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FREEDOM AND CAUSALITY

In Their Ethical Aspects

**Being the lectures delivered on the Reinecker Foundation at the
Protestant Episcopal Theological Seminary of
Virginia, December 1914.**

BY

JAMES R. HOWERTON,
Professor of Philosophy
Washington and Lee University

WITH AN INTRODUCTION

BY

REV. W. COSBY BELL, D. D.
Professor of Systematic Divinity
Protestant Episcopal Theological Seminary of Virginia

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Richmond, Va.



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INTRODUCTION

“You can shut up nothing within the scholar’s study door. For good or for mischief, all that the wisest are thinking becomes the basis on which the ignorant live.” So wrote Phillips Brooks in his Yale Lectures on Preaching, and he wrote with wisdom and insight. You can, indeed, shut up nothing within the scholar’s study-door. Ideas, conceived in speculative mood, sift downward and reappear as conduct; Materialism, a philosophy in the study, becomes a habit of life in the street; and Pessimism, a speculative theory in the hands of Schopenhauer and von Hartmann, becomes a pistol in the hands of the suicide. And it is only by recognizing this fact that we can get an adequate standpoint for estimating doctrines. We cannot judge them on a merely speculative basis, for they are not merely speculative; we cannot divorce a system from its practical consequences, for the consequences are an integral part of the system. We may begin by investigating the logical coherency of a point of view; but we must ever end by asking what it will look like when embodied in character. “By their fruits ye shall know them” is after all the final test.

The full recognition of this principle gives a peculiar value to the discussion of Freedom embodied in this volume. That subject has suffered more than most from unrestrained and wearisome dialectics. And, therefore, the correlation of reasoned theory and practical insight in this discussion is the more satisfying. The lectures possess, indeed, a combination of qualities too rare not to be appreciated. On the one side,

we have extremely close and accurate thinking backed by adequate scholarship and by a native philosophic grasp that especially impressed the lecturer's audience. On the other side, we have a faculty for apt illustration, a dexterity in the use of language, and a practical insight into the social and personal consequences of the two contrasted points of view with which the lectures deal. And this combination makes interesting reading out of the most severe and strenuous thinking. The author shows us the old struggle between Freedom and Determinism, too often regarded as merely academic, reappearing as a burning issue in the social movements of our time; in his hands the problem of the schools becomes a problem of the work-shops and the department stores.

The lectures were delivered on the Reinecker Foundation at the Theological Seminary in Virginia during the session of 1914-1915. Those whose good fortune it was to hear them are looking forward to giving them the thoughtful reading that they deserve. And, as one of that number, I am glad to have this share in presenting them to a wider circle. They will be of use alike to the technical student and to all those who are interested in approaching the social questions of our time on their profounder side. The lectures are the outcome of thought of a high order; they will provoke thought in those into whose hands they come; to the thoughtful they are commended.

W. COSBY BELL.

February 15, 1915.

PREFACE.

The first two of the lectures in this little volume are taken from my unpublished lectures on the Theory and Method of Ethics, with such arrangement and condensation as was necessary to adapt them to the occasion of their delivery and to separate publication. I reserve to myself the liberty of republishing them in their proper connection, should the whole course of lectures ever be published.

There is, of course, nothing new in these lectures; and advanced students of philosophy will easily recognize the sources. I have tried to do nothing more, at best, than to bring this discussion within the reach of less advanced students. The subject, however, is so difficult that it is impossible to make it popular in any broad sense of the term.

I wish to express my thanks to the faculty of the Theological Seminary of Virginia for the opportunity to deliver these lectures before their students, and to Dr. Bell for his kindness in writing the introduction.

J. R. H.

FIRST LECTURE.
The Antinomy of Causality and Freedom.

I

INTRODUCTORY.

Among the seven world enigmas cited by Emil duBois-Reymond, in his famous "ignorabimus" speech before the Berlin Academy in 1880, quoted by Haeckel in *The Riddle of the Universe*, is that of the Freedom of the Will. DuBois-Reymond considers it extremely difficult, if not impossible, of solution, Haeckel says that it is "pure dogma" based on an illusion.

The great majority of thinkers would agree with duBois-Reymond that it is probably the most difficult problem ever presented to the human understanding. Psychology is the most difficult of all the sciences, and of all the problems which psychology presents to us, that of the will is the most mysterious. The necessitarian thinks that he has solved it, but he has solved it as Columbus balanced the egg—by breaking it. For him there is no freedom,—it is a mere delusion. The libertarian thinks that he has solved it, but he has done so as Alexander solved the Gordian knot,—by cutting it. He has cleanly severed all relation between volition and the motives which precede it. It would seem that if the logical result of determinism is a remorseless fate, that of libertarianism is arbitrary chance. This is a question which has not only perplexed the minds of earnest men, but has given rise to the most bitter controversies, and has even led to actual war. It has divided the Church into contending sects, and has made cross-divisions in both Catholic and Protestant churches. It has divided both

the philosophers and the theologians. In theology it marked the difference between Augustinians and Pelagians, and in later times between Calvinists and Arminians. When it is charged that the predestinarian theory makes God the author of sin, it is retorted that the libertarian theory denies all foreknowledge to God, all power to govern the universe of His own creation, and, if carried to its logical results, denies to God the power to foresee or to determine even his own acts. In philosophy the problem has been no less difficult and the dispute scarcely less acrimonious. If determinism seems to lead to singularism which swallows up the universe into an All-One,—making little difference whether we call it matter or spirit, the Pantheos or the Absolute or the Substance—indeterminism, on the other hand, seems to lead to a pluralism which dissipates the universe into an infinite number of infinitesimal monads, every one possessing a capricious will of its own, with no explanation of the possibility of their influencing one another in such a way as to bring order out of this chaos of chance.

In spite of the time and ability spent on this age-long controversy, it seems no nearer solution than it was two thousand years ago. Haeckel boasted, just at the close of the nineteenth century, that the question had been at last settled in favor of the most rigid determinism, yet within the first decade of the twentieth century have arisen such champions of freedom as James Ward, Eucken and Bergson.

It is not within the purpose of the present lectures to add to the theological discussion of this question, still less to attempt a solution of the metaphysical prob-

lems involved. But the question has most important ethical aspects, and that not only theoretical but practical. This has always been so, but never has the matter had more important or pressing interest of a practical nature than in our own day. The prevalence of idealistic ethics, with its theory of a moral end, not only for the individual but for society as an organism, with its attendant movement for social reform, has made the question of causality within the moral sphere, with the closely related question of the adaptability of means to moral ends, individual and social, and their compatibility with human freedom and responsibility, a practical question of the highest importance. I make no apology for discussing this aspect of the question before the students of a theological seminary, for, in that enlarged field of usefulness which lies before the Church and her ministry during the coming generation, no class of men will have a greater influence in promoting such ideals than the ministry, and no class of men are more in need of clear convictions on this subject.

II

THE TWO SCIENCES OF CONDUCT.

There are two distinct sciences which go by the name of Ethics. Both of these sciences deal with human actions and conduct, with motives and volitions, feelings and emotions, pains and pleasures, joys and sorrows, plans and purposes, dispositions and characters. Both sciences treat these data from the social as well as the individual aspect. Both sciences have their theoretical as well as their practical aspects. But they

deal with the same facts under distinct categories, and this makes a fundamental difference both in their theoretical and practical aspects. They are related to each other, as all sciences are related to one another; but until philosophy sets about the task of determining that relation, these two sciences called by the name of Ethics may pursue their courses in entire independence of each other. They do not necessarily exclude or contradict each other, unless it be found that the categories under which they respectively arrange their data are in irreconcilable conflict.

For purposes of distinction we may call one of these sciences the Natural science of Ethics, and the other we may call, even at the expense of etymological tautology, the Moral science of Ethics. We must reserve the right, however, ultimately to give to the Natural a wider meaning than any which would be exclusive of the Moral, and to give the Moral a meaning which would interpret the Natural.

The Natural science is concerned simply with the question as to how men DO think, feel and behave. It is a science of conduct simply. It arranges all its data under the category of cause and effect. It seeks to show the phenomenally causal relations between thoughts, feelings and volitions; between these and overt actions; between the individual and his environment, consisting of the physical world, other individuals like himself, and the various corporate organizations of such individuals. It seeks the cause of human conduct, and also its effect, both upon the agent himself and upon other individuals, in its consequences of pleasure and pain, of benefit or injury to life, and in

promoting or retarding individual and social welfare. Man is viewed in this science simply as an object among other objects in nature, and the relation between him and them is not regarded as essentially different from their relation to one another. He is capable of being acted upon by forces outside himself, and of reacting in his turn upon those forces. His thoughts, feelings and volitions are regarded merely as objective or objectified phenomena, not differing in their phenomenally causal relations from those of other animals, or from the phenomena of vital, chemical or physical forces. With the question of the human will or of freedom this science has no concern, except when such a theory of freedom is propounded as would destroy all causal relation whatever between motive and will, between desire and its object, between man and his environment,—such a theory, in short, as would subject all human actions to capricious chance and make any orderly arrangement of them impossible. This science has no concern with the question of the intrinsic or relative moral quality of motives and actions, but only with their adaptation as means to desired ends. It has no concern with the question of good or ill desert, but only with the consequences of actions, and no concern with rewards and punishments except as means of inciting to or restraining from certain kinds of action. It has no concern with the truth or validity of the moral and religious beliefs of mankind, but only with their psychological effects and their result in conduct. It is concerned with human character and dispositions only as natural phenomena, resulting from natural causes and

resulting in natural effects. The test of the accuracy of such a science is its ability to predict human conduct under given conditions. It is not yet, and may never become, as Mr. Leslie Stephens says, an exact science in the same sense as chemistry or physics, but that is only because the forces are so complicated in their interaction and the phenomena so difficult of observation and experiment, not because of any essential difference in the relations between the phenomena. It differs from such sciences as meteorology or the science of weather differs from them,—in greater degree of complexity, but not in kind.

Such a science may have many practical applications. It is useful to the politician seeking votes, to the advertiser seeking business, to the social reformer seeking amelioration of vice and misery, or to the revivalist seeking converts. It may be used by privileged classes in exploiting their fellow men for their own pleasure, or by the philanthropist in seeking the happiness of the greatest possible number of his fellow men. It is of the highest degree of usefulness to the Moralists in seeking the virtue as well as the happiness of individual men or in seeking the consummation of a social ideal.

Now in thus regarding man with his motives and actions as *objects* to be inductively studied the natural science of ethics is not bound to contradict those affirmations of man concerning himself as a *subject* which are implicit in the very exercise of all his cognitive and conative powers, such as his self-hood or his personality, his self-determination, or his judgments of the moral values of his own motives, or his

judgments of obligation and desert. It merely ignores them, leaving all these questions to the moral science. So long as it merely ignores these subjective self-affirmations, the moral science of ethics can have no quarrel with it, but, on the contrary, may find it an indispensable means to its own practical application. But if the natural science claims to be the *only* science of ethics, contending that its conclusions have not only shown these subjective affirmations of self-consciousness to be illusory, but have invalidated the very categories under which the moral science arranges its facts, there ensues, of course, a very serious quarrel.

