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ART. I.—WILLIAM CARSTARES.

By Rev. THOMAS CROSQERY, Derry, Ireland.

William Carstares: A Character and Career of the Revolutionary Epoch. (1649—1715.) By ROBERT HERBERT STORY, Minister of Rosneath. London: Macmillan & Co., 1874. Pp. 385.

THOUGH it cannot be maintained that there are not spheres in connection with the institutions of society in which Christian ministers may not work with advantage, there is still some justification for the jealousy which restricts their activity to sacred functions and forbids their engagement in secular concerns. It would, for example, be hard to convince us that Dr. Forsythe was quite within the line of his duty when he invented the percussion cap; or Dr. Bell, when he constructed the reaping machine; or Dr. Cartright, when, in turning his energies to machinery, he invented the power-loom. Public opinion usually excludes ministers from judicial, military and parliamentary life; yet emergencies have arisen in the commonwealth when ministers with peculiar powers have placed in abeyance the peculiar duties of their office and merged the pastor in the statesman, the legislator, or the warrior. What shall we think of Zuingli marching at the head of the heroic Swiss to the battlefield of Cappel against the enemies of the Reformation? or of Governor Walker, in the brave garrison of Derry, shutting the gate of Ulster in the face of the last Stuart king? Or what shall we say of Dr. Wotherspoon, one of the most conscientious of Scotch ecclesiastics, who was only second to Washington and Franklin in laying the foundations of the great Republic, uniting the duties of pastor and president of the College of New Jersey with those of a member of Congress? or of Dr. John Owen

ART. VII.—RAVAISSON, LACHELIER, AND FOUILLÉE; OR,
THE RECENT SPIRITUALIST PHILOSOPHY OF FRANCE

From the French of PAUL JANET, in the *Revue des deux Mondes*, by Prof. JOHN W. MEARS, Hamilton College, Clinton, N. Y.

About the year 1840, the Eclectic School of Philosophy in France underwent a change; reacting in part against the too negative philosophy of Scotland (which at that time tended to Hamilton); and in part against the speculative pantheism of the German school (which was driven continually to greater and greater extremes by the Heglian left), it confined itself within the limits of a wise and sound spiritualism, putting itself in the closest possible accord with common-sense, and with the beliefs of natural religion. It was then that its early title of Eclectic School was dropped, in order to assume the name and bear the colors of the spiritual school.

Meanwhile, a new and important event helped to give that school a more severely philosophical character, and to furnish it a more solid basis, than the somewhat vague principle of Eclecticism; this was the recovery and publication of the writings of Maine de Biran. The fundamental idea of this great thinker is that the soul is not only conscious of the phenomena which take place within it, but that it has a consciousness of itself considered as force; that is, that it feels in itself a power superior to the phenomena and capable of producing them, a power which subsists as a unit and ever identical with itself in the variety of its effects. In that idea the spiritual school grasped a principle which afforded in their view an escape at once from Empiricism and from Pantheism—from Empiricism, because consciousness comprehends something more than phenomena; from Pantheism, because the consciousness of an individual and personal force does not seem reconcilable with the unity of substance. Such was the idea expressed by M. Felix Ravaisson in an article on Hamilton (*Revue des deux Mondes*, 1st, November, 1840), which M. Vacherot developed in a memorable article in the *Dictionnaire des Sciences Philosophiques*. Such is the idea which has formed the foundation of philosophical instruction in the Normal School from 1840 to our own days. The departure from Cousin is marked from the fact that that philosopher, while applauding de Biran as “the greatest metaphysician of

the century," shared but slightly in his views. He never admitted, for example, the doctrine which was taught by Saisset and universally accepted by his disciples in the University, that all our metaphysical ideas—cause, substance, unity, identity, hardness (except the idea of the absolute), owed their origin to consciousness and not to pure reason. As for the dynamism of Leibnitz, he mistrusted it greatly, and preferred to it the dualism of Descartes. Yet faithful as always to his Eclecticism he sought a bond of union between them. On this point, too, the teaching of Saisset was bolder than that of his master, and he was strongly inclined to confound matter with force.

