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ART. I.—*Davies's State of Religion among the Dissenters
in Virginia.*

AMONG the papers communicated to the Rev. Dr Green, as chairman of the committee appointed many years ago to prepare a history of the Presbyterian church, there are several relating to the settlement and difficulties of the Rev. Mr. Davies in Virginia. They consist principally of a correspondence between Mr. Davies and the bishop of London, and Drs. Doddridge and Avery in England. Some of these letters are so much injured by having long since been exposed to moisture, as to be in a great measure illegible. Others of them however are in good preservation. The most important is a long communication from Mr. Davies to the bishop of London, which we propose to print entire. In order however to understand it, it is necessary to recollect that the Episcopal church was by law established in Virginia, and non-attendance upon its services made a penal offence. To make provision however for dissenters, the legislature had adopted the English Act of Toleration, and given it the force of law in that colony. It was on this ground that Mr. Davies recognized that act, and appealed to it for protection. This he states distinctly in a letter dated May 21st, 1752, and addressed to Dr. Avery. He there says, "I am fully satisfied,

the race was in danger of extirpation. The title of this work was *A Brief Relation of the Destruction of the Indians*. His efforts were not altogether fruitless, for he obtained a new set of regulations for the treatment and government of the Indians. He was now made bishop of Chiapa, and in 1544 returned to America. But he did not continue long there, for in 1551 he returned again to Spain, where he spent the remainder of his life. He died at Madrid in 1556, in the 92d year of his age. This brief account deserves to be inserted here, because Las Casas was in his day connected both with slavery and colonization.

We have said nothing respecting Judge Wilkeson's History. It is doubtless drawn from the most authentic sources, and contains information greatly needed by many of the friends of Colonization, who have remained ignorant of the origin, progress, and present condition of this interesting enterprise. The only fault which we have to find with this work is, that it enters too little into detail, and is more like a table of contents than a history. It seems to have been suddenly produced to meet the urgent demand for information, which is heard from all quarters. But a "History of African Colonization" is still a desideratum; and from our knowledge of the facts, we are persuaded that there are materials for filling an octavo volume, and that the incidents are of such a character as could not but create a deep and lively interest in every philanthropic bosom. But until this is done, Judge Wilkeson's performance will serve an excellent purpose, by furnishing immediate information.

Las Casas

ART. III.—*Allgemeine Geschichte der christlichen Religion und Kirche.* Von Dr. August Neander. Vierter Band. Achter Theil des ganzen Werks, Hamburg, bei Friedrich Perthes. 1836. 8vo. pp. 506.

THIS is what would be called in England or America the *eighth* volume of Neander's great work, though, from the peculiar manner in which they manage these things in Germany, it is numbered only as the fourth. The period to which it is devoted falls between the death of Charlemagne and Pope Gregory the Seventh, or from 814 to 1073. We

are constrained to say that this is a tract of ecclesiastical story which less awakens our sympathies, and less displays the genius of the author, than any which he has yet treated. Instead, therefore, of seeking to characterize the volume, we shall single out a particular portion of it, relating to a subject never without its interest in the Presbyterian Church, and which it is useful to have brought before us by one as little favourable to the Calvinistic tenets as Neander; we refer to the controversy respecting predestination, which took place during the ninth century. Without confining ourselves to the language of the author, which is often awkward and circumlocutory in no common degree, we shall endeavour to be scrupulous reporters of his opinions; premising that in many respects they are very different from our own.

The almost constant battling about the true meaning of the scripture, in regard to predestination, had resulted in a triumph of the Augustinian doctrine of grace over Semipelagianism; yet the question of predestination was still unsettled. For though the recognition of Augustine, as an orthodox teacher, was almost universal, and though his theory of all-working grace was commonly received, there were some who stumbled at the naked and fearful avowal of unmitigated predestination. Not, indeed, that such avowed dissent from the doctrine of this father, or gave that place to free will, in relation to divine grace, with which we are familiar in later days. Such was the influence of Augustine on the mind and thinking of the age, and such the universal sympathy of Christian experience with the doctrine of grace, that it would have been regarded as putting these in peril to attribute any thing conditional to the free will of the creature. The truth is, however, they viewed the Augustinian system more on its practical than its speculative side, and were more concerned with the doctrine of grace than with that of predestination and reprobation; and the tenet was set forth in that mild form which appears in the work *de Vocatione Gentium*.* Both schemes, the rigorous and the mild, were handed down together. The age, if Neander errs not, was unused to the unfolding of subtile webs of thought, unpractised in acute and distinguishing thought, and given to a flow of rhetorical verbosity; hence it was easy for them to be misled by resemblances, and to mistake verbal for real distinctions. For the same reason, one who had derived all

* Neander's Hist. vol. ii. p. 897.

his theological prepossessions from the school of Augustine might readily see in milder forms of expressing the doctrines of grace, a departure from them towards Pelagianism; and could scarcely escape giving offence to many by the uncompromising roughness of his expressions. Such a man, says Neander, was the monk Gottschalk, or Gotteschalculus, with whom began the predestinarian controversy in the ninth century.