The Moral science is concerned with the questions as to how men OUGHT to think, feel and behave; as to what they ought to become and ought to Be. Of course it must deal with the facts as to what men do and what they are, but always with reference to the standard of what they ought to do and to be. It is concerned with truth not merely in the sense of fact but in the sense of right, with falsehood not only in the sense of ignorance or error, but in the sense of wrong. It must deal with causes and effects of conduct, but always with reference to moral ends and duties; it must deal with the consequences of action, but always with reference to Desert. It seeks to show the moral, as well as the causal, relation between thoughts, feelings and volitions; between motives and conduct; between conduct and moral ends; between man and his fellow man; between man and his environment both physical and social. While denying none of the facts or relations which constitute the materials and the framework of the natural science, it

claims that when these facts are viewed subjectively the moral relation supervenes and compels a re-interpretation of all these facts and relations under the moral categories. While not denying any or all causal relation between man and his environment, it asserts that the supervening of the moral relation compels a distinction of the *kind* of causal relation between man and his environment from that between impersonal objects which constitute that environment. The new order of causation is not only a final causation as distinguished from a mechanical causation, but is a final causation with a *moral* end,—an obligated end as distinguished from a merely desired end. The cognitive and the conative powers of man must be distinguished from the forces of an objective nature, at least as man ordinarily interprets those forces. Unlike the natural science, the moral science is concerned with the validity of the subjective self-affirmations of consciousness, both as to their own nature and as to the truth beyond their own phenomenal existence. The unity, identity and continuity of the self, the freedom of self-determination, the judgments of moral values implicit in the exercise of the conative powers, the moral feelings and sentiments, are not mere psychological phenomena to the moral scientist, but they are *truths* without which his science could not be.

Now the natural science would have no quarrel with the moral science, unless the moral science should impugn the phenomenal order of causation, and should demand, as one of its premises, such a theory of man's self-determination as would make impossible *any causal relation whatever* between man and his environ-

ment, thereby excluding man from the objects with which natural science could deal.

Now this is just our problem; are freedom and causality within the moral sphere contradictory opposites in such sense that if there is freedom there is no causality, if there is causality there is no freedom? If so, then either the natural or the moral science of human conduct is a system of illusions, depending upon which of the alternatives we may accept. If all man's conative powers are simply the product of the development of a nervous organism under conditions objective to sense experience, if all his motives are the result of the reactions of this organism to experiences of pleasure and pain, and if what we call his will is nothing more than the final result of such contending forces thus acting upon such feelings, then, clearly, the moral science of ethics becomes impossible. On the other hand, if there is no causal relation whatever between man and his environment, if, even when all complexities and involutions have been resolved, there is no *law* to be discerned in human conduct, if there is no uniformity in the character and operation of man's conative powers, if the will is an arbitrary faculty which may and does run counter to every known motive, then, just as clearly, a natural science of human conduct becomes impossible. Hence the conflict between the two schools. Is this conflict irreconcilable? Is there any theory of freedom which leaves possible any kind of causal relation between man and nature; and is there any theory of such causal relation which will leave to man any freedom consistent with morality?

Now it is not the purpose of these lectures to attempt

a resolution of this antinomy; rather the contrary, to show that its resolution is impossible, and why it is impossible; to show that extreme views on either side lead to consequences which invalidate their own premises—that both the libertarian and necessitarian arguments, pressed to their logical conclusions, constitute a *felo de se*; and that the contradiction, therefore, cannot be real, but seeming, its resolution lying above or beyond the limitations of human thought. With especial reference to the ethical question, we shall attempt to show that the scientist of the naturalistic school of ethics who insists upon an essentially mechanistic causal relation between man and his environment, with man as the passive element, thereby invalidates, not only the moral science, but his own science; and that the moralist of the other school, in denying all causal relation between motive and volition, thereby destroys the moral science of ethics as well as the natural science; that therefore the truth *must* lie, not *between* these two extremes within the same plane, but *above* them in, so to speak, another dimension of thought.

III

NECESSITARIANISM VS. LIBERTARIANISM.

In this discussion I prefer to use the older terms, necessitarian and libertarian, to designate the opposing schools, rather than the terms now in common use, determinists and indeterminists; first, because it is one of the points at issue whether or not all determinism is necessitarian, and secondly, because the word libertarian has a positive significance while the

word indeterminist is negative. The use of the words determinist and indeterminist would imply in advance that the contradiction is real and absolute.

A part of the difficulties of this subject are verbal difficulties, of some of which we may rid ourselves once for all by discarding the term "freedom of the will." In dividing the mind into so-called "faculties," even if we call them by some other name, we must always guard against regarding these as parts or organs of the soul or as powers which exist or act independently of one another or of the total self. The intellect is the power to think, the heart is the power to feel, the conscience is the power to make moral judgments, the will is the power to choose and act. But it is the same "I" who thinks, feels, judges and wills, and it is the total self which acts in all. We are obliged to use substantive nouns for these powers and processes, but we must correct the tendency to hypostatize and objectify them by continually referring them to the verbs with their one subject,—*I think, feel and will*,—apart from which the nouns are meaningless abstractions. When we say "will" then, if we mean anything at all by it, we mean the power to choose and to act. The question then is not whether "my will" is free to choose, but whether *I* am free to choose.

"Freedom of the will" is a tautological expression. The real question at issue is whether there is any will or not. If the necessitarian theory be true then what we call will is nothing but an illusory phenomenon of consciousness. On the other extreme, the libertarian theory makes the will a distinct entity or faculty independent of the intellect or the feelings. Out of this

confusion of language has grown a great deal of confusion of thought, and we talk about the power of motives to determine the will, or the will's independence of motives, as if motives and will were separate and distinct entities.

The necessitarian theory, broadly stated, is that what we call volition is simply an effect of which the motives are the efficient cause. These motives in turn are the effect of a combination of two series of causes, one of which consists of the nature of the agent himself re-acting necessarily to external stimulations, the other of which consists of the environment of the agent constituting the source of such stimulations. The nature of the agent in turn is the effect of a series of causes, objective to the agent and antedating his existence, and with which, therefore, he has had nothing whatever to do. The environment is of course equally beyond his control. Given then such a nature and the environment in which it is placed, the resulting reaction in conduct is as absolutely and necessarily determined as any chemical reaction. Any change which may be wrought either within his own nature or within his environment by the conduct of the agent himself *after* consciousness has supervened upon the process is as necessarily determined as anything which may have affected his nature or environment *before* consciousness began. The illusion of freedom is due to the agent's ignorance of the complexity of his own nature and of the external stimulations which may be operating upon it. Hesitation, or what seems to be deliberation, is nothing more than the oscillations of a balance which *must* settle finally on the side of the greatest weight.

Materialism is of course fatalistic in the most extreme sense. The nature of man, including both thought and feeling, being itself the result of physical causes, the determination of choice in any direction is as purely a physical phenomenon as the falling of a stone or the rising of a balloon. The good man and the bad man differ from each other only as food from poison. The purest wife and mother differs from the vilest strumpet only as the flower differs from the dung heap. Hate, malice, envy, lust, and all so-called vices differ from love, pity, veracity, justice and all so-called virtues, only as foul odors differ from fragrant perfumes. Pantheism is equally fatalistic whether stated in its Substance or in its Subject forms. Every thing that is is either a mode of which the Pantheos is the substance, or a thought or volition of which IT—we cannot say HE—is the subject; which, being impersonal and unconscious, is fatalistically determined in its willing and thinking. Predestinarian theism has been sometimes so stated as to make it difficult if not impossible to distinguish it from fatalistic pantheism.

Now it is manifest that no necessitarian theory, whether materialistic, pantheistic, or theistic, can be consistent with our judgments of moral value or quality, or of obligation, or of desert and responsibility. There can be no moral quality of either good or bad in being or doing that which is the result of a chain of fatalistic causes, whether that chain be traced through what we may call matter or spirit. There can be no obligation to do or not to do what we cannot help doing. There can be no desert or responsibility for such conduct and no more for such character. Even on this the-

ory we might still blame the bad man for his evil deeds, but our blame would be as much necessitated as the deeds for which we blame him. If he plead that he cannot help sinning we plead that no more can we help blaming him. There is neither justice nor injustice in our condemnation as there is neither good nor evil in his conduct.

Now it is one of the paradoxes which abound in the discussion of this subject that belief or disbelief in freedom itself has a causal efficiency in determining conduct. The libertarian, even though he may deny causality within the moral sphere, must admit that belief in his own freedom and responsibility is an incentive to duty. Even from the standpoint of naturalistic ethics, there can be no question that the belief of the great mass of mankind in their freedom and responsibility has always been one of the most effective restraints upon vice and one of the most powerful incentives to virtue, even though it be illusory. If it be illusory and all mankind could be thoroughly convinced of it, no restraints would be left upon vice except the fear of pain, and even that would be effective only when it was stronger than passion. If this theory were true, then such progress in science and philosophy as would destroy the illusion of freedom would be the most terrible calamity that could befall mankind. Education would become an incentive to vice and crime. Those who first discovered these things might still continue for awhile to live under the influence of the moral illusions of their forefathers, but as such theories worked their way down through the lower ranks of society and through succeeding generations they would inevitably make this earth a hell.

We are thus confronted with the singular dilemma that if freedom is true the belief in it can have no causal efficiency in determining conduct and is therefore of no practical importance; or if it has practical importance then it is an illusion. The very fact that such reasoning leads to such a conclusion is proof that there is a flaw in it somewhere.

The necessitarian theory, of course, renders impossible any *moral* science. But it also invalidates natural science. When the moral value of truth is gone, and when, if there be any difference, the lie is better than the truth, the highest incentive for the pursuit of philosophy and science has gone with it. Pragmatism in its most extreme form, which makes a useful lie better than a dangerous truth, would be the only refuge for philosophy. Pious fraud would be the only recourse for religion. We should have to return to the method of the Egyptian priests, to make the truth an esoteric religion, and give to the people an exoteric religion of useful falsehoods.

But the matter goes still deeper. The necessitarian abandons the only ground on which he can make any distinction between truth and error about this and every other question. If character, motive and volition, whether right or wrong, are the necessary products of an objective nature, so are reason and its conclusions, whether true or false. Belief in freedom and belief in necessity are both necessitated, *and of the same kind of necessity*,—a blind mechanical necessity. There remains, therefore, not only no test of either view as true or false, but no real distinction between them as true or false. Believe whichever you please, for whichever

you believe you *must* so believe; and it makes no difference which you believe, for either is true and neither is true,—for there is no truth. The same logic which would make the will an effect of a system of nature objective to itself and thus destroy moral values and distinctions, would also make reason the effect of the same system and thus destroy the quality of truth and the distinction between the true and the false.

