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ARTICLE I.

## PRELACY A BLUNDER.

Two theories of Christianity prevail in Christendom, which are in fact essentially opposite. If one is the gospel of God, then the other cannot be. To him who heartily holds the one, the assertor of the other must be as one who "brings another gospel," and who ought to "be Anathema Maran-atha." That the advocates of these incompatible schemes should co-exist, and should have co-existed for three hundred years, in the bosom of the same communion, can only be accounted for by the stringency of the political influences which originally dictated the unnatural union, and by the absurdity of that theory of the Church which requires its tolerance. The hatred of Queen Elizabeth for the gospel, with what she regarded as her diplomatic and secular interests, prompted her to coerce the two religions into cohabitation in the State Church, by the despotic hand of persecution. The blunder of making a visible unity an essential attribute of the Church, where Christ required only a spiritual unity, has betrayed both parties into a dread of "the sin of schism," which holds them to the hollow mockery of union.

The one of these plans of salvation may be described, with sufficient accuracy, as the high-Prelatic, held by Rome, the Greek Church, and the Episcopalian Ritualists. It is often called the theory of "sacramental grace;" not because the other party deny

*The Vedder Lectures, 1874. Prayer and its Relation to Modern Thought and Criticism. A Course of Lectures delivered before the Theological Seminary and Rutgers College (New Brunswick, New Jersey).* By ISAAC S. HARTLEY, D. D., Pastor of the Reformed Church, Utica, N. Y. New York: Board of Publication of the R. C. A., 1875.

*The Vedder Lectures, 1875. "The Light by which we see Light," or Nature and the Scriptures. A Course of Lectures delivered before the Theological Seminary and Rutgers College, New Brunswick, New Jersey.* By TAYLER LEWIS, LL. D., L. H. D., Union College. 'Εν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος—John i. 1. New York: Board of Publication of the R. C. A., 34 Vesey Street. 1875. 246 pp. 12mo.

"The Vedder Lectures" for 1875 are not without evidences of the genius and learning by which their venerable author has been so long distinguished from the mob of American writers. It is refreshing in these days, when the undoubted value of mathematical and physical studies is so often urged even to the disparagement of the classics and philosophy, to fall in with a man who, whilst betraying familiarity with some of the latest results and processes of "science," is yet one whose true delight is in the speculations of the ancients and in the unadulterated Greek of Plato and Aristotle. Still more is it gratifying to meet with a thinker of breadth and robust force, who, in these perilous times of infidelity, remains proof against every seduction, and "whose delight is in the law of the Lord," and who "meditates in that law day and night." It is also pleasant to find that, after his many encounters, the bow of this hoary champion abides in strength. The scholarship of Dr. Lewis is something remarkable. He is not only at home among the pages of the old Greek philosophers (accepting nothing at second hand), but Latin, German, and Hebrew, seem to be equally at his fingers' ends. It is with a novel sensation that one plunges into a volume newly from the press that bristles so with the characters of old Assyria. Several of the translations that are here offered, as well from the New as from the Old Testament, are noticeable not only for their exactness but their beauty and impressiveness. There are not wanting, too, traces of an acquaintance with other

Semitic and possibly with Indian dialects. There is withal no pedantry. The idea impressed on the reader is that of thoroughly mastered learning. The writer loves to get away from the atmosphere of the grammar and lexicon and soar into the regions of high philosophising and fervid imaginative and spiritual eloquence. The style is here and there, perhaps, too dithyrambic, and the diction is throughout certainly too technical. Many new words are coined, and Horace's "unaccustomed words" freely used. Yet it is the lecturer's own style, and we would not have it either changed or copied.