We have reached the moment when the philosophy of the University was about to encounter a double assault, and, stricken at once upon the right hand and upon the left, about to sink from view for some years, as often happens in France to the temperate and the reasonable cause. In the very bosom of the Normal School, hitherto so pacific and so docile, new generations, inspired by a new influence, arose to astonish and to disturb the spiritualist teaching. M. Taine, when scarcely off the college benches, took the attitude of a leader, and embarrassed the severe orthodoxy of his teachers by the harsh and biting tone of his criticisms. M. About deployed his Voltairian irony, and M. Prevost-Paradol his noble but cold Spinozism. Every one followed his own lead; but all, at least the most distinguished, declared themselves rebels against the philosophy of Cousin, Jouffroy and Maine de Biran, finding the one too theatrical, the other too modest, and the latter too abstract and too subtle. Simultaneously, the blind wisdom of the great politicians who, according to Plato, never know what they do, seconded with their best the revolutionary movement by attacking free thought in M. Vacherot, and in Amédée Jacques, and by affording the prestige of persecution to philosophical rashness. Very soon, following the political events of 1852, one of the two chairs of the Normal School was suppressed, the fellowship of philosophy was abolished, and the instruction was restricted to logic. Every attempt to contend against the critical, positivist, pantheistic current, which was fast becoming the philosophy of the Empire, was disarmed and suppressed in advance. Independent thought went pell-mell into negation or skepticism, so effectual were the efforts to give all truth the appearance of con-

straint. Any enlightened middle position between faith and doubt was discredited and discouraged, and in the interest of religion Atheism was implanted. A great lesson, but doubtless forgotten, as are most of the lessons of experience and of history, and which it seems likely we must renewedly experience in the interest of social order, as that is understood.

During this season of intellectual wretchedness the philosophical instruction of the Normal School of course sank into insignificance. The section of Philosophy ceased to exist or was only a neglected appendix to other studies. Yet even this epoch was not absolutely sterile, since it furnished to the University M. Lachelier, one of the new masters who are the object of this treatise.

In France the national elasticity is such that reactions, though vivid, are not lasting. Hence, as early as 1857, philosophy had awakened in the Normal School through the youthful, brilliant, agreeable and stimulating instruction of M. Caro, tempered by the more severe and more didactic methods of M. Albert Lemoine. Under these two guides, whose qualities were so diverse and yet so happily conjoined, the traditions of Cousin and of Jouffroy were renewed and rejuvenated. A new generation of distinguished teachers was gained by the University, and it is from this source that our better professors of to-day are derived. In this period, it was still the spiritualism of Jouffroy and of de Biran which inspired both masters and pupils, associated in some cases with the Christian sentiment of that tender and refined shade which the lamented Father Gratry lately represented among us.

It was in 1863, at the time when M. Duruy re-established the Department of Philosophy, a service which the friends of free thought should never forget, it was then that the philosophic movement which we are to study originated. It was in that department that the new talents appeared which direct the philosophical instruction of the Normal School to-day, and which are destined to exert a great influence upon the future of the philosophy of the University. But to comprehend the new movement it is necessary to go back a little upon our steps.

Among the most eminent of the philosophic writers who had sustained the lofty initiative of Cousin, there was one who yet

held himself at a distance and never reckoned himself as belonging to the Eclectic School; this was the learned and profound author of the *Essai sur la Métaphysique d'Aristote*. That work being exclusively historical could scarcely mark its author as a leader in philosophy (*chef d'école*). Some pages of a grand character, but rapid and obscure, at the close of the work, scarcely gave one a glimpse of the philosophic tendency to which the author belonged. Nevertheless, the wind bloweth where it listeth. Those few pages sufficed to kindle the spirit and the imagination of a young philosopher, M. J. Lachelier, who was soon united to his teacher in the most intimate philosophical intercourse. This teacher was M. Ravaisson, who afterwards gave a fuller and richer development of his views in his *Rapport sur la philosophie du dix-neuvième Siècle* (Report upon the Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century), an original and powerful work, which excited a lively admiration in the younger ranks of the University. In fine, as president of the section of philosophy, the position once held by Cousin, he exercised naturally and without effort a great influence upon the youthful minds who had the courage to subject themselves to his peculiar teaching. This influence was of an entirely different nature from that so long exerted by M. Cousin. He stimulated and controlled; he enkindled, but he directed. M. Ravaisson has a less direct and less vivid effect; there is no fear that his influence would degenerate into supremacy. He acts, if I may use the language, like the god of Aristotle, who moves everything while remaining tranquil. Such a philosophic government agrees with the most complete liberty. His disciple, M. Lachelier, received his thoughts only to transform and subtilize them, rendering them at once more precise and more rash. Another thinker appearing a little later, who had formed himself in strict seclusion, without the slightest reference to others, M. Alfred Fouillée, pursued analagous paths, and opposed more often than followed the earlier philosophers.

Truly all this was far more confused than we have put it here. There was no school properly speaking; there was much rather a common tendency with very decided differences; a general spirit rather than definite doctrines; more of speculative breath, of metaphysical liberalism, more of mysticism in sentiment and of poetry in expression, and of subtlety and obscurity in the

thought. Each of these philosophers has his own thoughts which it would be quite difficult to reduce to the same system ; yet all are dominated by one common and fundamental maxim, namely, that the last analysis must be sought in what is most elevated, and not in what is inferior ; that the ground of all things is spirit, thought, liberty, and not matter, which, spite of the cry of the blind senses, is nought but the shade and semblance of reality.

