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
No. 3.

PREREQUISITES TO ORDINATION TO THE MINISTRY.

THE preacher characterizes his ministry as truly as the ministry characterizes him. The type of the man and the type of his profession should in a few years at farthest vitalize. Acts and words with the man make the sermon. It is too narrow to call only a written or spoken discourse on some religious theme a sermon. Spiritual life is sermonized whenever it is made to take root in the world. Motions of the body may be sermons; but they must have righteous thoughts—sermon-thoughts, as expulsive and reserve power. The preacher is a sower of the “word.” He is responsible in some measure for the soil. There is much trouble saved in cultivating the plant by thorough preparation of the soil before the seed is sown.

The pastor is the seed sower, cultivating the field. Another figure is that of the shepherd. A shepherd not only looks after his flock to feed it, but he must protect it from the enemy and the storm. The character, the good name of neighbors and the members of his church the true pastor will zealously guard as a shepherd keeps watch over his flock—as the Good Shepherd kept watch over Peter when he was about to be sifted as wheat.

Since earliest times men have been “set apart”—that is, ordained to their office in the world. When we say a man has a talent for some particular work it is only another manner of expressing the fact that his abilities have been originally selected that way. A man may never act in the capacity for which he is designed. But because he does not is not a reason that he is not selected. God educates men through action. After a proper education he ordains them. All legitimate pursuits in life have their



THE ATONEMENT.

I CAN imagine a child screaming and smashing a kaleidoscope, out of anger at picking out of it bits of glass instead of the many gorgeous pictures which he saw that it contained.

I can imagine a man, or, if you please, myself, waking to the thought that the studies of a lifetime, and the whole side of a room in literature, have been fooling him with the idea of immense learning and immense variety of argument *pro and con* in respect to the atonement, when two bits of glass are all the Sir David Exhibition. It is a queer mental paradox, but the books on the upper shelf against the orthodox view, have more truth, *singulariter*, than the books below, even though these latter are fighting the battle of the reality.

The two bits of glass are, first, that the innocent ought not to suffer for the guilty; and, second, that there could not be any use in it if they might and did; for that, *in foro justitiæ*, no good could arise from any thing so unknown to equity. Turn over the tube and the sights that are seen fill whole books with apparent novelties; but to one in the secret it is amusing to see how the same pair do all. Sum any book upon the shelves, and if it be against, you have it down laughably to two points, whether they be Bushnell's or Ingersoll's; and, if it be for, it is an attempt to parry those two; and those two are, that we have no power to see, first, that the innocent ought ever to suffer for the wicked, or, second, that if he did, the wicked could be in the smallest helped by it.

And, now, being on the side of the orthodox (I mean in the general) and believing that the Innocent One must and might and did and should suffer for the guilty; and, second, that his sufferings could and did work a benefit, and that it was just they should, I beg pardon for presuming upon a fresh analysis. I have uttered the ugly sentence that the *cons* are better than the *pros* in the truthfulness of their arguings, *singulariter*; that is the secret of their dangerousness. I will take that concession along *obiter* in

our whole discussion; and will comprise a fresh account of all in two particulars: First, very little is known in respect of the atonement, though that little is rich and absolutely vital; and, second, much has been thought to be known; and that much more is the *fons belli*—the center and source of the better sort denials of Christ's method of redemption. Let us treat these two points separately:

1. To show how little can be known in respect to the atonement, let us give an exhaustive account of that little:

A Baltimore oriole, in all its colored splendors, is brought for the first time under an infant's eye. The child crows and claps its hands, and that is the bed fact in all the million of pages of learned æsthetics. I can not define what the child sees, but I can give a name to it. It sees beauty. And the emotion that sparkles in its face is a sense of the beautiful.

Now, a sense of the morally beautiful is just as conscious, and, let me say, just as impossible to be defined. We have it, and that is the great setting-out reality. But though we can't budge an inch in describing the consciousness, yet we can state at once the two things (and they are emotions) which are the only possible things which possess morality. One is benevolence, and the other is an absorbing love for moral beauty itself. These two exhaust morals.

