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I. THE DOCTRINE OF INSPIRATION AS AFFECTED  
BY THE ESSENTIAL RELATION BETWEEN  
THOUGHT AND LANGUAGE.

Do we think in words? Do we think only in words? Do we always when we engage in thought employ for that purpose language? Is it possible to think fruitfully, to think to any advantage, to think at all in any other way? On the assumption that one can think without words, is it possible to express, even to one's self, to formulate,—to communicate one's thoughts, *i. e.*, convey them intelligibly to others,—through any other medium? Must there not be some medium or vehicle for every form whatever of thought-expression; and must or must not that medium be language?

Some of these and kindred questions are not merely of curious interest, but also of profound significance and consequence, and have accordingly not only awakened the attention and occasioned and stimulated the researches of the great body of philologists and logicians, and the specialists in physiology proper, and of course those in mental physiology and what is now known as physiological psychology, but have also occupied the minds of some of the wisest philosophers and greatest intellects the world has ever seen. But what is still more to the purpose at present, the answers given to some of these questions have an incidental bearing on the inquiry as to the fact and extent of an infallible inspiration.

It will be the aim of this essay to indicate and touch upon the main problems which arise from a consideration of the more important of the interrogatories just referred to, and then to point

out briefly in what way some of the conclusions thus arrived at are obviously related to the doctrine of the plenary inspiration of the sacred Scriptures, and the special tenet, which we believe to be involved in that doctrine, of a universally infallible Bible.

It will, accordingly, be our endeavor to investigate the point, whether language, besides being, as is everywhere conceded, the ordinary *medium*, is also the invariable and indispensable *instrument* of our thinking. Manifestly either it is, or it is not. We shall, therefore, go on to consider the issues of this unavoidable alternative, and to show that in either case, that is, whether it be true or false that we can in some sense and to some extent think without words, the position is equally incontrovertible that there can be no communication, no formulation, no expression even of thought, without words or their equivalent; and that consequently the claim of infallibility for any given body of ideas *ipso facto* involves the claim of infallibility for the vesture of language in which those ideas are confessedly conveyed.

In the October number of the QUARTERLY for 1892, we gave a compact critique of Max Müller's *Science of Thought*, but reserved for subsequent and rather more particular consideration the principal theme of discussion in those deeply interesting volumes, namely, what the famous Anglo-German scholar and Oxford professor conceives to be the essential and inseparable relation betwixt thoughts and words.<sup>1</sup>

We now proceed to enter upon the examination to which we then looked forward. Following the well-established continental fashion, Dr. Müller pursues the historical method in connection with the one of critical philosophical inquiry, and sets before us a remarkable conspectus of the opinions and surmises of most of the expert logicians and philologists, and of some of the most notable amongst the world's great men and sages, on this difficult subject. He also, as would have been anticipated, favors us in advance, as well as in the progress and sequel of his argument-in-chief, with his own clear, resolute, vigorous, and striking views in reference to the matter.

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<sup>1</sup> As he does also betwixt words and things.

The great student of cognate vocabularies is not insensible to the danger of falling into logomachy in the conduct of this, as of other abstruse or intricate explorations which involve the use of terms that may vary in their meaning. Unfortunately he is not always on his guard against this source of fallacy. What is the precise shade of signification that we are to attach to the term "thought," and to the term "language"? When these definitions are agreed upon, the field of intelligent debate is at one stroke very much reduced in its dimensions. Men who before appeared to be at dagger's draw with one another in their attitude towards this problem, then are seen to be standing shoulder to shoulder. Max Müller would himself confine the term thought to the domain of concepts, and thinks a majority of writers on this subject, though by no means all the eminent ones, must be understood to have done the same. The term language he would extend so far as to make it include gestures, signals, and pantomime or dumb-show. It is sufficiently evident from this, that the man who affirmed and the man who denied the proposition in dispute would not be necessarily contradicting each other. For the man who affirmed that language is essential to thought, might by thought mean exclusively such thought as is involved in concepts; while the man who denied the statement, might by thought mean merely a vague percept, or a vanishing and illusory impression. Or, the first man might by language mean articulated words, whereas the second man might mean to comprehend under the term language that which is expressed in mute acting, or in symbolically suggestive rather than vocally or visibly declaratory signs.

We deem that we owe it to Professor Müller to allow, upon due attention to these distinctions, that on the whole he has made out a *prima facie* case as to the number of authorities who have taken his side in the controversy. We must, however, not forget the fable of the painter and the lion, or fail to bear in mind that the selection of the authorities is left, for the most part, in very partial, though very honorable, hands. It may be further conceded to him, that among these authorities, and we do not intend to travel much beyond his own register, are, perhaps, a small majority of the expert specialists in logic, as well as of those in the

special science concerning the phenomena and laws of articulate speech, and besides these some of the monarchs in the realm of intellectual speculation and achievement. Those which he does not cite may be safely relegated to one of the other classes.

There remains after this process of sifting a group of independent thinkers, some of whom appear, and others are known, to take the other side; and though these may not be quite to the same extent *multi* by the count, they would be admitted on all hands to be *multum* by the estimation of the scales. It may also be said, that several of the most conspicuous names on the affirmative side of the question are men who on other questions have maintained the side that could be clearly and forcibly made to seem to be the true one, rather than the side which, however awkward and difficult to champion, actually was the true one. As a counterpart statement it may be justly pleaded that an apparent adhesion to the affirmative can be attributed with propriety to some of the subtlest as well as most cautious of the special experts, as well as to some of the greatest thinkers of whom the world has record. It is thus seen to be "a pretty quarrel."

Professor Müller touches only incidentally, though shrewdly and knowingly, on the physiological and physiologico-psychological aspects of the question. It is our wish to say something on that branch of the subject on some other occasion.

Before making a survey of the authorities, we would interpose a word in passing. We cannot help thinking that Professor Müller is continually begging the question in dispute in his comments upon the views of those who have seen fit to take a different view, or who may be reasonably suspected of having done so, from the one he entertains himself and defends with so much zeal. He is also forever repeating, in varied forms of expression we admit, one and the same chime of bells. He exaggerates, too, the importance of the question itself when he represents it as—with its answer—lying at the root of all philosophy, and when he predicts or fancies that it is destined in the future to revolutionize the methods and conclusions of intellectual science. We are also convinced that this distinguished philologist is, unintentionally of course, hardly always quite fair in the accounts and criti-

cisms with which he favors us of the grounds respectively occupied by those writers who chance to be of a different mind from himself in this debate. At times he is faultlessly satisfactory as a reporter. He is, in our judgment, somewhat over eager to class amongst his aiders and abettors men who might with equal or greater show of reason be classed amongst his opponents. And when he half concedes the point, he is almost sure to speak of the writers' views as "vague" and their statements as "obscure." When he is constrained to give up all claim to a writer who manifestly belongs to the other camp, he is too prone to disparage the value of his testimony by asserting or insinuating that the writer never quite mastered the subject. Still he is careful to give us a judicious selection from the writers' own words, which enables the reader to judge fairly well for himself.

