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Gas. H. Alexander.

ART. I.—*Sketches of Residence and Travels in Brazil, embracing historical and geographical notices of the Empire and its several provinces.* By Daniel P. Kidder. In two volumes—with illustrations. Philadelphia: Sorin & Ball. London: Wiley & Putnam. 1845. 2 vols. post 8vo.

WHILE we show great avidity for information concerning regions in the old world, we are often ignorant of countries in our own hemisphere. How few of our readers could, on examination, give any intelligent view of the great empire of Brazil! We can answer for ourselves, that the work now on our table has communicated as much that is new and awakening, as any similar volumes we ever opened. Hitherto our sources have been few and imperfect: this is the first work exclusively on Brazil, which has proceeded from the American press. Even the English volumes on the subject are not recent; nor is there any one, the writer of which personally visited more than two or three of the eighteen provinces. Southey's quartos are very much confined to great libraries, and seldom perused; and the continuation by Armitage is still less known.

The very works to which we should naturally turn for information are full of errors. Mr. Kidder has shown this in regard to two of these; and we follow his strictures. In McCulloch's Universal Gazetteer, the blunders are such

rial, of which a copy is inserted, was regularly presented, in February, 1839. Although the proposition was never acted upon, it is significant and encouraging, that it was never formally rejected.

In remote places, our traveller found single copies of the Bible, faithfully preserved. Notwithstanding some momentary panics created by the priests, many volumes were put in circulation; some of which, we trust, under God's blessing, are doing their work at this hour. These may prove a happy antidote to the corrupt teachings of the ecclesiastics, who, according to the assertion of the archbishop of Bahia, go ahead, "without any BIBLE but their BREVIARIES."

We cannot lay down these engaging volumes, without declaring our conviction, that if there is a country in the world which should awaken the missionary zeal of American Christians, it is Brazil. We own ourselves to be surprised at the facilities for evangelical labour which are revealed by this narrative.

In point of style, this work is highly meritorious. It is always unpretending, almost always correct, and very often elegant. The natural transparency of the diction presents nothing to interrupt our easy progress; and on some occasions the author rises with his subject to what we consider the best manner of simple narrative. Here and there an inaccurate expression escapes his pen; but, as a whole, the book is worthy of a place among the more elevated productions of our national literature. Of its higher and Christian qualities, we need only say, that it leaves us with the most sincere respect for the mind and heart of the learned and benevolent author.*

Geo. W. Andrews

ART. II.—*The Mysteries opened; or Scriptural views of preaching, and the Sacraments, as distinguished from certain theories concerning Baptismal Regeneration and the Real Presence.* By the Rev. John Stone, D.D. Rector of Christ Church, Brooklyn, New-York. Harpers & Brothers, 1844.

* We should do injustice to these beautiful volumes, if we did not allude to one of their chief attractions, namely, the engravings and cuts with which they are adorned. These amount to the number of thirty-three, and are either principally, if not wholly, from original sketches of the author.

THE progress of knowledge has ever been through conflicts of truth with error. And whoever supposes that error, if left to itself, will die of its own inherent weakness; and that the proper way to advance knowledge, is to expound truth and let error alone, has entirely misread the lessons of human history. When we look back to the past, we see that the error, which after a severe conflict, has been put down in one age, re-appears in another, and sometimes for a conflict far more severe than the first. Indeed history proves that errors, no matter how absurd, which have at any time, seized upon human belief, may come forth with all the power of falsehood over the human mind, in ages of vastly different degrees of general enlightenment. The very work at the head of this article has been written, to put down the superstitious errors of monkish theology, which though an hundred times refuted, have re-appeared in the field of protestant theological controversy, amidst all the enlightenment of the present age. We will therefore make the able work of Dr. Stone, the occasion of examining what we conceive to be the groundwork of all theological controversy, viz: *The connection between reason and revelation.*

The first problem which presents itself in the investigation of the connection between reason and revelation, is *what is meant by reason?* We shall endeavour to show, that whatever idea men may intend to convey by it in such a connection, they do in reality mean by it, *philosophy.* If this be so, then our inquiry will resolve itself into an investigation of *the connection between philosophy and revelation.*

We have heretofore in an article on Psychology, (October No. 1843) endeavored to show with Locke, that there are no innate ideas or principles by which the mind judges of truth, but that all our knowledge is acquired by experience;* and that what we call principles are nothing more

* In order to be properly appreciated or understood, this article should be viewed in connection with those, from the same pen, already published in our Journal. See Princeton Review, for July, 1840, April and October, 1843. The writer uses experience in a wide sense, as including all the facts of consciousness. In saying therefore that all knowledge is to be referred to experience or to revelation, it is not to be considered that intuitive truths, truths which the writer elsewhere calls "self luminous." are denied. In the ordinary sense of the word, we think it impossible, that the knowledge of any necessary and universal truth, should rest on experience. Such basis is altogether too narrow. That every effect within our experience, has had a cause.

than generalised facts; and that whether these facts or principles have been generalised by ourselves or by others, they are equally acquired by experience in our meaning of that term. We refer to our reasoning in that article for the truth of this doctrine.

If, then, the mind has no innate knowledge, but acquires all through experience, we must mean by *reason*, either the bare faculty of reason, or else the knowledge acquired by that faculty: for upon that theory of mental philosophy, it can have no other meaning. If then we mean by it, the bare faculty of reason, the inquiry resolves itself into this: *What is the use of reason in interpreting revelation?* and if we mean by it, the knowledge acquired by that faculty, the inquiry resolves itself into this: *What is the connection between our knowledge of nature and revelation.* And whether we use the word in the one meaning or the other, it amounts to the same thing, in the connection in which we are considering it. For the real inquiry is, *what light does our reason throw upon revelation?* If our reason has no light, but what it has acquired by experience, then this light is the light of nature, which is philosophy; and it is by this light, that it must judge of the truths of revelation, if it judge of them by any other light, than that of revelation itself. There are then, according to this analysis, only two lights to guide the mind in the investigation of knowledge, the light of nature and revelation. And our inquiry obviously resolves itself into the question, what assistance does the light of nature afford us in examining the truths of revelation? Or, *what is the connection between philosophy and revelation?* And this is the question we propose to examine.

