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Article I.—*The Works of John Robinson, Pastor of the Pilgrim Fathers. With a Memoir and Annotations, by* Robert Ashton, Secretary of the Congregational Board, London. 3 vols. 12mo. pp. 471, 506, 516. Boston: Doctrinal Tract and Book Society. 1851.

We hold ourselves under lasting obligations to the Congregational Union of England and Wales for the republication of these works; and to the Congregational Board of Publication in this country, for their introduction here. It is one of the signs of good which we are ever ready to hail from New England.

Among all Congregationalists or Independents, there is perhaps no name that stands higher than that of John Robinson. "Both English and American Independents look with affectionate interest to Leyden as the refuge and home of their predecessors; and to Mr. Robinson as their father and friend."* "The father of New England Congregationalists," is a term by which he is continually recognized among us.

Robinson was born in the year 1575. The precise place of his birth is uncertain. It was probably in Lincolnshire. He was graduated at Cambridge, and commenced his public labours in the Church of England. Dissenting from the ceremonies, the vestments, &c., of the Church, he was suspended. It was

* Vol. I. page 5.

cardinal principles of religion and moral duty. They have seized the occasion, which the discussion of historical or scientific subjects has offered, to expose the errors and sophistries of the times, and have not feared to deal justly with vice and folly, however specious their defence, or importunate their plea for mercy.

It is to be feared, however, that in the aggregate of popular impression made by the lecture-room, religion has lost far more than it has gained. That it need not be so, is too obvious to require proof; for there is, surely, nothing in her character or claims that does not elevate, dignify, and adorn whatever is associated with her. Art, science, and philosophy cannot exalt themselves more highly than by rendering to her all the homage she claims. And if the public lecture opens an avenue to the popular mind, why should it not be used for the noble purpose of disseminating the sacred and saving principles of divine truth? Why cannot the "sons of toil," the "unwashed artificers," go home from such discussions, not only with some new conceptions of the power of steam, or the application of machinery, but with just thoughts of the might, the majesty, the goodness and glory of Him who hath made all things by the word of his power, and whose dominion is over all the works of his hands?

Art. III.—*Cours d'Etudes Historiques: par* P. C. F. Daunou, *Pair de France, Ancien Professeur d'Histoire au College Royal de France, &c.* 20 vols. Paris: Firmin Didot frères.

In 1819, M. Daunou was appointed to the Professorship of History in the College Royal of France. For twelve years he continued to fill the duties of that office. The fruits of his labours appear in the volumes above quoted, which were published after his death. A portion of the work, amounting to the first volume and about half the second, was prepared for the press by his own hand; the rest was printed without alteration from his college lectures.

Daunou is a conscientious writer, who employs no artifice to attract admiration; but honestly endeavours to establish a reliable criticism and to illustrate its application, and, under every head, to exhaust the demands of his duty as an instructor. He considers, in the first place, the sources of history, and treats of the investigation and choice of facts, under the two subdivisions of historical criticism and the uses of history. In the second part, he treats of the classification of facts, which comprehends the subordinate topics of geography and chronology. The third part is of the exposition of facts, and takes up the subject of style, and the art of writing history, adducing and weighing the opinions of the ablest authors on the subject, of both ancient and modern times. He then, in order to sustain his doctrines by the authority of the most illustrious examples, analyzes with great care the principal historians of antiquity, Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Polybius, Livy and others. Their narratives are taken up in order, reviewed at length, and compared with ancient monuments relating to the facts they recount, and thus form a complete course of profane history, anterior to the Christian era. The work closes with an investigation of the philosophic systems applied to history, and a summary of the history of philosophy from Plato to the nineteenth century.

Throughout, a clear discrimination is observed between the several elements of the subject, while their common aim is contemplated from each. The practical purpose, which it is the business of history to serve, and without which it would be no better than romance, is before the author's eye from every step in his course. The would-be philosophy which generalizes by obliterating distinctions, and the near-sighted detail, which loses the recognition of law in the particulars of its operation, are equally avoided. A minute and exhausting analysis is made to subserve the exposition of a great idea comprehending the whole.

The aim of all history is one. But in order fully to perceive this truth and what it amounts to, we need to think separately of things really separable. Instead of confounding after the common fashion, the art of writing history with the science on which it is based, and the subject of which it treats, in one

crude mass, we need even further to assign their proper boundaries to its own subordinate divisions. The path to all true art lies through nature and science. Nature furnishes the material. Science observes, classifies, and ascertains its laws. And Art, by following those laws, reconstructs for the expression of human thought. Nature utters the purpose of God, Art, those of man. Science stands between them and interprets the former for the use of the latter. Historical *science* is one thing, history, as written, is another; and the vast and varied subject, of which they treat, extends far beyond them both.

