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ART. I.—*The works of John Owen, D. D.* Edited by the Rev. William H. Goold, Edinburgh. New York: Carter and Brothers, 1850, 1851, 1852. 8vo.

THAT this is the best edition of Owen's works, we do not doubt for a moment. It is identical as to every letter and point with the Edinburgh edition of Messrs. Johnstone and Hunter, everywhere known for the beautiful impressions which they have produced, under the auspices of the Free Church. The series of volumes is rapidly coming out, and five have already appeared. For such a book, the price is surprisingly low. What is of more importance, the edition is a critical one, under the eye and hand of a clergyman of Edinburgh, Mr. Goold, who unites for his task several admirable qualities; extensive reading, accurate scholarship, a turn for minute collation, indefatigable labour, and a thorough acquiescence in the theology of the seventeenth century.

It was fit that the great Puritan champion should be introduced to our generation by a Calvinist and a Presbyterian, rather than by any laxer descendant of the nonconformists, who, if they should revisit their old haunts, would scarcely recognize their ancient Independency among the Congregationalists of England.

tament. Though in themselves interesting and valuable, they are probably much inferior in interest and value to the twelve rolls of vellum containing the law, each thirty feet in length by two or three in breadth, which our messengers examined in the holiest of holies. Measures are already in progress for procuring these latter MSS., and for bringing down to Shanghae any Israelites who might be induced to visit that city. The portions of the Old Testament Scriptures already received are the following:—Exod. i.—vi., Exod. xxxviii.—xl., Lev. xix. and xx., Numb. xiii.—xv., Deut. xi.—xvi., and Deut. xxxii.; various portions of the Pentateuch, Psalms, and Hagiographa, which appear to be parts of an ancient Hebrew liturgy, are contained in two of the MSS. already received."

A friendly feeling was generally evinced towards our visitors, which is in no small measure attributable to the Hebrew letter of introduction from Shanghae, of which although the Jews understood not the purport, they readily perceived its identity with their own sacred writings. Without such an introduction, they would probably have been received with suspicion, and mistrusted as spies. Our visitors learnt that during the year 1849 the whole of the little Jewish community at K'ae-fung-foo were thrown into great alarm, and exposed to danger of persecution on account of suspected connection with foreigners, by a letter written in Chinese and despatched some time before by the late Temple Layton, Esq., H. B. M. Consul at Amoy, for the purpose of procuring some Hebrew MSS.

Art. VI.—*Lectures on the Evidences of Christianity.* Delivered at the University of Virginia during the Session of 1850—1. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 1852.

Such a book, proceeding from such a source, and under such auspices, is not only a profoundly interesting phenomenon in itself, but eminently suggestive of the ultimate issue of the great and protracted controversy, to which it is so formal and massive a contribution. It is well known that the University

of Virginia owes its origin, as well as its original plan, chiefly to Mr. Jefferson.

The introductory Preface by the Rev. W. H. Ruffner, Chaplain of the University, under whose sagacious administration this course of Lectures was executed, and which recites the history and conditions of the introduction of Christianity into the institution, under the management of Mr. Jefferson himself, is not the least curious or instructive portion of the volume. It is an amiable attempt to shelter Mr. Jefferson, as far as possible, from any avowal of open hostility in the case, and to mask under the guise of prudence against the conflicts and jealousies which make up so large an element of the Christian spirit, under his conception of it, the apparent indisposition to install any definite form of Christianity. The correspondence and the documents drawn up by Mr. Jefferson are exceedingly curious; the problem which he undertook to solve being substantially this:—to find the least amount, and most diluted form, of Christianity, compatible with the religious prejudices and unsuspecting confidence and support of the public. The *animus* which pervades the whole *projet* of the University, as it came from the pen of its author, was manifestly the same which led him to move a resolution in the Continental Congress, recommending a day of national fasting, humiliation and prayer.

It is therefore with peculiar pleasure that we take the opportunity furnished by the volume before us, to apprize any of our readers, who may not have followed up the history of the University, that notwithstanding the baleful influences of its infancy, it now occupies a commanding place among the literary institutions of our country, not only for the comprehensiveness of its educational provisions, and the ability and learning of its Professors, but also for the liberal and untrammelled provisions furnished by its Faculty for the religious instruction and welfare of its members.

We cannot allow the opportunity to pass without saying that the conception of a course of Lectures on the Evidences of Natural and Revealed Religion, by distinguished gentlemen selected for the purpose, reflects great credit upon its projector, as well as upon those who have contributed to its execution. Our experience, first as a student, and then as a teacher,

has entirely convinced us, that there is vastly more suppressed infidelity (chiefly in the form of the scepticism of ignorance, or perhaps we ought to say of the scepticism of nascent science) among young men, than is apparent. An impression lurks in thousands of young bosoms, that there is a conflict between science and religion, a want of harmony between nature and the Bible: and that the former rests upon a vastly more tangible and secure basis than the latter: and we regard it as eminently desirable to lay before the minds of so large a class of young men rising into influence, a fresh and independent vindication of Christian evidences, with all the adjuvants of oral delivery, by men whose reputation for scholarship and eloquence would insure a respectful hearing. It may perhaps be questioned, whether the schedule of the Lectures is in all respects as effective as it might have been. If we should venture to criticise it at all, it would be because it is behind, rather than in advance of, the wants of the age. It contemplates the controversy too much, perhaps, as standing where it stood, when Hume and Priestley left the field of debate. In regard to the general merits of the volume before us, as a contribution to Christian Apologetics, it is wholly unnecessary for us to enlarge. The Christian public have already pronounced their judgment both upon its timeliness and ability, by a demand quite unusual for a work of its size. As public journalists we may therefore be permitted to express our thanks on behalf of the Church, to the projector, and each of the several authors of the volume, for the important service they have rendered to the cause of Christian truth. We commend it heartily to the confidence and kindness of the Church, and shall rejoice to hear of its wide and general circulation.

Among so many lecturers, there will, of course, naturally be a very great diversity of ability and qualification. Where there is so much to commend in all, we hope it will not be regarded as invidious, if we say, that the Lecture on the Internal Evidences of Christianity, by Dr. Breckinridge, would be regarded as a thorough and masterly argument, in any comparison. That of Mr. Robinson of Kentucky, on the Difficulties of Infidelity, displays great massiveness and power of intellect, as well as highly creditable skill and discrimination in its con-

duct. Dr. Rice, as usual, is keen, quick, and ever on the alert. We never read a controversial article from his pen, without having suggested to our mind the idea of a well trained and most expert dialectic fencing-master: and woe be to the adversary who makes a false pass, or leaves a single spot unguarded.

The Lectures which grapple with the objections to Christianity grounded on the hypotheses of modern science, are not in all respects what we could desire. The authors display great readiness and considerable book-knowledge of their subjects, combined with a high order of rhetorical ability. They hardly strike us, however, as indicating that complete appreciation of the real facts and difficulties of the case, as they lie before the mind of even candid scientific scholars, which we regard as essential to any complete or sufficient refutation. We greatly fear, therefore, that the full force of the Christian argument will not be felt by men of science, inclined to scepticism.

The argument against Morell does not fully satisfy our expectations. The author does not seem to us to apprehend, either in its ground-work or its essential nature, the real force of the hypothesis which he refutes. The introductory portion of the Lecture gives promise of a thorough sifting of the subject; but suddenly the speaker breaks away from the analysis of its ingenious and most imposing psychology, and then proceeds, with his well known rhetorical ability, to refute again the old objections to the commonly received theory of inspiration. In this view of it, the author has done his work well; but we are sincerely sorry he did not proceed to grapple with the real hypothesis which Mr. Morell has succeeded in transplanting to the cold ungenial clime of English philosophical theology. We have evidence in abundance, as conclusive as it is sad, that this philosophy of religion, is at this very moment making havoc with the faith and the peace of not a few young men, more, we think, among our Episcopal, Congregational, and New-School brethren, than among ourselves, of that original and thoughtful class, whom it is most important to protect.

In venturing to speak thus freely as to the high order of qualification which we think desirable in the discussion of such subjects, we are far from intending to disparage the authors. They are among the most prominent and influential ministers

of their age in our Church. But no man, whatever his abilities or polemic skill, is prepared to discuss such subjects as they should be discussed, without a training which our ministers do not often receive. If these dangerous systems of scientific infidelity are not refuted, it is our fault, as much as theirs who attempt it and fail. It is preposterous, of course, to think of furnishing a complete and final refutation of a system of infidelity, which has been three quarters of a century in rearing its ground-work and its defences, without a thorough training for the task; and scarcely less preposterous to think of preparing to discuss it adequately, by reading on the subject for a few weeks.

The most remarkable Lecture, on some accounts, in the volume, is that on "The nature of Christianity, as shown to be a perfect and final system of Faith and Practice, and not a form in transitu to a higher and more complete development of the religious idea." We do not doubt that the writer saw a really grand thought looming through the haze with which the deistical idealism of modern metaphysics has invested the philosophy of religion; but we have always doubted whether the "*dummheit*" charged by the admirers of this philosophy upon the English intellect, was not a real disqualification for following the game they have started, into the cloud-land of its native home. We mean no disrespect to the able lecturer, for we are free to concede, that none but a man of genius and learning could have written the Lecture; but we must confess, that its perusal constantly minded us of the famous *bon mot* of Napoleon to Las Casas, while making their way back from the rigours and barrenness of a Russian winter, "There is but one step from the sublime to the ridiculous." We do not affirm that the respected Lecturer ever actually takes that critical step; but to our optics, which are doubtless none of the best, the topography of the Lecture seems to lie somewhere near the debatable ground, about which the reader is sometimes compelled to doubt whether it belongs to the actual or the ideal; whether it is *terra firma*, or fog. As Dr. Chalmers once said of the brilliant conversations of Coleridge, on a similar class of topics, "we caught occasional glimpses of what he would be at: but mainly he was very far out of all sight and all sympathy."

