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ART. I.—*A Residence of twenty-one years in the Sandwich Islands; or the Civil, Religious and Political History of those Islands; comprising a particular view of the Missionary operations connected with the introduction and progress of Christianity and Civilization among the Hawaiian people.* By Hiram Bingham, A. M., Member of the American Oriental Society, and late Missionary of the American Board. Hartford and New York. 1847. pp. 616.

It is possible that among the readers of Mr. Bingham's volume are some who read, at the time of its appearance, the history of that voyage of Captain Cook, Clerke and Gore, which gave to the world the first information of the existence of the Sandwich Islands. To much younger persons, however, as well as to these, the two works must appear in wonderful contrast, even when superficially consulted. Between the times of King Terreeboo, when to be publicly invested with a linen shirt was a high mark of royalty; when the solemn offering of swine, in the successive stages of the living, strangled and baked animal, was the most distinguished honour that could be returned to the foreign "Oro-no," and that too as a religious sacrifice—and the times of the

By J. A. Alexander

ART. IV.—*Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's Leben, beschrieben durch Karl Rosenkranz. Berlin, 1844. 8vo. pp. 566.*

LITTLE addicted as we are to swear to the words of Hegel, we own we have read this memoir, by one of his most enthusiastic followers, with uncommon interest. The portrait at the beginning detained us long; it is a head not to be soon forgotten, suggesting as it does a sternness of profound thought which is almost oppressive. It is impossible to contemplate the character of one who has given form to the chaos of pantheistic error in our day, without a curiosity to know something about its development. Dr. Rosenkranz has afforded us the means of gratifying this desire.

George William Frederick Hegel was born at Stuttgart in Wurtemberg, August 27, 1770, and was the eldest son of George Lewis Hegel. His boyish days passed by, without anything very remarkable. He loved the peculiarities of his native country, and in all his works indulges in Swabian provincialisms. He was a promising school-boy, and at eight years of age received from his preceptor as a prize Wieland's translation of Shakspeare. The first work, which seems to have made a lively impression on him, was the *Merry Wives of Windsor*. We shall not follow him through all the gradations of his youthful curriculum. It was regular and complete, especially in all that relates to the ancient classics. The Greek Tragedy engaged much of his attention, and as long as he lived he retained his admiration for the sublimity and pathos of the *Antigone*. The deep love of Grecian beauty with which he was smitten abode with him, and perpetually re-appears in his works. His biographer speaks of the numerous common-place-books and epitomes, produced during this period, and still extant among his papers. In philosophy he already began to read Locke, Hume, and Kant. But the first decided tendency towards this field of research, is observable in a little manuscript of 1785, filled with definitions of philosophical terms.

From his earliest years and throughout his life, Hegel bestowed great pains on transcribing. It is wonderful how he found time for this: in later years his books are laden with excerpts from the *Morning Chronicle*, the *Reviews*, the *Courier*,

the *Constitutionnel*, the *Journal des Debats*, the *Jena Literaturzeitung*, and the like. The ease and fluency of his style was greater in his earlier than his later years: like Bentham, he required a perspicuous interpreter for his theories: we are however among those who admire his gnarled, oaken diction. His oral delivery is admitted to have been always bad; he superabounded in gesticulations, which were out of harmony with what he was saying, and his enunciation was such as drew ridicule from those who could not cope with him in argument. Hegel was eminently social: Rosenkranz tells us that he took snuff, and was very fond of chess and of cards, in which points he was like Kant. In his study-arrangements he abhorred every thing that savoured of niceness and coxcombriness: his simple writing-table became famous for the picturesque disorder of papers, letters, and snuff-box.

Hegel went to the university of Tübingen, expecting to devote himself to the ministry. He heard lectures from Schnurrer and Storr on Exegesis, and from Flatt on Philosophy. Flatt was an acute but liberal opponent of the Kantian system. The *Stift*, or Theological Seminary connected with the university was not agreeable to the young theologian, and he complained of its conventual seclusion. There is reason to think that nothing displeased him more than certain remains of evangelical strictness. The students had to preach, and Hegel took his turn, in 1792, exercising his gifts on Isaiah 6: 7, 8. Few particulars are accessible respecting Hegel's student-life. He was a jovial companion, and sometimes visited scenes of conviviality. In consequence of being visited with something like an academical censure for his irregularity in study, he suddenly made a complete change in his way of life, turned into application with extraordinary zeal, and for weeks together slept upon his sofa. During this period he was a liberal in politics and even a revolutionist. It is a fact worth noticing, that on a certain Sunday morning in spring, Hegel and Schelling marched out of Tübingen, with some friends, to a neighboring meadow, for the purpose of planting a tree of liberty. He gave however few tokens of greatness. When in later years he attained to high distinction, his old college comrades were amazed and would exclaim—"Well, this is what we never expected of Hegel." He was not addicted to the company of

ladies, and was nowise remarkable in knightly exercises. Indeed he seemed older than he was, so as to be nicknamed the Old Man. Yet he was beloved, both in town and seminary, for his uprightness, heartiness and frankness. He sometimes visited the neighboring towns with his friends, and not always with the necessary permission of superiors.

This was the epoch of the first French Revolution, which produced extraordinary awakening of mind in young Germans, many of whom saw in it tokens of the regeneration of Europe. A political Club was formed in the Tübingen *Stift* or Seminary; but this was betrayed, and the duke Charles broke it up. Hegel's father was a decided aristocrat, and earnest controversies took place between him and the young man. The latter, a diligent student of Rousseau, was a leading orator in the club. Great as was the change of his opinions in after life, he never lost a warm sympathy for all that was genuine in the French liberalism of that day. His Album attests his youthful zeal, in such watch-words as *In tyrannos—Vive la liberté—Vive Jean Jacques—Fatherland and Freedom.*

In 1790, he took his Master's degree, under the protectorate of Storr. His Dissertation was *De limite officiorum humanorum, seposita animarum immortalitate.*

His two companions most worthy of note at Tübingen were Hölderlin and Schelling. In Hölderlin Hegel found the love of Hellenism concentrated, and he was ardent in his wish to transport some of the beautiful enthusiasm of Greece into the dry religion of Germany. Hölderlin also was a Swabian. He commenced his romance, Hyperion, at the Seminary. In 1791 he wrote in Hegel's album, as his symbolum, Ἐν καὶ πᾶν. These young men, with Fink, Renz, and some others, gave themselves to the study of Plato, with high enthusiasm: they also read Kant and Spinoza. Schelling joined their group in the autumn of 1790. His father was a dignified clergyman at Bebenhausen and afterwards at Maulbram. When he brought his son to the *Stift* at Tübingen, he designated him as *præcox ingenium.* Hegel was five years older than his precocious friend; but a common zeal for freedom and philosophy drew them together in the club.

After returning home from the university in 1793, Hegel took a place as private tutor in Bern. It may be remarked

that Kant, Fichte, and Herbart were all private tutors. It was Hegel's lot to reside in a number of interesting towns, long enough to become intimate with all their great peculiarities; Stuttgart, Tübingen, Bern, Frankfort, Jena, Bamberg, Nuremberg, Heidelberg, and Berlin. To the close of life he was in the habit of making extensive tours. In 1795 he visited Geneva, and in 1796 the Bernese Alps. Rosenkranz assures us that during his sojourn in Switzerland, Hegel entirely emancipated himself from the dead theology of Tübingen, by which we may understand the orthodoxy of Flatt and Storr. He read Paulus, Grotius, Kant, Fichte, Spinoza, Marivaux's romances, Forster's travels, and the journals. His mind was much interested in the history of the Jewish nation, in regard to which his opinions suffered frequent change, so that all his life long, says Rosenkranz, it tormented him as a dark enigma.* He was furthermore concerned about the points of "guilt and penalty, law and fate, sin and atonement." But the philosophical element was rapidly gaining on the theological. In the year 1795 he compiled a life of Christ. In Tübingen he had taken a lively interest in comparing Christ and Socrates; but being then "drunk with Hellenism," he gave the palm in several particulars to Socrates. His studies in Switzerland took another turn. He here treats Christ as a pure exalted divine man, triumphing over vice, falsehood, slavery and hate. He summarily dispenses with all miracles; and the biographer speaks with admiration of the liberality then prevalent, which could honour the Christianity of one who did not believe in the miracles as matter of fact.