Still further, the whole necessitarian argument is based upon the validity of the principle of cause and effect. But as we shall see more fully later on, the only reason we have for believing in a causal relation between objective phenomena is to be found in our self-consciousness of that causal efficiency of our own which we exercise in willing. Without that, the senses would never give us anything more than phenomenal antecedence and sequence,—even if they gave that. If now we find that that causal efficiency of the self is an illusion, then we have no reason for believing in any causation at all. The necessitarian argument thus constitutes a *felo de se*. If we posit will, we posit causality; but if we deny causality, then we may posit freedom; and so on *ad infinitum*. The necessitarian theory, for these reasons, cannot be true.

The libertarian theory, in that extreme form which contends for what is known as the liberty of indifference, is exactly the contradictory of the necessitarian. Fearing that the admission of any causal relation between motive and choice, between desire and volition, would lead back into this series of fatalistic causes, the libertarian contends that the will is an absolutely independent power of contrary choice, undetermined

by motives. Freedom is a liberty of indifference to choose between motives. Now he is confronted with this familiar dilemma: If, when the two motives are being weighed, the will is a power to choose between the two, then either there is a third motive for this choice between the two, or there is no such motive. If there is such a motive, then this third motive would seem to be the determining cause of the choice, and the libertarian theory falls to the ground. If there is no such motive, then the choice is not only arbitrary and contingent in the absolute sense, but it is also without character, moral or otherwise.

This theory certainly renders the natural science of ethics impossible, since any law or uniformity of human conduct would be impossible, and all would be reduced to absolute chance. But with equal certainty it renders any moral science of ethics impossible, since there would be nothing left upon which to base any judgment of moral quality, obligation or desert. If conscience and passion are in conflict in the mind of any agent, and he should decide in favor of conscience, there would be no merit in the action; for to say that he made the choice because it was right would be to say that the judgment and feeling of duty determined his volition, which would be contrary to the theory. If he should decide in favor of passion, there would be no demerit in the action, for the evil passion would not be the determining motive.

Martineau, for example, in his zeal to vindicate the conditions of moral responsibility, has impaled himself upon the second horn of this dilemma. All his "springs of action" are something different from the

essential self,—forces acting upon the self, between which the self must choose by resisting the one and yielding to the other. Our affections and desires are “mere spontaneities” and can never be anything else until two of them contend for supremacy, and the Will, *as a something else*, decides between them, undetermined by either. As, according to him, “we never judge spontaneities,” the objects of our moral judgments are confined to volitions, and volition is whittled down to so fine a point that nothing is left to which we can attribute any static moral quality,—nothing which can constitute a character. Therefore, not only animal appetites, but Love, the Moral Sentiments, the Sentiments of Truth, can have no inherent moral quality, cannot be regarded as moral attributes of the soul, and cannot constitute a character which in turn constitutes an objective moral end. He is thus involved in the paradox inevitable to the libertarian view; he denies moral quality to the “springs of action” as being “mere spontaneities,” makes the will a colorless power of volition which can have no moral quality of its own, yet conditions the moral quality of the choice upon the difference in the comparative worthiness of these very spontaneities.

If this theory of the will were true, character would be a meaningless term. For, not only would there not be any more antecedent probability, to say nothing of certainty, that the good man would do good or that the bad man would do evil than exactly the reverse; but their characters would have no moral value when they were not exercising choice. All men would be equally good when they were asleep. If there is such a thing

as character the voluntary cannot be limited to the volitional. There is a *habitus* of consent, and it is just this *habitus* which constitutes moral character. On a thoroughgoing libertarian theory the element of chance would be substituted for that of necessity, and chance is as destructive of moral quality in conduct as fate.

Furthermore, what is even more important to the immediate purpose of this discussion, under such a theory there could be no moral end, either individual or social. For an aretist or virtue theory of ethics of the idealistic type, which regards perfection of moral character in ourselves and others as a moral end to be attained by the use of means, demands more than that *motive* must determine *action* in order to give it moral value. *Action must also determine motive and character; and that not only of the agent himself in its reflex consequences, but of other persons in its transitive consequences; and that too, under a system of law, at once natural and moral, whereby the aretic* consequences of conduct may be foreseen and provided for.*

We have to determine the moral quality of conduct, and consequently duty, not only by the moral quality of a motive as its source, but by the moral quality of character as its end. We judge conduct to be virtuous or vicious, not only as it may be inspired by a virtuous or a vicious motive, but as it tends to promote virtuous or vicious motives in ourselves and others, as it tends to promote love or hate, justice or injustice, truth or falsehood. All this would be impossible under any thoroughgoing theory of indeterminism. Neither could my present conduct have any effect in promoting love,

*Note. A word which I have coined to express the consequences in virtue and vice in distinction from hedonic or consequences in pleasure and pain.

justice or truth in myself or others, nor could the development of those traits of character in myself or others have any determining effect upon my or their future conduct. There could be neither reflex nor reciprocal effect of conduct upon character either as between man and man or as between man and society. Good laws and institutions, civil, social and religious, would be powerless for good in determining the character and conduct of men as bad laws and institutions would be powerless for harm. Social reform would become a meaningless term. Certainly it could have no ethical meaning. A moral end, whether in self or other individuals or in society would become impossible. Freedom is as impossible without design as is design without freedom; but there can be no design without causality, without the use and choice of means which are effective in attaining the end. If therefore freedom and causality are irreconcilable contradictories, then the very term "moral end" is a solecism, for the moment that it becomes an end it ceases to be moral.

Since both these theories lead to absurd and contradictory conclusions, *the truth must lie somewhere, if not between, then above these two extremes*, which, when viewed as lying upon the same plane objective to thought, appear to be contradictory, each of itself as well as each of the other.

SECOND LECTURE.

The Source of the Antinomy in the Conditions of
Thought.

IV
THE FALLACY OF OBJECTIFYING SUBJECTIVE
REALITIES.

Even a child, when he asks a reasonable question, if he cannot be answered, is entitled to be told why he cannot be answered. If we cannot find a satisfactory solution of the dilemma of freedom and causality, yet we ought to be able to give ourselves a reason why such a solution cannot be found. If the mind cannot find the rest which comes from the solution of a problem, it may yet find the rest which results from learning that the problem is insoluble and why it is so.

Mr. William James says in a related connection:

“Well, what must we do in this tragic predicament? For my own part, I have finally found myself compelled to *give up the logic*, fairly, squarely, and irrevocably. It has an imperishable use in human life, but that use is not to make us theoretically acquainted with the essential nature of reality. * * * * * Reality, life, experience, immediacy, use what word you will, exceeds our logic, overflows and surrounds it. If you like to employ words eulogistically, as most men do, and so encourage confusion, you may say that reality obeys a higher logic, or enjoys a higher rationality. But I think that even eulogistic words should be used rather to distinguish than to commingle meanings, so I prefer bluntly to call reality if not irrational then at least non-rational in its constitution.”*

*A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 212, 213.

If we are to define logic in the restricted sense in which Mr. James uses it, then we must follow his example and give up the logic. But it is logic which leads us to the conclusion that we must give up the logic. It would be a very singular conclusion that reason leads us to regard that reality of which reason itself is an essential element as non-rational. It would seem that if reality does transcend logic, then logic certainly cannot positively affirm that reality is non-rational. At the risk of "using words eulogistically and thereby encouraging confusion," we prefer to say that reality is rational in a sense which transcends the merely logical, —in the sense in which Mr. James uses logic.

But, after all, the trouble is not with the logic. It is with the kind of logic, or rather with the way logic is used. The whole trouble grows out of the objectification of subjective and intuitive truths, treating them in the same way as concepts obtained by abstraction from *a posteriori* percepts, subsuming them under the same classes with objective things, and positing the same relations between subjects or between the subject and its object as the subject posits between objective things. If God is brought into the discussion he also is objectified, and the alternative is presented of regarding Him as not only subjecting the universe to a rigid necessity of predestination but as being Himself being subjected to the same necessity, or else of regarding Him as helpless to govern the universe or to direct His own acts in accordance with wisdom, justice and love. If the relations which we posit between objective things are grounded in thought in the one thinking subject, they must be grounded in reality in the One

Creative Subject; the objective *relations* therefore cannot be regarded as objective *things*, nor can the relations between subjects or between the subject and its object be treated by the same logical processes as the relations between objects. The human mind can neither affirm the same relations between itself, the thinking subject, and the object of its thought, nor between God the Creative Subject and the created object, as it posits between objective things.

The metaphysicians themselves have made the major part of the difficulties under which they labor by this persistent habit of regarding subjective or intuitive realities as unknown or unknowable unless they can be perceived, conceived, and treated by the same logical processes as objective things. The philosopher seems unwilling to be convinced that he *can* see by the fact that he *does* see, but must in some way *look at* his own eyes and thus determine whether or not they are capable of seeing. If his conclusion agrees with that of common sense, then common sense may congratulate itself; if not, then so much the worse for common sense.

Since this is the crux of the whole matter, and since the above language may be unintelligible to those who are not accustomed to the philosophical jargon it will be necessary to explain it more in detail.

In respect of the source of their data, sciences are usually divided into two great classes, the Mental and the Physical. Much more important to our purpose is another division depending upon whether the data are facts or phenomena *objective* to the mind—that is distinguished from itself by the thinking subject; or whether they are truths which are implicitly involved

in the very processes of the thinking subject,—truths subjectively and intuitively perceived, truths so involved with the very existence of the thinking subject and the activity and validity of its thought that to deny them would be to invalidate all reasoning. This distinction is not exactly co-terminous with that of the distinction between the mental and physical. While in the physical world the phenomena are objective to us, (at least generally so regarded) yet there are *relations* between objective phenomena which are necessarily affirmed by the mind itself in the process of its knowing and reasoning about these phenomena. Such, for example, are the time and space relations and the causal relations. While the phenomena only are under consideration the only possible judgment which we can form about them is an *a posteriori* or empirical judgment and the only possible science of them must be an inductive science. But when the relations themselves are under consideration our judgments concerning them are *a priori* and the sciences which deal with them must be deductive as in mathematics. The one is a synthesis of *facts* or *phenomena* under *a priori* relations, the other is a synthesis of *truths*.

On the other hand, in the mental sciences the data are not always wholly subjective, since they may be regarded, at least for the time, as partially or relatively objective. We may *objectify* our mental phenomena, that is, we may, for the time being, regard the feelings or thoughts which we have experienced and which memory retains, *as though they were objects*, something different from that subjective state of consciousness to which they are at the moment the passive objects of

study. We may thus observe, compare and classify them, and make our inferences as to their nature and laws by a purely inductive process. Our sensations, our perceptions, our recollections, imaginations, dreams, our judgments and reasonings, our feelings and our volitions, our æsthetic, moral and religious sentiments, may thus be objectified and inductively studied, while we postpone all inquiry into the validity of their assertions concerning themselves or the existence of anything beyond themselves. We may add to this method of introspective induction that of the observation of the phenomena of other minds, and, so far as they are manifested by physical signs, we may use the same methods of experiment in dealing with them as in the physical sciences. Thus we get the science of empirical or inductive psychology.