Gotteschalculus was descended from a Saxon family, and was placed by his parents, at an early age, in the monastery of Fulda, as an *oblatus*, or one set apart to the monastic life. Here he pursued the ordinary course of study, and formed a close alliance with the afterwards celebrated Walafrid Strabo. But he sighed to be released from these bonds, and, in 829, received from the council at Mayence a dispensation from his ties to the monastery. In seeking this dispensation, he was zealously, though ineffectually opposed by the abbot of Fulda, Rabanus Maurus. It is not unlikely that this had some connexion with their subsequent conflicts.

Gotteschalculus, upon leaving this monastery, went to another called Orbais, in the diocese of Soissons, in France. Here he studied, with great zeal, the works of Augustine, and other theologians of the same school. The doctrine of absolute predestination became inwrought into his Christian life, and in his mind was inseparably connected with the idea of God, and the unchangeableness of the divine will. He employed himself chiefly with dogmatic and speculative questions. In connexion with these, he received from his friend, the abbot Servatus Lupus, some very wholesome advice. "Let us expatiate," said he, in one of his letters, "in the open field of scripture, and devote ourselves wholly to meditation upon them, seeking the face of God, humbly, piously, and forever. The clemency of God, in condescension to our weakness, while we attempt not things which are too high for us, will raise us to higher and nobler views, and reveal himself to our purged faculties."

In the system of Gotteschalculus the idea of predestination regards not merely the elect, but the reprobate. He recognised a *predestinatio duplex*, agreeably to which the former are predestined to everlasting life, and the latter foreordained to everlasting death. He held this doctrine to be important for vindicating the unchangeableness and independency of the divine decrees, which, but for this, would seem to depend on events occurring in time. In regard to the works

of God, to foresee and to foreordain are one, as God's knowledge, like his will, is creative.* And here, according to Neander, Gottschalcus departed from the mode of expression which was usual in the school of Augustine, where it was common to distinguish between the *praesciti*, or reprobate, and the *praedestinati*, or elect; no doubt with the intention of removing from God all causality in regard to sin. Yet Augustine did not always avail himself of this distinction, and the idea of a twofold predestination had already been presented by Fulgentius of Ruspa, and Isidore of Seville.†

There would, in the opinion of our historian, be no essential difference between the schemes of Gottschalcus and Augustine, unless the former should be understood, in his zeal for the consistency of his theory of absolute predestination, as mounting beyond the fact of the first sin, and regarding the sin of Adam as conditioned not by his own free will, but by the necessary accomplishment of an absolute purpose of God, which predetermined the whole history of our race, and this event in particular. Neander here assumes the incompatibility of free action with an absolute decree. Laying together the positions that prescience and predestination are identical—and that all foresight of God is creative—Neander concludes that Gottschalcus made no distinction between willing, creating, and permitting, on the part of God, and that his views were identical with those of the school since called Supralapsarian. Where he speaks of these points, however, he expressly limits himself to the relation of God *to his own works*, and denies that sin is one of the works of God. “Sempiterna cum praescientia voluntas tua de operibus duntaxat tuis, Deum praescisse ac praedestinasse simul et semel tam cuncta quam singula opera sua.” He nowise refers the predestination of God to evil, but only to good; his prescience to both. “Credo atque confiteor, praescisse te ante saecula quaecunque erant futura sive bona sive mala, praedestinasse tantummodo bona.” He further divides the good, which is the object of predestination, into the blessings of grace and the awards of justice, *gratiae beneficia et justitiae judicia*. Here, with Augustine, he proceeds upon the supposition, that the evil spirits fell by the lapse of their

* Apud Omnipotentiam idem praescire quod velle.

† Neander's Hist. vol. ii. p. 912; vol. iii. p. 211.

free will, and that the whole human race sinned in Adam, and partook of his guilt.*

In the year 847, as Gottschalk, in returning from a pilgrimage to Rome, tarried at a hospitium, or house of entertainment for pilgrims, founded by Count Eberhard of Friuli, he met with Notting, then newly chosen bishop of Verona, to whom he made known his doctrine of twofold predestination. Shortly after, this prelate, at the court of the emperor Louis the Debonnaire, fell in with Rabanus Maurus, who had recently become archbishop of Mayence, and acquainted him with the doctrine. It was highly offensive to the archbishop, who promised to oppose it in writing. Accordingly he composed two works, directing one to Notting of Verona, and the other to Count Eberhard. In these he manifested great warmth against Gotteschalculus, and pursued the opinions of the latter to remote and repulsive consequences, so as to justify the suspicion that he had not forgotten their former differences. It is not to be denied however that he may have been actuated by regard for true religion; and he was evidently the more hurt by the boldness of Gottschalk's positions, inasmuch as his own system forced him rather to conceal than to avoid the same odious consequences. He charged Gotteschalculus with the opinion, that the divine predestination so constrains every man, that even if he should desire to attain salvation, and seek it by true faith and good works, he would labour in vain, unless he were foreordained to eternal life. Gotteschalculus, as a man alive to the interests of morality, was far from admitting any such consequence. He unquestionably treated that grace, whereby man is converted and sanctified, as the operation in which the divine purpose of predestination reveals itself in regard to men. He was also, says Neander, far from teaching, as Rabanus alleged, a predestination of men to evil as well as good.