The relation of Hegel to Schelling, during this period, is an interesting one. Closely allied as they were, they were very unlike. Schelling was rapid, enthusiastic, imaginative, fluent, copious in poetical expression; the system of Hegel grew up by slow and imperceptible degrees. He was a most laborious student of preceding systems, as all his writings show: it was by a tardy and laborious process that these works became assimilated in his mind, so as to form the material of his own theory. Bachman, in 1810, likened Schelling to Plato and Hegel to Aristotle; the *mot* has passed into a proverb. Yet the comparison

* See also Hagenbach Encyclopaedie, § 59, note 10.

is only partially just. "Schelling's sanguine restlessness and combinatory daring were doubtless necessary, to break an outlet through the strait in which Idealism was involved by the subjective extreme; but Hegel's thorough erudition, self-denial, patience, and critical coolness, were not less necessary, to impose due form on the chaotic tumult which followed that outbreak." It has further been common to characterize Schelling as poetical and modern, Hegel as abstruse and scholastic. But Hegel is really more original than Schelling, and in the form of his teachings less scholastic and more modern. Rosenkranz adds, with a sarcasm which we only half comprehend, that in the relations of life Schelling was assuredly the more modern; in science, he is half covered with the grey robe of the scholastic, but when, as academical president, he appears to do honour to the birth-day of a king or the obsequies of a Talleyrand, he is radiant with elegance. The two young men kept up an active correspondence, chiefly on philosophical subjects. About the same time Hegel produced a mystical poem, entitled *Eleusis*, which contains some pregnant intimations of his future doctrines.

In January 1797, he accepted a situation at Frankfort on the Main, in the house of a merchant named Gogel, by which step his circumstances became much more easy. The same city, it has been observed, was the cradle of Goethe's poetry and Hegel's philosophy. Here he found Hölderlin, Sinclair who had studied at Tübingen, Zwilling, Muhrbeck, Molitor, Ebel, and Vogt. It was a great change, from Bern, with its patriarchal aristocracy, to commercial Frankfort. His interest in political problems was revived, and he began to make those inquiries into the idea of a State which resulted in his celebrated theory.

Here also he resumed his examination of the notion of positive religion. But at the same time his system of universal philosophy was germinating within him. He is said to have arrived at this by imperceptible degrees. It is likely that he was stimulated by the advances of his young friend Schelling. While at Frankfort he supplied himself with the best editions of Schelling's works and the Greek classics. He particularly studied Plato and Sextus Empiricus. Already was he diverging widely from Schelling, in taking his point of departure from Logic, and in denying the emptiness which had always been

predicated of dialectical forms. Though emancipated from the old theology, he schemed a plan so wide as to embrace universal being, and hence his system was in a measure theosophical. He read the middle-age mystics, constructed a "triangle of triangles," and speculated upon the Trinity. The manuscripts of this period reveal the sketch of a complete system. In this appear the fundamental tenets of his later works, especially the place of Logic as the corner-stone, his division of the Idea into two opposites, and his notion of Nature as thought externalizing itself. Hegel entertained the belief, that, as Catholic Christianity was a great improvement on Gentilism, so true Philosophy would in time develope an equal improvement on Catholic Christianity.

In 1799 his father died, and it became necessary for him to go to Stuttgart for a time. In 1800 he made an excursion to Mentz. The description of his person, in one of his passports, is worth preserving. "Agé de 30 ans, taille de 5 pieds 2 pouces, cheveux et sourcils bruns, yeux gris, nez moyen, bouche moyenne, menton rond, front médiocre, visage ovale." In the same year he expresses to Schelling his desire to leave Frankfort, and to go to some city where he might have cheap living, good beer, a small acquaintanceship, and if possible a Catholic community, in order to study that religion more closely. He soon removed to Jena, "the philosophic Eldorado." Fichte, charged with atheism, had gone to Berlin. Tieck also had removed, and Novalis was dead. Schelling, who had come from Leipsick as professor extraordinary, had lost the charm of novelty. But the city was full of young philosophers, incited by the speedy rise of some whom we have named. Old Hennings and Ulrich kept on indeed reading their old logic and ethics, but *privatim-docentés* "were all the while flying in and out, like pigeons at a pigeon-house." There were such names as Schad, Fries, Krause, Gruder, and Ast. The ambitious desire to be made professors was extraordinary. To this focal point came Hegel, to add himself to the numerous Swabians, in 1801. As the theme of his 'Habilitationdissertation' Hegel chose the Law of the Planetary Distances. His papers show, at earlier dates, extracts from Kant's treatises on Mechanics and Philosophy, and from Kepler and Newton. The Dissert-

tation is extant, in Latin. He here sets himself in array against Newton's theory of tangential forces, with regard to which he retained a certain bitterness all his life. Kepler was not only a German, but as Rosenkranz reminds us, a brother Swabian, and Hegel labours to exalt him above his English rival. He was equally opposed to the Newtonian optics. English and American savants are sometimes astonished when they come to learn how cavalierly the greatest names in their philosophy are treated by the Germans, and become more prepared for the exorbitancies of the German metaphysic, when they find the Newtonian theory, the doctrine of refraction, and the theory of polarized light, scouted as so many figments. It is really difficult for a philosopher of any other nation to read with coolness what Goethe has the assurance to say of Newton, in his work on Colour;* and with what contempt he records Voltaire's admiration of the English.† Hegel was early instructed in Newtonianism, but his subsequent idealism made it impossible for him to explain the heavenly motions by the limitations of finite mechanics, or by centrifugal and centripetal impulses. The dropping apple, which suggested gravitation to Newton, was wittily called by Hegel the "astronomical *fall of man*." His Dissertation was for Kepler, against Newton; it unfolded the relations of time and space, square and cube, right-line and curve, circle and ellipse. With Schubert he loved to view the series of planets, as a line of varying degrees of cohesion. It is the remark of Rosenkranz himself, that the same epoch which saw Newton degraded, in honour of Kepler and Goethe, saw the revived glory of Paracelsus and Jacob Boehm.

To his dissertation, Hegel appended certain theses, which are in the spirit of heroic paradox; the itch for startling novelty was never more remarkably betrayed. We cannot refrain from annexing them, though they must remain in their obscurity. 1. *Contradictio est regula veri non contradictio falsi*. The notion of the true is always accompanied by that of the false. Truth, so far from being a somewhat exempt from negation, is the positive negation of its negation. As Spinoza says, *Verum est index sui et falsi*. This constantly reappears in the Hegelian system; and our reader is requested to bear it in memory. 2.

* *Farbenlehre*, vol. iii. p. 27.† *Id.* p. 102.

