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I.

CHRISTIANITY AND THE COSMIC PHILOSOPHY.

THE New World is too young to have given birth to many builders of philosophical systems. The age of speculative thought comes after the time of felling forests and breaking up virgin soil. Not that the struggles of the pioneer do not tend to develop a virile and robust type of mind; but that, in his active exertions for subsistence, and in the measurings of his strength with the cruder forces of nature, little leisure is left him for the quiet meditations of the philosophic student.

But evidences are not wanting that the American people are getting beyond this jungle-cutting stage of the brawny frontiersman. If it is said that few of our philosophers are original, it is equally true that original philosophers, in this nineteenth century, are few in older countries. The late Dr. McCosh insisted that the time had come for the appearance of a philosophy distinctively American, but he was too wise to argue that this American school should aim to be independent of all the thinking of the past.

All the world has heard of the *Concord Philosophy*, and while nothing would be wider of the mark than to call Mr. Emerson a logical system-builder, still his was indeed a philosophic spirit. Competent European writers have pronounced Jonathan Edwards the greatest metaphysician America has produced, but he never presumed to give to the world a comprehensive scheme of human thought. We have had great men and great minds, but if they have not been wholly occupied with the tasks of a busy political

or commercial or clerical career, they have at most not done more than to produce some monographs, less or more extended, upon the specific subjects with which their activities were connected.

The *Cosmic Philosophy* is in itself a complete *Weltanschauung* or theory of the world. From its own point of view it is all-comprehending. Its outlines enclose all space and all time. It traces geneses, processes and cessations. It fixes the limits of the knowable and warns us of the folly of trying to overstep them. So far as rationality exists in things, it directs us where and why we may find it; and in so far as a philosophical exegesis of the universe is possible, it assures us that all other attempts than its own are delusive and obsolete.

Mr. John Fiske is known to the literary world in two distinct characters. He is a philosopher and he is a historian. It is only of the writings of the former that our present purpose leads us to speak. It is possible to admire Mr. Fiske, the historian, and at the same time wholly to dissent from Mr. Fiske, the philosopher. His literary style is excellent. To compare him with his great master in this respect is to contrast him. Mr. Spenceer is diffuse, involved and often obscure; Mr. Fiske is always direct, concise and clear.

The *Cosmic Philosophy* does not purport to be anything independent or new. The work originated as a course of lectures criticising the Positive Philosophy, and the idea of enlarging it into an outline sketch of the new philosophy based on the doctrine of evolution was an after-thought. For the most part illustrative of Mr. Spenceer's philosophy, it still does claim to be more than a mere reproduction of it. Substantially it is the Synthetic Philosophy according to Mr. Fiske. He develops some points more fully, as, for example, the moral significance of the prolonged period of human infancy. The postulates, the methods, the arguments, the conclusions, and, in some instances, the very words, are precisely the same in both. Mr. Fiske regards Mr. Spenceer's philosophy as so sublime and true that he does not hesitate upon every occasion, in terms of unmeasured enthusiasm, to commend the truth by means of glowing eulogies of its great teacher. He says: "Mr. Spenceer's work surpasses that of Aristotle and Newton in its vastness of performance as the railway surpasses the sedan chair;"* and he regards him as possessing "the resources of that psychological analysis of which he is incomparably the greatest master the world has ever seen."†

A careful comparison of the two systems would disclose the fact that the American, true to his people's genius, is somewhat less

* *Excursions of an Evolutionist*, p. 295.

† *The Idea of God*, p. xxvii.

speculative, or, if he would but permit us to use the word, less metaphysical. To adopt his own language, of the "Subjective and Objective Methods,"* Mr. Spencer employs the former most, Mr. Fiske the latter. It may be partly because Mr. Spencer had already written his *First Principles* and because Mr. Fiske presumed upon the fact, but it is not ungenerous to infer that Mr. Fiske said less about the presuppositions of his system for the good reason that it was not in his mental build to say more. Notwithstanding the hysterical protestations of Agnosticism at the very mention of the word, it is still true that the *First Principles* is a great book because it is, in its way, severely *metaphysical*. Mr. Fiske is more of an objectivist, better fitted for writing history. Mr. Spencer is more of a philosopher, in the conventional sense of the word, better fitted for developing a great speculative system. Accordingly, it would be hard to conceive of the conditions as reversed—of Mr. Fiske as the master and Mr. Spencer as the disciple.

The characteristic starting-point of the *Cosmic Philosophy* is in the unqualified repudiation of metaphysics. The bane of the past has been the metaphysical method. It is a delusion from first to last. Berkeley's complaint is echoed that in dealing with metaphysics men first kick up a dust and then wonder why they cannot see through it. The remark is credited to Hazlitt: "Sir, I am a metaphysician and nothing makes an impression upon me but abstract ideas." Abstract ideas as such are just what make no impression upon Mr. Fiske. Nothing is to be received as true which cannot show the *visè* of "objective verification." Intuitions are accumulations of experience, transmitted through inheritance. Plato's theory of reminiscences, Des Cartes' doctrine of innate ideas, Kant's notion of *à priori* forms are all alike rejected. The interesting chapter on "The Two Methods" exposes and justly denounces certain abuses of the subjective method, and directly the author turns about and, by a strange *non sequitur*; summarily denounces all metaphysics. Because Hegel will not hear of verification, therefore only what is objectively verified is true. Spinoza spun out a system of mathematical ontology, but he forgot to stop and prove the postulates with which he started; and all this is "irrefutable, save by the refutation of all metaphysics." We can only take things as we find them. Physics, phenomena—this is the sphere of our knowledge. Things that come after that—τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικά—are beyond the line. If the mercury rises in the tube, never say, "Nature abhors a vacuum;" that is metaphysics. Rather say that the atmosphere

* *Cosmic Philosophy*, 1, 97.

presses upon the mercury without the tube; that is the *fact*. Resort not to some hidden principle or power acting in a cause and producing an effect. Mr. Hume denied such a power—he denied causation. Ah, yes! that was Mr. Hume's great blunder. When he says there is *not* a hidden efficiency in causation, he is just as metaphysical as the other man who says there is. The great Scotchman ought to have been acute enough to say nothing about it. That, forsooth, is where Messrs. Spencer and Fiske have their advantage. "If we would keep clear of metaphysics, we must in such case neither affirm nor deny concerning a subject which lies utterly beyond our reach."* It is not easy to see how Mr. Fiske, after writing that, could add another word of censure against the *Positive Philosophy* which he cordially hates; for elsewhere he says: "Our Cosmic Philosophy is based upon the affirmation of God's existence and not upon the denial of it, like irreligious atheism, or upon the ignoring of it, like non-religious Positivism."† If Mr. Hume made his mistake in falling into metaphysics, he made the same mistake that not only Mr. Spencer and Mr. Fiske have made, but that every writer who discourses upon the conditions of human knowledge from Plato and Coleridge on the one side, to Protagoras and J. S. Mill on the other, is bound to make as soon as his tongue is unloosed or his pen touches paper.