As it regards the scheme of Rabanus himself, he considered the decree of God concerning the wicked, as conditioned by his prescience; not making this absolute like the decree of predestination. The distinction, therefore, between the *praesciti* and the *praedestinati* was in his view of great practical moment. His expression was that God had foreordained eternal punishment to those whom he foresaw as wicked, but not that he had foreordained these to eternal

* The words of Neander are remarkable: "dass das ganze Menschengeschlecht in Adam gesündigt und an seiner Schuld Theil genommen."

punishment. It was also with him a matter of practical moment to maintain, that God willed the salvation of all men, and that Christ died for the redemption of all: but he connected with this the opinion, that by the sin of Adam, in whom all sinned, all had likewise merited eternal punishment, and thus he believed that he effectually vindicated God from the causality of sin, and the corruption of those whom he left to their deserved doom. "Cui nullo modo fas est ea quae ab hominibus male aguntur, adscribi, qui in proclivitatem cadendi non ex conditione Dei, sed ex primi parentis praevaricatione venerunt. De cujus poena nemo liberatur, nisi per gratiam Domini nostri Jesu Christi, praeparatam et praedestinatam in aeterno consilio Dei ante constitutionem mundi." Out of this corrupt mass, it is true, only those attain to happiness, to whom God, agreeably to his eternal degree of predestination, communicates the grace which works true conversion. In regard to the question how the diverse relation of God to those whom he leaves to their deserved doom, and those whom he rescues from the same, can be reconciled with our belief in the holiness and justice of God;—he resorted to the hidden nature of the divine decree, and the incomprehensibility of the divine dealings; maintaining that we must hold fast to that only which is above all doubt, and not found our belief of God's holiness and justice in what is incomprehensible. "Contente," says he, "cum Paulo, immo si audes argue Paulum, qui dicit, Christo in se loquente, Rom. 9, 30."

We find Rabanus, therefore, shrinking from every thing, which, even in seeming, could make God the author of sin, or could derogate from his holiness; while it nowhere appears how he avoided these inferences. He did not venture to express dissent from the Augustinian system, and indeed usually expressed his opinions in phraseology taken from Augustine or Prosper. In this beginning of the contest, says Neander, we see in proclusion its whole subsequent course, it was a contest not between opinion, but between harsher and milder forms of expression.

When the letter of Rabanus to Notting was communicated to Gotteschalch, it filled him with surprise to find himself treated as an errorist. Instead of admitting the justice of the charge, he thought he could succeed in pointing out Semipelagian principles in the statements of Rabanus, whom he regarded as a disciple rather of Gennadius and the Marseilles school, than of Augustine. In 848, perhaps with some view to a better understanding with Rabanus, he went

to Mayence, and without hesitation appeared in a council held under the archbishop, in the presence of the king of Germany, and the principal men both ecclesiastical and secular. He laid before them a book in defence of his opinions. He combated the opinion, that when it is said, God would have all men to be saved, the expression is to be taken simply, and applied even to the reprobate; or that when it is said that Christ suffered for all men, it is to be taken in an absolute sense. All such expressions he understood as restricted to the elect; for he held that the will and decree of God, namely in regard to redemption, must be fully accomplished, and could be applied to those only in respect to whom they are so accomplished.* In all this, Neander acknowledges, Gotteschalculus said no more than Rabanus must himself have admitted; for while the latter often repeated such expressions as that God would have all men to be saved, and that Christ died for the redemption of all, he despoiled them again of all favourable meaning, by teaching that those only were actually saved on whom God conferred the necessary grace, and that this was conferred only on the elect. "This contradiction," our historian is pleased to say, "he could attribute to none but himself, as he referred also to a secret and incomprehensible decree of God"

At this council there was little for Gotteschalculus to expect, in regard to a fair hearing. Rabanus Maurus was here in his own circle of influence: the opinions of Gotteschalculus were condemned as heretical. As he belonged however to another diocese, Rabanus sent him to Hinkmar, archbishop of Rheims, his ecclesiastical superior, with a request that this prelate would prevent the propagation of his errors. Hinkmar accordingly caused him to appear before a mixed assembly of estates, held at Chiersy, in the king's presence, in 849. As he refused to recant, and boldly defended his opinions, he was treated as contumacious towards his superiors, and as insulting to the bishops; his forsaking of the monastery

* Ap. Hincmar. c. 24. fol. 149: Omnes quos vult Deus salvos fieri sine dubitatione salvantur nec possunt salvari, nisi quos vult Deus salvos fieri nec est quisquam quem Deus salvari velit et non salvetur, quia Deus noster omnia quaecunque voluit, fecit. C. 27. f. 211: Illos omnes impios et peccatores, quos proprio fuso sanguine filius Dei redimere venit, hos omnipotens Dei bonitas ad vitam predestinatos irretectabiliter salvari tantummodo velit;—and afterwards: Illos omnes impios et peccatores, pro quibus idem Filius Dei nec corpus assumpsit, nec orationem nec dico sanguinem fudit, neque pro iis ullo modo crucifixus fuit.

was not forgotten, and the result was that he was declared to be a heretic, sentenced to be scourged, *durissimis verberibus castigari*, and to be cast into prison. The sentence took effect; he was scourged in an unmerciful manner, and under the stress of pain, *jam paene emoriens*, delivered up to the fire the paper in defence of his opinions; which however contained nothing but a collection of testimonies from the scriptures and the fathers. He was then imprisoned in Hautvilliers, a monastery in the diocese of Rheims. The voices which were raised in his behalf led the archbishop, Hinkmar, to allow some mitigation of his punishment: perhaps he hoped, by milder measures, to render him less troublesome. At the instance of Rabanus, Hinkmar soon resumed his severity against the poor monk. All attempts to make him recant were, however, unavailing. In defence of his doctrine, he used every means which was accessible to him in his prison; and in this he found a helper in Guntbert, a monk of Hautvilliers. This man secretly left the monastery, with an appeal of Gottschalk to Pope Nicholas, which he carried to Rome.

