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ART I.—MORELL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.

*The Philosophy of Religion.* By J. D. MORELL, A. M., Author of the History of Modern Philosophy, &c. New-York: D. Appleton & Co., 200 Broadway; Philadelphia, George S. Appleton, 164 Chesnut-street. 1849. 12mo., pp. 359.

THE relation of philosophy to religion is one of those problems that it would seem each age must work out for itself. Whether the equation is really indeterminate, or whether we must wait for some more potent analysis than has hitherto been discovered, we cannot tell; but the fact stands palpably out, that every age has made the effort, and, by the demonstration of the age that followed it, has signally failed. That this failure occurred among the sages of Persia and India, and the yet loftier speculators of the Porch and the Academy, is a matter that cannot excite our surprise, for both philosophy and religion were yet in their infancy; and men at once dogmatized on an unknown science, and worshipped an unknown God. But we would naturally suppose, that after "life and immortality" had been brought to light in the gospel, a clearer conception of the relation of these great departments of thought would be attained. In this supposition, however, we are sadly mistaken. The Gnostic, the Neo-Platonist, the Scholastic, the Cartesian, and the successive schools of England, France, and Germany, have in turn shouted the joyful *εἴρηκα*, only to have it triumphantly proved by the school which succeeded, that a fatal fallacy existed in the analysis, and that the problem was yet unsolved.

The appearance of Mr. Morell's History of Speculative Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century, was greeted with no little satisfaction by the thinking world. Much of this satisfaction was produced by the novelty of the field that was opened up, and the clear, transparent style in which the crabbed technicalities of Ger-

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man metaphysics were explained to the mere English scholar. And Mr. Morell evinced, in that work, much good sense, as well as a fair acquaintance with the course of modern philosophy. There was also an apparent reverence for Christianity—a quality so rare in those who make extensive excursions in this field, that it was doubly welcome in one who had explored it so widely.

But, at the same time, his manner of treating some of the fundamental doctrines of natural religion, gave rise to suspicion that he entertained views of Christianity at variance with the common opinions on the subject. These suspicions were confirmed by his "Lectures on the Philosophical Tendencies of the Age," in which he discussed the philosophic doctrines of Positivism, of Individualism, of Traditionalism, and of Common Sense. In these discussions he developed some opinions that paved the way for those he has since avowed.

Yet, notwithstanding these indications, high hopes were felt that this contribution to the Philosophy of Religion would throw very important light on this difficult subject. The writer had been brought up at the feet of Wardlaw; his early training had been gained in the clear school of the Scotch metaphysics; his recent investigations had familiarized him with the profoundest investigations of modern times; and it was hoped that he combined in his own case the elements necessary for a solution of the high problems contained in the philosophy of religion.

It was, we honestly confess, with such feelings as these that we eagerly seized the volume before us. We hoped that now, at least, we should find an interpreter between the old Christianity and the new metaphysics; one who thoroughly understood the language, and partook of the spirit, of both; and who, possessing somewhat of the confidence of each, could mediate between them, and show us the nexus by which they are connected in the great circle of truth.

Our hopes were somewhat damped by the preface, and sunk lower and lower as we proceeded in the perusal of the work, until we laid it down, at the conclusion, with sadness of heart, feeling that if these great problems are soluble at all, this effort, at least, had failed to solve them. We do not mean to bring any railing accusations against Mr. Morell, or to call him by any of the hard names he repudiates with so much spirit in his preface: nor do we mean to undervalue the wonderful contributions made by German intellect to the knowledge of the world. But our deliberate judgment is, that instead of this work being the philosophy of religion, it is philosophy *versus* religion; and that if we adopt the principles here avowed, we must choose between our metaphysics and our Chris-

tianity. We do not say, nor do we believe, that Mr. Morell is not a Christian; nor would we dream of putting him in the same category with the Strausses, the Parkers, and the Emersons of the present age; much less with the Voltaires, the Gibbons, and the Paines of a past; but we deliberately aver, that if we believed with Mr. Morell, we must renounce everything that to us is peculiar and essential to Christianity. Whilst we are willing to believe that he is a Christian, we believe his Philosophy of Religion to be anti-Christian and perilous in the extreme. This charge, we admit, is very serious; but, as he has not been at all chary in speaking of our positions, we shall use the same liberty with his, and endeavour, not only to make the charge, but to prove it.

With the proface we need not be detained, for it contains but little that is worthy of special remark. It however seems to us to be needlessly waspish, as introductory to themes so grand and awful as those which are discussed in this book. There is connected with this asperity a tone of ill-concealed contempt for modern Christianity, at least in its English type, that must rather irritate than conciliate; and a real or affected ignorance of some of its most cherished doctrines, (as when Mr. Morell speaks of "the eternal *procession* of the Son,") that sits unfavourably on one who comes forth to act as an umpire and interpreter between conflicting systems. Some of his remarks, however, we regard to be just. There is, throughout the Church, a very vague feeling of hostility and suspicion directed towards everything German, that is too indiscriminate in its censure. We have received much that is good, as well as much that is evil, from the patient thinkers of Germany; and it is unwise to deprive ourselves of the one, because of the other. But we must say that this book, instead of diminishing, will rather tend to increase this feeling of suspicion and hostility.

The first chapter discusses the faculties of the human mind. It places human personality in the will, and regards it as "the *essential nature or principle* of the human mind." The essence of the soul, accordingly, consists in pure, spontaneous activity, that lies behind all its determinations; and this is the central point of a man's consciousness, that which distinguishes him from every other man, called indifferently spontaneity, personality, self, or will.

This definition of the "concrete essence of mind" is somewhat surprising. The essence of a thing is usually understood to be, what remains when everything individual and peculiar has been abstracted. The essence of matter is that which remains when all the peculiar properties of any particular kind of matter have been removed, and we have left that only which is common to all

matter. But here we learn that the essence of mind is not that which is common to all minds, but that which is the peculiar characteristic of each individual—his will. This is certainly in direct contradiction to the ordinary notion of what constitutes an essence; but it is also in direct contradiction to the common convictions of men, and the necessary laws of thought. It is one of our intuitive judgments that every quality must inhere in a substance. Thus we affirm, that underlying the qualities of matter there is a substratum, which we call its substance or essence, which is beyond our perceptions, but the existence of which we are forced to believe. So also we believe, that underlying the attributes of mind there is a substratum which we call mind or spirit, which in like manner is beyond our cognizance, but which we also firmly believe to exist. This something is not the will. We are as conscious of our volitions as we are of our emotions, which proves that the will cannot be the essence of the soul, more than the affections. There must be something that wills, just as there is something that feels, and this something must be distinct from both volition and feeling. Activity is an attribute of the soul as much as passivity, and we irresistibly demand a subject in which this attribute resides. To tell us that this attribute is its own subject, is to tell us what we feel to be untrue.

The analysis by which our author reaches this conclusion is really curious. It is by a sort of exhaustive elimination. The essence of the soul cannot reside in the body, in the senses, or in the affections, therefore it resides in the will! He says, page 36: "The concrete essence of the mind" cannot reside in sensation, because that is "experienced *by* the mind;" nor in the bodily organization, because that is used by the mind. But, we ask, are not volitions put forth by the mind? Is there not something that wills? Must not his analysis carry him, where it has carried every other common sense thinker, to the conclusion that the essence of mind cannot reside in the will, for the same reason that forbids it to reside in the body and the sensational consciousness? The mind thinks, but it is not thought; it feels, but it is not feeling; it wills, but it is not volition; but something which puts forth these activities and experiences these affections.

We affirm, as the grand peculiarity of the Philosophy of Common Sense, which the gigantic labours of Sir W. Hamilton have placed on an immovable basis, that substance, or essential being, is not the proper object of philosophy, because it is beyond our present capacities of knowledge. Ontology, in this strict sense, can never be a part of human science; for the objects of our knowledge are not the *onta*, but the *phenomena*; not the concrete essences, but the per-

ceived attributes of things. We can know, not the interior essence of matter, but its properties; not the substance of mind, but its attributes. And to select the will, and call that the essence of mind, is as egregious a blunder as to select extension, and call that the essence of matter. It was at this point that the Baconian system opened up an escape from the puerile subtleties of the scholastic philosophy; and it is by losing sight of this point, that the German systems are reproducing all the follies of the schoolmen without their piety. In attempting, then, to graft this feature upon our English philosophy, Mr. Morell has attempted what would have been most disastrous had he succeeded, but which, we are happy to say, he has most signally failed in doing. This blunder is the root of much of his subsequent error, especially in his speculations on our knowledge of God, or as he, according to his vicious philosophy, terms him, the Absolute.

The great subjective forms of mental activity are then divided into two classes, the intellectual and emotional, which run parallel with each other, and are developed correlatively. The power of the will is regarded as running through the whole of them; though what actual influence the will exerts over them, or what precise relation it bears to them, he does not fully explain. The scheme of successive, dual development, which he defends, will be better understood by examining the following table, found on page 38 :—

“MIND,				
commencing in				
<b>MERE FEELING, (undeveloped unity,)</b>				
evinces a				
<b>TWOFOLD ACTIVITY.</b>				
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Meeting in				
<b>FAITH—(highest, or developed unity.)”</b>				

The first state is that dim, undefinable form of consciousness that exists in the earliest periods of infancy, from which all the succeeding forms of mental life evolve themselves. The next state is that of Sensational Consciousness, in which the mind is impressed by

external objects through its material organism, but is occupied only with the subjective impression, unconscious of any outward cause of these sensations. The Emotional State corresponding to this is Instinct, a blind obedience to certain impulses, such as sucking, swallowing, &c., without referring these impulses to anything exterior to the mind itself. The next stage is that of the Perceptive Consciousness, in which the mind passes from sensation to its outward cause, and obtains a direct and immediate knowledge of the external world. The subject stands face to face with the object, and perceives that object intuitively, without the intervention of any intermediate process. The soul sees not its sensations, but the external object that causes these sensations. Corresponding with this is the Emotional State of Animal Passion, hunger, thirst, &c., which appetites act directly in view of their respective objects, in consequence of their perception of these objects. Next is the Logical Consciousness, which reflects upon and generalizes the knowledge furnished by Sensation and Perception, considers it under the forms or categories that are the fixed laws of its action, and classifies it according to different principles of arrangement. Corresponding with this are the Relational Emotions, such as the domestic, patriotic, and other affections based on our various relations in life. The highest stage is that of the Intuitional Consciousness, or pure reason, which contemplates directly the beautiful, the good, and the true, in their absolute form, and holds the same relation to the logical consciousness or understanding, that perception does to sensation. The corresponding emotions awakened by these intuitions are the *Æsthetical*, which have beauty for their object; the *Moral*, which terminate on the good; and the *Religious*, which rest on the true.

Faith is the synthesis of these two series of developments, at the summit of our being, partaking both of the intellectual and the emotional element; a state of soul in which we see truth and love it, in the same gaze. It is, when perfected, the state of consciousness which links the present to the future life.

The second chapter discusses the distinction between the logical and the intuitional consciousness, or the understanding and the reason. The knowledge we receive by the understanding is *representative* and *indirect*, obtained by combining or separating the ideas already existing in the mind; that furnished by the reason is *presentative* and *immediate*, consisting of the elementary conceptions of the good, the beautiful, and the true. The knowledge of the understanding is *reflective*, obtained by the mind turning in to contemplate its own operations; that of the reason is *spontaneous*,

flowing into the mind as light comes to the eye, by no effort, and coming to it from without. The knowledge of the understanding is *formal*, consisting of the forms in which the various original conceptions of the mind are thrown; that of the reason *material*, being the matter of those conceptions obtained by direct intuition. The understanding is *analytic*, tending to separate the knowledge it grasps; the reason is *synthetic*, striving to attain the unity that underlies apparent diversities. The understanding is *individual*, and hence the certain standard of truth, in its own sphere, to the individual; the reason is *generic*, seeking to correct and elucidate its intuitions by comparing them with those of mankind in general. The understanding is *fixed* through all ages, incapable of progress, because its laws and forms are stationary; the reason is *progressive*, growing, as the race advances in the march of civilization, to a clearer and wider intuition of its objects.