We return to M. Ravaisson, as making the point of departure for the younger and more recent form of philosophy which we propose to study. That philosophy, to say the truth, oftener consists of brilliant and profound views, uttered in curt and abrupt phrases, in a manner at once spirited and reckless, than of rigorously defined, closely connected, fully developed doctrines. Discussion, analysis, precise limitation of ideas, are here subordinated, if not sacrificed, to the synthetic and intuitive method. The author sees and affirms, it is for you to see as he does ; yet in default of dialectics, the splendor and force of the thought, the beauty of the expression, the noble grandeur of the philosophical feeling overcome and captivate us. One is upon the confines of all the philosophies without knowing precisely with which he at present has to do. Were it not for the close and often difficult language of the author, one would be tempted to refer such a philosophy to the domain of poetry rather than to that of science. One cannot deny to them the mastery of the imagination. Clear and exact minds can with difficulty assume such a mode of thought and expression, yet they are the first to submit to its charm.

We believe we may say that the whole philosophy of M. Ravaisson is dominated by the fundamental distinction borrowed from Aristotle, of matter and form,—matter corresponding nearly to that which in the modern schools is called substance, and form to that which is called attribute ; except that in modern philosophy, substance or substratum seems to be the very foundation of reality, and of true being, while with Aristotle and with M. Ravaisson, it is in the form, in the essence, in the attributes of the being, that reality properly so-called exists. What matters it that yonder Jupiter Olympus is of marble ? Its beauty does not consist in that, but in the form in which it is clothed, and that form is the figure of a god.

Matter then is only the condition, not the ground, of reality. The more reality there is in anything, the less there is of matter; and in the absolute reality, all matter, that is, all substance, must disappear. According to these thoroughly Aristotelian views, M. Ravaisson aims to suppress in philosophy the notion of substance, that is, of a dead and naked *substratum*, to which the attributes of things must attach themselves as accessories.

We can well understand the importance of such a view if it were explained, defended and developed. The whole strength of materialism, for example, resides in the importance, exaggerated perhaps, which the notion of substance has enjoyed in philosophy. Suppress that notion, and materialism is deprived of all foundation; but just because this negation of the idea of substance is fundamental, one would like to see it established upon clear and firm grounds. On the contrary, it is only in passing, in a kind of parenthesis, and by a bold stroke, that our philosophy cuts off the idea; expect from it no discussion on that point. This is not the way of the masters of philosophy. They prove their positions by right reasons; they defend them against objections by clear arguments; they develop their consequences by a fertile analysis. Proof, discussion, development, are the three essential conditions of a rigorously philosophical method. I admit that before making use of these processes, one must be able to think, and the philosophy of M. de Ravaisson is nurtured by strong thoughts; yet these are nothing but materials, precious materials, which he does not design to fashion, and which he abandons with a happy unconcern to their uncertain fate.

In like manner, we may speak of another of our author's ideas, which he borrowed from Aristotle; namely, the distinction between efficient cause and final cause. He would even go so far as to assert that at bottom, efficient causes are nothing else than final causes, and that these last are the only causes in existence. Important as this doctrine would be if proved, the proof is just what is lacking. Once more, I agree that dialectics is not the whole of philosophy, and even that the thinker is above the dialectician. But it is necessary to be both. Philosophy is made up of thoughts and arguments. The arguments without the thoughts are "empty," the thoughts without the arguments are "blind,"—to quote Kant's celebrated distinction

which he applied to the necessary union of concepts and sensations.

We have in the ideas of M. Ravaisson the philosophy of Aristotle spiritualized, in some sort, by contact with modern philosophy. The general character of this philosophy is to place one's self at the subjective point of view, at the very centre of consciousness, in the perception of the *Ego*. M. Ravaisson admits as unquestionable that fundamental thought; it is in the consciousness which the spirit has of itself, that it finds the type of all reality. He insists, above all, on that thought of Biran, that the soul grasps in it (consciousness) not only its own phenomena, but its own being, its causality; and if one admits the notion of substance, its substantiality. He even goes further than de Biran; while the latter limits the sphere of consciousness to our personal activity, and puts us in communication with the divine and the absolute only by a sort of mystic illumination, M. Ravaisson ventures on the daring but profound idea, that the soul in the act of self-consciousness is conscious of the Absolute. It is God himself whom we feel in us, according to the doctrine of the apostle: "in Him we live;" and nature, as well as ourselves, is full of God; *πάντα πλήρη Θεῶν πλήρη ψυχῆς*. . . . Physical and chemical forces, life, instinct, activity, love, liberty even, are nothing but successive manifestations of that universal spontaneity, whose source is in God. The material is already spiritual, the spiritual is already divine. The soul and God are objects of inner experience. They are facts. Hence, M. Ravaisson calls his doctrine a positive spiritualism, as opposed to what he calls the demi-spiritualism of the Eclectic School, from which he declares himself, in a trenchant and somewhat haughty tone, to be entirely separated.