But Mr. Fiske would not leave the world comfortless, though he have bereft it of metaphysics. He has a substitute. That substitute is philosophy. If any one is accustomed to regard metaphysics and philosophy as in any sense synonyms, he must correct an error in his thinking. Metaphysics is now banished and so philosophy must go elsewhere for its elements. Here is the open door for the Cosmic System. Philosophy is the science of the sciences—not the chief among the sciences, but the scientific systematizing of them.‡ As botany is the science of plants and geology of rocks, and astronomy of stars and histology of tissues, so philosophy is the science of botany and geology and astronomy and histology and all the rest, collectively. Philosophy is the clearing-house of the sciences. All the special sciences are to philosophy, which is the General Science, what the plants are to botany or the rocks to geology. It is a synthesis of the sciences. "While science studies the parts, philosophy studies the whole."§ Its subject-matter always is phenomena. It has nothing what-

* *Cosmic Philosophy*, i, 127.

† *Ibid.*, ii, 377. Italics ours.

‡ Mr. Fiske's conception of *Philosophy* is simply that which is better known in modern thought as *Encyclopedia*. Cf. Dr. Abraham Kuyper's *Encyclopedia of Sacred Theology*, pp. 11, 12.

§ *Cosmic Philosophy*, i, 40.

ever to do with efficiency, with the *vis occulta*. There was Mr. Hume's mistake. Assuming efficiency nevertheless, we are told that "the true business of philosophy is the determination of the order of the phenomena in which this omnipresent Power is manifested."* Here Mr. Fiske regards that a great gain has been made over the conception of M. Comte. The latter viewed philosophy as an organon—a formal idea; the former as a synthesis—a real body of truth, scientific in form, rational in content and verifiable in experience.

The importance of all this is tremendous. The inquirer after truth brings nothing to his task; he only studies what awaits him. He himself is a part of the cosmical scheme he is to study. His body, his mind, his consciousness, his very thinking itself as to the laws that control and confine it, are but parts of the one great objective whole. Mr. Fiske largely substitutes psychology for metaphysics, and this psychology—the *new* psychology, objectively and inductively known—is but one of the sciences which is to be correlated with the rest in the construction of this one great philosophic system. "This psychology is an offshoot of biology."† Biology in turn is an incident in geology, ‡ just as geology again is a chapter in the great book of sidereal astronomy.

What we call intuitions or categories of thought are thus dismissed without ceremony. Mr. Hume, accordingly, was not so far wrong in denying intuited causation. Mr. Fiske, indeed, grants causation, but he says that the mind believes in the universality of causation for the same reason that it believes that fire burns *i. e.*, from experience.§ Science knows nothing else than experience and science is the only thing that knows. Efficient cause is a metaphysical fiction; phenomenal causation, that is, "unconditional invariable sequence of one event upon another," is the only cause science knows. Although Mr. Fiske insists that philosophy is not a methodology, but is a substantial synthesis of truth, still he must know that there are certain forms of consecutive thought which are rational as over against certain other forms which are not. Does not Mr. Fiske believe in the rational sanctity of good logic? He uses the forms of logic well and often. How does he know that the same forms of ratiocination hold good for him and for other men? Does he glean them—categories or what-nots—from what he discovers in the area of phenomena? Or, are they inherited, as accumulated capital, from the fathers and forefathers back to the quasi-Adamic ancestral incipient thinker? If other conditions had prevailed, might other forms have been

* *Cosmic Philosophy*, i, 188; also 317.

† *Ibid.*, ii, 198.

‡ *Ibid.*, i, 435.

§ *Ibid.*, i, 147.

handed down? "Logic is to the philosopher and the scientific inquirer what the law of evidence is to the lawyer."* Certainly, but the law of evidence comes before the evidence; otherwise, the evidence *as* evidence could not come at all. Experience has fastened upon us the mental compulsion to think of fire as burning and of the whole as being greater than its parts. The very coupling together of these two things in this way is a kicking up of the dust equal to the pawing of the metaphysicians. But let us keep to the question of the antecedence of logical forms in scientific thought; which is first, the thinker or the thing thought about? It is to be noted that we are now speaking not of simple perception, but of discursive ratiocinative thought. The thought organizes its object into systematic logical form. It construes it in accordance with reason. Is the organizing construing principle in the thinker or in the object of his thought? If rational thought waits upon the phenomenon, then the thing creates the thinker. If the rational cosmos is seen to be such because the thinker is a rational thinker, then the *Ratio*, the logical faculty, was brought to the phenomenon, and was not brought from it; and this is true whether we regard the thinker as an individual, with Mr. Mill, or as the race, with Messrs. Spencer and Fiske.

Here we are brought up face to face with the choice between the school that derives man's highest faculties from below and the school that does not. Mr. Fiske does not hesitate to say, "It is not the intelligence which has made the environment, but it is the environment which has moulded the intelligence. In the mint of nature, the coin mind has been stamped; and theology, perceiving the likeness of the die to its impression, has unwittingly inverted the causal relation of the two, making mind archetypal and self-existent, to be the die."† The other view is well stated by one of the most distinguished of the contemned theologians: "All science rests on the postulate that the universe is pervaded and regulated by Reason essentially like our own and is constituted in accordance with its fundamental principles, laws and norms." "When scientists observe facts which they cannot account for and explain to the reason, they never assume that they are essentially unreasonable and scientifically inexplicable."‡

Mr. Fiske is, as a rule, commendably calm and judicial in temper. His books impress one as the utterance of a clear, able and honest thinker. The personal seldom obtrudes itself beyond the bounds of modesty and propriety.

* *Cosmic Philosophy*, i, 239.

† *Ibid.*, ii, 402.

‡ Harris' *God, Creator and Lord of All*, i, 526; ii, 21.

