of its connexion with moral emotions, has been shown; but emotions are moral which are not followed by any volition. When the first man was created, he had a nature susceptible of love and reverence for his Creator, as soon as his true character should be made known to him. Suppose—what is not improbable—that the first hour of his existence was spent in the contemplation of the august and glorious Being of whose attributes he had now some conception, we would respectfully ask Dr. Chalmers, whether the love and reverence, which would be spontaneously, and, if you please, involuntarily excited, were not of a moral nature? Yes; every man in his senses must answer, the very highest kind of virtuous exercise! But here is no volition—there is need of none. As soon as he looks abroad upon the glorious scene before him, he recognises a God of infinite excellence, and his love flows forth. Surely it will not be denied that love to God is a moral, yea, a holy exercise, and not the less so because not preceded or prompted by a volition.

If—as would have been natural—man, in innocence, had wished to give expression to his feelings, there would have been place for volition, to move his tongue and bend his

body; but even then the volition would add nothing to the devout and holy affections of the heart, but would derive all its virtue from these. It is the same volition which moves the tongue of the saint, and of the hypocrite; the difference is in the motive.

Dr. Chalmers apologizes for saying so much to explain a mere truism. We experience somewhat of the same feeling, in endeavouring to make evident what, perhaps, needs nothing more than a simple statement; as it is a matter not to be decided by reasoning, but by intuition. We are only following a great example in this reiteration; and our zeal arises from the conviction that the opinion which we are opposing is one of very extensive relations, and that its bearings on several important points in theology are very important.

According to this theory of morals, however much inclination a man may have to evil, if the consent of the will is not obtained, there is no sin. A person may feel a covetous desire of his neighbour's property, or a lustful desire of his neighbour's wife; but if the will, under the influence of some stronger principle, does not consent to do any act towards the accomplishment of these desires, there is no sin. This would seem to be the revival of the old Popish doctrine, that concupiscence remaining in believers, unless the consent of the will be given, is no sin. But we must not mix up theological questions with those which are philosophical.

There is, in our opinion, a nice point in morality here, which requires exact discrimination, in order to be distinctly exhibited. And we cannot but think that Dr. Chalmers has failed of distinguishing between things which are immensely different. He places all emotions which precede the act of the will in the same predicament. He clears from every taint of criminality all those mental acts, of whatever kind, and of whatever strength, until they are matured by the positive act of the will. "It is not," says he, "because his desire did solicit, but because his desire did prevail. It is not because his passions, his affections, and his sensibilities urged him on to that which is evil, but because his will first fostered their excitements, and then lent itself to their unworthy gratification—it is for this, and this alone, that he is the subject of a moral reckoning—it is at the point when the will hath formed its purpose, or sent forth to the various dependents upon its authority its edicts for the execution of

it. It is then that the praise of righteousness is earned, or then that the guilt of iniquity is contracted." Now, here we think there is a grand mistake, but very naturally rising out of the primary position, or axiom, which Dr. Chalmers defends.

Dr. Reid makes a distinction between *animal* and *rational* motives, which we believe is just; although we entirely dissent from the application which he makes of the distinction. This distinction Dr. Chalmers ought to have made here, and thus he would have avoided the untenable and dangerous positions which he has assumed in the last quotation. It will not be amiss, therefore, to illustrate this distinction, and apply it to the case in hand.

Animal motives originate in the body. They are such as hunger, thirst, the susceptibility of pain, &c. These operate directly and blindly on the will; and with such strength of solicitation, that it requires a strong sense of duty, or regard to our temporal welfare to resist them. But every one sees that the mere feeling of hunger or thirst, or pain, is no sin, and has nothing of a moral nature. Thus far Dr. Chalmers was correct. But when he confounds with these bodily feelings, *rational motives*, as Dr. Reid calls them, and teaches that these have no moral quality until they gain the consent of the will, we must believe that he has fallen into an egregious error in morals, as well as in philosophy; and the error is so plain and palpable that it will need no other refutation than to be distinctly stated. Take the following case; a man feels, from time to time, ill-will to his neighbour rising in his heart, soliciting him, and it may be urging him to do some injury to his person, reputation, or estate. But by various considerations he is restrained from willing to do the injury. Now is there a moral faculty in the world which would not judge this hatred of his brother—for it is nothing less—to be sinful? yet it does not prevail over him. It does not lead to any injurious action. It leads to no volition. According to Dr. Chalmers's theory—and he is not alone—there is no sin in such a disposition. As we said, we think it unnecessary to argue this point. If merely holding it up to view before the moral faculty does not produce an instantaneous judgment of the moral turpitude of such an emotion, all reasoning would be in vain. The same thing might be illustrated by every virtuous and by every vicious affection of the human heart. When the motive to volition is of the animal kind, as it is a blind impulse arising from a phy-