During his imprisonment, Gotteschalculus drew up, in vindication of his doctrine, two confessions of his faith, a longer and a shorter. His tenet of twofold predestination was in his mind closely connected with the essentials of Christian faith, as he regarded all who denied the predestination of the wicked to eternal wrath as making God a changeable being, and reducing him below the wisdom even of a prudent human creature. "Videant quale sit et quantum malum quod quum omnes electi tui omnia bona semper fecerint, faciant, et facturi sint cum consilio, praesumant affirmare, quod Tu qui totius es Auctor fonsque sapientiae, volueris vel valueris vel etiam debueris quicquam (quod absit) absque consilio patrare." No part of his personal sufferings gave him so much pain as the knowledge that the contempt which was cast upon himself redounded to the injury of the truth. "Maximum diu noctuque perfero moerorem, quod propter mei nominis vilitatem vilem hominibus video esse veritatem." And though he did not claim the power of working miracles, such was his conviction of the verity and high import of his doctrine, that he declared his expectation, that in default of other methods, God would attest his own truth by supernatural means. Accordingly, in the spirit of his age, he offered to undergo an ordeal, in the presence of the king, prelates, and clergy, by going into four casks filled with water, oil,

and pitch, and heated to the highest degree; and if this were not satisfactory, to complete the appeal by passing through the fire. And he appealed to God that he proposed this, not out of foolhardiness, but trusting in divine help. “*Quia prorsus ausum talia petendi, sicut ipse melius nosti, a me propria temeritate non praesumo, sed abs te potius tua benignitate sumo.*” It is remarkable, that at a time when such ordeals were accredited, the opposers of *Gotteschalvus* declined the proffered test.

The constancy of *Gotteschalvus* continued until his death, which took place in the year 868. *Hinkmar* refused to give him either the viaticum or Christian burial, except on condition of an explicit retraction: he refused, and being content to forego both, died peacefully in adherence to his belief.

The injustice and severity of these proceedings, could not fail to call forth much sympathy in his fate, and indignation towards the persecutors of *Gotteschalvus*. Pope *Nicholas*, whose attention had been drawn to the subject, not only by the above mentioned appeal of the prisoner, but by the accounts of his enemies, seems to have been dissatisfied with the course of the proceedings. He wrote in this view to King *Charles the Bald*, and gave *Hinkmar* to understand, that he stood in danger of something which he might not find agreeable.* The archbishop had, indeed, offered to have *Gotteschalvus* brought in person to Rome, or wherever the pope might command, in order to a thorough investigation: but it is evident that he was not sincere in the proposal, and that he stood in dread of such an inquisition. *Neander* expresses doubt whether, in this course, *Nicholas* was actuated by a regard for the rights of the innocent, which he sometimes was known to uphold, or by opposition to *Hinkmar* as a champion of ecclesiastical freedom. It is to be observed, that he did nothing effectual for the rescue of the persecuted man.

When *Hinkmar* discovered the strength of the current of opinion against his measures, he advised with a number of leading men as to the course which he should pursue in regard to *Gotteschalvus*. Among these, was *Prudentius*, bishop of *Troyes*. It is supposed by *Neander*, that the answer of *Prudentius* pointed towards a milder treatment of the accused, for whose opinions he was not without sympathy.

* *Ut providerem (says Hinkmar) ne pro iis tandem aliquando incurram quae non opto.* Op. ii. 290.

Against all such counsels, on the other hand, Rabanus Maurus set himself with violence, and even rebuked Hinkmar in a letter for allowing Gotteschalvus so much liberty in writing and speaking, to the injury of many others; exhorting him to deny the communion to the heretic, unless on condition of his recantation. "We must only pray for him," wrote he, "that Almighty God would work the salvation of the weak brother, and bring him back to the right faith." At a later period Prudentius himself espoused the doctrine of Gotteschalvus; as appears from a letter which he wrote to Hinkmar, and to Pardulus, bishop of Lyons. He maintained a two-fold predestination; but represented the predestination of God, in regard to the wicked, as conditioned by his prescience of the sin and guilt which passed upon all men through Adam; and explicitly rejected the belief that God had foreordained any one to sin, admitting, however, a foreordination to punishment. "He further held," says Neander, "that Christ died for the elect only; drawing the conclusion from the words, *for many* (Matt. xx. 28), *for you*, in the institution of the Lord's Supper. And he taught that God by no means wills the salvation of all, but only that of the elect; for God would not be the Almighty, if that which he willed should not come to pass: from the words of the apostle Paul, (1 Tim. ii. 4), he sought, by various forced interpretations, to release himself."