Syllogismus est principium Idealismi, the germ of his whole system. Here we discern the logical basis of his theory. 3. *Quadratum est lex naturæ, triangulum mentis*. 4. *In Arithmetica vera nec additioni nisi unitatis ad dyadem, nec subtractioni nisi dyadis a triade, neque triadi ut summæ, neque unitati ut differentiæ est locus*. 5. *Ut magnæ est vectis naturalis, ita gravitas planetarum in solem pendulum naturale*. 6. *Idea est synthesis infiniti et finiti, et philosophia omnis est in ideis*. 7. *Philosophia critica caret ideis, et imperfecta est Scepticismi forma*. 8. *Materia postulati rationis, quod philosophia critica exhibet, eam ipsam philosophiam destruit, et principium est Spinozismi*. 9. *Status naturæ non est injustus et eam ob causam ex illa exeundum*. 10. *Principium scientiæ moralis est reverentia fato habenda*. 11. *Virtus innocentiam tum agendi tum patiendi excludit*. 12. *Moralitas omnibus numeris absoluta virtuti repugnat*.

Our readers will agree with us that this is a psychological curiosity; it is however a slender specimen of the author's rage for paradox. In English ratiocination, point-blank contradictions infer absurdity and falsehood; and few readers ever perused for the first time even Kant's famous Antinomies, without a start; but not so in Germany. The mind closes its eyes to propositions such as *Sein-Nichts*, and "God is the universal nothing."*

It was adventurous to approach the circle of Schelling's popularity; he was about this period lecturing on the system of universal philosophy, on æsthetics, and on encyclopædia. Schelling's style and delivery were fascinating; he added to this the nimbus of a philosophical revolutionist. Against all this, Hegel came quietly forward, *privatim docens*, for a fee of three dollars. In logic and metaphysics he had, in 1801, eleven hearers. In the next five years, he went on, lecturing on his system of speculative philosophy, in these divisions, "*a. Logice et Metaphysice sive Idealismum transcendentalem; b. philosophiam naturæ; c. mentis;*" and for one semester on pure mathematics.

In 1802 and 1803 Schelling and Hegel were united in conducting the *Critical Journal of Philosophy*; the labour was however mostly Hegel's. To an insinuation in a Stuttgart

* See this identity demonstrated, Michelet ii. 721.

print, that Schelling had brought in Hegel as a sort of creature and philosophical bully, the latter replied roundly, "The author of this report is a liar, and as such I designate him in these words." In one of the contributions of Hegel, abstracted by his biographer, we find some characteristic views of religion, which connect themselves obviously with certain rising opinions of our age. A philosophy, he teaches, which is not in principle religion, is no philosophy. Religion, without historical relations, is inconceivable. As polar opposites, the only two possible forms of religion are Heathenism and Christianity. Heathenism is the elevation of the finite to the infinite; Christianity is the becoming finite of the infinite, or God becoming man. But a union of these opposites is necessary, of which union the first appearance will be in the form of speculation, revealing the *absolute Gospel*; so that Christianity is the way to perfection; but not the perfection itself. Heathenism is the beautiful deification of nature; Christianity, through nature, as the infinite body of God, looks into the inmost mind of deity. In Heathenism, predominates the cheerfulness of immediate, actual, atonement; in Christianity, the pain of atonement in process. To the former belongs Symbol; to the latter Mysticism. The world's problem is to bring together the depth of Christian atonement and the beauty of Grecian life. Hegel was naturally drawn to admire some things in Schleiermacher's Discourses on Religion; suggesting the flight from all that is actual to an eternal world beyond.

It deserves notice, that notwithstanding the alleged obscurity of Hegel's writings, he confines himself more than any of his countrymen to plain indigenous *words*. Kant's nomenclature is proverbially hybrid and pedantic. Hegel here acts on a principle which we would gladly see prevalent among ourselves: he prefers common words. He cannot for example see why such words as *quantitative* and *apodictic*, should be preferred to good old stout, pregnant terms of Teutonic origin. "It is peculiar to the highest cultivation of a people, to *speak in the language of all*." Men allow themselves, says he, the grandiloquent phraseology, because in this they can utter trivialities of which they would be ashamed in their homely dress. There are many, who hide common thoughts in a masquerade of expression.

It must be obvious, that to attempt even the slightest abstract of the system of Hegel, now in development during these years, and embracing the whole cycle of human knowledge, would more than occupy the entire space which remains of our present number; we must therefore limit ourselves more strictly to biographical notices. The influence of Hegel on a few students of Jena was daily greater and greater. His regardlessness of externals, and his profound earnestness and zeal for reality, could not but give intensity to his teachings, far beyond that of mere rhetoric. His eye was large and contemplative. His voice was heavy, without being sonorous, but indicative of occasional deep feeling. There was something almost repulsive in a first view of his noble features, till they were seen to be informed by inward mildness and friendship. A peculiarly benevolent smile played upon his countenance, modified by a somewhat of sly, ironical, and biting. Through all, there was reflected the tragic mein of the philosophic hero, struggling with the enigma of the universe. Such is the portrait of his admirers.

Upon the students as a mass Hegel made little impression; they regarded him as an obscure person. Those who were minded to depart from the old professors, generally preferred Fries, who was at that time rising to notice. There was a smaller circle however, which was beginning to take the new influence. In 1805, Hegel received an appointment as professor-extraordinary. At this period he was brought into some connexions with Schiller and Goethe; the genius of the latter was however particularly foreign from his abstruse inquiries.

The catastrophe of Jena, in 1806, swallowed up for a time all other interests. When the cannonade became more and more violent, Hegel took the last portion of the manuscript of his "*Phænomenologie*," then going through the press, abandoned his other papers and books to their fate, and took refuge in the house of the Prorector Gabler, which was protected by the presence of a superior French officer. After the battle he returned to his house, and found everything thrown into confusion by the soldiery. It has sometimes been said, that Hegel completed his *Phaenomenology*, under the thundering cannon of the battle of Jena. On the day of Napoleon's entry, he says in a letter to Niethammer: "The Emperor—that world-soul—I saw ride through the city to a reconnoissance. It is indeed a

wonderful experience to behold such an individual, who, here, concentered at one point, sitting on a horse, grasps at the world, and rules over it."

He was, however, beginning to look for other situations. Jena had become, as he said, like a cloister. Everything was narrowed, and governed by a clique. Interests predominated which were unknown in all Germany, except Jena and Weimar. Books were in authority, of which scarce a hundred copies reached the public. He was invited by Niethammer to be editor of a Journal at Bamberg; and the next year he went there, finding many attractions in its catholicity. Here were Niethammer and Paulus. There was a French theatre, in which he sometimes saw Talma in the great tragic parts. He edited the newspaper until the autumn of 1808. In November, 1808, he left Bamberg for Nuremberg, and shortly after published a pamphlet beginning with these words: "Germany is a State no longer." The south western countries of Germany, that is to say, Baden, Wurtemberg, and Bavaria were more than any others suffering, in respect of education. Two conflicting interests prevailed by turns, the monastico-scholastic and the utilitarian. Classical antiquity was invoked, to mediate between the two. An Institution of learning had been founded in Nuremberg, and Hegel was called to be its rector. Some said this was yoking the speculative Pegasus to the school-wagon; but at a time when Napoleon was oppressing the universities, the chief field of hopeful action was in the gymnasium. As university-teachers, Fichte, Schelling, and Steffens are said to have accomplished little from 1808 to 1813.* In his very boyhood, Hegel betrayed a pedagogical *tic*; for eight years he was a domestic tutor; his acceptance of the Nuremberg place needs no apology. He gave himself to his new employment with eager zeal. In philosophy and religion, he taught in all the classes. His paper lay before him, though he did not read it, but spoke at his ease, freely scattering his snuff, right and left. Each student was to write out one fair copy from this dictation. He allowed interruptions and questions. The young men were kept in awe by his profound seriousness, and absorption in things of moment. This respect was increased by the many-sidedness of his mind. When colleagues were indisposed, Hegel was ready to take their chairs; thus, on emergencies, he carried forward, without

interruption, the classes in Greek, and in the Differential and Integral Calculus. When, incidentally, he commended Herder's *Cid*, and the *Sacotala*, these books were immediately procured and devoured by the young men. When a youth asked direction in philosophy, he dissuaded from the popular works, and recommended the reading of Plato and Kant. He was no friend to student's sports, and, snuffer as he was, denounced the pipe in a way almost savage. He used to send for the "Abiturients," to give them a word of grave counsel, about their conduct at the university. The Gymnasium flourished under him. In politics he maintained neutrality, though in the town he was thought to be on the French side. In religion he was very grave and respectful. The Roman Catholic students were required by the statutes to attend mass daily, and the Protestant to go to church weekly. He seldom appeared in public places, and always in the same garb; hat and grey coat, with scrupulous whiteness of linen. His evenings were all at the Museum, for he was all his life a devoted news-paper reader. His chief companions were Seebeck and Paulus. The history of his rectorship is marked in the five discourses, which his office required of him, at the stated collation of prizes.*