A starved wretch staggers to my chair, in the pallor of death. I pity him. If I live a thousand years, I can not add to that consciousness as typically and seminally and, more than that, actually the whole of one table of the law. Now, speaking quickly, I take a look at my own emotion of compassion, and love it and admire it. The ages of eternity will develop no righteousness but these two. Edwards thought that there was but one; and, to this day, so close does benevolence lie to the love of it that the larger and more imperial duty gets intertwined with the simple thought, *benevolo*. But though benevolence initiates all—like sensation in thinking, yet it gives place to higher things, like sensation itself. I pity the starved man, and I love my pity, and these are the types of all morals. But this latter right thing outgrows its fellow. Started in my idea of what is right, I dote upon that for its own sake. And I dote upon this doting; till my love of God, whom I am not bound to love except as embodied holiness, becomes the supreme morality of all; and this our Savior

proclaims where he says, "On these two commandments"—viz., benevolence and the love of embodied holiness—"hang all the law and the prophets."

Now if these be the twin moralities of men must they not necessarily be the whole for the Almighty? The Bible says so: "Be ye holy as God is holy;" "Which thing is true in him and in you;" "That ye may be the children of your Father which is in heaven, for he," etc.; "He that dwelleth in love, dwelleth in God, for God is love;" and then that crowning, crucial intimation, "In the image of God created he them;" and the intimations as to our new birth—that we may be "Renewed in God's image," and become "Partakers of the divine nature."

If, then, these are God's morals, and a character for them is his highest good, these two govern the universe. It follows of course that there is no such thing as justice except as one or both of these two. This is a dynamite shell in the midst of much on the atonement. Let us pause and cart away the pieces.

There can be nothing in the make-up of the atonement that would not be innocent and bounden in a mortal. Resentment, therefore, must be voted away quite from Calvary; anger and vengeance and self-demanded reparation; reparation demanded by any thing else than the two forms of justice—that is, a thought for the general welfare, and a thought for trampled holiness; these two. They are splendid landmarks in theology. They must blaze our way up to our utmost notion on atonement. Whatever Christ did not do at the beck of God's two virtues, was never done; and whatever the atonement did not mean as a stroke for universal welfare (man being to be restored) and a stroke for the lifting up for holiness (holiness having been trampled down) it was never meant to mean. In other words, justice being but the virtue of God in its two shapes of benevolence and a delight in holiness, could not get fuel for itself beyond these two, did not need penalty to cool it or to allay itself; but did a necessary thing, which we must now take up; to keep its oath indeed, but that intermediately only; the necessity for such an oath forced to account for itself within the iron walls of the benevolence and the love of holiness in the Most Wise.

But now comes up our paradox. Men will say, Don't go a step farther. You have said the opponents of atonement have

had more reason, *singulariter*, than its skillfulest friends. Is not that a murderous admission? You have hung a calcium light which, if it is just, will utterly expose the facts. You have said, There are but two things in the hostile books, one that we can not conceive that the innocent ought to suffer for the guilty, and the other, that neither can we that it would do any good if they did. You have pressed the fact that this is more sensible than the reasoning to show that they ought and may, by the most that are arguing on the other side. And you have made the whole look wilder and more subversive by giving us the clearest scheme, and nothing to hide difficulties under but two transparent righteousnesses.

Now an answer to all this is, that the very fault of the orthodox has been in their attempt to meet the difficulty. For the heretic to say that it seems wrong for the innocent to suffer, and for the orthodox to create tons of rationalisms seeming to be the setting forth of how, on the contrary, it may be made to seem to be right, has made error for these long centuries say a great many more sensible things than the truth; and if any body says, Do n't you then give up the credibility of the Bible, seeing that it is that Book alone that teaches a thing shut up among so many difficulties? I feel myself introduced exactly to the point best fitted to open the main view intended in our paper.