Timid souls may charge these views with too near an approach to pantheism; but we should take care not to be cozened out of our philosophy by this spectre of pantheism. When one sees nothing but traps around him, he dares neither speak, nor think, nor move. Express some doubts, as did Socrates, you are a skeptic. Yield something to physical science, you are a materialist. Attempt to reconcile determinism and liberty, you are a fatalist. See God in all things, you are a pantheist. In truth, that incessant evoking of bad doctrines is something annoying, and is likely to end in giving you a taste for them; as

in politics one may become revolutionary from hearing the revolution incessantly and fanatically denounced.

We may here quote a solid and profound distinction from a German philosopher, Krause, between pantheism and what he calls *panentheism*. It is one thing to say God is all, ($\epsilon\nu\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu$), another to say that all is in God ($\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \Theta\epsilon\omega$). M. Ravaisson is accordingly a *panentheist*; there is no ground for calling him a pantheist. It is not here, but on another point that we are inclined to quarrel with him. It is for his cool persistence in cutting off what he calls demi-spiritualism, that is, everything pertaining to the Eclectic School. For a long time indeed the Eclectic School has ceased to exist as such. But there remain some free spirits united by a general tone of thought without any word of command (*mot d'ordre*). Those among them who most admire and love M. Ravaisson, have been legitimately affected in seeing that he would have none of them for disciples. Why such separations? Is this a time for forming little sects? Is it not putting the interests of a particular philosophy above the general interests of spiritualism? For ourselves we have always preached conciliation and accommodation, under the flag of a large liberty. Whatever have been our own views, and while contending as much as any one for philosophical independence, we have never been willing to renounce tradition, remembering always that we are the heirs of Cousin, of Jouffroy, of Saisset. It is not necessary always to start from the beginning. Go forward but don't throw down the ladder. If one creates as many schools as there are personal tendencies, every one of us will be a school: *tot capita, tot doctores*. What matters it that one has a third, a fourth, a half of spiritualism? He has what he can; and it may be just as dangerous to have too much, as not enough. For ourselves we go for a large symbol, comprehending all degrees and fractions of the spiritualist idea, from the mysticism of Malebranche to the empiricism of Locke. "In the Father's house there are many mansions." That question settled, we are the first to recognize that if there is to-day in the French University a thinker, to whom fairly belongs the direction of spiritualist thought, it is the author of *The Report upon Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century*.

M. Lachelier is a disciple of M. Ravaisson, but he is an emancipated disciple, bolder than his teacher, and of a different

temperament. The method, the turn of mind, even the doctrine, are all unlike. There is nothing common but a certain general direction of the thought, the use of certain formulas, and a final analogous tendency. In place of those brilliant electrical flashes, encompassed with darkness, which characterize the intuitive and bold method of M. Ravaisson, we have, on the contrary, a systematic and sustained thought, kept up from the first line to the last, as in that remarkable work upon the *Foundation of Induction*. The connection is so close that the entire work forms a single knot, or rather a succession of knots, one fastened upon the other, requiring the same amount of effort to disentangle from the first to the very last. Nothing to give the mind rest, nothing to conciliate, nothing to throw light. It is scarcely as easy reading as a treatise on Algebra, with the difference that the algebraic language, being absolutely precise, requires only attention and patience; whereas the indeterminate signs of the language of philosophy darken and weary the thought, unless the author constantly comes to one's aid by defining their meaning. But this M. Lachelier seldom does. Hence, his book, going to the depth of things, imposes upon the mind an excessive fatigue, which a little consideration on the part of the author would have notably diminished.

This laborious method has its source in a spirit naturally penetrating and profound, which can be satisfied with nothing common, which digs to so great a depth, that one asks, with uneasiness, if there is indeed any solid ground under its feet. One is carried down from stratum to stratum, and knows not whether there is a last one. When one believes himself in possession of the truth, he finds that it was only an appearance; that below that appearance there is a verity more true, which, after all, is itself nothing but an appearance, so that at last when there seems to be a pause and a cry: "Here we are, it is found," we mistrust ourselves, and we say involuntarily that there is nothing to hinder the malicious enchanter from dissipating this form of truth as well as the others, and from leaving us in a bottomless void. Thus while the author in that work strives above all to find for science a solid and immovable base, he makes rather the impression of a transcendental skepticism, with mysticism as the vanishing point of the perspective. Meanwhile the charm of the thought is so powerful, that one prefers the risk of that limit-

less career through the universe, to the seeming security of a routine dogmatism.