But we are in danger of very serious error if we follow this process too far without taking into consideration the other or subjective aspect of mental phenomena. Mental phenomena, unlike the physical, are not all mere passive objects of study. Many of the very facts which we have thus objectified and treated as phenomena are subjectively involved in those very processes by which we study them. They are, so to speak, aware of themselves, aware of our study of them and of the disposition we may make of them, and are by no means indifferent to that disposition. In every process of psychological introspection there is an "I" and a "ME." There results the constant danger of what is known as the psychologist's fallacy. This may take two forms. The "I" may impute to the particular aspects of the "ME" which are, for the time being,

the passive objects of its study, qualities or powers which do not properly belong to them, but are at that very moment involved in the active processes of the "I." Thus we may attribute to sensations powers which do not belong to them but to the mind which is studying them. Or the "I," misled by some inductive theory, may deny to the total self-essential powers because it does not find them in the "ME" while the "I" itself may be using those very powers to disprove their own existence. In that case the psychologist is like the man who is sawing off the limb on which he is sitting between himself and the tree. Hence we may lay down the canon as all important. **NO INDUCTIVE CONCLUSION ABOUT THE MIND ITSELF OR ITS ESSENTIAL POWERS DRAWN FROM THE STUDY OF OBJECTIFIED MENTAL PHENOMENA CAN INVALIDATE THE POWERS WHICH ARE INVOLVED IN THE VERY PROCESSES OF INDUCTION.** The inductive conclusions of every science must sooner or later be tested by this canon. In the physical sciences the circuit is very large. Not until natural science becomes speculative and propounds a theory to account for the mind itself does the issue arise. But every materialistic or naturalistic system does thus invalidate not only its own premises but its methods of reasoning. In psychology however, the circuit is much shorter. The mind very soon comes back from the examination of its own powers as phenomena or objects of study to the question of the validity of those same powers as processes of study.

Now there are some facts about our mental processes which can *never* be known as phenomena or

objects. As well might we expect to take out our own eyes and look *at* them, or to remain seated while we got up and looked at ourselves from behind, or to turn around quickly enough to see our own backs. We may thus know an image or representation of such powers, but not the very power itself in the process of acting. We no sooner make it an *object* of knowledge than it assumes the position of the knowing subject. No matter how often we attempt it the thing we wish to know eludes us in just this way.

Are such truths then not to be known at all? *On the contrary, they are the best known of all.* How then do we know them? Why, *in the very act of knowing.* To illustrate; I can take off my spectacles and look *at* them and thus learn something about them. But there is something that I can never know about these glasses except by putting them on and looking *with* them *at* something else. Though the glasses are not now my *objects*, but have become, so to speak, part of the subjective process, I now know something about them that I could never have learned in any other way. So, in the very act of experiencing and studying an objective world I know something about myself and my mental powers that I could never learn by looking *at* those powers or by an inductive study of them.

It would be most extraordinary if, from looking at my eyes in a glass, I should come to the conclusion that I cannot see with my eyes. Yet it is precisely a similar conclusion to which some inductive theories of psychology seem to lead about the mind itself. The unity, identity and continuity of selfhood or personality is not to be found among psychological phenomena so

long as they are regarded merely as objectified phenomena, nor can it be inferred by any inductive conclusion from those phenomena. So long as they occupy that standpoint, Hume and his successors are exactly right in affirming that there is no such thing as a self or a soul, but that it is a mere sum or succession of mental processes. But the psychologist who for that reason infers that there is no self is like the absent-minded man who is looking for his spectacles while he has them on and concludes that they are lost because he can't find them.

While inductive psychology therefore has its legitimate sphere, it neither exhausts the field of mental research nor is it conclusive in its results. After we have collected, compared and arranged our mental phenomena and have studied them by inductive methods, we must return to their subjective aspects, their affirmations about their own nature and their witness to truth beyond themselves, and study them by critical and exegetical methods. The testimony of our mental phenomena to truth beyond their own phenomenal existence may be turned over to the natural sciences, to pure mathematics, to logic, ethics or metaphysics, according to the nature of the content of such testimony. The witness of our mental phenomena to their own nature and validity is, in modern philosophy, turned over to a science called epistemology. But psychology and epistemology are so closely related, and the conclusions of psychology are so immediately dependent upon those of epistemology, that the separation of the two is questionable to say the least.

V

THE OBJECTIFICATION OF THE CONATIVE POWERS.

Now, *mutatis mutandis*, all this applies to our conative powers as well as to our cognitive powers. When we objectify ourselves and classify ourselves with the objects of our environment, when we objectify desires and classify them with their objects, when we objectify intellect, emotions and will, and reason about their relations to one another either as faculties or as processes, when we objectify and distinguish motive and volition, we are thereby making *things* of them all, and the only relations which we can affirm of them are the relations which we posit between things. If there are other relations we can never know them by this process; and if we already know such other relations in self-consciousness, intuitively or subjectively, we must ignore them while reasoning about self, thought, feeling, volition, etc., as phenomena, objects, or things. While reasoning on this plane we are obliged to use figurative language drawn from sense experience, and we are always in danger of forgetting that it is figurative and of mistaking it for the ultimate truth.

When the self posits a causal relation between two things, both of which, from its point of view, are inert and unconscious, such a causal relation, likewise from the point of view of self-consciousness, will be conceived of as mechanical. Now it may be an open question whether there is anything totally unconscious, anything inert and without a causal efficiency of its own; whether, therefore, we are justified on meta-

physical grounds in positing a *merely* mechanical relation between things and things, and between phenomena objective to us,—whether, indeed, there is any such thing as “merely mechanical” causation. But it does not remain an open question whether we can posit a merely mechanical causation between a thinking willing SELF and its physical concomitants, whether in the nervous organism or in the material environment, or between the powers and activities of consciousness.

To a purely empirical and phenomenal psychology man must always appear as an object, and any uniformity of sequence between the forces of environment and the ensuing conduct must seem to be as truly the result of a mechanical causation as any unconscious or automatic reaction of the nervous organism. Inductive science, whether physiological or psychological, can never find freedom of thought or volition in the facts at which it is looking for precisely the same reason that the absent-minded man cannot find his spectacles,—he has them on and is looking *through* his spectacles *for* his spectacles, and it is just because he is *seeing with* them that he cannot *see* them.

What is more, we can never combine the results of these two movements of thought into a consistent system. That is not because there may not *be* consistency in them, but because of the impossibility of our ever seeing the two series of facts from the same point of view.

Necessarily therefore, there will always be antinomies, or seeming contradictions, between the results of the subjective and objective view of self and its

powers. In this case, which of them must we regard as of superior authority and validity? Which is the real self, the self as self-knowing in the very act of knowing, or the self as known through this process of objectifying its own powers and processes? Obviously the former, *since it conditions the possibility of the latter*. Where then there is any question between a rational and an empirical psychology as to the unity, identity and continuity of the self, as to its activity in knowing or its self-determination in willing, the immediate and implicit dicta of the self concerning itself must be the final authority.

It is the vice of the whole system of associational psychology, with its logical consequences of sensationism in epistemology, of materialistic monism in metaphysics, and of a necessitarian hedonism in ethics, that it reverses this order and subordinates the implicit and subjective affirmations of self concerning itself to the inductive conclusions drawn from regarding mind and its processes merely as objective phenomena.

Man can never put himself wholly among other objects in nature, or posit finally between himself and those objects the same relations, causal or otherwise, that he posits between those objects and one another. Tentatively he may do so and arrive at some very useful results thereby, but if he accept such results as final without continually correcting them by the subjective self-affirmations of his own consciousness, he will find himself involved, not only in antinomies or apparent contradictions, but in solecisms, absurdities, and real contradictions.

Now our most serious difficulties respecting the problem of freedom have grown out of this very attempt to objectify and analyze the will, and to posit the same relations between its component parts, or between the will and its objects, as we posit between objective things,—which is forever a psychological, epistemological, and metaphysical impossibility. While we speak of them as “powers” or “processes” in the plural, and distinguish them from one another when we are reasoning *about* them, we subjectively know that they are manifestations of the causal efficiency of one and the same self. We think in willing and we will in thinking. As the one are the constitutive principles under which we organize or assimilate the experience which we *know*, so the other are the principles under which we organize the experience which we *make*. The unity and identity of the self conditions both the cognitive and the conative processes. For the same reason that we can neither prove or disprove the existence of the self by any *a posteriori* reasoning from objectified mental phenomena, we cannot prove or disprove by a similar process either the activity of the self in knowing or its self-determination in willing. Just as I know that I AM, so I know that I KNOW, and so I know that I WILL, or am free.

We cannot, then, objectify self with environment, desire with object, or objectify and distinguish motive and volition without putting them all into the relations and categories of *things*. Yet this is just what we do and cannot help doing when we merely state both the necessitarian and libertarian theories of the will. And further, when we do so, *there is no middle ground be-*

tween these two positions. Since we have put them on the same plane objective to thought they are the diagonal opposites in the square of contradiction. Both cannot be true and both cannot be false.

Nor can there be any doubt as to which of these two positions we must accept. A volition must be caused or uncaused. But if we regard it as a thing, as an object, as a phenomenon, it cannot be uncaused. If caused there can be no cause except the antecedent motive from which we have distinguished it in thus objectifying both. This motive in turn cannot be anything other than a combination of the nature of the agent and his environment. But as in this process we are ignoring the only means of distinguishing between the nature of the agent and the nature of the environment, both are necessitated and of the same kind of necessity. Not only that, *But the nature of the agent is the product of and necessitated by an objective environment.* On this ground the argument of the necessitarian is unanswerable. The psychological argument of Jonathan Edwards for necessitarianism has never been successfully impugned, and the conclusions of modern scientific naturalism are irresistible. The libertarian, in the very act of objectifying the power of self-determination, of calling it "the freedom of the will," and of distinguishing will from motive, abandons the only ground on which the freedom of the self can be vindicated. If the advocates of freedom consent to fight the battle on this ground their cause is lost. If this were all, Haeckel would be justified in boasting that the controversy has ended in an overwhelming victory for the necessitarians.

But the necessitarian victory would be, after all, a barren one, for, as we have seen, he makes the belief of the libertarian the product of the same kind of necessity as his own belief, thereby obliterating the quality of *truth* as pertaining to either opinion. For the quality of truth can only be subjectively perceived, and if thought is thus made the effect of an order of causation which is objective to itself it can have no subjective quality of truth. The argument which denies WILL also invalidates Reason.

Now we may ask, how do we come by this notion of causality upon which the necessitarian argument is based? Certainly not from sense experience. We do not *see* or *feel* any causal relation between objective or objectified phenomena. What we really see is only sequence in time or contiguity in space. To see even that requires the pre-supposition of the perceptive categories of time and space which are not to be explained as the product of sensation. Waiving that question however, and granting that we perceive antecedence and sequence in events or contiguity of things in space, we should be no nearer an explanation of why we say that the antecedent event *causes* the subsequent event or that one thing *moves* another in space. Hume has done great service to philosophy, and has unintentionally betrayed the cause of empiricism, by showing once for all that sense experience does not give us causation. He inferred that the principle of causality is not valid, being only "a propensity to feign," but his opponents have successfully retorted by showing that since the conclusion is so self-evidently false, one of his premises must be false, and that sensation cannot be the only source of knowledge.

