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The Ethnological Objection :

THE UNITY OF THE HUMAN RACE.

BY

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THERE are few more striking scenes in ancient history than the appearance of Paul on Mars Hill, before an audience of Athenians. As a mere spectacle, and irrespective of any interest attaching to it deeper than an incident in the past, it is impressive, and indeed sublime. Before him stretched one of the most magnificent landscapes on which the sun has ever shone. At his feet lay the city of Pericles and Phidias, a gem of loveliness, on which art had lavished the perfection of her most exquisite development, and which nature had set in the glittering beauty of forest, river, and sea, shading off its distant bordering with the more rugged grandeur of Pentelicus and Hymettus. Around him gathered the sneering Epicurean, the stern Stoic, the phlegmatic Academician, the cunning priest, the mercurial citizen, jealous of the glory of his peerless metropolis, and the motley rabble who thronged to the Areopagus, eager to hear anything new, and ready to break out into the fiercest rage, if that novelty should prove unpalatable to their whims, their prejudices, or their passions. Confronting that restless, excitable, and glaring crowd, stood a solitary individual, not heralded by national glory or personal fame, an unknown, unfriended man, from an obscure and despised nation, who came to fling down the gauntlet to superstitions venerable with an undated antiquity, gorgeous with all that art could create in the very home of her most exquisite perfection, and fortified, at once, by the passions of the many and the interests of the few; a man, who came to do more than Socrates had ever dared or Plato had ever done; who came to tell the Athenians that they were ignorant on the very subject where they considered themselves specially intelligent, and mistaken on the very points where they were most haughtily confident; and who came to demand their renunciation of the sublime teachings of their renowned schools, and their entire submission to the teachings of an unknown and crucified Jew. There is something in the intrepid heroism of such a position that makes it one of the most striking scenes in ancient history.

But it has elements of deeper interest than this. It was the Christianity of the East confronting the philosophy and civilization of the West; the reason of man encountering the revelation of God; the opening passage at arms of that great contest between science, falsely so called, and the truth as it is in Jesus; a contest which has been continually renewed from that day to this, with each new phase of a godless and faithless rationalism. How suggestive and instructive was the encounter! On the one side we see a quiet and unpretending, but fearless and trusting spirit, too confident of its strength to lose its calm heroism, and too conscious of its weakness to forget its lowly humility, with no parade of learning and no display of power; on the other side, a proud, sneering, and conceited spirit inflated with a confidence in its own powers, and despising the presumptuous babbler who had never traversed the shades of the Academy or learned the language of the Porch. Yet when eighteen hundred years have passed, the subtleties and logomachies of the Epicurean and the Stoic are forgotten, whilst the loftiest minds and the purest hearts of the race are bending with admiring reverence over the pages of this babbler of the Areopagus. The philosophies of Zeno and Epicurus, Plato and Aristotle, have been thrown aside as antiquated and obsolete, whilst the Christianity of Paul, to the last letter of its teaching is, this day, sustaining the faith and brightening the hope of millions.

It becomes therefore a matter of instructive interest to examine what were the doctrines deemed essential to be maintained by Paul in this encounter. Occupying a position of such extreme delicacy and danger, he would peril neither his cause nor his person by the gratuitous assertion of doubtful or irrelevant propositions. Before an audience of Athenians and philosophers, whom his whole discourse shows he was anxious to conciliate and convert, he would adduce nothing but the most essential and fundamental truths pertaining to Christianity, truths so vital as to require him to stake his cause on their successful defence. What then are these doctrines? He was speaking to a nation of polytheists, a people who had tenanted every rock and river, every mountain and plain with their innumerable deities, and who, in the thronging multitudes of their gods and demigods, demons and heroes, had lost sight of the one great unseen, unchangeable, but to them, unknown Jehovah. Hence with an elegance of exordium, whose tact, beauty, and courtesy, are almost unequalled in

the history of ancient eloquence, he assails the fundamental position of polytheism, and asserts the existence, the attributes, the sovereignty and the claims of the one, great God.

