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Art. I.—Three Sermons upon Human Nature, being the first, second, and third of fifteen Sermons preached at the Rolls Chapel. By Joseph Butler, LL.D., late Lord Bishop of Bristol; as published in two volumes at Glasgow, in 1769.

DURING a long period after the commencement of philosophical inquiries concerning morals, it seems to have been taken for granted, that all motives to action in men, as in mere animals, originate in regard for self, and the natural tendency of all sensitive beings to self-preservation. The appetites, the desires, and even in most instances the social affections were resolved into modifications of self-love. The instinctive pursuit of self-gratification was the principle to which all action must be reduced; and somewhere in that sort of transmuted essence the elements of morals were presumed to reside. No sentiment was entertained, by some of the most popular philosophers, of the reality of moral distinctions. Law and morality were considered as mere suggestions of interest, changing with circumstances. And by those who, with Grotius, recoiled from this revolting degradation of man's moral nature, the highest point of approximation towards a satisfactory theory of morals was the

There are several letters also in this collection of an earlier date, from Mr. Burr to Mr. Cowell, relating to matters of little importance in themselves, but clearly showing the intimate friendship which subsisted between them. We must not suppose, therefore, that the controversy which divided the Synod, destroyed all confidence and friendly intercourse between the members.

Frederick A. Rauch

ART. V.—*Psychology; or a View of the Human Soul: including Anthropology, being the substance of a Course of Lectures, delivered to the Junior Class, Marshall College, Penn.* By Frederick A. Rauch. New York: M. W. Dodd. 1840. pp. 386. 8vo.

WE are so much accustomed to get our German Philosophy at second-hand, that it is a refreshing novelty to have an authentic original work on the subject, written in our own language. We have had translations from German metaphysicians which, from the inadequacy of our own terminology to reproduce the original, have been either unintelligible or barbarous, if not both together. We have had German philosophy filtered through the French and American burlesques of the continental masters, in which the unintelligible has been made to pass for the profound. And last and lowest of all, we have had a train of admiring disciples of Carlyle and Emerson, who have no claim to rank among philosophers at all, but who, by affecting to talk nonsense 'in king Cambyses' vein,' have persuaded some that they were talking philosophy.

We owe an apology to President Rauch for mentioning his name in such connexion, and it by way of contrast only that we do it. What our opinion of his system may be, will appear in good time. Let it here suffice to say, that we opened the work with sincere respect for the author, and that we lay it down with increased regard for his learning, taste and piety.

In the very outset of our remarks, let us be clearly understood as placing Dr. Rauch in a very different class from the metaphysicians with whom we have lately been called to deal. He is no compiler, retailer, or sciolist; he affects no

inaccessible heights of mystical diction; even where a Transcendentalist, he is not such a one as would please the admirers of Spinoza and Hegel. Indeed, if we could clearly discern in his elaborate work a tendency towards this hideous system, no considerations even of personal friendship should withhold us from denouncing it in the strongest terms. Let others, if they see cause, sneer at these fears of Pantheistic speculation, as idle, prejudiced, and proceeding from shallowness of mind. We see such a gulf between the idea of a God—eternal, unchangeable, allwise, all-good, simple, immense and *personal*—and that of an eternal impersonal chaos, ever striving after self-consciousness, that we conceive of no two systems more destructive of one another: the difference between Deism and Christianity being trifling in the comparison. Of this godless philosophy we see no traces in the work. If in a few instances modes of expression have strayed into the system which seem to have come from the enemy's camp, we hope it is from mere neglect, and that these forms will be exchanged for others more becoming a Christian, a supernaturalist, and a believer in Jesus. We rejoice to see for once a work on Philosophy in which we find the name of Christ, and in which are recognised the fallen state of man, the need of regeneration, and the influence of the Holy Spirit.

It would be unjust to try this book by a comparison with works of similar title in our own language. It is eminently German rather than English, and this in every page; and in saying this we ought to add that it is the idiom not of the diction, but of the thought which is German.* As to the language, it is sound and vigorous English, far more pure than that of many among ourselves, whose principal claim to foreign scholarship is founded upon the corruption of our tongue by unauthorized German idioms. Indeed, we doubt whether one so lately a foreigner ever produced an English work less open to censure in this point. Yet it is in every respect a German work, and might be recommended with more propriety than any production which we could call to mind, as a specimen of German thought to those who are ignorant of the language.

