


Swanee Palm
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LECTURES



ON THE

EVIDENCES OF CHRISTIANITY,

DELIVERED AT THE

UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA,

DURING THE SESSION OF 1860-1.

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THERE is a tendency in modern science to the doctrine of developments. Anatomists believe that a skull is a developed vertebra, and botanists that a flower is a developed leaf-bud; and the tendencies of science might be expected to intrude upon religion.

The tendency of science to find a development in religion is assisted by the fact that religion *is* developed. Heaven, and (if our ideas are realized) the Millennium, are developments of Christianity. They develop its facts, for heaven and the Millennium *are* developed facts of Christianity. They develop its knowledge, for now we see through a glass darkly, but in heaven face to face. They develop *its* methods, for they shall not teach every man his neighbor, and every man his brother, saying, Know the Lord: for all shall know him from the least to the greatest.

We are not blind therefore to acknowledged progress in religion. The infidel schemes we would oppose will sufficiently define themselves in the progress of our discussion.

Development may be of two kinds, in the inventions of man or in the revelations of God, and these two might adequately divide our subject. The "religious idea" might be man's idea, and then Christianity is *in transitu* from one mythology to another. Or the "religious idea" may be God's inspiration, and then Christianity may be a step *in transitu* in the development of revealed religion. This is the division which we had first agreed upon, but it clears the way to another which is fuller, more easily remembered, and more strikingly in unison with facts in general.

All possible developments are in three forms.

First, there is a development of *art*: as for example, the steam-engine has been developed from the toy of Hero.

Secondly, there is a development in *nature*: as for example, the oak is a development from the germ of the acorn.

And thirdly, there is a development of *science*: as for example, the Copernican system has been developed from the spheres of the Greek astrologers.

Each of these forms of development has been imagined by different infidels as obtaining in Christianity.

I. First, they have imagined a *developed invention*, and adopted the theory that Christianity is a myth developed and cultivated from the ancient fables.

Whether it is a fable or no broadly, or as a general question, will not come up under this head, for that would be taking the work of all our colleagues. The whole circle of the "Evidences" would be contained under such a division; nor if it be a fable, whether it is developed and cultivated, for that we would be perfectly willing to acknowledge. What we are concerned in is the proof of the theory derived from the theory itself; or the meeting of the idea that Christianity is a cultivated mythology, as it is rendered plausible by the likelihoods in the very idea of the developments proposed.

Now a skull is thought to be a developed vertebra from its likeness to that out of which it is thought to be developed. A flower is thought to be a developed leaf-bud, because it is like a leaf-bud. It has its parts and properties. And the grand method of maintaining a development of faiths is, that Christianity is like its predecessors, and that we can see in Boodhism and the fables of the Greeks, the shapes and patterns out of which its principles have been derived.

Let us pursue this method in the instance of the gospel.

Suppose the question to be deliberately asked, how I know that Jehovah is better than Jupiter, or Christianity any different theology from the myths of ancient religion?

The first feeling is one of indignation. But part of this is unquestionably prejudice; and let us place ourselves in an avenue of approach where as much of this as possible shall be done away, and where the classic veil that hides us from the past shall be penetrated, and we enter among the men and women of the old worship.

Let us go up a street of Pompeii.

Here is a bakery. Across over the way is a drinking shop, and the steps worn by the feet of the inebriates. Above was an apothecary, and in his shop the pots and vials that he used in his craft. On the street are the ruts of the carriage-way, and in the yard of a house a well grooved by the rope as it rubbed incessantly on the marble twenty centuries ago.

These sights break a spell; and instead of the toga'd Latin,

half fabulous like the books of his own religion, we see actual men—pictures and carved work and pans and lanterns, thrift and taste and poverty thoughts and frailties like our own.

We go up the street, then, and on a corner lot is a temple to Jupiter.

