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ARTICLE I.

THE METAPHYSICAL POSTULATE OF HERBERT SPENCER'S FIRST PRINCIPLES.

First Principles of a New System of Philosophy. By HERBERT SPENCER. Second Edition. Appleton & Co. 1871.

Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, Education and University Reform," etc By Sir WILLIAM HAMILTON, Bart. New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers. 1853.

The Limits of Religious Thought: Examined in Eight Lectures Delivered before the University of Oxford, in the Year MDCCCLVIII., on the Bampton Foundation. By HENRY LONGUEVILLE MANSEL, B. D., Reader in Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy at Magdalen College; Tutor and Late Fellow of St. John's College. First American, from the third London, Edition. With the NOTES translated. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1859.

The corner-stone of Positivism in all its forms is the doctrine, now so fashionable in scientific circles, of the unknowable; and the derivative doctrine as to ultimate causes, whether final or efficient. Since this is so, it is worthy of remark that the founder of French Positivism, M. Comte, has taken this doctrine of the unknowable for granted. There is not a scintilla of proof for it in the *Cours de Philosophie Positive*. We are not aware that either M.

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Littre or Mr. G. H. Lewes* has added anything of value in support of the doctrine. It was reserved for another English writer, and one not a professed disciple of Comte, but one who is regarded as the coryphæus at once of British science and of British scepticism, to perceive the defect and to attempt to repair it.

The most inattentive reader of Mr. Herbert Spencer's "First Principles," the title of which work stands at the head of this article, can hardly fail to have been struck with an important admission which he makes in the Prospectus, issued in March, 1860. In defining the scope of the first part, which treats of the "unknowable," Mr. Spencer says that he is but "carrying a step further the doctrine put into shape by Hamilton and Mansel"; and "pointing out the various directions in which science leads to the same conclusions." Mr. Spencer's doctrine of the unknowable, then, in some sense stands or falls with Hamilton's doctrine of the unconditioned. An examination of the five first chapters, which together constitute that first part, abundantly confirms this *prima facie* inference. Whether the "new system of philosophy" is to any extent a logical evolution out of the doctrines of Hamilton and Mansel is a question we intend to discuss. One point, though, is clear enough *in limine*. Unless Sir W. Hamilton's position with regard to the unthinkable be a valid one, the position of Mr. H. Spencer with regard to the unknowable is as evidently invalid and as pure assumption as was that of Auguste Comte.† This proposition we expect to prove. The Hamiltonian theory of the unthinkable, it must be remembered, has long been and is now the subject of the sharpest criticism. It has most acutely, and, as many believe, conclusively animadverted upon by John Stuart Mill, and has been rejected by such experts as Dr. Young, Dr. Calderwood, Mr. James Martineau, Dr. McCosh, Dr. Charles Hodge, President Noah Porter, and the late Dr. McGuffey. But until this vexed question of the limits

*See "History of Philosophy from Thales to Comte." London. Vol. II., pp. (500-625). A defence of the Positivist doctrine of the Unknowable, which admits the evidence of a knowable, can hardly be sought for in the principles of Hume, who denies the validity at all knowable. Mr. Mill does not take the doctrine without caveats.

†See Positive Philosophy, Bohn, chap. I.

of the thinkable can be settled, the redoubtable Herbert Spencer has positively no ground whatever on which to make a stand.

On the other hand, on the assumption that Sir W. Hamilton's doctrine of the Incogitable is sound; if the Hamiltonian and Kantian doctrine of the unthinkable be reconcilable with the theology of Hamilton and Mansel, then again the doctrine of Mr. Spencer touching the unknowable is effectually undermined. This is so plain to Mr. Spencer himself, that he devotes all his strength in the first part of his "First Principles" to an attempt at showing that the doctrine of the unthinkable as expounded by those authors is inconsistent with their own and all other current forms of theology. Now in this attempt Mr. Spencer is either successful or not. If successful, then he has only (though without design to do so) *disproved* the Hamiltonian doctrine of the unthinkable, by a *reductio ad absurdum*. If not, then (as before) the whole structure of Comte, Mr. Herbert Spencer, and the Positivists, lies in ruins.

Here is a sample of his argumentation. We quote from his fifth chapter on "the Reconciliation" of Science and Religion:

"Some do indeed allege that though the ultimate cause of things cannot really be thought of as having specified attributes, it is incumbent upon us to assert those attributes. Though the forms of our consciousness are such that the absolute cannot in any manner or degree be brought within them, we are nevertheless told that we must represent the absolute to ourselves under these forms. As writes Mr. Mansel, in the work from which I have already quoted largely—'It is our duty, then, to think of God as personal; and it is our duty to believe that he is infinite.'* . . .

"Have we not seen how utterly incompetent our minds are to form even an approach to a conception of that which underlies all phenomena? Is it proved that this incompetency is the incompetency of the conditioned to grasp the unconditioned? Does it not follow that the ultimate cause cannot in any respect be conceived by us because it is in every respect greater than can be conceived? And may we not therefore rightly refrain from assigning to it any attributes whatever?† . . .

"After it has been shown that every supposition respecting the genesis of the universe commits us to alternative impossibilities of thought—after it has been shown that each attempt to conceive real existence ends in an intellectual suicide—after it has been shown why, by the very constitution of our minds, we are eternally debarred from thinking of the

*First Principles, p. 108. †*Ibid.*, p. 109.

absolute; it is still asserted that we ought to think of the absolute thus and thus. In all imaginable ways we find thrust upon us the truth, that we are not permitted to know—nay, are not even permitted to conceive—that reality which is behind the veil of appearance; and yet it is said to be our duty to believe (and in so far to conceive) that this reality exists in a certain defined manner. Shall we call this reverence? or shall we call it the reverse?''*

On a preceding page, in reference to the alleged duty of thinking of God as personal and believing him to be infinite, Mr. Spencer says:

“That this is not the conclusion here adopted, needs hardly be said. If there be any meaning in the foregoing arguments, duty requires us neither to affirm nor deny personalty. Our duty is to submit ourselves with all humility to the established limits of our intelligence; and not perversely to rebel against them. Let those who can, believe that there is eternal war set between our intellectual faculties and our moral obligations, I for one, admit no such radical vice in the constitution of things.”†

All that we have to say to this is, as previously in this discussion, if such reasoning is valid, it simply goes to invalidate the entire Hamiltonian doctrine of the unthinkable. That which leads by necessary logic to the utmost lengths of blasphemous absurdity must itself be false. Now as this Hamiltonian doctrine of the unthinkable of the unconditioned, with a certain important “qualification,” is the main premiss of the Spencerian doctrine of the unknowable, and as the removal of the premiss carries with it the removal of the conclusion, it follows that the total overthrow of Hamilton on the one point is *ipso facto* the total overthrow of Spencer on the other.