Such, in brief, is our author's map of the mind, and his distinction between the reason and the understanding.

We do not propose to enter at large into the metaphysics of the various questions here suggested, both because the field is too wide, and because it might seem presumptuous to assail the author on a subject to which he has given very particular attention.

We are not disposed to object to the distinction between the understanding and the reason, or the difference between presentative and representative knowledge. Indeed, it would seem impossible for any one to read the masterly dissertations of Sir William Hamilton, appended to his superb edition of Reid, on these topics, and yet reject the distinctions. And it arises, perhaps, from the very nature of the case, that, in drawing out the points of difference, some of them should seem to run into each other. A careful inspection of the distinctions between the reason and understanding, raised by our author, will, we think, convince the reader, that in some of them we have only the same fact looked at from a different direction, and expressed by a different term. This is, however, but a slight fault, in an effort to set forth clearly a distinction which has necessarily about it so much subtilty and obscurity to ordinary thinkers.

But let us look at these points of distinction more closely. Conceding the first, what are we to make of the second? All our mental acts are spontaneous, and therefore reflection as much as the rest. But it is not true that all the knowledge of the understanding is obtained by the mind contemplating its own operations. All the sciences fall, by his own definition, within the sphere of the understanding; they surely are not obtained by the mind reflecting on

its own operations. Were this true, there would be no ground for the assertion of the objective existence of a single fact of science, that was not a perception or an intuition; and we should be shut up to the most hopeless idealism. His third distinction, we confess, is very difficult of clear comprehension. What does he mean by the knowledge of the understanding being only *formal*? He tells us that "Perception indicates simply the *momentary consciousness* of an external reality standing before us face to face," and the logical faculty "seizes upon the concrete material that is given immediately in perception, moulds it into an idea," &c., page 69. Now, what is this "concrete material?" Is it the "external reality?" If so, it has matter as well as form. Is it the consciousness of that reality? Then again it has matter as well as form, for it is an intuitive perception. How does it mould this into an idea? If he means the external reality, this is nonsense; if the consciousness of the reality, it is already moulded into an idea, for the very perception of it was such an idea. His error here is one that we shall find him very prone to commit, that of confounding the subjective and the objective. Because the understanding takes up the matter of its knowledge according to certain forms, therefore that knowledge ceases to be matter, and becomes only form. It might as well say, that because the stomach takes up its contents by the secretion of its coats, therefore they cease to be food, and become gastric juice. The understanding knows by means of its forms or categories, but its knowledge is as material as that of the intuitive consciousness: the *matter* is the same in each case, it is only taken up differently by the mind.

His next distinction also puzzles us. Synthesis is surely as much a logical operation of the mind as analysis. We separate, in order to combine; and the aim of all scientific analysis is to obtain a perfect synthesis. We analyze the phenomena of light, to combine them all in an hypothesis which shall express the actual verity; and this synthetic process, this constant tending toward unity, is purely an operation of the logical faculty.

The fifth distinction is one that involves much of his subsequent error. We are forced to deny it in the most absolute terms. Our logical processes are not more certain than our intuitional, nor do our intuitional need confirmation by comparison, &c., more than our logical. There are some results, of both faculties, that we rest upon as certain; there are others that are uncertain, and on which we need the light of other minds. We know no better example of the uncertainty of the results of the logical faculty than Mr. Morell has himself furnished us in this discussion.



His sixth distinction, in like manner, we deny. The logical faculty has improved as much as the intuitional; nor is it fixed, in any such absolute sense as he alleges, more than the intuitional faculty. The human race is advancing in knowledge; but this implies no improvement of the intuitional power, more than the rising of the sun implies an increase of the visual faculty in the eye.

His grand error is in denying that the logical consciousness can be a proper source of any knowledge, but must simply grind, in its rigid forms, the knowledge received from other sources. So far is this from being true, that the opposite is the fact. It is the grand organ of knowledge. It cannot furnish us with any new elements, but it can so analyze and combine those already furnished, as greatly to extend our knowledge. Take any of the sciences, such as mathematics, geology, astronomy, and how much of our knowledge in them is the direct result of the patient analysis and synthesis of the logical consciousness? If we compare the knowledge furnished by intuition with that furnished by scientific investigation, we shall discover how grossly Mr. Morell has misused the logical understanding, in thus shutting it up, like Samson among the Philistines, a shorn and blind giant, to grind in a mill.

The most serious error in the metaphysics of these chapters is an undue limitation, and, we had almost said, degradation of the logical consciousness. The author holds that it is to the intuitive consciousness, simply what the sensational is to the perceptive. But a very little reflection will convince us that this is a most restricted and erroneous representation of the case. The sensational consciousness is the mere channel of communication with the perceptive, furnishing it the means of access to the external world, and is rigidly limited to its own sphere. But it is otherwise with the logical consciousness. Not only does it not act as a proper excitant, or a *vehiculum* to the intuitional consciousness, in the same way that sensation is related to perception, but its range is much wider than that of any other power of the mind. We reason concerning our sensations, our perceptions, our intuitions, and all the classes of our emotions. Its range is therefore over the entire field of consciousness. This cannot be said of any other power of the mind concerning the province of the rest. Sensation, perception, and intuition are rigidly restricted to their own spheres, and cannot transcend them. It is plain, therefore, that this metaphysical architecture, in which the logical consciousness is inflexibly built into a sort of third story without any windows, with its scanty furniture of conceptions, and its sky-lights and dead-lights from the other departments of the soul, is an inaccurate representation of this most important power of the mind. The

serious errors to which this assumption has led our author will be more distinctly perceived under another division of the subject.

It is extremely unfair to charge Mr. Morell with idealism, as some have done, in presenting these views. He avows his realistic sentiments in the most emphatic terms, and to force a different construction upon his words is singularly uncandid. But whilst we would not charge him with idealism, we believe that his views are liable to strong objection at this point. He affirms that the categories of the logical understanding are wholly subjective. Among these, of course, he will admit to be, causation. If so, the very same question that arose on the sensational philosophy of Locke, in regard to the objective validity of perceptions, will arise in regard to the objective validity of this conception. We conceive causation, but what evidence have we that there is such a thing in actual objective existence? By this theory, none. The same use that Berkeley and Hume made of Locke's perceptions, and Fichte of Kant's primitive judgments, we shall be compelled to make of the category of causation. Hence the grand argument for the being of God is swept away. It is true Mr. Morell holds, with Sir W. Hamilton, that we perceive intuitively the primary qualities of matter, and thus lays the foundation for a certain conviction in their objective reality. But it is also true that there are other conceptions of the logical understanding as important as these, such as unity, plurality, and especially causation. If there be no such mode then of verifying these, we can see no mode of escaping the pyrrhonism of Hume, and the atheism of Fichte. We see no escape but in asserting the same immediateness of knowledge in regard to these objects of thought, which he has already admitted in regard to the qualities of matter. But to assert this, would be to emancipate the logical understanding from the imprisonment to which he has doomed it, and thus open the way to the admission that it is susceptible of the phenomena of revelation and inspiration. This would be to overthrow the whole foundation of his philosophy of religion. It is, then, precisely at this point that we think his psychology begins to break down.

The same difficulties lie against his theory of the logical consciousness on the emotional side. He alleges that "these emotions depend not upon the immediate perception of their object, but upon our *relations* in human life." But even were this granted, we ask, how can they rest upon the relation in any other way than by a perception of it? Are not the objects of these relational emotions perceived to be exterior to the soul, precisely as the objects of the lower affections? Does not consciousness dictate that the only difference between them is, that in the one case the objects are material sub-

stances, perceived to have a certain correlation to our physical nature, and, in the other, there is a perceived relation which invests a particular object with these affections; but that the objects of both are in the same sense exterior to his mind, and directly perceived by it? Does not a man as directly perceive everything that causes him to love his child, as he does everything that causes him when thirsty to desire a drink of water? Why then shut up the one class of emotions in the dark machinery-room of the logical consciousness, and bring the other to the open air and light of a direct perception? We object then to this feature of his psychology, and it will be perceived presently that this is the very point of departure to which we can trace nearly all the errors into which he has fallen on the subject of religion.

Without pursuing the metaphysical discussion further, we turn to the third chapter, which discusses the essence of religion. He first alleges, rightly, that the religious feeling is an original element in man's nature, drawn forth and modified by the various outward influences to which he is subjected. He then inquires whether it consists essentially in any form of knowing or acting: and decides that it does not. He locates it in the emotional part of our nature. He next endeavours to ascertain what is the specific nature of this emotion; and having reduced it to its last analysis, with Schlegel, he discovers in it nothing but the feeling of *absolute dependence*.

Here we differ from our author, and think that he differs from himself. If the religious feeling be simply that of absolute dependence, then wherever that feeling of dependence exists there is religion. But, by his own admission, the dog has a feeling of absolute dependence on his master, and the infant a similar feeling towards the parent; but to say that the dog or the infant has religion, is either to trifle with the subject, or with the common use of language. If then the infant and the dog are capable of the feeling of absolute dependence, and yet incapable of religion, it is plain that these feelings are not identical or co-extensive.

Indeed the author admits this, on page 96. Speaking of this feeling of the infant he says: "Such an instinctive confidence we may regard as the first bud of feeling, out of which the religious emotions gradually germinate. We should, indeed, hardly call it *religious*, but simply say that such a feeling in the babe is the analogue of religious trust in the man." But why cannot this feeling of absolute dependence be called religious? If the essence of religion lies in this feeling, and this feeling exists in the babe, it must be strictly religious. But if, as he rightly perceives, there is something want-

ing to constitute it religion, then it follows that the essence of religion does not consist in simple dependence. What then is wanting? We answer, the correlative feeling of moral obligation. As the consideration of the absolute object, as he prefers coldly to designate the Father of us all, produces the feeling of absolute dependence, so the consideration of the contingent subject produces that of moral obligation, and in the synthesis of these feelings do we find the essence of religion.

This will be further apparent by another analysis. The duty of worship is, by the author's own showing, an invariable sequence of the religious feeling. Indeed it is questionable whether the one has ever existed without producing the other. There is, therefore, a necessary and direct connexion between the two which can readily be traced. Now let the feeling of absolute dependence exist, as we may readily suppose it to exist, in the mind of an Atheist, or even of an Epicurean, and yet no feeling of moral obligation, from whence can we deduce the conception of worship? It is impossible to make the deduction, for there is no connexion between the feeling of absolute dependence and the duty of worship. We may depend on a blind law of force, and yet not be bound to worship it; or if a personal deity be conceded, we may depend upon him, as the lower orders of creatures do, who are not bound to worship him. But the moment we bring to view the feeling of moral obligation, the inference to the duty of worship is direct and immediate, for the one is but the outward expression of the other. Worship is but the external exhibition of the fact in our consciousness, that we are bound to love and serve God, and to give a grateful expression of our feeling of dependence. The sense of obligation, however, must precede and produce the outward act.

We may appeal in this matter with safety to the common consciousness of mankind. The very word religion, in its etymology, has as its ground-thought the fact of obligation. And even if the accuracy of this etymology be questioned, its very general reception proves all we desire, by establishing the common sentiment of mankind, that there is included in the essence of religion a *religandum*, a sense of obligation. And the common feeling of men regarding it is, that it is something which *binds* the moral nature of man by obligations fastened on the unseen, the spiritual, and the future. Whilst then we concede that dependence is one of its essential elements, we contend that another equally essential is the correlative feeling of moral obligation.