Granting, however, that the principle is intuitive, and that its ultimate origin is as yet inexplicable, there must be some psychological occasion for its genesis into consciousness. What has been that occasion? What else can it have been, except the self-consciousness of the exercise of our own voluntary energy with relation between phenomena which are objective to us is imputed from the association of the self-consciousness of the exercise of our own voluntary energy with the consciousness of the ensuing phenomena. We are conscious of volition, and at the same time of the sensations of muscular movement and of the ensuing phenomena of motion of the arm and hand or body. We thus become self-conscious of a *power*, which however we cannot see, to produce effects upon a physical environment. In the infancy of thought, when we perceive antecedence and sequence of phenomena with which our own self-conscious volition has nothing to do, we impute this power *to some other will*, and thus the forces of nature are deified or endowed with souls. In the next stage of thought, when the forces of nature are found to be uniform and subject to law, and still later, when these forces are found to be convertible, the idea of personality disappears, and we now distinguish physical *force* from voluntary *power*. Nature becomes to us an impersonal and wholly objective system, and the causal relation between impersonal objects is regarded as *mechanical*. Now a further development of thought must lead us to one of two conclusions; either the uniformity of nature is phenomenal only, and causality is a mere fiction; or else we must regard all the

forces of nature as the expressions of some one World-Will, and the uniformity of their operation as the rational order of a World-Mind. The latter alternative may lead us to a "subject" pantheism, or to an immanent theism, but that is a metaphysical question which does not concern us at this point. But the third alternative between these two is inadmissible, that is to retain the principle of causality and yet to regard all causality as mechanical and the will itself as an effect of mechanical causation; for such an alternative would be a manifest *felo de se*. For with the denial of the validity of the self-consciousness of voluntary power the validity of the principle of causality also disappears. The very notion of *mechanical* causation is conditioned upon a distinction between a mere *machine* or a thing which is operated upon without consciousness of its own voluntary energy and an agent who is conscious of his own causal efficiency and of the power of self-determination. Deny will and we deny causality; deny any distinction between voluntary energy and mechanical force and the very word "machine" and all its derivatives become meaningless.

If then we affirm a causal relation between objective phenomena among which our own motives and volitions are numbered, we deny self-determination; but if we deny self-determination we no longer have any reason for affirming a causal relation between the phenomena, then we get back our freedom again, and so on in a perpetual circle. As we pass from the subjective to the objective points of view, we must always seem to be contradicting ourselves, successively affirming and retracting. The theologians are in pre-

cisely the same difficulty as the philosophers, except that they make God one of the objects of their reasoning. There is no help for this. The solution is from a point of view behind or rather above human reason. Until man can get back and look at himself from behind or above, until the perceiving self can be at one and the same instant the subject knowing and the object known, this riddle will never be solved. If this fact could only be fully recognized it would save much vain philosophical and theological wrangling.

In the objectifying process therefore, it is useless to seek an intermediate position, for there is none. We must make our choice, and whichever we choose, we find that either alternative, not only contradicts the other, but annihilates itself. As long as psychology confines itself to this objectifying process, it—and all philosophy and ethics with it—is either shut up in a cul-de-sac or driven over the precipice of nihilism.

What then? The only recourse is to accept the subjective affirmation of the mind about itself, that of which it is self-conscious in the very act of knowing and willing, that it is self-determining in both. I see that I see, not by seeing sight, but *in seeing*; I know that I know, not by knowing knowledge, but *in knowing*; I know that I will, not by any psychological analysis and inductive study of motive and volition, but *in willing*.

VI

THE SUBJECTIVE VIEW OF SELF AND THE CONATIVE
POWERS.

Now in this subjective aspect, in this implicit self-knowledge involved in the very act of willing, there is no such distinction between Reason, Feeling and Will; or between thought, emotion and volition; or between motive and choice; as we make when we objectify them and regard them as phenomena. There is a distinction of which we are self-conscious, it is true, between feeling and knowing, but these two processes are involved; so we are self-conscious of the difference between desiring and choosing, but they are not different things, or even different faculties. The will cannot be regarded as *a something else* deciding between conflicting desires, or between desire and affection, or between desire and reason or conscience. In a self-conscious, self-determining being these are all phases of the causal energy of one and the same self. All such language is figurative, and belongs to the objectifying process, which, for the time being, we have discarded. We shall be obliged to return to it, but with the distinct understanding that it must be interpreted in the light of the subjective aspect, even at the expense of apparent contradiction. The will interpenetrates the whole process from beginning to end. The real will, as we are self-conscious of it in action is the causal energy of the self, a self-determining power manifesting itself in desiring, loving, thinking, deliberating, and finally in choosing. What we ordinarily call volition

is only the last stage in the process, the whole of which is will. Volition is as it were a *focussing* of the conative powers of the self.

So far as everything else in the universe is concerned, including physical environment, other persons, or even God, when these are objectively regarded, *this is a real power of contrary choice*. But it is not a power of contrary choice between motives by a will which is distinguished from motives. Motives do not constitute the alternatives of choice. We can speak with propriety of choosing between motives only when we are regarding them as *ends* which may be strengthened or weakened in ourselves or others by some course of conduct. Even then there is always a motive for choice which is not itself at the time an object of choice. I do as I do because I will to do so, but in thus willing I am acting with my whole nature, or rather my whole nature is acting. Not even the omnipotence of God can constrain me to do otherwise without first depriving me of that which He has endowed me and without which I should cease to be a man—my self-determining power. And every time that I will to act thus I am self-conscious that I could have chosen to act otherwise. If this be a delusion, then everything else is a delusion, even the premises upon which I conclude that this and everything else is a delusion.

Now the objection may occur, that, although we may concede that man's nature is not the product of an environment objective to himself and therefore not determined by it, yet, if both the nature of man and the nature of man's environment are products of the causal efficiency of God, and predetermined to act necessarily

upon each other, do we not arrive at the same result, the denial of freedom and responsibility? Of course we do, but in thus reasoning we are returning to the objectifying process, and we are now not only objectifying man with nature and classifying him with things, *but we are also thus objectifying and thus classifying God.* Such reasoning is, if possible, more fallacious than the other. If man as the knowing subject can never put himself into a system of nature objective to himself, still less can be put God, the creative Subject, among such objects in nature, even though he give Him the first and highest place.

Even so, in such a process of reasoning, we are positing for man the only kind of freedom which we can posit for God; and if we are subjecting man and nature to a common necessity under God, we are, at the same time, subjecting all, nature, man and God, to some higher and unknown necessity. Reasoning on this plane the only alternative would be to suppose that the Divine will is not the expression of the Divine nature but an arbitrary caprice. The result is to subject the universe, including God, either to a blind fate or an arbitrary chance. Here again, if we must choose, the only possible alternative is predestination; but predestination stated in this way is indistinguishable from fatalism, and must always seem to contradict, not only the free agency of man, but the freedom of God. We escaped this dilemma, when it concerned only ourselves and our relation to an objective nature, by retreating to our own self-consciousness of freedom. But as we can know God only through our knowledge of ourselves, *and through that kind of self-knowledge*

which is implicit in and conditions all our knowledge of an objective world, we have the right to conclude that this immediate self-knowledge, though finite, is at least analogous to God's knowledge of Himself; and that if we could know God as we know ourselves and as God knows Himself, we should know that God is free, not in the exercise of a naked and arbitrary will, but self-determining in His whole nature and in the exercise of all His attributes; and that, when we were begotten in His image, we were endowed with the same power. Neither we nor He are either the slaves of a blind fate or the sport of a capricious chance.

Our position may be called an intermediate position, *but it is not in the same plane*. Propositions which are true of a space of three dimensions may not be true of a space of two dimensions. Two shadows may pass each other on the same plane, because they are shadows, and because the real persons of which they are shadows pass each other in a third dimension. If, knowing the screen of a moving picture show to be a plane, we should yet ascribe substantial reality to the images of two persons approaching each other, it would seem an impossibility that they should pass. But they do pass, because the real persons have passed each other in a third dimension. But in passing on the screen one or the other must disappear from our vision. If however we could have seen the real persons from another point of view both might have been visible while passing. *As images one or the other must cease to exist at the moment of passing, but the realities do not cease to exist*. Just so with this question of law or causality and freedom. We do not see the realities

on the plane objective to thought, but their images, and one or the other must disappear behind the other at their meeting point. But neither law nor freedom cease to exist because at the moment we do not see the one or the other.

Or, to use another illustration familiar to students of logic, what seems to us to be the square of contradiction, of which law and freedom are the diagonal opposites, is not a *square* but a *cube*, one side of which may represent the subjective self-consciousness, and the other side of which represents the plane objective to thought upon which we are projecting the images of the content of self-consciousness. On the objectified plane there is no alternative between fate and chance, for they are contradictories; but in the subjective dimension of thought *neither is true*, yet the law and the freedom of which they are the shadows *are both true*.

Our position, therefore, while maintaining freedom, does not deny an order of causation in the subjective activities of thinking, desiring and willing, or between true conative powers and volition. But as subjectively known it as a different kind of causation from that which we attribute to an objective order of things. It is a *final* causation as distinguished from a *mechanical* causation. The agent is moved, not by any force conceived of as objective or extraneous to himself, but by his own purpose. That purpose is the expression, not of a bare colorless volition, but of a will which is interpenetrated by and impenetrates reason, heart and conscience. In other words, Love, the sentiments of Truth, and the sentiments of Justice or the Moral sen-

timents are not mere instinctive appetencies, products of an objective order of nature and passive in their reactions to the stimuli of such an environment, but are true *conative powers*, organic to the will, expressions of the causal energy of the self. They are, in the Kantian sense, categories of the will, under which the self organizes its pragmatic experience as it organizes its rational experience under the categories of the understanding.

Common sense recognizes two entirely distinct meanings of the word "because;" and finds no difficulty in using it successively or alternately in both senses, however difficult philosophers may find it to reconcile these two meanings.

The same series of phenomena may be explained in both ways. For example, if one should ask why that little piece of iron in a railroad telegraph office keeps moving up and down making a series of staccato noises, the word "because," as used in a series of answers, would carry him back through a series of mechanical causes, including the hand of the operator in the chief dispatcher's office. If now he should ask why the operator is moving his hand in such a way as to open and close the circuit, the word "because," as used in a series of answers, would indicate a final cause, and he would learn that all these sounds have a meaning and a purpose. Further inquiries would elicit the fact that all these instruments and all these operators are parts of a great system, that the chief dispatcher and all his subordinates are actuated by a common purpose, and that it is this purpose which is determining the action of both the men and the instru-

ments. But while we may use the same word "determine," its meaning is entirely different when applied to the men from that which it has when applied to the instruments.