In 1811 Hegel was married; his wife was his delightful opposite, or rather supplement, in regard to her grace and loveliness. By marrying he deviated from the path of metaphysicians: Bruno, Campanella, Descartes, Spinoza, Malebranche, Leibnitz, Wolf, Locke, Hume, and Kant, were bachelors. Mrs. Hegel was light, ethereal, full of vivacity and fancy. The love-poems, which are preserved, have quite a glow for a metaphysician of forty:

"Doch wenn durch Rede sie dem Munde
Der Liebe Seligkeit
Nicht auszudrücken gab, zum Bunde
Der Liebenden verleiht.

"Sie ihm ein innigeres Zeichen;
Der Kuss die tief're Sprache ist,
Darin die Seelen sich erreichen,
Mein Herz in Dein's hinüberfließt."

He was not unmindful however of the prose of wedlock, but, like Schiller, kept up the old Swabian custom of an interleaved almanac, in quarto, by way of household journal. At the close

of every month accounts were settled; it were well if the like punctuality reigned among untranscendental philosophers. The children kept an old-fashioned savings-box. To the day of his death he maintained these usages, together with the old national customs of *Zehrpfennig*, *Ehrenpfennig*, and *Nothpfennig*. In common times, they kept only one maid-servant: his house was neat but plain; no antichamber, no hall; the guest opened the front-door directly on the hospitable sitting-room.

From 1812 till 1816, is the period of Hegel's Logic. The preface to the first edition bears date March, 1812, that of the third, July 1816. It is known that with him logic is every thing. It is the province of the Idea *per se*; not merely a formal, but a real science; not a frame-work, receptive of this or that, but a method in which as a process the absolute itself partly consists. Thoughts are the universe: and the laws of thought, are the laws of the Universe, that is, Logic. Objective thinking is the material of pure science, and logic is the system, not simply of ratiocination, but of pure reason. It is truth itself, not a bare method of truth; and thus it is a representation of universal Mind, that is of God. Thus Logic became, of a sudden, speculative theology. The notion of the logical idea is the notion of God. So soon as his book was out, he was assaulted, upon the alleged identity of Being and Not-being, (Sein and Nichtsein.) There ensued a humorous correspondence between him and Pfaff, a learned and witty man, who professed that Hegel's Logic was nothing but a bundle of postulates. One of Pfaff's letters is thus addressed: "Philosopho mathematicus infestissimus, Salutem;" another: "Philosopho novi mundi intelligibilis inventori Mathematicus incapax, sciendique cupidus, Salutem."

The next removal was to Heidelberg, which took place in the autumn of 1816; it was caused by Hegel's earnest desire to resume academical employment. He was called to Heidelberg as professor of Philosophy. For the third time he found himself in the same city with Paulus. Mrs. Paulus was a humorous and sociable woman, who received Hegel kindly, sometimes wrote comic billets to him, and sometimes joined him in a game at cards; an amusement not forbidden it seems in the families of rationalistic clergymen. Here he was brought into connexion with Voss and Daub. In writing to his wife.

whom he had left ill at Nuremberg, he says, the principle at Heidelberg is, "Every one for himself, and God for us all." "Yesterday" writes he, "I began my lectures, but certainly the number of hearers is not so encouraging as I was led to expect. If not perplexed and impatient, I was assuredly surprised, to find things so different from what had been reported. For one course I had only four hearers. Paulus consoled me, by telling me he also had read to four and five." Soon however he had twenty on *Encyclopaedia*, and thirty on the *History of Philosophy*. He was enchanted with the natural scenery of the environs, and often alluded to it in his letters. Clad in his unchangeable grey, he was often seen and met by the students engaged in Socratic musings, among these picturesque walks, and occasionally there was one who ventured to join him. Stories are told of his absence of mind. In the summer of 1817, after a heavy rain, he crossed over the university square, when the ground was moist, and left one shoe in the mud, without ever discovering his loss. During this period he carried out his theory, in its application to Aesthetics and the Fine Arts, being doubtless stimulated by the beauties of nature, and the numerous works of sculpture and painting, around him.

The following reminiscences of a student, the Baron Boris d'Yrkull, from Riga, will cause a smile; he came to Heidelberg in 1817. "I had scarcely arrived," says he, "when I made it my business, after looking about me, to visit the man, of whose person I had formed to myself the most impressive images. Conscious of my defect of science, I prepared my phrases, and went, not without dread, yet with confidence, to the professor, whom, to my no small surprise, I found to be a plain and simple man, who spoke with dulness, and uttered nothing remarkable. Disappointed with this impression, though attracted by Hegel's friendliness, and by a certain air of kind yet ironical courtesy, I went, after taking the professor's tickets, to the first bookseller, bought such works of Hegel as had then appeared, and sat myself down snugly in my sofa-corner to read them. But the more I read, and the more I essayed to read with attention, the less I understood, so that after torturing myself an hour or two over a sentence, without being able to understand it, I laid the book aside: yet out of curiosity I went to the lectures. I am bound in honour to say, that I did not comprehend

my own notes, and that I lacked all preliminary studies, in reference to the department. In my straits I now went again to Hegel, who after listening to me with patience, set me right in a friendly way, and advised me to take several *privatissima*; Latin reading, rudiments of Algebra, Physics, and Geography. This occupied a half-year; sorely enough for a fellow of six and twenty. For the third time I resorted to Hegel, who received me very kindly, but could not forbear laughing, when I communicated my propæudetic cross-bearing. His counsels were now more precise, his interest in me more lively, and I frequented his courses with some profit. A *Conversatorium* of Dr. Hinrichs, in which debaters met from all the four faculties, and in which the exposition of the *Phaenomenology of Mind* afforded the clew, proved instructive. During the next two semesters, Hegel came sometimes to me, but oftener I went to him, and accompanied his secluded walks. He often said to me, that our over-wise age could be contented by nothing but a sound method, which tames the thoughts and conducts to realities; that Religion was philosophy in presentiment or inkling, and Philosophy religion in full consciousness; both in different ways seeking the same end, namely God. I must never trust a philosophy which was either immoral or irreligious." This young nobleman became quite a traveller. He was at Ephesus, in Sweden, at Paris, at Rome, every where carrying with him a copy of Hegel's *Logic*. In one of Hegel's letters to d'Yrkull, he uses language which we cite as certainly applying to America, no less than to Russia: "You are so fortunate as to have a country which occupies a large place in the field of the world's history, and without doubt has a yet higher destiny. Other modern states, according to all probability, have to a certain extent already attained the term of their development; some of them have perhaps passed beyond the point of culmination, and are stationary. Russia, on the contrary, even now, it may be, the strongest among the powers, bears in her bosom a vast potentiality of developing her intensive nature."