The work is divided into two parts, of which the former

* If this work should cross the Atlantic, there are some variations from classical orthography which English scholars will ascribe to the ignorance of the American compositor, but which after all are only Websterian whims, as laughable here as in Great Britain. Such are *chimist*, *center*, *specter*, &c.

treats of Anthropology and the latter of Psychology. The second we consider the more valuable, as it is in the former that we discern most of what we are accustomed to think censurable in the German methods. The questions discussed under the head of Anthropology are those which British philosophers, since the time of Hartley, have, for the most part, laid somewhat out of view, as requiring a length of patient observation and experiment, and a width of induction, such as have not yet been secured. Such topics as the conditions of Life, the Plastic Power, the influence of Climate, of the Sun and Moon, Instinct, Sleep, Dreaming, and Somnambulism belong to 'a pleasing land of drowsy-head,' which most modern British psychologists have shunned, as a domain where nothing is ascertained, nothing free from debate, and nothing distinctly visible. On these and the like topics, which it is customary for the British school to approach with the utmost delicacy, scruple, and scepticism, and where our greatest metaphysicians rather suggest a hypothesis than assert a theory, it is, if we mistake not, too common for the German philosopher to declare a law or a principle, with only the narrow basis of a disputed fact, but with all the confidence due to an induction of the most extensive character. We cannot altogether acquit our author of this charge. He says, for example, under the title of 'Prophetic Dreams;' "A woman about to be taken sick with an inflammation of the brain, dreamed that her heart was changed into a Serpent which rose with awful hissing up to her head. *Her imagination represented her disease symbolically*" p. 117. If such a fact had occurred in the practice of an English or American pathologist, with how much caution would he examine it? how scrupulous would he be in publishing it, till corroborated by many analogous facts? and how impossible would it be for him, as in the present case, to connect it with so questionable a hypothesis?

Dr. Rauch has given us a little on Animal Magnetism; but we consider even that little to much. Not that we would represent him as avowing his reverence for this hocus-pocus, for he says, and it is his best remark on the topic: "Animal Magnetism is not *above* but *below* the common and healthy life of man; those that praise it, and raise it above the waking mind do not understand its nature." p. 380. But the dignity of his main subject would be better sustained in the judgment of American readers, if the topic had been treated with less regard, or omitted altogether. For in a philosophi-

cal estimate of Man, we should proceed on solid ground; and in regard to Animal Magnetism it is a most important consideration that it is not the mere *hypothesis*, but the *facts* which are called in question. And we fear that we should differ from the author as to some of the very leading principles of physical philosophy, to which the subject justly pertains, if we have taken up his meaning in the declaration, that "Those persons who prove every thing by facts, and consider facts the basis of all knowledge, will reject them as soon as they do not correspond with other facts known to them." p. 128. Dismissing therefore this part of the subject, we make the general remark, that it would be well for all who stray into the debateable land between physiology and psychology, if they would take a lesson of caution from the chemist or the physical investigator; who states nothing doubtful as a fact, but repeats his experiments and observations a hundred times, with every allowance for errors and disturbing circumstances, and who shuns a too precipitate generalization as second in its evils only to a falsehood. It is this which has drawn so vivid a line of demarcation between the true sciences on the one hand, and Astrology, Alchemy, Animal Magnetism and Phrenology, on the other.

In every page of the Anthropology we discover the scholar and the man of genius. There is nothing trite, nothing dull, nothing in bad taste. We are taken over a variegated surface rather than into deep recesses, and are interested at every change of the scene. Yet we will frankly own that we do not often feel ourselves under the stress of convincing proof, nor brought over by sound generalization from undoubted facts. There is something allied to credulity, we use the word respectfully, and a too frequent postulation of questioned premises. The author dwells too much on exempt cases, diseases, idiosyncrasies, and in the same proportion we think he fails to establish his conclusions. He seems scarcely to suspect that some of his most startling incidents need explicit attestation. There is nevertheless something very pleasing and scholar-like in the whole current of the discourse, and we are gratified and conciliated even when we are not convinced. Again and again have we been reminded of Schubert, with whom the author seems to us have quite as near an affinity as with any of those whose names are cited in the Preface.

The second part of the work treats, as has been said, of Psychology, and it is this portion in which we feel most interested. The arrangement is sufficiently clear: we have the subject

presented under the heads of Self-Consciousness and Personality, Reason and Will. Under the topic of Reason come Sensation, and Attention; then Conception, Fancy and Imagination, Memory, and Pure Thinking. Under the topic of Will, we have the Desires, Inclinations, Passions, and Emotions, generally and in detail. The work is concluded with an essay on Religion, as predicated of Man.