As, in geography, we never rightly apprehend the position of any province until we know by what districts or seas it is bordered, as well as to what kingdom it belongs; so, in science, the only effective way of studying the aim of one department is to settle those lines which separate it from others. The broad domain of universal history is wide as the ascertainable facts of creation. Bounded on one side by Philosophy, which aims to set forth the laws and causes of things; on another by Fiction, picturing them as they might be; on a third by Poetry, which expresses the affections they evoke; and, on a fourth, by Oratory, wielding all these considerations to control the conduct of men, history confines her policy to the presentation of the states and changes of actual existence.

Again, the products of the several provinces of history call for different culture, and give rise to different lines of commerce. Objects may be presented as they are at any given moment, or in respect to the changes which pass upon them; so history consists of the two fundamental elements of description and narrative.

Inanimate and animal nature are affected by few and regular changes, and those restricted to a narrow round. Their story told for one of a class is, in the main, told for all. Natural History consists chiefly of description. Still, there is narrative enough to render the word *history*, as qualified by a suitable epithet, the proper designation of the literature which pertains to them.

In mankind, on the other hand, we find change, of one sort or another, occurring continually, and taking a much wider

range. Even the natural history of our race demands an amount of narrative far beyond what belongs to all the rest of nature. But, it is in the moral, intellectual and social being that the changes increase beyond comparison. Consequently, there is a perfect propriety in the established usage whereby, when the word history is separated from all adjectives and qualifying epithets, it pertains singly to the narrative of human events. Thus limited, it still indicates a field of intellectual labour, which may fairly be said, in relation to human capacity, to be unlimited—limited, indeed, as not trenching upon the domains of other arts, but unlimited in the variety and abundance of the productions proper to its own. Concerning itself, with every path of change, whether towards improvement or degeneracy, its claims cover the whole world of human progress.

The natural changes which pass upon material things will be found to return into themselves after completing a very small cycle. Man alone can be said to *make progress:* that is, to advance by conscious efforts in a direction that does not necessarily return into itself. The course of nature in humbler life leads always back to its beginning. The plant springs out of the seed, grows to maturity, throws out its flowers, ripens its fruits, and sheds them on the earth, and the end of the process is precisely the same kind of seed with which it began. Human nature partakes of this animal cycle also; but that which distinguishes it above all other nature upon this globe is that, over and above, it is capable of a non-re-entrant progress, either upward or downward, but, in either case, tending into infinity. You cannot say of a man that he has reached such a degree of virtue as must necessarily coincide with the beginning of that course of iniquity out of which he emerged; nor will any persistency in vice ever bring him round to virtue.

Society is the aggregate of individuals, but not of all that pertains to the individual. The course of man's spiritual action, whether for improvement or degeneracy, points to no cycle, and continuance in either never works its own termination. It goes on as if it were infinite and immortal. But the individual, who pursues it, vanishes from our sight through the gates of death, and his contribution to society is paid. That contribution is

but a part of himself, and is therefore finite; and, although a very great number make such contributions, the sum of the whole must be finite.

In like manner, we never learn each other completely. No man, however much he may have acted, written, or spoken, has laid the whole breadth of his spiritual being before the world. One feels, as he turns from one thing to another, that mortal life does not furnish time enough to demonstrate all his capacities and feelings. Though possessed of a nature capable of endless expansion, he can only bequeath the fruits of a few efforts to the world. Society is only the aggregate of mortal portions of immortal individuals: and as its constituents are constantly passing away, and being replaced by others, it must be liable to frequent elevations and depressions. To such a degree is this the actual state of the case, that to the observer of only a few successive generations, it is often impossible to say whether after much agitation, society has lost or gained. A larger view perceives something like routine in its changes, nations emerging out of barbarism, by degrees reaching an elegant refinement, and then insensibly sinking back into the obscurity out of which they came.

While these conclusions are perfectly correct in view of their own facts, a more comprehensive generalization detects a persistent progress making its way through all these fluctuations. Even when society in one quarter has sunk the lowest, and its hope of revival perished, it has emerged, in another, after a time, to a higher civilization than before. Though the society to which it belongs is finite, yet, strange to say, civilization is found, when viewed as a whole, to be tending into infinity. Like each of the individuals from whom it springs, it seems to be pressing on towards a beautiful and blessed immortality; while vice and vulgarity, like the spirits to whom they belong, are as irretrievably taking the downward way to degradation and obscurity. The movement of evil, as well as of good, is never backward; but, notwithstanding fluctuations and occasional appearances of self-amendment, is always onward in the direction of its own destination. Thus the spokes of a carriage wheel do not advance in a straight line, but only by revolving round the axle, their depression, at one time, as truly

as their elevation at another, contributing to the forward motion of the whole.

The central problem, then, of historical science, is to determine the law of this wonderful progress; the true work of historic art to follow it in all its conflict with opposing elements, and faithfully to record its victories and defeats, and the series of events belonging to its increase and occasional decline; and the narrative will not be true to the spirit of the whole, if it fails to give encouragement to further effort, and to hopes of ultimate victory.