The reader will not fail to have noticed that even in the very act of denying that any attributes can be predicated of God, Mr. Spencer has in spite of himself in plain terms admitted several, viz., existence, absoluteness, infinitude, causation, greatness, superiority to human conceptions; and throughout the course of his writings he admits others. But if no attributes are predicable of God, then is neither substantiality, intelligence, wisdom, love, justice, or holiness, predicable of him; and the very existence of God in any proper sense of the term becomes a matter

**Ibid.*, p. 110. †*Ibid.*, p. 108.

no longer of belief but of conjecture. If this is not Atheism, in the technical meaning of the word, it is Atheism to all intents and purposes. We are none the less "the inhabitants of a forsaken and fatherless world."* But it would be no difficult task to show how this Agnosticism of the Positivists can be reduced in the crucible of logic to formal Atheism.

It is somewhat remarkable that both Mr. Spencer and the late J. S. Mill have constructed themselves arguments which if valid go far to demolish the very groundwork of Sir William Hamilton's whole theory as to the relation of the human mind to the unconditioned, and the whole logical edifice of Dr. Henry Longueville Mansel in his well-intended Bampton Lectures on the "Limits of Religious Thought." These replies of Mill and Spencer have probably done more to shake the confidence of the orthodox in the Hamiltonian theory, or at all events the theory of the Bampton Lectures, than even the more elaborate efforts of Dr. Calderwood and Dr. John Young, the one in "the Philosophy of the Infinite" and the other in "the Province of Reason." Mill's critique was designed to be, in all essential respects, utterly destructive; that of Spencer to be merely corrective. Their complete success in these efforts must involve their own logical ruin: that of Mill directly carrying with it the ruin of Spencer, and indirectly his own; and that of Spencer gravitating unavoidably to the success of Mill. These two intellectual athletes (like Samson in the Philistine temple) have bowed themselves with such might between the pillars which support the roof, that the house (if we suppose it to have fallen) has fallen not only on the Hamiltonian lords and their following, but also upon the suicidal authors of the overthrow.

We now propose to show still more distinctly, by citation from the pages of "First Principles" that the connection between the "new system" and the older one is such as has been stated. We shall then undertake to substantiate the assertion that the new philosophy is destitute of more than the shadow of a logical and metaphysical basis.

We go on to give the words of Herbert Spencer:

*Robert Hall's Sermon on Modern Infidelity.

“There still remains the final question—What must we say concerning that which transcends knowledge? Are we to rest wholly in the consciousness of phenomena?—is the result of inquiry to exclude utterly from our minds everything but the relative? or must we also believe in something beyond the relative?”

“The answer of pure logic is held to be, that by the limits of our intelligence we are rigorously confined within the relative; and that anything transcending the relative can be thought of only as a pure negation, or as a non-existence.” . . .

Whence the conclusion seems to follow that “we cannot rationally affirm the positive existence of anything beyond phenomena.” Unavoidable as this conclusion seems, it yet involves, he thinks, a grave error.

“If the premiss be granted, the inference must doubtless be admitted; but the premiss in the form presented by Sir Wm. Hamilton and Mr. Mansel is not strictly true. Though, in the foregoing pages, the arguments used by these writers to show that the absolute is unknowable, have been approvingly quoted; and though these arguments have been enforced by others equally thoroughgoing; yet there remains to be stated a qualification, which saves us from that scepticism otherwise necessitated. . . . To speak specifically:—Besides that *definite* consciousness of which logic formulates the laws, there is an *indefinite* consciousness which cannot be formulated. Besides complete thoughts, and besides the thoughts which though incomplete admit of completion, there are thoughts which it is impossible to complete; and which yet are still real, in the sense that they are normal affections of the intellect.

. . . “To say that we cannot know the absolute, is, by implication, to affirm that there *is* an absolute. In the very denial of our power to learn *what* the absolute is, there lies hidden the assumption *that* it is; and the making of this assumption proves that the absolute has been present to the mind, not as a nothing, but as a something. Similarly with every step in the reasoning by which this doctrine is upheld. The noumenon, everywhere named as the antithesis of the phenomenon, is throughout necessarily thought of as an actuality. . . . Strike out from the argument the terms unconditioned, infinite, absolute, with their equivalents, and in place of them write ‘negation of conceivability,’ or ‘absence of the conditions under which consciousness is possible,’ and you find that the argument becomes nonsense. Truly to realise in thought any one of the propositions of which the argument consists, the unconditioned must be represented as positive and not negative. How then can it be a legitimate conclusion from the argument, that our consciousness of it is negative? An argument, the very construction of which assigns to a certain term a certain meaning, but which ends in showing that this

term has no such meaning, is simply an elaborate suicide. Clearly, then, the very demonstration that a *definite* consciousness of the absolute is impossible to us, unavoidably presupposes an *indefinite* consciousness of it."*

We are willing to leave it to the intelligent reader whether this is not a giving up of the whole position. If it be not a total surrender of the Hamiltonian doctrine of the unthinkable, it is manifestly a surrender of the only ground on which that doctrine is logically defensible. The Hamiltonian argument, if it proves anything, proves everything; if it does not prove everything, it proves nothing. It is contended above by Mr. Spencer that "the very construction" of that "argument" involves a necessary absurdity. The common sense of mankind will then certainly conclude that "an argument" which is admitted to be "an elaborate suicide" is, not in part only but in whole, nugatory and worthless.