We see it in its home relation. The baker and the apothecary built it for a want like ours. And as we look at it in its actual intention through the Ides and Kalends of the year as a resort for the townspeople, and as a place to which tottering old men and widowed matrons went for the consolations of religion, it begins to steal over us as an arrangement like the others: here, if anywhere, we can indulge the skepticism that religion is a progress, and the question actually presses, why is not here the leaf-bud? Why are not here the likenesses on which philosophers rely? Why was not this a preparation? And why is not Christianity, too, an achievement of the mind working itself clear toward a higher and more mature religion?

Now it so happens that the objections you instantly propose, are the most startling analogies on which the suggestion could depend.

1. Your first attitude is mere resistance. In the inert moment of hearing the plan, you are perfectly tranquil, and when you analyze your feelings, it is one of mere assurance. This skepticism does not ruffle you. You have not the slightest idea of its plausibleness. And if you had, a certain jealous terror would hurriedly close all the avenues to any infidel opinion.

But unfortunately this is a family tendency. The religions of mankind deal in the profoundest confidences. The Mohanmedan nourished in Islam, is awe-struck at the teachings of the Christian. The Romanist in the shadow of the church, rejects with scorn the faith of the Reformers. And this temple in the street shows on its gorgeous front the intensity of the feeling that inspired its architectural designs.

See the columns. Observe the capitals how exquisitely they are wrought.

The faculties of men are not stimulated without an object. And the patience of the labor shows a resoluteness of will and a warmth of principle and purpose unequalled in Christian lands.

2. You may say theirs was an ignorant age. But how easily might the infidel contradict it.

When we wish to polish our styles, or to frame the thinking of our universities upon a generous model, we go back to the idola-

ters. We defer to them in every point. We leave Shakspeare and Milton, and take Homer. We leave Fox and Pitt and Chatham, and take Demosthenes. We study a dead language. We incur the reproach of inutility to get back to the thinking of that early period.

Our artists tell us that the "Apollo" dug up within our own century is perfectly inimitable. And we who have no experience in the art, are constantly surprised at the coolness with which they consent to the opinion, that the antique is hardly to be attained to by any modern application.

Here is an age then living upon the achievements of another. Our students ripen their minds by the pabulum of ancient wit. And when Kant and Hegel are mouldering in their tombs, we have no reason to be sure that Plato will not still be safe, and will not still be reaching to the centuries the volumes of his sense and eloquence.

3. But the philosophers, you instantly reply, were the ancient skeptics, and it is a favorite method of Christianity to condemn the temples by the admission of the grave and learned. But how would it answer in the instance of Christianity herself?

When the lighter literature of the time had floated off, Hume and Gibbon and the more learned of the German school, Descartes and Leibnitz, and in our own time Carlyle and even Macaulay might be gleaned from to undermine the gospel. And it might be said, See; whenever a mind rose above the level of the multitude, he descried the sophistries, and whereas a cultivated form might be less exposed to such a defection, Christianity would still furnish enough to give it the likeness of being a cultivated fable.

The heathen are in the hand of enemies. The ancient books have been studied to brace up the gospel. Let our literature be committed to the skeptics, and what might they not glean from it of infidel confession.

4. But you say, the vices of the heathen are the grave evidence against their system. Then there we encounter the vices of the Christians. Del Monte and Cæsar Borgia and the laxer of the Popes would stand side by side with Apollo and the goddesses. And in the church herself the infamy of the cloisters would hold, for a cultivated religion, a proportionate grade with the obscenities of the temple.

Seneca tells us,* vices were not a part of their religion. And

* *De Vita Beata*, ch. 26, § 5-6. See also Karsten *Phil. Vett. Reliquie*, vol. 1, p. 43 et seq.

looking upon Christianity as she was, a future mythologue might find in her persecutions and bloody wars enough to characterize her as having a likeness with the idolaters.

5. But you say Paganism is a perfect labyrinth. There is no order in its myths, and it is an intellectual impossibility to embrace it as a system. It has gods and demigods. We have hardly fancied one, before it is confounded with another. They trace themselves alike. We have hardly gotten an origin for Jove, before it is laid claim to in the theology of Bacchus; and in the endless confusion of traits and influences and clashings in the arrangement of their empire, we find a practical confession that it is not a system to be believed.