A very important result in the argument will follow from this conclusion. If religion essentially includes the feeling of moral

obligation, as well as dependence, it will follow that it is not a thing exclusively dependent on the intuitional consciousness. As the feeling of a moral obligation brings to view our relations, it lies within the sphere of the logical consciousness, even as limited by our author. It will follow from this, that the logical consciousness must be influenced by whatever agencies are employed to confer religion on the human race: or, in other words, it may be the subject of Revelation and Inspiration. This will destroy his theory of Inspiration, and allow the common views to remain unscathed. It is, therefore, not without reason that he first shuts up the understanding in a prison, and then pares away one-half of the definition of religion, otherwise his premises would be too broad for his conclusion.

Mr. Morell next discusses "the essence of Christianity." We quote a few sentences from the opening of this chapter, as illustrations of its style:—

"The religions of Greece and Rome had each their own peculiar elements of thought and feeling. The Jew, the Mohammedan, and the Christian, all, too, have cherished *their* several conceptions respecting the one living and true God.—In passing, therefore, from the subject of religion generally to the consideration of religion in some distinctive form, as a fact in human history, it will be necessary for us to investigate the subjective process by which a religion, historically speaking, becomes formed and established in the consciousness of different portions of mankind. In this way we shall be better enabled to comprehend what is the *specific* element existing in any one of the great historical forms of religious life, apart from the essence of religion itself; and, as Christianity is one of those forms, we may be led by this procedure to perceive what it is that distinguishes *it* specifically, as a phase of man's inward self-consciousness, from all the rest."—Pp. 106, 107.

This paragraph is an instance of what has struck us very painfully in the perusal of this book. It is the tone of frigid indifference which the author assumes towards Christianity. He seems to think it necessary, while dealing with these high themes, in acting the philosopher to become the stoic. It may be unphilosophical to have so little of the *nil admirari* spirit; but we confess that we have no sympathy with that bloodless and heartless assumption of impartiality, which can enable a man to sit down and anatomize Christianity as coldly as the surgeon takes his scalpel to dissect some nameless and outcast corpse. And we cannot see without a glow of indignation the patronizing air of concession towards Christianity that pervades so much of the speculation of modern dreamers in philosophy; as if it did very well in its time; was a very good sort of thing for the common herd; and really deserved to be encouraged as quite a useful affair where one could get nothing better. To the heart of the man who has known Christ in "the fellowship of his sufferings,"

Christianity is something vastly more than "a form of the religious life of humanity,"—it is *the way*, and *the truth*, and *the life*; and the levelling of it so near to other forms of belief which it sternly repudiates, and condemns as utterly false, is felt to be an outrage and injustice. We make these remarks, not as wholly applicable to the work before us, but as finding an illustration in its general tone and spirit, to an extent that has excited in us the most painful emotions. We doubt not that the things that have grated upon our feelings, have been unconsciously put forth by our author; but it is this very unconsciousness that strikes us so painfully, for it is the symptom not of love, but of indifference. It is not thus that Paul and John have written; and it is not thus that they have written who have followed in their footsteps, and known most of the nature of Christianity by their own blessed experience. Such as they have always written in a way that none could fail to see and feel that their reasonings were all wrought in fire.

There begins to appear in this chapter a sophism which runs through all the rest of the book, and leads to some of its worst conclusions. It is the confounding of religion as a state of the human soul, with religion as an outward system of influences and opinions, calculated to produce this internal condition. He starts with an avowal of the intention to discuss only the first, but he soon glides into the assumption that the second has no real existence. The importance of this mistake will appear when we come to the chapter on Revelation and Inspiration.

Thus he says, on page 113,—

"Christianity, like every other religion, consists essentially in a state of man's inner consciousness, which develops itself into a system of thought and activity only in a community of awakened minds.—Apostolical Christianity consisted essentially in the religious consciousness of the first great Christian community."

Now we affirm, that Christianity and Apostolical Christianity consist in more than these, and that they have a distinct existence independent of the minds that receive them. Clear and palpable as this distinction is, and recognized even by Mr. Morell himself, it is almost instantly disregarded, and his whole philosophy of religion is based on the implicit denial of this obvious fact.

He defines Christianity subjectively, as "that form of religion in which we are conscious of absolute dependence and perfect moral freedom being harmonized by love to God." It is somewhat remarkable that, in framing a definition of Christianity, he did not think of going to the only book that authoritatively describes its nature. And it is still more remarkable, that he has given us a definition

which really does not define it at all. We have, in fact, scarcely a single peculiar element of Christianity brought out in this definition. Was not Adam in Paradise conscious of absolute dependence and perfect moral freedom, harmonized by love to God? Are not the angels in heaven conscious of the same thing? How, then, can that be a proper definition of Christianity as a subjective state of the human soul, which, without altering a single term, expresses things so different? Must not the subjective state of an angel, and that of a soul redeemed by the blood of Christ, and living by faith on the Son of God, be essentially different? Yet this difference is completely merged in the definition. He overlooks the cardinal fact, that the substratum of the Christian consciousness is a sense of sin; and its essence that peculiar attitude which the soul assumes toward Jesus Christ, expressed by the one word *faith*.

He then defines Christianity objectively, as "that religion which rests upon the consciousness of the redemption of the world through Jesus Christ." We are puzzled with the terms of this definition. What does he mean by "the redemption of the world?" The phrase has a definite meaning in the Bible, and in the language of evangelical Christendom; but we look in vain for this, or, indeed, any distinct meaning of it, in the work before us. We are charily told that its "nature and extent cannot be decided in a *general* definition." Again: what is meant by a consciousness of this redemption? Does it mean what old-fashioned people call faith? If not, what exactly does it mean? We are forced to say, that there is a sort of cuttle-fish obscurity surrounds our author, whenever he approaches evangelical doctrines and terms, that is sometimes amusing, from the ludicrous dread evinced of uttering what might seem barbarous pietism to some sneering philosophy; but which is oftener painful in the last degree, from its evident indifference to the most vital and essential elements of Christianity.

But we object more seriously to this definition, that it is really not Christianity objectively, but Christianity subjectively, considered. It describes much more nearly the subjective condition of a Christian than the first definition, and then confounds this with the great fact which gives rise to this peculiar state of consciousness. The two definitions do not cohere; nor are they, in any proper sense, the correlatives of one another. And they both omit the cardinal facts of sin, atonement, and faith, as the real elements of the Christianity of the Bible. Had the author deigned to look at the description of Christianity given by one who, although evidently no favourite of his, yet surely understood something of its nature, he would have found it to be, "Christ formed within you, the hope of

glory." If this definition is fairly analyzed, it will be found to present an objective,—the cross of Christ; and a subjective,—the apprehension of that cross by the soul; which will give a far clearer conception of the essential nature of Christianity than anything that has been said by our author.

Our main objection, however, is, the quiet assumption made in it, that Christianity has really no objective existence but in the consciousness of the Christian world. This is manifestly the ground assumed in the definitions; an assumption whose vitiating influence on his whole theory we shall presently see to be very great, and very pernicious.

We see at this point the ingenious manner in which our author prepares the way for his theories of Revelation and Inspiration. He first, by his philosophy, limits all perceptions of truth to the intuitional consciousness, and muzzles the logical faculty with a carefulness that indicates no great fondness for it; a fact that is not perhaps without its rational explanation. He then limits the essence of religion to an Emotional state, dependent on the intuitional consciousness, omitting the equally important element which comes under the control of the logical consciousness. Then, in searching for the essence of Christianity, he limits it to the range of the intuitional faculty, leaving out those important elements that draw into operation other parts of the nature. He then quietly assumes that Christianity can have no objective existence but in the intuitional consciousness of Christians; or, in other words, that it cannot exist as a delineated system of emotions and doctrines in a book, because it is nothing but a form of the intuitional consciousness. All these assumptions we have shown to be untenable; and yet every one is necessary to prepare the way for his theory of Revelation and Inspiration. The whole chain is demanded, and yet every link is broken. It is with this vantage-ground that we proceed to the examination of his theory of Revelation.

Mr. Morell states at the outset, that "a revelation always indicates a mode of intelligence." This point should be carefully realized in the outset, since we are almost insensibly led, in many instances, to interchange the idea of a revelation with the object revealed, and introduce, ere we are aware, great confusion in the whole subject." This liability to confound the process of the mind in receiving a revelation, with the object revealed, is signally illustrated by this entire chapter, and even by the very paragraph before us. By what authority does Mr. Morell assert that a revelation *always* indicates a mode of intelligence? By what authority does he thus narrow down the universally received signification of this



word in theological language? The only show of argument he makes, is the statement that "the preaching of an angel would be no revelation to an idiot, and a Bible in Chinese would offer none to a European." Granted. But might not that preaching, or that Bible, be a revelation in itself, independent of the process of mind by which it is apprehended? The very terms imply that it might: for if this presentation be made to an intelligent mind, it perceives it as a revelation; from which it follows that it actually does exist as a revelation, independent of the mind perceiving it; unless the mind may perceive it to be what it actually is not. To assume, therefore, as he does, without a shadow of proof, that, because the process of receiving a revelation is a "mode of intelligence," therefore a revelation itself is so, is either a begging of the whole question, or a most singular inadvertence in a philosopher.

This appears further when he expands his view of revelation, on page 130:—

"The idea of a revelation is universally considered to imply a case of intelligence in which something is presented *directly* to the mind of the subject; in which it is conveyed by the immediate agency of God himself; in which our own efforts would have been unavailing to attain the same conceptions; in which the truth communicated could not have been drawn by inference from any data previously known; and, finally, in which the whole result is one lying beyond the reach of the logical understanding."

This extraordinary statement we are forced to meet by a flat denial. Mr. Morell surely knows that this is the very ground where he is at issue with the Christian world; and yet he coolly assumes it, without even a pretence at a proof.

We deny that it is always "something presented *directly* to the mind of the subject." The revelation God has given us in latter days is presented *indirectly*, by written or spoken signs, and not directly to the mind, as in the case of those who first received it, and transmitted it to us. If he only means that the mind directly perceives this revelation when once made, we will not object; but the perception of a revelation, and a revelation itself, are very different things.

Neither is a revelation always something "conveyed by the immediate agency of God himself." The whole Christian world holds that God has employed subordinate agencies in revealing himself to men. This was true even as to the first recipients of a revelation. Dreams, visions, symbolical acts and persons, words uttered by angels, and other modes, were employed by God to reveal himself to his servants. It was not only "at sundry times," but "*in divers manners*," that God spake in time past unto the fathers by the

prophets. These, surely, were instrumentalities different from the immediate and direct agency of God himself. Nor is it always truth that could not have been inferred from data previously known. Much of what God has revealed might have been inferred from previously known data, but yet not inferred with that certainty and authority requisite for our necessities. Take the Decalogue. This was revealed directly by God on Sinai. But could men never have known, by inference from previous data, that they should not kill, commit adultery, &c. ? If they could not, what becomes of that law written on the heart, by which they are hereafter to be judged ? If it is replied that this law is an original revelation, we might grant it. But still this definition of a revelation is destroyed, for we have something revealed which could have been inferred from data previously known ; whether known by revelation or otherwise affects not the question. Either, then, the Decalogue was not a revelation, or a revelation is something more than our author defines it to be.

Nor is it something in which "the whole result is one lying beyond the reach of the logical consciousness." This is the *πρωτον ψεῦδος* of our author, which is continually reappearing : and as it is the only point which he condescends to argue, we will give it a careful attention.