Progress belongs to time and starts from an act of creation. Any other hypothesis would land us in absurdity. The general current of events wells up from the same fountain-head with Revelation. If the latter is a message directly from God, and addressed to man alone, and therefore of peculiar interest to him, the field of natural observation is a broader page inscribed by the same hand. Man's daily experience is itself a revelation. Every moment some hitherto unpublished purposes of Almighty God are embodying themselves in fact, and issuing through the present into the past. Time is but the unrolling of the mighty scroll of God's decrees. It is the function of human memory to retain the impress which they make; and as memory to the individual, so is history to the race. True, its achievements are far from complete, and amount to little more than epitomized chapters from a few columns of the transient page; but these epitomes contain the great events of human duration, and enable us to understand the principal changes which have affected the government of the world for the last three thousand years.

Now, if there are found to be any regular principles, or laws pertaining to human progress, this record of it may become, if rightly studied, a book of invaluable moral instruction, furnishing a scale whereby to graduate our expectations, and a counsellor in the best means of effecting our designs.

Why the Creator, knowing the importance to us of a right anticipation of the future, should yet have withheld direct intuition of things to come, is a difficulty that admits of satisfactory resolution; but from the relative importance of the things it might have been expected to be otherwise. The past

can never be retrieved nor amended, and, in itself considered, might seem to be as unimportant to us as the breeze which rippled the surface of the flood; the present is independent of all accident or calculation; as it is, so must we enjoy or bear it; the only relation in time over which our deliberations can exercise any control is that of which directly we know nothing; the events for which alone it is our business to labour are hid from our eyes.

This first and *a priori* view of the subject becomes singularly modified upon further inspection. In the first place the evanescence and disconnection which seem to pertain to all temporal things, are found to be only apparent when viewed in relation to historical mankind. There is a vital tie which binds all civilized communities in one. "Let the dead past bury its dead," was an unfortunate saying for a poet. The past is not dead. The past of a progressive humanity cannot die. For the very condition of improvement is its continuation into the present. Even of the years beyond the flood there is a portion which history testifies is living still; not in the scanty record upon her page alone; that were only a figurative use of words; but in their shaping agency upon the present life of man and condition of his abode, as well as in the bliss and woe of spirits then assigned to their respective rewards. No transaction or condition is all over when it has ceased to be present. It has woven more or less of its own nature into the web of life, which passes not away. The realm of Cyrus was obsolete two thousand years ago; yet, in one of the highest senses, it may be said to be living still. For had it never been, many of the elements of Hellenic refinement would have been lacking. The struggle which developed the strength of Athens, the dominion which it yielded to Alexander, the hellenizing of the East, and ultimately of the Roman empire, the diffusion of the Greek language, fitting it to be the medium of later revelation, the oriental elements thus transmitted through accidental channels to modern times; their still greater effect upon mediæval orientalism, and then again upon modern times, are some of the means whereby the still living action of that ancient kingdom has survived the lapse of ages. This state of existence is ramified beyond calculation, not only into

elements in law and government, fundamental ideas in art and forms of society, but even into words and phrases, and figures of speech, and the infinitesimals that go to make up manner of thought and sentiment and conduct. It is equally true of the individual man. He is not free to regard himself as isolated, and responsible for himself and to himself alone. Nor does his earthly existence all perish when he dies. The contribution which it made to society, whether by way of benefit or injury, holds its place indefinitely, and goes to mould the character of ages yet to come. It is impossible to say how much of good and evil we owe to persons of the humblest rank, who were never known beyond their own neighbourhood, and the record of whose being, perhaps, was never made. We know nothing of the nations of Kufa, of Mennahom and Rebo, but the names; of other nations, who must have flourished in the same early times, even the names are unknown; but we know that their accumulated experience built up those arts which appeared already well established in the very dawn of history, and we know that national character is the resultant of the various forces pertaining to that of the persons composing it; and consequently, that multitudes of persons must have contributed to each one of those elements, which were afterwards embodied in a higher progress. Who knows but at this very moment there may be still living in our lives some element that first saw light in some Assyrian cottage, in some unrecorded age? There is such a continuity in the series of events, which constitute the civilization we enjoy, that every part belongs to the whole. Generations are not separate sets of communities. No period of human duration is independent of another. As in a web unrolling from the loom, the most distant extremity is one with that portion just parting from the beam: the whole constitutes a unit, having features, laws, and responsibilities belonging to it as such. In one sense, a man is complete in himself; in another, he is but an integer in a great numerical series. The mystery of our singular being is that it is not confined to the present, but lives in the past, present and future at once. As beneath the starry heavens, the light which we enjoy is not a present effulgence merely, but congregated from various times, as the sources of the component rays

are near or more remote. Some of those radiant messengers have reached us only after the lapse of months, and many a one has been years and even perhaps ages on its journey down. We stand actually in a light collected from various periods of time, and see, at present, things that are long since past. So in the progress of human existence, the contributions of many ages combine in the civilization which now prevails. We are clothed in and sustained by the past. A more or less distant future is the object of our every desire and aspiration. Out of that time to come do we draw all considerations and emotions that prompt to activity, whether in the formation or execution of plans. From the past we receive our instructions, from the future our motives. And the only moment for action is the present. God has bound all relations of time together. They are actually one, like the diorama, though appearing to the spectator in successive aspects, to the eye of the Maker one great picture, comprehensible at a glance. Nay, the unity of civilization is by much the more intimate, being not mechanical, but organic, having not only such a connection of parts as pertains to orderly arrangement, but also that of a plant or a living being.