Yet on that argument is founded the entire structure of the Spencerian, or Positive, doctrines of the unknowable. We cannot thus consent to allow Mr. Spencer, like Æsop's man in the cave with the satyr, to blow hot and cold with the same mouth. In the third chapter of this first part, the author attempts to show that all our "Ultimate Scientific Ideas," whether in the outer or inner world, are inconceivable, and inconceivable by consequence of this very doctrine of the unthinkable as propounded by Sir William Hamilton and defended by Dean Mansel. This is elaborately undertaken in that chapter with reference to our ideas of subject, object, space, time, matter, motion, force, and consciousness. Now, on the evidence just adduced, we pronounce this whole argumentation "an elaborate suicide." It would be very easy to demonstrate that Mr. Spencer does thus base on the doctrine of Hamilton his own conclusion with regard to the inconceivability of our ultimate scientific ideas. His main scope throughout the chapter is to evince that these ideas *are* inconceivable, or, as he sometimes expresses it, "unthinkable" or "incapable of being represented in thought," "of being realised to thought," or of "being mentally imaged." This unthinkable-

*First Principles, pp. 87, 88, and 89.

ness he maintains throughout on the authority and principles of Hamilton and Mansel. He deals in this way with our ideas of space and time, on pp. 47, 48, 49, and 50; with our ideas of force and matter, on pp. 53, 58, 59, and 60; and of motion, on p. 58. All our ideas of the outer world are vexed with the contradictions of which so much is made in the Bampton Lectures. And so too of the inner world. "We are equally unable either to know it as finite or to conceive of it as finite." (P. 63.) To every challenge and interrogation there are returned "inconceivable answers." (P. 63.) The "primitive dualism" of "Mr. Mansel" is appealed to (on p. 65) as the basis of "his refutation of the German absolutists." "So that the personality of which each is conscious, and of which the existence is to each a fact beyond all others the most certain, is yet a thing which cannot be known at all: knowledge of it is forbidden by the very nature of thought." (P. 65.) So, it follows, our personality, of which each of us is most certain, is yet unknowable, and that by the very nature of thought. (P. 66.)

An examination of the passages cited will, we are persuaded, satisfy the most incredulous reader that Mr. Spencer makes out his case of the inconceivableness, and therefore inscrutableness, of all our ultimate scientific ideas, only by a constant appeal to the touchstone furnished him by the Hamiltonian doctrine of the unconditioned and incogitable.

Throughout the discussion, it will also appear on examination, Mr. Spencer has been betrayed into the fallacious assumption (which he has also borrowed from his blind guides,) that what is incomprehensible is necessarily also inconceivable, and therefore wholly inscrutable. He is guilty of this paralogism in his concluding remarks on our "ultimate scientific ideas" (on pp. 66 and 67.) Similarly with regard to our "ultimate religious ideas," Mr. Spencer, in his second chapter, finds them all to be resolvable into the unimaginable, unrepresentable, inconceivable, inscrutable, and incomprehensible; and this for the same Hamiltonian reason as before. Sir William's shibboleth about the unconditioned is the incantation which causes all these bodiless ghosts of ideas to "vanish into thin air."

With respect to the origin of the universe, Mr. Herbert Spencer holds that three verbally intelligible suppositions may be made: that it is self-existent, or that it is self-created, or that it is created from without itself. The question as to which of these is most credible, is not discussed here. "The deeper question into which this finally merges, is, whether any one of them is even conceivable, in the true sense of the word" (p. 30). He then tests every one of these suppositions in turn, and shows it, on the adopted Hamiltonian principles, to be inconceivable. Yet we must think of the external world as caused, and inevitably adopt the hypothesis of a First Cause. But is the First Cause finite or infinite? If we say finite, we are involved in an inextricable dilemma. Then the First Cause is infinite. Mr. Spencer also proves that it must be independent. "Thus," in brief, "the First Cause must be in every sense perfect, complete, total; including within itself all power, and transcending all law. Or, to use the established word, it must be absolute." (P. 38.)

Having thus shown that there is a First Cause, and that the First Cause is infinite and absolute, Mr. Spencer stigmatises "these reasonings and their results" as "illusions;" and in order to make good this assertion, proceeds to avail himself, *totidem verbis*, of "the demonstration which Mr. Mansel, carrying out in detail the doctrine of Sir William Hamilton, has given in his *Limits of Religious Thought*." (*Ibid*, pp. 39-42.) The result is, that, to use Mr. Spencer's language, "passing over the consideration of credibility, and confining ourselves to that of conceivability, we see that Atheism, Pantheism, and Theism, when rigorously analysed, prove to be absolutely unthinkable." (P. 43.) Mr. Mansel could hardly ask for a more thorough-going adhesion in terms on the part of his obsequious convert; and yet Mr. Spencer is unwilling to be set down as more than a half-way disciple. Apparently, so far from disclosing a fundamental verity existing in each of the three cosmological schemes, the inquiry seems rather to indicate that there is no fundamental verity contained in any. Yet to carry away such a conclusion would, in Mr. Spencer's opinion, be "a fatal error." (P. 43.) This he endeavors to make sure by further argument. A religious

creed he defines as an *a priori* theory of the universe, and attempts to show that not only Fetishism, (which sees a separate personality behind every phenomenon,) the high forms of Polytheism, (where the personalities are partially generalised,) Monotheism, (where they are wholly generalised,) and Pantheism, (where the generalised personality is merged in the phenomena,) but even the seeming negation of all religion—positive Atheism—falls within the definition. (P. 43.) The ground for this statement is, that Atheism, “asserting,” as it does, “the self-existence of space, matter, and motion, which it regards as adequate causes of every appearance, propounds an *a priori* theory, from which it holds the facts to be deducible.” (P. 44.) Now every theory supposes two things—an explanation and “something to be explained.” By implication, then, all theories agree that there is a problem to be solved. If all the solutions are erroneous, then the problem is insoluble, and this theory is the common verdict of mankind. In other words, “the existence of the world, with all that it contains, and all which surrounds it, is a mystery ever pressing for interpretation. On this point, if no other, there is entire agreement.”

In the first and second chapters, the author had considered the relation between religion and science, and had argued that human beliefs in general, and especially the perennial ones, contain some soul of truth; that the most abstract truth contained in each must be the one in which the two coalesce; that, uniting these positive and negative poles of human thought, it must be the ultimate fact in our intelligence. In every respect, therefore, he holds, the conclusion in the present chapter answers to the requirements, possessing as it does all the characteristics which were inferred as necessarily belonging to that fundamental verity expressed by religions in general. (P. 44.) That this is the vital element in all religions, Mr. Spencer further argues, not only from its persistence through and after every change, but from the observed fact that it grows more distinct the more highly the religion is developed. (P. 45.) “The analysis of every possible hypothesis proves, not simply that no hypothesis is sufficient, but that no hypothesis is even thinkable. And thus

the mystery which all religions recognise, turns out to be a far more transcendent mystery than any of them suspect—not a relative, but an absolute mystery.” The chapter ends as follows: “There then is an ultimate religious truth of the highest possible certainty—a truth in which religions in general are at one with each other, and with a philosophy antagonistic to their special dogmas. . . . If religion and science are to be reconciled, the basis of reconciliation must be this deepest, widest, and most certain of all facts—that the power which the universe manifests to us is utterly inscrutable.” (*Ibid*, p. 46.)