sical cause, there is no sin in the mere feeling of such a motive; nor until there is some consent of the will: but when the motive is of the rational kind, in all its motions and degrees, it is good or evil; as the love of God, or good-will to men, on the one hand, or malice, envy, and contempt, on the other. Just so far as these exist, or come into exercise, they are good or evil. And we go further and say, that the latent temper and disposition of the soul which gives origin to such thoughts, has a moral character, good or evil. And here we arrive at the very point at which the Pelagian system of morals begins to diverge from the truth.

The latter part of this volume contains two excellent chapters; the first on the undue estimate put upon our emotions, the reference being chiefly to that indulgence of sentimentality, which awhile ago by many was put in the place of virtuous action; the second on the final causes of our emotions.

The Sixth Volume contains the Commercial Discourses, with the addition of seven which did not appear in the original volume. The Seventh contains the celebrated Astronomical Discourses. It is too late in the day to review either series of familiar works which have long since reached their due place in public esteem. They will renew in many minds the impressions made long since by the almost meteoric apparition of this great luminary. Indeed so many years have elapsed since Dr. Chalmers first appeared as an author, and so voluminous have been his publications, that it can scarcely be expected of us to communicate any new ideas with regard to his manner either of thinking or writing. We have perhaps already conveyed our impression that his *fort* is not in metaphysics. Though he has wonderful vigour of intellect, great perspicacity, and ardent love of truth, we must be permitted to think that he lacks that cool, patient, and deliberative turn of mind, which makes the metaphysician. He rushes forward like a mountain torrent, and when he is right, as he generally is, he sweeps errors before him with tremendous power. But in the vehemence of his progress he sometimes fails to respect those subsidiary considerations, which smaller minds might observe, and which are of real importance in the discussion. And when, in some rare instance, he happens to get on a wrong track, he lays all nature under requisition to furnish plausibility to his argument, and to reconcile his error with principles which he himself acknowledges and holds dear. It would be idle to refuse Dr. Chalmers the highest rank as to talent, but

most unjust to deny that his very impetuosity is unfavourable to inquiries which demand patience rather than gigantic ardour, and acuteness rather than strength.

If there are any who regard Chalmers as a model of good writing, we belong not to the number. For the sake of golden thoughts, bright and fresh from the mine, and abundant even to profuseness, we are willing to put up with a style which violates in turn every canon of criticism;—such in our judgment is the style of Chalmers. The mannerism is so obtruded upon us, the adventurous caprice of the language is so extreme, the diffuse irregularity is so gaudy, and (to use his own favourite figure of alliteration) so gorgeous and grandiloquent, that it is the highest tribute to his real greatness that the age has been willing to relish his beauties in such a dress. It is shower after shower—and when, as on an April morning, you think the refreshing irrigation has ceased for the day—down it pours again in a splendid repetition. There is no denying that this very profuseness makes him one of the most delightful writers of the day. Except his countryman Wilson, we know of none living who can more entirely make us forget every thing but his ever-varying train of glowing, and still more intensely glowing sentiment, and carry us along into the very paroxysm of feeling which he experiences himself. And this, while he is trampling upon every usage of the language, playing off upon us artifices of diction almost vulgar and almost barbarous, and flooding us with Scoticisms which need a glossary for their explanation.

We suppose Dr. Chalmers to be as diffuse as any author living; and even past ages may be safely challenged to furnish a philosopher or a theologian who has gone beyond him in this particular. Yet his is not the prolixity which wearies, or the amplification of weakness. True, there is a perpetual repetition, a revolution of the same orb, and we see the same body in new phases, but always with such changes of the accessories as make us willing to catch even the hundredth glimpse of the old friend, for the sake of the noble dress which decks and almost disguises him. The portraiture is the same, but always with a new back ground: the principal figure is constantly returning, but in new attitudes and with a new retinue. On this account it is, that almost every reader of Chalmers is disappointed, when he asks himself at the end of a book or chapter, What truths have I now learnt? The manner is admirably fitted to strike and