When we inspect more closely this wonderful progress, by which we are borne along, in one sense, like the particles of water in a stream, we find operating there all the essential laws that govern the development of life. Its parts are bound together by a connection that is necessary. No one period thereof could, without a miracle, have existed but for that which preceded. The nineteenth century is as necessarily connected with the eighteenth as one joint of the cane is with that beneath it. Its parts are inseparable. Not one of them could sustain life by itself, nor could have been what it is but for that connection.

And secondly, we find that the various parts are each in themselves perfectly adapted to their places. It is in the nature of the preceding to prepare the way for and give birth to the succeeding, and the succeeding is always in its nature precisely adapted to follow its predecessor. The fitness of periods of time for their positions in relation to each other is as natural as that of the different members of the animal body.

However capricious certain facts may appear to cursory glance, further observation will ascertain them to be the natural results of a preëxisting but unnoticed state of things. To the student of France under the Bourbons, and the state of public opinion in the latter part of last century, the French revolution is as natural as the fall of grain when fully ripe.

And further, there is found to be a reciprocity of services among all the parts of which this progress consists; a common activity pervades the whole. Through all countries belonging to civilization, through all times, through all grades of society, and every person composing it, there is the operation of an organism as true as that of a plant or living creature. The action of our material frame does not pertain to one set of parts alone, nor does any one communicate without receiving. The hand cannot say to the foot, nor the foot to the hand, I have no need of thee. It also extends to every fibre and molecule; so that if we should inspect a living muscle we should find every particle of it partaking in the all-pervading action, each one sustaining that adjoining to it, and the whole both giving and receiving from each of its minutest parts a reciprocal action which cannot stop except in death. If any part ceases to act its part, it spreads disease around it, and eventually death, unless the other parts are vigorous enough to cast it out, or otherwise defend themselves from its contact. It is this reciprocity and pervasive action which most remarkably distinguishes organic from mechanical structure. And nothing short of living organism can adequately illustrate the intimacy of that connection of parts which belongs to human progress.

Each process of development in nature is endowed with a peculiar power of its own, complete in itself, yet most definitely circumscribed. That germ which is wrapt up in the little seed of the elm, alone has the power to generate an elm-tree; and that condition of its existence is not merely a potentiality, but an imperative command, which in the proper circumstances it cannot disobey. Until the tree is complete, and everything that belongs to an elm fully formed and arranged, it gives not a symptom of incapacity. But there its force is bounded. It can only go on to enlarge that type of being, and cannot add a leaf nor twig of a different kind. In this respect every process in

nature is as sharply circumscribed as if it grew within a mould; while within those bounds it operates with as much certainty and as just a use of means as if possessed of the highest intelligence, invariably taking the right way, and never failing from any fault of its own. In like manner, every element in social development is all-powerful for the work to which it is ordained. Within those limits it is gifted with sole and undivided sovereignty. But anything new it can no more make than it could create itself at first. Consequently the result of any one case of development is a perfect unit; and the process, amid all the changes which belong to it, remains one and the same. It is the fiat of the Creator operating through the germ, which he has originally so endowed. Beyond this it cannot go. To speak, as some do, of development producing new elements, matter generating mind, for example, is a contradiction of terms. Out of a grain of corn culture will develope the stalk and leaves, and pollen and ears, whose elemental germs are in it; but no culture could ever develope from it an ear of wheat or a living creature. Development cannot bring out of a thing what creation has not put in it. It cannot make something out of nothing. In its best estate it can only obey the constituent command. Humbler nature finds no choice. Mankind, created in wisdom and holiness, have by some original calamity become possessed by another element contradictory thereto; and, accordingly, instead of developing homogeneously and consistently into greater and still greater breadth of power, and glory, and wisdom, choose more commonly the downward road, and develope the sin and folly whose original germs are bound up in the heart by nature, into greater and more shameless iniquity. Development is not necessarily improvement. That depends entirely upon the nature of the original germ. To develope is only to carry into actual existence the full operation of a principle. Development of good is greater good; but development of evil can only give ripeness to wrong. The one is not a misdirection of the other. Good is not the end at which evil aims; nor is evil a mistake of good. Though evil may be overruled for good, it never contemplates such an end. Its own object in that case is always defeated utterly, while the development of good is never overruled to evil. They have

no kindred, nor partnership. "A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit." Though the course of wisdom and righteousness alone unfolds all the best powers of our nature, and is, therefore, the only true and full development of our being; yet if we observe the sinner's course of sin, we shall find it a true development of an element or germ whose existence can be detected in every one of the race. Mysterious, indeed, is the nature of that principle in the seed of a plant, which collects around it the juices kindred to its nature, and builds a structure after a peculiar type of its own; but still more mysterious is that in man, which goes forth towards the apprehension of good and evil, of truth and error, and expands its own being in appropriating them. That secret of creation no analysis has ever yet laid bare. The law of its action, however, is an open truth, which, to man, whose business is culture of nature and himself, is really the thing most important to know.

