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ART. I.—*The Doctrine of Perception, as held by Doctor Arnauld, Doctor Reid, and Sir William Hamilton.*

It is our purpose in this article to offer a monograph upon one of the most limited questions in psychology. But inasmuch as the interest of the discussion must turn very much upon a particular controversy, and even on the opinions of an individual, we think it advisable to place at the beginning all that we have to say of a historical nature, in order that no details of fact may be left to embarrass us in recording the series of philosophical determinations. Working in a somewhat unfrequented field, we hope to be able to show, that in regard to the true doctrine of Immediate Perception, the great Jansenist was not only a successful co-worker, but that he approached singularly near a solution of the problem.

It is not quite ten years since we asked the attention of our readers to a special article on the Family of ARNAULD.* Our purpose at that time was not so much philosophical as theological and religious. But the good and ascetic recluses of Port-Royal des Champs also entertained themselves in spare moments with questions of metaphysic; and one of these now concerns us.

Let memory be refreshed by the statement, that Descartes was born in 1596, and died in 1650; that Arnauld was born in

* Princeton Review, 1849, pp. 467—502.

ART. II.—*A Treatise on the Methods of Observation and Reasoning in Politics.* By GEORGE CORNWALL LEWIS,* Esq. 2 vols. London: John W. Parker & Son. 1852.

Political Progress not necessarily Democratic; or, Relative Equality the true Foundation of Liberty. By JAMES LORIMER, Esq., Advocate. Pp. 303. London: Williams & Norgate. 1857.

How politics have come, in a Christian land, to be considered as beyond the pale of Christian restraints, and politicians to deem themselves entitled to impunity of the revealed law, is a very curious question, and one of no little practical import. In all other occupations, our citizens recognize it as the duty of him who ministers in holy things, to apply the doctrines of Scripture to their conduct, for reproof, for admonition, or comfort; and whether he does so or not, the more respectable hold themselves amenable thereto, as the law of their moral existence. Among politicians, however, it is becoming the fashion to reject the application of Scripture. Their acts are assumed to lie out of its range; not because immaculately righteous, it is clear, for they speak of them habitually in the opposite light; but because it is taken for granted that whatever touches the government of the nation or the movements of party, is entitled to special indulgence, or to be judged by the principles of a different code. To say of any topic that it is a political one, is deemed equivalent to saying that the pulpit must let it alone. Very convenient for the purposes of the sinner, to have an occupation into which the law of God is not to follow him; or, at least, which furnishes a plea for resisting, and telling the messengers of the Gospel that this is not in their line. But is statesmanship one of that kind? If we have rightly perused the page of history, no other branch of worldly business has been so largely indebted to the wisest and best of men, or to the word of revelation. Or have politicians, in the midst of their many exposures and temptations, and admitted sins, some recuperative powers, rendering them independent of

* Now Sir George C. Lewis.

that wisdom which cometh down from above—some peculiar resources from below, whereby, though they may fall, they will certainly rise again, with renewed rectitude, from the bosom of the democracy, as Antæus of old, from contact with the earth? Singular as it is, some such notion—vague, undoubtedly; it could not exist otherwise—seems to pervade the public mind, the principal symptom of which is a morbid sensitiveness to the application of gospel truth to the conduct of public men and public affairs.

Progressively, for many years, has this error been insinuating itself into the spirit of our politics, until it has seriously impaired both the moral and intellectual stature of political men. There was a time when citizens went to the polls under as true a sense of duty as they went to church, and when the wisdom and dignity of American councils filled the hearts of all advocates of human rights in every land with triumph. Well is it that many pious people do so still; but their number has certainly diminished, while that of a giddy and ignorant multitude has increased—a multitude disposed to jostle the more orderly aside, and with whom it is disagreeable for them to mingle. The effect is apparent in every branch of government. That sound principle, which separates the church and state, has, by the inactivity of Christians, and overbearing of the worldly, been forced into most unnatural distortion. An agency there is pervading all human affairs, which is skilful at engrafting evil upon every popular good; and an indispensable condition of orthodoxy in politics, as well as in theology, is sleepless watchfulness over interpretation of good doctrine, and over honesty of meaning in forms of sound words.

We fully appreciate the objection to political harangues from the pulpit, and regard with as much horror the act of turning the house of God into a place for advocating the merits of office-seekers, as we should that of making it a place of merchandize, or a rhetorical bazaar, in which to trade in the talents of a gifted minister; and hold it to be equally to the interests of religion and of the state that the church should not embroil itself as a party in the secular government; but a just abhorrence of such profanation has been carried by our people to an unwarrantable length. Though we would have the ser-

vice of God's house defended from all such contact, we cannot fail to see, that pious people are under the most solemn obligations to avail themselves of the proper vehicles of political opinion, to make the gospel bear upon the policy of the country. It has been too much left out of view that the profession of politics, like every other occupation of man, has its moral and religious aspects, in which it stands, as truly as any other, in need of the correctives of the divine word. An act of violence perpetrated by a politician, in carrying forward his measures, is just as truly violence as if it occurred in any other hands; dishonesty in a politician, though generally covered by some plausible name, is nothing but dishonesty; drunkenness does not cease to be a vice, because the privilege of indulging in it is defended by a party; and yet it cannot be denied that the sentiment is prevalent, which holds every thing taken up by politics as thereby defended from the reproofs of the gospel. It behoves us to reflect and see whether we are prepared for it, before we admit the doctrine and carry it out, that, no matter what a man's character and conduct, as soon as he takes up the profession of politics, the minister of God is bound to refrain from disapproval of his vices, and to acquiesce in all he may say and do, and sustain all his measures, no matter how flagitious, by a docile silence; and that even against crime, if committed for political purposes, he must hold it indecorous to remonstrate. Such is positively the meaning of the political public. Are Christians prepared to accept it? In short, it is neither more nor less than the old intolerance of monarchical sovereigns, which we, in the capacity of sovereigns ourselves, are attempting to enforce, on our own behalf. King Majority, like King Ferdinand, must not have his measures questioned, nor his servants interfered with by either expostulation or criticism. Such also was the opinion of Ahab in olden time, but Elijah thought otherwise, and has had some credit for resisting him. It is the duty of the church to follow the operations of the civil government with a vision enlightened by the word of God, and without becoming a party in the conflict of its business and passions, its sectional or personal issues, to labour faithfully, by the use of scriptural means, to imbue the public mind with a due sense of religious obligation in poli-