It is undoubtedly the truth that the Bible is our only warrant for imagining that there is any atonement at all. It is undoubtedly the fact that if I say those who hold there is none make a great many more sensible speeches than those who defend one, the brunt of that remark, if it is a mischief, falls upon the Bible. But now let us choose a something where the brunt falls upon nature. Let us choose that most seminal idea, that there is any thing in sin that would deserve punishment at all. Only a fool would question it, yet a fool can not travel a furlong from the door without coming into a maze of mystery. That a wretch who murders ought to suffer, even a child would cry out. My neighbor was a perfect angel to his son. He was poor, and had many children. But all through his manhood period he pinched and denied himself personal needs that he might scrape any saved surplus into a sum that might gratify that son with a business schooling. The worn old man has withered under the attempt.

He is practically a pauper; himself and his wife crippled invalids; whose spirit of independence walls off neighborhood support, and yet when it pushes in, intensifies their humiliation; a grand old German man of whom a son should be proud; and now, the son, for years enjoying a salary of a thousand a year, has let four years pass without the ten mile trip to his father's house, and his whole life-time pass without one dollar of returned benefaction. Now that here is the baseness of a devil, and that punishment is deserved by that monster, it takes a monster for one moment to question; and that such justice is a broad kindness—that is, does not demand a separate moral, but hangs, as Christ said it did, upon the two righteousnesses of benevolence and the love of holiness, all this is plain. But then, move a step, and we are in the midst of jungles.

Our argument will be understood: we are to find later that a substitutionary atonement is most undoubtedly taught in the Bible; that we can not follow it an inch without jungle; but that this must not lead us to give it up, for that any punishment at all is enigma; not, to be sure, in its first thought, but in all after; for that the skill of heretics has only been shown in making that appear, and the fault of orthodox men in chasing the bubble of explaining mysteries.

For now, as to punishment. Eve eats the apple. Before that act, and after that act, God accents a punishment, the meaning of which we may never understand. It pervades all nature. It is a hard fact, neither to be denied or expounded. It is a puzzle, like any in the books, and yet inside (unintelligibly I admit) of any punishment at all; and yet so much the most serious part of punishment, that God harps upon it the most; indeed, for reasons that will transpire, deals with it altogether in his first threatening against the access of iniquity. It is more a jungle than any thing we deal in in considering atonement.

Atonement weighs against the Bible (I mean if we insist upon understanding it), though nobody does insist upon understanding it. And this is our hint in theology. Do n't let us deny gravitation, because the sun has a ninety-four million mile pull without intervening tackle; and so do n't let us deny atonement, because, like the queer part of punishment, we can not understand how it satisfies justice, or satisfies, in fact, any thing in heaven or on

earth beside. For what now is the queer part of punishment? It is that to which God gave all the name, and than which he mentioned nothing else in his award to Adam. Who can fathom it?—"Thou shalt utterly die?" He does not say, "thou shalt suffer forever." He reserved that for the impenitent. He does not say, "thou shalt die physically," for that did not happen; but he said that which literally did happen, and which Paul echoes. Like virus upon a baby's arm, the least sin bred sinfulness; strange to say, bred it forever; Eve being what might be called in the moral world, a healthy life, died utterly; and the million that might be bred by one bacillus, is feeble by the side of the millions of millions of sins that will spawn forever in her if our first parents perished. This is twice the atonement puzzle, and yet so imbedded in facts that few doubt it. Lucifer stood up one day a prince, and by one sin shone like Miriam's flesh under the snow of an eternal leprosy. Why is this?

You noticed that punishment could look benevolent; but how can this look benevolent? What is there in the atonement of Christ less level to reason than that Eve, in her modest sin with the apple six thousand years ago, should be the vicar of the eternal Eve, walking the corridors of the cursed millions later in an eternal perishing? But now, further, the cling of this shirt of Nessus, without any possibility of letting off, has not a tittle of the mystery of how Eve could put that shirt upon her children. That men should have tackled that as a thing to be explained, seems truly like dry humor in the dogmatist. When Westminster says, "A covenant being made with Adam," she changes gospel truth into a practical error. And when Dr. Shedd remarks that "covenant" is no Bible word in this connection, he squelches a rationalism till he falls into one as bad. Why can not men stop *in limine*? It is a solid truth that we sin because Adam sinned. We may go further and say, it must be just and it must be natural. We may go further still and show that it is demonstrable that this is all we can arrive at. And therefore to hold with Hodge, it was a covenant, when there is not a scrap of Scripture to say so; or to say with Shedd, it was our act; as though it were our baby hand reaching across millenniums, is simply vicious; it is the soldier stepping out of his breastworks. As long as we abide with God, and point to penitentiaries and door locks and criminal jurispru-