But, for a cultivated religion, there are some contrarieties with us.

My neighbor near me conceives of Christ as a man. I conceive of him as a God. Let our writings go to a stranger, and you have no idea of the confusion they will cause. We will not pursue this subject. You can easily see how to a future antiquarian perseverance and its opposite, eternal punishment and its opposite, regeneration in its different methods, Pelagianism and the doctrine of depravity, would present a chaos of belief impervious to any system.

6. Your next attack is against the puerilities of the heathen. You say, their myths are so gross as to be hopelessly incredible, and there is a carnality about their worship in its images and bloody sacrifices, that renders it easy to dismiss it as monstrous and absurd.

But now (with reverence be it spoken; for we would bring out the fair weight of the infidel scheme) is there a due simplicity in the doctrine of the gospel?

What are we to think of the Trinity? What are we to think of atonement and a bloody crucifixion? What are we to think of Jesus and an incarnation of the Holy One? How are we to judge of miracles like that of Jonah or the one of Gadara; or of prophecies like this, "When Israel was a child then I loved him and called my son out of Egypt?" What are we to think of morals where Jesus creates wine, or Moses licenses divorce and encourages polygamy?

The method of induction, and the whole sweep of the modern sciences, help in this species of skepticism. Men have gotten to expect simplicity, and to beat at the gates of the future with a satisfaction in nothing else. Nature when rifled of her secrets,

gives them to us in simple laws, and men have grown to be confident of her that she has not told us the reality till she sends it to us in a plain response, orderly and regular like her own designs.

And if there be a God, plain, a *lumen albus*, without the coloring of cross or Trinity, is it not likely that that is the idea, and that we are to stand yet on the basis of law, and to be judged by a simple government according to the deeds done in the body?

This is fascinating.

And remembering, moreover, that our cumbrous faith is a legacy from the days of our fathers, and that when we cross the sea, the Boodhist and the Mussulman have the same faith in their hereditary doctrines, we are considerably shaken, and the avatars of the East and the incarnation of our own divinity seem a sister company, and seem to waive their rights all of them before a simpler theism.

Thus then we have in considerable order, and with a plainness that will be advantageous to the truth, a sketch of the reasoning on which this first scheme of development depends: we have a right in the outset to know what specifically is the *point* that the infidel values in the considerations that have been given.

Here is a series of facts constituting a series of resemblances. Does he depend upon the facts, or does he depend upon the resemblances?

1. He cannot depend upon the facts.

1st. It is a harmless fact that Christians believe the gospel. That Boodhists believe and Mussulmans is the resemblance. That we believe is a harmless and nowise discreditable fact.

2d. It is a harmless fact that the ignorant believe or the learned, as the case may be. The gospel offers itself to all, and that any believe is only a token that it fulfils its mission.

3d. That the learned disbelieve is harmless. "Not many wise, not many mighty," is a text of Scripture. That Zeno and Socrates disbelieved is the analogy. That Gibbon disbelieved is in full consistency with the truth of Scripture.

4th. It is a harmless fact that Christianity should be contaminated with vice; and,

5th. That it should be confused with heresy; for both these are consistent. That cannot be charged against a system that would disprove it if it were not the case. If Christianity distinctly affirms that Christians will be wicked and Christendom vexed and divided, the fact free of the analogy would only be consistent if it was as it is found to be.

6th. It is a harmless fact that the gospel is not simple.

And this we place on the foundation that the infidel is deceived in his notion of a God.

God is never simple.

Simplicity has two lodging-places, a place in the truth and a place in the mind by which it is apprehended. The truth is always simple. But the mind from the feebleness of its powers prevents that simplicity from being manifest.

To this category belongs the Deity. He is simple. And the Trinity makes him simple. But how it operates to complete the unity of the Godhead we are utterly unable to conceive.

But can the infidel conceive other things?

The feeling of plausibleness that started in your mind was due to the idea that a simplicity was just before you.

The idea seemed easy. Give us only a soul, or according to Varro a simple spirit of the universe, and our idea is complete, for then we have a simple King, a rewarder and punisher of all our actions.