So contradictory were the opinions on this point, that king Charles the Bald was induced to consult Ratramnus, a monk in the convent of Corbie, one of the most learned theologians of the age, on the question how that controversy could be determined by the opinions of the early fathers. Ratramnus, in his work on the subject, omits all mention of Gottschalk's name, but discusses the doctrine of the two-fold predestination. He deduces the doctrine of the predestination of the wicked to eternal punishment, and also that of the righteous to eternal life, as necessary consequences from the eternity and unchangeableness of the divine decrees; but he founds the predestination of God in regard to the wicked, upon his prescience; considering it of great importance to remove from God every thing like causality in respect to evil; and in this, he adheres to the Augustinian principle.*

* His words respecting the order of the decrees are these: "Electos divini amoris flamma succendens, interiora id est spiritalia, et superna id est coelestia concupiscere semper facit et sequi, at reprobos justo quidem iudicio, mortalibus

Among all the defenders of Gotteschalculus and his system, there was none so much distinguished for classical accomplishment and gifts of communication, as his friend, the abbot Servatus Lupus, whom we have already mentioned. He opened, indeed, no new prospects in theology, but was remarkable for his clear sight and felicitous representation of the points in question, and for his exact discrimination between what was substantial and what was accidental. In his work, *De tribus Quaestionibus*, he endeavoured to answer the questions concerning two-fold predestination, free will, and the extent of the atonement.

In all that respects the need of divine grace for the recovery of human nature, he draws from the depths of his Christian experience representations which Neander justly considers striking. "When any one," says he, "endeavours to fulfil what is commanded, and is not sufficient for the task, humbled with the vain attempt, he resorts thither, where, by asking, seeking, knocking, he may receive what he desires, and glories not in himself, but in the Lord, for all his benefits." This principle of self-renunciation, this inspiring consciousness of absolute dependence on God, is set by Lupus in striking contrast with the self-sufficiency and self-confidence which reign in ancient heathen authors.* In his representations of the doctrine of grace, he does not abide, with Augustine, by the consideration of man as fallen, but deduces his doctrine from the nature of creaturely relation to God. He describes grace as the divine principle of life, which the soul stood in need of from the very beginning, in order to her perfection, and without which, even in his primeval state, man, as confined to himself, could not have been perfect in holiness. God is to the soul what the soul is to the body. Neander censures the sophistry with which he endeavoured to evade the force of such passages as 1 Tim. ii. 4.

From what Servatus Lupus says, it is easy to perceive that there were many in his day who, in seeking to smooth down the asperities of Augustine's expressions, really departed from

tamen occulto, dum desiderio supernae patriae non irradiat, atque eos invisibilis boni extorres derelinquit, non interiora, sed exteriora, non coelestia, sed terrena bona diligere sequique permittit. Non enim veritatis quisquam bonum vel amare potest vel assequi, nisi veritatis luce commonitus.

* For example, the words of Cato, in Cicero de Senectute, c. ii.: "Quibus nihil opis est in ipsis ad bene beateque vivendum," in contrast with "Omnia bona a vero Deo non a seipso petere." Again, the words of Virgil: "Spes sibi quisque," as opposed to "Cuique Deus vera spes."

his doctrine, in regard to grace and free will: for he speaks of those who founded the decree of election upon God's eternal foresight of faith and good works: "Deum propterea predestinasse quoslibet, quod praescierit eos devotos sibi futuros et in eadem devotione mansuros." By such a hypothesis Servatus thought grace was made to depend on human merit; or, in other words, was made void. He hints that the doctrine was held by some of great consideration, but Neander has found none such mingling in this controversy. And he says himself, that predestination was held by most, but that some—in *quibus et quaedam praeclara praesulum lumina*—took offence at the doctrine of predestination to wrath, and points out the particular in which this was offensive.* If these he taught, would only consider, that God *foresaw* the sin resulting from the free will of the first man, but *foreordained* that which was its consequence, there would remain no such appalling difficulty. He also notices the bad practical consequences which could be deduced from the doctrine of absolute predestination, as, for example, that many would say, "Why may I not live as I list, seeing I must be damned at last?" But he replies, that nothing of this kind can possibly proceed from Christian experience. Far from the mind of the true Christian be such a thought! For he knows that he is redeemed by Christ, dedicated to God in baptism, and that repentance unto life is ever open before him. Every such suggestion betrays a soul full of insatiable love for sin; one which, by incurable ungodliness, has plunged itself into the abyss of despair. It is worthy of notice, that, devoted as Servatus Lupus was to the system of Augustine, he was far from attributing infallibility to his declarations, or to any thing except the word of God.

At the summons of Charles the Bald, John Scotus took part in this controversy, and in 851 wrote a book upon predestination, in opposition to Gotteschalcus. He was not a man however who could judge of his opponent with the impartiality of Servatus; and he gave an odious picture of his heresy, as he called it. The doctrine, as he thought, involved a denial not only of free will but of grace, by attributing to an absolute decree both the sins which incur eternal perdition, and the virtues which lead to eternal life. By an absolute necessity, therefore, grace as a free gift of God, and also

* Ne credatur Deus libidine puniendi aliquos condidisse et injuste damnare eos, qui non valuerunt peccatum ac per hoc nec supplicium declinare.