The work consists of five lectures; of which the first is entitled, "The Fearfulness of Atheism;" the second, "The Denial of the Supernatural;" the third, "The Cosmical Argument—Worlds in Space;" the fourth, "Cosmical Argument continued—Worlds in Time;" and the fifth, "The Kingdom of God; or, The Greatness of the Bible Theism, as compared with the Physical, Scientific, and Philosophical." The first lecture is one of the most striking. It is here shown that many dislike the theistic idea, but few are willing to abandon it altogether; that the consequence of such abandonment is intellectual and moral desolation; that the doctrines of hell and retribution themselves are not so dreadful; that no recourse can be had to the hypothesis of chance, or even to the supposed refuge of mere law; that Atheism is a gulf of horror; that there is a momentous seriousness about the world problem; that the ideas of holiness and justice fascinate even in their condemnation; that Atheism is without hope, without *security*; that Atheism does not protect against the chances of a future state; that there is no room in this scheme for the idea of progress; that nature is of necessity a *finite* thing; that the evolution hypothesis involves the notion of decay as well as growth, and that, with whatever interior cyclical movements and retrogradations, the grand cycle of the universe must at last run round and run out; that there is need of a renovating power, of a movement *ab extra*; that Plato and Socrates and Aristotle teach this; that the argument for Deity must be plain, adapted to all; that motion demands a mover; that the infidel cry for illimitable time furnishes its own refutation, inasmuch as on the

Atheist's view the direction of the universal movement is then indeterminate; that an insect crawling amidst the machinery of the great Haarlem organ, or over the dome of St. Paul's, would not be in a less favorable position for forming oracular judgments; that the mighty music of the Cosmos is unintelligible on Atheistic principles; that the world has higher aspects than the physical; that the physical is subordinate to the hyperphysical; that nature considered as a *mean*, has no *end* terminating in itself; that mind—that idea—that *the perfect*, should be placed first; that Strauss in his final melancholy utterance, is the despairing Prometheus of Æschylus.

It would be impossible within our limits to give a fuller outline of the argument as a whole. All that we can do is to seize upon certain points that have arrested our attention. There is admirable force and skill in the fencing by which the weapon of law is wrested from the hand of the modern Atheist. Upon *his* principles, it is triumphantly evinced there can be no *law* other than mere sequence, and that the most fortuitous sequence has as much the character of law as any other. The boasted ideas of order, relation, causality, are themselves mere products of a mindless power, and thus themselves mere contingencies. With a different atomic adjustment, order might have been disorder. Comte and his followers have consistently abandoned eternal and necessary ideas. It is a logical sophism, therefore, that would interpose the *tertium quid*, law, betwixt chance and mind. Another point that is made with ingenuity and pressed home with cogent power, is, that on the assumption of infinite ages in the past during which the evolution of the Cosmos has been going on, the result reached is far beneath what might naturally have been predicted. It was only yesterday, for instance, that man was an ape; whereas he ought long ago to have been an angel or a glorious demiourgos—unless, indeed, the progress were towards the worse and not the better; which had been proved to be just as tenable as the more flattering hypothesis. In that case, it follows by parity of reason, that by this time, in the possible sequences of a duration absolutely without beginning, there may have been evolved out of nature itself, and may now

be in existence, a baleful demon who may one day wreck the universe, and whose *mirabilia* may be to-day as repugnant to the familiar course of things as any of the *miracula* of the Bible are imagined to be by the Atheist. There is an elaborate attempt made in this chapter to offset the vaticination of Spencer (who is, however, not expressly referred to,) as to the probable fate of the stellar universe, by a masterly reproduction of the arguments of Plato and Aristotle. Spencer surmises a perpetual series of oscillations between the minimum of rest and the maximum of advance. The astute lecturer, on the other hand, revives the subtle *a priori* argument of the ancients, that "a movement right onward" must finally come to an end. There must be what Socrates calls a *καμπή*, or *turning* round, before the movement can be renewed and thus perpetuated. But though there may be something partial of this kind, inasmuch as part acts on part, there can be nothing of this kind that is predicable of the whole, inasmuch as there is nothing *else than* totality, and consequently, no the atheistic view, nothing to produce the cyclical return. We confess to an admiration for this species of mental gymnastics, and fancy the lecturer to be in occupation of ground as safe as that of Mr. Spencer; but we have grave doubts whether there is any gain in leaving the sure foothold of the *a posteriori* arguments.