tical conduct, and to refrain from the condemnation of no vice, because it has been adopted by government, or become a public or party measure.

The works named at the head of this article, though very different in their purpose, present kindred topics of grave importance in this connection; the former unfolding and establishing reliable methods of political reasoning, whereby the scientific position, and the moral purity and grandeur of the profession are brought to view, extricated from the wilderness of questionable and erroneous notions, with which they have been confounded; and the latter pursuing an inquiry into the vital principle of liberal government, whereby and to what extent power comes safely into the hands of the people, in the course of which, considerations of political education, and the legitimate influence of the church in the formation of political opinions, arise as essential elements.

The work of Sir George C. Lewis is a political *organum*, which, howsoever it may subserve the purposes designed, is addressed to a widely pervading want of the age. The impotency of reasoning, and consequent fluctuation of opinion, in which the world is actually involved by the vastness, and multitude, and manysidedness of political questions, make urgent demand for some help of this kind. Such is the diversity, not to say the perversity of reasoning, on such matters, that hardly a conceivable system of government is without its advocate among us. "Writers of the most dissimilar schools of philosophy, historians, and practical men, as well as the general public, seem to concur in thinking that the principles of political science are ill-ascertained, and that the maxims of political art are insufficiently established; while we see, from the daily experience of civilized nations, that there is no generally recognized standard of opinion with respect to the practical application of political theories and rules of conduct. So unfavourable, indeed, is the popular judgment with respect to political philosophy, that it is often inclined to proscribe the whole for the defects of a part; to disturb much that is sound on account of the rest that is unsound; and to involve the good with the bad, in one sweeping and indiscriminate condemnation."

Consequently the aim and limitations of the "Methods of

reasoning on Politics" are thus stated by the author. "The most effectual mode of removing this uncertainty, and of reducing the discordant chaos of political theories and doctrines to a uniform and harmonious system, would be to produce a complete body of political philosophy, which should, by the accuracy and completeness of its facts, the fitness of its arrangement, and the force of its reasoning, command the general approbation of competent judges, and, through their assent, gradually work its way to popular reception. Such a task, however, is more easily described than executed; and there may, in the present state of political investigation, be obstacles to the attempt, which, when we consider the failure which has attended the efforts of many eminent speculators, might fairly be deemed insurmountable.

"Whether, however, an attempt at a definitive treatment of the whole compass of political philosophy be, or be not, premature at the present moment, it will at least be conceded, that the success of such an attempt at some future period, may be facilitated by preliminary labours, intended to clear the way for other and more capable investigators. One of the most important of these labours consists in the determination of the subject-matter of politics, and of the methods by which it is to be investigated. When we have settled what political theory and practice are, and how we ought to reason respecting them, we may hope to have made some progress towards the attainment of that end, which all men, whatever their opinions may be, must concur in thinking desirable, provided it be attainable.

"In the present treatise, therefore, an attempt will be made to survey this foreground of political philosophy, with the view of furnishing a guide to the political student, who seeks to reason for himself, and to form an independent judgment upon any department of politics. On the one hand it does not aim at establishing any political theory, or inculcating any system of political doctrine; on the other hand, it does not pretend to be a logical treatise, but it avails itself of logical rules, established by professed writers on logic, and is merely concerned with their application to politics. It makes no claim to novelty or invention; but it seeks only to extend to politics those methods of observation and reasoning which experience has

proved to be most effectual, and which are employed with success in other departments of knowledge. Without proposing to determine truth, it proposes to be instrumental in promoting the determination of truth by others."

In pursuance of this purpose, the author proceeds to define the province of politics, which he afterwards subdivides into four departments. Of these the first pertains to the registration of political facts, including history and statistics, and all the methods adopted for preserving, in an authentic and permanent form, the memory of political facts, as they occur. The second is that of positive, or descriptive politics; or the treatment of what is necessarily involved in the idea of a political government. It undertakes to define the elements necessary to constitute a government, and to show how these are modified in its various forms. The third is that of speculative politics, which, upon the foundation laid by positive politics, seeks to determine how certain forms of government, and certain laws and institutions operate, and from observed facts, and from known principles of human nature, to determine their character and tendency; and attempts to frame propositions respecting their probable consequences, either universally or in some hypothetical state of circumstances. And the fourth department treats of maxims of political practice. "The second and third of these departments correspond with the science of politics; the fourth corresponds with the art."

Under these heads the author conducts an exhaustive treatment of the subject of political methodology, or the principles and apparatus of reasoning upon public affairs. It would be too much to hope for a work of this kind any direct popular effect, but certainly no man, accustomed to consecutive thinking, can read it without great practical benefit, assisting as it does towards the discrimination of facts, the detecting of fallacies, determining what kind of conclusions are ascertainable in a given case, and clearing them, as far as possible, of all grounds of doubt. The author's prolixity, which on some heads is excessive, is that of materials, not of words. Led away by the profusion and diversity of his knowledge, though he never turns aside from the subject, he illustrates by similitude, by contrast, example, and so forth, to an extent far

beyond what can be necessary for any reader of such a work as his. In both a moral and scientific point of view the book is one of inestimable value. Politics pursued in the spirit of its method must become a noble branch of the service of God.