It might seem, at first sight, that the incessant and violent hostility which Christianity has encountered, in every period of its history, is presumptive evidence against its truth. But a moment's reflection will enable us to see, in the light of any tolerable conception of its true nature and office, that this antagonism is a simple and necessary result of its truth. Whether Christianity be regarded, in the convenient phraseology of the day, as the source and essence of a new subjective life, a dynamic spiritual power in the soul; or, in its objective character, as a normal rule of faith and practice, it is plain, that it must be absolute and exclusive in its nature, and all-pervading and controlling in its effects. If it makes men new creatures within, and subjects them to new authority and new principles of action without, there can, of course, be nothing in human life, and nothing in society, which it will not reach and remodel. Though primarily designed to affect the personal relations of the individual soul to God, yet the new nature which it introduces for this purpose, and the new principles which it enjoins, cannot fail to imbue and modify the whole character of the individual in his social, and indirectly, at least, in his political, as well as his personal relations. Our Lord himself did not hesitate to avow this result, and again and again startled his hearers with the declaration, that he had come, not to send peace on the earth, but a sword. The Christian Church is, therefore, by the very conditions of its existence, *militant* in its history: and the religion to which it owes its peculiar life, and consequently its external forms and relations, must count upon meeting perpetual hostility, until the whole forms of the intellectual culture, the social civilization, and the very political institutions of the world, are assimilated to its spirit, and organized anew in accordance with its inward and peculiar life.

It is clear, moreover, that the character and grounds of the controversies in which Christianity finds itself engaged, and the nature of the opposition it encounters, will be determined by the characteristics of the philosophy, the civilization and the political institutions with which it comes in collision, as it advances to achieve the ultimate and complete regeneration of the race. It is not a single conflict that can be settled once

for all, but a series of conflicts, pitched upon new and ever shifting grounds, determined by the accidental position and defences of error or wrong, in which it found its adversaries entrenched. The great controversies of the world can no more be stationary than its intellect.

It is, therefore, a highly curious and instructive task, to trace the history of this great controversy, throughout its long line of changes—to mark the varying spirit of the combatants, to draw out an intellectual topography of its endless battles, as the culture of the world has perpetually shifted its ground, and to see how its adversaries, beaten from post after post, and entrenchment after entrenchment, with uncompromising and unwearied hostility, have hung upon the rear of its triumphant march, and dogged every step of its onward progress, towards the redemption and enfranchisement of the race.

In the cursory review which we propose to give, we shall aim to comprise in the very statement itself, the reasons of this incessant change of ground; and to affiliate, as far as possible, the several forms of error and hostility, encountered by the truth.

Though our Lord proclaimed from the beginning that his kingdom was not of this world, yet he did not deny the truth of the blind but unerring instinct, which led the public authorities of every sort, to treat him and his doctrines as formidable enemies to the abuses of the existing governments of the world; as well as the abuses of doctrine and practice sanctioned by the rulers of his own people. In the emphatic declaration to the Jews, "if the truth shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed," he announces the unavoidable antagonism between Christianity as a dynamic power, or living principle in the soul, and the endless forms of despotism, consolidated into the governments of the earth. Christianity was thus, at the very outset, precipitated upon a conflict with despotism, which cannot terminate, except in the ultimate and complete overthrow of the latter; for it is a contradiction in terms to suppose, that those who are made the conscious freemen of the Lord, should remain for ever the slaves of a human tyrant. However patient of wrong, and obedient to the powers that be, there is yet an upward tendency in regenerated human nature, which, like the lower strata of air, rarified by the warmth of the sun,

no amount or concentration of pressure can prevent from ascending.

The first form of outward hostility which the gospel encountered was determined, therefore, by the antagonism of its spirit and its tendency, with reference to the evils and abuses of the existing governments of the world. The persecutions which it endured, in consequence, drew out the apologies of its professors, addressed for the most part to the Roman Emperor, in the early ages of its history. These were chiefly explanatory and defensive, and were designed to rescue from calumny and misrepresentation the true nature of its rites, and doctrines, and spirit. But while the apologies of the early Christians were denying and refuting these absurd and malignant slanders, the spirit of the gospel had already entered into conflict with the Judaism on the one hand, and the paganism on the other, which supported the despotic governments, under which it went forth to battle. It was the living might with which it shook these pillars of absolute authority, that awoke the bitter and fanatical hatred of their respective adherents. The question of its evidence was, therefore, raised on two sides at once. It was compelled to exhibit and vindicate its title to credibility against the prescriptive and acknowledged institutes of Judaism and the countless forms of pagan worship and belief. And as the dominant paganism of Rome was instinct with the life and power of the old philosophies and the arts of Greece, it is evident that the Christian controversy would necessarily involve a reaction upon the whole ground work of that philosophy. Christianity, as a rule of life, contains new and divine provisions for determining the leading questions of social and public life. The power of the gospel, therefore, cannot be introduced into the bosom of a man or a community, without furnishing new solutions of the practical ethics of society, and new modes of meeting and discharging the great duties which spring out of the common nature and relations of humanity. Now the solution of these problems is the precise province of ethical philosophy; and to furnish such a solution on rational grounds without the suggestion of a divine revelation, or to set the solution furnished by such a revelation in philosophic relation with the true elements of humanity, involves an analysis and study of

the constituents of human nature, both in its psychological and social aspects, as well as a knowledge of the origin and evidence of necessary truths: and all this is the business of mental philosophy. It is plain, then, that in any complete achievement of the ulterior purposes of Christianity, it must come into contact with the received teachings of philosophy: and so far as it finds them defective or erroneous, it must seek to supply or correct them, by taking on, so far forth, the normal or logical forms into which the wants of man have shaped his philosophy. It is not in a condition to question their truth, and still less to convict them of error, until it has cast its implicit teachings into formularies that will admit of a definite comparison with those of philosophy. And if the terms of such scientific statement are not to be found in the multiform, but chiefly concrete, biographic or historic teachings of the Scriptures—or if the formulas of human science are found sufficiently accurate for practical purposes, Christianity may avail itself of those formulas, only breathing into them the power of a divine life, and clothing them with the authority of a divine sanction. In some form or other, Christianity must come into collision with the intellectual culture, and the social and political institutions, which make up the peculiar civilization of each nation and age. The result may be, that it may supplant them entirely, and set up new ones in their place, organized upon its own principles, and instinct with its own life: or it may be blended with the forms and institutions of an existing philosophy, or civilization, imparting to them a shape, and colouring, and life, distinctively Christian; or finally, it may imbibe from them philosophical principles, or be perverted to practical purposes, which shall mar and pervert its own. The history of Christianity exemplifies each of these contingencies; and the result, in either case, is a controversy, taking its form and violence from the peculiar reaction which gave it birth.

Thus, when Christianity grappled with the various errors and abuses of the world, or shook the hoary pillars of the pagan religion on which its governments reposed, it drew on the hostility, and finally the malignant persecutions of the dominant powers. When it came into collision with the various forms of pagan philosophy and ethics, it absorbed largely of their human

elements, and adopted their formulas, to a degree that corrupted for a time its own inspired teaching: and when, finally, it consented, under the blandishments of wealth and power, to throw its sanctions over the abuses of despotic government, its spirit, and in the end, its whole organic life, became infected, and were perverted to the support of a despotism, more fearful than the world had ever seen.

And, on the other hand, the reaction of Christianity upon the endless systems of Greek and oriental philosophy, generated a series of controversies, which may be classed upon the various ground-forms of those philosophies, which moulded them into shape. These may be included under three heads, according to the solution they gave of the leading questions of ontology and morals; viz., first, the nature and grounds of the certainty of human knowledge: second, of the origin and the nature of evil: and thirdly, of the character and the influence of the spiritual powers of the universe. From the first source we have the controversies which sprang from the various systems of the oriental Gnosticism, and one of the forms of Pantheism, mingled with the war of centuries between the principles of Plato and Aristotle in the schools of the Church. From the second source we derive the various forms of the Manichean heresies, asserting the eternal existence of evil on the one hand, and the pantheistic fatalism which grew out of the oriental quietism on the other. And from the last there sprang the infinitely varied and endless conflicts between the Christian teachings, touching divine and superhuman agencies on the one side, and the various mythologies of the pagan world on the other. The apologies directed against Celsus and Porphyry exemplify the latter class. Among the patristic writers who have contributed most largely to this phase of Christian Apologetics, with reference to the popular, and still more the pilosophical aspects of the pagan mythologies, we need scarcely name Justin Martyr, Tertullian, Clemens Alexandrinus, Origen, and Augustine. We do not, of course, include in our enumeration the controversies which grew out of the reaction of Christianity upon the countless philosophical systems of the pagan philosophy, touching the person and nature of Christ, as these belong to the internal, doctrinal, rather than the apologetical history of the Church.

To eliminate the errors, and correct the abuses resulting from this antagonism between Christianity and philosophy, was the work of long ages of darkness and conflict, from the very age of the apostles, to the period when the Reformation took the finished product from the schools, breathed into it the renovated life of faith, prayer, and martyrdom, and entered upon the final dispensation of the Church, in the universal diffusion of Christianity, thus cast into the living moulds of human thought, and set into vital relation with the wants and exigencies of human society, among all the nations of the earth.

The modern forms of the great Christian controversy, like those which preceded it, were determined by the external circumstances from which they sprang. The intellect of the world, struck free from its shackles, and quickened and intensified by the Reformation, was thrown, with intense ardour, upon the observation and study of nature, with the additional aid of the New Organon of the Inductive Method. The separate departments of physical research and discovery, one after another, turned, as if by some strange and unnatural instinct, like the fabled offspring of the pelican, to assault and prey upon the breast that had warmed them into life. Astronomy first, by revealing in the light of the telescope the true theory of the universe, and subsequently by the curious antiquarian discoveries of the zodiacs of Egypt, and the astronomical tables of the Hindoos, assaulted successively the credibility, the authority, and the chronology of the inspired narrative. Then came geology, with its allied and tributary sciences of zoology and physiology:—and now, last of all, comes ethnology, planting itself on the results of its predecessors, and disputing, first the unity of the human species, and when that was on the point of settlement in accordance with the Scriptures, suddenly springing a new question touching the common origin of the one species of the race.