It is not our purpose to go into an analysis of the work. We should scarcely do justice to the author's views, which, we say plainly, are not our own, while they are by no means those of the worst German schools. In many respects we perceive that President Rauch approaches more nearly to the Scottish than the German terminology. If we understand him, he waves the favourite distinction of the Germans between Reason and Understanding, and has in a most laudable manner avoided the jargon of novel phraseology which disfigures the productions of some American authors. But as we have not room to discuss all the points of difference, as we do not consider any of them as cardinal, and especially as we doubt whether the author's views can be fairly deduced from the short treatise on psychology proper, by an American reader, we prefer to speak of the work as to its general merits.

It needs but a cursory glance at Dr. Rauch's book to convince any one that he is any thing but a materialist. On the mutual relation of body and soul his observations are so ingenious, so unique, and so German, that we introduce them as affording a fair sample of the author's manner.

"The views entertained concerning the relation of the soul to the body are quite various, but may be divided into two classes, the one comprising those who admit of two different substances, the other, those that either consider the soul as the efflorescence and result of the body, or the body, as *built* by the soul. The former keeps soul and body so separate, that it is difficult to say how they can act in unison. According to it the body has a life of its own, and the soul likewise; both are however intended for each other, and the former receives the latter, as the engine the steam. Or to express this difference still more strongly, the soul and body are connected, as Plato represents it, like two horses yoked together, one born of earth and sensual in its nature, the other of heavenly origin and spirit:—one prone to the earth, the other rising towards heaven, and their owner, incapable of controlling them, hanging between heaven and earth, unable

to reach the one, and unwilling to descend to the other. A dualism that admits of two principles for *one* being, offers many difficulties, and the greatest is, that it cannot tell how the principles can be united in a third. A river may originate in two fountains, but a science cannot, and much less individual life. The latter class of theories represents the soul as the final result and efflorescence of a continually refined life of the nerves, so that reason and will are nothing but the organic life of matter, which by a refined process attains the power of thinking and willing,—here a soul becomes superfluous, and Materialism in its rudest form prevails,—or it takes the soul for the original activity, and considers the body as *built* by it. This is the theory of Stahl, Treviranus, and others. As the caterpillar spins and weaves a texture fitted for its future metamorphosis, so the soul, like a mason, builds its own tabernacle. The first of these opinions is too gross, and the last spiritualizes the whole existence of man too much. We cannot, however, enter into a scientific refutation of the theories alluded to, and must be satisfied with advancing one that seems to be nearer to truth. Yet we would not assert that it is not open to objections.”

“The general idea connected with the term *body* is that of an external frame animated by life. According to this view, the body and soul are wholly different, and as opposite to each other as life and death. Yet this view must be erroneous, as it not only brings the soul and body in opposition, but also the bodily life and the external frame. The body as an external frame has been ascertained by chemists to consist of nine different substances, gases, earths, metals and salt. It is therefore dust and must return to dust. No man would be willing to assert that man consists of a soul, bodily life, and nine different kinds of earthly substances; but all would be ready to acknowledge that earth is by no means an essential part of man.”

“The true and genuine body must be that which retains and preserves its *organical* identity in all these changes, which remains the same in the never-ceasing stream of matter. But what is this organical identity? The life or power, which connects the gases, earths, metals and salts into one whole, which penetrating them, keeps them together, or dismisses some and attracts others. No sooner does this penetrating power retire, than the body becomes a corpse, and the elements fall asunder. This power is the true body; it is invisible, but connecting the elements according to an eternal

and divine law, it becomes manifest by its productions.”

“All life wherever it exists is formed and organized. Form is not and cannot be the result of matter, which itself is chaotic and shapeless.