The aim of Mr. Lorimer's little volume is to determine the principle of safety in political progress, with a more special view to its conditions under the present government of England. A limited monarchy is considered as having, in its liberal elements, a native tendency towards radical democracy, and democracy, as it is liable to fall into the hands of a demagogue, and thereby to lead to the restoration of despotism, is represented as a dangerous proclivity. To secure all the advantages of liberty without approaching that precarious brink, to foster progress up to a point where it may safely be stayed, and where the government, equally balanced on every side, may thereafter librate with equal freedom and security, is the consummation, on which all the argumentations of the treatise bear. The means proposed to that end is a distribution of political privileges graduated to the presumptive competence and good will of the people. And the author's strength is laid out in demonstrating that "political influence ought, as nearly as possible, to correspond to social weight and importance."

Mr. Lorimer elaborates his convictions in a cautious and scholarlike manner. His style is refined, compact, and subdued, presenting in small compass the fruits of much thinking. It is too late in the world's history to assume that any one *form* of government is, in all cases, the best; that is bad, of whatsoever form, which is unfitted to the conditions of the nation; but if a democracy, in its right working, is a good form, it does not seem to be a sufficient reason for rejecting it, to say that it is liable to be corrupted. For that is true of most good things among men. Good institutions run the greatest risk from innovation, for the very reason that they are good. The inferior may be improved thereby, but that is certainly not a valid reason for preferring the inferior.

The considerations whereby the author would have his general proposition interpreted and applied, must, he says, "in each particular state, depend upon the peculiar circumstances

of that state." At the same time, he declares himself in favour of limitations formed upon property, rank, virtue and intelligence. Of these, the former two are no longer practical questions under our government, and we can foresee no benefit to us from their discussion. And as to intelligence and virtue, they can be maintained only by systematic effort to that end: which as it must be national, to answer the purposes of a popular government, should fairly extend to all the nation. It would be a mockery of the principle to admit its operation only in the case of professional men. The danger to be dreaded in any popular government is that the people, through vice or passion, or ignorance, may suffer their affairs to be mismanaged by the incompetent or designing. But that may be done by one million of voters as likely as by five millions. The evil is not to be met by diminishing the number, but by proper preparation of each individual for his political duties. A national system of education is indispensable, whether the number be one million or more. Mr. Lorimer remarks briefly, but well to the point, on the head of popular instruction, but why the agencies he recommends should not be addressed towards enabling all the people to take part in their public affairs, as well as only a large number of them, we cannot understand. His judgment is readily accounted for by the fact that, in his hands, this qualification is burdened by those of property and rank.

In the earnest inquiries awakened by agitation of further parliamentary reform in England, it was to be anticipated that every available example, and especially the Constitution of the United States, should undergo a thorough scrutiny; and the objections thereto presented, generally with the most respectful moderation of tone, but evidently under constraint of real apprehension, have received, of late, plausible support from certain occurrences among ourselves. We are by no means disposed to make light of the considerations of danger from vice and ignorance. On the contrary, we regard them as the most formidable that a liberal government has to encounter. How to meet and resolve them successfully, is the grand problem for us to solve. Their preponderance in our system of government would be the sure forerunner of dissolution. If

there is no way, consistent with justice to better citizens, whereby voters of the Paudeen and Bill Poole class can be excluded, it becomes absolutely indispensable to the safety of the commonwealth that their influence be countervailed.

The error to which our remarks apply is twofold. In the first place, it consists in leaving politics entirely to the occasional and heated excitement of party conflict, while no adequate provision is made for giving the subject that calm and systematic place in common education, which it ought to occupy in a free country; and secondly, in the fact that so many of those who are both morally and intellectually best qualified stand back from the post of citizen duty, thereby resigning the weight of power into the hands of such as are competent only to its abuse. By means of its commonness, franchise has come to be undervalued by that class, to whom a higher standard of qualification would have confined it. By no other civilized people is the subject of politics treated with such disrespect as it is by the religious public of the United States. Especially is this true of the cities; where it is notorious that political majorities are controlled by a class of persons, who themselves need the most stringent control of law; while the orderly and industrious are too much occupied with their private affairs to take any active hand in the matter, at least until moved by some glaring iniquity: and, even then, too often content themselves with an outburst of indignant language. And many pious people actually conceive that in thus neglecting their political duties, and, so far nullifying their own influence, they are commendable for eminent piety.

We are reaping the fruits of our error. It is certainly not other than might have been anticipated, if election movements are left in the hands of the idle, the ignorant, and the vicious, that office holders should in some degree correspond in character to their constituents, or that constituents should elect those congenial to their own likings. If the country has had to blush for disorder and profligacy in its high places, if even senators, with a view to outmanœuvre each other in party tactics, have perpetrated such undignified harangues as would have turned ridicule upon a country debating-society, the better class of citizens have had themselves to blame. The guilt lies

heavily upon the shoulders of American Christians, who in slighting their duty to their country, have thrown its interests into such hands. Were the fear of a well informed Christian constituency in all cases before the eyes of the national representative, we should be spared much of that *Buncombe* which it burns the cheek to read: and the manners of our legislative halls would receive some improvement in dignity, were the accounts always to be rendered to an orderly, right-thinking majority, instead of one mustered by pothouse bullies.