One exception, however, to all this must be noted. He does not disguise his dislike for the *genus theologicum*. Again and again he displays his abhorrence of this tabooed tribe. He speaks of a "kind of misrepresentation which is dear to theologians and we may contentedly leave them an entire monopoly of it."* He is graciously tolerant of their intolerance: "As regards theologians, a great deal is to be said in behalf of their intolerance of opinions which they honestly believe to be fraught with spiritual and moral evil."† In referring to these "narrow-minded theologians,"‡ he speaks of their "intellectual arrogance lurking beneath their expressions of humility."§ Because it has been learned that gravitation holds the worlds in place, he hears these intolerant imbeciles exclaim, "Nothing is left for God to do; how impious and terrible the thought!"|| "They resist new scientific truths with emotions so highly wrought that they are not only incapable of estimating evidence, but often also have their moral sense impaired and fight with foul means when fair ones fail."¶ He becomes more personal and has a patronizing slap for "the theological magazine writer who perhaps does not know what is meant by the relativity of knowledge."** And again he is sufficiently interested to trace the mental emancipation of a "person educated in an environment of Presbyterian theology" *pari passu* with his "enlarging environment."††

It is, of course, for Mr. Fiske to decide for himself whether such loaded expressions are exactly in keeping with the ideal cosmophilosophic spirit. There is just room for the cynical remark that such words befit the argument of the excited advocate rather than the calm judicial temper of the scientific student. Philosophy deals with premises and principles, and not with personalities. These quotations are given because only a recital of them would convince most people that Mr. John Fiske ever wrote them. In recounting these vigorous utterances of contempt, one is reminded of Coleridge's remark, "Contempt is egotism turned sour," and were it not for the possible appearance of the ungenerous in our words, we might be pardoned for intimating that this frame of mind sometimes exists when the subject of it is not in the least conscious of it. Mr. Fiske seems to have one waste basket into which all theologians from Augustine to Watson and from the Pope to General Booth are indiscriminately flung. He waits only to spy the label and, that once seen, in they go. His notion is that all knowledge is classification—if he be right, then he does

* *Cosmic Philosophy*, ii, 74.

† *Ibid.*, ii, 433.

‡ *Ibid.*, ii, 454.

§ *Ibid.*, ii, 451.

|| *Idea of God*, p. 44.

¶ *The Unseen World*, p. 143.

** *Cosmic Philosophy*, i, 255.

†† *Ibid.*, ii, 230.

not know anything whatever about theologians. He curses metaphysics and he regards theology as metaphysics baptized in the triune name of Ignorance, Intolerance and Hypocrisy. Hence his theological anathemas. Certainly if the esteemed author of the *Cosmic Philosophy* should be charged with the criminal habit of bethinking himself occasionally that just as there are scientists and scientists, or just as there are philosophers and philosophers, so also, peradventure, there might be theologians and theologians, he would be entirely safe in challenging a most minute examination of his books for a single grain of evidence in support of the base allegation.

Mr. Fiske does not seem to know more about theology than he does about theologians. He is hardly to be censured for a willful ignorance of that of which he knows enough in advance only to know that it is not worth knowing. Coleridge's remark is again called to mind when Mr. Fiske complacently tells us that the question of Free Will "is a very easy question to answer: would that science presented none more difficult!"* And would that while Mr. Fiske was about it, he had only answered it! The fact is, the utterly superficial view of the whole question which the agnostic takes, wholly incapacitates him to comprehend the profound elements that are involved. Mr. Fiske sets up an extreme view as the metaphysical one and proceeds to animadvert upon that. He says: "We are asked to believe that in one particular corner of the universe upon the surface of one little planet, in a portion of the organism of one particular creature there is one special phenomenon called volition in which the law of causation ceases and everything goes helter skelter."† He catches upon an infelicitous phrase that really has been too much used, namely, "the freedom of the will," leaving a chance for the false idea that it is the will and not the man willing—the *ego-volens*—which is free, and from this, Mr. Fiske says, it has been taught that the will is "a certain entity which is itself a sort of personage within the human personality."‡ Seeing nothing but this one error, he proceeds, upon the cosmical theory, to unravel the mystery: "Now the state of consciousness called Desire is accompanied by a nascent excitement of the nerve-fibres distributed upon the muscular apparatus whose activity is requisite for the attainment of the desired object."§ It is all a matter of remainder after an equilibration of tensions in the motor nerves. M. Littré is quoted for once with approval: "Liberty as applied to volition means the power of obeying the strongest motive."|| The strongest motive

* *Cosmic Philosophy*, ii, 174.

† *Ibid.*, ii, 174.

‡ *Ibid.*, ii, 172.

§ *Ibid.*, ii, 177.

|| *Ibid.*, ii, 179.

is the nerve push along the line of least resistance, and here we are where we started, with the primordial axiom of the persistence of force. Truly, nothing could be simpler than this! A man makes his own future precisely as a comet does. Consciousness says nothing about the doctrine of Free Will, "it tells us only that we will." Volitions are either caused or they are not, he says. If they are caused, Free Will doctrine is annihilated. If they are not, then the helter-skelter theory must hold good. *They are caused, and therefore Free Will is a fiction.*

Ah, how easy! He explains Free Will by explaining it away. He solves the problem by ignoring it. Does it escape Mr. Fiske that consciousness, in telling us that we will, *ipso facto* tells us that we are free? Does he not know that a coerced volition is as absurd as a circular triangle, and that the remark of Principal Fairbain is as applicable to philosophy as it is to the omnipotence to which he was referring: "One of the impossibilities is, having made man free, to compel him to act as if he were necessitated?"* Has it escaped Mr. Fiske's notice that the conception of cause is, even from his phenomenological point of view, a many-sided one, and is he quite sure that the very kernel of the problem does not lie in the little fact that the volition may be both caused and free? When he tells us that we may as well call a volition copper-colored as free, does it not occur to him that the *bona fide* question with which he began was not the copper color, but the freedom of the will? He docilely walks in the footsteps of his great master, and plainly denies the freedom of the will. For once the philosopher throttles the historian, and we read these words: "To write history on any method furnished by the free-will doctrine would be utterly impossible."† Happily, when Mr. Fiske writes his excellent historical books, the historian is able to "keep under the philosopher." As between Mr. Froude denying the possibility of a science of history and Mr. Buckle making sociology as much of a hard-and-fast science as mineralogy, we are bound somewhere to find a place which makes room for that without which man is no longer man and with which, under God and in His image, he is the architect of his own fortune and of his own future.

Mr. Fiske deplores that "accurate thinking is a somewhat rare phenomenon." Yes, it may be, but truth is not always as simple as he fain would have us believe. The manager of a great railway system sits in his comfortable office and sees spread out before him in miniature the vast complex network of roads, and at a glance he locates the trains with their movements and counter-

* *Place of Christ in Modern Theology*, p. 456.