“Form, in man, and throughout the universe, is the result of thought. Hence life, being formed, does not proceed from matter: but is a thought of God, accompanied by the divine will, to be realized in nature, and to appear externally by an organized body. As the thought gives the form, so the divine will, resting in the thought and inseparably united with it, works as power and law in all nature. Is there not every where reason and wisdom, and an eternal and unchangeable law manifested in all the productions we see? The plant before me, is it not the product of an intelligence; or does it not represent a thought, that by the divine will became not only external and corporealized, but received also the power to propagate itself? The animal with its members and senses,—what else can it be but a divine thought exhibited in an external form? All nature is full of divine wisdom and reason, but it does not *possess* reason, for it is neither conscious of itself nor of any thing else. Hence we should hesitate to speak of a soul in animals, for as gravity is not a mere quality of matter, but as matter would be wholly annihilated without it, so the soul has thinking not merely as one of its qualities, but cannot be conceived of without it. The soul of man and the life of the animal are therefore wholly different. In applying this to man, to the union of soul and body, we may say—The soul of man is likewise a divine thought, a creation of God, filled with power to live an existence of its own.* But it is *soul*, for it comprehends itself and all that is; and not only does it comprehend itself, but it is also able to produce new thoughts in accordance with its laws of thinking. Again, it develops itself like all other life in nature; and develops itself in a twofold direction; outwardly and inwardly. There can be nothing *merely* internal, but it must be so only in reference to itself as external. The flesh of the apple is internal only in reference to its skin, which is external. The internal or thinking life of the soul has its external, and this the sensitive life of the body, by which the soul is connected with the world. The

*When, here, or elsewhere, either the universe or the soul is said to be a thought of God, we do not object if it be explained as a strong metaphor, or in the sense of the Platonic idea; but in the mouth of pantheistic Germans, it has a fearful import.

life of the soul and the body is therefore *one* in its origin; a twofold expression of the same energy. The particles of the body on the other hand, are not at all a part of man; they are dust, and only their *connection* and the *life* connecting them, is truly human. Flesh, in so far as it is merely earth, cannot feel; but in so far as this earth is connected by life, it is life in this *peculiar connection* that feels in a peculiar manner. In order to render this somewhat difficult and abstruse idea more clear and distinct to all classes of readers, we will make use of some illustrations. 'The rainbow is a phenomenon well known to all; how is it formed? When the sun sends his rays in a particular angle upon a watery cloud, the beautiful colors and form of the great arch, will be directly seen. Let us examine of what this rainbow consists. Does consist of drops of water on the one hand, and of light on the other? By no means. The drops of water are to the rainbow, what the body as a mere corpse is to man. The drops constantly fall, and only serve to represent or reflect the different colors of the light. It is the sun that produces on the sheet of rain both color and shape. When the sun disappears, the rainbow with its colors is gone, but the gray rain-drops are still left. Yet as necessary as the sheet of rain is for the rainbow, so necessary is the body for the soul.'"

The whole of this hypothesis breathes the spirit of Plato, and seems to be regarded by the author as equally destructive to Materialism and Pantheism. In regard to the latter, the following passage, referring to what has been just cited, is pertinent.

"This theory upholds the idea of a creation and not of emanation. God remains what he is, the unchangeable Jehovah after the universe is created. . So the mind of man is not diminished however great the number of thoughts which it produces. On the other hand, neither the body nor the soul is the ground of their existence, but God himself."

When the author then comes forward with his theory of Personality, p. 174 et. seq. we feel half disposed to break a lance with him, but we check ourselves, lest perchance we should fight uncertainly and in the dark. - For he here occasionally steps aside from his ordinary ground and transcends the limit of our clear vision. It is the most Germanic portion of the work. At times we recognise familiar truths in very extraordinary dress, but for the most part we are utterly at a loss to understand what is meant. Such a passage as the following strikes us as altogether out of place

in the author's system. The language, apart from its obscurity, is too nearly allied to the pantheistic scheme. "The person," he tells us, implies, among other things "the centre of nature, the echo of the universe. What nature contains scattered and in fragments, is united in the person of man. Every isolated feeling, every solitary sound in nature is to *pass through* man's personality and to centre in it. His personality is the great, beautiful, and complete *bell*, that announces every thing, while nature contains only parts of it, the sounds of which are dark and dull.

"2. Our personality is the center of the whole human race, for it contains the generality and individuality united in one. It expresses a single and individual being, separating it from all others; and again, it is most general, since every one is an I, like myself. This *I* is, therefore, not like a proper name, but it is a word that conveys a most general idea. Thus in our personality, the general and individual are so united that the one is contained in the other. This will appear from the following remarks: We speak of a national spirit, of national honour, of national art and literature; these do not and cannot exist in the abstract, their existence must be concrete. It becomes concrete when the general and individual grow together, *concreresco*, or are united, when, therefore, the general becomes conscious of itself in the individual. Greece, as such, could not become conscious of its honour or literature, but when this general national spirit becomes individualized in a Plato or Sophocles, it becomes conscious of itself. Hence it is their personality, in which the Greek spirit must center, and through which, as its organ, it expresses itself by works of literature and art. True genius, must therefore always bear the character of a national generality—genius comes from *genus*—and the less individuality appears in its productions, the more valuable it is. The history of a nation, and its institutions, will all express the national spirit, as the actions and feeling show the character of a person; but without individuals, a nation could have no history. According to this,