As far as the course of human events is a simple development of known elements, we may consider the knowledge of its future perfectly attainable, from the example of its past. And if it consisted of nothing more than the unfolding of one or two original germs, the problem would be as easy as to foretell a crop of the same kind of grain that was sowed. But the grand difficulty of the subject lies in the fact, that while exhibiting all the process of development, it is not governed solely thereby. Events are continually turning up, which cannot be included under that head. There is always mingling with the present some new ingredient, which did not belong to any preceding state of things, and which consequently could not be foreseen by the most learned and thoughtful. While the promise made to the heart of man is entirely fulfilled in the sequence of events, the designs of Deity are advancing to completion by the gradual introduction of what no human sagacity could anticipate. The Creator has not planted our race like a seed in the earth, and left it to the operations of those laws, then once for all constituted in relation to it. He follows us with the frequent, if not ceaseless insertions, or communications of his own power. We are not mere outgrowths of a germ—not mere plants of a higher nature. The civilization, to which we belong, has always

enjoyed more or less additional to all that could have sprung out of itself. As the individual man consists of a spiritual life erected upon the basis of an animal life; so the progress of the race exhibits the working of supernatural agency upon the basis of natural laws. To admit development alone as the whole philosophy of history, is to eliminate from the problem what most distinguishes the progress of mankind from the cycles of brute and inanimate nature. It is certainly a simplification of the treatment; but it simplifies not by explaining, but by leaving out the real difficulties, and seizing upon that alone, which is most obvious and easy. As if one should attempt to explain animal life by circulation of the blood alone, his account might be very simple and beautiful in theory, but the student of the living phenomena would see in it a mere evasion of the complexities of the subject. The progress, which manifests the life of society, is a movement of most complex nature, proceeding not from a single seed, as in vegetation, nor, as in the lower animals, only from a common instinct actuating all alike; but from the free action of each one of thousands of millions, from age to age, as well as from a higher agency transcending human scrutiny.

Common language recognizes cause and effect, and is constructed upon the assumption of that relation, and yet employs familiarly a class of words to represent things as occurring without a cause. And common language never acts without sufficient reason. Following back any one of those words, we shall find that it idiomatically applies to such events as no human mind could have foreseen, nor, when past, can trace to any determinate order of things. A fleet is the offspring of human volition, and a storm the development of powers in nature; but the destruction of the Persian fleet off mount Athos belongs to neither category. It is not organically connected with either the one or the other. Most people would call it an accident—that is, a thing which has occurred without a cause, and induction from only a few examples would hardly justify us in saying that they are wrong. But the startling fact in regard to such cases is that, though they are exceedingly numerous in all ages, and connected with every variety of human action, yet a faithful study of them in series demonstrates that there is a

method pervading the whole. In nothing pertaining to history is the evidence of superior wisdom more cogent, than in the bearing of what are called accidents. And by this, we do not mean merely that they have contributed to bring about the present state of things; but we mean that their aggregate always works out strict national justice, to the reward of national virtue, and the punishment of national wrong. These fortuitous conjunctures appear as if they were controlled by a power which respects the right, and which, though long suffering, will ultimately inflict a just retribution for wrong. One man's life may be too contracted to furnish conviction to any observer of it save himself, but the duration of any people will confirm the truth of this position. Those apparently unintended incidents are not found to sustain one principle in one nation, and another in another nation; but in all ages, and in all countries, they vindicate the same moral code. With such a view of their aggregate, we dare not say that they are undesigned. Though not springing from, they sustain a relation to, the exertions of the persons whom they concern. "The race is not always to the swift, nor the battle to the strong," yet righteous effort is the permanent path of prosperity, and the people who should abandon it for a vague and idle reliance upon fortune, would reap the reward in being deserted by good fortune.

It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to estimate the true historical value of such elements. Who, for example, shall make the calculation, and show what the state of the world should have been, but for those accidents, which, in the Punic wars, gave preponderance to Rome? The difficulty is augmented by the fact that, as a general thing, they are undervalued at the time of their occurrence, and afterwards lost sight of in the splendour of effects which men are ambitious to credit to their own designs. Sometimes also the apparently trifling are followed by momentous results. An arrow glances aside from a tree, and piercing the heart of a king, affects the government of a nation for ages; a falling apple suggests to a philosopher a train of thought which renovates the science of the world. Things, not of such extensive and obvious influence, but of a similar nature, are of daily and hourly occurrence in the

experience of mankind. They take their place in succeeding development; but cannot be said to issue by organic process from any germ previously existing in human life and affairs. They are providential conjunctures, forming the starting points of new series, manifesting the hand of Him, who by some higher and unrevealed law is overruling to some unrevealed end all the varieties of order here below.