human liberty were annulled. He indulged in violent reproaches against Gotteschalvus, whose confessions above noticed, he set himself to answer. The two-fold predestination of his opponent, comprising on the one hand the cause of sin and misery, and on the other the cause of holiness and salvation, he declared to be untenable, as militating against the simplicity of the divine essence. "Si autem divina natura summa omnium, quae sunt, causa multiplex, cum sit, simplex et una saluberrime creditur, consequenter necesse est nullam in se ipsa controversiam recipere credatur." His polemical views were regularly deduced from the fundamental principles of his peculiar theory. For according to John Scotus, all that is predicated of God, is but an anthropopathical intimation of his incomprehensible essence. Hence even contradictory declarations may be true of God. In attributing to the Most High creation, will, foresight, and foreordination, we do at bottom indicate by all these only the one divine essence. "Quicquid invenitur esse non aliud id esse nisi unam veramque essentiam, quae ubique in se ipsa tota est, et quae est illa nisi omnium naturarum praesciens praedestinatio et praescientia praedestinans." Especially no relations of time can be ascribed to God, in regard to whom there is neither past nor present. Only by anthropopathy can prescience or predestination be predicated of him. In reference to sin we cannot properly speak of divine causality, or even of divine knowledge. In regard to God, evil has no existence, still less therefore can there be prescience or predestination of evil. And as in regard to God evil has no existence, we can speak of God's punishing it, only in an improper sense. The idea conveyed by such expression, is, according to Neander's report of Scotus, no other than this: God has so constituted the universe, that moral evil punishes itself, and all rational beings find their proper place in the universe according to their different moral characters. Every sin carries with it its own punishment; this is manifest in an obscure manner even in this world, but will be more clearly so in the world to come. This opinion might be pushed so far as to lead to a punishment merely moral, a moral purgatory and moral hell; and in his work *De Divisione Naturae*, John Scotus actually avows this consequence. He taught moreover that God had formed no part of his creation with a view to punishment. Those who suffer eternal punishment, suffer then, [as the diseased eye suffers from the light: "sicut una eademque lux sanis oculis convenit, impedit dolentibus."]

“All,” said he, “must submit to the eternal and divine law. And the only difference between the elect and the lost consists in this, that the former submit freely, and the latter by constraint.” The constitution of the universe has limited moral evil, so that it cannot stretch itself to infinity. In attempting to transcend this limit, it labours, and is tormented, and so is punished. “*Praedestinavit itaque Deus impios ad poenam vel interitum, hoc est circumscrispsit eos legibus suis incommutabilibus, quas eorum impietas evadere non permittitur.*” Thus as God frees the will of those whom he has foreordained to grace, and so fills them with his love that they not only rejoice in abiding within the limits of eternal law, but account it their greatest glory to be neither able nor willing to transcend them, so he constrains the will of the wicked, whom he has foreordained to punishment, in such a manner, that every thing which leads in the former case to eternal happiness, leads in the latter case to misery.

John Scotus came forward as the defender of human liberty, and blamed his adversaries as denying it, and subjecting all things to a constraining necessity. But he really set out from a principle common to both sides, inasmuch as he acknowledged, that the corrupt will could be awakened to holiness only by grace which God imparts to the elect. While he ascribed ability of good to fallen man, he seemed to teach that this ability could come into action only by the influence of grace. This is evident from an illustration which he employs; as a man in the dark, is possessed of the faculty of sight, and yet sees nothing, until light is introduced from without him, so is it with the depraved will, until illuminated by the rays of divine mercy. So also in another place, he says that the human will is endowed not with false, but true freedom, though this freedom is so disturbed by the consequences of the first sin, that there is wanting all will to what is good, or even where good is willed, the power of effecting it is wanting; yet there still remains a certain natural liberty indicated by the desire of happiness which is natural to every man.

Neander concludes, that if this famous schoolman had laid aside his disposition to push the doctrines of his adversary to remote consequences, he would have approached very nearly to the same views of predestination, liberty and grace. His own positions respecting the divine nature, creation, and moral evil, forced him to admit, that every thing, both good

and evil, was a necessary development of God; which however does not appear to have presented itself to his own mind; and the unwieldiness of the then prevalent scientific method, except in the single case of Servatus Lupus, afforded every facility for self-deception in this regard. The grand difference however between Scotus and his antagonists, and even allies, is to be sought in his doctrine of punishments, and of final restoration, which however are not so prominent in this work as in those which display his system of opinion at greater length.

It was soon perceived by Hinkmar that he had summoned to his aid a dangerous ally, and he endeavoured to rid himself of the connexion. For the abettors of Gotteschalcus took advantage of the openings made by Scotus, and pointed out many heresies in his book. Wenilo, archbishop of Sens, abstracted nineteen propositions from it which he denounced as heretical. Prudentius of Troyes, and Florus, a deacon at Lyons, employed their pens against it. It was particularly offensive to Prudentius, that John Scotus should have said that the essence of God and his works are one and the same. From this the consequence might follow, that whatever manifests itself in the universe as the operation of God, is a part of his essence, which Prudentius regarded as pantheistical.* This is to be distinguished from the definition of those perfections of God which are one with his essence, as his truth, justice, and goodness; or those which are merely relative, and indicative of something extraneous, as prescience and predestination. Prudentius closes his book by saying, that he refrains from pronouncing an anathema upon John Scotus, but earnestly prays that he would return to the purity of Christian doctrine.