"3. Our personality is complete only when we are conscious of God and our relation to him, and when we suffer God to speak to it and through it. It is not nature nor matter that produces personality, but God who is *the* person. We can know a thing thoroughly only when we are acquainted with its ground—so man must know God before he can become truly acquainted with himself. Personality is, there-

fore, that transparent center in man, through which every general and noble activity is to pass, and in which it is to become conscious of itself."

Here we must needs pause. No passage in the work has given us so much pain. Most carefully do we abstain from charging upon the reverend author opinions which he does not avow, and which indeed we understand him to disavow. For when on page 174 he admits a creation, and adds "God remains what he is, the unchangeable Jehovah, after the universe is created," we are glad to receive it as a renunciation of Pantheism. But the paragraphs just cited are, in diction at least, borrowed from that school. That "every isolated feeling, every solitary sound in nature, is to *pass through* man's personality and to centre in it," is not only false but dangerous, on any hypothesis but that of the pantheist. That it is "God who is *the person*," is a proposition which we reject with dread, as confounding human personality with the divine. Give the pantheist this single page of Dr. Rauch, and he can ask no more. At any rate, such expressions familiarized to us only by the works of the worst school of transcendentalists, should not have been suffered to appear without being accompanied with a clear, formal and categorical avowal on the part of the author, of his belief in the personality of God as infinitely and eternally separate from that of the creature, and also of the future personal existence of the soul after death as distinct from God. We hope to find that it is only in *words* that this coincidence exists. It is in reading such passages as these that we are tempted to doubt whether an Anglo-American and a German mind can coincide upon a psychological statement. And here as elsewhere we are struck with the coolness with which the most astounding declarations are made as if they were self-evident.

These, however, as we hope to discover still more clearly, are mere spots upon a very brilliant disk. Dr. Rauch is not always obscure. On the contrary, his fertile imagination is sometimes brought in to his aid, with the happiest effect, in giving clearness to his statements. Take the following account of the union of faculties in the human soul, and let it be premised, that we have used some license in condensation:

"There are many kinds of union: a mechanical one, as that of a machine; and an organic one, as that of a living plant. The latter will serve to explain the union here spoken

of. When we, for the first time, watch an apple tree from its earliest growth till it blossoms and yields fruit, we are at once ready to say that the first leaves of the young tree which sprouts from the soil differ as widely from those which afterwards appear on the trunk and branches, as these from the blossoms and the blossoms from the fruit. We are, therefore, inclined to view this tree as made up of so many different organs, as the old psychology considers the soul as consisting of so many faculties. But then again, if some one should direct our attention to the fact that each succeeding formation is but a repetition of a former one, that the first leaves, for instance, which sprout forth near the ground, thick, colourless, and full of unrefined rude sap, are repeated by, or transformed into leaves of the trunk, that, being raised above the ground, and more exposed to the sun and purer atmosphere, they become more refined, more vigorous, and more beautifully formed—we should willingly acknowledge that the plant could not be made up of parts independent of each other, but that the whole was produced by the plastic power contained in the seed.”

“It is remarkable, that in proportion as we nourish a plant with rude and heavy manure, it produces dark, strong, and large leaves, thus retarding its state of bloom. This shows that these stronger leave filtrate and prepare the juices for the higher and more delicate leaves, and that these again are the same leaves at a higher stage that we before noticed at a lower one. It is therefore certain, that it is the same organ which first appears at the root, then higher up, and finally as blossom and fruit. Considering this, we might be induced to suppose the plant, or the tree, as simple an activity as some have represented mind. Yet, in examining a plant or tree a little more closely, we must perceive that while all the different parts constantly repeat but one organ, and proceed from one common power, they nevertheless differ, each having a peculiar office to perform for the development and preservation of their general life. This view, the only correct one, unites the two former. For, according to it, we perceive on the one hand a union, an identity, and on the other a variety; but the variety and difference proceeds from the union, which appears in every single organ, and only unfolds itself by all of them. This leads us once more to the idea of development. Whatever develops itself, changes, yet it does not become any thing else than it was when undeveloped. For, while it takes different forms, it remains