This is your system. But why were the ancients perplexed by it?

You object to a Trinity, but how do you explain the mystery of the creation?

The Deity is infinite. The creation is finite. The creation is the history of the Deity. The creation had a beginning. The Deity had no beginning. An eternity, therefore, before he offered to create, he was without a government, and without an active history.

This so perplexed the ancients that they deified matter, or at least denied the period of its creation, and held that it had existed from the eternity of God.

Again, you object to a Redemption. But how do you simplify ordinary justice? Where are its punishments? Virtue is dethroned and vice elevated. Is this simple?

The ancients were so pressed by it as to invent metempsychosis, and by the stages of a transmigration to bury in a cloud what they could not solve by an immediate government. But this is not simple. And if we are to have any expedient, why not take the good one, and if we have no King simple in act and immediate in purpose, why not take the one that is revealed by Jesus Christ reconciling the world through the gospel?

You are stumbled by the Incarnation.

But can you explain any of the subsistences of the creature?

Why does that pillar stand? It stands by an energy residing in it of the Almighty. Dismiss that energy and it falls, and it falls so as to seem nothing but energy. Then actually what is it? The ancients solved the difficulty by inventing Pantheism. And can any one explain how a thing can be nothing in such a sense that it vanishes when energy is withdrawn, and yet be distinguished in its essence from the essence of the energy itself?

The infidel objects to Imputation.

But can he account for sin?

The ancients invented Platonism. In laboring for a simple God they were embarrassed by the presence of calamity, and rather than ascribe pestilences and vices to the same divinity they invented two, and defended the simplicity of one by adding the complexity of another.

Here then we have been miserably deceived. There is no fresh theism such as we imagined, but an old, exploded fantasy.

And taking our Christianity, on which all nature looks down with evidence, which explains sin and accounts for pain and suffering, which arranges life, and takes up again the ravelled thread of justice and providential things, we are to compare it, not with reason or some simple form imprinted in its beauty on the soul, but with the ghastly and forbidding shapes of ancient and exploded superstition.

2. But next as to the resemblances: is not the resemblance of Christianity to so many mythologies an evidence that it is one of them?

We confess that it is.

If the Copernican system has been preceded by fifty astronomies, the prima facie evidence is, without waiting much for analogies, that it is false like the rest. If the world were to entertain a hundred metaphysics, and the last were now to be brought forward, the prima facie evidence would be that it would be only temporary. But here are some things obviously in our favor.

First, such likenesses are inevitable. If man discovered a true metaphysics, its analogies would be in the nature of things. Map out all your consciousness, and the map would be dimmed, and dimmed by likeness. False systems would claim your facts, and did you do it by inspiration, analogies would confuse your map, and men could hardly receive from you a true philosophy.

That which assails all truth can hardly be fatal to anything.

Take the Copernican system. It has all species of analogy with the plan of Tycho Brahe.

Both considered motion. Both classified and connected motion. Both established periodicity : both calculated periods. Both advocated truth, however one had mixed it with ignorance and error. And yet are we to abandon Copernicus on the faith of the analogies? Both had mysteries. Both had ignorant friends, and both learned enemies. And yet who believes in a transition? Who is waiting for another system to be found? and does not take Copernicus as a last revealer of those laws in the frame of nature?

It is true, analogy is powerful.

I am timorous about doubting Christ, but I cross the sea, and I find a Turk as timorous about questioning Mohammed. It impresses me. I go to a Boodhist, and ask him for a miracle. I go to a Christian, and ask him for a miracle, and they at this particular age are neither ready ; they point me to the past. I go to Plato, and he laughs at the temples ; I go to Hobbes and Spinoza, and they laugh at the churches, and this impresses me. The only question is, what are our arguments? Are they multiplied enough? And are we able to heap them up sufficiently against the opposing likelihood?

Physicians tell us that jellies and concentrated essences are not good for the nourishment of the system. Food to be good must be coarse. Lions to be strong must hunt their prey. And the mind to be vigorous must not stumble upon truth, but dig for it in a period of study.