The history of Apologetics, since the Reformation, may be divided into three distinct periods or ages, each taking its peculiar character, from the type of philosophy which happened to prevail at the time. First we have the age of English Deism, clearly affiliating with the general prevalence of the philosophy of Locke; by pushing the sensational element to excess, thus

infecting every department both of intellectual and moral philosophy, and culminating in the blank philosophical scepticism of Berkeley, and the universal and religious scepticism of Hume. The second was the age of atheism, which reached its zenith among the philosophers of France and the court of Frederick, having such men as Voltaire, Condorcet, and D'Alembert for its chief apostles, and the great French Encyclopedia for its chief permanent organ. This form of infidelity may be readily affiliated with the pure sensationalism which sprang from the general prevalence of the English empirical psychology, as it was understood by the continental *savans*, accepting and carrying out the positive side of that philosophy to absolute materialism.

The result of these two movements—terminating in absolute scepticism on the one side, and absolute materialism on the other—was to wake up the more profound and earnest-thoughted German philosophers, and thus give birth to the *third* and last form of metaphysical infidelity; and which sprang from the extreme and one-sided development of idealism in philosophy, with its two divergent tendencies, towards pantheism on the one side, and rationalism on the other.

Passing by the older forms of English infidelity and French atheism, as likely to be familiar to our readers, besides being defunct and powerless, we propose to expend our remaining space upon those more modern forms of error, which, notwithstanding their deadly wound, still retain sufficient vitality to perpetrate great injury among us.

We shall endeavour, therefore, in the first place to indicate, in the briefest possible way, the character of the several schools of German Idealism, and so to affiliate their teaching, as to show the genesis of the modern, and most popular and dangerous process ever devised, for undermining the inspiration of the Scriptures.

Kant was the first to give a distinctly German character to the philosophy of the Continent. The germs of idealism had indeed been already planted in that fertile soil by Leibnitz; but his speculations wore so little of an indigenous character, that they were not even communicated through the medium of the German language. It was chiefly to the beautiful classifications of Wolf, and to his compact and consistent logic, that

the philosophy of Leibnitz owed its temporary, but complete, ascendency in Germany. The extreme latitudinarianism of the system which he built up out of the materials of Leibnitz, as applied especially to the truths of natural theology, was so obnoxious to the orthodoxy which still prevailed at the Court of Frederick William I., that Wolf was banished from Prussia. Such, however, was the rapid spread of his views among the philosophers of Germany, that one of the first acts of Frederick II., was to recall him from his banishment to the chair of philosophy at Halle. His system was soon introduced into every Protestant university in the country; and held its ascendency almost undisputed for the space of half a century.

The middle of the eighteenth century was the most remarkable epoch in the history of modern philosophy. In the four years from 1748 to 1752 there were published Hume's Essays on the Human Understanding, the Natural History of Buffon, the first parts of the great French Encyclopedia, Montesquieu's Spirit of Laws, the earlier writings of Rousseau, the principal works of Condillac, while Voltaire was at the acme of his glory at the court of Frederick, and Lessing and Kant, both educated in the philosophy of Wolf, were just preparing to embark upon the troubled sea of metaphysics in search of unknown lands.*

Impelled by the causes we have mentioned, Kant undertook a thorough revision of the fundamental principles of psychology, for the purpose of finding a ground of certainty on which he might rest those purely necessary truths, which Hume, following out Locke's doctrines, had struck out of the catalogue of our knowledge, because his keen and subtle analysis did not enable him to find them among the contents of experience. Kant, therefore, sought for them in the laws of our intellectual being. The business of sense, in his analysis of our psychology, is merely to give us the *matter* of our thoughts, in the "now" and the "here" of the objects of perception: all the

* Our readers may consult with great satisfaction, the "*Histoire de la Philosophie Allemande, depuis Kant jusqu'à Hegel*, par J. Willm, Inspecteur de l'Académie de Strasbourg." Paris, 1846. This is the work which took the prize offered by the French Academy.

rest comes from the depths of our own rational nature. It is the office of the understanding to give form, distinctness, and relation, to the vague shapeless matter furnished in sensation. This it does by applying to them, as they are presented, the twelve categories of existence, comprehending all the possible forms and relations of things; these categories being furnished for the purpose, by the Reason. The result is, that the formless sensation then becomes a *notion* ("begriffe"). These notions are then taken up by the Pure Reason, which seeks to reduce them to the simplest form, carrying them towards an absolute and all-comprehending unity. This is the process of generalization, which is conducted in accordance with the forms and laws of logic. The "notion," thus subjected to the action of the reason, becomes an idea, (*idee*). The notions, or judgments of the understanding, depending as they do for their matter upon sensation, are all experimental, and constitute the true and only basis of science. *Ideas*, being purely the product of the reason, are necessarily supersensuous; and can neither be proved nor disproved scientifically. These supersensuous ideas, such as God, the soul, immortality, freedom, power, &c., being thus removed beyond the range of the longest artillery of scientific scepticism, are proved to be real in their turn by an entirely different process; viz., because in point of fact they do practically control the conduct of men, with a conceded magisterial authority. To do this they must be endowed with a real existence: and this is the function of the Practical Reason—which Kant, therefore, admits to an actual and equal, or even more certain because more authoritative place, in the human constitution. This authority of the moral nature, or Practical Reason, obviously implies such correlative truths as, 1, the freedom of the will, in order to accountability; 2, the existence of God as the author or source of its authority; for otherwise its authority would be an unreal shadow without any answering substance; 3, the immortality of the soul, because we can conceive of no other adequate or rational end of human actions, &c.

For obvious reasons Kant also tears up the utilitarian or selfish foundation of virtue, and grounds all moral distinctions on the authoritative voice of the great Lawgiver, re-echoed in

the "imperative categorical" authority, with which his philosophy robed the Practical Reason.*

There is still another sphere of mental activity, in the psychological chart of Kant, lying between the intellectual and the practical, occupied by what he terms the Judging Faculty, ("*Urtheilskraft,*") answering in his critical analysis of its function, approximately to the Taste. It is the source of our ideas of beauty, fitness, design, &c., and brings into view, in its operation, the idea of a *final cause.* This function, which is the foundation of all art, also works into, and confirms by logical deduction from the clear perception of design, the categorical belief of the Practical Reason, in regard to God and immortality.

From even this brief and bald exposition of the metaphysical system of Kant, it is not difficult to trace the steps by which it was carried out into complete subjective idealism, in the hands of Fichte.

As all science was founded, according to Kant, on the formal element contributed by the subjective laws of the mind to the matter furnished in sensation, it was a very obvious step, to deny the possibility of any scientific transition to a real outward world at all. There were two possible alternatives left: the one was philosophic scepticism, in the denial of an external universe, as reduced to systematic form by Schulze; and the other, to admit the reality of the external world, but make it a creation of the subjective mind. For while Kant assumed the reality of our sensations, and of their material cause, and admitted, on the grounds we have stated, the absoluteness of our knowledge, yet that knowledge was cognizable by the understanding, only in forms derived purely from the reason;

* We have no doubt that the incidental service rendered by the German philosophy, in sweeping away the whole ground work of the miserable sensational or utilitarian morality of the Paley school of moral philosophers, in both its great branches, viz: the advocates respectively of the disinterested and the selfish schemes, (which are only the opposite poles of the same hypothesis, both alike making virtue to consist in the love of being, and the promotion of the greatest happiness,) and both of which have flowered and borne fruit copiously in the prolific nursery of New England theology, is one of the chief reasons for the extraordinary and ready acceptance it has met, among some of the ablest thinkers both in England and America.

and was, therefore, absolute only to man, and necessarily so to man, only so long as he retains his present constitution. Fichte began by denying Kant's assumption of the reality of our sense-perceptions; or rather by refusing to admit it into the category of scientific, *i. e.* demonstrative truth. All that we certainly know, he contended, is that of which we are conscious, and this of course is purely subjective. In reply to the allegation, that we are compelled by the laws of our mental constitution to believe in the objective reality answering to our subjective notions, he answers, that the laws which so compel us, are subjective too. The starting point of science, therefore, that which we know to be certainly true, is our sensations and subjective mental processes. We find ourselves thus completely and hopelessly shut up within the circle of our consciousness, so far at least as demonstrative science and certainty are concerned. Fichte, however, does not deny absolutely the reality of objective nature: but only the possibility of knowing it scientifically. He admits that we do and must accept and act upon its reality; but contends that this is a function of faith as contradistinguished from knowledge. He even goes on to argue for the necessity of this fundamental belief in order to our personal development, and productive self-culture. The ultimate and profoundest law of our nature, is this tendency to self-evolution, and this tendency would be for ever unfruitful, if the mind did not create for itself an objective world, like that in which we dwell, and fill it with relations and ends. Without this we should for ever remain without duties, and without a destiny. Our life, therefore, and the universe which sustains and nourishes it, all flow from the simple ultimate law of a pure and necessary subjective activity. All is thought. In the universe of Fichte, matter is created by ourselves for our own purposes: and the only God that is needed, is our own idea of moral order, personified by ourselves. Both are simple necessities of our own subjective laws; both created by ourselves. Having thus annihilated scientifically every thing in the universe except the subjective self, the opponents of Fichte, the chief of whom was Jacobi, were not long in precipitating his whole system into the bottomless abysm of *nihilism*. For if the objective world has no real existence,

why should the subjective fare any better? We *know* nothing by consciousness of our subjective being, but its phenomena; and these phenomena are not its essence. We are therefore, totally destitute of evidence that it has any real existence. Hence the universe, already reduced to sensation, thought and knowledge; not only has nothing for the object of these functions, but there is nothing to feel, think, or know. Pressed by the merciless logic of his adversaries into this "*reductio ad absurdum*," Fichte attempted to supplement his system, by adding a realistic side to his philosophy. The attempt was always regarded by his disciples as an inconsistency and a failure.