The second lecture is a very fine one. Without pretending to analyse it, we are content to bring out some of its salient ideas. The charge of anthropomorphism is here retorted upon the positivist. Much of the discussion in this chapter had been previously gone over in the "Divine-Human in the Scriptures," which is a book that deserves a more unqualified commendation even than these "Vedder Lectures" of the same author. There is nothing like slavish repetition, and the other work is not referred to in these pages. There is, however, much also that is new here, and much that is equally admirable. The alleged impossibility of the supernatural is carefully considered and denied. The Divine constancy in nature is admitted. The *moral* power of a miracle is eloquently illustrated. Nature is a kind of screen. There is something soothing in the notion of physical law. Yet

there is also a fascination about the *supernatural*. There are two kinds of incredibility: that of the sense, and that of the reason. Hume went no further than that of sense. A miracle was a thing unknown and unknowable, not impossible. The modern Atheist boldly asserts that miracles are incredible to the reason; that they are *per se* impossible. The author maintains that what is incredible to the sense may be credible to the reason, and illustrates his meaning by reference to the choral song of the angels at the birth of Christ, and the prodigies of the crucifixion. It was meet the angels should make merry and be glad. It would be almost *incredible* to the reason that the earth and heaven should be unmoved at the death of their Lord. *Moral* reasons come in. The total *absence* of the supernatural would be repugnant to every rational principle. The moral power of the biblical supernatural, in comparison with every other, and the sublimity of the Christian's, in comparison with all other sacred books, is amply set forth. The soul cries aloud for some supernaturalism. It is a childish argument that may be thus stated: nature is *all*; therefore there is nothing above or beside nature. There are manifold absurdities in the scheme of an eternal evolution which is itself self-evolved; in a scheme which finds the highest in the lowest, and educes *more* out of *less*. The impossibility of the supernatural is shown to be the staple of the rationalistic exegesis; and it is finely indicated that the subjective truthfulness of the Bible involves the objective reality.

We can say but little of the next two lectures. The first of them answers the astronomical objection, and in an admirable manner. The arguments of Whewell and Chalmers are given substantially, and the former is expressly cited. This, however, is only part of the reply, and is itself completely remodelled. Dr. Lewis's own answer to the cavil is wholly *suigeneris*. There is something almost fantastic in his "trine aspect of the universe," and his "three dimensions of being." These are breadth, length, and altitude. By breadth, he would denote space-relations; by length, time-relations; and by height or "altitude," supra-cosmical or hyper-physical relations. Yet there is a great thought wrapped up in this odd phraseology. True greatness is not mere

*bigness* or mere duration. The soul is greater than the fixed stars, apart even from the consideration of its immortality. God's ends cannot be determined by rule and compass. There is an interesting account given of the grandeur of the ancient views of the stellar world. The remainder of the lecture is devoted to an exhibition of the sublimity and non-scientific character of the Bible language. It is strongly argued that this language is so constructed as always to harmonise with the progressive relations of God's word and the progressive disclosures of human science. There are no double or cabalistic senses, but there are mounting or germinant senses. Old ideas undergo new expansions. The second of the two lectures on the Cosmical argument does not contain much that is fresh to readers of the "Six Days of Creation," and the Lange Commentary on Genesis. As is well known, the lecturer adopts the long-day view, and endeavors to sustain it by pure exegesis of the text and by the testimony of the fathers, unassisted by the help of the geologists. This chapter shows a knowledge of the Hebrew and cognate dialects that is possessed by few. There is perhaps nothing better on this side of the question. Without naming Hugh Miller, the "Mosaic vision" theory is advocated by the lecturer. Without entering upon the open question of the length or nature of the creative days, we are convinced that the first chapter of Genesis is more akin to the historic than to the prophetic books. There is something rather mysterious about the lecturer's "æonic words" and "olamic ages," though much that he says on these topics, where not obscure, is excellent. There is a marked tendency towards a sort of Christian mysticism that is observable in several parts of this volume. It is hard to say whether the respected lecturer has been most influenced by Plato, by such writers as St. Victor, or by S. T. Coleridge. It is evident that he has been influenced most of all by the Divine Logos, of whom he so loves to speak.