hold, and captivate, and thrill a popular assembly, for it has just those attributes which distinguish oral from written eloquence. But for the same reasons, and in the same proportion, it is unsatisfactory on subjects of philosophy or theology. The truth is, beyond a certain point there are no new conclusions, and it is new conclusions which we crave in an argument. After the first fair presentation of the grand thesis—and every discourse or treatise of the Professor's usually has one such—we are disappointed at finding, that, however delightfully the interval is filled with the music of his periods and the colours of his imagery, there is nothing added to this original proposition. A greater preacher, and we think a greater reasoner than Chalmers, has precisely expressed what we intend. The writer we mean is Robert Hall, and we leave our readers, as Dr. Gregory has left us, to fill the blank. “His mind resembles that optical instrument lately invented; what do you call it?”—“You mean, I presume, the kaleidoscope.” “Yes sir, it is just as if thrown into a kaleidoscope. Every turn presents the object in a new and beautiful form; but the object presented is still the same. Have you not been struck with the degree in which Dr. — possesses this faculty?”—“*His mind seems to move on hinges, not on wheels.* There is incessant motion, but no progress.”

If we were not commenting on one of the greatest men of our own or any age, we should have less fear about the imitation of his faults; but Chalmers seems destined to be followed by an endless procession of apes. It is therefore a duty we owe to the young to declare that his blemishes, though superficial, are broad and unsightly. His style is hasty, and may be cited to show that the mere use of the pen is no safe-guard against bad taste, inventions in language, incorrectness, vagueness, and verbosity.

The two great British preachers of our day, we suppose all to grant, have been Chalmers and Hall; both producing immense impression by their discourses as delivered, both ‘giants of mighty bone and bold emprise.’ Yet never were two great men more unlike. A writer in the *Quarterly Review* attributes the looseness and other deformities of Chalmers's diction to the Scottish practice of extemporaneous speaking, a practice fitted, says he, to cultivate preaching and spoil writing. This, like most flippant remarks, is unfounded: for it was the redundant Chalmers who never preached without a manuscript, and the classic Hall who

never wrote his sermons until he had preached them. No doubt, for common minds, and for the purpose of awakening present feeling, the amplification of Chalmers would be the most effective; but few can read his overloaded paragraphs a second time. To Hall, who, none will pretend, was less a reasoner, and who moved his auditories in a manner almost Demosthenic, we recur as to a model. Such is the fruit of wise care:

Ut pictura, poësis : erit quae, si propius stes,
Te capiet magis, et quaedam, si longius abstes.
Haec amat obscurum ; volet haec sub luce videri,
Judicis argutum quae non formidet acumen :
Haec placuit semel, haec decies repetita placebit.

Yet what are all these foibles when we consider the genuine grandeur of such a mind, in the perpetual, living, widening flow of thoughts like a mighty river, that scorns conventional boundaries, and rushes foaming and brilliant over all the bars and obstacles of puny criticism or puny argument. It is this which makes Chalmers the preacher that he is; this accelerative force and swelling torrent is the secret of his power. The coruscations of which we spoke above are not puerile ornaments, nor is the flame lambent and inoperative: on the contrary, the origin of the whole display is genuine earnestness, labouring with the imperfections of language, and making various successive efforts to communicate itself to the hearer. He rushes onward to a single object, and this he triumphantly gains. In the heat of the pursuit you are irresistibly carried along, and it is only when the course is over, and you begin to take breath, that you have time to discover how many a frail fence of rhetorical pasteboard or buckram has been overwhelmed by his fiery wheels. In his greatest sermons this is remarkably his manner, and here he is undoubtedly most successful. It is to be regretted that he has carried the same method too much from the pulpit to the theological chair. Such spirits are too ethereal to be un-stopped and examined in the closet. We are half of the mind of Fox, that a discourse must fall slightly short of the most available eloquence which will do to be printed.