“The knowledge of man (says Bacon) is as the waters, some descending from above, and some springing up from beneath; the one informed by the light of nature, the other inspired by divine revelation. So then, according to these

is no adequate ground of the assurance that every effect *must* have a cause. There are many forms of expression used by our able contributor, throughout this, as well as the articles above referred to, which we would not have employed; and, though we presume we refer far more of our knowledge to the constitution of our nature, than he may be inclined to do, yet we are not sure that, with proper understanding, we should be found materially to differ. At any rate, our readers will thank us for presenting them the interesting discussion contained in the following pages, though some of the principles advanced, may not seem quite consistent with the views which the conductors of this Review are known to entertain.—THE CONDUCTORS.

two differing illuminations or originals, knowledge is first of all divided into divinity, and philosophy." As then, nature and revelation are the only sources of knowledge, what assistance does the light of nature or philosophy give us in interpreting divinity or revelation? This question Bacon has properly answered. "But on the other side (says he) out of the contemplation of nature or ground of human knowledge, to induce any verity or persuasion concerning the points of faith, is in my judgment not safe. *Da fidei qua fidei sunt.* We ought not attempt to draw down or submit the mysteries of God, to our reason; but contrariwise, to raise and advance our reason to the divine truth. Wherefore we conclude that theology, which in our idiom we call divinity, is grounded only upon the word and oracle of God, and not upon the light of nature." Such is the doctrine of the Baconian Philosophy, that theology is grounded only upon the word and oracle of God, and not upon the light of nature. We must look to the light of nature for philosophy, but to revelation, for theology. And as the mind has no innate knowledge, if we interpret revelation by any other light than its own, we interpret it by the light of philosophy, whether we call it interpretation according to reason, or not. For we have shown, that what we call reason, is philosophy; and not a light put into the mind by the Creator, at or before our birth, and therefore a divine standard of truth, called by the a priori philosopher, *the reason*, by which, revelation as well as nature, is to be tested as to the truth of its doctrines.

But let us not, in this inquiry, overlook the distinction between reason, as meaning *philosophy* and as meaning *the bare faculty of reason*; and thereby mistake what we say about it as meaning philosophy, as being said about it as meaning the bare faculty of reason. For it would be nonsense, to say that reason in this latter sense, is of no use in investigating the doctrines of revelation. "The use of reason (faculty of reason) in religion, (says Bacon) is of two sorts: the former, in the conception and apprehension of the mysteries of God, to us revealed; the other in inferring and deriving of doctrine and direction thereupon. The former extendeth to the mysteries themselves; but how? by way of illustration, and not by way of argument; the latter consisteth indeed of probation and argument. In the former we see God vouchsafeth to descend to our capacity in the expressing of his mysteries in sort as may be unto us; and doth graft his revelations

and holy doctrine upon the notions of our reason, and applieth his inspirations to open our understanding, as the form of the key, to the ward of the lock; for the latter, there is allowed us a use of reason and argument, secondary and respective although, not original and absolute. For after the articles and principles of religion are placed and exempted from examination of reason, it is then permitted unto us to make derivations and inferences from and *according to analogy of them*, for our better direction. In nature this holdeth not; for both the principles are examined by induction, though not by a medium or syllogism; and besides, those principles or first positions have no discordance with that reason which draweth down and deduceth the inferior positions. Such therefore is the secondary reason which hath place in divinity, which is grounded upon the placets of God." Bacon here shows that reason enables us to apprehend the mysteries of God, such as the doctrine of the atonement, or the resurrection, not by way of argument or proof, but by way of illustration; for God doth graft these mysteries, as well as his holy doctrine, *love your enemies*, and other such doctrines, upon the notions of our reason, and applieth his inspirations to open our understanding as the form of the key to the ward of the lock, in order that we may fully understand them. But we will show in a subsequent part of this article, that much of what we, in considering at this day the connection between philosophy and revelation, are apt to call the notions of reason, and probably of what Bacon in the passage quoted, has called the notions of reason, is not derived exclusively from the light of nature, but also from revelation. Because our first parents were taught by revelation, at the very moment of their creation, or rather, as soon as their internal consciousness was awakened into knowledge. The light of nature had no sooner fallen on their minds, than God spoke to them and instructed them in all knowledge proper for them. And the mode of instruction by revelation was continued through prophets and inspired men till the completion of that mode of instruction in Christianity. So that the light of nature and the light of revelation are so mixed up in our knowledge, that the teachings of each cannot be separated, and the latter had become so corrupted before Christianity was promulgated, that we are apt in the ardour of investigation, to call all our knowledge anterior to Chris-

tianity the notions of our reason. So that, in strictness, the bare faculty of reason is not now, and never has been, employed in examining revelation, but is employed with a knowledge already furnished from both nature and prior revelations. But this use of our prior knowledge is not by way of proof of the doctrines of revelation at this day, but merely by way of comprehending them; because every portion of our prior knowledge has lost its authority as revelation, from the fact, that the revealed cannot be distinguished from the natural, and therefore cannot be made a test in examining what is known to be revelation. Bacon also shows that reason is of use in inferring and deriving doctrine and direction from revelation, and that this consisteth indeed in probation and argument: but still, that this use of reason and argument is secondary, not original and absolute; for, that all our inferences and derivations must be made according to the analogy of the articles and principles of religion, or as the Apostle expresseth it, by "comparing spiritual things with spiritual;" and not as in nature, where principles themselves are ascertained by induction.

We do not, therefore, in revelation ascertain first-principles, such as love your neighbour as yourself, or the ten commandments, by induction in the wide domain of reason or philosophy, and then try the scriptures by these principles; nor do we look out into the domain of philosophy for still higher and more absolute truths, as the transcendental philosophers do, and deduce from them the great doctrines of revelation, according to certain fancies about *the unity of truth*. But we get all our knowledge of the truths of revelation from a sound interpretation of the scriptures. "For the obtaining the information (says Bacon) it resteth upon the true and sound interpretation of the scriptures, which are the fountains of the waters of life." Because the fundamental doctrines taught in revelation are the generalizations, if we may so speak, of a wider experience than that which lies within the province of philosophy. They embrace eternity, with all the facts in that boundless field of experience. It is only then by a mind which has swept over that vast field of vision, that the truths which belong to it can be generalised. A finite mind cannot do so; and of course it must receive such truths from the mind that can; or rather, must receive them from the mind whose manner of knowing is different from man's

manner of knowing—who knows intuitively, what man knows inductively; and to whom all truths are objects of intellectual perception. And this is the reason that induction has a secondary office in ascertaining the truths of revelation: they belong to a wider field of experience than that in which induction can be used.