A similar insertion of new elements, but more declared, and more distinctly independent of previous development, is to be found in the case of those connected with sin and redemption.

It is beyond dispute that there is in man's moral being an element contradictory of improvement, which is not merely a negation, but an active principle, misguiding, thwarting, perverting and corrupting the whole, which is certainly not the outgrowth of an originally holy taste, and the correction of which is never effected by mere development of the original man.

Neither was the translation of Enoch a particular development of the nature inherited from Adam. The revelation to Noah, the call of Abraham, the exode from Egypt, the giving of the law and all the wonders which attended the Hebrew sojourn in the desert, as well as their subsequent independence in their own land, the birth of Christ, his life, death, resurrection and ascension, the day of Pentecost and so on, are obvious examples of the same kind. They have all regularly and in perfect order taken their places as living elements in the civilization we enjoy; and evidently belong to a series existing in unbroken connection with natural things in the Divine mind, but to call any of them a development of the original human germ would go to defeat the very definition of the term.

Thirdly, there is the continually occurring communication of the grace of God to the child of faith, which moulding his heart, enters through it into the life of society, and constitutes the very highest element of social improvement. The Spirit of God still broods over the race, and sustains its efforts by supernatural help at every point of emergency. Development belongs to the Christian life; but it is always from the implanting of a new element.

And, fourthly, if not every soul that comes into the world,

certainly very many bring with them each their own peculiar tinge of character, which, after commerce with the world, takes its place as a new element in the civilization of succeeding times. The genius of an Æschylus, Archimedes, Aristotle, Milton, or Shakspeare, is something more than mere development of a common germ.

To that element in human life seeming to consist of events without a cause, or springing from such a conjuncture of causes as no person ever designed or could command, the common term *Providence* is most properly employed. Such events differ from miracles in that, though additional, they are not contradictory of previously existing elements, and in the fact that such may be expected again; while miracles, and all that follow as their sequel, belong to the system of grace.

Although the operations of Providence and of grace are not the mere outgrowth of a seed already planted in nature, yet when we consider them for the time they have been recorded, they are found to observe certain laws peculiar to themselves, from which the docile and attentive student may learn something of the designs of the Almighty Ruler.

The works of Providence belong to an economy of such grandeur, that the observations of many successive ages are necessary to give even an inkling of its nature. At the time when they occur, it is impossible for any human mind to understand the bearing of the several facts; nor perhaps for an hundred years will their meaning appear. And sometimes facts which in their occurrence were deemed of but trifling moment, turn out in the lapse of ages to be of vital importance. Why the first Persian invasion of Attica landed at Marathon, at a time when Athens had not the means of defending Piræus; why the second, after really securing everything, should have been urged into an unnecessary battle to its own utter ruin, it was impossible for any man of that day to perceive. It required the lapse of nearly a thousand years to teach the world the bearing and importance of those events; and even the succeeding thousand years added so much to their elucidation, that although we now understand their bearing, we cannot feel assured that all their importance is before us yet. The boy Petrarch lighting upon the classical treatise which fascinated

his ear before he understood its meaning; the conscience-stricken monk of Wittemberg meeting with the long-neglected Bible, are facts of a similar nature. It was impossible for any man of those days to estimate or even conceive of the nature of their importance. Most of a generation was needed to exhibit their bearing, and succeeding centuries have not unfolded all their value.

These are, indeed, uncommon instances; but the same truth pertains to incidents of the most ordinary occurrence, myriads of which, doubtless, entirely elude all human notice: and of none among even the most minute, and most fully studied, can it be said that we have seen the end.

The system of Providence is the largest of all that intermingle their operation in human affairs. As in the case of some distant planet, years of observation are necessary to the computation of even the curve of its orbit. It presents, indeed, subordinate series springing within individual lives, which the individual may himself to a great extent understand, as far as they pertain to himself and his neighbours; but these also enter as elements into the grander system comprehending the whole race; as in the solar system, each planet, and satellite, and comet, and meteor, has its own motion, while all pertain to and partake of the motion of the whole. The former may be calculated from comparatively brief observation; but the latter cannot even be detected in less than centuries, and its orbit not even then determined with certainty.

It is this one economy which renders, and probably will always render, the future to a large extent inscrutable to human eye. It interlocks itself with the economy of nature and of grace, but is vaster than both. That of grace requires no analysis here, inasmuch as its very object is to declare itself. But by that declaration it belongs only to mankind, having its beginning and end in the decrees of God regarding the race as fallen.

The natural development of the original germs of humanity is of course an economy that belongs solely to the nature of those germs, and can pertain to nothing that is not in man. Its elements are, therefore, all subject to scrutiny and computation.