The reader who has a competent acquaintance with the subject discussed, will be satisfied with the evidence we have now given to prove that Mr. Herbert Spencer relies upon the Hamiltonian doctrine of relativity and the unthinkable, to make out his case of the inscrutableness of our ultimate religious ideas. It has also been proved that he relies equally upon that doctrine to support him in his similar position as to the inscrutableness of our ultimate scientific ideas. It is, therefore, in proof, that the position of Mr. Spencer, as to the inscrutableness of all our ultimate ideas, whether scientific or religious, is by him made to rest upon the same basis, viz., the Hamiltonian doctrine of the unthinkable. But the five chapters of the First Part of Mr. Spencer's work, and which embody his teaching as to “the unknowable,” are wholly taken up with the discussion of this very point, of the inevitable futility of all human efforts to arrive at the ultimate ideas—further than this, that there exists, and that the universe manifests, a cause; which cause, however, is utterly inscrutable. From which follows unavoidably the proof of the averment which we engaged to demonstrate, viz., that the Spencerian doctrine as to the “unknowable,” is ostensibly based on the doctrine of Sir William Hamilton and Dean Mansel as to the “unthinkable.”

It is worthy of remark here, before passing to another topic, that (as has been pointed out) when Mr. Spencer wishes to establish *the existence* of an inscrutable Power, that is, the ultimate Cause of all things, he thereupon arraigns the argument of Sir William Hamilton and Dr. Mansel on the charge of “an elaborate suicide.” When, on the other hand, he desires to establish

the *inscrutableness* of the Power thus seen to be existent. he waives all objection to an argument that is become necessary to the support of his own system.

We shall probably be reminded here, that in making this criticism we have not taken into the account Mr. Spencer's "qualification," by which he supposes that he evades the consequences of a complete adoption of the Hamiltonian principles, and that we have overlooked the canon of interpretation that in a case like this, that which is more general must be limited by that which is more special. Let this be granted; yet we are now about to make a "qualification" ourselves, which will at once remove all occasion for this protest, and we ask the benefit of the same canon in our own behoof, in application to the preceding strictures. *Our* qualification is not absolute, but relative, and it is this: that if Mr. Spencer be authorised by the common rules of logic, to make *his* qualification, and at the same time to avail himself of the advantage of the Hamiltonian doctrine of the unthinkable, in his effort to ground his own doctrine of the unknowable—then our present strictures are admitted to have no weight. But, as we have already pointed out briefly, Mr. Spencer's qualification by necessity involves not merely a partial but a total abandonment of the Hamiltonian doctrine. If this be so, Mr. Spencer is manifestly convicted of the folly of trying to carry water on both shoulders; or (to express it in a still more homely way) of "having his cake and eating it too."

That Mr. Spencer's qualification does lead to this conclusion, is sufficiently evident from the arguments by which he seeks to justify it. It would require a detailed examination of his reasoning to show that every one of these arguments involves this fallacy. Let one of them stand as a sample of the rest; "Strike out," says Mr. Spencer, "from the argument" [of Sir William Hamilton and Mr. Mansel] "the terms, unconditioned, infinite, absolute, with their equivalents, and in place of them write 'negation of conceivability,' or 'absence of the conditions under which consciousness is possible,' and you find that the argument becomes nonsense. Truly to realise in thought any one of the propositions of which the argument consists, the unconditioned

must be represented as positive and not negative." But if so, then manifestly the entire Hamiltonian doctrine falls to the ground for the lack of logical support; and that doctrine can no more be legitimately used (when convenient) to make good the position that "the ultimate cause," thus shown to be possible and otherwise proved to be existent, is "utterly inscrutable." Apply Mr. Spencer's "qualification" to Mr. Spencer's reasoning to show the inconceivableness of all our "ultimate ideas," and Mr. Spencer's own "argument." (to use his words in regard to Sir William Hamilton and Mr. Mansel,) "becomes nonsense;" and it would be idle to add that an argument which has been turned into nonsense, is deprived of all probative force. The author of "First Principles." has, therefore, fatally contradicted himself, and by his own showing, his much-lauded defence of "the unknowable" is logically worthless.

But the certification of this last point, which is the vital one, does not depend alone on Mr. Spencer's fortunate (or unfortunate) concessions. Our counter-argumentation might then be objected to as being merely *ad hominem*. We are willing, therefore, to concede, argumentatively, that Mr. Spencer's reasoning is not justly liable to the exception we have taken to it, and that the Hamiltonian doctrine of the unthinkable may be consistently employed by the author of "First Principles" to make good his own position as to the "unknowable." Still, if the Hamiltonian doctrine be indefensible and untrue, it is as certain as before, that Mr. Spencer's theory is equally untenable. The two systems stand or fall together; to this extent, at least, that if Sir William's conclusion as to the unthinkable be wholly invalidated, then confessedly the entire theory of Mr. Spencer, as to the unknowable, is invalidated also. A house from which every one of the foundation stones has been removed must fall.

If any still doubt that the doctrine of the unknowable, as expounded by Mr. Herbert Spencer and his school of "scientists" has its basis in the metaphysics of Sir William Hamilton, as expounded by Dean Mansel, let that doubt be set at rest by Mr. Spencer's "last words and confession" at the end of the volume, where he tacitly admits that not only his own doctrine of the