It remained, therefore, for Schelling, the next in the catalogue of the great German metaphysicians, to supply the objective element of the ideal philosophy. This he did by assuming as the true starting point of his constructive process, the reality of absolute existence, of which, (as we must use the barbarous technical lingo of these schools,) the "me" and the "not me" were but difficult and complementary phases. He thus bridged over the impassable gulf of his predecessors, between the subjective and the objective, by identifying the two. The result, of course, was Pantheism again; differing from Spinoza chiefly in this—that he made the absolute existence spirit, while Spinoza made it substance. But this is obviously more of a distinction than a difference. It comes to the same thing in the end, whether we begin by spiritualizing matter, or materializing spirit. The great feature of Schelling's philosophy was the identifying of subject and object. And the grand organ which he employed, and which was destined to play so important a part in subsequent philosophy, was the faculty of Intellectual Intuition ("intellectuelle anschauung"), by which we gaze directly on the absolute essence of truth in all its relations, without the need of mediating it through individual objects, or special relations. We had drawn out a brief sketch of Schelling's system; but the space at our command forbids its insertion. We regret this the more, because it was the form into which he cast the ideal philosophy, that has chiefly infected the literature, the philosophy, and the theology of England and America; first through the brilliant and fascinating conversa-

tions, lectures, and writings of Coleridge; and subsequently through a new growth from the same seed nurtured into extraordinary luxuriance in the hot beds of Schleiermacher's Theology; from whence they have been transplanted, in prime vigour, by Mr. Morell and some three or four influential writers, chiefly theologians, in our own country.

We must be content to refer our readers for a fuller view of Schelling's system to his own works—particularly his *Natur Philosophie*, and his *System des transcendentalen Idealismus;* or, for a briefer view of its principles, to any one of some half dozen critical histories of German Philosophy. Morell and Cousin may suffice for the necessary purposes of the purely English student. The forming principles of Schelling's Philosophy are, as we have stated, first the identity of subject and object; and secondly, the doctrine of Intuition, as expounded in his system. The *anschauung* of Schelling, was essentially a poetic conception, in which he sees the infinite essence passing into the unconscious development of matter, through the successive forms of light, dynamic force, (electricity, magnetism, &c.) and organism or life; becoming self-conscious in *mind*, and ascending through knowledge and activity, or in other words its mental and moral life, into a state of culture, in which it finally reproduces ideal conceptions of perfect beauty and excellence as in the highest forms of art, and so arrives at perfection, in the sphere of the divine. The great problem of philosophy thus reaches its solution in a form of poetic pantheism. With Schelling, creation was a work of art; differing not at all in kind, but only in degree, from a picture or a statue. In fact, the philosophy of Schelling is a poem, rather than a science. It is a vast, gorgeous *anschauung* of a brilliant fancy; with scarce the least vestige of rigid science, except in form, terminology and compact structure.

Accordingly it has uniformly met its keenest reception and greatest popularity among poetic minds. We owe our older knowledge of it almost wholly to Coleridge, who was as much of a poet, as he was little of a philosopher. If any fact is settled in literature, it is that Coleridge originated nothing, added nothing; but by his quick, comprehensive poetic mind, and brilliant discourse, interpreted the mystic utterances of

the great German oracle, into captivating English prose. He began where Schelling began, and stopped where Schelling failed nim. He broke off in the middle of a sentence, not, as he would have his readers think, because the world was not prepared for his metaphysical speculations; but, as it seems to us clearly, because he had not the constructive intellect necessary to carry him on without a guide. In the fragmentary metaphysics of the *Biographia Literaria*, and in the little volume entitled *Hints towards the Formation of a more comprehensive Theory of Life*, pages upon pages are little else than a free translation of his original; and we take it upon us to say, that there is not a single leading idea in either, that is original with himself.

Schelling, like Fichte and Kant, later in life, saw the incompleteness and dangerous tendencies of his speculations, towards denying human personality, freedom and moral responsibility, and set himself to construct a practical philosophy, that would restore what he had torn to pieces and scattered to the winds. His speculations in later years seem to have blended more and more into mysticism. He delivered a course of Lectures in Berlin in 1842, after a silence of thirty years, on the Philosophy of Revelation, in opposition to the anti-religious tendencies of the Hegelian Logic, in which, judging from the Analysis of Willm and other recent historians, (for we have not seen any part of them,) he seems to blend the mythic hypothesis with his theosophic mysticism, the whole tinged with a decided strike of theological rationalism.

Hegel, the only remaining great name in the pure philosophy of Germany, began by rejecting Schelling's Intuitional Faculty as unphilosophical, and leading to unavoidable abuse, as well as destructive of all real certainty in science. His system is purely rationalistic, and well characterized by all the critics, as absolute idealism. He admits nothing but thought: the laws of which constitute the only materials of philosophy. Thought, with Hegel, is an absolute and real entity: and the development of thought is the development of the universe.

One leading characteristic of the Hegelian Logic is its identifying of opposites. Every thing has its two poles, the blending of which is necessary to complete its existence: because the conception of any thing implies also that of its opposite:

thus being and nothing give us existence, (*seyn und nichts= daseyn.*)

The other fundamental principle of Hegel is, that thought and being are one. Nature is thought becoming objective to itself, and so externalizing itself. Nature he divides into three departments: 1, mechanics; 2, physics; 3, organism. Organism then generates mind: which again has three spheres, (1) Subjective, including anthropology, psychology and will: (2) Objective, including jurisprudence, morals and politics: (3) Absolute mind, aesthetics, religion and philosophy. This last sphere, moreover, includes three eras: (*a*) art, or the poetico-mythologic era: (*b*) religion, in which God is conceived as a person to be worshipped and obeyed: (*c*) philosophy, or absolute truth in the highest form. This last achievement being due to Hegel himself, he of course stands on the apex of the great pyramid of human glory in the universe.

Theologically considered, the thinking process is God, and the Trinity is its three-fold form. Pure thought, self-existence, the Father; when self-conscious and objective to itself, the Son; and the union of the two in the Church, the Holy Spirit.

The destructive tendencies of their philosophy, when applied to the fundamental questions of theology, produced a reaction in the case of every one of the great philosophers of Germany, (unless we except Hegel,) which led Kant and Fichte to engraft a foreign and heterogeneous element upon their system; and under stress of which, Schelling took refuge in those fundamental principles of mysticism, which Schleiermacher, the great theologian of modern Germany, has carried out and applied to the solution of the leading questions of theology: while Hegel, ever a rationalist, both in head and heart, suggested that train of application which Strauss has carried out to the complete subversion of the whole Scriptures; or rather their conversion into a string of myths, which though totally destitute of a historical foundation, yet furnish a true symbolical account of the great truths of religion.

The intermediate links between the one sided idealism of the national philosophy, and the philosophy which Schleiermacher applied to revelation and theology, were supplied chiefly by

Jacobi. The distinctive peculiarity of his system lay in assigning a philosophical place to *Faith*, as a fundamental organ in science. Its office was two-fold, viz., to take cognizance of and affirm the reality, first, of our sense-perceptions, and so the objective truth of the outward world; and 2, of the essential or absolute truths of the pure reason,—God, the soul, immortality, &c., with all their derived ideas of virtue, obligation, religion, &c. Faith is therefore a distinct spiritual faculty, by which we gaze upon essential truth. As the certainty of an outward world arises from faith immediately apprehending the truth of our sense-perceptions, so the certainty of absolute truth arises from faith in the intuitions of our reason. Faith, therefore, is the inlet of all knowledge: and without its revelations, all science is but empty and unmeaning forms. The truths which are derived from faith, pass into the understanding, are reduced to scientific form, and so applied to the relations of life. Jacobi, therefore, adds to the psychology of Kant a fundamental organ, or sense, which takes immediate cognizance of the essence and reality of truths, assumed by Kant as real without any clear ground; and which Fichte and Hegel had rejected from the sphere of science altogether, as pure unproved assumptions.

But while furnishing a ground of resistance against the extreme idealism of the national philosophy, it is obvious that Jacobi threw open an effectual door for that mysticism, which Schleiermacher was to carry out to the denial of all objective sources of truth whether by revelation or otherwise. To do this, it was only necessary to make the intuitional consciousness not only the channel, but the source of all moral truth; to endow this organ with the power of originating, as well as perceiving, with sensibilities, feelings or emotions, which are themselves the independent fountains of all moral truth. The fundamental assumption of this hypothesis is, that religion does not depend upon external truth or relations; but is a life in the soul itself—a well-spring of truth gushing forth from the depths of the emotional human consciousness. It is purely from within, and incapable of being sustained and nourished by objective truths, which have their origin in God, and are

conveyed to the moral nature of the soul by the vehicle of language, or imagery, or symbols, or whatever means he may see fit to employ, through the medium of the understanding.

Mr. Morell does not hesitate to avow broadly his indebtedness to Schleiermacher, for every characteristic feature of his Philosophy of Religion. He apprehends fully and adopts implicitly, in the main, the psychology of Schleiermacher, expounding it with beautiful and taking clearness; and then builds upon it a philosophy of revelation and religious experience, not differing in any essential particular, from the mysticorationalism of his theological guide.

The system of Quakerism as applied to the theory of Inspiration, if we may call it a system,—"rudis, indigestaque moles," certainly, when compared with the polished theological architecture of the accomplished German mystic—rests upon substantially the same foundations.

"The germinal principle of the system of Schleiermacher and Morell, as applied to revelation, is the fundamental and ultimate identity of the human and divine." The personality of Christ is a perfect ideal human nature, flowing down pure from the divine fountain; and so becoming a new and divine life-principle to the race, in contradistinction from, and subversion of, the earthly life derived from Adam. Religion is not the empirical conformity of the heart and life to the principles and precepts of the gospel; it is not pardon and new obedience due to the objective righteousness of Christ, but participation in the divine life of Christ, which flows down into humanity through the channels of the Church. The highest Christianity conceivable, is perfect likeness to Christ, in point of religious consciousness. Thus there is opened in the emotional consciousness of the individual soul, a living fountain, from whence the streams of absolute religious truth are continually flowing. Revelation is a purely subjective process, though it may be supernaturally conducted; and the truth revealed has its source, not in God but in the religious life of the individual, reacting upon the surrounding world.

The spirituality and loftiness of the revelation, therefore, depends upon the purity, the depth and the enlargement of

mind of the individual; and that again upon that of the age. Hence Mr. Morell contends explicitly that "inspiration is only a higher potency of what every man possesses to some degree." Of course, therefore, every body is inspired: and this is the same thing, in effect, as to hold that nobody is inspired: for in the common and true sense of the word, these two things differ not in degree only, but in kind. The authority of inspiration in the case of the apostles, *e. g.* is nothing more to us, than the respect which men of ordinary power and purity of intuition, should, and commonly do, feel for those of extraordinary power and purity. There is no such thing as an objective, normal, divine authority in either case. Hence Mr. Morell disparages the revelation of the Old Testament, as compared with the New, because of its low and imperfect morality, which is easily accounted for, on the ground of the low and undeveloped religious consciousness of the world at that period. In the same way he accounts for the scientific errors, imperfections, and contradictions of the sacred record.