As a whole, doubtless, the people of the United States are superior to all other nations in political knowledge, and on emergency, do not fail to use it; but mere superiority to those, who are not called upon to exercise any such rights, or discharge any such duties, is too low a standard. Our measure is not what other nations are, but what we have to do, and spasmodic effort in time of danger will not always atone for the careless security, which gave occasion to it; and it will make little matter what is the wisdom existing in the country, if the Christian and well disposed classes suffer the political lead to be taken out of their hands by the enemies of social order. No other government in the world presupposes, and depends upon such an amount of political knowledge in the people. Christians did well under imperial Rome, and while they were comparatively few, to refrain from intermeddling with a government, which they could not affect otherwise than indirectly, by living quiet and peaceful lives; it is otherwise when they have a government of their own choice, shaped after their own views, and founded upon principles of the Holy Word. No Christian citizen can withhold his coöperation towards its right working, without dereliction of a most solemn duty. And that coöperation consists in both a prudent use of the right of suffrage, and execution of what falls to his own hand to execute, and in promoting such instruction as shall enable and dispose the succeeding generation to do likewise.

No form of government can be rationally condemned because its violation produces evil. If it is found impossible to prepare by education a majority of the people for the proper discharge of their citizen duties, we shall admit that our system is wrong; or if the work of government is itself such an evil that

pious people cannot put their hands to it without pollution, then there is nothing for us, under any constitution, but to submit to the domination of iniquity, and rest content if fortunate enough to be ruled by rogues of talent, who will spare us at least the humiliation of official imbecility. But these are hypotheses, which though largely acted upon, are too absurd for serious consideration.

Assuming what we have large ground for believing true, that Christians are more generally beginning to take just views of their duty in this respect, we shall address our remaining remarks to that branch of a republican education, which goes to prepare a citizen for the proper discharge of his duties as such.

Suffrage is not an innate and inalienable right. A man is not entitled by the laws of good sense to a voice in the government of his country just because he has been born. Intelligent preparation for the position of a freeman and constituent of legislators is implied in every liberal constitution, otherwise it would be preposterous. A liberal government is called upon by the very dictates of self-preservation, to be indefatigable in the use of systematic means for propagating and maintaining virtue and political intelligence among its citizens. The right working of a pure democracy is a state proper to the very highest civilization, and cannot be maintained without a suitable education, as general as the suffrage. Its most deadly ingredient is an ignorant or vicious class of citizens, led blindly by selfish and unprincipled demagogues. The vicious never governed themselves but to their own destruction, and the only step possible to ignorance is to obey. When the majority of any people sink to that condition, they are no longer democratic, and the sooner they find a master the better for them. Servile in spirit, despite their refractoriness, the only choice left them is whom they shall serve, anarchy or monarchy. For anarchy consists not in every man thinking for himself, but in a mass who do not think for themselves, having too many masters. Nor can we rely for security against this danger upon the recuperative power, the inevitable coming right of human nature. Examples are too abundant, in both past and present time, of the inevitable going wrong of human

nature, unless directed and followed up by the correctives of a moral, scientific, and religious training.

Rightly, and, we are happy to say, with most praiseworthy practical effect, have we been directed to popular education as the safeguard of liberty; but it still remains to discriminate in the well stocked arsenal of education what weapons are the best to be selected. One man cannot know all arts, nor possess himself of every accomplishment; and the labourer and artisan have only limited time for any thing beyond their daily task. Education should guide them as directly as possible to what they need. It is not every kind of education that will answer the purpose. All learning is not equally good for the same thing. What is suited to a lawyer would be no preparation for a surgeon. You may have a common school course which shall prepare its pupils to be submissive subjects, and to recognize a propriety in implicit obedience to a priest or a king, as readily as one that will prepare them to be freemen; and if you leave out of the school all reference to virtue and religion, you will certainly subserve the purposes of vice and infidelity. Not that any branch of truth depends upon education; but a human mind, as it cannot comprehend all knowledge, must be characterized by that portion which it knows, and cannot possibly take the bent of that which it does not know.

It becomes, therefore, a matter of the first importance to make a suitable selection of studies. Of course, there are certain indispensable elements lying at the foundation of all instruction, indispensable, because only instruments whereby the substantial work is to be done. A higher step, and the all important one is towards the use to be made of them. It is true that this latter pertains to a man's whole life, and education cannot follow him all his life; but it may give such an impulse and bearing to his life as to determine the whole of it for right or wrong. And this is just what it should most eminently aim at. His education should be such as to start a man right in the course of duties belonging to him. And what are the duties belonging to us? Those touching our private affairs, and those which we owe to the public. In regard to the former, it is not doubted that even learning may greatly err if not of a kind that is to the purpose, while in the latter it is deemed

secure, no matter of what kind it may be. Almost universal is the notion among us that if a man is educated he must be a republican—that if the people be only instructed in reading and writing English, and the use of numbers, they must, by a certain natural consequence, think correctly on all their public duties. A strange hallucination! As if multitudes of the educated in different countries were not both the subjects and advocates of monarchy. True liberty is the colleague of intelligence; but intelligence of certain things may exist without liberty. Knowledge is power. But knowledge of what? Why, knowledge of what you have to do, and how to do it. That is the only knowledge which is power. There is a branch of education which seeks to liberalize a man's thinking, and cultivate him in relation to himself; but the full work of instruction is not done until the man is prepared for his proper duties.