In the discussion of high metaphysical and theological points, we do not find in Chalmers all that satisfaction which his fame had led us to expect. We should infer that his theological discipline had not familiarized him with the peculiar methods of the old Reformed Theologians. This school, beyond all others, is characterized by clearness, precision,

method, exact statement of the question, definition so multiplied and so exact as to preclude mistake, and concatenation of arguments almost mathematical. If the reader does not already recur in thought to the men we mean—that is, if his reading has been confined to theology in the English language—he has a pleasure yet in reserve, provided always, that he is capable of a logical pleasure. Let him go to Calvin, or to Turretine, or to any of the great Calvinists who wrote about the time of the Synod of Dort. They are as clear as a crystal current, and they never leave you a moment in doubt as to whither you are going. They boldly tell you what they mean to prove, and they generally accomplish their purpose. This is a method which exposes crude and shallow thinkers to great inconvenience, and which does not comport with the haste and discursive variety of our day. Now, we could wish that Doctor Chalmers, whose intellectual force is gigantic, and who has felt called upon to grapple with some of the most awful questions, had cultivated in his researches a clearer method of delivering himself, and had oftener descended to the homely task of laying down his series of propositions, and showing their connexion. In consequence of the defect which we have indicated, we cannot but think, that there are feebler men who are abler expounders of the faith.

A recent contest with the Earl of Aberdeen has shown how serenely true greatness, even when unsupported by rank or title, can carry itself over the little assumptions of mere worldly dignity. The insult cast upon this venerable clergyman will no doubt continue to be one of the most bitter recollections of its hasty author. The contest, of which this occurrence was a part, has already occupied many of our pages, and must employ us again; for we cannot be dead to any thing which concerns the freedom and independence of the church of our fathers. Doctor Chalmers, as is known to every Presbyterian reader, has identified himself with the orthodox part of the church, in this controversy, as its acknowledged champion. How successfully he has fought its battles in the General Assembly is known and felt by the adverse or Moderate portion of the church, who after having been the preponderating weight for a long period, have now given place to men of sounder principles; an event due, under Providence, chiefly to the labours of this single man.

In Great Britain, much more than in America, ministers

of the gospel feel a freedom to mingle in political and politico-economical controversies. This is easily accounted for. The union of church and state makes it the duty of all who are connected with either of the established churches, to keep a vigilant eye upon the rights secured to them by law. The higher clergy, therefore, both in England and Scotland, are familiar with many details of state proceedings, and are active and prominent in furthering great measures, even in cases where these are of the most delicate or the most momentous kind. This is known to all who are accustomed to read the reported speeches of the English bishops. That it is not equally true of the clergy of the Scottish church, arises from the fact, that while they belong to an established church, they have been most unequally dealt by, in having been denied any place or representation in the parliament of the United Kingdom. The only great deliberative body, therefore, in which the eloquence of the Scottish ecclesiastic can find an arena, is the General Assembly. Here Dr. Chalmers has long been a leader: and both here and elsewhere, both orally and in print, he has come forth with great boldness as the champion of opinions distasteful to a great class of minds, which it would have been natural for him to conciliate. His avowed predilections for a national establishment made him a sudden favourite with the dignitaries of the Anglican Church. His works were cited and lauded from the bench of bishops; his visits to the metropolis were courted and gazetted; and his Lectures on Establishments were frequented by the élite of the aristocracy. No clergyman in Scotland, if we except Sir David Brewster, who never entered on actual clerical functions, is so widely known as Chalmers. It was just in the height of this unexampled popularity, that the crisis occurred in the history of Scottish Presbyterianism, on the occasion of the Auchterarder affair. It might have been expected by one ignorant of Dr. Chalmers's opinions, that he would have ranged himself on the side on which is found so large a proportion of the Presbyterian rank and opulence. But the exact reverse took place; and be the event as it may, in regard to the independence of the Church, posterity will rank Chalmers with the Knoxes, Melvilles, Bruces, and Hendersons, of the heroic age of Reformation.

It strikes us as a pleasing fact, that as he advances in life, Dr. Chalmers becomes more and more a man of active effort. After a long and toilsome preparation in the closet

and the schools, he has come with great vigour into the heat of conflict. Certainly no endeavours of his life have been so public, so multiplied, or so efficacious, as those by which he has succeeded in bringing the great body of the Church of Scotland up to their present vantage-ground, in the contest for the Headship of the Lord Jesus Christ over his church.