† *Cosmic Philosophy*, ii, 187.

movements and interrelations as they are represented before his eyes. His little boy stands at his side and thinks the busy panorama a beautiful, interesting plaything indeed. He does not understand that every toy train on the table represents to his father a mighty massive caravan with its steaming iron horse and its hundreds of human travelers. The youngster is an agnostic. His knowledge is purely phenomenological. His father is perplexed with thought and deluged with care. Vast interests are subject to his word. The questions before him are complex, varied and profoundly delicate, and they are not solved or made easier of solution by the annoying prattle of the well-meaning little agnostic at his knee.

One of the most prominent marks of Mr. Fiske's philosophy is his insistence upon cosmic theism as against what he calls anthropomorphic theism. He repeatedly declares his system theistic. If theism consists in maintaining simply that God is, but in a confession of total and permanent ignorance as to what God is, then his philosophy is theistic. However, it is a debatable psychological proposition that the mind can intelligently affirm the existence of that of the nature of which it is in blankest ignorance. And it is certainly a notable fact that the agnostic's consistency invariably breaks down at this point. He builds upon the negative elements of the theory of cognition adopted by Kant; Kant begot Hamilton, Hamilton begot Mansel, Mansel begot Spencer, and Spencer begot Fiske and the whole race of modern agnostics in the English-speaking world. The tremendous mistake of this school is that of placing substance and phenomenon in contrast with each other instead of regarding the former as making itself known only by the latter. Every attribution made to the unknowable is a compromise of the cosmic system. God is God only because the agnostic's logic is illogical. He makes absolutely bare existence all we know of God, but bare existence is the *caput mortuum* of the Noumenon. Bare existence is itself unknowable, and the very thing which the agnostic declares to be the only object of his knowledge is, *per contra*, the only thing which he cannot know. To call it Power is a confession of knowledge and not of ignorance. That was the *faux pas* for which Mr. Hume incurred condemnation. The very conditions of intellectual intercourse compel the agnostic to be inconsistent with himself. Everything a man knows must come into the moulds of his faculty of knowledge. Jacobi said: "God theomorphized in creating man; man therefore necessarily anthropomorphizes in thinking God."* Any name we may apply to the unknowable is

* Quoted in Stählin's *Kant, Lotze and Ritschl*, p. 301.

a random symbol and must mean at once more and less than the ineffable Reality. "To us therefore, as to the Israelite of old, the very name of Jehovah is that which is not to be spoken."* Mr. Fiske is better than his philosophy: he calls this unknowable the infinite sustainer of the universe;† the eternal source of a moral law;‡ psychological,§ or perhaps oftener, "quasi-psychical" and moral.¶ He may well concede that "the exigencies of our thinking oblige us to symbolize the nature of Deity in some form that has a real meaning for us."¶ Accordingly, in all our talking and thinking about Reality, we are dealing in counters and never in the intrinsic coin of the realm.

In entire agreement with Mr. Spencer, the *Cosmic Philosophy* repudiates teleology as essentially anthropomorphic. A volitional God is a crude fetich of human ignorance. In the *Outlines* too much could not be said in depreciation of teleology as a principle, but a few years later, in the *Destiny of Man*, an amendment is proposed in the way of a design which is universal and immanent throughout the evolutionary process. Undoubtedly, there has been a shifting in the argument from cosmical teleology, and it is important to be reminded that the old eighteenth-century doctrine leaned overmuch toward the deistic extreme. And yet, on the other hand, Mr. Fiske has stolen too much from Mr. Mansel. Personality and infinity are mutually exclusive, we are told. "Omnipotence cannot contrive nor plan nor adapt means to ends." Is this the agnostic who is speaking? Is this the man who is so sure that he can know nothing except through experience? Is he the same who scolds the theist for affirming a somewhat, back of the phenomenon; and scolds Mr. Hume for denying such a somewhat; and scolds M. Comte for ignoring it? And yet when Mr. Fiske can throw off his philosophical clamps—he ought to pity the poor theologian all the more—he strongly affirms with the theist.

It is not in mind at present to question the merits of the program of evolution. There is a doctrine of evolution far less sweeping than is that of Mr. Fiske. His scheme is all-comprehending, and yet it has no room for the extra-cosmic, the supernatural. His account of the origin of life is confessedly little more than a guess.** The mysterious process is chemical, that is to say, mechanical. He speaks of "the increasing chemical complexity which at a remote epoch resulted in a formation of living

* *Cosmic Philosophy*, ii, 422.

† *The Unseen World*, p. 6.

‡ *Cosmic Philosophy*, ii, 470.

§ *Idea of God*, p. 155.

¶ *Ibid.*, p. 167.

¶ *Ibid.*, p. xvi.

** *Cosmic Philosophy*, ii, 434, 6.

protoplasm.”* Differences of kind are only differences of degree grown great; this is true of the difference between life and not-life, and “under favoring circumstances not-life may become life.”† It is a curious fact that, if it be true that the living and the non-living are the same thing, men like Messrs. Spencer and Fiske should find it necessary to discuss at great length the question of the transition from the one to the other.

Thus far we have written in order to make clear the relation which the *Cosmic Philosophy* sustains to Christianity. That it sustains some relation goes without saying, for, it matters not who declares to the contrary, no doctrine can have a place in Christianity that does not have its place and part in any rational scheme of philosophy which the thoughtful Christian may adopt.

In his early ministry the writer was presented by one of the brightest and most thoughtful young men of his congregation with a copy of Mr. Fiske's *Idea of God*. This young physician declared himself exceedingly pleased with it, and he asked his inexperienced pastor for his judgment upon it. That little book and its companion volume, *The Destiny of Man*, are widely read because of their beautiful style and scientific method, and that they have had a great influence upon intelligent minds makes it important that we should understand accurately the basis upon which they stand and how consistent or inconsistent they are with the philosophy of their author, of which they may be presumed to be a legitimate product.

Many of Mr. Fiske's utterances are noble and true. With all his trouncing of theologians, he is careful to seem to keep on good terms with Christianity. Conventional religion he will none of; but he says, “We still regard Christianity as in the deepest sense our own religion.”‡ He is confident that there is a better time coming; what Judaism was to Christianity, that, in a way, Christianity is to Cosmism. The world will some day cease to think and speak and understand as a child, with mythological symbols and anthropomorphic pictures; “that which is fundamental in Christianity is not the mythologic superstratum, but the underlying spiritual principle.”§

In a former article in this REVIEW|| the present writer endeavored to set forth the theological implicates of Mr. Spencer's philosophy. The system now under review is so nearly identical with that that it is only by a constant restraint that we are able to avoid saying the same things again. Any reader who is inter-

* *Cosmic Philosophy*, ii, 368.