the same in all of them; while it exhibits itself under different aspects, it does not pass over into any thing that is not itself, nor does it receive any of its various forms from without, but all develop themselves from within. It becomes and exists otherwise when developed, than when undeveloped, but it has not become any thing else. Developing itself, it becomes *in reality* what before it was according to *possibility and energy*. So the bulb of a hyacinth may be said to be and not to be the hyacinth. It is the hyacinth according to energy, and nothing can grow forth from it that is not in it; and again, it is not yet the hyacinth, for it is not yet grown forth. The growing forth is the development of the energy slumbering in the bulb. The idea of development contains, therefore, the idea of a transition from the invisible to the visible, from the dark and unknown to the manifest and revealed. Thus the soul contains in its simple identical activity, all that afterwards appears in succession, under the form of faculties. They are but the development of the energy of the soul, but its representation and its organs. Hence the soul is an energy, that in developing itself remains the same that it was, and yet becomes different. It remains the same, for nothing is added from without, all comes from within; it is different, for it exists in its developed state. The first developments of the plant are, as we have seen, the roots and rude leaves, which become more refined as they grow higher on the stock; the first development of the soul, the leaves near the roots of its existence are the senses; these are followed by attention and conception. Higher than these are fancy, imagination, and memory, which may be considered the blossoms on the tree of knowledge, while pure thinking, under the form of the understanding, judgment, reason, and will, are the ripe fruits. And here we may remark, that there could be no blossoms, were there no leaves near the root; but as the juice in them rises higher, it becomes more refined, until it appears pure and clear in blossom and fruit. So sensation is the beginning and root of all knowledge, and nothing can enter the understanding that has not first been received by sensation. As it passes from the lower to the higher activities of mind, it becomes more and better known, and like the fruit, more refined. Again, as the bloom of a plant may be retarded, or wholly prevented by rude nourishment, so sensual persons may always move in the sphere of sensuality, and satisfied with it, never look for any thing beyond."

The section on *Reason* comprehends what we are accustomed to find under the head of the Intellectual Powers. In what regards Sensation, Attention, and Conception, there is a considerable departure from that phraseology which has become common since Stewart wrote; and the author has here exercised an undoubted right; for the limitations given to several old terms in the language of metaphysics have by no means gained the universal suffrage of scholars in their favour. Dr. Rauch presents some views of General Feeling, which are new in this country. By this term he means the inner source of all the senses, employing no distinct organ, and applying itself to no object without, but reporting to the living being, as such, the comfort or discomfort of the entire organism. In what regards Conception and Attention there is very little to awaken the surprise of the American inquirer, and the illustrations from nature and art, as elsewhere, are striking and felicitous. But when the author conducts us into the department of Fancy, as a nobler sort of Conception, we feel at once the strangeness of his representations and the affinity of the subject with his own genius. He abounds in illustrations drawn from the ancient remains of Poetry, Sculpture, Painting, and Architecture. These are gracefully strewn through his whole course, and are never inappropriate and never far-fetched. In no work have we ever seen so copious an illustration of psychology from the stores of the ancient history and drama. These embellishments are in no respect like the *purpureus pannus* of the satirical critic, but plainly flow from a mind surcharged with riches of this kind. Much of the same thing appears in the treatise on Imagination. The author considers Imagination as the activity of the mind which, with ease and freedom, unites different images, or creates new ones, from materials furnished by sensation and conception; and further, as giving to the new images contents which do not originally belong to them. This mode of presenting the subject connects it at once with the whole circle of tropical language, with poetry and the fine arts, with the sublime and beautiful; in a word, with the philosophy of rhetoric. And it is here that in our judgment Dr. Rauch is most at home. It is imagination, in its high import, which predominates in the development of his mind, and when we are most satisfied, it is the elegant scholar, the tasteful critic, the philosophic guide to the interior of Art, rather than the constructive philosopher, whom we recognise and admire. He hangs garlands on the cold

marble of the Porch and the Lyceum, and makes us wish that he would give freer scope to his talent for aesthetical composition. On these topics, the brilliancy and exuberance of the examples and comparisons remind us more of Goethe, Winkelmann, and Schiller, than of the consequential spinners of the metaphysic web. Especially does this remark apply to the glimpses which he affords us of the penetralia of Art—a term inadequate to express its German synonyme, and a subject always treated superficially by English critics. Take what follows as a specimen of the author's manner of connecting his subject with literature and the arts:

“Imagination differs also with regard to its *form*. This is either *symbolical*, *classical*, or *romantic*.