Several works of the distinguished author have not been yet reached in this course of republication. If the complete series were before us, we could not be exempt from the duty of endeavouring to characterize Chalmers as a philanthropist. In all that regards the progress of society, the wealth of nations, the growth of knowledge and civilization, in a word Political Economy,—which, when not dissevered from religion, is in truth the Philosophy of Benevolence,—he is an enthusiast. Hence he cannot enter the lists even of Natural Theology, without breaking a lance with the English political-economists. We touch the subject here, however, in order to add, that Dr. Chalmers deserves as well as any man living the name of a Christian Philanthropist. His heart manifestly burns with an unquenchable love to his race, and his soul is as clearly penetrated with a conviction that Christianity is a perfect, as that it is an accessible remedy, for ‘the ills that flesh is heir to.’ His zeal has never, so far as we know, expended itself in fanatical agitation, or sought a vent through ephemeral and unscriptural movements of the people, but has taken the safer, wiser direction of holding out great lights for the guidance of senates, and especially for the national and municipal administration of his own country. It is too early to see the fruit of his labours, but our sagacity must go for little if the day do not come when some of the principles of his “Christian and Civic economy of Large Towns” will be the directory of states and churches in sending truth and holiness to the utmost ramifications of the social tree.

As we have not the books before us, we shall express no judgment as to the side which Dr. Chalmers has taken in the controversies respecting population, pauperism, and the allied subjects. Let it suffice to say, that he is not a desponding politician, and that his philanthropy is stimulated by an irrepressible hope. Greatly removed from the sentiments of those who, in the infidel sense, assert the perfectibility of the race, and augur a millennium from the mere workings of natural manhood, he takes his auspices from

heaven, and finds in Christianity a system of mighty principles, unfolding itself from age to age in an ever ready correspondence with every change in society and every new exigence of the people. The Scripture is his citadel and watch-tower of hope. And with its principles, he attaches himself with alacrity to all the great schemes of the age, which promise to enlighten and exalt the masses. No man has uttered more weighty arguments on the education of the people. On this topic, the extracts which here follow will be an interesting specimen of his manner as a preacher :

“ Did a king come to take up his residence amongst us—did he shed a grandeur over our city by the presence of his court, and give the impulse of his expenditure to the trade of its population—it were not easy to rate the value and the magnitude which such an event would have on the estimation of a common understanding, or the degree of personal importance which would attach to him, who stood a lofty object in the eye of admiring townsmen. And yet it is possible, out of the raw and ragged materials of an obscurest lane, to rear an individual of more inherent worth, than him who thus draws the gaze of the world upon his person. By the act of training in wisdom’s ways the most tattered and neglected boy who runs upon our pavements, do we present the community with that which, in wisdom’s estimation, is of greater price, than this gorgeous inhabitant of a palace. And when one thinks how such a process may be multiplied among the crowded families that are around us—when one thinks of the extent and the density of that mine of moral wealth, which retires and deepens, and accumulates, behind each front of the street along which we are passing—when one tries to compute the quantity of spirit that is imbedded in the depth and the frequency of these human habitations, and reflects of this native ore, that more than the worth of a monarch may be stamped, by instruction, on each separate portion of it—a field is thus opened for the patriotism of those who want to give an augmented value to the produce of our land, which throws into insignificance all the enterprises of vulgar speculation. Commerce may flourish, or may fail—and amid the ruin of her many fluctuations, may elevate a few of the more fortunate of her sons to the affluence of princes. Thy merchants may be princes, and thy traffickers be the honourable of the earth. But if there be truth in our text,* there may, on the very basis of human

* Eccle. iv. 13.

society, and by a silent process of education, materials be formed, which far outweigh in cost and true dignity, all the blazing pinnacles that glitter upon its summit—and it is indeed a cheering thought to the heart of a philanthropist, that near him lies a territory so ample, on which he may expatiate—where for all his pains, and all his sacrifices, he is sure of a repayment more substantial, than was ever wafted by richly laden flotilla to our shores—where the return comes to him, not in that which superficially decks the man, but in a solid increment of value fixed and perpetuated on the man himself—where additions to the worth of the soul form the proceeds of his productive operation—and where when he reckons up the profits of his enterprise, he finds them to consist of that, which, on the highest of all authorities, he is assured to be more than meat, of that which is greatly more than raiment.”