The mode of procedure adopted by Mr. Morell in this investigation is not a little surprising. We are reminded of the Frenchman, the Englishman, and the German, who were each called upon for a description of the camel. The Frenchman went to a neighbouring menagerie, and, by the help of accessible sources of information, furnished in a few days a very clever sketch of the animal. The Englishman travelled to the home of the camel in the desert, and after a considerable time, produced a complete natural history derived from his own observation. The German, however, retired to his study, and there enthusiastically set himself to work to evolve the primitive idea of the animal from the intuitional consciousness ; and, by the latest advices, he was at the work still, though vastly encouraged by some "glorious nibbles."

But, in all seriousness, is it not strange that, in examining the nature of revelation, we do not find a single appeal to revelation itself ? Who so competent to describe its subjective facts, as those to whom it has confessedly been made ? Why, then, has not Mr. Morell come up fairly to the question, whether these men believed that other things were revealed to them than the conceptions of the intuitional consciousness ; and whether they deemed the record of these things a real revelation ; or the yet more important question, whether their testimony on this point is worth anything at all in the

philosophical investigation? The fact of Mr. Morell's silence on these points excites painful surmises.

After running an analogy between his definition of revelation, and the action of the intuitional consciousness, and showing their identity, he then endeavours "to demonstrate that the whole of the *logical* processes of the human mind are such, that the idea of a revelation is altogether incompatible with them,—that they are in no sense open to its influence, and that they can neither be improved nor assisted by it."

This is strong ground. What, then, is the *demonstration*? Simply that the logical processes take place according to the laws of thought: but these laws are immovable; therefore they cannot be made the subject of a revelation. "Correct reasoning could never be subverted by revelation itself; bad reasoning could never be improved by it." This is most marvellous. Grant that the laws of the logical understanding are immovable, are they infallible? Could not correct reasoning be certified by revelation? Could it not inform us whether we had used these laws of thought legitimately? Could not bad reasoning be corrected by it? Is it possible that the God who made these powers could not furnish them with logical processes and results, which they could rely upon as infallible and correct? This must of course be denied by Mr. Morell; a denial which, to most minds, will be a *reductio ad absurdum* of the theory.

But he gets a glimpse of the difficulties of his position as he proceeds, for he adds, page 135,—

"There is, however, one more process coming within the province of the logical faculty, which might appear at first sight to be far more nearly compatible with the idea of a revelation, and through the medium of which, indeed, many suppose that the actual revelations of God to man have been made. The process to which I refer is that of verbal exposition. Could not a revelation from God, it might be naturally urged, consist in an exposition of truth, made to us by the lips or from the pen of an inspired messenger, that exposition coming distinctly under the idea of a *logical explication of doctrines*, which it is for mankind to receive as sent to us on Divine authority? Now this is a case of considerable complexity, and one which we must essay as clearly as possible to unravel."

This is undoubtedly rather an ugly case for his theory, but he floats over it as glibly as a cork. The amount of what he says is simply this, that if such a messenger kept within the bounds of our present experience, there would be no revelation to us; if he transcended these bounds, we could only understand his message by the elevation of our religious consciousness. In his own words, such an exposition of truth "would give us no *immediate* manifestation of

truth from God, it would offer no conceptions lying beyond the range of our present data," therefore it would be no revelation. In other words, it would conflict with our theory of revelation, therefore it is no revelation. This is really all we can logically infer from the reasoning.

He asserts that revelation is *always* the presentation of some truth *immediately* to the intuitional consciousness, and must therefore be confined to those truths which come within the range of this power of the soul. Was this the case with the history contained in the first chapters of Genesis? Was it the case with the moral and ceremonial law, the form and arrangements of the Tabernacle, and the structure of the Hebrew commonwealth, revealed to Moses? Was it so with the visions, dreams, voices, and symbols revealed to the prophets? When it was revealed to Simeon by the Holy Ghost that he should not see death until he had seen the Lord's Christ, was this a truth of the intuitional consciousness? When Paul went up to Jerusalem "by revelation," was that a truth of the intuitional consciousness? When he received an account of the last supper from our Lord, was that narration a truth of the intuitional consciousness? Were the resurrection, the second coming of Christ, the scenes of the judgment, the rise of Antichrist, and similar futurities, conceptions of the intuitional consciousness? Were all the minute predictions of prophecy truths of the intuitional consciousness? Is it not obvious at a glance that many things were matters of revelation to inspired men that must fall within the scope of the logical consciousness, even as narrowed down by the psychological theory of our author?

But he also asserts, page 143,—

"That the Bible cannot, in strict accuracy of language, be termed a revelation.—The actual revelation was not made primarily in the book, but in the mind of the writers: and the power which that book possesses of conveying a revelation to us, consists in its aiding in the awakenment and elevation of our religious consciousness."

This bold assertion is not a little startling. We ask, if there is no revelation there, how can it ever become a revelation to us? We grant that a blind man cannot read a book until his eyes are opened; but neither can he then, if the book is not there. We must be spiritually enlightened before we can fully perceive the revelation conveyed in the Bible; but it is hard to see how we can perceive it then, if there is no revelation there to be seen.

But what is the judgment of the writers themselves? Do they call the words they were inspired to speak and write a revelation? "Secret things belong unto the Lord, but the *things revealed*, to us

and our children." Are these things "modes of intelligence?" "The Revelation of Jesus Christ," sent and signified by his *angel* to his servant John, who bare record of what he saw, and blessed those who read and hear the words of this prophecy,—was this a "mode of intelligence?" Was the "revelation of the mystery" in which Paul's gospel consisted, "made manifest, and by the *Scriptures* of the prophets made known to all nations," a "mode of intelligence?" When Paul asserted, "the things that I *write* unto you are the commandments of the Lord," did he mean to teach that only the mode of intelligence of those who read them was the command of the Lord? What is the meaning of such phrases as, "the Word of God;" "the oracles of God;" "the *Scriptures* of inspiration;" "the words which the Holy Ghost teacheth;" "the form of sound words;" "the gospel of God;" and similar expressions? do they only mean a mode of intelligence? Are not all these things in direct contradiction of this starveling theory of revelation?

But suppose we grant the theory for a moment. We ask, what is the precise authority of revelation? Has it any, independent of the mind that receives it? If it has no existence but in the mind perceiving it, how can it challenge any authority over a mind that does not perceive it? How can it demand universal submission on the penalty of eternal perdition? And what guarantee of certainty have we as to any revelation at all? If our intuitional conceptions contradict Mr. Morell's, and his contradict Neander's, and his again contradict Dr. Strauss's, who shall decide between them? How shall we know who or what is right? We have no infallible standard, no absolute rule, to which we may refer these conflicting revelations, and know whether they speak according to the law and the testimony. We are left at sea without chart or compass, and the trackless waters covered with a German mist. "Jesus I know, and Paul I know, but who are you?"

But, waiving these difficulties, let us examine whether his theory follows from the premises he has assumed. He alleges that because spiritual perceptions cannot be attained by a mind whose power of intuition is not elevated to their reception, therefore, a revelation can be made only to the intuitive consciousness, and not to the logical. But as the intuitive consciousness perceives by direct perception, this revelation cannot be in the form of a book, but in an immediate presentation of truth to the mind; and a revealed theology is impossible.

The sophism in this argument is not difficult of detection. Grant that spiritual intuitions are impossible to a blind soul; does it follow that a revelation must consist in *nothing else* but these spiritual

intuitions? Is not this assuming the very point in discussion? A revealed theology cannot of itself awaken these intuitions: but does it follow that it can do nothing, much more that it is impossible? Grant that it may be of little use to an unenlightened soul: does it follow that it will be of none to one enlightened? A system of optics is useless to a blind man, and powerless to produce his sight; but let vision be granted him, and is it then useless?

Mr. Morell admits the importance of a theology, and confesses that it is impossible for a man to avoid constructing one for himself, after attaining spiritual conceptions. But what is there in this work that confines it to man? Because God must give the intuitions, does he thereby lose the power of delineating them? Is He who alone understands these emotions fully, alone incapable of describing them? If man can do this work for himself, why may not God do it for him? What is there in it that limits it to the fallible, purblind creature? We cannot, then, for the life of us, see how the conclusion of Mr. Morell will follow from his premises.

But Mr. Morell has saved us some trouble, by virtually giving up his own theory, or at least by allowing it to break down at the very point where he attempts to apply it. He tells us, page 140,—

“The aim of revelation has not been formally to expound a system of doctrine to the understanding, but to educate the mind of man gradually to an inward appreciation of the truth concerning his own relation to God. Judaism was a propædætic to Christianity; but there was no formal definition of any one spiritual truth in the whole of that economy. (!) The purpose of it was to school the mind to spiritual contemplation; to awaken the religious consciousness by types and symbols, and other perceptive means, to the realization of certain great spiritual ideas,” &c., &c. “The Apostles went forth to awaken man’s power of spiritual intuition; to impress upon the world the great conceptions of sin, of righteousness, of judgment to come, of salvation, of purity, and of heavenly love. This they did by their lives, their teaching, their spiritual *intensity* in action and suffering, their whole testimony to the word, the person, the death, and the resurrection of the Saviour.”

Concede for a moment that the sole object of these great agencies was to awaken spiritual intuitions, how, by Mr. Morell’s own account of it, was this done? They could not bring the naked idea before the blinded world, and thus cause spiritual perception. How, then, did they proceed? By “teaching!” by the use of “types and symbols;” and “giving testimony to the word, &c., of the Saviour!” And, pray, what was this but addressing themselves to the logical understanding? If they embodied these great conceptions in teaching, must not this, as far as it was embodied, be “an exposition of Christian doctrine?” How otherwise could they have proceeded? A spiritual conception can only be presented by one man to another through some verbal sign or exposition of the facts that give rise to it.

But this, by the author's own definition of the logical consciousness, is a purely logical process. "Their lives, and their intensity in action and suffering," had no significance in themselves, except as related to their teachings. Madmen and impostors had exhibited the same things; and it was only by verbal exposition that the world could understand the difference between the two cases; in other words, the whole process by which they acted was an appeal to the logical understanding. Here, then, the theory fails at the very point of its application; for it leads us irresistibly to the conclusion, that the revelation made by the inspired teachers of religion was made in the forms of the logical understanding.

The fatal error of Mr. Morell's theory lies in confounding the work of the Spirit of God with the action of human agents in the spiritual enlightenment of man. It is man's work to present the great conceptions of religion in those logical forms in which they have been placed in the revealed word; it is the Spirit's work to awaken the power of spiritual intuition, by which these embodied conceptions can be grasped by the higher consciousness of the soul. By confounding the work of God with that of man, and both with the agency of the revealed truth, he has involved himself in a maze of the most fatal error.

Our limits compel us to pause here, and postpone the conclusion of our remarks until the next number.

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#### ART. II.—REMARKS ON I. CORINTHIANS XIII, 9-13.

*"For we know in part, and we prophesy in part. But when that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done away."*

ALTHOUGH there exists very general uniformity of interpretation on the contents of the impressive and important chapter from which the above words are selected, yet it may not be deemed presumptuous to offer a few remarks, with a view to present a different, and, we trust, a more consistent exegesis. The faith of the Christian need not be shaken by the prevailing differences of opinion among commentators. "The judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether." "The pillar and ground of the truth" is a rock that never can be moved.

The general views of commentators on the above passage may be given in brief extracts from a few, with whose works most of our readers are familiar.

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ART I.—MORELL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.

*The Philosophy of Religion.* By J. D. MORELL, A. M., Author of the History of Modern Philosophy, &c. New-York: D. Appleton & Co., 200 Broadway; Philadelphia, George S. Appleton, 164 Chesnut-street. 1849. 12mo., pp. 359.

SECOND PAPER.