dence, and bad children coming punctually at every birth, we are safe enough; but the moment we begin to theorize, we are lost. We have to trust God all the way through. So that both the ideas thus far started—first that sin should beget sin, and second, and worse, that sinners should beget sinners; stating it radically, that plucking an apple should people Tophet! comes within the reach of Mansfield's counsel—"You will make a first-rate judge if you keep clear of exposition. You understand Indian affairs, and are one of the shrewdest merchants; you will make shoals of irreversible decisions. But don't you ever go to give a reason." It is giving reasons for mysteries that hands them over bound. You practically preach the doctrine in a rationalistic or man-accounted-for shape. Few will stand it. That sin should have punishment seems benevolent and pure; but that a million per cent of the punishment should be that sketched in the Psalm, "He gives over to crookedness the way of the wicked" (Ps. cxlvi. 9). There we would better call off our logic. That a ruffian should not breed a saint, that seems credible enough; but that our beautiful mother should colonize the pit—that is not quite level to our vision; and yet the grave fact that her family is bad, stands out ocularly in all men's wanderings.

You will understand, therefore, our argument: That sin corrupts seems obvious, but I dare not say I understand it; that birth corrupts I feel sure of, but it is still more a mystery; and so now, therefore, the atonement, though it leans heavily upon Holy Writ, and, unlike the other two, can appeal scarce at all to nature, yet, if I find it overwhelmingly revealed, there is nothing in the least against it in the shooting down of the guard who have pushed noisily beyond its color line.

2. We end, therefore, with the second point we were to bring up, viz., How men have known too much, and lost the doctrine in attempts to be articulate.

Oddly enough, this has been done through Scriptures. The Scriptures, to a dogmatic mind, are just like a strawberry bed. A plant stools out and plants another. So a doctrine in the Bible throws out a metaphor. Instead of treating it as one, and using it as in any other skillful rhetoric to beautify the text, it becomes itself a center; it stools out like its parent root. Let Christ say, "This is my body," and libraries are filled with it. Let him say,

“On this rock,” and lo! the tramp of armies and millions of men listed for the primacy of Peter. So, now, the atonement of Christ by its very multiplication of metaphors has multiplied schools. We do not learn by the Bible treating its own words as metaphors. For example, redemption. Theologians make it mark a system. The Bible flouts any such use by using it itself in at least three significances. We are redeemed on Calvary, and yet we are born suffering and lost. We are redeemed when we are regenerate, and yet we are born again to suffer and to sin. Once more we are glorified; and Paul pauses not an instant upon former uses of the word, but calls that “the day of redemption.”

We ridicule, therefore, any body's forthputting, that it is a substitution, but not a sacrifice; that it is an atonement, but not a propitiation; that it is vicarious, but not an expiation; not penal, but a satisfaction otherwise; not a reconciliation of God, but a reconciliation to God; and we do all this because we say, these, in some shape, are all Bible, and, therefore, the atonement means every one of them. And yet it really means none of them. It has a shadow of them all, like any other rhetoric. Bushnell may write a book on the exemplary eloquence of the atonement, and Hodge on its being penal, and Beman on its being governmental, and others from as many other strawberry settings of themselves as are found in metaphors, and I might say, gentlemen, I claim you all. All of you are false, if you pursue any one view *ad unguem*; and specially false if you exclude the other views; and all of you are true just and only as you treat Christ as distantly shadowed in the words, as Eve is in the mystery of our ruin.