“The form of imagination is *symbolical* when it places its contents in an object which is more or less capable of indicating them. Truth, for example, is the same in the sphere of science, that light is in the sphere of nature. Thus far both are homogeneous. But truth is spiritual, and cannot be felt by a sense, nor perceived by the mere bodily eye, while the rays of light may be felt. When now truth, as an invisible power, is represented by the orb of the sun, we have a symbol. The symbol is something external—a form perceptible by sense, which, by its peculiar position, convinces us that it contains a hidden meaning. This meaning is invisible and internal. In symbolical imagination, therefore, we must distinguish the external form from the internal signification. The owl at the feet of Athena, for instance, held by a chain, is the symbol of darkness, for it cannot see by day; the chain in the hand of the goddess of wisdom, is the symbol of the powers of light over darkness. We can only see the owl and the chain, but being connected with Athena we must believe that the artist had some design in placing it there, and that the owl is but the receptacle of some of his thoughts, which we must discover by reflection.

“Imagination is *classical* when form and contents so fully receive each other, that the former is transparent and seems only to exist in order to represent the latter, and when the latter fully expresses itself so that the artist not only shows the best form, but also knows how to communicate by it every particle of its contents, leaving nothing unexpressed, retaining nothing in his bosom. This entire *intus-susception* of form and contents is the only classical form of imagination, and we meet with it in Greece alone. If in the

symbolical form, contents and form are only brought together externally, if we must reflect in order to discover the one in the other, the contents in the form. if consequently we may make a mistake; with the classical form all is otherwise, for all is clear, transparent, and perfectly beautiful. Who that looks at the statue of Apollo, will not at once recognise an ever-blooming youth, that, free from care and trouble, rejoices in the feeling of existence.

“The form of imagination may be *romantic*. As such, it was not known to the ancients; for it has become possible only since the introduction of Christianity which opened to the mind of man the world of infinite spirit; this world, filling the breast of artists, imagination seeks in vain for conceptions and images in which to place, and by which to express it. Nothing in the world can represent, in an adequate form, that God whom Christ has revealed. The spirit is only accessible to the spirit; we cannot convey it by any image. The symbol, it is true, may represent the Infinite by the finite; but what a defective representation! And yet, however defective, it satisfied the ancients, for they had no clear idea of the Invisible and Infinite; they felt it darkly, but knew it not. Now the infinite is clearly revealed; hence it is, that no representation given it by imagination will suffice, for our consciousness of the Infinite will flow beyond every visible, finite form, and leave it far behind. The poet is overpowered by the riches of his theme, and yet he cannot dismiss it. He feels that he cannot fully express what agitates his breast, and yet he is irresistibly urged to give vent to his deep and lasting emotions. The elements of the romantic imagination are, the love of Christ, the variety of all things, a desire for an eternal home, the transitoriness of this and the immortality of a future life. Its elements are, on the one hand, the spirit and the world, for which it is destined, and, on the other hand, this world of sense, in which it lives, and which cannot satisfy its spiritual longing, nor represent its ideas. This romantic character is indicated by the steeples which are peculiar to Christian churches; they rise high into the clouds, and point to a world above.

“If we compare these three forms with each other, we shall find the symbolical to be *sublime*, the classical to be *beautiful*, and the romantic to be *sentimental* and *mystical*.”

In the discussion of the subject of Language, the author connects it most intimately with our conceptions. He inves-

tigates the long agitated question of the origin of language, and takes a middle ground between those who maintain that man invented language by his own ingenuity, and those who hold that the Creator communicated to the first pair, without any intervention of their own powers, a complete system of expression. Although we do not feel the force of the author's philosophical objections to the latter opinion, we regard what he offers on this topic as ingenious, and especially as reverent towards the Mosaic history. God gave man—to use the author's own phrase—the *possibility of thinking and speaking*, as he placed in the germ the possibility of growing and developing a specific form: and as Reason produces our conceptions, it also produces inseparably from them their corresponding words. The varieties of language are due to the modifications of temperament, race, nation, climate, occupation, and the like. In language, therefore, there is nothing arbitrary, nothing conventional; it is the *external reason*; and if we wish to know a nation, we must know its language. Accordingly, the author regards the study of languages, and especially of the ancient languages, as the best means of mental cultivation.