At Heidelberg Hegel gave to the press his *Encyclopædia of Philosophical Sciences*. The admirers of Hegel are accustomed to refer to the first edition, as having most of the author's freshness and power. He also resumed journalism, in the philosophical department of the *Heidelberg Year-books*.

In 1818 he received a call to a professorship in the University of Berlin, which from that time became the theatre of his fame and influence: he had for some years longed after the Prussian capital, and he entered on his new residence with great animation. It was only by gentle degrees however that he attained to eminence in Berlin. Soon after his arrival, Solger writes to Tieck: "I was anxious about the impression our good Hegel would make. Nobody speaks of him, and he is quiet and laborious." Solger, who had come to Berlin as professor in 1811, was only one year the colleague of Hegel; for he died in 1819. He was, according to some, the last link of the chain between Schelling and Hegel. He coincided with the latter in extraordinary and startling tenets respecting nonentity: as for example, that the absolute cannot be thought of as positive, but by means of the negation of itself; and that God, in order to create the world, reduced himself to nothing.* Much as the names of Hegel and Schleiermacher have been connected by their adherents, they by no means coalesced at Berlin. Rosenkranz even speaks of it as remarkable, that differing as they did, they should have avoided open rupture. The first important labour of Hegel, in his new position, was the revision of his work on Law and State. In his anti-Newtonian zeal, he devoted a series of lectures to the exposition of Goethe's hypothesis of Colour. In 1821 Goethe sent him a drinking-glass, with a very flattering inscription. Hegel replies, among other things, that wine has always been a great uniter of natural philosophers, as showing so clearly that there is a spirit in nature. The Hegelians have loved to dwell on the identity of Hegel's speculation and Goethe's poetry.

At this point in his history, Hegel became obnoxious to vehement censure, on account of his theological tendencies. Now it was that he was marked by his opponents as a pantheist. So far as we can learn, the dispute began with the philosophers of feeling, (as a certain school was called,) against whom Hegel made a demonstration, denying that feeling could ever be made a principle of science. In his opposition to the theology of feeling he was clearly seen to reflect on the particular opinions of

* Rosenkranz, p. 326.

Schleiermacher's Dogmatik. In reference to the founding every thing on feeling, he used to quote from the Xenien,

“Lange genug kaun man mit Rechenpfennigen zahlen,
Aber am Ende—da muss man den Beutel doch ziehn.”

He denounced the attempt to found a scientific theology, not on revelation as a fact, not on the church as a symbol, not on the Bible as primitive tradition, not on anything objective, but on reflexion, on pious feeling, on the empirical subject: the latter is what he represented Schleiermacher as doing. About this time great horror was excited by a saying of Hegel, to wit, that if the feeling of absolute dependence was the essence of Christianity, then a dog was the best Christian! Various attempts have been made to explain the passage in which this is asserted.*

Berlin afforded Hegel great advantages for the cultivation of taste in the fine-arts. He was passionately fond of music, and had the eye of a painter. His followers boast of him as the only systematic philosopher who embraced the whole field of art in his survey; that no one has developed so profoundly and extensively the idea of art, nor with equal precision determined and characterized the epochs of its history. Indeed there are many who altogether dissent from Hegel's system in general, who nevertheless admit the value of his aesthetical works, as presenting a classification of the arts, with new views and admirable criticisms.†

In 1817 and 1818, Victor Cousin, in company with a son of the Duke of Montebello, visited Germany. He spent some time in Heidelberg, where he saw much of Hegel. In 1821 he dedicated his edition of Proclus to Hegel and Schelling, and in 1826 his translation of Plato's Gorgias to Hegel. In 1824, he made another journey to Germany, and was thrown into prison in Berlin, upon some political suspicion. It was by the interposition of Hegel, that he was liberated. The influence of Hegel's system on Cousin is very apparent; but his modified Germanism is a weak dilution of the original matter. As Hegel once said to the Baron de Reiffenberg, who asked a brief expo-

* “Gründet sich die Religion im Menschen nur auf ein Gefühl, so hat solches richtig keine weitere Bestimmung, als das Gefühl seiner Abhängigkeit zu sein, und so wäre der Hund der beste Christ, denn er trägt dieses am stärksten in sich, und lebt vornehmlich in diesem Gefühle.”

† The *Aesthetik* fills three volumes of the late edition.

sition of his theory, "Monsieur, cela ne s'explique pas en Français."

In 1822-3 Hegel first lectured on the Philosophy of History, a subject with which his name will always be connected; and to which we will revert. Fichte, Schiller, Herder and Stutzmann had previously laboured in this field, but no one went further than Hegel, in the attempt to reduce the series of historical events to the category of cause and effect. The idea of endless progress lies at the bottom of his theory; a progress in which all that is possible becomes actual, and yet the possible is not exhausted. This connects itself very naturally with the idea of an impersonal God, constantly coming to development and self-consciousness in secular events. The ever-moving waves of this progress disturb the surface of an ocean, which is none other than God. *Autonomy* Nature is the machine in quietude; History is the machine in motion. Nature stands related to History, as Creation to Providence; History is Nature all alive. *Universal History* The history of the East was pondered by Goethe and Hegel, with great interest, in their respective manners. We find much in the chapters of Hegel upon India and the Orientals which is not only novel and ingenious, but sound; and there is a singular freshness about his representation of the Hellenic period, which to him is the favourite one. If Rosenkranz is to be believed, there were many things in Oriental mysticism, which Hegel greatly preferred to the form of religion known by us as evangelical; the "modern self-plaguing," he calls it, "hypochondriac vanity, hypocritical sanctimony," "lacrymose narrowness," and "biblical base-money and spiritless servility."* The pantheism of some like-minded young Germans led them to a proper Indomania.

By degrees Hegel had attained the summit of reputation. It was the fashion in Berlin to hear him. Men of all ranks, students from all parts of Germany and all countries of Europe flocked to listen to the magical words which he uttered, as he fumbled among his papers, hemmed and hawed, and stammered out his meaning. The culminating point was perhaps the birthday festival of 1826.

In the Berlin Critical Year-book, Hegel wrote in connexion with Barnhagen, Marheineke, Schulze, Boeckh, Bopp, Gans and Hotho. These labours brought him into connexion with Wil-

* Life, p. 379.

liam von Humboldt; some of whose judgments concerning Hegel it will be worth while to extract. "Hegel" said Humboldt, "is certainly a profound and singular mind, but I cannot think a philosophy of this kind will ever strike deep root. For myself, thus far, after all my efforts, I cannot become reconciled to it. Obscurity of expression may be the hinderance. This obscurity is not engaging, or like that of Kant and Fichte, colossal and sublime, like the darkness of the grave: it springs from visible helplessness." "Even on ordinary topics, he is far from being easy or noble. It may proceed from a great defect of fancy." "The public seems to me to fall into two classes, with reference to Hegel; those who adhere to him unconditionally, and those who cautiously go about him as a rough cornerstone." In the appendix to his philosophy of Religion, Hegel has a treatise on the arguments for the being of a God. He here records and passes judgment on the cosmological, ontological and teleological arguments. Rosenkranz endeavours to show from this essay that Hegel maintained the personality of God; but the very terms in which he expresses this show that there is something essential omitted. He objects to the term *person*, and suggests the substitution of *subject*. Elsewhere, we are informed, Rosenkranz proposes the phrase *personality of Mind*.* "God," says Hegel, "is activity, free, referring itself to itself, abiding by itself: the fundamental limitation in the notion, or in all ideas of God, is that he is himself, as intermediation of himself with himself. If God is defined as Creator only, his activity is regarded as simply outgoing, self-expanding, as contemplative production, without return into itself."† The world, according to him, is as eternal as God.