The only divine influence which is possible or could tend to give weight and authority to revelation, or constitute it in a low and remote sense the word of God at all, is that supernatural array of circumstances which tended, first, to elevate and purify, and so impart clearness and comprehensiveness to the intuitions and emotions of prophets and apostles; and then, secondly, to bring before them in greater purity and power, as *e. g.* in the life of Christ, or the history of men or nations like the Jews, the sources or embodiments of divine truth, in concrete or historic forms. Thus God reveals his truth in the life of Christ, but no otherwise, *in kind*, than he does in all history; and the province of the inspired teacher is, by his pure, clear, and lofty intuitions, to draw forth from all such sources, the divine truths which they contain, and set them into relation with the common religious experience of humanity, through a prior reaction with his own inspired, *i. e.* spiritual, emotional consciousness. Revelation is, therefore, a perfect philosophy of human experience with reference to God. It is purely human, as much as a philosophy of history is human, though it may draw lessons of divine truth from the facts of God's dealings with the race. The only difference in its favour is, that

its authors are more spiritual, and therefore more clear sighted than other men.

We have so often, in this journal, had occasion to describe the nature and genesis of Schleiermacher's system, that we shall not attempt any farther analysis of its ground work, as our limits would forbid us to enter upon the argument, in the present connection.

It may be questioned whether the universal, and almost unquestioned prevalence of the inductive philosophy of Bacon, combined with the allied psychology of Locke, as carried out at least among Englishmen, by the rigour with which it confines itself to phenomena and laws, to the exclusion of the absolute and necessary ideas of power and final causes, has not tended to foster and exaggerate the extreme objectivity and empiricism, which has degenerated so often, in modern physics, into materialism in philosophy, and atheism in religion. The physical philosopher finds himself constantly skirting along the domain of metaphysics; and however anxious he may be to keep clear of that land of shadows and spectres, he will soon find that there are hosts of foes, for ever skulking from the clear sunlight of his induction and experience, which hang on his flanks, and impede his progress. Certain it is, that there is a steady, and we greatly fear in some influential quarters, at least a growing tendency among men of science, to ignore all absolute and necessary truths, to rule out of the cognizance of science the whole doctrine of power, and of final causes, to deify the totality of second causes, under the designation of laws of nature, and then elevate to the vacated throne of the universe, this new impersonal apotheosis of their own creation.

We cannot better express what we mean than by quoting the language of one of the most earnest, eloquent, truth-seeking, but alas not always (in our way of thinking,) truth-finding minds of our age:

"The studies of Physical Science within a few years, have been gigantic and incessant, and thus far their results are as a whole, unfavourable to implicit faith. The telescope with its majestic and ever-lengthening sweep, seems, if I may so express it, to *crowd back* farther and still farther from the orb we inhabit. God no longer walks in the garden, conversing face to face with men; he thunders no more from Sinai, nor holds his court on the summit of Olympus; and to the search-

ing inquiries directed to all accessible, cognizable portions of the universe for the dwelling-place of its Creator and Lord, the chilling answer comes back, 'Not here! Not here!' Meantime the number and power of the intermediary agencies between inert matter and quickening spirit, seem perpetually to increase; electricity and magnetism steadily approach the rank of demi-gods; and when at length some dogmatic Compté, some specious observer and analyzer of the 'Vestiges of Creation,' proclaims to us, as if from the utmost pinnacle of scientific achievement, the conclusion that planets, suns, systems, plants, beings, men, are but inevitable results of a law which yet had no author; and that intelligence has been slowly, blunderingly evolved from ignorance, soul from body, thought from dust, as planets, with all their diverse properties and uses, from one homogeneous, universally diffused vapour, or 'fire-mist,' our hearts sink within us as we falter out the expostulation,

'O star-eyed science! hast thou wandered there,
To waft us back the message of despair?'

"These materialist dogmas do not overcome but they try our faith. They do not vanquish our convictions, but they try our reason. Death has so steadily gone forward from a period anterior to history, cutting down all who lived, and removing them beyond all human cognition, the course of nature has been so unvaried and inflexible, the fall and disappearance of generations of men so much like that of the annually renewed foliage of the forest, that even faith hangs trembling over the brink of the grave, and tearfully, dubiously asks, 'if a man die, shall he live again?' Most of us *believe* he will, and yet would give very much to *know* it."

In this view of the subject we may economize our narrow space, by treating the sceptical or anti-religious tendencies of modern physical science under this single aspect; as they have all, by a generalization which startles us by its very magnitude, combined for a final and decisive assault upon the power, providence, and personality of God. The reader may see this generalization carried out to its fullest extent, in blank, universal, materialistic atheism, with amazing power of intellect and of logic, in the vast, comprehensive, all-embracing classifications of Compté's "Philosophie Positive." This is the ultimatum of sceptical philosophy.

This comprehensive generalization admits of easy reduction within the sphere of physical science, to three subordinate hypotheses, as successively applied to the solution of the problem of the universe, in the three great departments of Cosmogony, Zoögony, and Zoönomy. The first includes the Nebular Hypothesis, first cast into complete form by La Place: the second regards life purely as a result of physical organization, and then traces the latter, in its ultimate analysis, to purely physical causes; viz., to a stream of electricity acting upon a globule of albumen, and imparting to it, dynamically, the power of absorption, growth, and propagation; and so ori-

ginating organic structure, endowed with organic life: while the third, commonly known as the development hypothesis, taking this ultimate organic structure for its starting point, makes its varied organic forms the result of a vegetative instinct, or unconscious want, prompting a *conatus* in certain directions, just as the tendrils of a plant in a window all grow towards the light; and this again resulting in new wants; as the development goes on, gives rise to new struggles of the dynamic or vital force, until the whole complex organism is perfectly developed.

We entreat our readers' patience while we describe these hypotheses of science; for however they may strike across their common sense, as solutions of the profound mysteries of living nature, we assure them, first, that they are held by men of great vigour and penetration of intellect, great compass of knowledge, and, so far as appears, of the utmost scientific fairness and candour: and secondly, that they are calm and careful records of what microscopic and chemical analysis seems to reveal, as the true history of the ultimate phenomena and laws of the physical and the organic world. And then, if they will further remember, that phenomena and laws are all that the inductive processes of physical science are held to apply to, it may mitigate their wonder, that so many, especially of our enthusiastic young scholars of science, should stop short with a physical solution of physical facts; and discarding the whole doctrines of efficient and final causes from the domain of science, to that of religious (*i. e.* in their view of unsupported or superstitious) faith, should easily dispense with a personal, intelligent and beneficent First Cause.

In admitting the truth of the ultimate facts of physiology on which the Development Hypothesis rests its argument, we are far from conceding that the zoological deductions from them are valid, in whole or in part. The moment the hypothesis leaves the ultimate phenomenon of organic life, mysteriously originating in a nucleated albuminous cell, endowed by its vital forces with the power of assimilation and reproduction, to construct on that fact a solution of the vast and complex problem of the organic world, it becomes a tissue of assumptions and unproved generalizations; many of which, that are

vital to its truth as a hypothesis, are contradicted by the observations and inductions of what is even now settled physiological science.

This hypothesis for explaining the origin of organic life, wholly refuses to bear the tests supplied by the rapid progress of discovery, or accommodate what are now perfectly established and familiar facts. The examples which were at first supposed to prove its truth, have one after another fallen away under the more penetrating research of recent experiment. The monads of vegetable infusions prove to be separate animalcules under the microscope of Ehrenberg; furnish no less than twenty-five or thirty distinct and classified species, some of which do not exceed the 12,000 part of an inch. The studied and prodigious provision for organic propagation convicts the hypothesis of uselessness and error. Geology lifts up a clear and decided testimony against it. The famous *acarus* experiments are explained and exploded. The improvement of instruments is every day withdrawing the supposed examples of the spontaneous generation; and the only ground on which the assumption now rests, is the obscure and doubtful case of certain *entozoa*, which promise to follow in the same train with the *acari* of Mr. Crosse. The hypothesis once so pretending and formidable, is now delivered over by all the really great naturalists of the age, into the hands of the neophytes in science, who are easily captivated by the novelty of the hypothesis, and whose smattering acquaintance with the facts of science is too superficial to enable them to see its fallacy.

The second alleged generalization of the development hypothesis, is that which undertakes to deduce the varied organism of the economy, in a given individual, from the simple law of organic growth, subject only to the modification of external agencies and of internal wants. This is analogous to the doctrine first announced by Göthe, and now very generally accepted in botany, under the name of the morphology of plants. For its application to the organic development of the animal economy, we are indebted to the ingenious and brilliant, but fanciful mind of Professor Oken, a transcendental pantheist, of the school of Schelling. According to this hypothesis, the various organs of the animal body, are merely the products of

a common law of vital development, inherent in organized matter, subject merely to the modifying physical agencies of position and vital instinct. Thus, *e. g.* the curious and complex bones of the cranium are only peculiar devolopments of vertebræ determined by their position and uses, and modified by the cerebral expansion and development of the spinal marrow: precisely as the petals of a flower are resolved by the botanist into mere modifications, occurring in the development of a common leaf-bud of the plant. The advantage of this hypothesis, which is not very apparent at first sight, is that it dispenses with the old fashioned notion both of an intelligible final cause, and an intelligent first cause in the amazingly complex and perfect structure, as in the example just cited, of the cranium and brain, and accounts for their production with no other agency than the vital force, which developes a fungus or an eye according to circumstances. This, to say the least, is in admirable keeping with the highest generalization of the same author, in his Physico-philosophy, "God is a rotating globe; the world is God rotating."