So it is in regard to our probation. Error is an ore of truth, and analogy is the law that holds its ingredients together. It is healthy for us to forge out our faith. And though the "evidences" are literally of every sort, prophecy, miracle, fact and testimony, yet we are not to receive them like the devils, who believe and tremble, but like inquiring men ; and the difficulties that disturb shall be edifying in their influence on the mind.

II. It is time, however, that we should notice the second species of development which is that of nature, that Christianity is a step in the onward development of something that exists in fact, but in a very immature condition.

We can illustrate by facts in its own origin. Adam received the message, "In the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die."

This was the religion of the time. But how germinal it was is seen in the fact that subsequent developments have entirely relieved

it, and the very persons that received the message, are exalted higher than before their iniquity occurred.

So of the protevangelium. "The seed of the woman shall bruise the serpent's head," was the gospel of its time. And Christians might be ready to confess that it imparted few ideas, and some of these imperfect and distorted in their reception by the people.

The same is true of the system of Abraham. It noticed little a hereafter. It was crude and dark: and the apostles themselves confessed that it was a bondage under the rudiments of the world.

Now what are we to say of the like in Christianity? We are no judges. We are living in the system. The men of the time cannot detect the crudities of their own opinion. The argument from simplicity is wasted: for the simple threat "in the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die," was a simpler information for practice, than all the light and all the precept of our superior religion.

This is an interesting idea. The protevangelium, "The seed of the woman shall bruise the serpent's head" put Adam in a simpler state than us, for without the complexities of Christianity, he learned only that out of the sins that were beginning to reign, and out of the evils that were beginning to afflict him, the offspring of the woman was to appear for his deliverance.

Now the theory may be advanced. Christianity is germinating yet. It is the mere embryo of a sublimer manifestation. And our zeal in considering it as perfect may only be the fondness of the misguided Hebrew who would rest in the shadows of the law, rather than embrace the substance of the gospel.

It would seem a natural way of replying to this theory to take up the doctrines of the cross, and show that they are final in their nature. So under the head of invention we might have *denied* development, and showed that Christianity reached back from the beginning, and could not historically have been derived from myths. But this, and more that we could have done in showing that myths were derived from Christianity, would have involved us in controversy, and called up a multitude of questions, that we could not have despatched in the limits of our lecture.

We are driven, therefore, to a shorter method.

We say, grant there may be a development.

Literalists believe that Christ is personally to reign. It is a harmless doctrine in contrast with infidelity, and no one would

implicate the two, lest pious persons should believe in the first and be harassed by connections with the other. But if Christ come, that is a developed Christianity. Personal interviews with men would develop our intelligence, and free intercourse for ages would bring out wonders, and fill, as it will be in heaven, all our minds with believing admiration.

It is better therefore to meet the idea of development not with an iron-bound denial, but an appeal to the nature of things showing that the most glorious development of light must be only a kindling of the twilight of the gospel.

Naturalists have imagined that the world was in a state of progress. They imagine the nebular hypothesis that all things existed originally in a state of vapor, and that by a series of changes, some of which have been calculated, central masses and concentric rings, and finally revolving planets have resulted from the principles of nature.

Attributing to matter further powers to vivify and improve itself, they have skeptically imagined a progression by which germs and motions and finally plants and life have been successively evolved from this ceaselessly improving materiality.

Now this will illustrate the instance of religion.

If matter be developed in the manner stated, it must either be by God or by a system in itself. If it be by God, then it must be truthfully, or if it be by matter, then eminently it must be truthfully by some order. The vapor out of which the universe is to evolve must be singularly instinct with a truthfulness to its whole design.

Now this we claim in respect to religion. If it is a development of a series of phenomena, these phenomena must be continually facts. If a leaf-bud is to generate a flower it must be instinct with the flower at the beginning. If a chaos is to evolve a world it must be instinct with the world; and so of religion. If it is a series of developments, whether they are of God or something else, the moulds or patterns of the whole must be in it from the beginning.

Now the doctrine of development carried to the undermining of Christianity would make Christianity singular among things.