We shall not pursue the order adopted by Max Müller, but shall classify the authorities to suit ourselves. Our plan will be to take up first the declarations of the men who appear to agree with Max Müller in the view, of which he is himself so much enamoured, that language and thought are universally inseparable. We shall next examine what has been said by those who have not been entirely outspoken on this question, who have been silent or ambiguous, or who have spoken in tones of hesitation. We shall reserve for the last the exhibition of the views of those who stand arrayed on the opposite side of the question from the one taken by Professor Müller. We shall add but one or two to his own catalogue. We are on the whole content with the list, regarding it as, in the main, substantially a safe one as it stands.<sup>1</sup> It is

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<sup>1</sup> Our delightful compiler may in general be trusted out of sight, and he has displayed an "erudition" "prodeegious" enough even for Dominic Sampson. He would be sure to leave out, or neglect, none of the authorities on his own side, and we need no more on ours. On this basis we are half tempted to cite also the eminent authority of Professor Ludwig Noiré, to whom Max Müller's book is dedicated, the author of *Der Ursprung der Sprache*, in the second class, or those who are either dumb, or else dally or doubt. Max Müller debates with Professor Noiré through page after page and chapter after chapter of the second volume, yet he never once, so far as we have noticed, mentions Noiré's view on the point discussed chiefly in the first. We are strengthened in this impression of ours by the circumstance that Professor Müller should have reviewed Noiré's book on *The Origin of Language* in an essay entitled *The Origin of Reason*.

furthermore our purpose to revise, and even to reverse, several of the classifying judgments pronounced by Max Müller.

The only citations we are willing to make under either the first or the third head are those which are reasonably clear and unequivocal.

The first name to be called of the first class is that of the author of *The Leviathan*. "It is evident," says Hobbes, "That truth and falsity have no place but amongst such as use speech." This, of course, is indecisive. Nothing, however, could be more explicit than the following clever dictum: *Homo animal rationale, quia orationale*.<sup>1</sup>

Similarly Condillac, who maintained that "all science is but a well made language." Care must, however, be taken not to press too far what may have been intended merely as a Gallic paradox or figure of speech. But all the world is agreed about the learned abbé.

The late Archbishop Whately comes out boldly on the same side. Whately's opinion was that "Logic is entirely conversant with the use of language." A position that Sir William Hamilton protested was unworthy of an archbishop, but which was reasserted and ably defended by Sir William's astute commentator and remorseless critic, John Stuart Mill.

Turning now, for a change, to Germany, we find Herder, the founder of the historical school in that great bee-hive of industry and learning, committed to the unqualified statement, that "without language man could never have come to his reason," to which Doctor Müller appends the witty remark, "and, we might add, 'to his senses.'"<sup>2</sup>

From Herder we naturally pass to Hamann, the epigrammatic contemporary and the friend of Kant, who was himself one of the coëvals of Herder. Hamann was for "his short and telling oracular sayings" dubbed by his admirers "the Magus of the North."

<sup>1</sup> We might here raise the point as to exceptional instances, but we are good-natured and yield up Hobbes.

<sup>2</sup> Herder, *Ideen Zu Geschichte der Menschheit*. Müller, p. 44.

According to this Teutonic sorcerer, "language is not only the foundation for the whole faculty of thinking, but the central point also from which proceeds the misunderstanding of reason by herself."<sup>1</sup> Hamann's fearlessness, not to say audacity, no less than his acuteness and originality, express themselves in the exclamation, "The question with me is not, what is reason? but, what is language? And here I suspect is the ground of the paralogisms and antinomies with which reason is charged." To the same purport he says again: "Here I feel almost inclined to believe that our whole philosophy consists more of language than of reason, and the misunderstanding of numberless words, the prosopopœias of the most ordinary abstraction, the antitheses *τῆς φευδωνύμου γνώσεως*; nay, the commonest figures of speech of *the sensus communis* have produced a whole world of problems which can no more be raised than solved. What we want is a Grammar of Reason."<sup>2</sup> This, we are free to say, strikes us as nothing but dazzling superficiality.

Max Müller plainly has the high authority of William Von Humboldt to support him in what to some might appear to be his eccentric attitude; an "authority" to which he is fully justified in appealing as having been "equally great, both as a scholar and as a thinker," in the heroic epoch of scholarship in Germany. It will be remembered that this, the far-famed and philosophic linguist, who was as great and famous a man in his special lines as his encyclopedic brother Alexander in his wider sphere, was one of the very first of the few who near the beginning of the century that is now drawing towards its close broke ground for the new, and then scarcely nascent, science of comparative philology. Sir William Humboldt's position on the question we are now examining, is one which hardly admits of misconstruction. "If," he declares, "we separate intellect and language, such a separation does not exist in reality." . . . "The language of a people is its mind, and

<sup>1</sup> Gildemeister, *Hamann's Leben und Schriften*, Vol. III., p. 71. In Müller, Vol. I., p. 43.

<sup>2</sup> Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, translated by M. M., Vol. I., p. xxix. In Müller, Vol. I., p. 43.

its mind is its language; we can never conceive the two as sufficiently identical.”<sup>1</sup>

It is interesting to put side by side with this emphatic deliverance the kindred utterances of the great idealistic metaphysicians, Schelling and Hegel, and the great rationalistic and semi-pantheistic critic and theologian, Schleiermacher.

This is what Schelling says: “Without language it is impossible to conceive philosophical, nay, even any human, consciousness.” To the same purport that Corypheus of analytic thought in modern Germany, the problematic Hegel, announces to mankind that “we think in names,”—appearing to imply that we do so in no other way.<sup>2</sup>

Schleiermacher, who powerfully leavened the speculative and religious thinking of the dawning century, expressed himself in the same unambiguous fashion: “Thinking,” he writes, “and speaking are so entirely one that we can only distinguish them as internal and external; nay, even as internal every thought is already a word.”<sup>3</sup>

Dean Mansel, the pupil and editor of Sir William Hamilton, who is usually either at one with the dauntless Stagirite of Scotland, or else sends his cloth-yard shaft a bow-shot beyond him, here for once asserts his own individuality, and differs from his renowned preceptor *toto cælo*. What he says on the subject before us is characteristically clear and able, and is not susceptible of perversion. Here is one of his numerous statements: “That language, verbal or other, is inseparable from thought, is rendered morally certain by the impossibility under which we labor of forming universal notions without the aid of voluntary symbols.”<sup>4</sup> The noted author of *The Limits of Religious Thought*, is, if possible, more explicit still in another of his perspicuous declarations. “As a matter of necessity,” he says, “men must think by symbols; as

<sup>1</sup> *Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaus*, Vol. II., p. 52, ed. Pott. In Müller, Vol. I., p. 44.

<sup>2</sup> We raise no point here, and yield Hegel as we yielded Hobbes. We nevertheless must be pardoned for doubting if anybody ever did find out exactly what Hegel was driving at.

<sup>3</sup> *Dialektik*, p. 449. In Müller, Vol. I., p. 44.