If it be asked, then, do you believe in Bushnell? I say, no, because he is Pelagian. He paints nobly the effect of Calvary to melt men; but men won't melt. That is the very call for Christ. If Bushnell does not secure a purchase—an *ab extra* power, an intra-coming spirit, as the gist of his view of the atonement, he teaches not even Christianity; but if it follow, then, you believe in Hodge? I say, no; for he teaches resentment. He makes the morals of God differ from the morality of men. This is a terrible mistake. It withers worship. It introduces the vengeful into Calvary. Of course we shudder at it if we are people who make no justice in any one other than benevolence and a taste for purity. Then, do I believe in Burney? Very eminently in three respects:

(1) He has done yeoman service against vengeance and the whole Hodgean view of *semet ipso* retribution. This is the service of the Cumberland Presbyterians. A God with the same morals as his victims, if diligently taught, would have kept out whole books about the atonement and endless controversy. (2) He has answered Bushnell. Instead of a Christ merely tender and loving, and instead of a sacrifice merely fitted to impress, and which we could only imagine could save under the scheme of a Pelagian self-sufficiency, he is able to use that adjective, *necessary*. He is able to use it of what Christ was and did as an equipment for his work. He is able to make this positive, that as Adam damns us through himself as a sinner, so Christ had a necessary fitment to give us life, by what he went through for our deliverance. Dr. Burney, more than other men, has brought out this true view of Christ's fitness for his post-resurrection office. We will show afterward how this is enough for faith, but how it leaves out a part of the reality. And then, once more (3) Dr. Burney restores justification. That figment of Martin Luther, so destructive to redemption, that Christ's righteousness is imputed instead of being imparted to us, Dr. Burney triumphantly puts aside. He will be remembered for this in the future literature of the Church. Our theologians, among whom I have lived, whom I happen to know as painstakingly honest men, can not get it into their minds, and, by a species of fatality, can not tell their pupils, that the world never had Luther's justification till it had Luther; that Justin and Chrysostom and Anselm taught like Augustine, and that Augustine taught exactly like Lebanon—that "Being justified is being made righteous, to wit by him who justifies the ungodly, that from being ungodly he may be made righteous" (Works, Vol. X., p. 228); "That he justifies those whom out of a condition of impiety he makes righteous" (Vol. V., p. 753); that "Justification here is imperfect in us" (Vol. V., p. 867); that "When our hope shall be completed, then also our justification shall be completed" (Vol. V., p. 790).

Dr. Burney, therefore, exalts redemption; for if his sacrificial Christ wields our pardon; and if, equipped to administer it, he stays on the field to give us life, and if pardon lifts the curse, and if the heaviest curse is sinfulness, of course pardon will take away our sinfulness. So, go on extending to me pardon, and, as the

chief meaning of that, reduce my sinfulness, and where can Luther come in? Keep me pardoned to the last, and in heaven end my sinfulness, and Augustine has told every thing. Luther's amendment but hangs a sail to take the wind from an all-satisfying redemption.

But now Dr. Burney has part of the insufficiency of Bushnell. Dr. Bushnell can not tell why God persecuted Christ, and where God's part of the inflictions came in, and these the overshadowing and the worst. What melting tenderness can we think of in the man, not shadowed and thrown into confusion by the frowns and wantonness of the Almighty? And so of Burney. His sacrificial Adam! Where was the necessity of the sacrifice? More precisely, now, where the necessity of a Christ at all? Let us push that! Where the necessity of an interposed Christ? unless it be something *in foro justitiæ*? Except as I must sin before I can be punished, except as Adam must fall before I can be cursed, why could not God be my second Adam, all alone by himself, and omit all the awkwardness of being eternally incarnate?

It will be seen, therefore, why we object to Burney. They err miserably who stool out from metaphors into whole books on propitiation and redemption. But so do those err also who go slaughtering among metaphors, and deny all court necessity for any thing in Emmanuel. It must be understood that Dr. Burney's is a very sufficient gospel, because Dr. Bushnell's gospel of light (which would imply the Pelagianism of tenderness alone being enough to melt the sinner), is enlarged into the very much more sacrificial Christianity, that Christ had to do something and to be something to win the power to bless; just as Adam had to do and to be, that he might win the power to curse. And that makes more brilliant that true part of the evangel, that Christ must be eternally active upon the souls of the redeemed. But then why that easily misunderstood shyness of using the usual terms in the description of the sacrifice? All this will come into place in the home-stretch of our discussion.