The deacon, Florus, enters more into a train of theological argument than had been done by Prudentius, who confined himself chiefly to testimonies from the fathers. He admitted that the wisdom of God, and also his knowledge, are the same with his essence, but considered it dangerous to say the same of his predestination and prescience.† He rejected,

* *Velut Dei essentia praedicantur occisio, in errorem inductio, morbi, fames, naufragia, insidiae, et alia complura, quae in divinis elogiis indita prudentium nullus ignorat.*

† Yet between the consistency of his system and the evil consequences which might be deduced from the doctrine, he seems to have been somewhat vacillating: *Utrum vero, sicut dicitur, Deus substantialiter dici possit praescientia, iudicet secundum rationem et regulam fidei qui potest, nobis tamen videtur, quod non ita possit dici de illo nisi vel mendaciter vel nimis inusitate, non est aliud illi esse et aliud praescire.*

with great indignation, as derogating from the divine glory, the doctrine that moral evil is a mere negation, and therefore cannot be an object of divine knowledge. Such an opinion seemed to him to be of evil tendency, as leading to low views of the evil of sin. In accordance with Augustine, he maintained that Adam, even in innocence, needed divine grace in order to perseverance in holiness.

While Florus condemned the abuse of human science, for which his opponent was remarkable, he did not allow his polemic zeal to betray him into a rejection of all such aids in theology, but admitted a sound and proper use of all intellectual resources. He demanded only that every thing of this kind should be brought to the test of scripture. But he maintained that in order to the right interpretation of the Bible, something more was necessary than the study of the letter, namely, the inward illumination of Christian experience. For no one, he held, could rightly understand and soundly interpret the word of God, unless his heart were possessed of faith in Christ: "*Nisi aut fides Christi praeceat in corde legentis, per quem veraciter intelligantur, aut ipsa fides Christi in eis fideliter quaeratur et Deo illuminante inveniatur.*"

Against such opponents, Hinkmar now found it necessary to seek new helpers. Gotteschalculus had communicated his views to Amulo, archbishop of Lyons, and requested his aid. This prelate was, however, incapable of forming a fair estimate of the doctrine, and adhered to the milder representations of the Augustinian system, or perhaps contemplated the whole subject through the medium afforded to him by Hinkmar. He, therefore, imputed to Gotteschalculus all the odious consequences which were deduced from his tenets by his enemies. At the same time, he was distinguished by a gentleness of manner in his treatment of those whom he regarded as in error. In the composition which he put forth against Gotteschalculus, in order to reclaim him, he addressed him as a beloved brother, for whose welfare he was not less concerned than for his own. He sent a copy of this letter to Hinkmar, and publicly expressed his desire of a reconciliation between the archbishop and Gotteschalculus; assuming, however, the very improbable occurrence of a recantation on the part of the latter. In consequence of this, Hinkmar was led to regard Amulo as an auxiliary in the contest with his new opponents. In connexion with one of his diocese, who shared in his sentiments, Pardulus, bishop of Laon, he ad-

dressed to Amulo and the church of Lyons, two letters respecting the doctrines of Gotteschalcus; annexing the letter which had been written by Rabanus Maurus to Notting, of Verona. But the archbishop Amulo died about this time, (A. D. 853) and his successor Remigius made it known that he was opposed to the course of Hinkmar. In the reply which Remigius made, in the name of the church of Lyons, he was very decided in condemning the unjust and rigorous manner in which Gotteschalcus had been treated. He calls upon them to judge for themselves whether they had evinced that moderation and Christian love which became a spiritual tribunal, and a company of priests and monks. He declared that their conduct was an object of general abhorrence. "Omnes non solum dolent, sed etiam horrent." All heretics had heretofore been overcome and convicted by reason. "Cum omnes retro haeretici verbis et disputationibus victi atque convicti sunt." The condemnation of Gottschalk's tenets, he added, was really a condemnation of catholic doctrine. "In hac re dolemus non illum miserabilem, sed ecclesiasticam veritatem esse damnatam." The true course would have been to subject his declarations of opinion to a thorough investigation. If indeed Gotteschalcus had reviled the bishops, this was an insolence which should be punished; though it were better that this should proceed from any than the bishops themselves. And he urged it as a duty, to mitigate the punishment which the poor monk had for many years endured in prison, in order to win by kindness the brother for whom Christ died, rather than to abandon him to be 'swallowed up of overmuch sorrow.'

In regard to two questions, first, whether the expression that God wills the salvation of all men, is to be taken without limitation, or with such restriction as is demanded by the doctrine of predestination; and, secondly, whether Christ died for all men, or only for the elect;—Remigius avowed his attachment to the particularistic tenet, but claimed, as Servatus Lupus had done before him, that in regard to this each party should enjoy freedom of judgment, as the church had not pronounced definitively upon these points, and as there was a diversity of opinion among the fathers.