This segment of the Development Hypothesis has a claim upon our respectful consideration, not because of its place in a work which its author believed himself inspired to produce, but because its approximations to other analogies in organic nature which science has accepted as true, were so striking, and the solution it offered of certain physiological phenomena, so beautiful, that it was at first received by naturalists of the highest eminence; and even yet numbers among its adherents, we believe, Professor Owen, of the London College of Surgeons, than whom there is no higher authority in questions of comparative anatomy and physiology.*

As there is no great interest at stake on the issue of this particular doctrine, we shall not argue the question, farther than to say, that Professor Agassiz, though at first strongly disposed to accept the hypothesis of Oken, has since decisively rejected

* The reader may see an ingenious and beautiful application of this hypothesis, in Professor Owen's work on the Nature of Limbs: also an elaborate and very able report to the British Association on "The Archetype and Homologies of the Vertebrate Skeleton," by the same distinguished comparative anatomist, for the year 1846.

it on purely scientific grounds; and Mr. Miller deals it a most stunning blow, with his ponderous stone-hammer, in the "Footprints of the Creator." Indeed, we may say with great confidence that the weight of scientific authority, with the exception of Professor Owen, is almost unanimous against the doctrine: so that no formidable argument, at least in the present state of the evidence, can be raised upon it against the fundamental truths of Natural Religion.*

The third and only remaining phase of the Development Hypothesis, is that first suggested, we believe, by Geoffrey St. Hilaire, but chiefly elaborated into form by the learned French naturalist, Lamarck. It rests on the assumption, first, that all the functions of life, from the lowest to the highest alike, are purely the result of physical organization: and secondly, that there is inherent and fundamental to that organization a law of progressive development, by which the vital organism, in obedience to instinctive wants, is constantly struggling up into higher types, by the mere process of perpetual, progressive self-evolution. The higher species of animals no more need a Creator, than the foliage of a tree, or the perfect organic forms which incubation developes from an egg. All are alike, and in the same sense, the development of purely physical agencies, acting under purely physical laws, inherent in themselves. And in like manner, at the lower end of the animal scale, the vegetable organic life, by the development of self-consciousness, passed into the class of animal existence.

Without wasting time upon this hypothesis, once so imposing in the eyes of naturalists, and so formidable to weak hearted Christian believers, it is sufficient to say that its plausible facts and deductions are daily vanishing under the increasing light of modern scientific research. Analysis, armed with the power of the microscope, has proceeded to unfold the constituent organic elements of living forms, until it has detected, in the very germs of the organism, at the very fountain of organic life, differences just as decisive, both in kind and degree, as those

* We may refer our readers who desire to see an able and thorough examination of this whole theory, to the late work of President Hitchcock—"*The Religion of Geology and its connected Sciences.*"

which distinguish the maturest and completest forms of the organic world. While it has traced back the growth of each genus and species of the animal kingdom, to its primordial germinal cell in the embryo from which it sprang, it finds a generic and specific character impressed upon that ultimate, primordial, living cell, containing, potentially, all that is to be, or that ever can be developed from it; and which forbids its transition into any higher form of animate existence, just as peremptorily as the mature and perfect organism itself is forbidden to take on the form of some higher type of being. When analytic research has carried us down to the germinal cell from which an oyster is to be developed, it finds its character so settled, both in organic constituents, and organic laws, that it can no more develope a man, by any conceivable process of nature, or in any conceivable period of time, or by any succession of generations, than an oyster in its mature form can open its shell, and rise up in the proportions and symmetry of a man. We make a definite and intelligible statement to every tyro in natural history, when we say, that the cell-life out of which the tissues first, and then the organs, and finally the specific forms, of the animal kingdom are built up, are just as specific and determinate, and just as incapable of transmutation or progressive organic development, as the fully formed species themselves. The globules of the blood, *e. g.*—the mysterious symbol of life—which different species of animals elaborate out of the same food, notwithstanding their apparent identity of character, are yet as really different, and as incapable of interchange or transition, as would be the full formed members or organs of the body. The blood-globules of a reptile, or a fish, or a bird, differ as really, and are just as incompatible with those which form and nourish the organism of a man, as would be the head of a fish, or an alligator, on the shoulders of Lamarck. When the Scriptures refer the family relationships of the animal kingdom to the blood, they are laid upon foundations that are deeper and firmer than a rhetorical analogy, or a figure of speech. They are like the everlasting granite which underlies the formations of geology; which human science may possibly dig down and reveal, but can never take up or shift.

In like manner there is an impassable gulf, which no natu-

ral law of development can bridge over, between the vegetable and animal kingdoms. There is in the constitution of their respective germs, in every stage of their development, and in the whole results of their vital action, an absolute opposition, as great as that which exists between the poles of a magnet. The organism of the one can by no possibility be developed from or pass into that of the other; except by a total change of properties, laws, and functions, equivalent to a miracle, or an act of creation. Nor could the different classes and families, even of the vegetable world, be developed from any common type of vegetable life. The formation and form of their *utricles* and *citoblasts*, or germinal organs—answering to the cells and blood discs of animal life—the law of their germination—the selection of their constituent elements, in each of the great divisions, of the monocotyledon, the dicotyledon, and the acotyledon, utterly forbid the hypothesis of development in any of its applications.

If, therefore, the laws of nature possess the uniformity claimed for them with one voice by philosophers, and without which there could be no such thing as science, it follows of necessity, that as Cuvier could, by his faith in their absolute uniformity, restore the full form of an extinct and unknown fossil animal, from a single tooth or splinter of its bone, so, on the very same principles, could Ehrenberg, by a glance of his microscope, directed to the germinating cell of a living organism, make out its complete form, and determine its future position, as regards at least the great classes of the organic world. The logic of both processes is the same, and grounds itself in both cases on our rational conviction of the absolute specific uniformity of the laws of nature, on which alone the advocates of the law-hypothesis of creation can proceed a single step in their argument. Thus it is that we are enabled by a maturer science, to demolish by their own artillery the fortresses which infidelity has founded upon premature and erroneous inductions, for the purpose of battering down the sacred defences which Christianity has reared for the human race, against the day of adversity.

But we cannot go into this argument more largely in this connection, nor happily is it any longer necessary. There is

not a living naturalist known to us, of any authority in science, who would risk his reputation on its support. The very facts which gave such an air of plausibility to the Development Theory, though long regarded as settled conclusions of geological science, seem likely once more to be drawn into question, at least so far as they have any bearing on the theory before us. We have heard Professor Agassiz, ourselves, ascribe its advocacy to ignorance and misconception of the real laws of comparative physiology. Mr. Lyell, perhaps the highest purely geological authority now living, in the last edition of his "Principles of Geology," and still more pointedly in the last annual address to the Geological Society, which has long honoured his eminent scientific attainments by the gift of its Presidency, labours to prove that there is no sufficient geological evidence of any progressive development of organic forms, from the earliest epochs of organic life; and to explain the absence of fossil remains of the higher types, in the lower strata of the geological scale, by the agency of causes which are entirely compatible with their existence in full proportion among the very earliest products of the creative power. And while Professor Agassiz was thus turning to scorn the scientific logic of the Development Hypothesis, and Mr. Lyell was assailing the foundation facts on which it built its argument, Mr. Hugh Miller was propounding the *counter* hypothesis of *degradation*, as the true law of organic change, pervading the animal kingdom as a dark and terrible symbol of the moral history of that race which the previous stages of creation were designed to prefigure and to inaugurate.

In the view of this sketch of the Apologetics of physical science, the most nervous among us may well acquire sufficient steadiness of nerve to stand by, and if need be, hold the torch of science, or even lend a hand in prosecuting to their completion, researches which the varied experience of the past must satisfy the candid observer will only render a more signal testimony, and put more abundant honour on the inspiration of the word of God. The whole ground once bristling with hostile bayonets, is now deserted, and the enemies of the gospel have drawn up their forces for the next conflict, and quartered

themselves upon a still more remote outpost of the disputed ground.

It is curious to observe, that while science, in the flush of its prime, sought to dispense entirely with divine agency, in the creation of organic as well as inorganic nature, it has now swung off to the opposite extreme, and objects to the sacred narrative on the ground that its record of creation is inadequate and defective. Instead of claiming to develope the human race by natural law, from the inferior types of the animal kingdom, it passes to the assumption that *one* primeval origin is insufficient to account for the diversified races of men; and that there must have been distinct and separate origins for each of the several varieties of the species. It is to us a matter of sincere and deep regret, that this hypothesis is due to a name so universally respected and commanding in the world of science as that of Professor Agassiz. We are entirely confident of these two things,—1. That it owes its temporary ascendency mainly to his great authority as a naturalist; and 2, that it is doomed to a speedy overthrow; because no authority can stand long against the pressure of accumulating evidence.

The difficulties which press upon this recent hypothesis of diversity of origin for the single human species, grounded on the anthropological diversities of the races, are multiplying every day. The facts which research is daily adding to our knowledge, are already refusing to conform to the hypothesis; while, on the other hand, the more the philological, anthropological, and ethnographical details of the argument are studied, the more they point towards a common origin for the whole human race. In favour of this declaration we may cite the testimony of such men as Humboldt, Bopp, Bunsen, Prichard, and Latham; all devoted to different departments of the subject. Walls of separation between the races, lately deemed impassable, are already levelled to the ground; and others still standing are only waiting similar researches, in all human probability, to follow in their train.

We do not hesitate to say that the difficulties of the hypothesis are already insuperable; while the current of research and discovery is setting steadily and strongly against it. A very brief

summary of the chief points involved in the argument, in its present form, is all that our limits will permit.