† *Ibid.*, i, 422.

‡ *Ibid.*, ii, 502.

§ *Ibid.*, ii, 504.

ested in this article is referred to that, for this may not improperly be regarded as a sort of completion or supplement of that.

Everything that is there said in criticism of Mr. Spencer's theory of cognition is equally applicable to Mr. Fiske's. A whole system of philosophy takes its cue from the initial point of view assumed by its author. The heart may, to be sure, correct the errors of the head, but, rightly apprehended, there is a logical self-consistent framework in evangelical Christianity, and if a man grant the first position of the agnostic, he cannot *ex animo* subscribe to the teachings of the Christian system. Mr. Fiske may edify us with his really delightful treatise on the *Idea of God*, but if we take him at his word in his *Cosmic Philosophy*, he has no right and we have no right to any idea of God. He must apologize to his philosophy for every good thing he says for a positive Christian faith.

Fundamentally, it is a false and fatal notion that all metaphysical presuppositions are to be forever renounced. That is the weakness and the condemnation of Ritschlianism, and it traces its ancestry back to the same sources as the agnosticism of Spencer and Fiske. Because metaphysics, like many other good things, has been abused, we are not therefore to annihilate it. Milton represented metaphysics as the subject which the bad spirits in Hades delighted in discussing. Milton was hardly a rigid empiricist in that, but even if he were right, truth is not less true because devils and bad men discuss it. It is an age of impotent intellect and languid thought; it is an age of superficial spirit and indolent achievement when men blind their eyes to the Eternal Realities of the Reason that is in them and refuse to be stimulated by the Heaven-born incentives that reveal themselves in the chambers of the soul and in the irrepressible voicings and longings of their moral nature within. "*Paupertina philosophia in paupertinam religionem ducit.*" We hail the symptoms of the renaissance of a healthy metaphysic. So long as there are men, there will be metaphysicians in the world. It is not a question of metaphysicians or no metaphysicians; it is only a question of good metaphysicians or bad ones. Hume denied and was condemned. Comte ignored and was lost. Spencer neither denies nor ignores, but doubts because forsooth he cannot know, and yet it is a metaphysical doubt and straightway to metaphysics he must needs go in order to vindicate his doubt. So long as agnosticism goes stalking through the world with its dogmatisms of ignorance, idealism will have its champions, sometimes prattling overwisely of the Eternal Reason and what it says—not knowing nothing, but knowing everything rather—and yet

with all its temptations and tendencies to rationalize religion, we welcome the man who affirms too much rather than the man who denies our right to affirm anything, and we must regard Hegel with his dialectic as a less-to-be-dreaded enemy of the Gospel than Spencer with his wiping out, as with a wet sponge, of the whole realm of the soul.

It must be clear at a glance that the "Cosmic Philosophy" which presumes to be exhaustive absolutely excludes evangelical Christianity. Mr. Fiske leaves no room for the supernatural. We have no quarrel with cosmical knowledge. Strauss said that the Copernican astronomy meant the death-knell of Christianity, but somehow Christianity is still alive. We believe in the law of gravitation, and yet we are not of Mr. Fiske's excited theologians who are distressed because the universe is "untenanted of its Creator." Cosmical knowledge is only another name for physical science. We thank God for every achievement it has scored. Our quarrel is with the man who dogmatically affirms that the objective cosmos is all that we can know. Mr. Fiske chooses the name of his philosophy with great care. He even withstands Mr. Spencer's preference for his term, namely, "Synthetic." Mr. Fiske likes his word better because it more explicitly shuts out all ontological or theological assumptions and clearly delimits its scope to the totality of phenomena and their orderly succession. Science is the only knowledge. Science knows only phenomena. Collectively, phenomena are the cosmos, the mundus. The supra-mundane is metaphysics. Metaphysics is *ipso facto* false. At the best it is only a guess.

The theistic high-tide mark in the *Cosmic Philosophy* is a passage, too long to quote in full, in which the author says that "Deity is unknowable just in so far as it is not manifested to consciousness through the phenomenal world—knowable just in so far as it is thus manifested; unknowable in so far as it is infinite and absolute—knowable in the order of its phenomenal manifestations."* It will be noted that the knowable Deity is confined to the manifestations of the cosmic phenomena and that these manifestations are always orderly. In *A Word About Miracles* he pronounces the arguing against miracles "a contest more necessary than glorious or difficult."† The doctrine of miracles must of course upset any such complete cosmical scheme.

Only a word is needed to show the bearing of this upon Christianity. If that religion teaches anything, it is that God is apart from and above, as well as in and through the cosmos. "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth." His will is

* *Cosmic Philosophy*, ii, p. 470.

† *Unseen World*, p. 136.

the source of all law to his dependent creatures. The immanence of God is a great truth, too often overlooked in the past, but it is not the only truth. If we cannot know God except as the objective world makes Him known to us, then the communings and comfortings of His Holy Spirit are the dreams of a mystic or the crass fancies of a fanatic. If Mr. Fiske is right, Providence is a fable. Miraculous intervention, if not impossible, at least is unhistorical, and the whole idea of Divine Government in nature and in man is unscientific and untrue.

The hope of religion is represented as in the gradual deanthropomorphization of theism. And yet it is admitted that to think of God at all is to bring Him within the terms of human consciousness. Ultimate deanthropomorphization then would be not skepticism nor atheism, but rather an absolute dismissal of all thought of God from the human mind. All Reality is interpretable to man only in terms of man's consciousness and perception. Mr. Fiske admits that even Power is known to us only anthropomorphically, and so to call the unknowable Power is to violate the law of cosmic theism.