unknowable, and that wholly, but also to some extent his own philosophy of the knowable, in short *his entire argument* throughout this his initial and fundamental volume, to a greater or a less extent, turns on the truth or falsity of the propositions taken by the great Scotch critic of Cousin. After recapitulating the course of the argument, in the First Part, as to the ultimate results of both science and religion, as ascertained by his analysis, he says: "We found that subjective science can give no account of those conditioned modes of being which constitute consciousness, without postulating unconditioned being." So, too, objective science was seen to postulate something that, unaccountable otherwise, continues constant under all forms. "This," he adds, "is the implication to which we are now led back by our completed synthesis." (P. 551.) The analysis of the First Part has led up to the conclusion of an inscrutable Power or Cause. The synthesis of the Second Part has required the same conclusion. Analysis and synthesis thus coincide in their results. The recognition of a persistent Force, of ever-variable manifestations, but invariable quantity, is that which alone makes possible each concrete interpretation, and unifies all of them. "*Not, indeed,*" continues Mr. Spencer. "*that this coincidence adds to the strength of the argument as a logical structure. Our synthesis has proceeded by taking for granted at every step this ultimate truth [which had been ascertained by his analysis]: and the ultimate truth cannot, therefore, be regarded as in any sense an outcome of the synthesis. Nevertheless,*" he proceeds to show, "the coincidence yields a verification." But if the analysis is worthless, let it here be remarked, that coincidence no more exists. He then goes on to set forth that after science has done all, it has only systematised, and not enlarged, our experience; and that his own implications are neither materialistic nor spiritualistic in the highest or ontological sense. The correlation and equivalence between the forces of the outer and the inner worlds, may be made to assimilate either to the other, matter to spirit, or spirit to matter, according as we begin with one or other of the terms.*

* Prof. Huxley takes the same general view in his Examination in "Lay Sermons" of Descartes's "Art of Thinking."

"But," he goes on to say, "he who rightly interprets the doctrine contained in this work, will see that neither of these terms can be taken as ultimate. He will see that though the relation of subject and object renders necessary to us these antithetical conceptions of *spirit and matter*, *the one is no less than the other to be regarded as but a sign of the Unknown Reality which underlies both.*" Thus Mr. Spencer's book is brought to an end. This is its last sentence; and in this sentence is contained the marrow of Mr. Spencer's metaphysics, which (as will again be perceived,) is wholly dependent on Sir William Hamilton's and Dr. Mansel's.

We would here call the attention of our readers to the fact that has been made obvious from the foregoing exhibition, viz., that the views entertained by Sir William Hamilton and Dean Mansel *quoad* the relation of the human mind to theological truth, are regarded by Mr. Spencer as identical. If this be indeed so, then plainly the refutation of either (for example of the Oxford scholar.) would be amply sufficient. If not so, then (whatever attitude be taken in regard to the great schoolman of Edinburgh,) Mansel, inasmuch as he goes farther than Hamilton, must be right. or else Spencer is left without support, for Spencer goes the whole figure. If Hamilton did not really hold with Mansel, Hamilton's *opinion* cannot be fairly quoted on that side. If Hamilton's principles lead logically to Mansel's conclusion, even in despite of his own better judgment, Hamilton's principles may indeed be pleaded in evidence by Spencer, if they can be sustained. If, however, Hamilton's principles, when correctly expounded, do not carry with them Mansel's conclusion, then neither need they carry with them Spencer's. Again, (waiving the point just made,) if Hamilton's principles be unsound, so manifestly are Mansel's and Spencer's. It is therefore plain, that in any case the controversy turns as on two hinges on these two questions, the correctness of Mansel's principles as set forth in the Bampton Lectures, and the worth of the logic which has deduced from them Mansel's conclusion. If (conceding the sameness of their principles,) Hamilton was fundamentally wrong, then Mansel and Spencer are alike subverted. If Hamilton was fundamentally right, and only Mansel wrong, still Spencer is sub-

verted. It is, accordingly, immaterial to the main issue raised by this controversy, whether Hamilton was right or wrong, provided Mansel was wrong; since in that event Spencer's ground is, upon either view of Hamilton, taken from under him. On the other hand, if Mansel is right in his deductions from Hamilton's principles, and Spencer also right in his further deductions from the same principles, then the whole question turns on the soundness of those principles. Those principles, on the assumption, are maintained in common by the Bampton lecturer and the late philosopher of Edinburgh. It follows, that upon any hypothesis as to the position of Hamilton, the whole question, considered essentially, may be narrowed down to an examination of the principles of Mansel, an inspection of the logic by which those principles are connected with the conclusion of the argument in the Bampton Lectures as to the Limits of Religious Thought, and a scrutiny of the procedure by which the author of "First Principles" has carried the same logic so far as to sustain the blank negation of theology, even regarded as a matter of faith, as distinguished from knowledge.

The case, then, stands thus: On the supposition that Dean Mansel, in his principal argument, has correctly reasoned from true premises, even then Mr. Spencer's position remains to be established. If not only the principles and main reasoning of Dean Mansel, but also certain of his distinctions, together with the corollaries he holds to be connected with them, are to be accepted, then Mr. Spencer stands wholly unsupported as to his fundamental postulate. Again: whether those distinctions be valid or not, if Dean Mansel's deductions from his principles are unwarranted, then clearly no less than before, Mr. Spencer's metaphysical prop stands itself unsupported. The same thing is true, if the reasoning of the Bampton Lectures be sound, but their principles invalid.

Whilst thus it is true that Mr. Spencer's postulate may be discussed apart from the subtle lucubrations of Sir William Hamilton, except so far as these are reproduced in the Bampton Lectures, it will facilitate our inquiry, as well as strengthen our

foundations, to pay some attention to the views of the Scotch philosopher.

The following questions will therefore comprise the whole discussion :

I. Is Mr. Spencer justified in the further extension he has given to the argument of the Bampton Lectures ?

II. Is he justified in assuming that the teaching of the Bampton lecturer is the same with that of Hamilton ?

III. Is he justified in his postulate, that the teaching in the "Limits of Religious Thought" is sound ?

It is evident from what has now been said, that if the second of these questions be answered in the negative, Mr. Spencer is wholly debarred from appealing in his own favor to the authority of Sir William Hamilton. He would not, though, be estopped from appealing to the name and arguments of Dr. Mansel. If the second question be answered in the negative, everything turns, in that case, on the answers to be given to the first and the last question. Unfortunately, however, for Mr. Spencer, and irrespective altogether of the debate touching the true position of Hamilton, things are in *this* predicament, (as is clear from what has already been argued,) that if either one of these two questions be answered negatively, the metaphysical sill underlying "First Principles" is as effectually taken away as if it had never existed.