<sup>4</sup> *Letters, Lectures, and Reviews*, p. 8. In Müller, Vol. I., p. 49.



a matter of fact, they do think by language." What follows this is highly interesting, but must be omitted.<sup>1</sup>

We close this list of the acknowledged, or fairly presumable, factors of the theory advocated by Max Müller by introducing, with the *εἰ φανεῖται* with which Eusebius estimated the canonical value of the Apocalypse, the distinguished name of the younger Mill. We refer now to Mill's maturest utterances on this subject. Presently we shall see that his earlier ones, in his *Inductive Logic*, were of a wholly different character.

In his masterly critique upon the writings of Sir William Hamilton, Mill takes that Achilles of the insular metaphysics to task for the view the great Scotchman had presented of the matter now occupying our attention; a view which we shall soon inspect, and which in its illustrated form and interpreted agreeably to his own ideas, came near satisfying, as it quite charmed, Professor Müller himself, but failed to meet the even more exacting demands of Sir William's cool-headed English censor. Mill, in the course of his acute comments on Sir William's statements, all at once insists upon it that concepts, or what are called general notions, cannot be formed without the aid of signs.<sup>2</sup> These signs he contends, need not be, and are not, conventional or artificial, but are natural. He argues that we think by means of concrete phenomena, as presented in experience and represented in imagination; and of names, which, by reason of association with certain elements of the concrete images, arrest and fix our attention on those elements. "To say," he continues, "that we think by means of concepts, is only a circuitous and obscure way of saying that we think by means of general or class names."<sup>3</sup>

The richly decorated Doctor of Oxford contends at this point that when once fairly confronted with the champions of the view that concepts precede names, and that while it is easier to think in names\* it is possible to think in concepts as yet unnamed, Mill makes a radical advance upon the ground he occupied originally, viz., in the "logic," and "is in possession of the whole truth," and

<sup>1</sup> *North British Review*, 1850. In Müller, Vol. I., p. 49.

<sup>2</sup> *Examination of Sir William Hamilton*, p. 384. In Müller, Vol. I., p. 47.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 387. In Müller, Vol. I., p. 48.

in entire agreement with Professor Müller himself. This result he thinks grew out of Mill's eventual perception of "the truth," that names are natural instead of being artificial signs. It does look as if there might be something in this. In his latest enunciations, Mill did have the air of having gone over bag and baggage to the other side. Whether this is only another case of a man who has changed his opinions but is incapable of answering his own arguments, is a very different question.

In connection with this matter Mill's subtle no less than learned expounder makes one of the most striking and pregnant remarks to be found in his voluminous writings. Doctor Müller finely points out that *nomen*, name, is the result of *notio*, which denotes the act, although often taken for the result of the act, just as *conceptio* is often taken for *conceptum*; and he holds that if Mill had always perceived this he would have occupied a different position from the one he actually occupied at the first. Then comes the remark to which we just now called attention, and which is this: that if Sir William Hamilton had himself only discerned the true relation between *notio* and *nomen*, he would thus have gained the best foundation possible for his otherwise rather rickety theory of the identity at bottom of Conceptualism and Nominalism. Mill elsewhere inveighs against that attempted identification; yet Doctor Müller keenly argues that there is little difference observable between the position assumed by the Scotch philosopher and the final view of his English critic, viz., that we think by means of ideas and of names conjointly.<sup>1</sup>

We have now arrived at that stage in our progress of citation that it is in order to refer to the views of those writers who either give a wavering or hesitating answer to the question principally discussed in *The Science of Thought*, or else are silent, or more or less ambiguous on the point at issue.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> *The Science of Thought*, Vol. I., p. 48. The difference is no more than that between *almost* and *quite*.

<sup>2</sup> In speaking of those who make no declaration of their views on the point in question, we have reference only to the few great leaders of human opinion in general, and the well-known specialists in philology and logic. Our interesting Oxford friend is apt in certain moods to "claim the earth," but neither he nor we would venture to count all the absolutely silent members of the human family in either one of the three classes.

It should be stated that Professor Müller counts on his side not only the testimonies of individual men, but what he considers to be the implications of the scholastic philosophy, and also those of the Greek and Sanskrit tongues. We do not ourselves scruple to class these *en bloc* testimonies in the second, not the first, division. Max Müller finds ingenious support for his favorite dictum respecting language and thought in the double use of the Greek word *λόγος* to denote on the one hand speech, and on the other, reason. The later distinction between the *λόγος προφορικός*, or the spoken word, and the *λόγος ενδιάθετος*, or the inner thought, he regards as a backward movement in analysis, if meant to be anything more than a distinction between two sides of the same thing. This may or may not have been the case, but in either event we are disposed to look upon the distinction as an advance in philosophic precision, and as leaving the testimony of the Greek language, so far as it has any bearing at all upon the present investigation, in the category of doubt.<sup>1</sup>

Max Müller regards the early Hindus as having been even more philosophical than the Greeks; they can at any rate be classed more speciously with his supporters, since their term for things in general, *πραγματα*, *res*, was *padârtha*, which signifies "meaning of the word." So, too, certain of the representative schoolmen defined the essence as the meaning of a name.<sup>2</sup> "What a man thinks with his mind," says the *Kkândogya Upanishad*, "that he speaks with his tongue, so says the *Sruti*, (revelation)."<sup>3</sup> Dr. Müller, however, goes too far when he insists that an attempt is here made to express the simultaneity of the two acts.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Max Müller has more colorable if not really solid ground for citing the illustrious name of Plato on his side, notwithstanding the latitude of meaning given to this very word *λόγος*. It is true we should greatly prefer an answer direct, and not merely by construction, to the inquiry we are now making. But the antithesis, the sense thus obtained, and above all the *ὢν ἄν*, appear to leave us no clear option. The sentence quoted is from the *Theætetus*, p. 189 E., and is as follows: τὸ διανοεῖσθαι λόγος, ὅν αὐτῇ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἢ ψυχῇ διεξέρχεται περὶ ὧν ἄν σκοπεῖ.

<sup>2</sup> See T. H. Green, Works, Vol. II., p. 221. In Müller, Vol. I., p. 35.

<sup>3</sup> *The Science of Thought*, Vol. I., p. 47.

<sup>4</sup> He elsewhere speaks of the difficulty of expressing this alleged simultaneity by similes, as he has demonstrated by his own simile of the orange and its peel.

Abelard's words are: *Sermo generatur ab intellectu, et generat intellectum*. We may admit that the rationalistic schoolman here employs "the quaint yet very telling expression," that language is begotten by intellect and in turn begets intellect, without necessarily agreeing with Professor Müller that he does so "in order to express the inseparableness of language and intellect."

We, therefore, class this great Twelfth Century Nominalist and semi-rationalist, *not* as Max Müller would, in the first, but in the second, group of our authorities, viz., those in reference to whose settled opinions on this subject we are insufficiently apprized.<sup>1</sup>

In the same division, we insist, should probably be placed Abelard's and Aquinas's Master Aristotle, and possibly that also of the worthy successors of the great Greeks, and of Cicero and Augustine.<sup>2</sup>

Professor Müller has some good remarks on the accuracy of thought to be met with in the discussions of the schoolmen—a class of thinkers often derided by those who know nothing about them and who are pigmies where they were giants. The great mediæval controversy, that has not yet been absolutely silenced betwixt the Realists and the Nominalists, brought up at once the question concerning ideas and their verbal signs. Those great disputants, like the earlier philosophers of the modern period, worked in the dark where light has now fallen from "the historical and comparative study of languages" in the present century. Of the mediæval writers, too, it should be added, that their

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<sup>1</sup> Abelard studied Nominalism under its founder, Roscelin, and in a measure anticipated in his day the great *naturalistic* movement of the later centuries.