As regards Lachelier's doctrine, it also seems to be notably different from that of his earlier teachers. If one can resume the doctrine of M. Ravaisson in the words "All is spirit," that of M. Lachelier is in substance, "All is thought," at least so far as regards the object of human knowledge; for perhaps there is a something beyond, which is neither thought nor the object of thought. That region aside, the hypothesis adopted by M. Lachelier explains the possibility of human knowledge, not by the objective laws of nature, so far as they are susceptible of being known, but by the subjective laws of our thought so far as it is capable of knowing.

The laws of nature in their last expression and their essential truth, are nothing but the laws of our own proper thought. But these laws are traced back, according to Lachelier, to two that are fundamental; the law of efficient causes; and the law of final causes. The first constitutes the inflexible determinism of nature; it is in virtue of this law that every phenomenon is contained in a *series*, the existence of every term of which determines that of the next following. According to the second law, on the contrary, every phenomenon is comprised in a *system*, the idea of the whole of which determines in advance the existence of the parts. These two laws, in the language of Kant and Leibnitz, are the reciprocals of one another; they are two series in an inverse order; the one descending, the other ascending; that which is cause in the one is effect in the other, and *vice versa*.

What is now the foundation of the law of efficient causes? It is, that without that law thought would be impossible. The fundamental condition of thought is unity. I cannot think without fastening one thought to another; on what, in turn, rests that unity of thought? Upon the unity of the universe itself; "for the question of knowing how all our sensations unite to form a single thought, is the same as that of knowing how all the phenomena unite to form a single universe."* Yet the unity of the

* It looks as if the author were here entering upon a most manifest vicious circle. For after having declared the necessity of explaining the object by the subject, nature by thought; he here seeks the explanation of thought in nature, that is in the object. Yet the fault is only in seeming, for it is evident that the question here is of an ideal universe, which only exists so far as it is thought. The author however makes no effort to prevent confusion.

universe itself is not possible except on condition of forming a necessary series, such that every given phenomenon is connected strictly with a preceding one. Without such a connection there would be no unity of the universe, no unity of thought and consequently no thought. Such a connection is simply the law of causality. Finally, whence comes that inflexible series of phenomena, and why cannot we think the one without having previously thought the other? May it not be that these two existences are, strictly speaking, nothing but two distinct phases (*momenta*) of a single object which prolongs its existence by transforming itself from the first into the second phase? May not all phenomena be but one and the same phenomenon, at once one and several, the continuity of which is ever reconciling itself with change? This phenomenon is movement. All phenomena are then movements, or rather a single movement, which proceeds as far as possible in the same direction and at the same rate, whatever may be the laws of the transformations. Here the author admits, in all its breadth, the principle of the Cartesian mechanism. And he follows that principle to the last degree, not only in the inorganic world, but also in the world of organized and living creatures. He admits that such a conception, if conclusive, would be a kind of idealistic materialism. But it must not be forgotten that we have in it only one of the laws of our being, the law of efficient causes, and that we have still to explain that of final causes.

Without that law of final causes, says M. Lachelier, we should be without guarantee, not only for the conservation of living things, but for that of brute bodies in their determinate forms; since these bodies are composed of corpuscles or atoms which always form the same combinations, a fact by no means involved in the general laws of motion. These small bodies compose systems of motion which the laws of mechanism would by themselves have no tendency either to conserve or to destroy. "The world of Epicurus" says the author, "before the concourse of the atoms gives us only the feeblest idea of the degree of dissolution to which the universe would in a moment be reduced, in virtue of its own mechanism: we still represent to ourselves cubes and spheres tumbling into the void, but we do not picture to ourselves the infinitesimally fine dust without figure, without color, without any property appreciable by any sense whatever.

Such an hypothesis appears monstrous to us, and we think there will always remain a certain harmony, at all events, among the elements of the universe ; but whence should we know it, if we did not recognize that that harmony is as it were the highest interest of nature, and that the causes whence it seems to result, necessarily, are nothing but the means wisely arranged to establish it." The law of final causes is hence as needful to the understanding of nature, as that of efficient causes.

What is the ground of that second law ? As before, the author here makes use of the necessity of unity in thought : but this is unity of another sort. The first is a superficial and external unity. What in fact is motion ? It is nothing more than the possibility of passing without interruption from place to place in space and time. That is an empty unity, devoid of intrinsic reality. (A thought which rests wholly upon the mechanical unity of nature, slips along the surface of things without reaching the things themselves. Not attaining reality, it lacks reality in itself and is but the empty form of a thought.) We must therefore find a means of rendering the thought real, and the reality intelligible, which will be by substituting for the purely external unity of the universal mechanism, the internal and organic unity of a systematic harmony. Without that principle thought could still exist, "but that purely abstract existence would be a condition of evanescence and of death." The law of final causes gives life to thought while giving it to nature.