I. The first of these questions has received consideration, and it has been shown that Mr. Spencer's argument breaks down under its own weight. In other words, he has himself invalidated the reasoning of the Bampton lecturer, in so far as it is destructive of all knowledge of the *existence* of the Absolute; and in doing so, has thoroughly undermined his own ground as to the possibility of knowing anything as to the *nature* of the Absolute. He is therefore precluded from the opportunity of reaching his results by the method of his own selection. We have nevertheless agreed not to press this point against him. There is, it is true, no apparent way (other than the one which has thus failed him,) of legitimating the distinction which he has sought to draw betwixt the two kinds of knowledge in relation to the Infinite and Abso-

lute, namely the knowledge *that* it is, and the knowledge (true, however partial.) *what* it is. It is, notwithstanding, evident that by abandoning his strictures upon the sweeping force of the Hamiltonian logic, and by accepting the argument of Dr. Mansel in its integrity, our author might then plausibly contend for the doctrine of the unknowable in the form in which that doctrine was held by Comte, and is still held by some of Comte's followers. He might, that is, contend with at least the show of reason on his side, for the doctrine of human nescience, not only as respects the *nature*, but the very *existence* of the Absolute. This Mr. Spencer has not done; but this, we say, Mr. Spencer might do. Yet, as has been seen, before Mr. Spencer could be justified in so doing, it would be incumbent on him to overthrow the barrier which Kant has raised between the speculative and the practical reason, and the barrier which the Scotch Professor and his Oxford pupil have raised between ordinary and regulative knowledge and between faith and science. At any rate, his nominal victory would be without the desired fruits. For although the objective verities contemplated by theology were denied as matters of cognition, they might and would still be affirmed as matters of sure credence. The author of "First Principles" is thus again between the horns of a dilemma. If either of these distinctions can be established; if, for instance, Kant's "certainty" of the practical reason, or Hamilton's assured conviction, derived through faith, can be saved from the shipwreck of pure or speculative knowledge, ontology, in the technical sense, is indeed impossible; but we may still hold to the imperishable truth of the sacred oracles. If, however, these distinctions must be given up, it is only because faith, belief, credence, is itself considered to be a form of cognition, and therefore an exercise of pure intelligence. Whichever way the question is decided, Mr. Spencer's reasons are demolished, and the postulate of "First Principles" is without evidence, whether intuitive or discursive.

II. We are thus brought up to the second question in our series, which is this: Is Mr. Spencer justified in regarding the teaching of the Bampton lecturer as identical with that of the

Scottish philosopher? If the answer to this query be in the negative, it must then follow that the Bampton Lectures are founded on a misstatement or perversion of the views set forth in the Discussions, the Annotations on Reid, and the Lectures on Metaphysics. In that case, there is no more real connexion between the views of Sir W. Hamilton and the "First Principles" of Mr. Herbert Spencer, than there is between the ring of Saturn and the crater of Vesuvius. If Hamilton consciously went all lengths with Mansel, of course no one will deny that the principles of Hamilton have been truly expounded by Mansel. But if that far-sighted Aristotelian could not see his way so far as this, or seeing, deliberately refused (like a nervous passenger in a stage-coach,) to take the perilous journey in the Bampton mail, the question is still open as regards the inevitable drift of Hamilton's acknowledged speculations. What did Hamilton mean to teach, when he announced his peculiar view of the relativity of knowledge and of the boundary of speculative thought?*

* See the first seven chapters of Mill's Examination of Hamilton, for a curious and almost exhaustive discussion of this and the connected points. Mill allows that Mansel's premises are those of Hamilton (Examination, London, p. 106); but elsewhere uses the following startling language: "The conclusion I cannot help drawing from this collation of passages is, that Sir W. Hamilton either never held, or when he wrote the Dissertations had ceased to hold, (for his theory respecting knowledge of the Primary Qualities does not occur in the Lectures,) the doctrine for which he has been so often praised and nearly as often attacked—the Relativity of Human Knowledge. He certainly did sincerely believe that he held it. But he repudiated it in every sense which makes it other than a barren truism. In the only meaning in which he really maintained it, there is nothing to maintain. It is an identical proposition, and nothing more." (*Ibid.*, p. 29.) Compare with this the very significant statement of Dr. McCosh, in his valuable work in "Defence of Fundamental Thought." (See "An Examination of Mr. J. S. Mill's Philosophy," New York, 1866, p. 234, foot note.) Both Hamilton and Mansel undoubtedly held to the existence and reality of the *mundus transcendentalis*. None is more free to acknowledge this than Calderwood. It does not follow that they recognised the validity of theological knowledge. One of them certainly did *not*, if his language expresses his judgment. The doubt is respecting the other. For an elaborate and comprehensive

to say on this difficult subject? Would he have allowed the terms infinite and absolute to be so defined and employed as to be used indifferently of the pantheistic *Idea* of the German, and of the awful personal Jehovah?

The perplexity in this case, as in that of Kant, is that Sir W. Hamilton has made contradictory statements on the subject of man's capacity to construct a theology. One class of these statements seem to conduct us to a denial of all knowledge of God. The particular statements in question are thought to admit, indeed, of a more generous interpretation. Another class of these statements require us imperatively to affirm the possibility of some knowledge of God. For instance, Hamilton says in one place. "Thus it is, that our theology is necessarily founded on our psychology; that we must *recognise a God from our own minds*, before we can *detect a God in the universe of nature*."* Upon this and similar passages in Hamilton's writings, we need no better comment than that of Mr. Martineau: "To recognise a God from our own minds," says this sharp-witted critic, "is surely to discover a 'passage from psychology to ontology;' and the transition which Sir W. Hamilton denies to Cousin, he finds possible himself. There is a way—and he has indicated, with the clearest discernment, precisely where it lies—to reach the sublime truths in which philosophy culminates."† In the mean-

discussion of this point, see Hamilton's Letter to Calderwood, and Calderwood's minute dissection of it, in "The Philosophy of the Infinite," Cambridge and London, second edition (pp 497-511): Appendix. In this Letter, Hamilton regrets (on p. 498) that "my doctrines (briefly as they are promulgated on this abstract subject,) *have been now again so much mistaken*." (The italics are ours.) That there was obscurity in Hamilton's own mind as to this matter, seems not unlikely, after comparing such statements as those on pp. 507, 508, with such as those on pp. 498 and 500. In the place last cited, he uses the term, "comprehend," as a synonyme of "conceive."

* Quoted by Martineau, from "Discussions," p. 298.