<sup>2</sup> The author of *The Science of Thought* mentions the name of Aristotle fourteen or fifteen times in those two volumes, and discusses more than one of his opinions. If he thought the Stagirite was with him he would have been sure to say so, and apt to have done so if he regarded him as hostile; but he does neither. Yet he might have argued for Aristotle just as plausibly as for the schoolmen, and on the the same ground, viz., his definition of *essence*. This, and also Plato's, the reader, we think, may find in Bishop Lightfoot's excursus on the word *μορφή*. We have not our Aristotle, or Dr. Lightfoot's *Commentary on the Philippians*, by us as we write. We should be charmed to know the view of Pascal. As to Augustine, the words quoted in *The Science of Thought* are too general to decide a question bearing on exceptions. *Cogitamus, sed verba cogitamus*. Ostensibly here the African thinker stands with Plato and—Max Müller.

labors preceded the eras marked by the *Novum Organon* of Francis Bacon, and the *Principia* of Newton.

We now cite the great name of David Hume—one of the most renowned of modern historians, one of the most plain and influential writers of his generation, being one of the conspicuous ornaments of the eighteenth century, and without doubt one of the most subtle, adroit, and perspicacious of his fellow-countrymen, though sophistical and misleading.<sup>1</sup>

Hume accepted Berkeley's view that we have no general concepts (percepts), but only particular ones with corresponding terms annexed, giving them a wider meaning. "But," concedes Professor Müller, "whether he thinks that we can have ideas with this extensive signification without such terms, he does not say, at least I have not been able to find any decisive passage on this subject."<sup>2</sup>

Archbishop Thompson in his *Laws of Thought*, 1860, p. 46, admits that any theory is pressed by logical absurdities which affirms the possibility that either thought or language can antedate the other; "yet," Doctor Müller is constrained to testify that the cautious prelate "hesitates to draw the only conclusion," which he holds would be legitimate from such premises.<sup>3</sup>

With equal circumspection Mr. Jevons, in his latest work, expresses himself in such a way that we were inclined to put him down as one of Max Müller's positive opponents. We shall nevertheless be fair to the limit of generosity, and class him with "the *non liquets*."

Mr. Jevons says: "We can hardly think without the proper words coming into the mind, and we can certainly not make known to other people our thoughts and arguments unless we use words."<sup>4</sup> Professor Müller, in commenting on this admirable statement queries, falling *suo more* little short of a *petitio principii* in doing so, what should we think of a manual of music that should inform us that we can hardly sing at all without the proper notes coming into our mind, and that we can certainly not make known to other people our songs unless we use notes?

<sup>1</sup> *The Science of Thought*, Vol. I., p. 38.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid*, Vol. I., p. 42.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid*, Vol. I., p. 36.

<sup>4</sup> *Logic*, in *Science Primers*, p. 23. In Müller, Vol. I., p. 36.

Here, in our judgment, the learned commentator was either merely joking or else has blundered. The analogy is in more ways than one sufficiently diverting, but it is deceptive. Songs, in the proper sense of the term, must be sung through the exercise of the vocal organs, and are essentially audible; but thoughts may and do exist in the mind that are never communicated by the thinker to others.

Professor Fowler, in his *Elements of Deductive Logic*, occupies a similar but somewhat bolder ground. After speaking of the dispute that has been constantly going on amongst logicians and psychologists as to whether it is possible to think without the aid of language, he observes, that all logicians are agreed that we cannot *communicate* our thoughts without the aid of words or of equivalent signs, and for himself contends that practically we do always think through the instrumentality of language.

Professor Fowler does not, however, consider a logician bound to decide the point. The safer phraseology he is inclined to think is that of those authors who hold a belief like that of Max Müller in this controversy. He is far from expressing himself dogmatically, but on the whole would rather speak himself of terms and propositions than of concepts and judgments.<sup>1</sup> This is certainly a very qualified statement, and at last an acknowledgment of hesitation.

The late distinguished Professor T. H. Green is admitted by the author of *The Science of Thought* to have been "certainly an honest and painstaking thinker," but to have evaded "a straightforward answer to this," which his learned, if whimsical, critic pronounces the "question of all questions," by the rather perfunctory remark, that "it is hard, some say impossible, to think without expressing thought in language."<sup>2</sup> This remark strikes us not as perfunctory, but as just—no less than compendious; and as likely to have proved more embarrassing than gratifying in certain quarters.

We are now prepared to summon to the witness-box representatives of that class of writers who judged by all, or by some, of

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<sup>1</sup> *The Science of Thought*, Vol. I., p. 37.

<sup>2</sup> T. H. Green, *Works*, ed. R. L. Nettleship, Vol. II., p. 175. In Müller, Vol. I., p. 37.

their utterances, unquestionably take sides *against* Max Müller in this debate; holding, as they do, that language, or its equivalent, while it is, beyond question, the only vehicle for the conveyance of thought, and also the usual instrument of our thinking, is not in the invariable sense the indispensable instrument of our thinking.

Let us go back for a moment and refresh our memories as to what is the precise point in dispute. It is not whether language, either in the narrower or wider acceptation of the term, is rigidly necessary for the *expression* or *communication* of thought. Everybody, or nearly everybody, worth attending to is agreed about that. Neither, which amounts, however, to much the same thing, is it whether language, broadly considered, is the invariable *vehicle* of thought—when thought has to be or is conveyed. There is scarcely one who has the temerity to deny that. Nor is the question whether language is the ordinary, the prevailing, or even the *almost* invariable instrument of thought. Part of this interrogative statement would be affirmed by all, and the rest, clearly so if the term “thought” be confined to concepts, would be disputed, if by any, but by few. The exact point of difference between the two sides in this encountre of wits, is as to whether language—taking the term liberally—is *absolutely* the requisite and invariable instrument of our thinking.

The first witness we call for the traverser is no less important a one than John Locke, who, when he admits that “in treating of mental propositions, language is *almost* unavoidable,<sup>1</sup> obviously implies that it is, or may be not *quite* so.” This is honorably, but sadly, admitted by Max Müller in the following ample manner: “But what can philosophy do with such an *Almost*? By this *Almost*, Locke admits the possibility of thought without language; nay, in another place, he actually imagines that men, after they had formed their ideas, might, simply for the sake of social intercourse, have chosen certain words arbitrarily as the marks of certain ideas.”<sup>2</sup>

The next to testify is Bishop Berkeley. How great and good a name this is, no reader of this review can well be ignorant.

<sup>1</sup> *The Science of Thought*, Vol. I, p. 38.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 39.