Popular education is always implied in a popular government, as truly as, in a monarchy, it is understood that whoever is born to the throne shall receive the instruction proper for a king. But as the education of a king must be royal, that of a citizen should be republican. No doubt a large amount of political information, though of a very unreliable kind, is scattered abroad among the people by conversation and the newspapers; and school study of the Constitution and History of the United States is very well, as far as it goes; but all that is far short of what is needed by a population, upon whom rest the awful responsibilities of sovereignty. Are they to be abandoned to the consequences of such meagre and defective rudiments, and the random discussions of the smithy and bar-room? Good, as well as evil is effected through the newspapers; but the newspapers do not teach politics, though generally occupied, more or less, with pleadings of party interests. What we stand in need of is a well devised course of political instruction, which shall go directly and systematically to prepare, at least, a majority of citizens for an intelligent and conscientious discharge of their citizen duties. Such an end cannot be effected by the simple adoption of any European system, however excellent in itself, and for its own purposes. The body of the Prussian system, for example, we may safely borrow as it stands, but

there is an element of its spirit which we must leave out, and another element which we must introduce, or we shall train up subjects and not citizens—shall shape the young mind to views inconsistent with the practice around it, and the duties to be exacted of it. Under a monarchy, it is wise to give such a bearing to all studies as to impress youth with the proper feelings of subjects, inasmuch as all the duties to be exacted of them spring out of the spirit of submission. A monastic training may be suitable for one whose life is to be spent within the walls of a monastery, or in obedience to the regulations which are there observed; but for those who are to tread the busy walks of life in a free country, it is not only preposterous, but disabling, like the bandages which imprison the feet of a Chinese lady. A youth brought up under any such method would feel himself growing into discordance with the spirit of his country, and must become, as far as his education takes effect, not merely unqualified, but positively *disqualified* for the position of a citizen.

Nor is it enough to attempt to leave the mind of the pupil neutral—simply inculcating a disrespect for authorities, and inordinate esteem for himself, with the wild notion, that because we have no king in this country, we have no sovereignty; and because we are free, we are subject to no restraints. In the training of a subject, it may suffice to avoid every thing that has a liberal tendency, and so to order the “incidentals of education,” that the pressure of royal authority shall be felt throughout, and obedience inculcated insensibly, like the sentiment of religion; but the citizen requires more than a negation of loyalty—more than a mere sentiment of the opposite. He needs positive instruction for positive and ever recurring duties. It is not enough to leave out the subject-training of monarchical countries, and give up its place to insubordination; to put into our books president instead of king, and patriotism for loyalty—we must substitute the citizen-training and instruction, which is to put a man into the proper moral attitude towards his country, and give him a just apprehension of its government, and of his own responsibilities under it. To be a citizen is something more than to toss one’s cap in the air, and fire off powder and rhetoric on the Fourth of July—it is to

partake in the powers and responsibilities of sovereignty—most solemn responsibilities, not to be undertaken without careful preparation.

The first element of citizen character is reverence—reverence towards God and properly constituted human authority; connected, at as early a date as possible, with right instruction as to what it is to be rightly constituted. A feeling this, which, in itself one of the most valuable and beautiful of human nature, is more important to the success of a free government than of any other. Fear may subserve the purposes of order under a despotism, and a strong army may suffice for its moral power; but in a government dependent upon the will of the people, nothing can take the place of due reverence for the authorities of their own appointment.

Freedom differs, on the one hand, from vulgar license, in that it possesses reverence, and on the other hand, from servility, in that it entertains reverence only for what is good and noble. And how shall that emotion be most certainly directed to the noblest and the best? If common sense should answer, it would be by pointing us to God. But a higher authority than common sense has provided us with both an answer and a guide, in one. The word of God is the only complete text book on this subject. And the schools of a free country cannot be safe without it. Reverence to a priest must not be suffered to take the place of reverence to God. To pay to man what is due to God is the very essence of servility. The noblest independence is direct dependence upon God. And, if we deem our government to be according to the will of God, we shall reverence also the authorities which constitute it, and teach with diligence the revelation which inspired it. The most valuable element in the schools of a free country is the Bible. For he alone is the true "freeman, whom the truth makes free."

After the church, no other class of human affairs are more solemn than those of the state. Sovereignty may be abused; but cannot be degraded. If treated with irreverence by one occupant, it will only transfer the crown to another, and will neither die with us, nor at our hands. To exercise it with indignity is not merely to lose possession of it, but also to sink

beneath its vengeance in another form. For, though its shape may be submitted to human choice, and even that within narrower limits than is commonly believed, its essential authority is of God—springs out of the same volition that created the human spirit. To rightly and deeply apprehend the solemn nature of political office, would go far in guiding to the proper choice of incumbents for its duties. Every thing that represents the authority should harmoniously conspire to its divinely appointed end.

With such a spirit of intelligent reverence, the citizen needs also to be imbued with a true and delicate discrimination of the rights of others, as well as of himself, and of the claims which, in the ordinary business and intercourse of life, his fellow-men have upon him. Constitutional freedom is not designed to protect a selfish man, in gratifying himself at the expense of others, while it positively does leave much more of the private intercourse of men to their own discretion. It becomes necessary, therefore, to include the proper culture of that individual discretion in the educational training of the future citizen, as well as to inculcate a right understanding of and due respect for those relations in which men stand to men by nature and through the same governmental system.

In political science every man among us claims to hold opinions; and it seems no more than reasonable that some care should be taken to have those opinions formed in consistency with truth. If the subject were one of an esoteric philosophy, on which it is possible to withhold discussion from the people, we might content ourselves with saying that it is above their capacity, they can do very well without it, why trouble them with such abstruse matters, away from their proper business? But as it is just about topics of political science that our people talk most frequently, it is no longer a question whether the subject is to be discussed before them, or whether they are to have the means of entertaining opinions about it. Opinions they will adopt, on that subject, instruction or no instruction, and act upon them too, in a way very deeply affecting every one of us. The sole question is whether they shall be helped to form their opinions correctly or not.