The proper mode, then, of interpreting the scriptures, is not by making its doctrines square with our reason, which is nothing more than our philosophy, but by a sound interpretation of their language by the rules of grammar and logic; and by collecting all the passages on the same subject matter, and from the induction of the whole, draw the meaning of each; and not from the meaning of one which we may fancy to be a leading one, to infer the meaning of all the rest, thus violating the fundamental principles of induction, which in this secondary way holds good in investigations of this kind, as well as in nature. In some cases, however, where the meaning of a text is so obvious that no two opinions can be entertained about it, like what Bacon calls “glaring instances” in nature, where one single instance is so significant, that you can by it alone determine upon the nature of the whole class, you may use it as a key to the meaning of less obvious passages upon the same subject matter. In a word, we must make scripture the infallible rule of interpreting scripture; just as we make nature the infallible rule of interpreting nature. Neither must we interpret the scriptures altogether as we would a mere human writing. For though in most things they are like human writings, yet they differ in some essential particulars; as is well shown by the following remarks of Bacon. “But the two latter points known to God and unknown to men, touching the secrets of the heart and the successions of time, do make a just and sound difference between the manner of the exposition of the scriptures and all other books. For, it is an excellent observation which hath been made upon the answers of our Saviour Christ to many of the questions which were propounded to him, how that they are impertinent to the state of the question demanded: the reason whereof is, because not being like man, which knows man’s thoughts by his words, but knowing man’s thoughts immediately, he never answered their words, but their thoughts: much in the like manner it is with the scriptures, which being written to the thoughts of men, and to the succession of ages, with a foresight of

all heresies, contradiction, differing estates of the church, yea and particularly of the elect, are not to be interpreted only according to the latitude of the proper sense of the place, and respectively towards that present occasion whereupon the words were uttered, or in precise congruity or contexture with the words, before or after, or in contemplation of the principal scope of the place; but have in themselves not only totally or collectively, but distributively in clauses and words, infinite springs and streams of doctrine to water the church in every part. And therefore the literal sense is as it were the main stream or river; so the moral sense chiefly, and sometimes the allegorical or typical, are they whereof the church hath the most use: not that I wish men to be bold in allegories, or indulgent or light in allusions: but that I do so much condemn that interpretation of scripture which is only after the manner as men use to interpret a profane book." These sagacious remarks of Bacon need no comment. They point out with great precision, the difference to be observed in interpreting the scriptures and a mere human writing—a difference founded upon the omniscience of the Author of the scriptures.

It may perhaps be asked, whether philosophy is of no use at all, in the interpretation of the scriptures? as our remarks thus far, may appear to lead to the conclusion that it is not. We answer, yes! For it must be borne in mind, that the scriptures contain something besides revelation, that though they brought life and immortality to light, yet the greater part of them are rehearsals of historical facts and citations of natural phenomena, and remarks upon the nature of man, all of which lie within the province of philosophy. Of course then, all natural phenomena, whether physical or psychological, are to be explained by philosophy, with the limitation as to the psychological phenomena which will be explained hereafter; and not to be judged according to the words of scripture, as these convey the notions current amongst men at the time the scriptures were written, and not absolute truth, as do their teachings of revelation proper. The Papal Church, for instance, followed the letter of scripture, when it condemned Galileo. But this was a matter in which it ought to have followed the light of nature or philosophy. For the scriptures do not teach philosophy, but theology. They were intended to light up that dark abyss which lies beyond the present

state of existence—to bring life and immortality to light. This is the province of revelation, and over it philosophy throws no light. For much of what we now call philosophy, as we have already indicated, is in reality the light of revelation, which has become so mixed up with the light of nature in our knowledge, that we cannot separate them, and it has therefore lost all its authority as the light of revelation in interpreting the scriptures. Indeed, it is doubtful whether all the the the theological notions in the world are not fragments of revelations more or less corrupted, made in the early ages of human history. For it is certain that the theology of our first parents, was a direct revelation, and not inferences from the indications of nature. And this was also the case with our second great progenitor, Noah. And therefore it may be, that all the theology in the world, in all the varying forms of monotheism, polytheism, and pantheism, is derived more or less from these original divine revelations, but kept alive in these corrupt forms by the indications of nature, ever since they were revealed. And as the light of nature, with the assistance of all the fragments of divine revelations which had been handed down to them, was not sufficient to enable the wisest philosophers before the Christian dispensation, to form a correct idea of God; and as the light of nature has not been sufficient to prevent the idea of God from being entirely obliterated from the minds of some tribes of men in the south of Africa, who have for centuries been entirely removed from the influence of the amount, of revealed truth which is always acting through the general agencies of civilization, it may be doubted whether the light of nature in itself is sufficient to *originate* in the human mind the idea of God; though they are certainly sufficient to prove the existence of a God, after the idea of God is once in the mind,—is once grafted upon the notions of causation and contrivance developed in consciousness; and the mind is thereby enabled to perceive and generalise the analogies pertaining to the subjects which are presented in the psychological and physical world. And the Creator has certainly not left the human race to the teachings of the light of nature alone: but has made revelation even of his own existence, a part of his educational economy. It is true, that the Apostle to the gentiles has said:—"For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made,

even his eternal power and Godhead: so that they are without excuse." But this, we apprehend, does not controvert our view. Because the Apostle says this of men, who had the idea of God, as he well knew, given them by divine revelation, either immediately, or by remote means. And what the Apostle says further seems to confirm our view: "Because that, when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful, but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish hearts were darkened," &c. The words, "when they knew God," evidently refer to other knowledge than that derived from nature—from "the things that are made." All then, the Apostle appears to teach, was, that even the light of nature was sufficient to keep alive in the mind the idea of God, which had been communicated by divine revelation, if man had not apostatised, and thereby suffered his mind to be darkened. And a kindred thought is expressed in the eleventh chapter of Hebrews, "Through faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the word of God, so that things which are seen, were not made of things which do appear." The meaning here is, that it is by faith, by the teachings of revelation and not by the light of nature, that we know that all things are made by God, and not developed out of capabilities of nature by agencies which we can ascertain by the light of nature; as philosophy would seem to teach. So that there may be a doubt, whether all the evidences of natural theology are not seen by a light imparted at some stage of man's history, by direct revelation.

And this does not detract from the proper force of the evidence of natural theology. For though we might not be able to read the planetary system in the indications of the heavens, as Newton did, still after he has taught us, we can there see its evidences in all their force, and they are just as incontrovertible as if we had discovered them ourselves. So in regard to the evidences of natural theology, we might not be able to see these evidences in nature, without an instructor, but when once instructed, we may be able to see them in all their fulness. And it is no objection to the parallel, that we require a supernatural instructor in the one case and only a human instructor in the other. For we utterly repudiate the shallow sophism, that "nothing can be made intrinsically evident to reason, whose intrinsic truth transcends reason; or, what is the same thing, is not naturally knowable by reason." The intrin-

sic truth or internal reasonableness of many of the doctrines of revelation which are not naturally knowable by reason, is now evident to the mind enlightened by revelation. For example, the precept "love your enemies," and the other sublime instructions of the sermon on the mount, were not naturally knowable by reason : but we apprehend, their internal reasonableness or intrinsic truth, is clearly discovered by the Christian. Else, the doctrine of spiritual discernment taught in the scriptures is a cunningly devised fable. We admit there are some mysteries in revelation, as for instance, the trinity, whose internal reasonableness is inevident to the mind of man : but none of them contradict what is known. They are merely above our knowledge ; and therefore do not support the sophism which we repudiate. Therefore, though the evidences of natural theology may not be naturally discernable, yet they may be seen by the light of revelation shed abroad on the mind, increasing its spiritual discernment.