We remark, first, that the hypothesis has never been cast into definite form, so as to admit of decisive criticism. As propounded by Professor Agassiz, it rests upon the analogy of the animal and vegetable kingdoms: and if this analogy is valid at all, we should infer that the zones in which separate human races have originated, not—(for such is his hypothesis)—in single pairs, but, like plants and animals, in numbers bearing nearly the same relative ratio as at present, should coincide with the zones or centres of separate botanical and animal creations. If so, we should have at least ten different races, besides the Adamic, totally distinct in their origin and history. Now we defy the most ingenious naturalist living to make out a schedule of ten distinct races, which we cannot identify, in some part of them at least, even in the present state of the evidence, by affinities either philological, anatomical, archæological, or historical, such as no ethnologist will hesitate to accept as conclusive. Indeed the leading advocates of the hypothesis may be easily set to repeating the famous Kilkenny game of destroying one another. The late Dr. Morton, perhaps next to Agassiz, the ablest supporter of this hypothesis in our country, makes his strongest stand on the separate origin of the American variety. Pickering, on the other hand, is clear that the American is partly Asiatic and partly Oceanic in its origin: and Colonel Hamilton Smith, who, we believe, first led Dr. Morton astray, in his work,* the last published in this country on this controversy, with a very pretending, but unphilosophical and feeble preface by Dr. Kneeland, also rejects Dr. Morton's strongest case—the American variety—and limits the species, if we understand him aright, to three, having, therefore, but three centres of origin, viz., the Caucasian, the Mongolian, and the African. Of course it is the easiest thing in the world, in the present state of the evidence, to show, on universally recognized ethnological grounds, that these terms separate races as certainly one in their origin, as the English of our day are

* The Natural History of the Human Species, by Lieut. Col. Charles Hamilton Smith, K. H.

lineally one with the Germani of Tacitus, or the Gauls of Cæsar one with the Keltoi of Herodotus. The great difficulty with these naturalists is, that they appear to have no knowledge, whatever, of the very elements of ethnological science. This is provokingly the case with Colonel Smith, and, we are sorry to add, it is palpably so with Professor Agassiz. They leave out of sight the corrective testimonies that are offered from other sources, as, *e. g.*, the affinities of language; and give a free rein to the fancy, in interpreting the anatomical and physiological diversities. In the vaunted work of Hamilton Smith, on the Natural History of the Animal Kingdom, of the new species described by the author *every one* proves to be merely a variety. As a pure naturalist he regards slight osteological peculiarities as evidence of diversity of species; and thereupon constitutes such a case as the tail-less fowl, a separate species, because it wants the caudal vertebræ.

Now it so happens that neither the Caucasian, Mongolian, nor African varieties are distinct natural groups. They are merely geographical, and not ethnological classifications. They represent anthropological agencies, and not affiliation, which is the proper question in ethnology.

It is very much as if a naturalist should found his zoological classifications on the colour of the feathers, or the texture of the hair, or external varieties of form, irrespective of physical agencies likely to produce them. Like Colonel Smith, he would be apt to find that what he regarded as different species, were, in fact, the same species, and even perhaps the same individuals, in the dress of a different season or a different climate. As an ethnological hypothesis, it is unphilosophical and insufficient. We do not, in fact, know a single authority of a high order in ethnology, where it properly belongs, who has given in his adherence to it; while the really great names in that science, such as Prichard, Bunsen, Rask, Humboldt, &c., decisively reject and repudiate it. It is impossible that it should ever prevail. Indeed the very analogy with the vegetable and lower animal kingdoms, which originally suggested it, now falls away from its support. The separate vegetable and animal provinces or zones are all distinctly marked, and strictly coincide in the two kingdoms.

In the second place we have to say, that the hypothesis which ascribes the varieties of men to diversity of origin, fails to obviate the difficulties it was devised to relieve, or labours under others equally great. There is nothing really gained by it even in an anthropological point of view. We say this deliberately and advisedly, after a patient examination of the hypothesis in all the forms yet proposed, whether separately or combined. By taking the extreme abnormal departures from the standard type of the human race, a plausible argument is made out for a diversity of origins. But what we have now to affirm is, that whether three or eleven distinct centres of origin be assumed, we shall find among the races undeniably proceeding from a common source, diversities just as unaccountable, as on the hypothesis of a common origin for the whole.

Among the eastern branch of the Indo-European (Arian, Prichard,) nations, we have every hue of colour, from the "very fair, often with blue eyes, and with hair and beards curled, and of an auburn or red colour," as among the Kafirs of Kohistan and the Himalayas, down to the very dark and even jet black natives of the south of India, especially in the low agricultural castes, such as we have seen them ourselves. That they are all pure Indians has been proved beyond dispute by Ritter and Bopp.*

So the Arabs of Shegya, on the Nile above Dongola, of undisputably pure blood, are described by Mr. Waddington as "black—a clear, glossy, jet black." And Bruce describes the inhabitants of the high craggy mountains on the coast of Yemen, as having "red hair and blue eyes." And then as supplying the intermediate transition stage towards the negro type, and involving all the particulars of colour, hair, features, and skull, we have the Gallas of Abyssinia, described by Dr. Rüppel, with "dark complexion, round faces, obtuse and thick features, thick lips, hair thick, strongly frizzled and almost woolly, (*beinahe wolliges.*) In like manner we find among the Austra-

* See "Travels in the Himalaya," by James Bailey Fraser. Researches of Lord Mountstuart Elphinstone and Sir Alexander Burnes. Prichard's Nat. Hist. of Man.

lian family of nations, the extreme abnormal Negro type repeated, in distinct localities, which their isolation and language utterly forbid us to assign to the Negro zone.

The Negro is, in fact, itself an exaggerated and extreme representation of the African type, evidently due to the collective force of physical conditions perpetuated and exaggerated by the natural laws of reproduction; and varying extremely in different parts of the continent, and different portions of the same family. Any argument that will demand a separate origin for the African variety, will require a separate origin for the Negro and Hottentot sub-varieties.

In an exceedingly elaborate table on the ethnographical distribution of round and elongated crania, combined with the perpendicular or the prognathous profile, by Professor Retzius, in the proceedings of the British Association, for 1846, we find a complete network of these cranial and physiognomical variations, applied to each of the great divisions of the globe, which laughs to scorn any idea of classifying, permanently, the families of the human race, on any principles of the sort. Each of the forms, in all their possible combinations and transition stages, is found in every separate family of affiliated nations on the globe.

But it is impossible for us to present a tithe of the evidence before us, to the truth of the proposition, that whether we make few or many centres of origin, the difficulties of the subject are not met: and an ethnographic classification, founded on the hypothesis of a diversity of origins, would be an inconceivable absurdity. It groups together, as in the African, the Hyperborean, and still more in the Australian zoölogical province, the most diverse and incongruous elements of classification: and it separates others into distinct zones, which are clearly one in origin and history.

Our third, and we think decisive, point against the hypothesis is, that it ignores all settled ethnographical distributions, and runs a quixotic tilt against the profound researches, and rigorous scientific deductions of comparative philology. Professor Agassiz despatches the whole results of the untiring and amazing labours of nearly half the highest German intellect, for half a century, to say nothing of the countless scholars devoted to

the same pursuits in other countries, by the *naïve* remark, that men of different origins may talk alike, just as swallows hatched in different nests, twitter alike. It might be a curious problem, on this hypothesis, to explain how a Chinese swallow should twitter so very differently from an American. In truth the hypothesis was one of those rapid leaps of the generalizing faculties, in view of a single set of facts, in a man cultivated in that one direction, to a degree that makes his mental conformation all but abnormal. The moment new facts come to be applied, the theory breaks down.

We can only furnish a specimen or two of this description, in the present connection: and we shall give its advocates the advantage of selecting the extremest case of departure from the ideal human type: let us take the Hottentots of South Africa. They certainly belong to a distinct species, or a diverse origin, if there be such a thing, yet even this refractory case at last yields facts that are incompatible with the hypothesis.

It will hardly be contended that the Hottentots were a separate creation by themselves. This, we submit, would hardly fulfil the requirement of Horace—

> "Nec Deus intersit, nisi dignus vindice nodus
> Inciderit."

To what family, then, do they belong, and how far can we trace them towards a common origin with humanity? The first generalization will clearly include the next member of the African family—the Caffre—and yet he is as unlike the Hottentot on the one side, as he is unlike the chain of tribes reaching up both coasts to the equator. But still the identity rests on no vague analogy. We have positive proof. The languages are absolutely identical, in all the essential elements of one language. Even the inarticulate click of the tongue, so characteristic of the Bushman, is heard in some of the lower Caffre races. The transition from the one to the other is all but historical.

We are thus carried into the very midst of the great family of Congo dialects; and these again shade off, by almost insensible gradations, into idioms extending up the West coast to the Gambia and the Senegal—the proper home of the true typical Negro. There is no proposition more determinately settled than

the essential ethnological unity of the greatly diversified families of Southern, Western, and Central Africa.

In this stage of the research, the philological labours of our able countryman, the Rev. J. Leighton Wilson, are deserving of highly honourable mention, as resolving the problem in one portion of the generalization just stated.

The next step in setting this great African family of languages into connection with a common origin for the human race, brings us to the languages of Eastern Africa—Abyssinia, Nubia and the Valley of the Nile, especially the Gheez, the Galla, the Coptic and the Berber. It is now a settled point among ethnologists of every class, (unless we except the pure naturalists who class and affiliate families on purely anthropological grounds,) that these families of languages are all descended from an Asiatic stock. Bunsen, in a masterly and extended report presented to the British Association at Oxford, in anticipation of the remaining volumes of his great work on Egypt, argues this question out, and settles it, we think, beyond farther dispute. The only question that can be raised is, whether this class of African languages can be affiliated certainly with those of Western, Southern, and Central Africa. To this point Latham has directed special attention. "Unequivocal," says he, "as may be the Semitic elements of the Berber, Coptic and Galla, their affinities with the tongues of Western and Southern Africa are more so. I weigh my words when I say not *equally* but *more*. Changing the expression, for every foot of ground in advance which can be made towards the Semitic tongues in one direction, the African ethnologist can go a yard towards the Negro ones in the other."

The Gallas are, in fact, as nearly as possible, in every respect, midway between these two extremes; passing on the one side through the Abyssinian, the Nubian, the Berber and the Copt, into the recognized Caucasian, in the mummies and paintings of ancient Egypt, and on the other running into the Negro type, as pure as it can be found in Senegal itself, in the Negroes of Sennaar, on the very borders of Abyssinia. These physical characteristics may be cited in confirmation of the linguistic affiliation of Latham and Bunsen.

The generalizations and classifications of Dr. Latham, touching this point, are in perfect agreement with the prior and independent researches of Dr. Prichard, which comprehend also the anthropological aspects of the subject; and have since been adopted and confirmed by an elaborate paper in the Philological Transactions by Dr. Beke of Abyssinia, and by Tutscheck, Gablentz, and Krapf, of the Galla country, than whom there are no higher living authorities, in regard to questions pertaining to that family of languages. One of these Galla dialects runs four or five degrees south of the equator, and actually loses itself by merging into the Somali of Barawa.