Max Müller is even more put out with Berkeley than he was with Locke, and it does indeed seem a pity that so many of the world's foremost advisers in such matters should have deliberately gone aside out of the path in which the benevolent Oxford professor walks secure as if by instinct.

There was, according to Professor Müller, one redeeming feature in Locke's belief. Locke was a Nominalist, and held to the inseparable connection betwixt words and general ideas. He went further: he argued from the absence of language in the brutes, the non-existence of general ideas in the brute mind. Berkeley, on the other hand, was so fully convinced that he could strip ideas bare of all names, that in the introduction to his treatise concerning the principles of human understanding<sup>1</sup> (1710), he declares: "Since, therefore, words are so apt to impose on the understanding [I am resolved in my inquiries to make as little use of them as possibly I can<sup>2</sup>] whatever ideas I consider I shall endeavor to take them bare and naked into my view, keeping out of my thoughts so far as I am able, those names which constant use has so strictly united with them."<sup>3</sup>

We now pass across the seas to obtain the testimony of the illustrious Leibnitz. Leibnitz was the greatest of these "universal geniuses" who seemed to have rather abounded in the latter part of the sixteenth and the whole of the seventeenth centuries.<sup>4</sup> But Leibnitz was as deep, as original, as "creative," as he was large. Leibnitz is not everywhere the safest of guides, but he is as much so as many of his illustrious coëvals and successors. Leibnitz's express assertion, in the *Dialogus de connexione inter res et verba* (1679), that thought is impossible without words, receives a significant qualification from what he puts into the mouth of A, who makes answer: "*Imo si characteres abessent, numquam quicquam distincte cogitaremus neque ratiocinaremur.*"<sup>5</sup> This at once determines the

<sup>1</sup> *Works*, ed. Fraser, Vol. I., p. 152. In Müller, Vol. I., p. 41.

<sup>2</sup> This Irish bull is said to have been omitted in the second edition. See Müller, Vol. I., p. 42.

<sup>3</sup> See Max Müller, Vol. I., pp. 41 and 42.

<sup>4</sup> We do not forget that Leibnitz lived on into the eighteenth.

<sup>5</sup> Leibnitz, ed. Erdmann, p. 77; Geiber, *Sprache und Erkennen*, p. 144. In Müller, Vol. I., p. 42, n.



position of Leibnitz as belonging to the class of those who take the negative in this special controversy.

The name we next call is the imposing one of Kant—the but half-dethroned monarch of speculative thought in Germany to-day. Max Müller, himself an enthusiastic Kantian, confesses his inability to get at Kant's view on this subject. But Max Müller is apt to be slightly color-blind when contemplating the view of an opponent whom he wishes to class among his friends. Kant, in *Anthropologie*, § 36, says that to think is to speak with one's self. Kant admits that without an expression accurately corresponding to its concept, we cannot become quite intelligible either to ourselves or others. But Doctor Müller sees and allows that that is not the point to be determined.<sup>1</sup> Kant does call language the greatest, but his Anglo-German reporter concedes and draws attention to the fact that the sage of Königsberg does not call language the *only* instrument of understanding ourselves and others.<sup>2</sup> We venture to add—what Professor Müller would not care to deny—that the very declaration that language is the greatest instrument of our thinking, would, especially in the case of such a marvellously analytic mind as that which conceived and constructed the *Critique of Pure Reason*, seem fairly to imply that there were, or might be, lesser ones.

We proceed to lay before the honorable judges the affidavit of another and an especially sharp and dispassionate witness, by submitting to the court the gloomy and yet glittering pages of Schopenhauer, the more popular of the two far-famed representatives of the school of modern Pessimism.<sup>3</sup> Max Müller's endorsement of Schopenhauer's entire competency as an expert is frank and hearty, where he speaks of him as “generally so much more bold and keen-sighted than either” Hegel or Schelling. If Professor Müller was pensive in his references to Locke, and miserable in his references to Berkeley and Kant, he is in a state of dejection that borders on despair and mutiny when he comes to Schopenhauer. Ah, how could it be otherwise when the imperturbable exponent of the scheme of

<sup>1</sup> *The Science of Thought*, Vol. I., p. 42.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 42.

<sup>3</sup> The other was, of course, Hartmann.

theoretic wretchedness "expresses himself," but not, as it appears to us, "somewhat obscurely," after this hopeless fashion: "Thoughts die the moment they are embodied in words."<sup>1</sup> Once more this prince of metaphysical paradox goes on to say in plain terms, "So important an instrument of the intellect as the concept cannot be identical with the word—a mere sound." The troubled commentator, while owning the gravity of the situation, here manfully and justly protests that the word is not a *mere* sound. But does the shifty pessimist whose view he is considering actually mean here to imply that there are, or may be, *other*, although *less* important, instruments of thought than language? It certainly looks that way. The doughty champion of purely verbal thought obtains but a crumb of comfort from Schopenhauer's partial, but by no means conclusive, admission: "Nevertheless the concept is a presentation, the clear consciousness and preservation of which depends on the word." But the disconsolate reporter and critic owns that the prospect of any aid from Schopenhauer is dim, indeed, when that frisky foe to philosophic happiness fires hot shot at him in the following remorseless way: "Nevertheless the concept is totally distinct both from the word on which it depends, and from the perceptions from which it has sprung." This awful statement Doctor Müller admits settles the question as to the status in relation to the problem under discussion of this aggravating detector of the world's ultimate and irremediable disaster, and thinks it justifies his own remark that "Schopenhauer never reasoned out the true relation between words and thoughts"; which is tantamount to saying that upon the main question under examination Schopenhauer had come to a different conclusion from the one very confidently arrived at by Max Müller himself.

The authority next to be appealed to is that of the Oxford teacher's own old preceptor at Leipzig—the venerable, the honored and admired Lotze.<sup>2</sup> Lotze took the place of mark in metaphysical Germany that had been vacated by Trendelenburg, and, like

<sup>1</sup> *Paralipomena*, II., p. 52. See, however, *Welt als W. und V.*, p. 511. *Ethik*, p. 148. In Müller, Vol. I., p. 45, foot-note.

<sup>2</sup> Max Müller also attended the lectures of Schelling at Berlin, and knew Schopenhauer and the Chevalier Bunsen.

him, belonged to that series of commanding thinkers, who, beginning with Kant, have filled not only all Teutonic centres but Europe and the world with their influence and their renown. The two more recent of the names just mentioned signalize a strong conservative reaction against the speculative skepticism that had for so long a time retained its ascendancy on the continent.

It would be interesting to know just what Trendelenburg's notion was on the curious subject under consideration. He is not referred to in *The Science of Thought*, and the surmise may or may not be a groundless one that he never committed himself one way or the other.