We see then how little the light of nature or philosophy has to do with theology or the teachings of revelation. Philosophy is nothing but the result of the observation and analysis of phenomena, either in the physical or psychological world : and our knowledge of the infinite and the absolute, or in other words, our general conceptions, are nothing but inductive inferences, and not the result, of direct cognition, as is our knowledge of particulars. Every conclusion therefore, which transcendeth the sphere of phenomena, is mere conjecture. What light then, does philosophy throw upon the doctrine of the trinity, or of the origin of sin, or the atonement, or even upon the immortality of the soul ? Where are the phenomena or analogies in nature, from which these great doctrines are to be inductively inferred ? They are without any but the very vaguest analogies in nature, and certainly without any prototype in existence. The little light which philosophy amongst the ancients seemed to throw even upon the immortality of the soul, was perhaps but the faded light of ancient revelation which had passed down commingled with the light of nature in human teachings. This truth has often forced itself upon us when reading the *Phaedon* of Plato. The rambling speculations, the flimsy hypothetical reasonings that prove nothing, the vulgar illusions, which neither explain nor enforce anything, but need to be explained themselves, all overwhelm us with the conviction, that the writer is

striving after something beyond the compass of the human faculties unaided by revelation. And even the analogies of nature which are often employed in illustrating the doctrines of revelation, and defending them from the cavils of infidels, are but a secondary knowledge. They have been seen by the light of revelation, and not by the light of nature. *They* do not lead to the truths of revelation, but the *light of revelation* leads to them, and enables us to see them as the foot-prints of the God of revelation upon the domain of nature. It is by a spiritual discernment, which the truths of revelation beget in the mind, that we perceive them; just as we have already shown, is the case with the evidences of natural theology.

We have said that all natural phenomena whether physical or psychological, are to be explained by philosophy, and not by the words of scripture. But it is important to observe, that there is a difference between physical and psychological truths in the certainty of which they can be made to bear upon the interpretation of scripture. There is generally more certainty in our knowledge of physical than of psychological truth. For instance, we know with absolute certainty, that the earth moves round the sun, and that the bread and wine in the eucharist are bread and wine; and of course, scripture must be interpreted accordingly; for God never contradicts in revelation, what he has said in nature; and it must be borne in mind that in physics all reasoning must end in submission to the senses. For the illusions of sense can only be corrected by evidence of the same sort, where one sense is brought to testify against another or the same sense against itself. And Revelation throws no light over physical truth, except as to the origin of the world, and the order of its creation, and perhaps also as to the time in which it was created, and also, that things were created mature, the vegetables bearing seed after their kinds, and the animals, young after their kinds; if these truths can properly be said to lie within the range of physics. And therefore physical truth must be seen exclusively by its own light, or the light of philosophy. But this is not the case with psychology. For over the moral branch of this subject, though lying within the province of philosophy, revelation throws much light. For even though it should be maintained that we are not enabled by the light of revelation to discover any psychological truth, which is not to some extent made known to us by the light of

nature, yet it must be admitted, that we are enabled by it, to see the great truths of the moral branch of psychology in much greater distinctness. For example; the great fundamental truth of our moral nature, that which constitutes the basis of the moral branch of psychology, *that the heart of man is deceitful above all things and desperately wicked, and that man is born in sin*, is made much more manifest to our reason by the light of revelation, than it is by the light of nature. Our spiritual discernment is quickened and invigorated by the doctrines of revelation, through the agency of the Spirit of God; and we are thus enabled to discern much more clearly, the great truths which lie within the moral branch of psychology. The remark of the Apostle: "But the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God; for they are foolishness unto him: neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned," has much pertinence to the topics of which we are treating, but was spoken more particularly of the great truths of the plan of salvation through Jesus Christ, over which the light of nature throws no light whatever. Notwithstanding though, that the light of revelation illumines the truths of the moral branch of psychology, still after we have searched the scriptures about any doctrine relative to man, it is legitimate, with the light thus obtained to look into the nature of man or psychology, and to the intellectual branch as well as to the moral, for though it throws no light over the purely intellectual branch, yet it assumes the truths of that branch, to see whether we can derive from thence any evidence confirmatory of our interpretation, in the adaptation of the doctrine to the nature so discerned, or in the conformity of the doctrine to ascertained psychological laws. Indeed the adaptation of the doctrines of revelation to the nature of man in regenerating it, and satisfying its most earnest cravings, and its most perplexing doubts, is one of the strongest evidences of its divine character; because it evinces a knowledge of man, on the part of the teacher of such doctrines, far more accurate than any man can by possibility possess; for one of the most important of these doctrines, is *that man cannot possibly know, such doctrines*. In order to discover this adaptation, we must understand, both revelation and man: but in the enquiry, it ought to be constantly borne in mind, that revelation is the light, and man the subject to be illumined, and not the reason of man the light, and revelation the subject to be

illuminated. "For God doth graft his revelations and holy doctrine upon the notions of our reason, and applieth his inspirations to open our understanding as the form of the key to the ward of the lock." It is true however, that the truths of scripture do nevertheless appear more manifest after we have seen the excellence of their application to our natures, than before; and thus more completely satisfy our skepticism.

With these views then, we should never make revelation subordinate to philosophy. For of any of the proper truths of revelation, philosophy knows but little, and of many of them nothing at all. And this truth cannot be too much urged upon our attention. The neglect of it, has been the great source of heresy in every age of Christianity. And that it has lost none of its importance is made manifest by many publications of the present day, and by none more clearly than the recent work of Prof. Bush on the resurrection. The Professor has signally violated this fundamental principle of scriptural interpretation. He has made his argument from reason, or the light of nature, the first step in the investigation of the teachings of revelation on the subject of the resurrection; instead of first examining revelation and ascertaining its doctrines from its own teachings on a subject lying so emphatically within its province, and then examining nature, to see whether it said anything upon the subject. And as might be expected by any one acquainted with the fallacy of such a method of interpretation, we see in the whole investigation, a constant effort to bring the truths of revelation within the laws of nature, which if successful, would at once destroy the supernatural character of revelation and cast the inquirer down upon the broad platform of infidelity. In his very preface, he says "the resurrection is effected by the operation of natural laws." And he more than intimates, that the spiritual body is developed immediately after death by the magical agencies of Mesmerism; and declares that "the intimate connection between electrical phenomena and *light* goes undoubtedly to favour the idea that the spiritual body will be essentially luminous." And thus the great leviathan doctrine of the resurrection which had been swimming about in the boundless ocean of metaphysical conjecture, for a period long before the Sadducees disputed about it, and had escaped the angling of the most skillful philosopher, has been caught by Prof. Bush upon the cunning hook of reason, with almost