RESUMING our examination of Mr. Morell's book, we turn now to the author's views of Inspiration, embodied in the sixth chapter. These will be gathered from the following extracts:—

"Inspiration does not imply anything generically new in the actual processes of the human mind. It does not involve any form of intelligence essentially different from what we already possess; it indicates rather the elevation of the religious consciousness, and with it, of course, the power of spiritual vision, to a degree of intensity peculiar to the individuals thus highly favoured of God. We must regard the whole process of inspiration, accordingly, as being in no sense *mechanical*, but purely *dynamical*, involving, not a novel and supernatural faculty, but a faculty already enjoyed, elevated *supernaturally* to an extraordinary power and susceptibility: indicating, in fact, an inward nature so perfectly harmonized to the Divine; so freed from the distorting influences of prejudice, passion, and sin; so simply recipient of the Divine ideas circumbient around it; so responsive in all its strings to the breath of heaven,—that truth leaves an impress upon it which answers perfectly to its objective reality."—Pp. 148, 149.

"According to this view of the case, inspiration, as an *internal phenomenon*, is perfectly consistent with the natural laws of the human mind,—it is the higher potency of a certain form of consciousness, which every man to some degree possesses. The supernatural element consists in the *extraordinary influences* employed to create these lofty intuitions, to bring the mind of the subject into perfect harmony with truth, and that, too, at a time when, under ordinary circumstances, such a state could not possibly have been enjoyed."—P. 159.

"We cannot infer that any one of these books was written by an *express* commission from God. We cannot infer that they are *verbally* inspired, any more than were the oral teachings of the Apostles. We cannot infer that they had any greater authority attached to them, than the general authority which was attached to the apostolic office. We cannot infer that they were regarded

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by the early Christians as being the *Word of God* in any other sense than as being the productions of those who lived with Christ, were witnesses of his history, and were imbued with his spirit; as being, in a word, veritable representations of a religious life which they had derived by a special inspiration from heaven."—P. 171.

The plain meaning of all this is, that inspiration is identical with a high degree of sanctification; and that the man who writes with clear conceptions of spiritual things, is inspired. But it cannot be said of these writings that they are inspired, for inspiration is a phenomenon of the intuitional consciousness, and not the property of a writing. The Bible, therefore, is not inspired, and does not contain an infallible rule of faith and practice. This theory he maintains, in opposition to what he chooses to term the mechanical theory of inspiration. This he states to be, "that which supposes a special dictation of the actual words inscribed on the sacred page, distinct from the religious enlightenment of the writer."—P. 151.

The unfairness of this statement of the common notion is obvious at a glance. Does not Mr. Morell know that the theory of plenary inspiration, as held by most theologians, is not fairly stated in the definition, "a special dictation of the actual words inscribed on the sacred page?" Does he not know that the position, that the Holy Spirit so guarded the words of the inspired writers that they should not convey any error, differs from that which asserts a special dictation of every word as to an amanuensis? Does he not know that such special dictation is commonly limited to those parts of Scripture where such dictation was needful to guard from error? He has himself admitted (p. 176) that this is not precisely the theory held by the more moderate orthodox divines of the present day. Why, then, grapple with it? Why confound verbal inspiration with verbal dictation? Had he fairly stated the common view, most of his objections would have been answered by that simple statement. This will be perceived as we examine his objections to what he terms the mechanical theory.

His first objection to this theory is, that

"There is no *positive* evidence of such a verbal dictation having been granted. The supposition of its existence would demand a two-fold kind of inspiration, each kind entirely distinct from the other. The Apostles, it is admitted, were inspired to preach and teach *orally*; but we have the most positive evidence that this commission did not extend to their very words. Often they were involved in minor misconceptions; and sometimes they taught specific notions inconsistent with a pure spiritual Christianity, as Peter did when he was chided by Paul. The verbal scheme, therefore, demands the admission of *one* kind of inspiration having been given to the Apostles as men, thinkers, moral agents, and preachers; and another kind having been granted them as *writers*."—P. 151.

This objection contains almost as many errors as sentences. The two-fold inspiration supposed, is solely in the nomenclature of the author. He first confounds inspiration with personal holiness, and then argues that verbal inspiration is inadmissible, because it would make a second kind. Undoubtedly, if spiritual enlightenment is one kind, we must admit another, or fail to include the very phenomena in question.

Again: it is not alleged by the verbal theory that the Apostles had one kind of inspiration as preachers, and another as writers. If, then, they had an inspiration as preachers to teach orally, what makes another kind needful for them as writers to teach scripturally? Why confound their spiritual enlightenment as men with their inspiration as teachers; and because the former was distinct from their inspiration as writers, assume that the latter was so likewise?

But we have "positive evidence that this commission did not extend to their very words." And what is this positive evidence? Why, forsooth, that they were "often involved in minor misconceptions." Suppose they were; the question is, Did they ever teach such misconceptions orally or in writing? If they did, our theory breaks down. What, then, is the proof? "They taught specific notions inconsistent with a pure spiritual Christianity, as Peter did when he was chided by Paul." Peter did no such thing. His error was one of action and not of teaching, and we have no proof that then or at any other time he taught any such notion. Peter the man, who was imperfectly sanctified, is confounded with Peter the Apostle, who was perfectly inspired to teach the doctrines of the gospel; and because he erred in the one capacity, he is charged with having erred in the other. And this is the positive evidence that their commission did not extend to their very words! It is with such bald sophistry that we are to set aside the positive statements of Christ himself: "When they shall lead you and deliver you up, take no thought beforehand what ye shall speak, neither do ye premeditate, but whatsoever shall be given you in that hour, that speak ye, for it is not ye that speak, but the Holy Ghost!" Yet Mr. Morell has "positive evidence that their commission did not extend to their very words!"

The second objection is, the improbability

"That each writer should manifest his own modes of thought, his own temperament of mind, his own educational influences, his own peculiar phraseology; and yet, notwithstanding this, every word should have been dictated to him by the Holy Spirit."—P. 152.

This objection can lie only against the extreme theory of verbal dictation, and not the common view of verbal inspiration. When it

is stated that each writer was left to the free play of his own powers, with such an influence of the Holy Spirit as to secure him infallibly from error, the individuality of the writers appears in perfect accordance with their inspiration, and the objection falls to the ground. It was necessary that this individuality should be preserved to attain the object of revelation. Being made for men, it was necessary, by the laws of human sympathy, that it should be made through men. The same beautiful and tender regard to the yearning sympathies of our nature that induced the High-priest of our profession to be tempted in all points as we are, that we might, in coming to a throne of grace, commune with a human heart as well as a Divine nature, also led to the employment of human hearts and minds in conveying God's will and purposes to man in a revelation. But, to accomplish this, it was necessary that each writer should preserve his own individuality, while at the same time he was uttering through it the things which he was moved to utter by the Holy Ghost. In this, then, there is no sort of discrepancy.

His third objection is, that it

"Tends to *diminish* our view of the *moral* and *religious* qualifications of the writers, by elevating the mere mechanical influence into absolute supremacy."—P. 162.

It were sufficient to reply to this, that the question is, what is the fact? and not, what effect will that fact have on our estimate of the writers? But it will surprise those who hold this theory to be told that they have been undervaluing the sacred writers, by believing them commissioned to speak infallibly and authoritatively for God; and that their estimate of them would be raised, if they held that they had no other influence on their minds than that which they share not only with other Christians, but with all men of genius; and no influence which could preserve them from blunders in matters of fact, of opinion, or of reasoning. Surely Mr. Morell was sorely pressed when he invented this, which, if it has no other merit, has at least that of originality.

The fourth objection is declared to amount to "a moral demonstration," and is,—

"That even if we suppose the letter of the Scripture to have been actually dictated, yet that *alone* would never have served as a revelation of Christianity to mankind, or obviated the necessity of an appeal from the letter to the spirit of the whole system." "The letter of the Scripture has to be illuminated by the Spirit of Truth, before it affords to any one a full manifestation of Christianity in its essence and its power."—Pp. 152, 153.

This is the old averment in another form, that because the Bible is not a complete revelation, in its plenary sense, to an unconverted

man, therefore it is no revelation at all. Because a guide-book is of little or no use to a blind man, therefore, not only is it not a guide-book to those who can see, but there is no such thing as a guide-book possible! Such is this boasted moral demonstration. We do not claim for the Bible that it can compensate for the agency of the Holy Spirit. We hold that God must open our eyes to see wondrous things in his law; but we also hold that these wondrous things are there to be seen. The author admits that a human summary of faith and practice is highly important, and we cannot, for the life of us, see why the mere fact that it is human gives it such value as to make unnecessary and impossible one that is divine.

He then brings forward another view of the "mechanical theory," which is, after all, only the same opinion that he has already discussed, with some additions from his own fancy, and the introduction of another distinct question,—the Canon of Scripture. He thus sets forth this theory:—

"The idea is entertained by many, that a distinct commission to write was in every instance given to the sacred penman by God; that each book came forth with a specific impress of Deity upon it; and that the whole of the Canon of Scripture was gradually completed by *so many distinct and decisive acts of Divine ordination*. Now the evidence of this opinion we regard as totally defective, and can only ascribe its growth and progress in the Church to the influence of a low and mechanical view of the whole question of inspiration itself.—Let any one look through the whole of the books composing the Old and New Testaments, and consider how many can lay claim to any *distinct* commission,—and consequently how their inspiration can be at all defended if it be made to rest upon this condition."—P. 155.

Here it will be remarked that he dexterously shifts the ground in his argument. He first states the question to be, whether the writers had any distinct commission to write these books; but the question he discusses is, whether their books, in all cases, record any such commission. These are totally different questions. He also takes advantage of the ambiguity of the word *distinct*. As he states it in the proposition, it means distinct to the writers themselves; as he discusses the proposition, it means distinct to us. These again are different questions, yet hopelessly confounded by Mr. Morell. His entire argument on this point is a recapitulation of the books, with an assertion in each case that they contain no distinct commission to write them. As well might he pore over a set of statutes, and reject them because each volume does not contain the certificate of election and legislative commission of each individual legislator.

Almost the only specific argument which he draws from the Scripture, evinces his usual lucklessness in dealing with the Bible. He asserts that Luke "distinctly professes to write from the testimony

of eye-witnesses, and to claim the confidence of Theophilus, for whom his two treatises were composed, *on this particular ground.*"—P. 157. Unfortunately for Mr. Morell's argument, Luke asserts the very opposite. He says that others wrote thus, but that he wrote because he had a perfect understanding of all things from the very first.

He then insensibly glides into the indirect discussion of the Canon of Scripture. This he does in the following assertions:—

"The light which history sheds upon the early period of the Christian Church, shows us that the writings which now compose the New Testament Canon were not at all regarded as express messages to them from God, independently of the conviction they had of the high integrity and spiritual development of the minds of the writers. They received them just as they received the oral teachings of the apostles and evangelists; they read them in the churches, to supply the place of *their* personal instructions; and there is abundant evidence that *many other writings* beside those which now form the New Testament were read with a similar reverence, and for a similar edification.—It was only gradually, as the pressure of heresy compelled it, that a certain number of writings were agreed upon by general consent as being *purely apostolic*, and designated by the term *homologoumena*, or agreed upon. But that much contention existed as to which should be acknowledged canonical, and which not, is seen from the fact that a number of the writings now received were long termed '*antilegomena*,' or contested." "The canonicity of the New Testament Scriptures was decided upon solely on the ground of their presenting to the whole Church clear statements of apostolical Christianity. The idea of their being written by any special command of God, or verbal dictation of the Spirit, was an idea altogether foreign to the primitive Churches."—Pp. 157, 159.