There are three steps of justice, each of which is a mystery. First, that sin deserves punishment; where the mystery is, how it is of the essence of justice that the wrong-doer should grow corrupt and continue and increase his sinfulness; second, that my child must be corrupt, and the mystery lies on the very thresh-

hold; third, that a spiritual parent should come in, and, being born himself of the fleshly Adam, yet, as God incarnate, should play second Adam to me, introducing into my soul spiritual life as Adam brought into my blood damnation. This is all mystery from the very first; but then it is a triple climb, that enables me to bring out as a whole the meaning of my paper. It begins with a consciousness. I am conscious, as the child is conscious of the beauty of the oriole, of the shameful wickedness of Satan in wrecking our planet. I see that he deserves suffering. But then that he deserves sinning, why, that is another part of speech. But then it is so inwound in the very constitution of intelligences; so universal in accountable existence, that though we can conceive of Satan as pitied and restored, with only well-weighed torment for the one defection, yet the moment the other thing is established as the fact, we seem forced to three admissions; first, that it would be a queer world where sin flashed up and flamed in its temporary visitation and grew pure again; second, that we have no reason to know that justice would favor such a thing; and, therefore, third, as the Bible appeals to justice in the case, we can well afford to take it that way, and write it that way, "The wages of sin is death."

Then, secondly, the generating of sinners, that must be considered justice. It is not a revelation like the atonement. It is a planetary fact. And we can treat it like corruption. It behaves like a sovereign punishment; and we have nothing to prove that it is not one. It is revealed to us as just and natural; but how it is just, and why it is natural, I believe it is perfectly demonstrable that we can not determine.

So, thirdly, of the atonement. To keep it a mystery, is the safe theologizing. To say it is just, may be said of any thing that comes from the Almighty. But, to say it is necessary justice, and an award of the most vital and critical kind, is thoroughly in keeping with the solemnity with which it is brought forward by the Almighty, and the court terms with which it is everywhere presented to our fears. Its necessity can never travel beyond the two forms of justice, viz., benevolence and the love of purity; but, nevertheless, both these make it necessary. It would not be benevolent in God not to require a Redeemer; and it would not favor holiness; and yet why it would not is about as intelligible as

those hard-to-be-repudiated sorrows—that sin generates sinfulness, and, what is far cloudier yet, that sinners generate their like, and people death with its eternal victims.

We come now to the metaphors that have given so much trouble. Were the sufferings of Christ penal? Of course they were, and of course they were not. A good way to drive off difficulty is to ask, Is sinfulness penal? It is the most terrible and general and punctually announced consequence of my sinning; but whether it be a punishment or no, depends simply on how I choose to use language. It is not a punishment like hanging; and, furthermore, to say that sin is a punishment for sin sounds awkwardly, and mixes God awkwardly with our transgressions; but if justice demands my being given up to being sinful, and punishment, though in no such sense ever possible in human administration, nevertheless is retained as the word for expressing the fruit of such a demand, then corruption is penal, and hurrying to the other mystery, then heredity is penal, and, further yet, Christ's sufferings were penal; as the thing demanded by the two moralities of God which are the sum of that secondary and inferential idea in morals, Jehovah's justice. So of being redeemed. If Christ had to be something and do something to act as a second Adam, where is the harm of calling it a ransom? Remember, the Bible furnishes this rhetoric itself. Why not call it a satisfaction? or a substitution? Why not call it vicarious? Christ certainly did something for us which we could not do. Why not call it a sacrifice? and say it propitiated and expiated and atoned? It certainly did all these in a sense touched by the light of the service done; and yet it certainly did none of these in a sense usual in human language; and to say that it did, is just the strawberry stooling-out in the sense complained of in the beginning of our paper.

Watch now how these metaphors have corrupted doctrine. "Propitiated!" Christ certainly did propitiate in the sense of ridding God, under his sweetest traits, of the necessity of that most horrible vengeance, the wrath of the lamb. But driving the idea too far, what have we? We have a God of mad heat. We have that in God which would be wrong in his creature. We have one person of a trinity placating another. We have a wicked vindictory vengefulness; and instead of remembering that God did the propitiating, we get up the figment of a thirsty wrath,

rather than of the sweetest traits, themselves furnishing their own justification. So of redemption. We have made it stand square, till it has worked the horror of a limited atonement. So of substitution. It has been by insisting on all its square sense that we have drawn on it the thunderbolts of just denunciation; the bad, talking more sense than the good, and hurling at us the fact, that guilt, or realized or accepted hostility of the great God to the innocent, or any thing like the same pain or pain of equal pressure and duration, can not be for an instant thought of in the declared atonement.