as much ease, as a boy catches a trout. But scriptural commentators should know that the line of philosophy cannot fathom the mysteries of revelation; nor its light illumine their darkness. Philosophy stands by the dying man, feels his pulse ebb and flow, sees the pallid hues gather over the brow, sees the fire of the eye bedimmed, and hears the last gasp of life; and all then is lost in shadow, clouds and darkness. True, philosophy may then cast a longing hope and a probable conjecture into a future state, which imagination can create. But is this sound philosophy? Is this such a light as can gild the dark clouds which hang over the future, with a bow of promise sufficiently bright to animate the hopes of the dying man? Let the dying infidel answer the question! For philosophy then, to tell us in what body the soul is to rise, when it does not tell us that it will rise at all, is to our minds, something like a double *petitio principii*.

And to show to what extravagant lengths Prof. Bush has been carried by his endeavour to make it appear that "the resurrection is effected by the operation of natural laws," he says that, the body of the resurrection is a *psychical*, and not a *spiritual* body. He does this for no other reason, as his whole argument shows, than, because the *psyche* according to the distinctions of ancient philosophy has more of affinity with the agencies of nature, than the *pneuma*, and is therefore more likely to constitute the body which is to be under the operation of natural laws according to his favourite theory. And yet the Apostle Paul says explicitly that the body of the resurrection is not to be a psychical body, but a spiritual body, "it is raised a spiritual body," (*soma pneumatikon*.) And stranger still! Prof. Bush has made this declaration of the Apostle, the motto to his book; and a great part of his argument assumes the doctrine. And yet when he comes to make an explicit statement of his doctrine, he reverses the declaration of the Apostle, in order to carry out his favourite theory, "that the resurrection is to be effected by the operation of natural laws." Such are the straits into which an incautious speculator is placed by a false logic.

This *a priori* mode of interpreting scripture.—of forcing one's philosophy upon its teachings,—has been the great source of theological error in all ages of Christianity. At the present day, we need but look to New-England theology, where the attempt to bring down the mysteries of

revelation, to the principles of reason, at first reduced Christianity to Unitarianism, and has now completely frozen all light out of it, that as a retreat from open infidelity this theology has ascended the high walks of the transcendental philosophy, to see whether it cannot descry in its reveries something to bridge over the yawning chasm which separates the mystery of revelation from the teachings of philosophy. And in all countries where the a priori philosophy prevails, at the present day, especially in Germany, it is corrupting revelation by subordinating its teachings more or less to its transcendental conceptions, upon the ground that Christianity is a system of accommodation undergoing a gradual development through the agency of philosophy. And Cousin the French philosopher openly takes the ground, in his Introduction to the history of philosophy, that revelation is to be developed and perfected by philosophy. We do not wonder at this in a professed philosopher. But even he is often driven by his reasonings from this principle, into such infidel positions, that in order to prevent his reader, from considering him an infidel, he frequently amidst the difficulties of reconciling his religion with his philosophy, exclaims in his very loudest accents, that he is a *Christian* philosopher. We can smile at the philosopher who thus rolls his stone to the top of the hill, and is then carried down by its weight back again to the bottom. But very different are our feelings, towards those rational theologians who with lusty, though unavailing efforts are striving to clamber up the lofty, but cloud-capped summits of the transcendental philosophy, to see whether they cannot descry from the lofty peaks, by the light of reason, the objects of that distant region, where only the light of revelation penetrates, while the higher they ascend the thicker is the darkness; and who at last become so habituated to the darkness, that they mistake the figments of their own imaginations for the objects of that distant region. And we know that some, who are so firmly convinced by its external evidences, that Christianity is a divine revelation, as to be unable to throw off the belief, after becoming captivated by the eclectic philosophy of Cousin, and following it with enthusiasm, in its vain endeavours to subordinate Christianity to philosophy, have at last become so well aware of its infidel tendencies, that in a moment of despondency, they have precipitated themselves down into the broad abyss of Roman Catholic credulity,

exclaiming as they fall "that nothing can be made intrinsically evident to reason, whose intrinsic truth transcends reason, or, what is the same thing, is not naturally knowable by reason"! and maddened by this sophism, strive to believe, that bread and wine are flesh and blood, as taught by the infallible church, which sees not with its eyes, but with an inward grace.

In the earliest ages of Christianity also, the various sects of philosophers of that day, the Judaizing sects who maintained a sensuous philosophy of the lowest grade, as well as those sects who maintained a speculative idealistic system, resting upon an a priori foundation, perverted Christianity, by making its doctrines conform to their respective preconceived philosophical notions. These interpreters set out with these notions, and searching through the scriptures for something to support them, seized upon individual passages, and dis severing them from their historical and logical context, made them mean what suited their preconceived notions, because the words taken by themselves were capable of such signification. They could not bring themselves to limit their speculations by the definite facts of revelation. The Platonists, for instance, instead of conceiving God, as the scriptures represent him, as a personal God who created all things from nothing, and who upholds and controls all things, and has a care for every individual as well as the whole, brought into Christianity the God of their speculative conceptions, their *ὄν*, from whence all existence eternally flows by a necessity, under the guidance of the reason. That Judaizing sect, the Ebionites, also brought their carnal Jewish notions into the interpretation of scripture; and made the whole Christian scheme conform to them. They considered the Messiah, according to the Jewish representation of him, as a man who had been chosen Messiah by a decree of God's council, and furnished with the requisite divine powers, for the accomplishment of his office. And though this sect maintained a sensuous philosophy of the lowest grade, and not a speculative one, yet they made an a priori application of it to the interpretation of scripture; and thus perverted scripture in the same way that the idealistic philosophers did.