There is a certain order in growth. The solid parts are first attended to. The gneiss and granite of the hills have been laid, so we are to understand, before the marble. The spine and the blood-vessels appear in the earliest orders of the creatures; the

root and the leaf-stem, in the gigantic ferns. And so in religion the essential root, Christ reconciling the world by his death appears in the earliest ova, if you prefer to speak so, of the Christian religion.

Then now another principle. Things develop themselves till their parts at last are thoroughly identified. The fossil megalosaurus has a distinct eye and a distinct shoulder; and so, rising in the scale, a lion or a man has distinct organs that have come at last to be identified, and in respect to which it is impossible to entertain a doubt however much the species might be elevated. The stars revealed themselves to the Chaldees in the distinctest motions. Astronomy was in its crudest state, and yet some facts were *settled*. And if you ask me how, I answer by intuitive perception. The facts stared at them from the skies, and the mind seized on them as her own, and has retained them as her perpetual possession. We can illustrate by the system of Copernicus; a thousand crudities had prevailed, but the facts finally fell into their places like type into a form, and now it would be just as impossible to shake the conviction of astronomers as the conviction of a child about his plainest verity.

How much then can the infidel assail us, if he will grant us two facts, first, that as nature develops, her improvements sink steadily in structural importance, and therefore her prime things are present in the beginning; and, secondly, that as she develops, her parts successively identify themselves, and that by discoveries of the mind as certain as if the whole were there?

We pretermit, therefore, the argument that there will be no other revelation, and suffer the infidel to indulge the highest hopes of future light. We only say that the development attained already, binds him down to a sufficient gospel.

The statement that Christ died and rose again, never can be developed into a doctrine that he never descended from the Father. The statement that he died for our sins according to the Scriptures, never can be developed into a naked Deism. The statement, that the heart is deceitful above all things and desperately wicked, never can be developed into the statement that it is as it was meant to be. And the statement that he that believeth on Christ hath everlasting life, never can merge itself into some after-faith resting our hope upon mere obedience to the law.

We pass on next to the third head.

III. The third species of development is a development under which Christianity is regarded as a form in transitu to a higher development of religious knowledge.

This is the species of Morell.

Morell's metaphysics as a separate introduction to the case need not trouble us, for we can admit them all and still show its utter impracticability.

This perhaps were the better way.

It is the part of a logician to deny only what is necessary of an adversary's system. And as this, which is essentially German, is spreading among men, it is best perhaps to stand clear, and not let our argument depend upon anything fundamental in a favorite psychology.

We may say a few things, however.

First, we object to the very elements of Morell's system. The "logical consciousness," and "the intuitional consciousness," as an analysis of our thinking,* are a solecism. Logical conceptions are as much intuitional as the conceptions of their subject matter. Reasoning is a series of intuitions; and when we affirm the relation between truths we as much appeal to an intuitional power as when we see justice or see beauty in the facts around us. We quarrel, therefore, with the division; but we would be sorry to implicate with that a belief in Christianity.

Again, we object to a second step. Religion, we are told, in its essence is a feeling of dependence.† Now religion is a broad state. We might as well say it was patriotism or a motherly affection. We might as well say it was giving of alms or shouldering a burden. We might as well say it was love or hatred. If we might narrow it down to any fact, we might call it knowledge.

Knowledge, in its broadest sense, includes our tastes and the notitiæ of conscience. What a blind man cannot see is part of our knowledge; and what a painter appreciates in beauty and proportion above an ordinary eye is part of his knowledge; and so also is our cognizance of light, and our appreciation of excellence of character. In this sense religion's essence is in knowledge, if you will allow that term to be inseparable from one accompanying fact: I mean attendant emotion.

So faith is a low stage of knowledge. Obedience springs from knowledge. Love and penitence flow from knowledge. "I have heard of thee by the hearing of the ear, but now mine eye

* Philos. of Religion, Am. Ed chs. 1 & 2.

† Ib. ch. 3.

seeth thee. Therefore I abhor myself and repent in dust and ashes."