It is hard for an American mind to comprehend the protestantism of certain German philosophers, who appear to surrender the very fundamentals of all religion. In 1830 Hegel pronounced a discourse at the festival of the Augsburg Confession. He had from his youth been an avowed Lutheran, and had even manifested some zeal for the distinctive tenet of the eucharist. He now lauded the Augsburg Confession, with special reference to justification by faith alone, as the Magna Charta of Protestantism. It should be observed that he was at this time

* Hegel's *Lehre von der Religion u. Kunst*. Leipzig 1842, p. 6

rector of the university. The question is still mooted among his followers, how far he was a believer in evangelical religion. The right-hand Hegelians represent him as maintaining the full personality of the Deity, and as defending historically the literal views given by the scripture of the person of Christ. So says Morell, (p. 479), adding "These opinions there is every reason to believe, very much accorded with those of Hegel himself, who even professed his belief in the ordinary faith of the Lutheran Church." But in direct contradiction to this, he elsewhere says, (p. 473) "With him God is not a *person*, but *personality* itself, i. e. the universal personality, *which realizes itself in every human consciousness as so many separate thoughts of one eternal mind.*" This we believe to be exactly the truth, and thus we understand Rozenkranz as asserting the "personality of mind." God is not, as with Spinoza, the universal substance; yet we might say God is the universal thought. The idea of the absolute, is the absolute itself. The thought of God is God. God exists in the thoughts of him. Or otherwise, "God is the whole process of thought, combining in itself the objective movement as seen in nature, with the subjective as seen in logic, and fully realizing itself only in the universal spirit of humanity."

For such views of God the way was prepared by Fichte, who had long before maintained, that "pure thought is itself the divine existence."* We are enveloped in mists when we read the transcendental writers on these topics; and many who are not reputed pantheists use a language which is much to be watched. There is no phrase more common among the later German writers on religion than *God-consciousness* (*Gottesbewusstsein*.) At first this seems very innocent, as importing the intimate sense of God's presence with the soul, *conscientia Dei*: but on careful comparison we find at length that this consciousness of God is God himself; which we take to be the meaning not only of Hegel, but of many followers of Schleiermacher. This recognition of God in mind, easily connects itself with the recognition of God in nature. It is God, perhaps, (says Fichte) who lives behind all these forms; we see, not himself, but his covering; we see him as stone, herb, animal, see him when we rise higher, as law of nature, as moral law and yet

* Michelet, *Gesch. d. Phil.* II. 199.

all this is not He; but he is the one, indestructible form of reflection, the infinitude of the life within thee. In the daring play of terms, in which the names of God and eternal things are used as counters, or as x and y in algebra, the results of philosophizing are sometimes odd and sometimes dreadful. In analytical mathematics we sometimes reach a point where the symbols break down under us, ceasing to have any real applicability; or representing imaginary or impossible quantities; such as the square-root of minus five. Precisely thus, as it seems to us, German philosophers deal with abstract terms, subjecting them to operations and transformations, in which the mind ceases to comprehend, and therefore has no test of verity. Applying this to the case in hand, we are startled when Oken tells us, that Man is that idea of God, in which God is altogether his own object; that Man is God, represented by God; that God is man, representing God in self-consciousness.*

Hegel died of the cholera in its most concentrated form, on the 14th of November, 1831. Since his death no one philosophical teacher has attained to the same acknowledged eminence. Schelling, his early friend, and long his rival, survives, and continues, in a new scheme of philosophy, to contend with the Hegelians, who have gone off in various directions, to the right hand and to the left, as it is called. Seven of the most distinguished pupils of Hegel combined to bring out an edition of his works; Marheineke, Schulz, Gans, von Henning, Hotho, Michelet, and Förster. The edition is in seventeen octavo volumes. We would refer our readers to Morell's History of Modern Philosophy, for some account of the controversies which have ensued upon Hegel's death.

The system of Hegel is known as that of Absolute Idealism. It does not take its beginning from the subjective *Ego*, the creative self of Fichte; nor from the objective absolute of Schelling. It starts, as no preceding system of metaphysics ever did, with Logic, and this is its great claim to originality. The formal logic of Aristotle and the Schools, was a scheme of categories, figures and processes, equally applicable to any and every subject of ratiocination, and therefore itself without contents; a vehicle for all reasoning. From a science thus empty, nothing of course

* Michelet II. 428.

could be deduced, of ontological or psychological truth. But Hegel conceived the thought that there was that in logic which was constant and substantive, and which might redeem it from the imputation of vacuity. All ratiocination being reducible to the form of the syllogism, and every syllogism being made up of propositions, the germinating point of all reasoning was found to be the assertory part of the logical proposition, the declaration of being, the substantive verb, EST, SEYN, BE. Logic is the science of Thinking; and Philosophy is a view of the absolute self-development of Thought. Thoughts are the elements: we have nothing else to begin with. Thoughts are the true and only concrete essences. Logic, being the description of these thoughts, is the description of the laws of the universe. "Everything comes to this," says Hegel, "to conceive and express the True; not as Substance, but as *Subject*." Mind is the opposite of matter. Matter gravitates toward a centre, something out of itself: Mind is all in itself, self-contained, self-moved, free. Pure free thought, absolute knowledge, is the true essence of things. The life of Science, is therefore the life of the Absolute itself. Thus Aristotle taught, that in immaterial things, thought and its object are one and the same. The Method is the same with what is methodized.* The system of Logic in no respect differs from its contents and object. The processes of this logic, unlike all preceding ones, are the processes of thought, that is, the processes of the things themselves. This is what is called the *Absolute Method*, and is that in which Hegelians chiefly glory. This method is the $\pi\omicron\upsilon\ \sigma\tau\omega$ of philosophy. The work of thinking is not a mere operation in one man's brain, but contains in it all being and all the contents of truth. The Categories, which Aristotle had emptied of their contents, are now restored to their glory: Logic and Metaphysic are brought into indissoluble union.

All science and all existence begin with one and the same *punctum saliens*, which is expressed by the verb ESSE. Pure Being is the simplest, widest, vaguest, and therefore emptiest, of all thoughts. Nothing can be ascribed to it; nothing can be predicated of it. Turn your mind upon it—and what is it? How like to very nothing? Pure *esse*, as well as pure *cogitare*,

* Encyclopaedie, Vorrede, p. 30, ed. 1830.

is a mental abstraction; bare, illimitable, undefinable, abstraction, with no tincture of actuality. To arrive at this pure Being, we must abstract every notion of limit or definition. The *Esse* can be thought of, only by absolute abstraction. To think of pure *esse*, I must think, not of *a*, or *b*, or *c*, (and so *in infinitum*). What then is it that I herein think of? It is nothing. Here we arrive at the startling dogma of Hegel's system, to wit, Being and Nothing are the same: *Sein* and *Nichts* are identical.

Logic therefore begins with the assertion *Est*, which is radical in every syllogism, and from the consideration of *Being* and of *Nothing*, goes on to construct the system. Every thought, involves, according to Hegel, its own negation. This is true not only of the radical thought, *Esse*, or *Being*, but of all and every thought. Nothing is the never-absent opposing pole of Being. Eliminating by degrees every term in the complex of universal science or universal existence, we at length come to bare *esse*, and so to zero. Without the idea of nothing, we never could have had the idea of being.

Logic divides itself into three parts; the Doctrine of *Esse*; the Doctrine of *Essence*; and the Doctrine of Conception or Notion (*Begriff*) and Idea; agreeably to these three aspects, respectively; 1. Thought in its immediateness,—*Notio per se*; 2. Thought in its reflexion and mediateness, the *esse per se* and the phenomenon of *notio*; and 3. Thought in its regression into itself—the *Notio in et per se*.