But the most extravagant example of perverting scripture by forcing upon it the speculative opinions of a spurious a priori philosophy, is that of the Gnostics. These specu-

lators gave themselves up, in the interpretation of scripture, to the most unbridled license, despising the letter, idealising every thing, and striving to look by the light of reason beyond scripture and the natural world, and dive into the mysteries of those things which lie beyond the ken of man, and properly belong to the things which rest upon that faith which reposes upon the authority of God. This gnosticism, not even content with the wide range of Platonic speculation, gave itself up to still wilder fancies. They introduced the notions of the oriental theosophy into the interpretation of Christianity, and made a theosophical Christianity. They found in Christianity what they thought resemblances to their theosophical doctrines, and seizing upon these resemblances, they forced them according to their spurious method of interpretation, into full harmony with their preconceived notions. And thus while they thought they were interpreting scripture, for they were firm believers in Christianity, they were in reality developing their own theosophical notions. Christianity did not soar enough into supernatural regions for them. It dwelt too much among men—was too practical. They wished to prove all things—to comprehend the incomprehensible. “The inquiries which chiefly occupied them,” says Neander, “were these: How is the transition from infinite to finite? How can man imagine to himself the beginning of creation? How can he think of God as the original projector of a material world, so foreign to his own nature? Whence come those wide differences of nature among men, from the man of truly goodly disposition, down to those who appear to be given up entirely to blind desire, in whom no trace of the rational and the moral creature can be found?”

“Now it was exactly here,” continues Neander, “that Christianity made religious faith independent of speculation, and cut off at once all that would lead to those speculative cosmogonies by which the element of pure religious faith was only troubled, and the confusion between the ideas of God and nature furthered, inasmuch as it (Christianity) directed the eye of the spirit beyond the whole extent of the visible world, where in the chain of cause and effect, one thing is constantly unfolding itself out of another, to an almighty work of creation performed by God, by which worlds were produced, and in virtue of which the visible did not spring out of that which appears, Heb. xi. 3.

Creation is received here as an incomprehensible fact under the constraint of a faith that raises itself above the position occupied by the understanding, which wished constantly to deduce one thing from another, and to explain every thing, while it denies everything that is immediate. Gnosis would not acknowledge any such limits to speculation; she wished to explain and represent to the mind how God is the fountain and the source of all existence." And the Gnostics, in their attempts to explain these problems, built up the most fanciful system imaginable; because their speculations were not limited by facts either in nature or revelation: but in the licentious spirit of an a priori philosophy, they roamed at large over the boundless regions of fancy, and filled Christianity with the doctrinal phantasmagora of their theosophy.

But Platonism holds the most prominent place of any philosophy in the history of Christian theology. For it has been from the first ages of Christianity, and is even now, proclaimed as the philosophy peculiarly akin to Christianity. And some have declared, and do still declare, that Platonism was a forerunner of Christianity; and some going still further, maintain that Jesus was inspired in no other sense than Plato was. Now all this we conceive to be most pernicious error—from the first proposition that Platonism is akin to Christianity, to the legitimate deduction from it, that Jesus was inspired in no other sense than Plato was. The Platonic philosophy with its a priori method, and its transcendental conceptions, never did, and never can exercise wholesome influence upon Christian doctrine. It dwells too much on empyrean heights, ever to affiliate with Christianity in its humble walk in the strait and narrow way of life. It claims to have a mystic ladder, by which it can ascend to the region of absolute truth, and have a clear intellectual perception of the real essence of things—to have in fact, as great an abundance of revelations, as the apostle Paul had, when he was caught up to the third heaven. It professes to have a knowledge which transcends the bounds of those truths which are received from external impressions and internal suggestions—in fact, to know after God's manner of knowing. It thus, like every other a priori philosophy, poisons knowledge at its very source, by teaching that general truths are objects of direct cognition, and that particulars are known by reasoning from these general truths. With these high assump-

tions, Platonism has made, and cannot but make Christianity a system of doctrine to be tested and explained by its own principles, and to be moulded in accordance with its own knowledge of absolute truth. When carried to its ultimate deductions, it cannot but maintain that Jesus was inspired in no other sense than Plato was: because Plato knew absolute truth by direct cognition—"by employing the naked thought (says he) alone, without any mixture, and so endeavouring to trace the pure and general essence of things without the ministry of the eyes or ears; the soul being, if I may so speak, entirely disengaged from the whole mass of the body, which only encumbers the soul and cramps it in the quest of wisdom and truth, as often as it is admitted to any the least correspondence with it." According to this doctrine, the reason of Plato was equal to the inspiration of Christ. What then is to be done with the declaration of the Apostle:—"For other foundations can no man lay than is laid, which is Jesus Christ?"

It is true, that at an early period of Christianity, Christian doctrine took a wider range and more discursive flights in the theology of the Platonic schools of Alexandria, than in that of the cotemporary schools, where different modes of thought prevailed; and in looking back over that period of history, we are apt to be captivated by the false show of Alexandrian theology. But we apprehend, that it is at least doubtful, whether the impulse which proceeded from the Alexandrian schools had a tendency to advance sound scriptural interpretation, and pure Christian doctrine. For no fact in church history is more certain, than that the fathers of the first centuries perverted Christian doctrine by calling into their aid the Platonic philosophy in the interpretation of scripture. And that many of them believed and endeavoured to make others believe, that most if not all the mysteries of their religion had been set forth in the writings of Plato. Chrysostom declaimed against these efforts; and the unsophisticated Tertullian declared that the seeds of heresies were scattered in Plato's doctrine of ideas. And it was Platonism culled from the writings of the fathers, that furnished the schoolmen with the extravagance of the matter of their theology, as the logic of Aristotle did the subtilty of its form. So that at every period of the progress of Christianity, Platonism has been one of the chief sources of its corruption.

And it is manifest that the great Apostle to the gentiles,

who was so eminently qualified for his high mission, by his gentile as well as Hebrew learning, did not think that the Platonic philosophy was in any way kindred to Christianity. For in his first epistle to the Corinthians, he denounces the Greek philosophy as foolishness, and takes great pains to place Christianity in open hostility to it. And throughout this whole epistle, he never once attempts to elucidate any doctrine of Christianity by the teachings of the Greek philosophy, though the epistle was addressed to Greeks. And yet, it is one of the most striking features of the mode of instruction used by Christ and his Apostles to graft their doctrines upon those notions of their hearers which have any affinity whatever, with the doctrines which they taught. This we see strikingly exemplified by the Apostle Paul when he was writing to his own countrymen the Jews, in the epistle to the Hebrews. In the very opening of the epistle he shows that Christianity is the continuation of the system of instruction, which God had employed towards their fathers, by the prophets. And in the eleventh chapter, he shows at great length, and with deep earnestness, that faith was the vital principle of religion under the old dispensation as well as under the new: thus showing that the great central doctrine of Christianity, "*the just shall live by faith*", was also the central doctrine of the religion of their fathers. But never once in all his epistles to the Gentiles, though we find him saying that *certain of their poets* had said what he was then teaching, do we find him saying that Greek philosophy, whether Platonism or any other form of it, taught similar doctrines with those of Christianity. But on the contrary, his whole drift is to show that this philosophy was antagonist to Christianity. And indeed, we do not recollect any instance in all his writings where the Apostle ever attempts to liken the great doctrines of revelation to any thing in the natural world—to any doctrine of philosophy—except when he speaks, in the fifteenth chapter of first Corinthians, of the resurrection of the dead. But even there, he does not attempt to *prove* the doctrine of the resurrection, by analogies from nature which he adduces; but merely to illustrate what he taught. For the analogies, are not philosophical analogies from which an inductive inference can be drawn as to the truth of the great doctrine discussed, but merely rhetorical analogies illustrative of his meaning. And it is contrary to the fundamental idea proclaimed in Christianity, to prove