With Lotze it was different. We cannot with his accomplished pupil observe any "hesitation," only a becoming caution and prudence as well as fairness, in what he has to say upon this topic. It is true that Lotze remarks of logic that it "has never concerned itself with a thought which did not make its various ideas, one after another, the object of its attention, which did not move amongst them comparing and relating them to each other, and which did not symbolize abstract ideas by spatial images, which finally did not express its thoughts in the forms and constructions of a language."<sup>1</sup> But he is equally emphatic in the announcement, that "the logical meaning of a proposition is in itself independent of the form in which language expresses it," and that whether or not he speaks of more than one instance of the kind, "an inward act of analysis and combination would remain the same if it employed other forms of communication."<sup>2</sup> We can sympathize with the author of *The Science of Thought* when he inquires how we could ever arrive at the logical meaning of a proposition *except* through language, and what *other* forms of communication Lotze can be dreaming of. If indeed he only means numbers or hieroglyphics, Max Müller would withdraw his protest, and agree to widen the definition of language so as to include such signs. But all this does not touch the question as to where Lotze stands in

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<sup>1</sup> Lotze, *Logic*, translated by B. Bosanquet, p. 476. In Müller, p. 38.

<sup>2</sup> *The Science of Thought*, Vol. I., p. 38.

this trial, which is plainly with the traverser and not with the plaintiff.

We at this point make a somewhat retrograde movement in order to cite in evidence the earlier view on this head of that lynx-eyed investigator of difficult subjects, the late J. S. Mill. That perspicuous and courageous thinker, like Aristotle and the schoolmen and the German masters and Sir William Hamilton, was equally an expert in logic and in philosophy. In his celebrated work on *Inductive Logic*, Mill clearly seems to us to have, for the time being at any rate, aligned himself with those who dissent from the view since so attractively advocated by Professor Müller. His own language will scarcely admit of any other construction. "Reasoning," he says, "or inference, the principal subject of logic, is an operation which usually takes place by means of words, and in all complicated cases can take place in no other way." Professor Müller appropriately remarks here that Mill nowhere points out "in what other way it might," however exceptionally, "be possible to reason . . . without language." But it might be rejoined that Mill was not absolutely required to do that. Besides, that is not the question immediately before us. The question pending at this moment is not the one, elsewhere discussed, as to the *legitimacy*, but the question as to the *nature*, of the views entertained, and as to *this* question, the language just quoted from Mill leaves no loop-hole for doubt. The affirmation that a man "usually" talks with his mouth, would fairly imply that a woman does not do so, or else might be understood to intimate that talking is sometimes done with the ear or the nose. Notwithstanding Doctor Müller's faint protest against this conclusion as to the position occupied by Mill, it would appear to be sustained by other things that Mill says. Thus, Mill contends that language is one of the *principal* elements or helps of thought which certainly justifies the inference that thought has, or may have, certain *other* principal elements or helps besides language.<sup>1</sup> This is quite consistent, it appears to us, with what he broadly allows in another passage,

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<sup>1</sup> This view of Mill's meaning is fully confirmed by the whole context in the *Logic*. We could make other extracts exactly to this purport from his clear and decisive statements.

viz., that "language is a catalogue raisonné of the notions of all mankind,"<sup>1</sup> and is not to be confounded with the more extreme affirmation of Condillac, that all science is but a well-made language. As is pointed out in Professor Müller's own volume, Mill himself assails Condillac for ever uttering such a dictum, "and with a warmth quite unusual in so mellow a reasoner." What a red rag is to a bull that Doctor Müller would have us to believe what Mill calls "mere names," are to the English critic. He distrusted and he decried what he stigmatized as "verbal knowledge." Mill, it is asserted, was affrighted and enraged by "the spectre of Nominalism."

Max Müller favors us at this point with some of his own finest observations. On a desert island a gold coin worth a pound sterling might be a mere sovereign to a wrecked sailor, but that same coin in England would stand for food and life. So, he reminds us, "a name in a living language is never a mere name. A name is nothing if it is not the name of a thing, a thing is nothing if it is not the thing of a name."<sup>2</sup> Mill in some places fully recognizes this. Mill too admits that "we think" "to a considerable extent by means of names;" he does not, however, hold with Max Müller that we do so "always and altogether." Both these writers have valuable remarks on the kind of thinking that is carried on by algebraic and other artificial signs; what Leibnitz has called "symbolical thought."<sup>3</sup> What we mean by names must be determined by definition, and is variable from time to time. As our knowledge widens and advances, our names must undergo a corresponding change. Max Müller illustrates this necessity by saying that a soldier's cartridge may be either little or much, either damp or dry, and he might have added, it may be either properly or improperly charged and rammed, but unless he has some sort of a cartridge—the learned Professor means *load*—in the chamber of his gun, he will be unable to fire it off.

The next witness on this side, and the last one that we shall call in the line of professional philosophers and logicians, is Sir

<sup>1</sup> Vol. I., p. 25. In Müller, Vol. I., p. 33.

<sup>2</sup> *The Science of Thought*, Vol. I., p. 34.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 34.

William Hamilton, the wizard scholar and champion critic of the North. We should do well too if we gave heed to his well-considered utterances.

Sir William Hamilton's position is unequivocally that the concept must always *precede* the name.<sup>1</sup> This position he elucidates by two capital illustrations. "Language," he contends,<sup>2</sup> "is the attribution of signs to our cognitions of things. But as a cognition must have been already there before it could receive a sign, consequently that knowledge which is denoted by the formation and application of a word must be preceded by the symbol which denotes it." Here Sir William introduces his first illustration. "A sign," he says, "is necessary to give stability to our intellectual progress,—to establish each step in our advance as a new starting-point for our advance to another beyond. A country may be overrun by an armed host, but it is only conquered by the establishment of fortresses. Words are the fortresses of thought. They enable us to realize our dominion over what we have already overrun in thought; to make every intellectual conquest the basis of others still beyond."

If Doctor Müller admires this illustration, and he declares it to be a most happy one, he is fairly carried away with the second, and well-nigh (playfully) convinced by it that Hamilton had become his convert. Here it is: "You have all heard," continued Sir William Hamilton, "of the process of tunnelling—of tunnelling through a sand-bank. In this operation it is impossible to succeed, unless every foot, nay, almost every inch, in our progress, be secured by an arch of masonry before we attempt the excavation of another. Now language is to the mind precisely what the arch is to the tunnel. The power of thinking and the power of excavation are not dependent on the words in the one case or the masonry in the other; but without these subsidiaries, neither pro-

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<sup>1</sup> Max Müller appends to this the similar doctrine of Renan: "Prétendre que dans l'esprit humain la notion de la chose signifiée ne précède pas celle du signe, que l'homme spontané crée le symbole avant de savoir bien précisément ce qu'il y met c'eût été vraisemblablement parler une langue inintelligible en un temps où l'on était convaincu que l'esprit humain avait toujours procédé selon les règles tracées par l'abbé de Condillac." *Etude d'histoire religieuse*, p. 11.

<sup>2</sup> Examination, p. 379. *The Science of Thought*, p. 46.

cess could be carried on beyond its rudimentary commencement. Though, therefore, we allow that every movement forward in language must be determined by an antecedent movement in thought, still, unless thought be accompanied at each point of its evolution by a corresponding evolution of language, its further development is arrested."