The economy of Providence, which overrules and interweaves itself with both, seems to belong to and be part of a system wider than earth—that portion of the constitution of God's empire which extends to us—while the other economies embrace the local laws of our particular province. It might be represented as the path of the moral universe, not only tending into a future eternity, but also coming from an endless past, on which mankind occupy a very scanty segment. It constitutes the infinite and inscrutable in human events.

Men continually and habitually confess their inability to fathom this economy of the Divine government, by such words as—it happened, it turned out, accident, chance, incidentally, and so forth—which are merely expressions admitting ignorance of a cause. Vast and inscrutable, however, as is the economy of Providence, some of its principles as bearing upon man have been well determined. Though often appearing to oppose, it invariably coöperates with both the other economies, and evidently comprehends them. Apparent conflict, wherever the connection can be conclusively followed, is always found to be harmony upon a larger scale, like certain discords in music, which for the instant that they strike the ear, seem to spoil the melody; but the moment they are resolved, are found to have been the very best for the place they occupied in relation to the whole passage. The narrower sphere of nature, the particular system of grace it takes up upon the circumference of its mighty orbit, and sustains in their place in the endless revolution of the years of God—the primary cycle of His government, with whom a thousand years are but as one day. Providence never contradicts either nature or grace, while it is continually pouring into existence something additional of its own. We cannot tell what a day may bring forth, but we know the certain effects of natural causes, and that the revealed promise of the Lord standeth sure.

Thus, the progress of human events is found to be affected by three economies; consisting respectively of natural development of the original germs of humanity, of Revelation, and of Providence. The first has been diverted into a course of deterioration. The second has been devised to restore it. And the third is the universal system out of which they have both

arisen. The first is the local law of a province, the last, the constitution of the whole empire. The second is a remedy for a particular evil. Both the former two are designed for men alone, and therefore submitted to the understanding of men. The great primal and over-ruling system is not submitted to the knowledge of men. They have no more right nor power to comprehend it, than they have to comprehend the universe of which it is the law. At the same time, its obvious action among them, and over them, demonstrates daily their dependence upon an inscrutable Jehovah, and daily declares in their ears that, after all the learning in theology and in natural laws which it is incumbent upon them to acquire, they must not flatter themselves that they can comprehend the divine government, or "find out the Almighty unto perfection."

Now, the work of man in this system is simply the development of elements; but not merely of those planted once for all by the original act of creation. Had that been the case, it would never have amounted to more than revolution in a cycle. We are as much under obligation to cultivate the gifts of Providence and grace, as to improve our inheritance from Adam, and have this consideration for encouragement, that the Almighty Donor ever follows the steps of diligence with new supplies. The Creator calls upon his intelligent creature to coöperate herein with himself, and pours forth new elements in proportion as the already communicated are employed. It is thus that the non-reëntrant progress, which we find belonging to civilization, is constituted. As the stream of water draws its resources not only from the moisture of the valley in which it flows, but also from the showers that descend directly on its breast from heaven; so, human progress is the work of human effort ever sustained by fresh communications from on high.

But, as this work of man is not instinctive, but intelligent and voluntary, every new step must be taken from a right understanding of the past; as in one of those vast cathedral structures, whose erection occupied several centuries, each succeeding architect had to begin with the study of what his predecessors had accomplished. History is therefore an art indispensable to human progress: and the existing state of the world demonstrates that none is made without it. Where one genera-

tion forgets the experience of another, the whole must be confined to the revolution of brief cycles in the manner of the lower animals. To throw off the debt of the past, and disregard obligation to the future, if it were possible, would reduce man to the level of inanimate things. The very tendency thereto it is which renders him, in some cases, a savage. The case of barbarism and that of iniquity are one. They do not fulfil the demands of creation and of Providence upon them. Whatever development they make is towards deterioration. Civilized life, and in these days, Christian civilization, alone approaches the distinctive duties of humanity.

If human actions should quietly die, when their lessons are neglected, the importance of this whole subject would be less than it is; but man is not permitted thus to become a harmless brute. If not better, he must be worse. The transactions of his past, whether intelligently listened to or not, will press themselves into his actual present, for evil, if not for good. Not only do their effects positively abide, but the persons who did them continue to be responsible for them, and to enjoy the good or suffer the evil which follows in their train. And what is truė of the individual, in this respect, is more plainly so in the case of nations, and races of mankind. We cannot act, and then be just as if we had not acted, nor be idle and reap the fruits of activity: and active or idle, we are, by the lapse of every day, carried into a further debt of moral accountability, which neither ourselves nor our posterity shall be able to cancel. As we inherit the vice and virtue of the past, our conduct now is going to make up the aggregate of which future generations shall receive the reward or punishment. Accordingly, instead of foreknowledge we are endowed with the native belief that similar causes will always produce similar effects. And although, by means of providential modifications, we never have a recurrence of precisely the same combination of circumstances, the progress of human events never returns upon its own steps, and not the *same*, but only *similar* things are to be expected; yet the careful student of the past may with safety calculate many of the most important results of still operating causes. And by knowing the present, and preparing for the future, in this way he is made better acquainted with