Again, we object strongly to the idea of revelation as a heightened consciousness.* Morell in his apparently candid division of historic facts and conscious intuitions, ignores a third species of truth which does not come out either under the added head of 'logical constructions.† 'Logical constructions' he defines to be the formal stating of our material intuitions. Now there is something more than this. There are doctrinal revelations. Historic facts he alleges could be gotten by an eye-witness, and then nothing more would be necessary to write the Scriptures than a heightened conscious intuition. But there is a third thing required—doctrinal fact. Who *explained* the historic fact? Who clustered about Christ a system of atoning life? Who told us what he was? This is not history but exposition, and could appear no more upon the face of the crucifixion, than it could be stirred up within us by our interior consciousness. There is a *tertium quid*, therefore, that Morell has not noticed. His logical construction is a mere expounding of our intuitions, and the doctrine of a Trinity could as poorly spring up in that way, as sights and odours without the instrument of sense.

Again, we object to the idea that inspiration depends upon piety,‡ and strange to say, this we refute consistently with the theory of Morell.

Piety is but one intuition.

There is an intuition of justice, an intuition of power, an intuition of truth, generally. Balaam had intuitions that were anything but intuitions of piety. Grant that inspiration were all intuition, there are a thousand intuitions that unite besides the intuition of moral excellence. If piety were all our intuition, the most pious men would be the most doctrinally intelligent. Abraham would be more doctrinally intelligent than we, and a pious slave necessarily more so than his master; which is so far from being the case, that the most learned doctrinal disquisitions have been of those who had no piety at all.

Again, we object to a new organon.§ Bacon's method is as old as the creation. It is like the brain, congenital. Adam used it in naming the beasts. The Baconian method is the instinctive organon of children. The office of Bacon, like a lecturer upon the

* Philos. Relig. chs. 5 & 6. † Ib. p. 211. ‡ Ib. ch. 6 et al. § Ib. p. 201.

brain, was to show the instrument, though the instrument existed since the earliest generalization.

But though these things are serious as respects other errors, yet as to the doctrine of development we would concede them all.

What does the skeptic argue for? 1. Is it historic fact* that is to develop?—that we concede, but the facts of the past cannot be altered by the facts of the future.

2. Is it intuitional consciousness?† What is that? If Morell asserts that it is piety, we agree again, for piety is certainly to develop. “The wolf also shall dwell with the lamb, and the leopard shall lie down with the kid, and the calf and the young lion and the fatling together, and a little child shall lead them.”

What is it though? Is it doctrinal intelligence? That also we acknowledge: and if it means actual informations, we claim the usual rules. Systems grow from the foundations upward. Two and two will be four in the highest regions of analysis. God will be in Christ reconciling the world to himself, when the highest millennial light shall have dawned upon the mind.

3. Nothing therefore is left to Morell but logical‡ development, which he confesses is the fruit of intuition. We ask nothing but that intuition shall really be intuitive, and settle upon truths as truths that are possessed already in the system. The electrician, for example, believes polarity, whatever discoveries may be added. The astronomer has settled upon periods. The mathematician, as we have seen, is convinced of his arithmetic. And so give us the first principles of the doctrine of Christ, and we will gladly go on unto perfection.

And it is interesting to see how little this view is affected by anything we concede to the psychologist.

Give him his organon.

If a new organon is discovered, it will improve religion. We agree that it will clear it. It will not add to its distinctive truths: though here we need not stickle with the infidel. His great attack is against the fundamentals of the faith, and these his organon would spare. The old organon has spared them in every science.

So on the other hand, we are not afraid of the idea that if intuitional and doctrinal religion are the same, and the first is identical with piety, that as the intuitional improves, religion will again be benefited—if you please, developed—that is, cleared in the out-

* Philos. Relig. p. 211.

† Ib.

‡ Ib.

line of its truth, and filled out in its doctrinal proportions; for what is this asserting than that intelligence and piety united will see more of the truth than where there is less of either. We believe intelligence and piety are to be revered. But if it is not so, that will be an excellent man who has them growing up in him proportionally together, and that will be a glorious age, when awakened light shall be one with extraordinary piety.