Mill, in his *rôle* of critic of Hamilton, was not satisfied by either of these comparisons; but Max Müller seems almost ready to clap his hands and cry "*brava*" at the one just given. He is so captivated, indeed, that he actually exclaims that "there could not be a more accurate or a more telling simile of the progress of thought and language." He of course regards the two processes in both cases, the physical and psychological, as being simultaneous,<sup>1</sup>—Sir William Hamilton, as being closely successive.

Max Müller's own illustrations are also ingenious, by which he endeavors to show the inseparable connection—by some of them the organic identity—of language and thought. After all, it would sometimes look as if this crafty rhetorician, though far from wishing to impose on others, had unwittingly imposed upon himself, by now and then enunciating, or making out that he holds a rather more extreme ground than he really occupies. If language and thought are in one sense the same, he would hardly be willing to say that it is only as the dark and bright sides of the moon, or the silver and gold sides of the shield are the same, *i. e.*, as being the two complements of a common whole.<sup>2</sup> But he does say, and says with truth, that we should be on our guard against the error that things which can be distinguished from one another must necessarily have an independent existence. We can distinguish, he tells us, between the hair and the scalp, but the hair must have something to grow on. We can distinguish between the orange and the orange-peel, but there can be, so he says, no orange without a peel, and no peel without an orange. We can distinguish, he goes on, between the colors on the surface of the orange-peel and the surface itself, "but *in rerum naturá* no color

<sup>1</sup> *The Science of Thought*, p. 47.

<sup>2</sup> These two illustrations are our own.

can ever be conceived to exist without a surface, as little as a surface without color."<sup>1</sup>

We are ourselves not so sure about all this. There are inseparable things which may be differentiated from one another, as, for example, Professor Whitney's tortoise and its shell; but a separation actually occurs, and leaves the better part intact, when the human soul quits its tenement, the body. We hardly know how to decide in the case of the orange and its rind, and of the scalp and its hair. The orange and the orange-peel are organically united, and can be torn from one another only by artificial violence. But it remains true that the fruit can be detached from the tree, and its covering from the fruit, without immediate detriment to the quality of the fruit. We do not cease to call the fruit an orange after it is plucked from the bough, or has been stripped of its skin. Something originally belonging to the orange is indeed gone, its vegetative life has been injured or destroyed; but all that gives worth to an orange, except as a vital part of a growing plant, or as a spectacle, is for a while retained and made more accessible. No one would any more confound the peel with the orange, or be in any dubiety which to eat and which to throw away. And is it certain that a growing orange might not under anomalous conditions run all to peel—just as we have seen a pine run all to leaves, without the semblance of a trunk or major limbs? So, too, hair can be shaved off and the roots be extracted from the human scalp; and we have been informed that some scalps are congenitally bald. On second thoughts, we consider Max Müller's similes to be sufficiently *ad rem*. The illustrations drawn from the surface-color and the surface itself of the orange-peel, and from the enclosing lines and enclosed angles of a triangle seem to be more exact; though in the last case the connection is not organic, but, of course, they are merely expository.

We consider that Sir William Hamilton has come as near to the

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<sup>1</sup> This comparison is by no means a new one. The reader may put it, if he likes, side by side with the fine image of Cicero in reference to another matter; which image is, however, analogous, but not the same: "*Ut, quum in sole ambularem, etiamsi aliam ob causam ambulem, fieri naturâ tamen ut colorer.*" *De Oratore*, Lib. II., Cap. XIV., 59. (*Tauchnitz*, 1827, p. 90.)



bottom of this matter as any other with whose opinion on the subject we are acquainted.<sup>1</sup> The great authority next to be cited has fathomed the question equally well and has arrived at precisely the same conclusion.

We now finish the whole catalogue of the witnesses, as well as the particular list we have in hand, by citing the weighty name of Professor Whitney, of Yale College; who without the versatility and brilliancy, is also entirely devoid of the volatility and amiable dogmatism of Max Müller; and while probably inferior to him as a mere verbal *prestidigitateur* is his close rival as a popular first-hand expounder of linguistic science, and at least his equal as a Sanskrit scholar, and in the judgment of many, his superior in the unfailing exactitude of his statements and in thoughtful philosophic poise and cool judgment. American scholarship has indeed good reason to be proud of Professor Whitney, as the English universities and pulpit of the late prelate of Dublin.

Dr. Whitney, as is his wont, expresses himself briefly on this point, but clearly and decisively. He thinks he sees something approaching palpable absurdity in the doctrine that words and thoughts are identical.<sup>2</sup> "How futile . . . to talk of such a thing as identity between thought and the expression which sits so loosely upon it, and can be so easily shifted. As well compare the house of the hermit-crab—which, born soft and coverless, takes refuge in the first suitable shell which chance throws in its way, and thenceforth makes that its home, unless convenience or opportunity lead it to move to another—with that of the turtle, whose horny covering is a part of its own structure, and cannot be torn off without destruction of its life." He also argues strikingly, and we think cogently, from the procedure of those who, from any

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<sup>1</sup> We are sorry that Professor Müller did not favor us with the views of Coleidge and De Quincey on the point at issue. Both of them had minds and education that eminently fitted them to illuminate if not to decide it. We should also have been pleased to have heard from our old guide, Archbishop Trench. Trench, it is true, was no great adept in comparative philology; but he was a scholar and a man of genius and sense, and had looked with penetration and sagacity into kindred questions. In his work on *The Study of Words*, Trench to some extent identifies the word and the thought; and De Quincey in his essay on *Style* does the same.

<sup>2</sup> *Language and the Study of Language*. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1887, p. 410.

cause, make signs without speaking, and especially from the phenomena presented by the deaf and dumb. Professor Whitney concedes the enormous importance of language to thought, and that some such mode of expression is rigidly necessary in order that our thoughts may be communicated to others. But he suggestively adds, that we do not half express ourselves in language or in signs; we leave much quite unexpressed. Thought, he holds, has a wider circumference than speech.<sup>1</sup>

The operation of thinking in words, according to the philosophic linguist of Yale, is a double one, consisting of thinking, and putting the thought into words. "We conceive the thought and also its expression." That we are conscious of the thought and its expression together only proves the intimacy of the association that has been established between our ideas and their signs, and the controlling influence of the habit of expression.

He accuses those who differ with him of gaining their point by so defining thought as to exclude all that is not done by means of speech. "Apprehension of generals and particulars, comparison, distinction, inference, performed under the review of consciousness, capable of being remembered and applied to direct the conduct of life, these are the characteristics of the action of mind in every grade; where they are present there is thought."<sup>2</sup> He then proceeds to apply this criterion to untrained deaf mutes, and even, within limitations, to the brute animals. That we ordinarily think in words he admits may be true, but imagines that the extent to which we do so, and the necessity of the accompaniment of thought by language have both been considerably exaggerated.<sup>3</sup> "When we think most elaborately and most reflectively then we formulate our thoughts as if we were speaking or writing them; but we need not always think in that style." Can a child not come into the world, he asks, until a layette and a nursery have been provided for it; or along with each infant must there also be born its swaddling clothes and a cradle?<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> *Language and the Study of Language*, p. 412. Where in this article we do not expressly quote an author's own words, we sometimes approach them more or less closely; at other times vary from them indefinitely so as to condense the meaning.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 414.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 412, 413. <sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 412.