Returning to pure *esse*, or Being, *the Absolute is the Esse*. This pure Being is pure abstraction, as said above, and so is the absolute-negative, or Nothing. It follows therefore that the *Absolute is Nothing*. This prepares us for the expression, often quoted, that "God is the universal Nothing." Hegel himself reminds us, that the Budhists make nothing the principle of all things.* The Nothing is the same that the *Esse* is; the truth of *esse* as well as of Nothing is the oneness of both; this oneness is the *fieri* (Werden). Hegel owns that for the understanding and conception, the proposition that Being and Nothing are one and the same, is paradoxical, so that a learner might believe it could scarcely be uttered in earnest. But he goes on to sur-

prise us, by declaring, that they are not only the same, but are also different.* *Fieri*, (Werden), for which we possess no English word, is the true expression of the resultant of Being and Nothing, or the unity of both. Whoever thinks of *fieri*, or the *coming to be* (becoming), finds on analyzing his thought, that two elements are present, namely, first *not being*, and secondly *being*; here is the union of the two; *fieri* is the unity of *esse* and *non-esse*. The notion of *Beginning* leads to the same result: Beginning is the transition from nothing. This is diametrically opposed to the ancient and still prevalent fallacy, *Ex Nihilo Nihil fit*; which, says Hegel, is the very basis of Pantheism.*

From the idea of Being, Hegel goes on to develop that of Existence. Then he treats of Essence, and of Phenomenon. For a general schedule of Hegel's Logic we may refer to Morell, who seems to have deduced it chiefly from the Encyclopaedia. Our purpose has been only to indicate the starting-point of the system: it could not be reasonably expected of us, in a few pages, to enter into details. No abstract of ours could make it intelligible to the reader; and he who seriously proposes to examine the wonderful structure, will not be content with any epitome, including even that of the author himself, in his Encyclopaedie, but will resort to the original statements in the first volumes of the collection, on the Science of Logic. The sketches, given in the histories, Rixner's, &c., are so meager as to be unintelligible. Morell has afforded us the only view accessible to an English reader, and has merited well of the public, by his assiduity and labour. But Michelet has given the only extended report of Hegelianism, of which we suppose the author would not be himself ashamed. It has the advantage of being written by a pupil, an admirer, and a friend; and though Michelet is regarded by some Hegelians, as too rationalistic, and too ready to identify faith and reason, going further in this way than Rosenkranz and Marheineke, we are disposed to regard him as a faithful interpreter of his great master. He is one of the liveliest writers who ever treated on philosophy, and represents

* Ib. 103. † Encykl. p. 107. Frank u. Hillert, p. 47.

himself as occupying the *juste milieu*, between the contending factions.*

The controversies which have arisen from Strauss's Life of Jesus have caused Hegel to be claimed on both sides, with much heat and assurance. One large party (and their opinion on these points seems to be widely diffused) deny the personal God of Christians. In the endless progress of events and cycles of history, the Infinite is coming to self-consciousness. It emerges to this chiefly in human minds, and in some more than others. As substance, God exists elsewhere: as spirit, only in human minds. Something of this has been lamely reproduced among ourselves by Theodore Parker; but in this country it soon falls into cold, blank, old-fashioned, blaspheming atheism. Abroad, speculative theologians adhere to the tenet that the idea of God is God. The divinity is an ideal, a mental God, *Deus cogitatus*. There is no extramundane consciousness of God, and therefore no personality. To be consistent, God must know nothing of himself; he is beholden to man for this knowledge. God, as spirit, exists only for spirit. God contemplates himself in all minds. This is the true idea of God's immanence in the world. "Theistic Hegelians," says the German Michelet, "who maintain the personality of God in a world beyond our sphere, must, for consistency's sake, deny that God is cognizable. But how then can they remain in the (Hegelian) school?"†

According to these extreme Hegelians, Christ, more than all other men, thought himself one with God; therefore God was one with him, and Christ is simply the highest manifestation of God. Michelet very clearly proves the Straussianism of Hegel, by citations from his lectures. Baur thus represents the Hegelian doctrine as to a historical Christ: "God becomes man, not as a single, once-happening, historical fact, but by an eternal limitation of the essence of God, whereby God becomes man, in time, only so far as he is man from all eternity."‡ Michelet speaks for the whole school, as holding that God eternally becomes man.

* "So schlage ich die Coalition des Centrums (ohne welche es weder Fisch noch Fleisch, ein niederträchtig Grau, wäre) mit der Linken Seite vor." II. p. 659.

† Michelet, II. 648.

‡ Die Christliche Gnosis, 715.

While the more abstruse parts of Hegel's system have worked themselves but slowly into the thinking of the popular mind out of Germany, his views of development and progress in human events, or of the law of free phenomena, that is, of the Philosophy of History, have been seized upon with great avidity. In France, Victor Cousin has been a most celebrated advocate of these views; but even in America, no one can look back a few years, without observing that the whole tone of our public men has changed, and that the phrases, "progress," "necessary development," and "God in history," occur with marked frequency.

Dr. Gans ascribes to the Italian philosopher Vico, the first distinct enunciation of the opinion which has since become common, that the events of history follow a law as necessary as those of physics. The subject has since that time been touched in some of its parts, by Montesquieu, Bossuet, Leibnitz, Lessing, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Schiller, William von Humboldt, Görres, Steffens, and Rosenkranz. But the attempts of all these shrink before the vastness of Hegel's plan. Here we see the popular notions on this subject compacted into one consistent whole, and so identified with theological philosophy, that all history becomes a realization of absolute Mind, or God. The volume of Hegel's complete works, the Ninth, which is occupied with this subject, is made up of lectures, from his own briefs, and the notes of his students during 1822 and the next nine years; the last edition having been brought out under the care of his son, Dr. Charles Hegel. Except a certain characteristic knottiness in the introductory lecture, the whole of this volume may be read with great interest, even by those who reject the theory. The knowledge involved is vast, the classifications are beautiful, and the racy and sometimes acrid wit of the author gives sapidity to every page.

The key to the whole Philosophy of History is found by Hegel in the famous old saying of Anaxagoras, that *Nous*, or Reason, governs the world. In its religious shape, this is familiar to us, under the form, Providence governs the World. But Hegel means far more than this. That Reason, which governs the world, is free, self-disposing Thought.* God, the absolute

Reason, is everlastingly developing himself in History. God is not incomprehensible, or rather, according to Hegel, God is knowable. It was long enough common, to see God in beasts, insects, flowers, and shells; why not, Hegel asks, in events, in history? Mind or what is the same thing, perfect Freedom, the self-disposing, as opposed to matter, is perpetually realizing itself in History.

A specimen of Hegel's manner may be given in his threefold classification of nations; for he abounds in trilogies. The three classes are the Orientals, the Greeks, and the Germans; these terms being taken with great comprehension. The Orientals know not as yet that Mind, or Man as such, is free. Not knowing that they are free, they are not free. They only know that the individual is free; but such freedom is only wilfulness and wildness. The Greeks first arrived at the idea of freedom; but neither they, nor the Romans, knew that all men are free; Plato and Aristotle knew it not. The Germanic nations, under Christendom, first came to the recognition of universal freedom. The World's history is the progress of conscious freedom. Hence the classification: the Orientals, who knew that *one* is free; the Greeks who know that *some* are free; the Germans, who know that *all* are free; that man, as such, is free.