its doctrines by the light of nature—to search in the analogies of nature for a key to its mysteries. For as the doctrines taught do not lie within the range of experience—within the province of nature—the mode of proof was by *miracle*; thereby bringing supernatural things, though not within the province of nature, yet within that of experience; by making, for instance, the supernatural fact of the resurrection a fact in experience, by the resurrection of Christ. And when Paul stood upon Mars Hill, which overlooks the proud city of Athens, prouder perhaps of her philosophy, than any thing else, he did not enlogize that philosophy, and say that it was kindred to the great doctrines which he taught, and thereby gain a favourable hearing; but proclaimed that he had come to declare unto them the God whom they *ignorantly* worshipped. How differently does the Apostle act from the fathers of the first centuries of the Christian church, who were continually endeavouring to show that Platonism contained almost all Christian doctrine.

With these facts forcing themselves upon any but the most superficial student of the scriptures, how can it be pretended, that Platonism has any affinity with Christianity. For the Apostle does not except Platonism from his censures of the Greek philosophy; as he undoubtedly would have done, if he had not intended to include it in his denunciations. And it will not be pretended that the Apostle was not acquainted with the Platonic philosophy; when he was familiar with all Greek literature.

We have now, we submit, shown that Platonism, with every form of the a priori philosophy, is utterly at war in its very fundamental conceptions, in its whole view of the capacity of the human mind, with the genius of Christianity as a revelation from God lying beyond the province of reason, and to be found only in his word contained in the Holy Scriptures. For every system of a priori philosophy when carried out to its legitimate deductions, must like Platonism, virtually supersede revelation, in its assumption that man by virtue of his natural union with the Divinity, is able to apprehend intuitively all the spiritual truths which concern him; and thus confounding all distinction between the natural and supernatural orders of things—between philosophy and revelation.

We now propose to show, that there is a philosophy which is consistent both in its method of investigation, and

its principles with Christianity—a philosophy, which, humbling itself before Christianity, acknowledges it to be a revelation of a knowledge that lies beyond and above its province. This is the Inductive or Baconian philosophy.

That there is a philosophy, or rather psychology, which accords with Christianity—is assumed in it—is very obvious. We say *psychology*, because we have heretofore shown that revelation throws no light upon physics—teaches nothing in regard to them—but is confined to the spiritual part of nature—the nature and destiny of man, which lies properly within the province of psychology. There is, therefore, a psychology which is in accordance with Christianity, and which is assumed in it, because there must be a correspondence between man and revelation. Man must be such as revelation represents him to be—else revelation is false. And revelation must be adapted to man—must assume a correct view of his nature. The laws of his mind, must be such as revelation assumes. If his mind were like that of the beasts of the field, for example, revelation would be altogether unfitted to it. Because, such is the constitution of the mind (if we may use the word in such an application) of a beast, that moral truth cannot operate upon it. There are no notions in his mind, no perceptions in his instincts, upon which the doctrines of revelation can be grafted, and the inspirations of God applied as the ward of the key to the form of the lock, to open his understanding so as to comprehend them. The process of enlightenment and regeneration set forth in the scriptures would be unfitted to such a nature; because they could not operate upon it—its very laws forbid it. For how could moral truth, which is the great and only instrument by which the Spirit of God operates upon the mind of man in bringing it from a state of sin to one of holiness, operate upon the mind of a beast which has no moral perceptions? There would have to be a *new creation*—the beast would have to be changed, or rather created into a man—would have to be endowed with all the capabilities of an intellectual, moral being—before the doctrines of revelation could operate upon it. But such is the nature of man that the doctrines of revelation can operate upon his mind; because it is founded upon a correct view of the laws of his mental constitution—it assumes a correct theory of his mind. The theory of mind is a legitimate object of philosophical inquiry—is a branch of philosophy which we call

psychology. There must be then, according to this analysis, a theory of mind, a psychology, assumed in Christianity; and this theory of mind, whether it be possible to ascertain it or not, is just as true as Christianity itself, which assumes its truth as its own foundation as a scheme of salvation for man.

It is therefore legitimate, in the interpretation of scripture, as we have before shown when we had this topic in hand in another part of this article, after we have carefully examined the doctrines of revelation, to search in psychology to see whether we can find any thing there confirmatory of our conclusions, or any thing which clearly forbids them. But it cannot be too constantly and too carefully borne in mind, that we must not force our psychology upon scripture. For there is much danger of doing it, even when we make the psychological inquiry the last in the process of interpretation; but not the hundredth part as much, as when we carry our preconceived psychological notions into the inquiry according to the a priori method; thus making the psychological inquiry the first in the process of interpretation. For let it not be supposed, that we imagine that any one would in the interpretation of scripture, first look into psychology and then into scripture; for all that we mean, by making the psychological inquiry the first in the order of the investigation, is, that they will carry their preconceived psychological notions into the interpretation; which is the same thing in effect, as first examining into psychology for the doctrine to be found in scripture. For so clearly is it contrary to all sound canons of interpretation to force our preconceived notions upon scripture, that we cannot even take the abstract meaning of a word and force it upon that word in a passage contrary to the import of the context; as is strikingly exemplified in 1st. Cor. iv. 3, where the word *ἡμέρα* (day) is used in the metonymical sense of judgment, contrary to its universal signification.

What then is the psychology, or theory of mind assumed in Christianity? We have heretofore, in the article (October No., 1843) before referred to, shown that it is the theory, that all our knowledge is founded upon experience; and is acquired through the light of nature, or the light of revelation. This is the psychology with all its doctrines developed in that article, which is assumed in Christianity. We refer to our reasoning in that article for the truth of the doctrine. We have there shown, that the theory of mind,

that all our knowledge is founded on experience, is true according to the light of nature or psychological phenomena, and we have also there shown, that it is assumed in Christianity as a scheme of instruction. When, therefore, there are more than one view of the genius and cardinal doctrines of Christianity, derived from different interpretations of scripture, it will be legitimate according to the principle developed in this article, to enquire which view accords best with the established principles of psychology. And we think, that it will appear in the sequel, that the evangelical theology will accord best with these principles.