These passages assert that the primitive Church did not regard the canonical Scriptures as written by any special inspiration, peculiar to themselves, and that they did not receive them as an infallible rule of faith and practice. Both of these assertions are made in the face of unquestioned facts. Surely, if Mr. Morell had not the patience to examine original authorities, or even to look through such works as Lardner's *Credibility*, or the *Corpus Confessionum*, he might at least have glanced at a little book, which we fear he holds in sovereign contempt, called *Paley's Evidences*. He would there have found sufficient evidence to prevent him from making such reckless and baseless assertions.

The primitive Church did regard the Scriptures as, in a sense peculiar to themselves, inspired by the Holy Ghost, and did appeal to them as an authoritative rule of faith and practice. In quoting them they call them, "the Divine Scripture; inspired of the Lord; given by the inspiration of the Holy Ghost; the oracles of the Lord; Divine fountains; fountains of the Divine fulness; the foundation and pillar of faith," &c., &c. They quoted them in controversy; cited them in preaching; commented on them in exposition; made cata-

logues of them; and by every possible means exhibited the high estimate placed upon them above all other writings. The very mysteries that such men as Origen and Chrysostom found even in the syllables of Scripture, prove the estimation in which they held them. Theophilus of Antioch says, "The like things are to be found in the prophets and the *Gospels*, because that all, being inspired, spoke by one and the same Spirit of God." Many testimonies to this effect could be cited; but we are really ashamed to quote authorities on the point to a Protestant. Those who wish to examine them for themselves, can consult Lardner's *Credibility*, or Paley's *Evidences* under this head; Daillé on the *Fathers*, book ii, ch. 2; Taylor's *Ductor Dubitantium*, book ii, ch. iii, rule 14; Bingham's *Antiquities*, book xiv, ch. 3.

The very fact which he alleges to sustain his views, that there was much contention as to what works were to be regarded as canonical, proves the very opposite. Why so eager to determine their canonicity, except that canonicity was matter of high moment? Why, especially, should "the pressure of heresy" produce this settlement, if the Scriptures were not regarded as a rule of faith by which to determine what was heresy and what truth? Why term the apostolical writings *canonical*, unless they regarded them as a *canon*, a rule and standard of faith and practice? Was not their anxiety to be kept from fraudulent and spurious writings, proof that it was their apostolical or inspired origin, rather than their power to address the intuitional consciousness, which they deemed important? If a book embodied the religious life, what mattered it by whom it was written? Why, then, these keen contests about the apostolical origin of these books? Does Mr. Morell feel this question to be one of much importance? Does his philosophy make it of much importance? Does not this show that his theory and estimate of the Scriptures differ from that of the early Christians?

He objects further to the verbal theory, the defective morality of the Old Testament. This is an old stereotype of Infidelity and Socinianism, which will be found answered in detail in any respectable system of theology. We utterly deny the allegation. We grant that some things were both permitted and commanded in the Jewish Theocracy that are not in the New Testament, because of different circumstances and relations. But assuming these relations, and we find nothing that was not consistent with the essential principles of morality. Such were the expulsion of the Canaanites; the Levirate law; the permission of polygamy; the *lex-talionis*; the law of the avenger of blood; and similar arrangements in the Jewish history and polity. The moral relations were different, and hence the dif-

ference of the institutions grafted on those relations; and it has yet to be proved that in those relations the institutions were inconsistent with immutable morality. The general principles of morality are the same under both dispensations, and we defy Mr. Morell to show any *new principle* of morals revealed in the New Testament. As to the actual attainments in moral excellence made even by the saints of the Old Testament, this is another question, and one that does not touch that at issue. Their acts are recorded not for imitation or approval, but for instruction and warning. Had the ethical teachings of the Old Testament been as defective as Mr. Morell alleges, it is unaccountable that the great Teacher did not correct them. So far from this, when asked for a perfect rule of morals,—one so perfect that its obedience might secure eternal life,—he furnished precisely that which was taught in the Old Testament. And it is of this maligned law of the old covenant that he says not a jot or a tittle of it shall ever pass away. Let Mr. Morell beware, then, lest in his eagerness to maintain a theory, he may haply be found accusing Him who never spake of the Old Testament but in terms of the highest admiration and respect.

His only other objection is, the discrepancies that exist in the sacred records. This, again, is an old acquaintance whom we have met before in very bad company. He specifies but three cases.

The first case is, its discrepancies with scientific truths; and of these he only mentions geology. He surely knows that this is not admitted by a single advocate of plenary inspiration, or believed by many Christian geologists. The *facts* of geology are perfectly consistent with the Mosaic record, rightly interpreted. As for the hypotheses of world-builders and world-dreamers about the Natural History of Creation, brought forward to explain these facts, we have nothing as apologists to do with them. It will be time enough to settle the question of discrepancy when these hypotheses are shown to be facts, and not, as they yet are, mere fancies.

He next alludes to discrepancies in the statement of facts, which we will discuss as soon as he gives us some instance of them. He hints at but two, which he will find explained in any respectable commentary.

He then refers to discrepancies in reasoning, definitions, and other logical processes. The only instance of these he has specified is an unfortunate one for his argument. He says, page 167,—

“We know well that Peter reasoned very perversely about the circumcision, and that Paul at once vanquished him in argument.”

Now, we do not know any such thing. We are not told that Peter

erred in reasoning about the circumcision, or that he reasoned at all, but simply that he erred in conduct, and for this was reproved by Paul. It might cast some doubt on Peter's inspiration, according to Mr. Morell's theory, but does not touch the theory of verbal inspiration, which does not maintain the infallibility of the men, but of their inspired writings. Yet this is the only instance of false reasoning which he has been able to produce. This luckless blunder, which appears twice in the same chapter, suggests painful thoughts as to our author's familiarity with the Scriptures, and the estimate which he places upon them.

Having seen the groundlessness of his objections to the verbal theory of inspiration, we shall now examine the one he offers in its place. It is, in a word, that inspiration is nothing but an elevation of the intuitional consciousness to perceive spiritual truths; that, therefore, it only applies to the writers of Scripture, and not to their writings; and that, so far from the Scriptures being inspired as an infallible rule of faith and practice, they actually contain many errors as to matters of fact and reasoning.

We object to this theory, that it is a mere speculation. It is not drawn from the records in question: it is not the result of an induction of facts describing the phenomena, but a mere speculation drawn from his psychology. It is the natural history of the camel elaborated from the interior consciousness.

But it does not even flow from that psychology. Grant all that he asserts as to the intuitional and logical consciousness, and the impossibility of inspiring the latter, does it follow that God cannot set forth a description of the intuitions of the former in an infallible form? If each man can do this in an imperfect mode for himself, why cannot God do it in a perfect? Then granting that inspiration cannot apply to the logical consciousness, his theory will not follow. A book may infallibly describe the workings of the intuitional faculty in the matter of religion, and thus be all we claim for it in asserting a verbal inspiration.

But we do not grant that inspiration is impossible to the logical faculty. Inspired reasoning is with him an absurdity. But this does not follow from his psychology. Cannot God suggest a train of reasoning to the human mind? Can He not so control that mind that it will come certainly to a right conclusion? Can He not, then, secure the record of this reasoning in terms that will be free from error? Surely all this is possible. But if so, this is verbal inspiration of a record describing the workings of the logical faculty. Not only is this possible, but God has actually done it. Is not the Decalogue an infallible utterance of God? But it contains reasoning.



Are not our Lord's discourses also infallible? They also contain reasoning. Either, then, we must admit that God can inspire the logical faculty, and so control the record of its workings that it shall be infallible; or we must assert that the Decalogue, and the teachings of our Lord, are liable to error. Mr. Morell may choose his horn of the dilemma,—on the one he loses his theory; on the other, his religion.

But not only is it not required by his psychology, it is even inconsistent with it, when pressed to its results. He tells us in chapter I., that the intuitional consciousness obtains materials from the logical, by means of which its intuitions are awakened; just as the perceptive consciousness does from the sensational, in order to attain to its perceptions. Now from this position it follows, not that the logical consciousness cannot be subjected to supernatural aid, but precisely the opposite. Suppose that the sensational power were deranged or imperfect, as, for example, in a blind man, his perceptions must be limited and distorted precisely in proportion to this defect. If now the perceptions are to be corrected, where must the remedy be applied? Manifestly not to the perceptive, but the sensational, consciousness. If, then, the parallelism exists which is asserted by our author's psychology, and the intuitional consciousness is dim or distorted in its conceptions, where must the remedy be applied? Manifestly, by this theory, to the logical consciousness. Let its conceptions be correct, and correct intuitions will follow; just as right perceptions ensue from healthy sensations. When, therefore, such a corrective is brought in play, as is assumed in inspiration, it follows that it must be applied to the logical consciousness, as the only means of reaching and awakening the intuitive. This fact, then, overturns his entire theory of inspiration, and lays the foundation for that which we claim to be the only true one.

Again: it does not meet the necessities of the case. Why do we need a revelation at all? Partly because of our depravity, and partly because of our ignorance. We are sinful, and need something to purify us; we are ignorant, and need something to enlighten us. What am I? Whence came I? Whither do I go? These are the great problems that press upon the human spirit, and demand a solution. And, deeper than these, then comes up the heavy consciousness of sin, and the spirit asks, How shall man be just before God? What answer will Mr. Morell give to such a spirit, on his theory of inspiration? Will he tell him to believe on the Lord Jesus Christ? He asks, Who is he? and what am I to believe concerning him? Is he a mere man, a simple teacher of ethics, who improved on Judaism, and died a martyr like Socrates? Or is he divine, the

Messiah of prophecy? If he refers him to the Bible, he at the same time tells him that it contains nothing more than the spiritual intuitions of its writers, mingled up with their own reasonings and opinions, many of which are erroneous. How, then, shall he discriminate between these two elements? His powers of intuition are weak and purblind: can they be relied on as a touchstone in so important a case? How shall he know that the same imperfection which attached to the logical conceptions of these men, does not also attach to their intuitions? How shall the ignorant and the poor, who compose the majority of the world, be profited by such a revelation? How shall they know what to believe, or what to do, with any satisfactory degree of certainty?

If it is replied, that this theory furnishes as valid a ground of certainty, and as perfect a guarantee of unity, as the other, we meet it with a simple and emphatic denial. Take the line of Christian writers who have maintained the verbal theory, and however they differ on minor points, in all essential doctrines they agree. The plan of salvation, and the essential theology taught by Irenæus, Augustine, and Chrysostom, are the same with those taught by Aquinas, Gottschalk, Luther, Pascal, and the Church of the present day. Can this be said of the teachings of philosophy for which we are asked to abandon the ancient basis of certitude? Scotus and Abelard denied the ground of their predecessors; Descartes theirs; Leibnitz, Wolf, Kant, Hegel, Fichte, Schelling, and others, each shouted the *eureka*, and proved that he alone had found the grand secret. Now comes Mr. Morell, in plumage plucked from Schleiermacher, and tells us that the whole world has been wrong on these points until now, and that here is wisdom. But may not this wisdom die with him? Have we any guarantee that this is the last *avatar*? May not some new hierophant mount the tripod, and prove that Mr. Morell is all wrong? Can we, then, be blamed if we prefer Siloa's brook, that flows with a soft and brimming tide that never fails, to these thunder-gust streamlets that alternately deluge and desert us?

Again: it is inconsistent with the facts of the case as represented by the inspired writers themselves. It is very remarkable that, in forming and discussing a theory of inspiration, our author should scarcely in a single instance refer to the account of the matter given by those who were the subjects of it; and in the references he does make, should evince a carelessness, if not an ignorance, that shows his low appreciation of this source of information. This course in any other investigation would be either denounced as unfair, or ridiculed as absurd. But if his theory is true, it will at least explain the facts, if it should not be drawn from them. Let us, then, bring it to this test.