The transition is very natural from this to the subject of Memory, which, according to the peculiar views of President Rauch, is intimately connected with language. For he defines Memory to be “that activity, which *finds the appropriate word* for every general conception or thought, and recognises in every word the conception it contains.” This is a limitation of the faculty which is new in our philosophy; and leading to such conclusions as the author intimates, it certainly calls for a more close examination than we can give, or perhaps than the brevity of the exposition renders practicable.

Upon the chapter which treats of Pure Thinking, the author has evidently bestowed special care. He has, agreeably to the usage of the German language, and, as we think, not without reason, confined the term Thinking to a narrower and higher field than is common among ourselves. His views cannot be given by fragments, and we have not room for detail. “*Thinking* is that activity which *generalizes*.” Yet the author in expounding this proposition admits Ratiocination, and Judgment, which strike us as not legitimately falling under the head of Generalization. This is a part of the subject however which, though properly introduced, pertains rather to Logic than to Psychology, and it would require a separate

volume to consider the conduct of reason in arriving at conclusions.

In treating of the Will, Dr. Rauch considers all that the Scottish Philosophers have, somewhat unreasonably, denominated the Active Powers. If we err not, he here manifests what we regard as a characteristic tendency of his thinking. In his ingenious endeavour to simplify, to systematize, and to harmonize distant and heterogeneous particulars, he sometimes blends those which are different, and constructs a transition from one to another, which, so far as we can observe, exists only in his own hypothesis. He objects for example to the view of Reason and Will as wholly different 'activities.' "Reason," he tells us "is nothing else than Will with prevailing consciousness," and "Will is Reason with a prevailing practical tendency." This we consider simplification beyond truth. That they are inseparable, and that they are 'activities' of one and the same mind, we readily admit: we admit as much in regard to all other faculties: but the attempted proof of these propositions, on page 261, &c. carries no conviction to our minds; nor are there in our apprehension any two functions of man more radically and essentially distinct than Will and Reason.

The whole concluding portion of the work, upon the moral affections, is more popular and less striking than what precedes it; beautified however in no common degree by flowers from the garden of the Muses. On a few topics we could have wished our author to have been more explicit, especially on the laws of Volition, the whole subject of Habits, and especially the separate Personality of the soul after Death, and the Moral Faculty, to which last no separate place is allotted. In justice to Dr. Rauch we should however state that this omission is consistent with a sound view of human nature. If we understand the treatise on Will, from page 261 to 373, it relates exclusively to man in his fallen state, in which the will is enslaved, and has no freedom except when actuated by the will of God. We therefore doubt not Dr. Rauch's assent to the proposition, that it is only the regenerate who can be morally good at all, because he only can love God, or own obligation to obey that will. A full discussion of these topics would pertain to Ethics, yet as even unregenerate man has a *moral*, though not a *holy* character, the moral faculty is no less a part of his constitution *as man*, than Sensation, Reason, or Memory. We therefore regret the absence of a definite statement in regard to this point.

Those remarks upon the general character of the volume which might be naturally expected here are rendered unnecessary by the free comments on the author's manner which have already been laid before the reader. We cannot, however, allow the occasion to pass, without a tribute of respect to the Institution over which Dr. Rauch presides. Marshall College is situated at Mercersburg, in a rich and pleasant part of Pennsylvania, and derives its name from the great John Marshall of Virginia. Though it has been only a few years in operation, it already numbers more than a hundred students, and we have been informed that measures will soon be taken to erect a large edifice. Several things concur to awaken our lively interest in this institution. Among its founders, none was more active than the late lamented and Reverend Mr. Rice, who went out from among ourselves. The Theological Seminary at Mercersburg is under the presidency of the Reverend Dr. Nevin, late Professor in the Western Theological Seminary of our own church; a gentleman in whose talents, erudition and piety this school has gained a great prize. Both these Seminaries at Mercersburg are under the care of the German Reformed Church, a large and respectable branch of the Presbyterian body, and one which must exercise a great influence upon the thousands of Germans who, by emigration as well as natural increase, are yearly added to our population. If our German brethren are not dead to their own interests as a separate branch of Christ's church, to say nothing of their national feeling, they will not allow this college to languish for lack of fifteen or twenty thousand dollars. The pressing want at this moment seems to be that of an edifice: among the wealthy Germans of Pennsylvania no doubt as to this point should remain for a single week. With an accomplished President, and the other learned gentlemen who are gathered around him, there can be no doubt of success if the spirit of Christian enterprise be not wanting: and we cherish the hope that this institution will, in the course of a very few months, be placed on as firm a basis as any college in the state or country.