The clear indications furnished by the great family of African languages and dialects, numbering in all more than a hundred, and so long regarded as wholly isolated from those which fall within the range of sacred and profane history, are now, therefore, universally received by ethnologists, as establishing a relation between this remote province of human civilization,—in its general characteristics, perhaps the most remote of all the great divisions of the human race—and the common centre of origin to which the Scriptures refer the beginnings of all human history.

It would doubtless be premature to affirm that comparative philology is yet prepared to render a definitive and final verdict upon the ultimate question of ethnology—the unity and common origin of the human race: but we hold ourselves fully authorized to say, that there are no dividing lines which any extant hypothesis of diversity of origins has laid down, which it has not already obliterated; and no arguments for such diversity yet produced, which it is not prepared to overthrow and scatter to the winds.

The great family of African languages has thus been traced, by the united researches chiefly of the Tutschecks, Gablentz, Krapf, Wilson, Beke, Bunsen, Prichard and Latham, (the fruits of whose labours are piled up before us while we write,) to a vital connection with the Asiatic stem either through the Semitic relations with the old Abyssinian tongues, or, as Bunsen maintains is more probable, through a colony of Hamites by whom Egypt was originally colonized; and whose language preserved, and now yields up to philological research, indubit-

able proofs of a common primitive relation existing between the Semitic and Japhetic, or Indo-European branches of the human family.

The great American family, regarded by the naturalists as furnishing the next clearest case of perfect isolation, in its origin and history, under the combined labours of Gallatin, Du Ponceau, Pickering, Alexander Humboldt, and Hale, has been brought into such relationship as to authorize general ethnologists like Prichard, Bunsen, and Latham, to lay it down as settled, 1. that all the countless and highly diversified languages of the western continent constitute but one great family, divided into a few subordinate groups, with some minor offshoots not yet placed:—a fact which is wholly inexplicable on any other hypothesis than that of ethnological affiliation; and 2. that this family displays so many and striking marks of analogy, in point of grammatical structure, and even amidst the general and wide discrepancies of its vocabulary, so many cases of obvious analogy in its roots, and its lexicographical forms, that Bunsen does not hesitate to pronounce it a scion of the great Turanian stock of Central Asia; and Latham, in his latest and maturest contribution to ethnology,* undertakes to trace the aboriginal American race, by the aid of philology, from Terra del Fuego to the North Eastern parts of Asia. We need scarcely add that the cranial conformation perfectly agrees with this philological result.

Still another and wholly independent line of investigation has led to a farther result in a different quarter, pointing to the same general conclusion. William Von Humboldt, in the elaborate and learned introduction to his great work on the Kawi tongues of the South East of Asia, has established, to the unanimous acceptance of the ethnologists of Europe, a clear connection between the widely diffused languages of Polynesia and the Kawi or Malay family, and thus brought them into relation with the Turanian or eastern branch of the great Asiatic stock. Thus again we have affiliated with the central province of Asia, a class of languages spoken by people who must constitute a separate division of the human race, if such

* Man and his Migrations; by R. G. Latham. New York, Charles B. Norton, 71 Chambers street.

a thing exists at all, inhabiting isolated and widely separated islands of the Pacific, reaching from Madagascar, on the very coast of Africa, to within 40° of the west coast of South America, girdling the globe to the extent of three-fifths, if not three-fourths of its entire equatorial circumference. If this result is accepted, and we see not how any man who reads the argument can fail to see its conclusiveness, (nor do we know any competent or respectable ethnologist who denies it,) both the necessity and the fact of diverse origins for the scattered families of the human race, seem to be reduced to an assumption as gratuitous and unnecessary, as it is destitute of sufficient proof.* If three-fifths of the circumference of the globe, separated by trackless oceans, can be peopled from one centre, by tribes differing, as the inhabitants of Polynesia and New Holland do, in all the points of diversity which divide the most dissimilar families of the race, it is surely unphilosophical to assume, without proof, distinct original creations for the continental populations of the remaining two-fifths.

As the remotest and most isolated human races have been brought into relation with the primitive stock of mankind, by the evidence furnished by a thorough study of their languages, we need not dwell on the more probable, if not palpable, inference, that the inhabitants of Central Asia, to whom these wide and diversified human migrations have been traced back, were really one in their origin. The hypothesis of Professor Agassiz does not require us to make different centres for families so nearly allied. It has long been known that all the leading nations of Central and Western Asia, and the whole of Europe, belonged to one great family. Prichard, in his masterly analysis of the Keltic tongues, made the last important addition to this family, by substituting the wider Indo-European, for the

* To preclude any possible charge of a *suppressio veri*, in the statement of this part of the argument, perhaps we ought to say, that there are two languages prevailing in Polynesia, while the text refers only to the Malayo-Polynesian. The Papuan languages have not yet been studied sufficiently to fix their relations with entire certainty. The prevailing impression, at the present moment is, that they are an independent stem from the same stock with the Polynesian proper,—older probably, less developed, and more degenerate. But there is certainly no likelihood that they will ever suggest the idea of a separate origin for the few Negroes who use them.

less comprehensive limits of the Indo-Germanic family. Professor Rask of Copenhagen, the great Scandinavian ethnologist and philologist, was, we believe, the first to suggest a hypothesis, (now familiarly known to ethnologists as the Finnic Hypothesis,) by which certain fragmentary and insignificant remnants of people scattered over Europe, and Asia also, (the most familiar of whom are the Basques of Biscay, and the Finns of the extreme north,) were brought into relation with the same teeming centre of population, in the heart of Asia. These are alleged to be the remains of a migration anterior even to the Keltic, and underlying, so to speak, and cropping out at the edges of the present European civilization, which is due to a succession of inundations from the same prolific source, the ethnological analogues of whom are still to be found in similar isolated spots in India itself—as exemplified by the mountain tribes of the Dekhan, who are destitute of caste, and differ in language, religion, government and social life, from the dominant races of Hindustan. Curiously enough, it is now alleged, that late excavations, penetrating beneath the oldest Gothic burying grounds, have brought to light skulls manifestly differing from those of the Keltic, or any of the later migrations, and yet bearing a clear and close resemblance to the scattered wandering tribes whom this hypothesis regards as the remnants of races which once covered this whole area, from Iceland to the mouth of the Ganges, and which, in their turn, as the organic affinities of the language clearly show, are only an older branch of the same great family—the Japhetic.*

The connection between the Indo-European or Iranian languages and nations, and the Turanian, or Eastern Asiatic, has been partially, but never quite fully investigated and determined.

* Among the works of high authority, on this department of the philological argument, we may mention Bopp, Burnouf, Lassen, Pott, Benfey, W. Humboldt, Lepsius and Höfer. The languages of Keltic origin have been investigated, independently, by Prichard, Bopp, Meyer, Rosen, the brother of Professor Rosen, of London University, and author of the Grammar of the important Ossetic languages of the Caucasus. And on the Meroïtic and Nubian, as collateral with the Egyptian, Lepsius is the great authority; while the Berber and connecting languages of the African family, in their Asiatic relationships, have been made accessible by Professor Newman of London. Many, very many of the evidences and authorities now lying before us, we are compelled to pass without a reference.

The great belt which runs across Asia, including Tartary, Mongolia, and Mantchouria, has been sufficiently explored to establish the fundamental identity of its languages.* The recent researches on the Ossetic family, spoken in the region of the Caucasus, have disclosed, unexpectedly, some most striking affinities with the most eastern side of the Turanian stock, which has led Dr. Latham from the careful comparison of their vocabularies, and Mr. Norris, the accomplished President of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, (strangely and unaccountably, we confess, to us,) to concur in the classification on the ground of their grammatical affinities.

For our own part, we are entirely satisfied that the true connecting link of the monosyllabic and inorganic languages, of which the Chinese may be taken as the type, will be found in the polysyllabic tongues of Siam, Burmah† and Thibet; the Bhotyah of Thibet furnishing the closest analogue of all.

But these are minor considerations in the great philological conclusion, touching the unity of origin of the human race; and however they may be decided, or whether they are ever decided at all, it is clear enough already, that the whole weight of authority, and (what is still more decisive,) the whole drift of research and discovery are in favour of the plain teaching of the sacred record, and are so held at this hour by the greatest names in philologico-ethnological science, with a unanimity which should be held conclusive on the point. While the immense multitude of new facts disclosed every year, especially in philological ethnology, utterly refuse to conform to any classification of races, that is conceivable upon the new hypothesis of diversity of origins, they all fall in with, and tend to establish more and more clearly, the scriptural account of a single origin from a single pair. It may, we think, be fairly claimed, that this strong and steady tendency in one direction, this constant and ready absorption of new facts as fast as they are discovered, actually, in effect, fulfils that decisive sign of

* See, on this point, the great work of Abel Remusat, *Sur les Langues Tartares.*

† Since writing the text, we see that Humboldt, in his "Kawi Sprache," argues strongly for the radical agreement of the Burmese and the Chinese.

all true inductions in science, viz., the power to predict future phenomena. The very last paper ever contributed to the science, by Dr. Prichard, distinguished by his achievements in comparative philology, as well as by his unrivaled scholarship in the anatomy, physiology and anthropology of the science, concludes with a remark made in the modesty so characteristic of a truly great mind—"I may venture to say, that with the increase of knowledge in every direction, we find continually less and less reason for believing that the diversified races of men are separated from each other by insurmountable barriers: and it is with much gratification that I find this to be the ultimate conviction of the great author of Kosmos." Testimony equally decisive might be added to any extent from the able and laboured argument of Bunsen, than whom there is no higher authority living upon all questions of general ethnology; and more especially upon such as hinge upon comprehensive and minute research, coupled with the most careful and scrupulous induction. After the fullest sifting of his materials, he enunciates as his conclusion, "the original unity of mankind, and a common origin of all languages of the globe."

ART. VII.—*Five Years in an English University*, by Charles Astor Bristed, late Foundation Scholar of Trinity College, Cambridge. 2 vols. G. P. Putnam, New York, 1852.

WHEN we first heard that these volumes of Mr. Bristed were in the press, we confidently expected that they would supply a want which many in this country have felt, of a work giving a clear and intelligible account of English University life. We took up Mr. Bristed's book, certain that we should find in it ample details respecting the English collegiate system, and the methods of education pursued in one of the most distinguished seats of learning in Britain. From the few productions of Mr.