This subject is immediately practical also in another sense.

Whether considered as touching domestic or foreign affairs, the people, with us, are the ultimate resort, and their opinions, right or wrong, will find expression in the national policy. For men, who may be called upon to give their vote upon a question of government, it must be of importance to have some just ideas of what a government is, in itself, and as respects those for whom it exists. Here it is, on the very threshold of political science, that many a flattering promise of national independence has stumbled and fallen. A government is not an industrial institution, set up to find the people employment, nor an almshouse, to make provision for those who are unable or unwilling to provide for themselves; only Frenchmen accept the idea that it is both, and, consequently, fall into the hands of him who succeeds in providing for them best; and his servants they must be, while their views of government remain the same. But such an error, as well as others more or less dangerous, there can be no difficulty in exposing to a people, fond of political discussion, in such a light as to make its practical bearing perfectly clear. Much metaphysical speculation may be employed upon theories of government, but all that pertains to the necessary instruction of the people, for the proper discharge of their citizen duties, requires no such elaboration. The same may be said of that branch of the science which treats of public wealth. Because it has been handled philosophically, not the less is political economy a matter of solid, practical, every day business. All political measures, in greater or less degree, affect the material resources of the State; and few elements of government are more conducive to public comfort and independence, or more indicative of a wise and temperate management than an unembarrassed treasury. But with nations, as with individuals, the art of being economical—a very different thing from niggardliness—is one that calls for no little judgment and cautious forethought, drawn from the very heart of statesmanship. And when debt has to be incurred, those who stand at the sources of authority ought to have some ideas as to where, with least national danger, the liability may be created. On the other hand, it is not desirable that a government, as such, should be wealthy. National riches ought to lie in the hands of the people, not of their govern-

ment. But an ignorant populace, whether dazzled by, or jealous of official state and splendour, and military array, are continually prone to rush blindly into measures which involve both evils. In heat of party action, and from false notions of economy, they will adopt a policy which cuts off revenue, and involves deficit and debt; and from admiration of a favourite hero, indulge him in privileges and emoluments which put it in his power and tempt him to oppress them. Great erudition is not required, nor is it necessary that every man be an Adam Smith, or a Bentham; a few principles, in connection with knowledge of the particular case, are sufficient for citizen duty; but these cannot be mastered without set purpose to that end.

No small amount of government business in every country, but most of all in a commercial country, is concerned with its foreign relations. And these often involve the very national life, its dignity, its independence, its wealth or poverty, its peace, or the necessities of war—subjects that touch the interests of every individual. As there is no congress to determine what shall be the laws of international intercourse, but every great nation acts without recognition of an earthly superior, the people of a democratic government cannot help having to do with international law, and thereby, to some extent, affecting the policy of the civilized world. The subject is one inseparable from sovereignty. The sovereign may, indeed, be ignorant, and utterly incompetent to his place; but he is one in the community of sovereigns, and his conduct towards his peers, no matter how rude, or how stupid, must enter as an element into the character which marks the intercourse of the whole. But, as among gentlemen, there is an unwritten law, which gentlemen do not violate without detriment to their standing as gentlemen; so among nations there are principles of right and comity, which no one can disregard without impairing that respect of its peers, to which much of its power is due; and possibly, also, not without incurring the penalty of a deadly conflict. Those with whom are the powers of sovereignty, if they cannot always foresee who of their servants will act in accordance with the national interest and honour, should be well enough informed to make the weight of

their reproof fall correctly upon the head of him who violates them.

It need scarcely be added, that to such a course of instruction, the outlines of general history, and especially the constitutional history of England and of the United States, belong as essential ingredients. For these are the fruits of national experience, and sources of national wisdom. Civilized society implies provision for continually succeeding changes. Experienced prudence is required to adapt the constitution thereto. Blind adherence to old routine will not suffice. What was wisdom in one conjuncture, may be folly in another. The most conservative government in the world, to be well conducted, needs the aid of nice adjustment, continually renewed.

In its mutability lies the distinction of human nature, and its glory. Brute existence is one and the same from beginning to end. The mountains and the ocean may be now as they were on the day of their creation. There is sublimity in their ever-during sameness; but grander far is the sublimity of that progressive change, every step of which, if taken in accordance with fundamental law, is a growth towards divine perfection. We have no knowledge of moral or intellectual progress, except in man. It is the peculiar condition of our kind. Aspects there are, in which this mutability is really painful to contemplate; but intrinsically it is the path of greatness for the life of man, and the only one. Man can attain to neither power nor happiness otherwise. At any stage of progress, to become stationary is to deny our human nature, and sink towards that of the irrational creation. No matter where a people ceases to advance, it there terminates its prosperity and its contribution to civilization. However wisely our fathers have done for us, there is still something we have to do for ourselves. We need continual study of present emergencies, in the light of past experience, and of sound political principle.