Once in possession of this principle, our idealist philosophy seeks to restore, in succession, all the truths which it had abstracted in its earlier stages. It is thus that it grasps, or believes that it grasps again, the objectivity of nature, the principle of force, of activity, of spontaneity, of liberty ; that it raises itself to the human soul, the spirituality of which it maintains, at its point of view. In a word, if the principle of efficient cause conducts to a sort of idealistic materialism, the principle of final causes brings us to " spiritual realism."

Nor is this the last word of philosophy ; it is only its second stage, which still summons us to a third ; "this second philosophy, says the author in concluding, in subordinating mechanism to final cause, prepares us to subordinate final cause to a higher principle, and to overpass by an act of faith the limits of

thought, at the same moment with those of nature." We are thus on the threshold of the third world, so mysteriously announced, when the author pauses. He has wished simply to explain the possibility of Knowledge, but he gives us to understand that above Knowledge there is something else, namely morality and religion. Are we then to infer that philosophy cannot reach so far, and that its whole office is to prepare thought for self annihilation, so that it is all, at first, only to be the more completely nothing at the end? This we cannot affirm, since the author has vouchsafed us no account of this new world, which he merely opens to us without caring to enter it.

We cannot allow to the subtle author of the *Fondement de l'Induction* (Ground of Induction), that "all is thought," unless we understand the word in a sense so broad and so vague that it signifies exactly the reverse of that we have been accustomed to understand by it. At least, it would be necessary to distinguish an objective thought from the subjective,—and that objective thought so far as it manifests itself in the form of extension we call matter, and the subjective thought so far as it manifests itself to itself by consciousness we call mind; and we distinguish them in as much as the first always appears to us in a condition of dispersion and plurality, and has its unity only outside of itself in the mind which thinks it; while the mind, characterized by consciousness, appears to us in a permanent state of concentration, and finds its unity in itself. To be mind is to be one; to be matter is to be many. So, the distinction of matter and mind must needs subsist, far as one may push his system of identity. It is the same with the individual and the whole. The individual personality cannot comprehend itself without a principle of distinction, which limits it, and circumscribes it in the universal unity. Plurality of substances cannot explain the unity of the one; the unity of substance cannot explain the plurality of the *Egos*. Thus the primitive unity, called God, has permitted to emanate from it secondary unities called souls, who distinguish themselves, on the one hand, from the Supreme Cause, by the consciousness of their individuality; on the other hand, from the co-existent pluralities called bodies, by the consciousness of their unity. If that is demi-spiritualism, we are demi-spiritualists. For us, on the contrary, it is the true middle path, and

everything which goes beyond it is, in our eyes, an ultra-spiritualism, which may at any instant be transformed into its contrary.

M. Alfred Fouillée, colleague of Lachelier, at the upper Normal School, and sharing with him the direction of our philosophic teaching, is a young writer, who in a little time has attained a foremost rank, by two works of diverse character, yet equally remarkable, one historical, the other speculative. They are, *La philosophie de Platon*, and *La Liberté et le Déterminisme*.* M. Fouillée's talent is of another sort from that of Lachelier, nor does his teaching present the same characteristics. The one, as we have seen, is, strictly speaking, an idealist, the other belongs rather to spiritualism properly so called. The one is more condensed, more systematic, more exclusive. The other is richer, more copious, more ingenious in details, more psychological, and thus of a more open and conciliatory spirit. The one is inclined to interpret all ideas in the sense of his own thought, the other seeks to bring them by degrees into his own intellectual range. M. Lachelier perhaps has more power, M. Fouillée more breadth. Each one has a strong imagination, but the one restricts himself, the other goes at large. Both of them are obscure; the one by his brevity, the other by his diffuseness. And how often, in spite of all their differences, they have this in common; an excessive strictness, degenerating into subtlety, in regard to the origin of knowledge; and at the close, a tendency to absorb philosophy in an act of faith. Theirs is a refined spiritualism, of which knowledge is but the envelope, morality and religion being the ground.

We have resumed M. Lachelier's philosophy in the formula "all is thought"; we may as fairly sum up that of M. Fouillée in the words "all is liberty." Such at least appears to be the tendency of his last work, for in his work on the Philosophy of Plato, he seems to have taken intelligence rather than will for his principle. The law of cause itself was but an illustration of the principle of sufficient reason. But in his most recent work the will seems to take the place of intelligence. The law of cause, instead of being a mere consequence, has become a principle; the idea is subordinate to liberty.