He asserts that inspiration is limited to the intuitional consciousness, and in no case can apply to the operations of the logical understanding. Now, as one of the offices of that understanding is to arrange and detail historical facts, (see p. 63,) it follows that inspiration cannot in any proper sense be asserted of the historical portions of the Bible, or of the writers in receiving and recording them. What are some of the facts? 1 Cor. xi, 23: "I have *received of the Lord* that which also I delivered unto you." Was this a conception of the intuitional consciousness? No; an account of the Lord's supper. Here, then, was an historical narration received *directly* from God, or, in other words, inspired; received to be delivered, and delivered as received in words; for an historical narration can only be given in words; in a word, a verbal inspiration of the logical consciousness. How can this fact be crushed into Mr. Morell's theory? The Bible has many others of the same nature. When Moses received the description of the tabernacle, and the entire law, moral and ceremonial, were these intuitions? When Ezekiel received an account of the future temple, was that an intuition? When John received and recorded the visions of the Apocalypse, were these intuitions? When Peter, and Stephen, and Paul, received a knowledge of things beyond the sphere of human ken, were they intuitions? How can such facts as these, with which the Bible is full, be compressed into this theory?

He also asserts that inspiration can only belong to the man, and not to the writing which such a man may indite; nor can it be supposed to attach to the words in which an inspired man utters his inspiration. What are the facts? 2 Tim. iii, 16: "All scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness." Paul here asserts that the *γρᾶφή* is *θεόπνευστος*, not the *συγγραφείς*; and, moreover, he asserts that it is profitable for *doctrine*, for *instruction*, and other uses, that fall solely within the scope of the logical understanding. Both these positions are in flat contradiction of Mr. Morell's theory. 1 Thess. ii, 13: "When ye received the word of God which ye heard of us, ye received it not as the word of men, but as it is in truth, the word of God." What Paul meant by the word of God appears from chap. iv, 15-17, where he tells them, by "the word of the Lord," of the coming of Christ and the resurrection of the dead. Here, then, is something revealed which was not a mere intuition, but a statement of facts coming within the cognizance of the logical understanding; and this statement is called the word of God. And lest this conclusion should be evaded, by saying that it refers only to the oral teachings of the Apostle, he urges the Thessalonians (2 Thess. ii, 15)

to stand fast in what they had been taught, "whether by word or our epistle;" thereby making his writings the "word of God," and an authoritative rule of faith and practice. In 2 Tim. ii, 9, Paul, alluding to his bonds, which prevented him from preaching, congratulates himself that "the word of God is not bound;" thus contrasting the word and the living teacher, and asserting the Divine character and independent power of the former. These passages prove unanswerably that Paul regarded the written word as inspired, divine, and authoritative, in direct contradiction to Mr. Morell's theory.

He also denies that inspiration can refer to words. Here, also, he contradicts the records themselves. We have seen that the promise of Christ expressly referred to the words of his disciples. That they regarded these words as important, appears from their anxiety about them, manifested in such passages as 2 Tim. i, 13, 14: "Hold fast the form of sound words—keep by the Holy Ghost which dwelleth in us." Here was a *ὑποτύπωσις*, a formula of words, which was sacredly to be kept by the aid of the Holy Ghost. Why so important to keep the form of words, if there was no inspiration attached to the words composing that formula? 1 Tim. iv, 1: "The Spirit speaketh expressly." Is not this something like verbal inspiration? 1 Cor. ii, 13: "Which things also we speak, not in the words which man's wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost teacheth, comparing spiritual things with spiritual;" or, rather, "explaining spiritual things in spiritual words," *πνευματικῶν πνευματικὰ συνκρίνοντες*. Here the words are stated to be inspired, in the same sense with the things set forth in them. 2 Pet. i, 21: "Holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost." The words of Scripture, then, were the direct result of the action of the Holy Ghost on the minds of the prophets, or, in other words, the subjects of inspiration. But, to put this beyond all question, the same Apostle asserts (1 Pet. i, 10–12) that the prophets searched into the meaning of the things testified to them by the Spirit, having it revealed to them that these things were not for themselves, but for the Church of later ages, to which they would be preached in the gospel, with the aid of the Holy Ghost. This text asserts that the prophets did not know the full significance of the terms they were directed to use, but were made the mere vehicles of transmission to us of language whose entire meaning was to be perceived only in later times. In such cases, at least, the very terms must have been dictated by the Spirit, or why were they not understood by the writers? These facts are totally subversive of the theory.

Another fact that will not square with it is, the remarkable freedom of these men from error. It is true that Mr. Morell darkly hints

at various errors into which they have fallen, but it is also true that he has not adduced a single case to establish the charge. Compare these writings with those of Aristotle or Pliny; and why are the former so free from the puerilities and false notions in philosophy that disfigure the latter? If it be alleged that the fact of their being written by men who were taught by Christ makes the difference, we can meet the evasion by an *experimentum crucis*. We have yet extant, in sufficient purity and genuineness for our present purpose, an Epistle of Barnabas, the companion of Paul, his peer in apostolic authority, and inspired to teach *orally* with the rest of the Apostles. This Epistle, like some of Paul's and Peter's, was addressed to the churches generally; and, if this theory be true, was inspired in the same sense with Paul's and Peter's. But when we come to compare them, the difference is amazing and unaccountable. It is full of puerilities, Rabbinical conceits, and errors, some of them not of the most delicate character. It adduces the fable of the Phoenix to prove the resurrection; and parades such monstrous tales as are found in Pliny's Natural History, to illustrate the Mosaic law of clean and unclean beasts, which is spiritualized in a most extraordinary manner. What makes this wide difference? Barnabas was not inferior to the other Apostles, either in knowledge or intellect, as this very Epistle proves. Why, then, did he fall into all the errors of his age, while they were exempt from them? According to the verbal theory, the fact is easily explained; according to our author's, it is absolutely inexplicable.

He also makes inspiration identical with elevated piety. It will follow, therefore, that every one who was inspired was eminently pious. What, then, will he do with the case of Balaam? He was inspired, for he uttered a prophecy, yet he loved the wages of iniquity? How will he explain the cases of the prophets of the Old Testament, who were grievously imperfect, if not wicked, such as the old prophet of Bethel? But, further, if inspiration is identical with piety, why are its effects limited to the time of the canonical writers? Was not the piety of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries equal to that of the first? Is not that of the present day equal to the type that prevailed in the days of David and Hezekiah? By our author's favourite theory of a progressive consciousness, it must be vastly superior. Why, then, did the one exhibit the phenomena of inspiration, whilst the other does not?

It is also no small objection to this theory, that it contradicts the almost universal consciousness of the Christian Church. According to our author's psychology, especially as he has developed it in his second lecture on the Philosophic Tendencies of the Age, this is a

most serious objection. The men of every age whose piety has been deepest and purest, who have known most of the Christian life within, and have manifested most of it without, have held to the theory of verbal inspiration. And it is the reception of the Bible on this theory that has accomplished all the great results of Christianity, on individuals and on the world. Can as much be said of the opposite theory? Are its supporters remarkable for their piety, or their reverence for the Bible? Has its reception given the Bible power over the heart? Is not the contrary the fact? Let the history of English and American Unitarianism and German Neology furnish the answer.

But, if possible, a more serious objection is, that it not only confounds inspiration with piety on the one hand, but confounds it on the other with genius. This is expressly admitted on page 173. Now, according to the axiom that things equal to the same thing are equal to one another, it will follow that genius is identical with piety. Why, then, Plato should not have been more pious, and his writings more perfectly inspired, than those of Amos or Jude, does not appear; for he certainly had a larger development of the intuitional consciousness.

Without dwelling further on his theory of inspiration, which we have shown to be utterly untenable, we turn to his chapter on Christian Theology. In this chapter he leaves the intuitional, and enters upon the logical, sphere of the question. There are many things in this and the following chapters which we would like to notice, did our limits permit; but the length to which we have already been drawn, imposes on us the necessity of but a brief and cursory notice. He discusses first the nature of theology as distinguished from religion, and makes the distinction between them to be identical with that between the intuitional and logical consciousness. We here see again the strange apprehension that he manifests to coming in contact with the Bible. Theology, with him, is not a formal statement of truth taken from the word of God, but a reduction of spiritual intuitions into a logical system, which is progressive with the progressive development of the intuitional consciousness. The necessity for it arises only from the imperfection of our powers of intuition. Here, again, we must differ from him most seriously.

He states that the necessary conditions of a theology are but two,—

“A religious nature, awakened by the development of the Christian life; and the application of logical reflection to the elements of Divine truth, which that life spontaneously presents.” “The existence of the Scriptures, *as such*, was not *essential* to the rise and maintenance of Christian theology at all.”

Here, again, we have the old sophism of confounding the sub-

jective and the objective, and arguing from the conditions of the one to the non-existence of the other. We grant that Christian theology, as a subjective fact, cannot exist properly in the history of an individual or a community where there is no piety; but it does not follow from this admission that it cannot exist, as an objective fact, in a formal, logical statement of truth. Has Schleiermacher's theology, which our author has copied so closely, no existence apart from the minds that receive it? Undoubtedly it has. If, then, this may be true of a human theology, why may it not of a divine?

We object, also, to his statement of the source from which the materials of theology are to be drawn, and the fact that gives rise to a necessity for its existence. He says that the source of its materials is the intuitional consciousness; that its function is simply to classify these intuitions; and that the necessity for its existence is solely because of the imperfection of this power. For the refutation of these positions, we appeal to the whole history of Christian theology, and the consciousness of every theologian. And we are sure that we are but stating the clear testimony of both when we say, that its materials are drawn from the Bible; that it is a classification of the facts and statements of the Bible, precisely as every other science is a classification of the facts that lie within its field; that in its construction both the logical and intuitional consciousness are brought in play; and that its necessity arises from the form in which God has revealed himself to man, having scattered the elements of theology through successive revelations contained in the Bible, precisely as he has scattered the facts of botany, geology, or any other science that has ever been constructed; and that theology is as strictly an inductive science as any that exists, its object being to draw out into scientific form the theology already revealed in the Bible. These points we have not space to argue, nor do we think they need any laboured argument. However Mr. Morell or his German friends may get their theology, we affirm that, right or wrong, the fact is indisputable, that Protestant theologians obtain their theology from the Bible. They may misinterpret the Bible, just as the astronomers may misinterpret some facts in the stars; but in each case the process is the same,—a classification of facts that have an independent, objective existence, exterior to himself.

His theory of the progressive character of theology, corresponding to the progressive advance of the intuitional consciousness of the Church, we also object to most earnestly. It is not a progressive comprehension of the materials of theology already existing, which we might admit; but an actual increase of the materials themselves, which we most emphatically deny. We can see no important dif-

ference between this and Mr. Newman's theory of development, with the single exception that Mr. Newman furnishes a stable ground on which the mind may rest, although it be a false one; whilst Mr. Morell leaves us to the shifting phantasmagoria of human reason. What the legitimate tendency of this system is, may be seen in the case of O. A. Brownson, who, wearied with this everlasting chase of phantoms, and having repudiated the sure word of prophecy, threw himself blindly into the arms of the Romish Church. Such we believe will be the result of the theory in many minds. Where it does not drive into sheer infidelity, it will force into Romanism. It agrees with Popery in repudiating the Bible as a sole rule of faith and practice, and it furnishes no such ground of certitude as Popery proposes in its stead. The result can be easily foreseen, for men would rather anchor in the sand than drift, chartless and rudderless, on the trackless waters.