† Martineau, *Essays*, Vol. II., p. 288. Compare with this the striking argument in defence of Hamilton, by Young, in the first chapter of his third section, pp. 128 *et seq.*, and more particularly the quotations from Hamilton's first Lecture. See "Province of Reason," pp. 134, 135. Two will answer for the rest: "Philosophy would then be subverted in the

time, it is not competent to Mr. Spencer to claim the authority of Sir W. Hamilton for the views presented in "First Principles" as to the Infinite. The utterances of Dean Mansel are confessedly plain.* The utterances of Sir W. Hamilton are deemed by many to be as ambiguous as they are otherwise oracular; and by not a few, the utterances relied on by Dean Mansel and Mr. Spencer, are understood in a distinctly opposite sense from the sense they have put upon them.

In order to determine what are the views of a given writer, it is always necessary to consider his scope. This obvious rule has been violated by many of Hamilton's adversaries, but has been carefully observed by Dr. John Young, the brilliant author of the "Christ of History," and the "Province of Reason," and, we regret to have to add, of other works which cannot be so highly commended. Dr. Young agrees in his critique on this subject with Professor Calderwood in his strictures on the Bampton Lectures, but differs from him as to the attitude of Sir William Hamilton, who he thinks has been misinterpreted by Dean Mansel. The effort is made to evince that the teacher never would have gone the lengths of the pupil. Hamilton was merely beating down Cousin and the Hegelians. Hamilton's "Causality," which is demonstrated to be "a mental impotence," is only causality in the sense required by the argument of Cousin. Hamilton's "Absolute" is nothing but the vacant abstraction of the German idealists. It was *this* "absolute" that Hamilton was battering and showing to be unknowable and worthless.† All

subversion of its [!] three great objects—God, free-will, and immortality." (Hamilton's Lectures, 90–93.) "Mind rises to its highest dignity when viewed as the object through which alone our unassisted reason can ascend to the knowledge of God." (*Ibid*, Lecture I., 35.) The same side of the question, regarding Hamilton's true meaning, has recently been taken in this REVIEW, in an able paper by the Rev. Mr. Quarles of Mo., which has since appeared in pamphlet form.

* Yet even Mansel sometimes recoils from the plain consequences of his own logic, and with "a noble inconsistency" repudiates the inferences of Mill as to the bearing of certain of his statements. (See Examination of Hamilton, Chap. VII.)

† "Province of Reason," 1860, pp. 133–145. See, particularly, the quotations from Hamilton's first Lecture on Young's, pp. 134 and 135.

this is exceedingly generous and ingenious ; and if it could only be made out to be *true*, every word of Hamilton's celebrated paragraphs on the unconditioned might be accepted, and yet Mr. Spencer be forced to give up his already precarious hold on Sir William Hamilton, and cling fast and solely to Dr. Henry Longueville Mansel. We may at least admit to Dr. Young that Sir William was not *meditating* the destruction of Christian theology, but simply the overthrow of Continental Absolutism.

The same view of his intention was apparently taken by Dr. Thornwell, and the general position of Hamilton, interpreted in this sense, was accepted by him with certain important modifications.* The question we have been considering under this head, is perhaps forever insoluble. Till it is fairly set at rest, however, Mr. Spencer is certainly estopped from numbering the great Scottish thinker with the conscious advocates of utter nescience as to matters of theology ; or even of claiming the unchallenged support of Hamilton's avowed theory. It is of course quite conceivable that the sage of Edinburgh has *unwittingly* enunciated propositions that allow of no other construction than the one which, in the able hands of Dean Mansel, has yielded the results given in "The Limits of Religious Thought."

The whole question in regard to the true reading of Sir William Hamilton is, however, a question of mere interpretation.

* See, for example, Thornwell's Works, Richmond, Vol. I., p. 18, and Vol. III., pp. 96-99. The wonderful analysis of Hamilton's doctrine, however, which is given in the examination of Morell's "Philosophy of Religion," should be compared with the following remarkable criticism, which is worthy of being especially pondered: "Sir William Hamilton, whose philosophy by no means leads to a total denial—on the other hand, it expressly postulates a necessary faith and a relative knowledge—of transcendent existence, has yet, at times, expressed himself in terms which justify the remark of Professor Fraser, [Essays in Phil., p. 222,] that 'the Scottish philosopher seems to cut away every bridge by which man can have access to God.' To maintain the absolute incognoscibility of God, is to maintain the absolute impossibility of religion. The philosopher, accordingly, who, in modern times, has so triumphantly demonstrated that ontological science is a 'mere fabric of delusion,' was but consistent with himself, when he resolved religion into obedience of the moral law."—*Id.*, Vol. I., p. 107.

It is, as we have said, hard, if not impossible, to give a decisive answer to that question. Mr. Herbert Spencer has boldly taken his leap in the dark, without waiting for the answer to be given, or without considering that an answer was required. But it is only on the assumption of the identity of the premises of Mansel with the principles of Hamilton, that the founder of "A New System of Philosophy" could obtain aid or comfort from the intractable antagonist of Cousin.

Let us put it in this way. Sir William Hamilton's well-known theory on this subject logically involves the conclusion of the Bampton lecturer, or not. If his theory does involve that conclusion, then the matter can be greatly simplified by restricting the debate to the contents of the Bampton Lectures. If Mansel is approved, Hamilton is approved. If Mansel is condemned, not even the exalted name of the Scottish Stagirite can protect him who bare it from the same condemnation. On the other hand, if the theory of Hamilton does *not* involve that conclusion, then manifestly the corollaries of Mr. Spencer can derive no countenance from Hamilton's authority. The interests of the present discussion do not seem to call for a choice between these alternatives. In either case, the course of Mr. Spencer, in counting upon this backing in Scotland, has been shown to have been a precipitate one.

If the propositions in the "Discussions" on the subject of the unconditioned are compared with the propositions in the Bampton Lectures, from which the logician of Oxford has derived his conclusion as to the limit *ad quem* of religious thought, these propositions will be seen to be obviously and expressly the same, in so far as they bear against the ontology of the German idealists. The real question, however, is, would Hamilton have been willing to substitute the word *God* for the word *Absolute*, as Dr. Mansel has done, thus regarding the terms as convertible, and thus permitting the batteries that had before concentrated their fire upon the Pantheists to be directed also against the Theists? It is upon this question that a subsidiary one depends, viz. : Was the Bampton lecturer reasoning fairly from his premises when he argued to the extreme conclusion he has reached in "The