And now what is the sum of it all? So far as pertains to the expert witnesses, they are substantially agreed on the matter that is most vital to the *theological* controversy, though, while uppermost in our thoughts, that is not the question which has been chiefly discussed in this essay. There is little need for discussion in any field where there is practical unanimity amongst the debaters. Difference of opinion has emerged as to whether we always think in words, whether it is ever possible to think without them. The authorities, allowing for the occasional difficulty of placing them, would seem to be pretty evenly divided. What may be wanting in force of numbers in one quarter is amply made up by weight of metal in another.

Some of the authorities are ambiguous; some of them use qualifying terms; some of them hesitate; some of them are silent. A large majority consent that if by thoughts are meant concepts nearly all our thinking—and almost everybody, that absolutely all our sharply outlined, clean-cut thinking—is done through the instrumentality of language, taking language in its broadest acceptance; and that if by language is meant strictly verbal language, through language or its equivalent in signs.

But all the authorities without exception, unless it be Kant and Lotze on a strained construction, so far as they have been at all explicit on this point, and doubtless also, if we could but get at it, where they have not, are absolutely agreed in the entertainment of the view, that thought can never be even approximately, however inadequately *expressed*, and never be in any degree *communicated*, *i. e.*, conveyed to others, except through the intervention and mediation of language in the sense defined. This is in fact pronounced by Max Müller to be a truism, and there is no one, we suppose, who is bold enough to dispute the proposition.

It surely follows, then, incontestably and self-evidently, that if infallibility be predicated of the thought of Holy Scripture, that infallibility must attach also and equally to the language in which that thought is admittedly expressed.

Our final conclusion, then, and this has been the ultimate aim of our whole contention, is that the vital question about the authority of the Bible is not the question, signally important as the right an-

swer to that question is admitted to be, as to a verbal inspiration ; inasmuch as the question of the verbal inspiration of the whole or of a portion of any given volume goes without saying—if only there is once allowed to be such a thing as an inspiration of infallibility, and if that infallibility can be, and is predicated of the whole or of any portion of that volume. The hinge of the whole debate has thus been demonstrated to be not a question about the mere *language*, but a question about the *substantial averments* of the Bible. It is not, at last, our readers will take notice, then a question about *words*, but a question about *facts*. That is to say, the transcendently vital question has been ascertained to be not the question whether the Holy Scriptures are infallible in their language, considered merely *as* language, but the ulterior question whether they are infallible at all ; and if so, whether they are infallible in whole or only in part. Such, if we mistake not, will be found to be the precise aspect and situation of the supreme argument in this debate. That momentous question is the one which is now rocking, is destined one day to rock still more severely, and, if we do not err in our forecast, the foundations of the Christian church.

That paramount and sovereign issue has not, however, been directly dealt with in the present article. Our more restricted business, after carefully examining the relation between thought and language, has been simply to try to establish the position, that precisely that issue is the capital and peremptory one which has confronted the church from the beginning, and, underlying as it does all others, is the one which must at last be joined.

The adherents to the doctrine of the infallibility of the Holy Scriptures attribute that infallibility to the Divine inspiration of the original penmen. The question that has been before us is not, however, whether God can or cannot think without words. The mode of the Divine operations, except in so far as it has been imperfectly revealed to us, is by us utterly unknown. It would seem to be a legitimate inference from God's omnipotence, that had he so chosen, he could have communicated his noblest message to mankind in some other way than through the vehicle of human speech. He has not so chosen. He has, in point of fact, been pleased to communicate with the race of men through the medium of their own intelligence and their own tongues.

But had the contents of the Bible been human in their originating and authoritative source—as they undoubtedly are human in their outward form and method of presentation; and if the position of Max Müller and his associates can be sustained, that human thought and human language are strictly inseparable, being, indeed, but differing phases or aspects of one and the same complex reality, then we see no escape from the conclusion; that to have predicated infallibility of the concepts of the Scriptures would have been *ipso facto* to have predicated infallibility also of the words, or signs, in which those concepts were essentially embodied or incarnated in the minds of the human authors themselves, anterior to all outward or inward expression of them, and of course, anterior to all conveyance of them to others.

But such is not the posture of the matter as the case now stands. On the assumption of the Divine plenary inspiration and infallibility of the Scriptures, the question need not be taken up whether the thoughts contained in them were previously and externally clothed in a vesture of language; the palpable and acknowledged fact is, that they are clothed in such a vesture now, and the language selected has been the familiar one of ordinary words. In the existing situation, Max Müller's "question of questions," so far as the exigencies of theology are involved, might be left wholly unnoticed. For it is agreed on all hands, that whether it is true or false that we can only think in words, or signs, it is an unquestionable fact, that all expressed or communicated thoughts, or signs, must be expressed or communicated in words; and that the words, or signs, in any such conveyance of ideas are essentially inseparable from the ideas themselves which are thus conveyed. If, then, the Bible be God's thought, it must equally be God's word. The human instruments might be equally or unequally "inspired" in some other sense of the term inspiration. They might not all possess even the inspiration of infallibility to the same extent; that is, some might have it longer, or more constantly, or in greater measure, so far as the mass of the communications was concerned, than others. There is no question that God, had he so desired, could have brought about such an inspiration, *i. e.*, one producing infallibility, in different cases by varied kinds of exer-

cises of his omnipotence. But there is no paralogism or sophistry that could enter as a disturbing element into the simple mental process which leads us to the inevitable conclusion, that in the *infallibility* itself, thus effectuated, there can be no degrees of greater or less, distinguishing one inspired man, or writing, on the score of his infallibility and authority, from another. This statement, whilst only made *obiter*, and though repeated substantially from another article in a previous issue of this review, is, we are persuaded, one of the utmost importance, and is one that is often, but vainly, challenged.

In a comprehensive review of the whole subject, which has sufficiently engaged our reflections for the present, we beg leave to say, and we do it in all candor and respect, that we find that we can, in a manner, "put ourselves in the place" of many who differ from us most widely and radically in the light in which they view the word of God. We can, for instance, though not with the sympathy of assent or approval, put ourselves in the mental attitude of those who deny the infallibility, or "inerrancy," of the Scriptures, in part or in whole. We can put ourselves in the mental attitude of those who deny the possibility of "a book revelation." We can put ourselves in the mental attitude of those who oppose, deride, and utterly reject the Bible. We can put ourselves in the mental attitude of those who would have us throw out certain books, or great sections of books; as, for example, Deuteronomy, or Chronicles, or Daniel, or half of Isaiah, or Esther, or the Song of Songs, or Second Peter; or those who contend that only the *spiritual* teachings of the Bible are infallibly inspired, and who can thus *ex animo* accept it as an unerring religious, but not as an unerring secular or scientific, rule. But we own that we find ourselves quite incapable, even in imagination, of putting ourselves in the mental attitude of the man who can assert and believe that any of the concepts contained in the Bible are inspired so as to be infallible, whilst the *words* in which it is conceded those concepts are embodied and expressed, are left fallible and even false.

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