We are also pained with his mode of alluding to the fundamental doctrines of Christian theology. One of these is, the sinfulness of man. According to a man's view of this doctrine will be his estimate of Christ and his theory of religion. This is a standing fact in human nature, and one that cannot be omitted in a philosophy of religion. We have, then, a right to demand of Mr. Morell what he thinks on this great question, and where it stands in his philosophy. But the gingerly mode in which he touches it, shows either that he is unwilling to avow his sentiments in the face of the Demigorgon of German philosophy, or that he has no distinct sentiments to avow. The clearest utterance he has given of himself is in such a sentence as the following:—

“This perfect state of the intuitional consciousness has been disturbed; at any rate, it does not naturally exist.”—P. 182.

The only meaning we can gather from this is, some people think that man has fallen and is corrupt, and hence needs a religion; this may or may not be; my philosophy cares nothing about that; at any rate, his intuitional consciousness is not perfect. And is this all? The philosophy of Paul, and we say it with reverence, the philosophy of Jesus Christ, uttered no such Delphic responses as this. With them the fundamental fact in religion was, that man is lost, that he is dead in trespasses and sins; and on this great fact was based the necessity for all those processes and acts, objective and subjective, that we include under the terms religion, revelation, Christianity, and theology.

He next discusses the conditions, the method, and the development of Christian theology, in which are several points which we

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reluctantly pass by. He concludes with stating the uses of Christian theology, in which he forcibly shows its importance. We ask, if it be thus useful, is it not important that it be true? This importance does not of course depend on its origin, but its nature. If, then, God saw it to be thus useful to us, is it not likely that he would furnish us with it? If man can construct such a system for himself, why cannot God, who gave him his faculties, do the same thing? What advantage has it in being human, and therefore imperfect in its origin? Has it any other than that it gives human speculation free range to construct its castles of cloud according to caprice? If, as he admits, page 204, a theology "may appeal to *every element* in the nature of man," were it not surprising if such an agency should be left to the bungling construction of every builder of theories? If these things are so, we have swept away his fundamental positions of the impossibility and the uselessness of a revealed theology.

The chapter on the analysis of popular theology has the same radical errors with the one just noticed. His analysis extracts from it three elements; the historical facts, the intuitional perceptions, and the logical distribution and construction of the system, page 211. His eagerness to limit the teachings of the Bible to mere historical statements has led his analysis astray. It is a matter of universal experience and observation, that popular theology finds in the Bible something more than mere historical facts; that it discovers also doctrinal teachings, and that the office of the logical understanding is to classify these doctrinal teachings as well as the historical facts. His excessive eagerness has led him to the employment of language that grates harshly on our ears. For example, in speaking of the death of Christ, page 48, he says: "As a fact of sense, this is no more than the murder of any innocent man that ever lived." The only meaning that we can gather from this singular statement is, that to one who had no theory of redemption in which this death held position as a great agency, it had no more significancy than the death of Socrates. Had the Roman centurion any such theory, when, in looking at this "fact of sense," he exclaimed, "Truly this man was the Son of God?" If Mr. Morell means to deny the miraculous attendants of the death of Christ, why not openly do so, instead of accomplishing the same end by an indirection? If not, why use language that implies this denial?

He also exhibits his usual lucklessness in referring to the Scriptures when, on page 220, he puts the beautiful words of our Lord, "God so loved the world," &c., into the mouth of the apostle John. This ignorance or carelessness about the Bible, whichever it may be, ex-

cites the most painful emotions, when appearing in one who comes to persuade us to give up the Bible for the shadowy dreamings of the intuitional consciousness. We cannot but think that if he knew more of the Bible, and studied it more, he would think better of it.

The chapter on Fellowship has much in it which we would like to discuss, did our limits permit. Take, for example, the following, page 232: "The essential idea of Christian fellowship is concentrated in the hallowed unanimity of religious *feeling*, created by the common experience of that new and Divine *life* which was first awakened in man by Christ and his apostles. Wherever this Divine *consciousness* is so developed in the heart as to predominate over the modes of thinking and feeling common to the unchristianized world and the unsanctified mind, there is a member of Christ's spiritual kingdom." A man then becomes a Christian by a predominance of the Divine consciousness over his unsanctified mind. We had thought that he became a Christian by believing on the Lord Jesus Christ; that as soon as he had thus believed he was justified; and that the work of sanctification was a subsequent and distinct matter. Thus at least Paul teaches, but he had not the advantage of studying Schleiermacher, or seeing the light of modern philosophy.

Again he tells us, page 232: "The design of Christian fellowship is threefold, namely, to develop, to preserve, and to propagate the Christian life." Much of this, we had thought, was the work of the Holy Spirit, but in reading this book we have not so much as heard whether there be a Holy Ghost.

He then discusses the outward bond of unity in Christian fellowship, in which he protests against all formulas of faith as a bond of fellowship. There is nothing in this chapter which may not be found as ably put in the attacks of Unitarians on creeds that did not allow them to enjoy the emoluments of orthodoxy, while indulging the luxury of heterodoxy; and in the writings of Alexander Campbell. The result of this sort of religious sentimentalism may be seen in the patched and piebald condition of Unitarianism and Campbellism in this country, if Mr. Morell has never seen it in England. He differs from them, however, in his doctrine of the organic life of the Church, in which his teachings might be adopted almost *verbatim* by the staunchest Puseyite. So strangely do opposite errors meet, when they leave the centre of truth.

The chapter on Certitude occupies a very important position in our author's theory, touching as it does the foundation on which all philosophy rests. In his Lectures on the Philosophical Tendencies of the Age, he makes this the principle of classification, by which he arranges all existing systems of philosophy. It is therefore a

central point in his theory, being simply the ground of certainty that man has for his religious belief. It resolves itself very easily and obviously into a discussion of the rule of faith. He admits but three kinds of certitude,—logical, intuitional, and a mixture of the two. All statements resting on testimony can amount only to a higher or lower probability. This position is not a little startling; for, we ask, suppose the testimony be certainly that of God himself,—and surely it cannot be denied that this, at least, is possible,—do the truths thus declared amount only to a probability? This is a point that demanded the most explicit discussion, for it lies at the very foundation of the Christian system; yet Mr. Morell dismisses it with a mere passing remark;—a remark, however, that throws a doubt over the whole subject of apologetic Christianity.

He then discusses the ground of certitude assumed by Rationalism and Traditionalism, to which we have nothing special to object. His remarks here are only a condensation of his lectures on Individualism and Traditionalism, in his work on the Philosophical Tendencies of the Age. But when he takes up the theory that rests it on the letter of the Bible, we have very much to object; much more than we have room to express. His entire argument is an evasion of the real question at issue, coupled with an ingenious play upon the phrase, “letter of the Bible.” The question in discussion is, can we rest our belief on the dictum of the Bible, when clearly ascertained, as a sure foundation of faith? This he meets by the old Jesuitical trick of parading the difficulties of determining what is the word of God, and what it means, and that to ascertain its meaning we must appeal to our logical faculties. He therefore sagely concludes that our final appeal is to reason, and that thus this theory coincides with the fundamental principle of Rationalism. This paltry sophism is really unworthy such a mind as our author’s. Surely it is one thing to appeal to reason in the interpretation of a document, and quite another to appeal to reason for the truth of the statements thus interpreted. The former is the theory he attempts to combat, the latter the theory of Rationalism. Take for example the case of a will. It may be a very difficult thing to authenticate that will, difficult to interpret it when authenticated, and necessary to argue conflicting interpretations, and appeal to reason in support of the true one; but on what do we rest the rights created under the testament? Not on our interpretation; not on our reason; but on the authority of the instrument itself,—an authority derived from the fact that it utters the will of the testator. A lawyer who would object to the binding character of a will, because, in settling the meaning of it, it was necessary to appeal to reason, would be laughed to

scorn. The process is precisely analogous to that used in the interpretation of the Bible. Yet this form of the question has been as completely evaded by Mr. Morell as it has been by the adroit polemics of the Church of Rome, when discussing the same point in settling the rule of faith.

The substitute he proposes for the word of God, is contained in the following most satisfactory and intelligible words: "The highest appeal for the truth of our theological sentiments must be the catholic expression of the religious consciousness of purified humanity in its eternal progress heavenward." In the name of darkness, what does this mean? We must then believe what the catholic consciousness of purified humanity believes. But what does it believe? And how and where has it uttered this belief? We cannot escape the answer of the honest Milesian in such a case, who, when asked what he believed, replied, "What the Church believed." "But what does the Church believe?" "What I believe." "And what do you both believe?" "We both believe alike." We can really make nothing more satisfactory of this theory of certitude. And we are very certain that if Mr. Morell were to bring his philosophy to this chosen tribunal, the verdict must be one of absolute condemnation, he himself being the witness.

The next chapter is on the significancy of the Past. This he finds in a struggle of reason against authority, first by means of the Aristotelian philosophy, then the Baconian; and now, with a higher philosophy than either, he hopes to see the struggle ended in the triumph of the higher reason. All that we can gather from this is, that the Bible, as an authoritative rule of faith, is to be swept away; that the Baconian philosophy is to be flung to the moles and the bats; and that we are to build the mighty structure of Christianity on the huge cloud-mountain of Teutonic philosophy. And this is the millennium of the Philosophy of Religion! To us the significancy of the Past is widely different. The Church of God is built upon a rock, set forth in the revealed word of the Most High. Against this rock wave after wave have dashed in the past, each covering it with spray, and threatening to engulf it in ruin; but when the waves had rolled sullenly back, the rock was there still. And now, though there dashes against it a billow with a prouder crest and a wilder foam than any that preceded it, yet when that billow has spent its fury, and returned all shivered and broken to the deep, the rock will still stand, unscathed and unshaken, the beacon of the world.

The concluding chapter, on the relation of philosophy to theology, contains but little that has not been previously discussed, and we hence pass it without any further notice.

When in April, 1848, it was reported that one hundred thousand men were to meet on Kensington Common, and march to the House of Commons, demanding a redress of their grievances, no small alarm was diffused throughout all England. The danger was unseen and undefined, and men were filled with a secret dread. But when the day arrived, and this vast army dwindled into a few dyspeptic looking radicals, who slunk away from their own shadow, the whole affair was extinguished in laughter, as a "muscipular abortion." It was with something of the same dread that we anticipated the onset of this new philosophy. It loomed so gigantically through the mist, and defied the armies of Israel with so Goliathan an air, that we trembled for the ark of God. But the giant has come forth from the mist, and we find that we have been terrified at a shadow. It is the same old champion, who has been met and conquered a hundred times, and who only appears in new armour and with a new name. We therefore breathe more freely, and may go on with our appropriate work. This satisfaction is the more complete, because of the medium through which the attack is made. Although this work has not impressed us with an exalted estimate of Mr. Morell's logical abilities, yet, together with his preceding books, it shows him to be a fair expounder of the Teutonic philosophy. He has stripped it of its robe, its mask, and its buskins; and enabled us to grapple with it hand to hand: but in disrobing, he has disenchanted it. Unless it is something mightier than this, we have little to fear from it more than from any previous form of error, and philosophy, falsely so called. It will be a nine-days' wonder, and then pass away into oblivion. True, it may do much harm during its time, but will produce no such changes in the opinions of the Christian world as its friends hope or its enemies fear.

We wish to raise no senseless clamour against Mr. Morell or his book, nor excite any *odium theologicum*. But as he has spoken without scruple of the most sacred and cherished articles of our faith, we have but dealt in equal frankness with him. We believe Mr. Morell to be a sincere and earnest man, one who reverences Christianity, and really desires its advancement, but we also believe that for this very reason his influence may be the more pernicious; for in attempting to make a compromise with the enemies of truth, he has compromised truth itself; and in abandoning what he deemed mere antiquated outposts to the foe, he has surrendered the very citadel.