So far from regarding determination by final causes as inconsistent with freedom and moral responsibility, common sense requires such determination in order to impute moral quality and desert to the action. If a man should take the life of a fellow man under compulsion of physical causes, as by falling on him, we impute no moral quality to the action; but if, on the other hand, he should take the life of a fellow man without determination by some moral motive, as when insane, we still impute no more moral quality or desert to the action than if it were that of a baboon, as in Poe's celebrated tale.

But this distinction between the two meanings of the word "because," disappears when we objectify self, motive and volition and regard them, for the time being, as though they were capable of being operated on by something outside themselves without their own consciousness or consent. To regard this as final, as we have seen, is to destroy our reason for believing in any causality at all. We have a better reason for believing in our own causality than in that of anything else in the universe.

The only possible Cause to which we can attribute our own being is a Free and Rational Cause like ourselves. Even of Him we cannot be the effect in the same sense as *things*, but as participating in His nature and His freedom, or as being *His sons*. To conceive ourselves as being *things* to God, to be con-

trolled by Him except through the free consent of our own natures, is to nullify the only reasons we have for believing in the existence of God. A theistic theory of predestination which denies human freedom is as self-destructive as any materialistic theory of necessitarianism.

Now in thus seeking to vindicate freedom in general against naturalistic objections, it is not meant to assert that all men are equally free or that any man is wholly so. Human freedom is circumscribed within limits which are in part common to all men and in part peculiar to individuals. The limitations arising from heredity and environment yet await scientific determination. Nor is such a doctrine of freedom inconsistent with its development in the individual or its evolution in the race. But neither the development of personality and freedom in the individual nor their evolution in the race can be explained by naturalistic causes if the word "nature" be taken in its purely objective meaning. Human freedom as well as human thought, the conative as well as the cognitive powers, may have developed or evolved, but they cannot have been developed or evolved by or out of anything objective to themselves.

It is also possible that there may be a devolution or degeneration of this power of self-determination. That many human actions, even of those of which the agent is conscious, may be mere passive reactions of the nervous organism to the conditions of environment no one need be concerned to deny. That man may thus permit himself to be acted upon until all will power is lost is not only theoretically possible, but practically

demonstrable. But he is self-conscious of a power, which cannot be explained by any physical or naturalistic process whatever, to inhibit such reactions, and to control all instinctive appetites and desires to the attainment of moral ends. But when the Heart, Reason and Conscience supervene, so far from being mere naturalistic causes which destroy freedom, they are the essential conditions of freedom.

It is also conceivable that this power of will may be developed in the direction of either the good or the bad will. By no means all bad will is weak will. A bad man may be of as strong character as the good man. Appetite and desire, environment and circumstance may be controlled by a strong will for wicked as well as for righteous ends.

Old Dr. Samuel Johnson, when this question was being discussed in his presence, finally thumped the table with his fist and exclaimed, "Sirs, we know we are free, and there's an end on't!" After all that is the best argument ever made on this subject, and the only reason for discussing the subject at length is to show that there is no better argument either for or against freedom.

The sum of our conclusion is that there must be causality as well as freedom within the moral sphere, although the antinomy is inevitable whenever we project them upon the plane objective to thought and forever incapable of resolution from that point of view. Without freedom there can be no knowledge of causality, but without causality there can be no design and no possibility of the attainment of moral ends.

THIRD LECTURE.

The Practical Corollaries of Causality and
Freedom.

VII

THE PRACTICAL ASPECT OF THE ANTIMONY.

Certain conclusions follow from the preceding discussion which are of the very highest practical importance both to religion and ethics. Some of these conclusions follow from positing causality within the moral sphere, others follow from positing freedom. Since causality and freedom, when we are reasoning *about* them, appear to be contradictories, so it will be of the respective conclusions from these two postulates. But since causality and freedom are both true in the subjective dimension of thought so it will be of their respective corollaries. The only thing we can do under the circumstances is to occupy these two standpoints alternately and view their respective corollaries, without troubling ourselves with the ultimate resolution of the antinomies. For example, when we exhort parents by warning them of the consequences of their teaching and example upon the moral characters of their children, we ignore, and must ignore, for the time being, the self-determination of the child in forming his own moral character; but when we are exhorting the child to exercise his own self-determining power we must ignore, for the time being, the influence of the parents in determining his moral character. So also, in prescribing to any individual his duty with reference to his influence upon the character of others, while we are assuming his freedom, we seem to be regarding them as the passive objects of his influence. In discussing the moral utility of social institutions and cus-

toms we must seem to be regarding the moral character of the individual as the necessary product of such influences, but in urging the duty of the individual in shaping such institutions and customs we must assume his freedom. When, therefore, we shall have occasion to speak of the causal relations between environment and the development of character we must use the language of determinism; but when we speak of the duty of individuals to develop their own characters and to exercise it in the bettering of social environment for themselves and others we must use language of freedom. Common sense finds no difficulty in assuming these two points of view alternately, but the moment the attempt is made to state the philosophical reconciliation of them the antinomy appears.

VIII

THE POSSIBILITY AND NEED OF A PRACTICAL SCIENCE OF MORAL FORCES.

If we postulate causality within the moral sphere, then there may be a *science* of the moral forces which determine the formation and development of moral character and of the laws of their operation. Not only may there be such a science, but it is indispensable to the attainment of ethical ends and ideals, both individual and social. If moral character is to be regarded as an *end* which may be affected for good or ill by conduct; if social conditions and institutions, political and economic as well as religious and moral, have any influence upon the moral character of men and women; then it becomes absolutely necessary that there should be a scientific statement of these forces and laws in

order that there may be an intelligent and effective use of them as means to the attainment of moral ends.

While we may distinguish moral determination from physical compulsion by calling it influence, yet influence as truly implies causality as does compulsion; and, while the task may be much more difficult, the laws which govern the operation of moral influences are no less capable of being stated in a rational order than those which govern the operation of physical forces.

The necessity for the development of moral science is rendered all the more imperative by the progress of other sciences. When men lived in more or less isolated communities, when their interdependence upon one another for the conditions of life were limited to such communities, their moral influence upon another was similarly restricted. A simple moral code, respecting chiefly the duty of individuals toward one another together with the duty of the individual toward the most elementary social institutions might suffice. But the code which sufficed for an age when men depended upon the horse or the sail boat for intercommunication will not suffice for an age of steam and electricity. The tremendous advance in natural science and in practical invention which has characterized the century just passed has resulted in a revolution in human affairs whose moral significance is only just now beginning to be fully appreciated. The railroad and the steamship, the telegraph and the cable, are like veins and nerves which are ramifying the whole human race and uniting it into one great social body. They have not only increased the economic interdependence

of different races and nations, but their moral and intellectual influences upon one another. The scientific hypotheses, the metaphysical systems, the ethical codes, the political theories, the religious beliefs of any one race or nation are exercising their influence upon the whole world. Not only so, but within the several countries social relations and institutions are growing more numerous and more complex. Business transactions are no longer between individuals but between corporate organizations of individuals, with a consequent weakening of the sense of personal responsibility for the acts of such corporations. To say that a corporation has no soul is equivalent to saying that it has no heart and no conscience. Men are influencing one another for good or ill, not only immediately, by the conduct of individuals toward individuals, but to a far greater extent mediately, through social institutions and corporations. We can no longer confine our consideration to such fundamental institutions as the Family, the State and the Church. Whether or not we regard these others as "Divine institutions" they are here, and their influence upon the moral destiny of mankind must be given full consideration. It is in the department of social ethics that there is the greatest room for and the most need of the development of moral science.

But along with this increase of the dependence of individuals upon social institutions, there has been an increase of interdependence and reciprocal influence between individuals of different nations and races. Men are coming to know one another, to love one another, to influence one another simply *as men*, and

not merely as white and black, as Occidental and Oriental, as English and German. The result has been to raise very serious questions as to the duty of men toward their own race or country when it seems to conflict with their duty toward their fellow men of other races and countries. Patriotism can no longer be regarded as a simple feeling, intuitively known to be a virtue, but is a very complex mixture of some of the worst and basest with some of the best and noblest of human passions. "One's country, right or wrong" can no longer be regarded as an axiom of morals. Men are beginning to see that they have interests, not only economic but moral, in common with their fellow men of other countries, greater than some of those which they have in common with men of their own country. The laboring men of France and Germany may well ask what moral obligation rests upon them to kill one another in the interest of the capitalists, and the aristocracy of their own country. In the days when men thought their national gods to be the only true gods, their ethics and jurisprudence the only righteous codes, and themselves the chosen instruments of their gods, they might well have looked upon war as righteous and necessary, not only in defence against aliens, but as a means of forcing their religion or their ethics or their "culture" upon the rest of the world. Such a view is now an anachronism.

With a God who is not the God of the Jews only but of the human race, who is not a "god of battles" but a God of Peace, with an ideal of righteousness of Love, Justice and Truth which should bind the whole human race into one great brotherhood, war is be-

gining to be seen, not merely as an evil but as a sin, as a *crime*.

The development of the science of ethics will not result in the repeal of fundamental moral precepts but in their enlarged scope and wider application. But it must result, not only in new moral precepts and civil laws to fit new conditions, but also in the repeal of old laws and the abolition of old institutions which were the result of a wrong application of the fundamental principles of morality to conditions of human experience. War, slavery, polygamy, political and ecclesiastical despotism, not to mention other things yet under discussion, all of which were once thought to have Divine sanction, are now seen to be inimical to the moral progress of the human race, and scientific ethics must devise the means for their complete abolition. Not only so, but evils which have always been regarded as evils yet supposed to be ineradicable, are no longer considered hopeless of extermination. Drunkenness, prostitution, crime and poverty, evils insurmountable to sporadic and individual effort, may yet be overcome by scientific and concerted effort of the whole body politic.

Moral science must keep pace with the progress of these other sciences if they, together with the forces which they have discovered and the inventions by which these forces are utilized, are to be made means to the moral progress of mankind. For scientific progress in other directions does not of itself imply moral progress. It may imply precisely the contrary. Our progress may be in the direction of the civilization of sin and the refinement of selfishness. It is one of the

paradoxes of the ethical situation that moral enlightenment itself may not only be accompanied by, but may contribute to the development of sin in some of the highest and worst forms. There are many trees in man's garden of whose fruit he may eat, so long as he does not know that they are forbidden, with no other injury to himself than physical injury, or at most, than the arrest of his moral and spiritual progress; but when once he knows them to be forbidden by moral law, if he eat of them in defiance of the Divine prohibition or of his own conscience, they will poison his whole moral and spiritual nature. Every new and higher law is a new enemy to selfishness, and if it be disobeyed, that disobedience will intensify the hatred of the good and all in whom it is personified. There is thus a synchronous process of the development of selfishness and sin with that of love and righteousness. All the sciences and all the arts of civilization may be perverted to the service of sin. Moral progress, therefore, must be the result, not merely of a struggle to overcome natural difficulties, but of a warfare against the powers of evil deliberately seeking man's moral perversion. We may be sure that the enemy will avail himself of all the discoveries and inventions of science to accomplish his evil ends, and the moral forces must adapt them to moral ends. The same printing presses which make our Bibles also print vicious books and periodicals; the same vessels which carry our missionaries also convey rum and opium. The moving picture may be an instrument of moral instruction or of seduction to vice. The battleship increases in the same proportion as the vessels of commerce; automo-

biles and aeroplanes are pressed into the service of war; the explosives which dig our canals and open our mines are instruments of wholesale slaughter. The candid moralist, therefore, will not blind himself or others with an optimism which sees only the progress of the good, but will recognize the growth of evil and will see the necessity of summoning every power, human and Divine, of nature as well as of grace for its conquest. All moral forces must be united, systematized and organized into one great army whose campaign must be directed with the most scientific strategy and whose battles must be fought with the most skilful tactics. To this end, every science which in any way affects human conduct must be re-interpreted in the light of a sound theory of ethics and every art must be made an instrument to moral ends.