The true theory of atonement, then, is this: (1) that it is an affair of justice; (2) that justice is but a case of mercy, or, to go more thoroughly into the truth, an instance under the two moralities of benevolence and the love of morality itself; (3) that it is perilous to push metaphors; and, therefore, that wrath, anger, vengeance, punishment, debt, guilt, ransom, sacrifice, propitiation, satisfaction, are all hives of prejudice if we insist on a human use, but all beautiful if we give justice its human use, and make all these serve *tantis pro tantis*; (4) that to push them further is to have to give them up altogether, and that to give them up altogether is to suffer discomfiture as to the one great trait, viz., the judicial necessity of the atonement; that it redeems, because it pays down something necessary to our pardon; that it is penal and a sacrifice and a substitution and vicarious, because it does something for us that we can not do for ourselves; that it propitiates, but starkly in the sense of doing something required by morals; and expiates, but sheerly in the same way; and that to build theories further out over the gulf, though truer to what is usual in the emblem, is to bring the whole thing down with a crash, and to accord the infidel more sense than the believer.

It will have been seen, therefore, that the moral, penal, governmental, exemplary, and sacrificial are all theories that we claim; but that we claim them without the possibility anywhere of being entangled in their sense. We can speak of wrath and guilt and vengeance and satisfaction to justice, without the carp of an antagonist, because we confess no justice as visiting Christ not composed of the two sweetest traits of benevolence and a love of holiness. If a hell is thrown at us intolerably bitter, and we, as we do, believe in it, we do not believe in it except as a demand of

justice; and we do not believe in any justice except as a form of those two; and if the demands of those two are for any punishment for any thing, and I call that penal; and for that strangest punishment, corruption, and I call that penal; and then the corruption of my child, and I call that penal; I do not see why I may not call atonement penal, nay, expiatory, substitutionary, propitiatory, and all those other things, even though Christ was innocent, and his sufferings *in loco poenæ* were like no other sufferings that at all answer to the idea of retribution. If a man does not pretend to satisfy demands for explanation, and, on the contrary, keeps quite out of that rationalistic snare, and when challenged for this as unreasonable, bids his challenger to explain to him the penalty of hereditary corruption; and if he goes further, and explains all penalty as simply outflowing from the two moralities of heaven, I do not see that such theologizing can come to grief, particularly if it keep watchfully within the fence of what is known, and employ the language chosen for us by the Most Wise.

Nay, we may go further yet. I think we may have a preference among these different appellations. Governmental, substitutionary, vicarious, propitiatory, if you please; but, after all, the most central term is moral. This seems to be what the best are groping after. Once settle it that vengeance is not the central thing, then, what is the central thing? Is it not, after all, universal morals? What would become of these if there were no punishment at all? What is the necessity, then, if it be not one of discipline? Not necessarily for the victim, but through him for all mankind? And if Christ be a substitute for such a discipline, and pain have no virtue in itself, and punishment is a vital instrument, and the absence of it would set all minds astray, why is not the presence of it *gratia mentis*? And why is not the atonement, if it takes its place, a lesson for worlds? If it be a necessary lesson, as much so as punishment direct, then the love involved in it becomes conspicuously visible, and the justice involved in it becomes more conspicuously nothing but those two affections which we have pleaded for it in all this paper.

This is what strikes us pleasantly as an enlarged and completed moral theory. Not Bushnell's, as a mere spectacle of tenderness; not Burney's, though that altogether is a quite distinguishable

advance; but one that counts all punishment a lesson; a lesson needful in the very nature of things; governmental and vindictory and deserved, of course; but very vitally a lesson; this being the moral theory of punishment, and, therefore, justifying a moral theory for the Lord's atonement.

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