Limits"? His premises are ostensibly the positions of Hamilton, which he has carefully re-stated and expounded. If, then, his statement and exposition are to be received as accurate, we are free to admit that his main argument is unassailable. If, however, he has misconceived the sense of his master, there is a sophism at the very outset of the reasoning, considered as reasoning based upon the principles of Hamilton. Viewed in that aspect, the reasoning is inconsequential. Regarded apart from the question of the just connexion of Mansel's premises with the Hamiltonian principles, the special reasoning of Mansel from his own premises is legitimate or not, according to the view that may be taken of the propriety of interchanging certain terms, such as "know," "conceive," "comprehend," and the like; the correctness of his doctrine of relativity; and a number of other matters which are intimately bound up with the general Hamiltonian philosophy, and at once lead to the discussion of that philosophy on its merits; but above all, according to the view that may be taken of the justifiableness of that process by which the Bampton lecturer skips so lightly—

"As on the unsteadfast footing of a spear,"

from the Absolute, or the Infinite, and what may be concluded respecting them, to *the Deity*, and what may be concluded, by stress of the same arguments, respecting *it* (or *him*). Even if the Hamiltonian philosophy, in its other teachings, be approved, (the inquiry as to Hamilton's responsibility for Mansel's procedure in the particular instance having been suspended,) before the Bampton lecturer is warranted in drawing his extreme conclusion, he must be able to show authority for the procedure by which he has so constantly identified in his argument what is true of the mere abstraction of the German ontologists, and what is true of the awful and transcendent Jehovah of the Scriptures. Admitting the validity of Mansel's reasoning, viewed in other lights, and of the Hamiltonian philosophy on which it depends, if the Infinite-Absolute of the Germans be not identical with the God of heaven and earth, then all the lecturer's pains have been to no purpose, and his famed argument in "The Limits of Religious Thought", is utterly inconclusive.

We are thus abreast of the last and largest question of the series which we have been examining, which is this: Are the principles, whether they be regarded as those of Mansel alone, or of Hamilton as well, upon which the Bampton Lectures rest for their logical support, *sound* principles, or are they not? As introductory to this question, or as wrapped up in it, there would be a pertinency in discussing also the soundness of Sir William Hamilton's conceded position in regard to the possibility of a philosophy of the Unconditioned. The whole of this discussion, as to the true relation of the human mind to the Infinite and Absolute, may be properly reserved for another number of this REVIEW, where we lay out to take a broader view of the modern doctrine of the Unknowable.

It is now sufficiently plain that there could not well be a greater misnomer, when applied to certain current forms of philosophy, than this term "positive," which Mr. Herbert Spencer and his school (though eschewing all affiliation with Comte,) affix to modern science. It is notorious that Comte insisted on this very thing of the positiveness of modern science, and of modern science only, as the key-stone of his philosophy. Nor is Mr. Spencer behind Comte in the importance which he too attaches to this dictum. By positive, we commonly mean either that which is opposed to what is negative, or else that which is opposed to incertitude. But in neither sense are the Agnostics* entitled to appropriate to themselves (as Comte and his immediate followers have done,) the name of Positivists. So far as all profound knowledge of anything is concerned, and all knowledge whatever of "ultimate ideas," of the Infinite and Absolute, and of God, their system is a system of stark negations and of utter nescience. It is, moreover, a system that is centred in one of the most perilously insecure, even if it is not one of the most demonstrably rotten and untenable, of purely *a priori* speculations.

Even should it be granted, whether absolutely or merely for the sake of argument, that the Hamiltonian doctrine of the un-

* A descriptive term, suggested by Dr. Littledale, and employed by him to designate all the schools that found on the doctrine of the unknowable.

thinkable has not been overturned, but only shaken by the heavy strain put upon it, one thing at least is undeniable: that doctrine, the validity of which, in the sense given it in the Bampton Lectures, can alone insure the philosophy of Mr. Herbert Spencer, is, in point of fact, true, or it is false. If it is *false*, then (on grounds already won by argument,) the whole philosophy that is based on the doctrine of the unknowable, is subverted. If the doctrine of Hamilton is *true*, the work of that philosophy remains an open question, to be finally decided on independent evidence. The force of this evidence has been sufficiently examined to have justified us in pronouncing it unsatisfactory and untrustworthy. The teaching of the first five chapters of "First Principles" is not in such a manner dependent on the conclusion of Sir William Hamilton, that if the latter remains intact, so necessarily does the former. It must first be shown that the conclusion of Hamilton is identical with the doctrine as stated by Mansel; and even then the teaching in "First Principles" remains intact only on the assumption that the conclusion of Hamilton and Mansel is irreconcilable with "the current theology." The truth of this assumption would, however, involve the disproof of Mansel and Hamilton, by a *reductio ad absurdum*. If the distinctions that have been drawn by Sir William Hamilton between knowledge and belief, and between ordinary and regulative knowledge, or if simply the general distinction of Kant between the pure and the practical reason can be successfully maintained, then once more, and manifestly, the entire Positivist teaching as to the unknowable will have to be abandoned. We take stronger ground. The Positivist teaching is subverted all the same, if the Hamiltonian doctrine of the unthinkable be saved, yet saved only at the sacrifice of the distinctions just referred to—though still saved on the basis of a reconciliation in *some* mode between the Hamiltonian metaphysics and Christian Theism.

Here is our *ars inexpugnabilis* against the assaults of Mr. Herbert Spencer and his followings. For the Hamiltonian doctrine of the unthinkable is at best a precarious, and, in the form in which it is restated by Dr. Mansel, a most treacherous founda-

tion; but the Bible and Christian Theism rest upon a basis of evidence that has no weak point, and can never be successfully assailed. Whatever else is doubtful, this is beyond all reasonable dubiety. Whatever else may be "unknowable," the truth of Christianity is unquestionably known. This, then, is the final dilemma in which Mr. Herbert Spencer is involved. Either the Hamiltonian doctrine of the Unthinkable is *false*, and the system of Mr. Spencer consequently subverted; or else it is *true*, but only true upon grounds which, admitting of the reconciliation of nescience and faith, equally necessitate the overthrow of Mr. Spencer's Atheistic philosophy as to the Inscrutable. The doctrine of the unknowable, and, by consequence, the entire system of the Positivists of every school, is therefore built upon the sand. So far as that system has reference to supersensual verities, and especially in so far as it has reference to the knowledge of God, and in particular to the authority of the Christian Scriptures and the truth of the Christian religion, it is at bottom absolutely worthless. This result will be still more apparent from a discussion, upon their *merits*, of the metaphysical principles on which the new system is professedly grounded. The consideration of this branch of the subject is necessarily postponed to another issue of this REVIEW.