IX

THE ESSENTIAL CHARACTER OF A TRUE THEORY AND SCIENCE OF ETHICS.

A sound theory of ethics must be intuitional, not in the sense that it regards maxims of conduct as latent in the mind anterior to and independent of all experience, but in the sense that it finds its bases in the intuitive judgments of moral values which are implicit in the very exercise of those conative powers which are organic to the will, as Love in all its forms, the Moral Sentiments, and the Sentiments of Truth and Beauty.

It must be idealistic, not in the sense that it seeks a metaphysical ideal, incapable of definition, but the Perfect Man whose intrinsic goodness consists in these

essential elements of a moral character, the Love of God and man, the Love of Righteousness and the Love of Truth. Its perfection does not consist in the mere harmony of powers which are in themselves without intrinsic moral quality, but a harmony which is the result of attuning all the powers of human nature to those which are intrinsically good. Its social ideal must be a Kingdom of God in which Love constitutes the bond of all social relations and the supreme motive of all service, all whose organic laws and institutions are directed by Truth and governed by Justice.

The ethics for the day must be utilitarian, but not in the sense pre-empted by the older school of that name. Its end is not pleasure, nor even happiness stated in the terms of pleasure, but character, virtue, righteousness, and that kind of happiness which derives its moral value from righteousness. Its aim is not "the greatest good to the greatest number," but *to make the greatest possible number of good men and women.*

It must be juristic ethics, not in the sense that it finds its ultimate ground in the intuition that life, liberty and property or the pursuit of happiness are absolute rights, but that the one are indispensable means to the discharge of moral obligations and the pursuit of moral ends and the other is the just desert of righteous conduct and character.

It is an ethics of authority, not in the sense that the distinction between good and evil, between right and wrong, is grounded in the naked authority of any arbitrary will, not even that of God; but in the sense that the judgment of the moral value of righteous-

ness involves that of its authority, and that the Will which is the expression of Love, Justice and Truth possesses the authority, not of *might* but of *right* and is entitled to obedience.

It must be a theistic ethics, because any theory which takes its starting point in these basic intuitions is on its way toward God, even though it may not yet have found Him, and must find in Him the ultimate ground of all righteousness and source of all authority; while any ethics which is on its way from God must sooner or later end in the denial of every basic moral intuition.

It must be a Christian ethics, not only because Jesus Christ is the personified ideal of the Perfect Man and because his conception of the Kingdom of Heaven is the highest social ideal, but because in Christianity alone is to be found Redemption for those who have sinned.

The practical science of ethics may be called an inductive science, but not in the strict sense in which the physical sciences are so called. Such sciences are syntheses of *a posteriori* or empirical judgments about objective facts under the *a priori* categories or rational forms of thought. Such facts can only be derived through sense experience, but such forms of thought cannot be the products of an objective experience. But the science to which ethics must look for its practical methods and instruments must be a synthesis, not only of such objective *facts*, but of those subjective *truths* which are implicit in the exercise of self-consciousness. Such truths may be rendered explicit, not by an empirical psychology which always objecti-

fies its phenomena, but by a rational psychology whose method is one of criticism and exegesis of self-consciousness itself as an authoritative source of truth.

Such a science may even be called an empirical science, but if so the word empiricism must be taken in a much broader and deeper meaning than its traditional philosophical meaning of sense experience. It is an experience of all that of which we are conscious, not only of the phenomena of an outer world through the organs of sense, but of our own thoughts and feelings. It must include not only our *rational* or *cognitive* experience, but also our *pragmatic* or *conative* experience. In his use of the word experience the common sense thinker does not run a psychological scalpel between the perceiving self and its sensations, between those elements of experience which are due to the senses and those which are furnished by the mind. Not only so, but he finds it very difficult to perceive such a distinction when the psychologists point it out to him. And the common sense thinker is perhaps nearer right than some of the philosophers in this respect, that the validity of experience, in either subjective or objective aspects, is not affected by such distinction between its rational and its sense elements. In this broad, and perhaps most correct sense of the word Experience, there can be no question that all human knowledge is derived from experience, because such experience includes that intuitive knowledge of necessary truths which is implicit in the exercise of all man's powers. *It is an experience in experiencing.* By means of language

and other instruments of intersubjective intercourse the whole experience of human history becomes available for the materials of such a science. To ethics history becomes a progressive revelation of moral truths. Human behavior is not a mere biological phenomenon, like the conduct of plants and animals, but it has a self-conscious *meaning*. Not only what man *says*, but what he *does* and what he *makes*, interprets his character. Man's works are the products of spiritual powers which cannot be measured by quantitative standards or treated by the methods of physical science.

The science of practical ethics may be called a natural science; but here again the word Nature must be used in a much broader sense than that of an objective or physical nature, from which man distinguishes himself. It is used, not only as including man himself as well as his physical environment, *but man as he knows himself in his own self-consciousness*, not as he may be regarded as an object among other objects in nature, or as the product of an objective nature. It is used as including the whole nature of man, moral and spiritual, as well as physical, without merging the former into the latter; as including not only the laws of what seems to be a mechanical and necessary determination, but the laws of man's own self-determining energy; as including not only the forces by which physical nature acts upon man, but the powers in man by which he acts upon nature; as including not only the laws by which nature *compels* man to act, but those which *command* and *influence* him to act through his reason, heart and con-

science; and finally as including all those powers, capacities, and all those intersubjective communications and relations through which men are able to exert a moral influence for either good or evil upon one another individually and upon society as an organic body.

Now it is true that, up to a certain point, man's development is natural and necessary in the strictest sense of those words. But supervening upon this natural development—in the conventional sense of the word Natural—there is an order of moral development which is the result of rational will. Nature, so to speak, seems first to compel us, by instinctive impulses and appetites, to do the things necessary for our development up to a certain point; next she bribes us with pleasures or threatens us with pains to do or not to do the things which may be for our welfare or our injury; but when once she has awakened Reason, Conscience and Will, so that we can see and choose moral ends and the means of attaining them, she leaves the degree, rate and direction of further development to our own self-determining power.

A system of nature in which man is a mere passive object among other objects, from which nature's forces merely rebound, or through which they merely pass to emerge again unchanged, could never evolve either righteousness or sin. To produce either, these forces must pass through something within man which is not a mere passive capacity, but an active power,—active both in receiving them and in sending them forth again to react upon external nature. Merely *as* physical forces they are subject to laws of con-

servation of energy and of mechanical necessity, neither gaining or losing anything by passing through the human soul. But in that passage they have acquired something which cannot be measured as a physical force. As it is the activity of the intelligence which gives meaning to the sound which it receives from without as well as to those which it sends forth; so it is the power of will which gives moral meaning to the solicitation which it receives from environment as well as to the consequent re-action upon that environment. Such power, however, is not that of a bare, colorless volition, but of a will of reason, heart and conscience.

This implies that those affections and sentiments which are symbolized under the terms Heart and Conscience, which may be called the categories of the will, can no more be regarded as phenomena of an objective nature than can the intellect with its rational categories. A psychology or philosophy which, while claiming a spiritual character for man's reasoning powers, surrenders all his feeling powers to materialism or naturalism and treats them exclusively by the empirical or inductive methods of physical science, is fatally inconsistent. Such a psychology has no data for Ethics.

If, then, we call ethics a natural science, we must use the word nature in a sense which includes both the physical and the spiritual, the objective and the subjective in a relation of both law and freedom. Nature, as it appears objectively to us, while it is none the less real, cannot be the *whole* of nature. Man cannot be the product of such a nature, nor can his

origin be explained by a merely naturalistic process of evolution. If we use the word Natural in this broader sense we can mean no more or less than that these two aspects, though we can never see them both from one point of view, must, nevertheless, constitute one Rational and Moral System.

Man must interpret nature by himself rather than interpret himself by an objective nature. The material must be regarded as the instrument of the ideal, the physical of the spiritual. Nature has an end, and that end a moral end, which can never be fulfilled except in the production of a being who is capable of becoming a Perfect Man, of a race which is capable of the consummation of a Kingdom of Heaven. Nature in the physical or objective sense must seem to be non-moral until its relation to nature in the spiritual sense is seen. But that relation once discerned, every natural law becomes a Moral law, and every physical force as well as every spiritual power, becomes a means to the moral end.

X

THE RELATION OF SIN TO ETHICAL THEORY AND METHOD.

Now, what is involved in the above reasoning but needing especial explication and emphasis because of its supreme importance to ethics and religion, Sin cannot be a product of a nature which is objective to man. The doctrine of a scientific naturalism that sin is merely a natural phenomenon, a mere survival of the brute in man, or a necessary stage through which

man must pass in his moral evolution—a “fall upwards”—not only acquits sin of all guilt but deprives righteousness of all merit. But what is more to the point at this stage of the discussion, *it is a false diagnosis of man's moral disease and must result in the use of wrong remedies and the neglect of the right ones.* Not only is such a doctrine ethically inadmissible and destructive in its practical moral effects, but, like the whole system of which it is a part, it is a result of that epistemological fallacy of objectification which regards all the conative powers of man as products of an objective system of nature. Sin is far more and far worse than mere indulgence in animal appetites and passions. The animal appetites themselves are corrupted and depraved in man as they are nowhere found to be in the brute creation. But Sin, in its proper sense of that deliberate Self-will which seeks its own pleasure in defiance of Love, Justice and Truth, and which breeds hatred of every will in which these are personified, Divine or human, *does not appear at all* until man has entered on the scene. It is impossible to any being not endowed with a self-determining power. And this is true quite independently of theological dogma or ecclesiastical creeds. Even if theology should be compelled, on scientific and historical grounds, to give up its theory of immediate creation of the human soul and its doctrine of the Fall of Man, it would not therefore follow that Sin is a mere naturalistic phenomenon. If man's spiritual nature be a product of evolution that process is one which is invisible to sense and to science. And if man be a product of evolution, then sin is the pro-

duct of a process of evolution which has begun since man, a process which has its causes within man, and which is not susceptible of any naturalistic explanation whatever drawn from the facts of nature which are objective to man.