Such a course of instruction might be varied in extent and thoroughness to any degree. It is not necessary for every citizen to be a great jurist, any more than for every Christian to be a great theologian; but if any one denies that a knowledge of the proper bearing and fundamental principles of political science can be of use, except as followed up to great

legal learning, he controverts the whole doctrine of popular instruction. He might as plausibly say that the common principles of arithmetic are of no use, because every man cannot become a Newton; or that the practical elements of the gospel are of no use to any, who cannot hope to be theologians like Calvin or Edwards; or that there is no use in attempting to distinguish between truth and falsehood, right and wrong, unless a man is to be a great moral philosopher. If he says that political principles cannot be communicated to the people, he assails the very foundation of all liberal government, on a hypothesis, which we hold to be untenable. For we can see no reason why this range of subjects should not be comprehended in popular education, as well as the elements of chemistry or astronomy, which are much more out of the range of common thinking, and require more recondite reasoning to understand. We would not undervalue any department of art or science; but as a selection has to be made for popular instruction, why not take those subjects most apt to citizen wants? Chemistry and the higher mathematics are very valuable, and richly repay all who have time to devote to them, but they are not every man's business. Every man is not called upon to analyze earths and acids—it is not every man's business to circumnavigate the earth, and weigh the stars in a balance; a man may be a good citizen although he knows no language save his vernacular, and cannot parse a sentence of Aristotle to save his neck; scarcely one of us in a hundred has occasion to read or to speak a foreign tongue, although it is sometimes very convenient to be able to do so; but every man needs a practical acquaintance with the duties belonging to him as a citizen, as truly as he needs instruction in his profession or handicraft.

Political philosophy is, by its very nature, the most easily accessible kind of knowledge. It requires no previous mathematics, no previous linguistics, no previous chemistry. Its logic is comprehended within itself, and it presupposes only a basis of good common sense and intellectual honesty. Nor would such a course of citizen education be either tedious or difficult; inasmuch as its design could not be to confer at once, all the information that the pupil should ever need, but

simply to start trains of thinking and habits of observation in the proper direction. People do not need to be taught to reason, but only how to avoid errors in reasoning. The humblest among us attempt to reason on politics, and do reason after their own fashion. On this very account it is that they stand in need of instruction, as well for the guidance of their own thinking, as for the detection of false argumentation when addressed to them. It is not true that the uneducated do not generalize. This they do only too rapidly, and to a degree that defeats itself. A man who has jumped at several contradictory inferences with equal facility, and seen them to be contradictory, is ready to lean upon any person who can give him confidence. To reach a conclusion in reasoning is so gratifying to the human mind that, without instruction touching necessary cautions, a man will hurry to an apparent conclusion by a very inadequate process. And, for the same reason, he is prone to fall in with the judgments of others even when scantily sustained. Perfectly charming to ill-regulated minds are wide and sweeping assertions, which seem to reach broad principles from a few facts easily apprehended. A cautious survey of a subject in all its aspects, leading to a fair estimate of it, tires and disgusts them. Greedy of excitement, impatient of proof, prone to infer rapidly, and confused by an opposite inference, whoever would fix their attention and carry their convictions must present only one side of a subject, adroitly adapted to their propensities. The demagogue is their only man. An audience of this kind can have no intelligent understanding of their political affairs. Their vote is only the expression of a passion, of a prejudice or haphazard. Calmness in thinking, patient hearing of adverse opinions, and suspension of judgment, until all accessible arguments have been weighed, are the work of education either given or taken.

The influences, under which an American citizen lives, impress him with the spirit of freedom; but as far as intellectual furniture goes, he is provided by his education with very little help towards the right formation of opinions. It is not unlikely that a consciousness of that lack accounts, in the case of many good men, for the utter neglect of their political duties, and

with a greater number, creates the necessity under which they are of following the leadership of a party. Such is not the manly part of a true republican; such is no addition to the national wisdom. The blind follower of a demagogue is only a make-weight to his leader. To him, as far as the party question is concerned, that leader is a king. It is really time that some elementary political instruction should be given to those upon whom such solemn political responsibilities are to rest. Why is it not given? Perhaps for no other reason than that it has not been given. We have copied our methods and subjects of education, from countries where such an element was not needed, or rather carefully shunned, and have not yet made all the amendments necessary. It is to be hoped, as well for the safety of our rights as for the style of our statesmanship, that the step will not be much longer delayed.

Elementary principles of political science, and of the methods of reasoning on politics might be introduced into the school, in connection with history and moral philosophy, to the extent of laying before the pupil clearly the nature and obligation of his citizen duties, and the sources of proper equipment for them. And lyceum lecture courses, which, in their present condition, without aim or plan, are good for nothing, might be wrought into a system, and turned to the valuable account of following up the discipline of youth with well graduated political instruction for maturer years. Thus a citizen, at some of the leisure hours which he now wastes, might enjoy the means of continuing the increase of political knowledge upon the basis of early education, throughout life.

It will certainly not be forgotten that we are advocating, not the education of statesmen—although in a country where so many are needed to fill places in township, county, state, and general government, and where, in the rapidity of rotation, almost any citizen may be chosen to almost any office, the education proper for a statesman ought not to be rare—but of the people, to the end that they may recognize a statesman in his work, and properly judge of the place in which to put him. It is much to have men competent to the work of government—a matter in which this land was, at one time, highly favoured. A true statesman is of no common growth—not to be picked

up at random on the highway. Few men have either the necessary breadth and force of character, truth and humanity, or the industry in acquisition. When found, his price is above rubies, and all the wealth of mines not to be compared with him. But what matters it how many such invaluable men a country may possess, if the power in whose hands is the gift of office, is equally incapable of understanding their value and the demands of the places that need them?—if the people, who appoint to such places, go to work so blindly, or so recklessly, as to pass by men equipped with every proper qualification, and set up those who have none? Of what use is it to be favoured by God with great statesmen, if they are to be trodden down, or hustled aside to make way for any militia captain, or empty demagogue who succeeds for the moment in getting up a shout? What is the use of jewels to those who trample them in the mire and crown themselves with straw? When great statesmen, whose equal the world has seldom seen, after long and invaluable service, and in the prime of their wisdom, have been turned over to neglect, to make way for second rate soldiers of a few months' notoriety—when party watch-words, slang epithets and nicknames go further towards securing elections than any consideration of solid merit, we can make little question that more is needed than great men to choose from. Successful sovereignty, whether wielded by a king or a people, must depend upon the discriminating disposal of right men in right places.