This is knowing God only at the cost of forgetting God. There must be something wrong with a theory that reacts suicidally upon itself. "His thoughts are not our thoughts, neither are His ways as our ways." Let not the agnostic quote the prophet's words to show that God does not think and feel and choose as we do. Mr. Gladstone's thoughts were not as his little three-year-old grandchild's, but still the laws of their thinking—both being human—are indeed the same. If when we are told that God pities His children, we cannot interpret the message in terms of what we experience as pity, then we are mocked and not comforted. God so loved the world as to give His Son to save it; if love in God is not as the love which we know of, we are only bewildered and lost. The Word of God laboring to bring its heavenly messages down to the low level of human thought and need is not afraid of the supercilious charge of anthropomorphism. It trusts to a docile frame, a grateful mind and an enlightened spirit to apprehend the truth. If God is to speak to men at all, He must needs speak in terms that men can understand. Even John Calvin says in answering the anthropomorphites who make God corporeal because Scripture ascribes to Him mouth, ears, hands and feet, "Who of even the least intellectual perception does not know that in these forms of expression God uses a sort of baby-talk as nurses are wont to talk to little children?" *

* *Institutes*, Book i, chap. xiii, 1: "Quis enim vel parum ingeniosus non intelligit Deum ita nobiscum, ceu nutrices solent cum infantibus quodadmodo balbutire?"

Cosmism strips God of all His Godlike attributes, and leaves this "unexplored remainder" for our comfort and our faith. This *terra incognita* is the region of the agnostic's religious guesswork. Kant finds therein the "Thing-in-itself," and we say the "thing-in-itself" is simply nothing. Schopenhauer in his gropings finds what he calls *Will*. Hegel finds his *Idea* there. Matthew Arnold discovers his Eternal Not Ourselves that makes for righteousness. Spencer after Hamilton finds the Inscrutable, while Lotze, rising toward the truth, finds what he plainly calls *Personality*.

We must always beware lest in an excess of wisdom which is only folly we make what Archdeacon Hare speaks of as "a recoil from the gross anthropopathy of the vulgar notions which is a fall into the vacuum of absolute apathy."

Mr. Fiske's doctrine of sin is a segment of his theory of evolution. Sin consists essentially in a breach of adjustments. It is the slow death of the ape and tiger in man. Original sin is the brute inheritance in human nature. Evolution is salvation and sanctification. Religion is adjustment, and as sin is only a phase of maladjustment, sin has therefore strictly a religious character. The complete harmonization of organism and environment would be heaven. But we are safe against that; such a millennium is a flying goal, it is unattainable, else the Nirvana of indolence and imbecility which Mr. Balfour wittily refers to* might some day overtake mankind.

Christianity is the effort and tendency toward such an adjustment. It is cosmic, for everything we know is cosmic. It would be interesting to read Mr. Fiske's promised book long overdue, on *Jesus of Nazareth and the Founding of Christianity*.† The great doctrines of the Incarnation, the Atonement and the Resurrection are relegated to metaphysics and are therefore not within the purview of philosophic vision. Historical Christianity not only came at the right time;‡ it was not only an evolution from Roman law and the Stoic philosophy, which to trace is to obtain the key to Roman history;§ but to a person familiar with later scientific modes of thought, contemplating the unique phenomenon of Rome uniting in a single commonwealth the progressive nations of the world, it would have been entirely possible to foresee the rise of Christianity as the inevitable result of the interaction of Jewish, Hellenic and Roman ideas; and this naturalistic prophet could probably have foreseen that the new religion would arise in Pales-

* *Foundations of Belief*, p. 75.

† *Unseen World*, p. 66.

‡ *Cosmic Philosophy*, ii, p. 218.

§ *Ibid.*, ii, p. 206.

† *Ibid.*, ii, p. 169.

tine and would for centuries confine its spread to the regions under the sway of Rome. Cosmism is blind to that which Christians regard as the essential spirit and moulding force of Christianity. That faith has a history to be sure, but its history is not its all. There has ever been efficiency behind it, but of that we are forbidden to speak or even to think. A ruling God, an enthroned Christ, a cleansing Spirit, a redeeming plan, an unfolding purpose—these are the very elements of genuine Christianity, but to the short-sighted cosmicist they are *metaphysics*.

As to the evolution of the moral sense, Mr. Fiske develops the idea that the moral is essentially the outworking of the social. In doing this, he says much that is beautiful and true. The late Prof. Drummond, in his last book, *The Ascent of Man*, gave popular expression to some of the ideas which Mr. Fiske was the first to publish to the world. Here, as elsewhere, if he is wrong, it is because his underlying assumptions are wrong. If conscience be the product of evolution, then right is contingent and truth like the chameleon takes the complexion of its background. Abstract systems of ethics are only the capitalized experiences of men and the great religions of history only stand for the process, covering a longer period of time, which J. G. Fichte was referring to when, in dismissing his class, he said, "Gentlemen, to-morrow we will create a God."

It is not necessary to multiply words in showing that one cannot make room in a logical mind for the Cosmic Philosophy and Christianity. Doubtless, with modifications, Mr. Fiske would be the first to second this sentiment. His renunciations of "conventional theism" and of evangelical Christianity are frank and explicit. His Bible would doubtless need many expurgations before it would be recommended by him as an authority on cosmism. He insists very strongly that there is no conflict between science and religion. There is a conflict, but it is between the more crude knowledge of yesterday and the less crude knowledge of to-day;* or, between the theological and the scientific methods of interpreting natural phenomena.† It is the old fight between cosmism and antropomorphism. Once upon a time there was an old minister who was always preaching upon foreordination, and when his indulgent hearers expostulated, the good man replied that he would be only too glad to vary his theme, but every text led to that one comprehensive doctrine. They ventured to suggest that he preach a sermon from the first verse in the Bible. He gladly consented. After taking his text, he spoke for a few moments upon the glories and the mysteries of creation and then

* *Unseen World*, p. 145.

† *Ibid.*, p. 216.

came a long and impressive pause. By and by, he burst forth with the great thought that had been overburdening his soul. "But, brethren, if the Lord had not *foreordained* the heavens and the earth, He never would have created them ;" and from that point to the end he had smooth running over his familiar ground. Mr. Fiske's *bête noir* is anthropomorphism, and as all human thought is necessarily anthropomorphic, he has his favorite text always near at hand.

As the deanthropomorphization of theism is simply the annihilation of it, so the complete substitution of the cosmic philosophy, as Mr. Fiske would have it, would be nothing less than the absolute obliteration of human thought.

But are there not certain redeeming features in Mr. Fiske's writings? Is he not less hostile, less unevangelical than Mr. Spencer? And are not *The Idea of God* and *The Destiny of Man* in some measure retractions from the legitimate conclusions of the agnostic premises?