“And before I pass on to the application of these remarks, let me just state, that the great instrument for thus elevating the poor, is that gospel of Jesus Christ, which may be preached unto the poor. It is the doctrine of His cross finding an easier admission into their hearts, than it does through those barriers of human resistance, which are often reared on the basis of literature. Let the testimony of God be simply taken in, that on His own Son he has laid the iniquities of us all—and from this point does the humble scholar of Christianity pass into light, and enlargement, and progressive holiness. On the reception of this great truth, there hinges the emancipation of his heart from a thralldom which represses all the spiritual energies of those who live without hope, and, therefore, live without God in the world. It is guilt—it is the sense of his awakened and unexpiated guilt, which keeps man at so wide a distance from the God whom he has offended. Could some method be devised, by which God, jealous of his honour, and man jealous of his safety, might be brought together on a firm ground of reconciliation—it would translate the sinner under a new moral influence, to the power of which, and the charm of which, He, before, was utterly impracticable. Jesus Christ died, the just for the unjust, to bring us unto God. This is a truth, which, when all the world shall receive it, all the world will be renovated. Many do not see how a principle, so mighty in operation, should be enveloped in a proposition so simple of utterance. But let a man, by faith in this utterance, come to know that God is his friend, and that heaven is the home

of his fondest expectation; and in contact with such new elements as these, he will evince the reach, and the habit, and the desire of a new creature. It is this doctrine which is the alone instrument of God for the moral transformation of our species. When every demonstration from the chair of philosophy shall fail, this will achieve its miracles of light and virtue among the people—and however infidelity may now deride—or profaneness may now lift her appalling voice upon our streets—or licentiousness may now offer her sickening spectacles—or moral worthlessness may have now deeply tainted the families of our outcast and long-neglected population,—however unequal may appear the contest with the powers and the principles of darkness—yet let not the teachers of righteousness abandon it in despair; God will bring forth judgment unto victory, and on the triumphs of the word of his own testimony, will he usher in the glory of the latter days.

“There is one kind of institution that never has been set up in a country, without deceiving and degrading its people; and another kind of institution that never has been set up in a country, without raising both the comfort and the character of its families. We leave it to the policy of our sister kingdom, by the pomp and the pretension of her charities, to disguise the wretchedness which she cannot do away. The glory of Scotland lies in her schools. Out of the abundance of her moral and literary wealth, that wealth which communication cannot dissipate—that wealth which its possessor may spread and multiply among thousands, and yet be as affluent as ever—that wealth, which grows by competition, instead of being exhausted—this is what, we trust, she will be ever ready to bestow on all her people. *Silver and gold she may have none—but such as she has she will give—she will send them to school.* She cannot make pensioners of them—but will, if they like, make scholars of them. She will give them of that food by which she nurses and sustains all her offspring—by which she renders wise the poorest of her children—by which, if there be truth in our text, she puts into many a single cottager, a glory surpassing that of the mightiest potentates in our world. To hold out any other boon, is to hold out a promise which she and no country in the universe, can ever realize—it is to decoy, and then most wretchedly to deceive—it is to put on a front of invitation, by which numbers are allured to hunger, and nakedness, and contempt. It is to spread a ta-

ble, and to hang out such signals of hospitality, as draw around it a multitude expecting to be fed, and who find that they must famish over a scanty entertainment. A system, replete with practical mischief, can put on the semblance of charity, even as Satan, the father of all lying and deceitful promises, can put on the semblance of an angel of light. But, we trust, that the country in which we live will ever be preserved from the cruelty of its tender mercies—that she will keep by her schools, and her scriptures, and her moralizing process; and that, instead of vainly attempting so to force the exuberance of nature, as to meet and satisfy the demands of a population, whom she has led astray, she will make it her constant aim so to exalt her population as to establish every interest that belongs to them, on the foundation of their own worth and their own capabilities—that taunted, as she has been, by her contemptuous neighbour, for the poverty of her soil, she will at least prove, by deed and by example, that it is fitted to sustain an erect, and honourable, and high-minded peasantry; and leaving England to enjoy the fatness of her own fields, and a complacency with her own institutions, that we shall make a clean escape from her error, and never again be entangled therein—that unsexed by the false lights of a mistaken philanthropy, and mistaken patriotism, we shall be enabled to hold on in the way of our ancestors; to ward off every near and threatening blight from the character of our beloved people; and so to labour with the manhood of the present, and the boyhood of the coming generation, as to enrich our land with that wisdom which is more precious than gold, and that righteousness which exalteth a kingdom.”

ART. IV.—*A View of the Origin and Migrations of the Polynesian Nation; demonstrating their ancient Discovery and Progressive Settlement of the Continent of America.* By John Dunmore Lang, D. D., senior minister of the Scots Church, and Principal of the Australian College, Sidney. Author of an Historical, and Statistical account of New South Wales. London, 1834.

Archibald Alex and son

THE way in which America was originally peopled, or the nations of the old world from which the aborigines of