When Hinkmar perceived the array of his opponents to be increasing, he resolved to avail himself of ecclesiastical authority, and procured a second council to be held at Chiersy, in which four propositions were established against Gotteschalcus. These proceeded upon the principles of August-

tine. Liberty of will, sufficient for continuance in original righteousness, was ascribed to Adam. By the abuse of this liberty, he fell, and thereby the whole human race became a *massa perditionis*. Out of this mass, God, according to his foreknowledge, elected those whom through his grace he foreordained to eternal life, and to whom eternal life was foreordained:* as to those on the contrary, whom by his righteous decree he left in the mass of corruption, while he foreknew their perdition, he did in no way predestinate them to it. Nevertheless, in his justice he foreordained eternal punishment to such. In this way, divine predestination is made one, referring itself either to the gift of grace, or the reward of righteousness—and this *phraseology*, says Neander, is in a two-fold manner opposed to the doctrine of the *duplex praedestinatio*. A second important difference consists in the principles, that God wills the salvation of all men, and that Christ died for all men; declarations which receive their limitation, as our author observes, from their connexion with the former position, and which, in the system of Hinkmar, as in that of Rabanus Maurus, are to be understood only with this limitation.

In opposition to these determinations, the second council at Valence, in the year 855, agreed upon six *capitula*. They established the two-fold predestination, in the sense above explained, but at the same time declared in the most express terms, that human sin is founded only in the will of the first man and his posterity, and is an object of divine prescience only. “Nec ipsas malas ideo perire, quia boni esse non poterunt, sed quia boni esse noluerunt, suoque vitio in massa damnationis vel merito originali vel etiam actuali permanerunt.” This council further condemned the doctrine that Christ died for the unbelieving. Yet such was their regard for the objective efficacy of sacraments, that in the fifth canon, this determination is appended: “That the whole body of believers, who are born of water and of the Holy Ghost, and who are thereby truly embosomed in the church, according to the teaching of the apostle, are baptized into the death of Christ, and hence are cleansed from their sins by his blood; for their regeneration would not be true, unless their redemption were also true. It is necessary to hold this, unless

* Aus dieser Masse habe der gute und gerechte Gott nach seiner Praescienz Diejenigen erwählt, welche er durch die Gnade zum ewigen Leben, und denen er das ewige Leben vorherbestimmt.

we would distrust the reality of the sacrament. Yet out of the mass of the believers and redeemed persons, some attain to eternal happiness, because by the grace of God they faithfully persevere in their redeemed state, while others by no means attain to the enjoyment of eternal happiness, because they do not choose to persevere in the saving condition of faith which they received at the beginning, but have again made void the grace of redemption by bad doctrine or a bad life."

In regard to grace, it was determined, that without it no *rational creature* could possibly maintain a life of true happiness. Hence the necessity of grace was deduced, not from the entrance of sin, but from the natural and necessary relations of the creature to the Creator. The errors of Scotus likewise were condemned as frivolous and absurd.* A council was proposed to be held at Savonnières (apud Saponiarias) near Toul, for the purpose of meeting upon some common ground, but the plan was never carried into effect. "There was now," says Neander, "no difference between the parties as to the substantial articles of belief; so that if another and deeper cause had not prevented, they must have been brought to a settlement by a comparison of ideas; for both parties agreed in setting out with the Augustinian principles, and their necessary consequences. But as each party clung to its own formulas as the only correct ones, and would on no account depart from these, any mutual understanding, by means of an analysis of the ideas in debate, was impossible. Again, each party had its own interest in adhering to its favourite terms: the one being concerned for dogmatic consistency in the system of absolute predestination, and the other being no less zealous for universal grace (den christlichen Universalismus) in regard to the doctrine of divine love and redemption; doctrines which in truth could be held only in name in connexion with these views, since they are opposed by the system of predestination from first to last." The want of scientific method and logical clearness, and the plan of disputing more by the aid of sentences from the fathers than by solid arguments, conspired to prolong a controversy of phrases, without any real comparison of views upon the merits of the subject. The last event worth mentioning in this train of disputations was the publication of a book by Hinkmar, in defence of the four *capitula*

* Ineptas quaestiunculas et aniles paene fabulas Scotorumque pultes.

of Chierys. As the defects just mentioned existed, to no common degree, in the mind of this prelate, in union with a verbosity which was peculiar to him, he was eminently successful in writing much upon the questions in debate, without approaching to any resolution of the discordant formulas into corresponding conceptions; and, as might have been expected, this diversity was propagated in the following centuries.

ART. IV.—*Report on Education in Europe, to the Trustees of the Girard College for Orphans.* By Alexander Dallas Bache, LL.D. President of the College. Philadelphia. 1839. pp. 666.

WHETHER the great bequest of Mr. Girard, for the endowment of a College for orphan boys, shall prove to be a blessing or the contrary, is a question of much doubt with those who understand the will as discouraging the practical religious instruction of the beneficiaries of the institution. However this may be (and it would be premature to discuss the question before we know what interpretation the trustees of the legacy have adopted,) this report of President Bache convinces us that the organization and progress of the college will be of no small importance to the general interests of education. This document furnishes abundant proof that the critical task of laying the foundation of a system of instruction and discipline, by which thousands of youth are to be in constant training, has been committed to a sagacious, comprehensive, judicious and practical mind. The station which the president holds, with such qualifications, must give great authority and influence to his views, and every thing in the circumstances under which he enters upon his office, is favourable to a successful *début* for himself and the school. A fund of millions, years of preparation and experiment, and the opportunity of profiting through actual observation by all the experience and knowledge of Europe—are advantages which no literary establishment with us has heretofore enjoyed to such an extent. Our schools of every grade and name, and most of our colleges, have been formed and conducted on the great American principle of accomplishing in the speediest and cheapest me-