Not only that, *sin has grown worse* with man's progress in civilization. Man can never re-descend by whatever path he may have ascended. If he descend, it will not be to a non-moral innocence, but to a sodden bestiality which will make him a pariah among all clean brutes. If he ascend it must be either to a god-like man or to a human demon. The perfection of wickedness, if we may so speak, is to be found only in the highest development of human society, side by side with the highest types of righteousness. The vices of savage ignorance are not to be compared with the moral decadence of civilization where God has been known and rejected. The superlative of sin is to be found, not only under the shadow of the Church, but within its innermost sanctuary. The optimist may be right in saying that the world is growing better, but if so it is not because Sin is healing itself by any naturalistic process, but because there is a Redeeming Power at work in the world.

It necessarily follows that no naturalistic means—still using the word in its conventional sense—can accomplish the ethical ends, either in making good men and women or in making an ideal state of society. No economic theory based upon a materialistic theory of man's origin and of the influence of his environment upon his moral character can solve the ethical

problem or overcome its practical difficulties. Even if socialism should prove to be the true economic theory and could be put into practice, the best it could do would be to provide better conditions for the operation of moral and spiritual forces.

Practical ethics, therefore, must avail itself of religion and of the Church in seeking its ends. Redemption, in both its phases of Atonement and Regeneration, of Justification and Sanctification, is indispensable upon any true diagnosis of sin. Not only that, it must be a *true* religion. A purely naturalistic and hedonistic ethics can perhaps afford to regard religion as a mere psychological phenomenon and use it as such without regard to its truth. But an ethical theory which seeks an ideal of which Truth itself is one of the essential attributes cannot afford to avail itself of "cunningly devised myths" to promote such an ideal. Whatever temporary advantage might seem to be gained by the delusions of priestcraft, will be more than lost when the time of disillusionment comes. The creeds and dogmas of the Church, therefore, must undergo the test of the criticism of history and science; and it is to the interest of religion as well as of morals that all which cannot stand the test should be discarded once for all. But if such scientific and historical investigation should leave no Saving Truth, there would be an end to all optimistic theories of the world's destiny as well as to all hope of saving lost men and women. For religion can have moral value as a restraint upon sin only in so far as it is true, and it can have healing power for

sin only in so far as it is a revelation of Redeeming Love.

But the chief arguments by which the existence of a Personal God and the possibility and fact of a revelation of Himself to man are discredited are based upon the same false premises and use the same fallacious methods of reasoning which lead to a denial of human personality and freedom and of the validity of the basic moral intuitions. In other words, the same errors which lead to a wrong diagnosis of man's spiritual disease lead to a denial of the existence of the only possible remedy. Such errors are self-destructive. An inductive theory of Epistemology is an impossibility. If it reaches the conclusion that human knowledge is valid, it involves a *petitio principii*; if it reaches a sceptical conclusion, it becomes a *felo de se*.

The Church and ethical idealists, therefore, need have no fear of such a destructive result of the progress of scientific and historical investigation. It may result in the revision or even the abolition of creeds and rituals, but the essential truth that is in them will survive. The vessel may be lost, but there shall be no loss of its most precious freight,—the Life and the Truth as it is revealed in Jesus Christ.

On the other hand, the Church can no more afford to despise the moral aspects of man's physical environment or of economic and social conditions than the social reformer can afford to ignore the Church and religion. It would be a fatal inconsistency, for example, for the Church to insist upon the influence of the Christian home and family as an indispensa-

ble means of grace, yet make no war upon iniquitous economic conditions which render a Christian home and family religion impossible to so large a number of people. This inconsistency is all the more fatal when it appears that the Church derives so large a portion of her revenues from just such conditions, and when so many of the largest contributors to her educational institutions and missionary enterprises are the very men who are most responsible for the existence of such conditions.

It is beginning now to be very generally recognized that such conditions constitute not only a very serious hindrance to the Church's saving work, but, to a very considerable extent, an impassable barrier between the Church and a large portion of the human race. I heard an intelligent layman say, "Ethics is the John the Baptist to religion." This is especially true of the new social ethics. There is still need of the voice in the wilderness crying:

Make ye ready the way of the Lord,
Make his paths straight.
Every valley shall be filled,
And every mountain and hill shall be brought low;
And the crooked shall become straight,
And the rough ways smooth;
And all flesh shall see the salvation of God.

There are Pharisees in the Church to-day who must be warned to flee from the wrath to come and to bring forth fruits worthy of repentance.

Many of the conservative leaders of the Church look with distrust upon this whole movement for social reform, as I have had occasion to say else-

where, for two reasons, that are quite as difficult to reconcile with one another as either is with the moral effect of a social environment. On the one hand it is feared that emphasis upon social influences may destroy the doctrines of freedom and personal responsibility; on the other, that it will belittle the doctrines of Divine grace, the work of the Spirit in regeneration, and the redeeming work of Christ, and thus lead to the neglect of the spiritual influences which are necessary to man's salvation from sin. Unquestionably there is this danger. But the Church can avert it, not by antagonizing the movement, but only by joining it and leading it. When the true relation between the physical and the spiritual is seen, when politics and economics are made the servants of ethics, when the bettering of economic conditions is made to facilitate the preaching of the Gospel, there need be no antagonism between the Church and Social Reform. On the contrary, they should be allies against the forces of selfishness which promote crime and sin.

It is the task of the Church to-day to show the relation between economics and Christian ethics, to interpret the commandments of God and the ideals of Jesus in their ever-widening scope, to show to her members their responsibility for existing social evils, and to arouse their hearts and consciences to the duty of applying Christian principles to all social institutions and conduct.

XI

THE NEED OF EMPHASIS UPON PERSONAL
RESPONSIBILITY.

Now while, as a result of the postulate of causality within the moral sphere, we have been discussing the need of a science of practical ethics and of the scientific use of means and methods for the attainment of moral ends, we have been ignoring the postulate of freedom with its corollaries. Necessarily so, for the time being, for the reasons already stated. But if we continue to look at the matter too long from the standpoint of causality we are in danger, not only of forgetting ourselves that there is any other standpoint, but of making those whose salvation we are seeking forget it also. The physicians, by discussing the moral disease of their patient and its remedies in his presence, are in danger of making him think that it is a purely natural disease which he had nothing to do in causing and which he has nothing to do in curing. Such a result would be fatal.

For, owing to the very fact to which allusion has already been made, that the belief in freedom and responsibility itself has a causal efficiency in determining conduct, if our scientific theories of ethics should convince our patients that they are passive victims of heredity and environment, we should have destroyed in them the most effective restraint upon vice and that which is the prime essential of their recovery. Self-pity will prove a poor substitute for repentance; blaming our sins upon God, man or the devil will render any true conviction of sin impossible. Moral influ-

ences, as well as Divine grace, must work *through*, not *upon* the human will.

This is not an imaginary danger. Temperance reformers, in discussing the moral influence of the saloon in making drunkards, sometimes make the drunkard think that he himself has no responsibility in the matter. In warning parents of the danger of transmitting the drunkard's thirst to their children they may make the children think they are helpless victims of their parents' sins. In urging total abstinence they may create the belief that all will power is lost with the first taste. I myself knew of a case of a young man who went on a prolonged spree as a result of tasting wine in an ice at a social entertainment, mainly because he had been hypnotized into believing that such a taste must result in a debauch. Another young man once came to my study in an agony of remorse after drunkenness, but at the same time in profound despair, because, as he said, his father and grandfather had been drinking men and there was, therefore, no hope for him. As soon as he was convinced that his *belief* in the power of heredity was affecting him much more than the heredity itself, he summoned his manhood and became a sober man.

The same danger may arise from the discussion of the causes of prostitution and of the white slave traffic. It is very true that low wages and long hours for working girls, cheerless homes and deprivation of innocent pleasures, the attractions of the dance halls and cheap vaudeville, the betrayal of young love by the seducer's wiles, the bribes or threats of unscrupulous employers, the hiring of professional panderers

by wealthy libertines, the use of drugs and intoxicants, are all causes of prostitution. It is true that the victims are objects of our pity. It may also be true that there are cases in which girls are dragged into such a life while in an unconscious state, without volition or responsibility of their own. But the cases are extremely rare in which there is not *some* degree of participation and of responsibility on the part of the girl herself, if not in the final surrender, in the causes leading up to it. Often it is disobedience to parents, sometimes disregard of the warnings of older friends, sometimes the pleasure of toying with the earlier phases of sexual passion, the reading of erotic novels or of witnessing sexual plays, and many other things too numerous to mention, *in all of which the girl knows that she is doing wrong*, and in which she is deliberately disregarding the dictates of her own conscience. Just what *degree* of guilt may attach to particular cases, we would do well to leave to God; but we must insist upon that responsibility, not as an excuse for our pharisaic condemnation of her as a social outcast, *but as indispensable to her own salvation*; as well as to the prevention of the fall of others.

The same danger also applies to the discussion of the causes of crime. It is doubtless true that there are cases of abnormal criminality which are the result of disease and hereditary insanity. It may be true that the sterilization of such criminals is the only or the best means of preventing such forms of crime. But the vast majority of criminals are not abnormal. They are actuated by the same motives which actuate other men. One man steals for the same reason that an-

other man works, to satisfy his natural wants, with the additional reason that he is either too lazy to work or cannot get work. One man robs a bank for the same reason that another man steals a railroad system or waters stock.

There is perhaps no department of sociology in which there is greater need of reform and the use of scientific methods than in that of criminology. Our methods of punishment probably cause more crimes than they prevent, certainly they tend more to make those who are already criminals worse than to reform them. But it will be no improvement upon our methods to eliminate the element of justice in them. The criminal's own conscience must be awakened, and to this end he must be made to feel his own *desert* of his punishment, although our motive for inflicting it may be love for him and desire for his restoration to good citizenship.

The sum of the matter is this, that all our methods of dealing with vice, crime, or sin, whether for prevention or cure, whether they be physical or spiritual, whether moral or religious, whether civil or ecclesiastical, whether individual or social, must come at last to this, the direct personal appeal to the sinner's own will through his heart and conscience. The scientific study of such means and methods, the systematization and organization of our efforts, the reform of social conditions, can serve no other purpose than to render that final appeal more effective. Neither righteousness nor sin exist as abstract entities apart from persons. They are characteristics of the individual will. All our abstract reasonings about

vice or sin must be reduced to concrete terms of personality when we come to the practical application. There is no regeneration of society except by the regeneration of its constituent persons, and the only way to make a better social state is to make better men and women. This can never be done if we lose sight of the postulate of self-determination ourselves or make those whom we are seeking to save think that they are the slaves of circumstance.

Let the speculative reconciliation of these truths wait until we can know as we are known. They are truths in spite of all seeming contradictions. Meanwhile we can work for the salvation of men as if all depended upon our efforts for them, we can pray as if all depended upon the power of Divine grace, we can persuade, appeal and exhort as if everything depended upon their own wills.

These are difficult problems, gentlemen who are seeking the Gospel ministry, but they will face you in every stage of your ministerial life, not only in your theological and ethical studies, but in your practical work. I have not attempted the speculative solution of these problems, but if it prove that I have contributed in any degree toward removing these speculative difficulties from the way of your practical work in life, I shall be fully repaid.