It is not in mind to paint the *Cosmic Philosophy* in hues darker or other than its distinguished author has himself employed. He jettisons metaphysics, but he does not dispense with logic, and no injustice is done to him or his writings by applying the test of logical consistency. Many of his chapters are exceptionally suggestive and full of particular elements of truth and value. His paper in review of Tait and Stewart's *The Unseen Universe** is an exceedingly lucid and correct statement of the doctrine of human immortality from the standpoint of empirical knowledge. He declines to accept their ingenious theory, namely, that by a continuous transfer of energy from the visible world to the impalpable ether, a death in the former correlates and synchronizes with a birth in the latter; and accordingly by virtue of this preservative safeguard against real loss of life immortality is insured. His criticism is that the ether, however imponderable, is still material. Matter cannot be so refined as to become spirit, nor spirit so "coagulated" as to become matter. The theory, therefore, does not cross the bridge, and so falls short of spiritual immortality. Scientifically speaking, that transition is impossible, and here Mr. Fiske stands squarely for Des Cartes' dualism of Mind and Matter, of Thought and Extension. He indisputably demonstrates the scientific undemonstrableness of psychical survivals in a sphere denuded of material conditions. His attitude as to immortality is neutral, therefore. Not only is a *postmortem* life undemonstrable, it is inconceivable. This would seem to abolish all hope and all room for hope; but not so. Our conceptions are built of the

* *The Unseen World*, pp. 1-58.

materials that have been gathered in experience. In sitting upon questions of futurity, experience is not a witness in court. Science, *i. e.*, experience, has no word on the subject. "The entire absence of testimony does not raise a negative presumption except in cases where testimony is accessible."* In this attitude of suspense philosophy, cosmism leaves us. Mr. Mill said that if there is any spiritual comfort in it, there is no reason why one should not believe in a future life. That is to say, there is absolutely no evidence either way; what spiritual comfort there may be tips the balance in favor of believing, and so we may believe.

It must be said that it is hard to see just where Mr. Mill and Mr. Fiske, who agrees with him here, are in error at this point. If science be strictly phenomenological, then science cannot demonstrate immortality. If there be no other cognition than that of science, we are absolutely in the dark. If the empirical is the *all* that we can know, then, at best, we are at liberty to *hope* for a future, while yet we must be sober enough to remember that there is no evidence whatever that appeals to our reason or convinces our judgment.

In this realm of helpless, dawnless doubt, Mr. Fiske locates his doctrine of immortality. He makes faith the complement of knowledge—decreasing with the increase of knowledge. Rather, we should say, the complement of knowledge is ignorance and ignorance is the source of superstition and not of faith.

It is not too much to say that Mr. Fiske, confining religion to the sphere of the unknowable, makes it a thing of random guesswork, and not of intelligent conviction and reverent devotion.

Shifting evolution from the genesis of new species to the maturer development of man, the individual, and to the progress of the civilization of man, the race, Mr. Fiske places this individual human culmination upon the pinnacle of Darwinism and makes his future life the goal and riper expansion of present cosmic processes. "Are man's highest spiritual qualities, into the production of which all this creative energy has gone, to disappear with the rest? *Has all this work been done for nothing?* Is it all ephemeral, all a bubble that bursts, a vision that fades? For aught that science can tell us, it may be so, but I can see no good reason for believing any such thing."† Religion stands upon the silence of science only. He accepts the immortality of the soul, not as a scientific demonstration, but "as a supreme act of faith in the reasonableness of God's work."‡ Certainly that is strange talk from the man who cannot know whether or not God is reason-

* *The Unseen World*, p. 49.

† *The Destiny of Man*, p. 114. Italics ours.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 116.

able, and who warns us again and again that to predicate design of God is to be guilty of a vulgar anthropomorphism. The trouble about all this is, that Mr. Fiske declines all truth except such as science teaches. If empiricism is the Alpha and Omega of human knowledge, and if metaphysics is to be relegated to the limbo of superstition, then the doctrine of the immortality of the soul hangs suspended by a single slender thread from a single uncertain guess. How shaky is that guess and how fragile is that thread appears from these words, summing up the *Destiny of Man*: "Speaking for myself, I can see no insuperable difficulty in the notion that at some period in the evolution of humanity, this divine spark may have acquired sufficient concentration and steadiness to survive the wreck of material forms and endure forever."* This is the last and best word of Cosmism. It was Rabelais who described his own religion as "a great Perhaps." A truer name for the Christianity which Mr. Fiske leaves room for could not be coined. In the judgment of one obscure "theological magazine writer," such plausible concessions, made at the cost of self-consistency, are utterly valueless as statements of any cardinal element of the Christian religion. If Mr. Emerson is right in saying that "there is a statement of religion possible which makes all skepticism absurd," it is also true, in a sense, that there is a statement of skepticism possible which makes all religion absurd. Christianity is a farce when judged by its own claims, if it exists only by a by-your-leave to science. If it is worth anything, it is because it has a distinct integral place in the complete perspective of human knowledge. Mr. Fiske frames his comprehensive view of things, excluding a personal God and human immortality; then he kindly grants that *possibly*, beyond that view, these great doctrines may or may not be true. Such an apologetic is a confession of weakness and an invitation to unbelief.

And yet Mr. Fiske, like Mr. Spencer, believes that present-day evangelical Christianity is best for its time and place. "For the larger part of the world to-day, the anthropomorphic doctrine of sin is unquestionably the better one—and it is the doctrine held by the larger part of the world."† Just so! it is not true, but it is best that the largest part of the world should believe that it is true. Only he who believes that truth is changeable and contingent in its very essence; only he who regards truth as in a ceaseless flux and the deepest convictions of the soul as subject to constant and endless revision; only he who believes that there may be and often is an actual divorce between creed and conduct and that character depends far more upon the feelings which are

* *The Destiny of Man*, p. 117.

† *Cosmic Philosophy*, ii, p. 470.

inherited than upon the doctrines which are taught;* only he who could speak of "that Gothic gloom with which the deep-seated Christian sense of infinite responsibility for opinion has saddened modern religious life"—could father such an abhorrent idea as that. This shallow, intellectually frivolous view of Truth and Duty and God and Right could never characterize the thought of men who religiously believe that above all the transactions and transitions of time God rules supreme and that the essential principles of Truth and Righteousness are as imperishable and immutable as the foundations of His eternal throne. Some may think Mr. Froude half right in saying that "martyrs may be among the best of men, but they are not commonly among the wisest." The agnostic is notorious for his bad logic. Now and then his logic chanches to be good, however, and Mr. Leslie Stephen, the man upon whose shoulders the mantle of the late Prof. Huxley may be regarded as having fallen, makes a slip of better logic than is common in the teachings of his school, when he frankly says, "I will not undertake to say that there is any creed which I would not avow or renounce rather than be burnt alive. I think that I might possibly prefer distant damnation to immediate martyrdom."† There is then no immediate prospect of a call for an appendix to the eleventh chapter of Hebrews, recording the brave deeds and heroic sufferings of the champions of agnosticism in behalf of the truth and for the improvement of mankind. Most martyrs have at least been good enough and wise enough to cherish some convictions which they esteemed worth living for and dying for.