According to the theory of mind which we maintain as the true one, revelation teaches a knowledge which nature does not : and all our knowledge is derived from one or the other of these two sources. If this be so, then of course we must look to the scriptures which are the records of that revelation for the doctrines which it teaches ; just as we look to nature for philosophy. And it is manifest that such perversion of scripture could never result from this method of interpretation, as from the a priori method which we have shown to have been so great a source of error. Because this method of interpretation is limited in all its speculations by the definite facts of revelation, and does not pretend to see beyond. And this inductive method of interpretation corresponds with the nature of Christianity. For Christianity is given to us not in the form of a system demonstrated in all its parts ; but it is presented in facts and doctrines which are to be generalized, and the unity of its doctrines to be ascertained and developed by an examination of all their various representations and applications set forth in the scriptures. This constitutes the glory of Christianity. This makes it that practical, popular system adapted to the wants of every grade of intelligence, just as the light of nature, or rather its phenomena, are adapted to every grade of intelligence, from the peasant to the philosopher, from the child to the man. If Christianity had been promulgated as a dogmatic system developed in all its logical concatenations, the ignorant could never have profited by its teachings, except through the instructions of the learned. And it would have been an esoteric, priestly system, known only to a priesthood whose divine right it would have been to monopolise the oracles of God ; and thus to hold the keys of heaven. But it is presented in such a form that every man can appropriate it to himself

in his own way—can understand its doctrines set forth in a practical mode, in so many various applications to the conduct of individuals of every grade and character, and condition. Its very form teaches the great Protestant doctrine of private judgment.

For the first time then in the history of man, the esoteric and the exoteric are united and harmonised. The philosopher and the multitude have the same religious doctrines. Faith and knowledge have become reconciled—knowledge has confessed its ignorance, and admitted it must build upon faith as its only sure foundation in theology as well as in philosophy. The Greek has renounced his wisdom, and espoused the foolishness of the Jew. And thus is realised, what appeared to the ancients an impossibility, a religion that unites all men with one another: “A man must be very weak,” says Celsus, “to imagine that Greeks and barbarians in Asia, Europe and Lybia, can ever unite under one religion.”

How distinctly at every step in the foregoing analysis do we see that the psychological doctrines which are developed in the inductive philosophy, are those which harmonise with the nature of Christianity, as a mode of instruction to mankind. It is seen that Christianity makes faith occupy a position higher than reasoning. That reasoning must set out from faith, just as in nature we must set out from simple belief. And the facts which are the legitimate objects of faith must be ascertained, by induction employed in the secondary way we have before mentioned, in the examination of scripture under the guide of the rules of grammatical and logical interpretation. Neander, in speaking of Apelles, an oriental theosophist, who embraced Christianity, says: “Apelles, finding no satisfactory conclusion in his speculations upon the incomprehensible, took refuge in the faith which obeys an inward necessity without being able to solve every difficulty to itself (difficulties which in his case met him even in that which he could not choose but to recognise), he could do no other, he said; he felt himself obliged *to believe* in one eternal God, as the original cause of all existence, but he could not scientifically prove how all existence was necessarily to be traced back to the one original principle. The church-teacher, Rhodon, to whom he made these communications in confidence, laughed at him as one who pretended to be a teacher, but only *believed* what he taught;

and *acknowledged* that he could not prove it; but one is inclined to ask, whether the laughter in this case was wiser than the man whom he laughed at, and whether Rhodon himself, in the strict sense of the word, could prove that which Apelles avowed that he only believed. What Neander says of Apelles, "he took refuge in the faith which obeys an inward necessity, without being able to solve every difficulty," is the true psychological doctrine developed by Reid, as is shown in the article before referred to. Here then is shown the doctrinal identity of the true psychological doctrine that we believe by an inward necessity independent of ratiocination, and the psychology which is assumed in Christianity. And thus is shown that the faith of Christianity is adapted to the nature of man—is in conformity to the laws of his mind.

But as faith is the great central doctrine of Christianity, we will develop its psychological foundation still further. It is a psychological fact, that the knowledge of every philosophical truth increases the ability of the mind to apprehend still more recondite truths. The more of philosophy we learn, the greater is our ability to learn other truths; and the knowledge of truth invigorates the mind—quickens and enlightens the mental eye: gives it a wider view and a deeper penetration. And it is another psychological fact, that there is an intimate connection between the feelings and the intellect—that it is a law of our own mental constitution, that every emotion is allied to some object of perception, or memory or imagination, and is dependent upon it as its antecedent or cause; and the emotion can never be excited in the mind except by its appropriate object being in the view of the mind; and can never cease to exist in the mind until the object is forgotten or removed from its view. We see then, how it is that philosophical truth operates upon the moral and aesthetical part of our natures, quickening and improving both the sensibility to the moral and beautiful. We will now show that we have here developed the psychological foundation of religious faith; and that the doctrine that we are saved by faith, is one adapted to the nature of man.

Through faith we are saved; and that not of ourselves. As it is the truth which is the proper object of faith; it is the truth which, by the agency of the Spirit of God, operates upon man, enlightening his mind, and quickening and purifying his moral sensibility, according to the psy-

chological laws above indicated, by which truth operates upon our moral and aesthetical nature. The truth is given to us by God, and by an inward necessity, we believe, when it is discerned by us. True faith is accompanied with a spiritual communion between the heart and the doctrine believed, according to the psychological law of the connection between the feelings and the intellect; and hence there is generated in the heart a condition kindred to the truth believed. The truth enters into the spiritual life, and becomes its forming and fashioning principle, by which the whole inward man is changed according to the psychological law, into conformity with it. By true faith we enter into communion with divine things; and this is different from that faith which rests merely upon authority, and clings only to outward things. This last is not a belief in the truth by its own impression upon the mind, but a belief in the authority; and is therefore a mere logical inference that the doctrine to which the authority is given is true. It is not a perception of the truth by its own light. It is not spiritual discernment—a perception of the truth accompanied by its correspondent holy emotion. Believing the miracles of the gospel is nothing in itself, the devils believe and tremble—but the belief of its truths is every thing.

We see then, that according to psychological laws, it is through faith, having truth for its object, that we are changed from wickedness to holiness—that the love of sin is turned into the love of holiness; and it is the truth by the agency of the Spirit of God, which changes us, and not we of ourselves. Faith works by love; because the truth which produces faith, converts our hatred of holy things into the love of them; and love becomes the condition of faith—the impulse of the soul generated or quickened into life by faith, is love; and of course the heart then works by love. And thus is shown, according to psychological laws, the nature of the doctrine that faith works by love.

We see, then, by this analysis, how the evangelical view of Christianity, which makes faith and truth the great paramount matters in the scheme of redemption, is explained and supported by those psychological laws which have been established by a rigid induction of phenomena, and this is strong confirmation, that this is the correct view of Christianity.