the different relations of time, and better instructed in his duties than if he had direct intuition of things to come. For, in that latter case, men would certainly disregard the past and present, live in giddy anticipations or depressing fears, and be equally without hope and experimental knowledge. As it is, a careful study of the laws of human development as far as that process has been recorded, will enable us to restore much of the unrecorded past, as well as to anticipate the future, as an architect, from a few elements in a ruin, can reconstruct, in all its essentials, the building to which it belonged. Had full and faithful records of the states and events of society been kept from the beginning, the ascertainable knowledge of historical cause and effect would, by this time, have been very extensive. But the world, like the individual, had an infancy, of which it remembers nothing, and a childhood and youth, of which only few and fragmentary notices remain, and those, in many cases, so highly coloured by the pencil of romance that no discrimination is able with certainty to separate the fictitious from the real. The voice of its Author alone has transmitted to the mature years of the world any trustworthy records of that early time: and those are scanty, except as bearing on the history of sin and of redemption.

Though past events will continue, more or less, to retain their place in the present, the benefits accruing from them will differ according as they are, or are not, intelligently apprehended. The fact that their effects still live, and the fact that they are recognized for what they are, and the fact that a proper use is made of them, are three entirely separable things, and as different as those parallel ones that we have natural powers, that we are intelligent of their operation, and that we employ them aright. And, as an incalculable amount of intellectual power, and thereby of means of good to each other, is wasted by individual ignorance and neglect, so by far the larger amount of public experience has run to waste from lack of records, of care in preserving those made, and of industry in turning them to account. Historical nations, ever since the dispersion at Babel, have been greatly in the minority. The original and natural state of man is civilization; but conscious effort is necessary to sustain it. Vice leads to ignorance and barbarism,

History necessary for civilization

and barbarism keeps no record of itself. When a people sinks out of civilization it sinks also out of history; and persistent neglect of history, on the part of any nation, will as certainly stamp their public conduct with fatuity, as that the man whom experience cannot teach will be through all his life a fool. It is inconceivable what the world has lost of knowledge and practical wisdom by the neglect of proper records: and it will not be in vain to regret, if thereby we are prompted to greater diligence in studying and turning to practical account the treasures which we have. For though the breadth of historical philosophy is less than it might have been, yet what we do possess of historical fact is actually more than can be fully mastered by any single human life.

In order to study history with profit, attention must be given to the connection of actions with their effects, arranging them in the mind, according as they are followed by success or failure, by good or evil, as they obtain the praise or blame of succeeding times, as they recommend themselves to the approval or disapproval of our own hearts, and as they coincide with or vary from the revealed law. Large induction must be made, if one would arrive at confident moral conclusions. Nothing is easier than to make a show of argument on any side of a question with two or three partial facts. Truth cannot be expected unless the specimens examined are, both in number and kind, fair representatives of their respective classes. Many readers jump at a conclusion from one fact, and prejudge all the rest. Reliable instruction can accrue only from patient comparison of many examples impartially collected.

In the classification of facts we shall often need the application of a strict criticism of their moral character; for that is not unfrequently misrepresented by even the best historians.

It is necessary also to discriminate between what is human and what is divine. The latter we cannot hope to reproduce—the attempt is a common source of failure—but we may learn from it how to improve upon the use of means. Providence, by bringing about for us what we cannot do, teaches us, in future, the better to execute what we can do. And thus, upon some other occasion, by the same divine aid, we may succeed in reaching higher results than were at first attainable.

Thus it is that history subserves the same ends with revelation and true philosophy, being, in short, the practical illustration of the doctrines of both, presenting the realities of which their doctrines are the laws. Instead of reading it, therefore, as the giddy read romances, under the impulse of a shallow curiosity, we should treat it with the most serious attention, as a treasury of profound practical lessons, respecting both classes of human duty, acting and trusting, works and faith, human enterprise and overruling Providence, inasmuch as nothing teaches better how to work while it is to-day, nor demonstrates more clearly that

> "There's a divinity that shapes our ends
> Rough-hew them how we will."

And in the still profounder utterance of the Hebrew psalmist, that "a man's heart deviseth his way, but the Lord directeth his steps."

Art. IV.—*Some Account of the Writings of the Reverend Philip Doddridge, D. D.*

The first publication of Mr. Doddridge was entitled "Free Thoughts on the most probable Means of reviving the Dissenting Interest; occasioned by the late Enquiry into the Causes of its Decay." It was printed in 1729, when the author was about twenty-seven years of age, and was addressed to the querist alluded to in the title, who, as afterwards transpired, was a young dissenting minister named Gough, who afterwards conformed to the Established Church, and who, in 1750, published a volume of sermons. This early production of Doddridge evinces much of the taste and talent which mark his later writings. Some of the opinions which characterize all his labours are here made prominent. With an undeniable affection for the Nonconformist Churches, he discloses, as we cannot but think, an erroneous estimate of the cause of decline, which was not so much want of culture as decay of zeal. The star of Dissent began to pale, when the holy ardours of Owen,