The progress of events in history is a necessary development, wherein God accomplishes his own end. He can have no end out of himself. "God, as an infinitely perfect being, can will nothing but himself, nothing but his own will." The great actions of history proceed from what may, in general terms, be designated as human passions: "nothing great in the world is performed without passion." These passions are working perpetually towards the great rational end; and thus the idea is actualizing itself. Beyond the intention of the individual actor, there is a hidden, but awful end.

World-historic individuals (to use Hegel's phrase) are those in whom the great world-historic idea is embodied. They represent the era. They concentrate in themselves the spirit of the age. They cannot but be just what they are, and when they are. Their own passions may govern them, but these passions work out the idea of that particular stage of the general plan. Cæsar was ambitious; but Cæsar filled just the place assigned

in the development. "Those are the great men of history, whose own individual aim contains the substantive will of the spirit of the age, or World-spirit." They see beyond others, as mountain summits catch the earliest rays of the rising sun. They press on, through conflicts, and even through crimes, towards the accomplishment of the universal idea. Only the next age can understand them. They are producing epochs in the world's history, when they seem to be only intending their own private objects. Their function was to catch sight of the general, necessary, impending stage in the world's progress, and to concentrate all their powers on accomplishing it. The heroic men of an age are therefore the farsighted men: their acts, their speeches, are the best of their times. They learn nothing from past history. "For the far-advanced spirit is only the inward, unconscious soul, of all men living, brought to consciousness in these great minds."* This is the very reason why the masses are seen to follow such men. Here is the idea of the "manifest destiny," placed on philosophical grounds. Here is Pope's couplet generalized into its law:

"If plagues or earthquakes break not heaven's design,
Why then a Borgia, or a Catiline?"

The fate of such individuals as mark an epoch has seldom been happy. The end is attained; and then these men fall away, like the petals around the fruit. "They die early, like Alexander; are murdered, like Cæsar; are transported to St. Helena, like Napoleon." Hegel still more distinctly avows this historical fatalism, when he gives examples. For instance: Alexander of Macedon (so he says) ravaged Greece in part, and then Asia; Alexander is therefore set forth as rapacious. He did this out of ambition, and lust of conquest; and the proof is, that he did those things, which resulted in fame and power. Where is the schoolmaster, who has not demonstrated, concerning Alexander the Great and Julius Cæsar, that these men had such and such passions, and were therefore immoral men? Whence it follows, forsooth, that he, the schoolmaster, is a most excellent man, because he has had no such passions; the proof being that he never overran Asia, or conquered Darius and Porus, but was willing to live and let live. "The man, as a private

person, must eat and drink, like others; must stand in relation to friends and acquaintances; must have feelings and boilings-over of the moment. No man is, therefore, a hero to his valet-de-chambre, as the proverb declares; to which (says Hegel) I added—and Goethe repeated it ten years after me—the reason is, not that one is no hero, but that the other is a valet-de-chambre. The latter pulls off his lord's boots, helps him into bed, knows how he relishes his champagne, and the like. Such historic persons fare badly when represented by valet-historians; by these they are levelled with their own valets, and placed on the same plane, or it may be even a little lower than the plane, of these sagacious judges of human character. The Thersites of Homer, who rails at kings, is a permanent figure of all ages.”*

The grand conclusion, to which all Hegel's speculations on History and Politics tend, is, that *the actual world is as it ought to be*; that the true Goodness, the universal divine Reason, is at the same time Power, bringing itself into actuality. “This Goodness, this Reason, in its most concrete conception, is God.” God governs the world: the matter of his government, the realizing of his plan, is Universal History. In the clear light of this divine Idea, says Hegel, which is not mere idea, all outward seeming falls away, as if the world were a senseless, perverse accident. But we must leave the consideration of a subject, which is rapidly and dangerously coming into notice, under the labours of inferior minds, and which connects itself plainly with the developments of the Church. This we suppose to be the only one of Hegel's works, which would endure translation into English.

We cannot contemplate with gravity some of the speculations, found in modern German works. The very language becomes barbarous. On sacred subjects it is horribly like the wildest ravings of the Hindoos. Mathematics and Physics are mixed up with theology; thus Oken is represented as saying, “God can come into time, only as radius.” “The line is a long nothing, the superficies a void nothing, the sphere a thick nothing; in fine something is only nothing endowed with predicates: all things are nothing with different forms; God is a

* Werke ix. 40.

rotating ball; the world is the rotating God.”* We must not smile at this, lest we incur a censure for our Anglo-Saxon shallowness. The same theosophist tells us that God before he created the world was darkness, and in the first act of creation became fire. We wonder no longer at the honour bestowed on Jacob Boehm. As Hegel declared that such things cannot be expressed in French, so we are sure they can be neither comprehended nor tolerated in English. Our language suffers a dreadful violation in the attempt. Germans in passing through Pennsylvania, often smile at the changes wrought in their own language. We wish our neighbours would confine their commendations to the German; but our vernacular also suffers, and we have from the same prolific land such mongrels as “surrogate,” “stand-point,” “world-religion,” “ground-proof,” “extraanthropological” and the like. Our ears have already become familiar with the *me* and the *not-me*. Copying Bardili and Herbart too closely, we may arrive at *Pferde-ich*, the “Horse-me.” “The experience of beasts, says he, has also the categorics, only they cannot maintain them.” The shield against all raillery is the immanent conviction of transcendental Germans that they are the depositories of all knowledge. To them, Germany is the world. In their catalogues of works on theology recommended to students, there is in general an ignoring of all English ones. Prussia, said Sietze, “is a giant-harp, strung in the garden of God, to lead the chorus of the world.” This beats Jonathan’s talk of “the great nation.” None have been more ready than we to give honour to Germans, for their great contributions to learning, criticism, and history: for their ever-varying and barbarous metaphysic, we owe them no thanks. While we write, some new dream is doubtless supplanting the old one. It is pleasing to observe that the great image is less strong, and that the feet and toes, part of potter’s clay and part of iron, indicate that the kingdom shall be divided. In conclusion we protest against the charge that this is an *American*, as against a German opinion. Holy and wise men among the Germans themselves, such as Hengstenberg and Neander, have expressed their abomination of these fatal errors more strongly than we.

* Michelet ii. 430.

In the foregoing sketch of Hegel's life, we have put a constraint upon ourselves, and following his ardent admirer, have set forth at length his great abilities. To give an abstract of his system we have not attempted. Even Morell who, if any one, could have done it, has failed to furnish to English readers an intelligible view of the whole. To his epitome however we would refer, as the best extant. One closing word, as to the proclamation in Germany of bans between Hegelianism and evangelical Christianity. At a first view, it might appear, that the great philosopher, and his adherents of the extreme right, were deeply concerned for the interests of spiritual Lutheranism. They use its terms, *de industria*, and have the name of God, of the Holy Trinity, and of the Spirit, continually in their mouths. A little study suffices to show, that to every one of the familiar phrases of religion, they have annexed notions of their own. This is the most dangerous mode of bringing in heresy and infidelity. The very words of the Westminster catechism may be rehearsed from a professor's chair, and then explained to mean the exact reverse of their true import; this adds perfidy to falsehood. We do not charge it on the Hegelian divines, but employ it as an apt illustration. As a celebrated theological innovator of New England used to say of his novel expositions of the quinquarticular controversy, that he was "only taking the bear-skins off Calvinism;" so Strauss, while he is offering Christianity a holocaust in Hegel's temple, calls it a simple "cutting away of the extra fat of the church-dogma."* If we must choose, let us have an open enemy. Like Ajax, we pray for conflict in the light. Socinianism, about Boston, already affects half the language of the church: it will probably be her next finesse to return to the whole Athanasian creed, with private meanings of her own.

* Streitschriften, Heft iii. p. 59.