Length of days, and experience in political campaigns, and intercourse with political men, will give even the uneducated some adroitness in the duties of citizenship. But such a method is very imperfect, not to say corrupting. For a man must become accustomed to all that is bad in that course of things before he is able to discriminate for himself what is good. And familiarity with the bad blunts the perception of its iniquity.

But granting that such a method well attained its end, it is too slow. The greater number of citizens do not live long enough to profit by it, and the most favoured only when old. We want well equipped men in the prime of their days, with all the vigour and elasticity of youth, to carry forward the

operations of our liberal institutions, and to fill the numerous offices under them, to which any citizen may be called.

Without entangling the present question in discussion as to what party in the state is under special obligation to execute this work, we insist upon it as a duty of Christians, and of vital importance to the whole. All parties who wish the well-being of their country are interested in it. Self-defence imposes upon the state, at least, a sedulous encouragement of such instruction. The church may deem itself, or may be deemed, improperly employed, as a body, in conducting anything, even education, with a view to political good. It is not to the present point to dispute that position; none will deny that it belongs to Christians to use every influence of the gospel to make a government, which is their own, tell to the glory of God in the highest well being of the nation; nor that having the power so to do, they are recreant to a most holy obligation, if by neglect they throw sovereign power, with all the influence it wields, into the hands of vice. Politics of a Christian country, if Christians are faithful to their citizen duties, should not be unsuitable for pious people, or ministers of the gospel to put a hand to, or make their voices heard in. That the contrary belief extensively prevails is a reproach to the Christian character of the nation—a humiliating proof of our dereliction of duty.

Moreover, the church, in the discharge of its own proper office, is possessed of a power, which merits better than to be strangled by its own hand. Does any other power in the country so nullify itself, and is there any other so solemnly bound to give itself the widest possible effect? Whatever may be done by state or individual for political instruction, there will always be much that can be effected only through the church; to it must we look for that practical virtue, without which freedom would be only an evil, and there will always be many, whom no instructions save those of the church can reach.

This notion that it is inconsistent with Christian life to take any part in politics, has not arisen within the church. No man ever learned such a doctrine from intelligent study of his Bible, or of church history. It is due to a cry got up by unscrupulous men, who wish to be rid of the troublesome presence of

sensitive consciences—men who know that their ends and measures must conflict with those of pious men, and who naturally wish to have the whole field to themselves. Under cover of an excellent principle—the separation of church and state—they have boldly claimed politics for the ungodly; and Christians have tamely succumbed, and joined in the outcry against themselves. Well may the trickster laugh in his sleeve. Weakness is too mild a term for this submission on the part of a Christian community in a Christian land, under a government dictated by Christian principle, and for the establishment of which their Christian forefathers fought and bled, and toiled and suffered so much and so long. It is high time that the error were corrected, and that Christians took such a part in the affairs of their government that those affairs should bear their impress, and reflect to all the world the influence of a Christian public sentiment.

Public opinion consists largely in an echo of the opinions of a few. We have most fully and distinctly learned that the voice of the people is not the voice of God, and that there is no more confidence to be put in the infallibility of a public than in that of a pope. A few active minds are always the generators of popular sentiment. The masses of mankind, educated and uneducated, do not form, but adopt the doctrines which they hold. Consequently, it is no good defence of letting alone, to say that it permits every one, without bias, to form his own opinion; for, in that case, very few will have any political opinion, or it will be one inherited, or taken up at random or in a passion. The majority of people, in order to think rightly, must be taught rightly.

And yet, notwithstanding the proclivity of the human mind to err, and the disposition to rely upon authorities, the doctrines which everywhere are esteemed most respectable for opinions, are those which have the appearance, at least, of being in accordance with the divine law; and the active and consistent conduct of a good man will always exert a superior influence. A wise and consistent Christian, taking his legitimate place in public affairs, is not a mere isolated drop in the shower; he is rather to be compared to a wind on the surface of the waters. Each of those ten thousand waves seems to run

at its own free will; and yet they are all impelled by a touch unseen, which lights upon them as softly as the breath of persuasion. A formative influence some must and will exert to the creation of public sentiment, and direction of public action. None possess a means so powerful or benign to that end as the Christian. It certainly is no light matter to hide such a talent in the earth, and sin against the well-being of a nation.

ART. III.—*The Pilgrim's Progress. By John Bunyan.*
 Edited for the Hanserd Knollys Society by GEORGE OFFOR.
 1847.

The Works of John Bunyan, with an Introduction to each Treatise, Notes, &c. Edited by GEORGE OFFOR, Esq. Edinburgh, 1856.

PERHAPS no book, with the exception of the Bible, has been so universally read and admired as Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress*; and especially has it been the treasure of the humbler classes, for, as Baron Macaulay remarks, "it had been during near a century the delight of pious cottagers and artisans, before it was publicly commended by any man of high literary eminence. At length critics condescended to inquire where the secret of so wide and so durable a popularity lay. They were compelled to own that the ignorant multitude had judged more correctly than the learned, and that the despised little book was really a master-piece. Bunyan is indeed the first of allegorists, as Demosthenes is the first of orators, or Shakspeare the first of dramatists. Others have shown great ingenuity, but no other allegorist has ever been able to touch the heart, and to make abstractions objects of terror, of pity, and of love."

Mr. Offor, a great authority on editions of the English Bible, is also a great authority on the various editions of Bunyan. In this reprint of the *Pilgrim's Progress*, which he edited for the Hanserd Knollys Society, he has given us an exact reprint of the first edition; and not the least valuable part of this