* This latter treatise has already been described in the *Revue des deux Mondes* for August 1st, by M. Caro.

And it would seem that this predominance of the will over the intellect, has become characteristic of several recent philosophies; M. Fouillée is in the line of current thought. This, for example, is the doctrine of M. Secrétan, of Lansanne, a thinker of genuine worth and originality, whom we may appropriately cite at this point, since his *Philosophie de la Liberté*, a work little known hitherto in France, is beginning to exert an influence upon our philosophically inclined youth. According to M. Secrétan, the essence of Deity is absolute liberty, and all his attributes are but different names of that liberty. Bold as it is, the philosophy of M. Secrétan adheres to Christianity, and is deeply religious in its character. Altogether different is another philosophy, although resting upon the same principles, the pessimist and misanthropic system of Schopenhauer. Intelligence is subordinate to will; this is the only *thing-in-itself*; intelligence is only a mode of its manifestation. This doctrine of the will connects with the second philosophy of Schelling, which he intended to be the positive part of his system, the first forming the abstract and negative. To this thought also, M. Ravaisson seems to incline in his *Rapport*. If we comprehend the book of M. Fouillée, this is also the final word of his philosophy, for as we have said, he makes intellect proceed from will, and considers this as an absolute act, not determined, but determining, which consequently commands the motives, instead of being guided by them.

We should be disposed to put higher than is ordinarily done the place and power of the will. If, for example, we consider not human but divine liberty, we can but admit that the philosophy of the schools for the most part allows a very insignificant part to that liberty in the creative act. It has nothing to do but servilely execute a model all complete which the absolute intelligence has eternally borne in itself. Where would be the omnipotence of an act so inferior? It is incessantly repeated that God made the world out of nothing, as if that were a great marvel. What matters it of what the world was made? It is the idea of the world that is the miracle, not the material of which it is made. Is the creating of marble a greater work than creating the statue? Such is ever the error of materialists who believe matter to be more important than form.

We disavow the maxim of the schools, that God created

“existences, but not essences.” Admit with Plato that the essences of created things existed from eternity, and that God did nothing but produce externally that preconceived world, that photograph in advance; join with him under the name of “ideal” such a world, or if you choose an infinity of worlds, with which He has dwelt without having willed it; and as Spinoza objected to Leibnitz, and Fénelon to Malebranche, it is to subject deity to fate. It is a kind of ideal pantheism which subordinates God to the world, because the image of the world is necessary to his existence.

Without doubt, truth cannot be the object of a free act of God or of any power in the world. Without doubt, a triangle being given, it is necessary that the three angles should always be equal to two right angles; but why must a triangle be given? This is the question. A triangle is a group of three lines arranged in a certain manner; yet is that group necessary, eternal, absolute, self-existing? Is there not required a previous activity, a productive power, in order to bring the three lines together, in such a manner that they intersect each other? We distinguish among human artists, those that copy and those that create. Can the divine activity only copy and not create? To create is to invent. Invention is an act of will and of power, not solely of intelligence. The divine model itself, the paradigm of Plato, that which he calls the *αὐτόζωον*, the animal in itself, is then itself the work of the divine will. It is, if one prefers, begotten, but not created. It is the first born of God, *πρωτότοκος, πρωτογέννης*. This it is perhaps which is meant by the great mystery of Christian theology, the relationship of the Father and the Son.

Meanwhile, as far as we may push this creative activity and this power of liberty, we cannot go to the extreme of sacrificing intellect without confounding everything. One may admit that liberty created the idea of the world, but not that it created the idea of God. Absolute will cannot be before absolute idea, and in general, the will cannot, without ceasing to be itself, be independent of intelligence. These may be, must be, co-essential, co-eternal, identical in essence; but they cannot absorb each other, without destroying themselves and becoming the opposites of what they are. What do we mean by will? Rational activity, *appetitus rationalis*, say the scholastics; *ὁρεξις μετὰ λόγου*, says Aristotle. Reason is then an essential element of

the will. Bossuet classes it with the intellectual operations. "I wish nothing," said he, "save for some reason." If then you cut off reason, what have you? A blind power which is no more will, than its opposite. One may call it so, if he pleases, for names are free; but one can just as well call it force, instinct, necessity; it is a nondescript, which resembles the human will, to quote Spinoza, "as much as the dog (*Canis*), in the constellations, resembles the dog, the animal that barks."