The last of the five lectures is perhaps the best of all. He draws rather a whimsical distinction between the words *conception* and *idea*. We think the lecturer concedes too much to the pantheist (on p. 239) where he holds that there is a pantheism that is true and scriptural. Much of the preceding discussion is

condensed and recapitulated in a more impressive form. There is a good deal of this kind of repetition in the book, but it is exactly of the kind that is necessary in oral addresses. There is no apparent effort at symmetry in the arrangement of the particular topics. Everything seems to flow from the point of the pen. The hideous *hysteron-proteron* of the modern Atheist is once more presented, in the fifth lecture, and forcibly exposed. Matter and force ought not to be put first. The nebula could not have come first. The lowest could not precede the highest. Quantitative or dynamical are not to be ranked with *spiritual* values. *Faith* has inestimable value as the measure of spiritual worth. (Heb. xi.) Strauss's dictum is grandly refuted, that the Hebrews had only the *personal* and the Greeks the *absolute* idea of God. The anthropopathism of the Bible is not a mere figure, but a real approach of the infinite to the finite. It is just here that infidel philosophy loses its balance.

"*The Vedder Lectures*" for 1874, had already won their way into the regards of those who were acquainted with their object; but they are now for the first time offered to the reader. While not seeing our way clear to accept all the subordinate arguments as conclusive, we do not hesitate to pronounce the argument-in-chief unanswerable. The method is a good one. The first lecture is on the nature, history, and practical uses of Prayer. The second is on the being and personality of God. The theistic proposition, with its corollaries, is supported by a variety of proofs, some of which (as that of Dr. D. H. Hamilton, pp. 69-73) being of a purely metaphysical character, hardly possess the weight which the lecturer gives them. The voluntary character of the Divine action is abundantly established. The third lecture, which discusses the question, whether God can answer prayer, or the relations of prayer to science, is the ablest of the series. The argument here is essentially the same with that of Argyll's "Reign of Law." Prayer, however, is considered too much in the light of a natural force, rather than as a means of securing a divine action. There seems to us to be a confusion in this chapter, and occasionally elsewhere in the book, of God's miraculous and unmiraculous interpositions. At all events the discussion is not



clear on this point. On p. 140, it is argued that God may "suspend or reverse" any law; not by "a new force," but through "other laws." The meaning seems to be, that God may answer prayer without working a miracle. But in the account the author gives, on pp. 137-139, of the miracles of Scripture, we understand him to analyse them into the same kind of operations with ordinary, so far as physical laws are concerned. Either, then, there is no such thing as a miracle, or it is still to be shown that all prayer does not demand the miraculous. The next chapter is on the notorious "Prayer-Test," which the lecturer shows up very cleverly and successfully. He is, however, too mild. There was room for more of virtuous wrath. The grand reply is omitted, viz., that such a test involves the sin of the arch-tempter on the mountain-top. The fifth lecture discusses the point, does God answer prayer, or prayer and miracle.

The thought in this book is better than the language, which, though commonly good, is often diffuse. We challenge the word "reliable." The book abounds in apt illustrations.

*Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman: Written by Himself.*  
D. Appleton & Co. 2 vols. 8vo. Pp. 405, 409.

Darwinians say that the first of a new *genus* is created by its "environment." No other environment than that of Yankee "civilisation" could have rendered possible such a book as this from a man holding such a position. Its author is a distinguished member of an educated profession, and commander-in-chief of the armies of this Empire. His book may be briefly described as lively, perspicuous, egotistical, reckless, slashing, with a spice of profanity, a large infusion of slang, and a general complexion of vulgarity. Military and political criticisms are out of the sphere of this Review; and, for literary criticism, the work does not present a subject matter at all. Our only object in noticing it, is to remark upon its code of official ethics.

Gen. Sherman here not only avows, but glories in his ravages of the South. During his career, his usual answer to remonstrance was: "You Southern people chose war; and war is war."