We believe, of course, that there are slow and gradual processes in the subjective apprehension of the eternal truth of God. We believe that the first book of Euclid is better for the beginner than the thirteenth, but we believe that the first is as true as the thirteenth—indeed, the last book is true because the first is true as well. We believe that the anthropomorphisms of the Psalms and the prophecies are better for the beginner than the abstract arguments of Paul to the Romans. But we believe that those are as true as these. It is abhorrent to regard error as a stepping-stone to truth. It is absurd to make anthropomorphic nonsense a preparation for cosmic wisdom.

Mr. Fiske's position in this regard, precisely that also of Mr. Spencer, has its analogy in the experience of some northern people, visiting the religious services of a congregation of colored people in the Southern States. The godly pastor in his appeals to the impenitent grew fervent and eloquent. In most concrete terms he appealed to every consideration which might weigh with

* *Cosmic Philosophy*, ii, p. 453.

† *An Agnostic's Apology*, p. 249.

his attentive auditors. The rewards of the faithful and the miseries of the ungodly were pictured in language more anthropomorphic than Biblical. In dwelling upon the woes of the wicked, he took occasion, with striking pictorial power, to describe a frigid realm of eternal icebergs, of mountainlike snowdrifts, and of bitter biting frosts through all the cycles of the ceaseless years. The effect was as was intended, evidently deep and impressive. At the close of the service, the astonished Northerners, in paying their respects to the preacher, hinted at the slight divergence from the Scripture representation of the destiny of the wicked. The minister quickly interrupted them with the remark that he knew all that, but he knew better what suited the people in that warm and sunny clime, and that if the Bible view should become common among the members of his flock, he feared that, with their partiality for high temperatures and their love for torrid atmospheres, there would be a stampede away from his calls to repentance and from the blessedness of the redeemed.

Without question anthropomorphisms are often a degradation of the pure and lofty verities of religion. Ignorance and error would often prostitute the truth, and superstition would fain have men believe that with all their infirmities and sins God is such an one as themselves. Nor has ignorance been the only offender in this regard. Mohammed was not without warrant for his iconoclastic crusade upon an apostate and idolatrous age. The tangible form too often, instead of serving as a help to spiritual faith, becomes a horrid hindrance to its holy exercises. To one who walks amidst the sacred scenes of Gethsemane to-day, at the foot of the historic Mount of Olives, the tawdry realistic representations that look out from the oratories of the garden are shocking and repulsive. Carlyle is credited with the Carlylish remark that the more images of Christ a man has on his walls, the fewer of them he has in his heart. In Raphael's famous "Vision of Ezekiel" in the Saloon of Saturn in Florence, and, particularly, in Bandinelli's statue of God the Father in the cloisters adjacent to the chaste and historic Church of Santa Croce in the same art-loving city, it is difficult for many a visitor, though he be not overcharged with a Puritanical distaste for the representative arts, to rid himself of the feeling that when brush and chisel take it upon themselves to represent the purely spiritual in visible color or in material form they are perpetrating base crimes of æsthetic blasphemy and are violating, in deed if not in spirit, the second commandment of the Decalogue.

But still, if men are not to do their own thinking, they will cease to be men, and if they are to think at all, they must think

with minds that are purely human. There must be some mental image to correspond with the word that names the object. If we are to worship God, we must have some conception of the God we worship. That conception is inadequate, incomplete, often grossly incorrect. We know God, not fully, but really; not exhaustively, but actually. If we are correctly informed, that "an illusion is an inadequate conception; a delusion is a false one,"* then we may say that the intelligent Christian's idea of God is rather illusive than delusive. Goethe says that man never knows how anthropomorphic he is; the remark is profoundly psychological because man, being human, can never get outside of himself so as to catch the other member of the comparison. Theodore Parker was not altogether wrong when, taking his cue from old Xenophanes, he said, "A beaver or a reindeer, if possessed of religious faculties, would also conceive of the Deity with the limitations of its own personality as a beaver or a reindeer;"† only, if it were "possessed of religious faculties," it would be, *ipso facto*, in so far forth in the image of the Deity of whom it would form its conception.

All this indictment of anthropomorphism *as such* is pedantic nonsense. It were as well to find fault with human beings because they are human. "Surely it is too plain for words that *all* our thought and all our feeling *must* be anthropomorphic. The proposal to avoid anthropomorphism is as absurd as the suggestion that we should take an unbiased outside view of ourselves by jumping out of our skin."‡

Mankind will always present the extremes exemplified in Goethe's learned and subtle Faust, and his humble, simple-minded Margaret walking together in the evening twilight in the garden. Their conceptions of God will be affected, but not created, by the mental and spiritual histories through which they have passed. Mephistopheles may have poisoned the mind of the one, and mysteries may have vexed the faith of the other. The one may have speculated with Spinoza in his theories of *Natura Naturans* and *Natura Naturata*; the other may have been meditating upon the gentle God that pities His children and loves to give them great and precious gifts. It is the same God over both and over all. Degrees may vary widely in true conceptions of His being and His glory. The spirit of the man who adores the Infinite will be conscious of a healthy and blessed agnosticism in the sacred presence. But the mysteries that surround him will deepen and broaden and heighten the spirit of his adoration. Science will be

* Illingworth's *Personality, Human and Divine*, p. 78.

† Mansel's *Limits of Religious Thought* (Gould & Lincoln, 1859), p. 242.

‡ *Riddles of the Sphinx*, quoted by Illingworth, p. 222.

to him both usher and preacher in the sanctuary of the Creator of the cosmos. If he must ever choose between the absurd and the incomprehensible, with Coleridge he will not long hesitate in his choice. *In mysterium exit omnia.* All things go out in mystery and God is that mystery, not the unknowable, not the absurd, not the *caput mortuum* of the agnostic, but the Glorious, the Eternal, the Ineffable Living God who created all things by the word of His power, who guides all things in His own wise way, and who redeems His people from their sins to the glory of His grace.

SAN FRANCISCO.

HENRY COLLIN MINTON.