Proof of the indeterminate nature of this principle of absolute will is found in the utterly opposite consequences which can be derived from it. M. Secrétan, for example, comprising in his philosophy the religious tendencies of his own nature, arrives at a Christian optimism, which, while giving the largest place to evil, finds in redemption the final triumph of the good. On the other hand, the philosopher of Frankfort (Schopenhauer) nourished in the philosophy of the eighteenth century, ends in pessimism, and while equally positing the principle of absolute liberty, he thinks that that blind and indifferent principle can produce "only the worst of possible worlds." In one word, either we deprive absolute liberty of every attribute, and the residue is a blind force, independent alike to good or to evil; or, under the name of will, you mean an active, living and wise power; and we have got back to the threefold division of the common system of philosophy, and it is simply a delusion to believe that one has discovered a new principle.

M. Fouillée seems to us to oscillate perpetually between these two philosophies. On the one hand he says; "Liberty is the Absolute;" it is "the supreme independence;" it is again, that from which everything depends and which depends upon nothing. Yet how can such an absolute, which determines everything without itself being determined, "which is what it is because it is it," be distinguished from the ancient *fatum*; which the author combats, with Leibnitz at the opening of his book, but the notion of which he says, blends with that of absolute liberty? On the other hand, he says that that absolute ought to be represented "under the active form of the spirit, as a living personal being which determines itself by thought, by desire, and by action, and which is entirely in the action." Thus the absolute liberty, being at once thought, desire, and action, is indistinguishable from the three general faculties of

the soul. At one time, the author with an indefatigable spirit of investigation seeking a last event, which he never finds, tells us that in all doctrines there is a residuum, a "*je ne sais quoi*," and that this residuum is liberty itself, which is "neither determined nor undetermined, but determining," thus placing power and will beneath everything; and again, fearing as he may the vagueness of such a thought, he refers liberty to love, to goodness, to sacrifice, to disinterestedness; what should I say? to all the virtues. "Liberty," he says, "is justice, charity, religion;" it is, moreover, "equality and fraternity." In one word, it is everything. Can we recommend such a source of confusion as a principle of thought?

Without doubt there is a last residuum at the foundation of all things—a last term where everything must become one; without doubt, above everything we can know or name, even above everything which we can represent by remote analogy, there remains an unknown, which the Gnostics in their mystical language eloquently called "the abyss of silence," which Christian Theology calls the Father, which we may call, if we wish, the Absolute, liberty, will, and the like. Only believe not that by all those names you represent distinct ideas. There is a limit beyond which human thought and human language cannot reach in fact or in representation. Philosophy is powerless to express the inexpressible, to define the indefinable. Music seems to be the only language which can put us in communication with the Infinite. Here is perhaps the secret of the ineffable emotions which a Beethoven produces in each soul, as we listen to his immortal symphonies, or the unknown authors of our sacred chants. But here, too, Philosophy expires; for she has not at her disposition any but the language of man, which limits and defines; that which transcends that limit belongs to the domain of poetry and religion.

If the metaphysical conclusions of M. Fouillée appear to us to err by lack of clearness, which is perhaps to be ascribed to the nature of the subject rather than to himself, we would praise, on the contrary, the beautiful psychological analyses, really novel and worthy an admission into the science, by which he shows us the soul mounting by the different steps of the idea, of desire, and of love, to freedom. We can do no more than indicate the ingenious, eloquent and brilliant development

which the author has given to his thoughts. The chief peculiarity of M. Fouillée's talent is copiousness. Ideas spring to existence under his pen with amazing fertility, nevertheless this richness is not without its dangers. To develop is not always to *eclaircir*. We have already given examples of the tendency to drown all ideas, one in the other, which is the stumbling block in the way of this brilliant talent. He has something of that obscurity which characterises the Quietist writers, which arises from an excess of imagination, united to an excess of analysis. It is to be greatly desired that an intellect so noble, giving so great hope to solid and sound learning, may be led to exercise self-denial in the midst of so great riches, to put severe restrictions on his thoughts, and to renounce the attempt to say too much—to say all.

Obscurity, subtlety and refinement are the faults of the new school; it redeems them by the power, the depth and the richness of its thought. We owe it thanks for having restored to Philosophy a highly scientific character, and for not recoiling before difficulties. It should not be too shy of simple ideas, nor yield up received ideas too readily. Profundity is a good thing; yet there may be such a degree of it that one no longer knows what he is saying. One may contend in regard to the orthodoxy of this or that formula, but we cannot question the moral and religious elevation of the three philosophers whose ideas we have been expounding. As philosophers they are to blame for giving too much to synthesis, for putting the whole into everything. There are two problems in philosophy: to analyze and to combine. The other spiritualism analyzed too much, and neglected the intermediate links; the new spiritualism combines too much, and suffers differences and oppositions to escape it. It is the business of the critic always to contradict and to require of you exactly the opposite of what you are doing. Analyze, I ask you to combine—combine, and I require you to analyze. If it were not so, it would be because philosophy had uttered its last word. Alas! we have not yet reached that.