But he was also addressing a people who regarded themselves as *αὐτοχθόνες*, sprung from the sacred soil of Attica, underived and independent of all other families of mankind. But in direct contradiction to a theory suggested by their pride, and cherished by their philosophy, Pauls deems it essential to Christianity to assert that the unity of the divine involved the unity of the human, that the oneness of the source from which the race of man came forth, found its proper counterpart in the oneness of that race itself, and that the ethnological distribution of that race was not a matter of random chance, but of specific divine appointment and direction. "God that made the world and all things therein hath made of *one blood* all nations of men, for to dwell on all the face of the earth; and hath determined the times before appointed and the bounds of their habitation." Acts xvii. 26. Here then in the very first encounter of Christianity with human philosophy, its great expounder asserts as essential doctrines in its teachings, that all men have been derived from a single source, having a unity of blood-relationship, which implies a unity of origin; and that the geographical distribution of the various nations or families of men, and the epochs of their history, are not matters of chance, or undirected general law, but of specific divine appointment.

The mere fact that a man of such consummate tact and courtesy as Paul, deemed it necessary to assert the unity of the human race among a people who held its diversity by claiming for themselves a separate origin on the soil, is a proof that he regarded it as essential to Christianity. The studied adaptation of his discourse to Athenian customs and forms of thought proves, that if this doctrine so offensive to the pride of that jealous and scornful people, could have been suppressed or explained away, it would have been done, that no unnecessary obstacle might be thrown in their way to the reception of Christianity. But side by side with the unity of the divine nature does he place the unity of the human race as a truth correlative, supplementary, and equally essential to the Christian system.

The reason of this juxtaposition and of the stress laid on this doctrine, is involved in the subsequent parts of his discourse. He there glances at the dealings of God with the human race in the

past, present and future, showing in those dealings the unity of a mighty purpose that binds all the race in one common destiny to its one common God, the twofold aspects of which destiny in their terrible contrasts of weal and of woe, shall be unfolded in the dread scenes of a common resurrection and a common judgment. But his epistles explain more fully the earnestness and prominence bestowed on this doctrine. The theory of sin and redemption which Paul believed to underlie the entire system of Christianity, reposes in its last analysis on the unity of the human race.

This is distinctly and emphatically asserted in the fifth chapter of Romans, where the parallel is run at length between the fall of the race in Adam and its redemption in Christ. "By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin, and so death passed upon all men." "As by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous." Rom. v. 12, 19. "For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive." "The first man Adam was made a living soul, the last Adam was made a quickening spirit." "The first man is of the earth, earthy, the second man is the Lord from heaven." 1 Cor. xv. 22, 45, 47. As Adam is the natural head of all that sin, and all that die, so Christ is the spiritual head of all that are saved from the guilt of that sin, and the sting of that death. The universal headship of the one finds its proper and only counterpart in the universal headship of the other. The salvation in Christ runs parallel with the depravity that is traced to Adam, and if we cut off any portion of the human race from its connection with Adam, we thereby cut it off from its connection with Christ, and all the hopes that are garnered up in his atoning work. If we close to any nation on earth the pathway that leads to Eden, all stained though it be with blood, and all blistered though it be with tears, we by that act close to them the more precious pathway that leads to Calvary, and deny them the boon of those gushing streams that come forth from the cross to wash away the dark and sorrowful traces of sin that lie all along the highway of human history. This question, therefore, is not one of mere idle speculation, but one whose relations are entwined with all that is most precious and vital to Christianity.

The effort to evade the force of these considerations by affirming that the Bible speaks only of the historic races, is one that demands little attention, until it is shown that the non-historic races neither sin, nor die, nor have any capacity of sharing salva-

tion in Christ. If depravity and death are the peculiar heritage of the superior races, and a title to heaven a thing dependent on the hue of the cuticle and the texture of the hair, then we may assert the original diversity of the race, without impeaching the Bible. But if in Adam all sin and die who do sin and die, and in Christ all are made alive who are made alive, then this evasion of the manifest teachings of the Bible is to stultify Moses and to falsify Paul. That Moses must have known of the existence of the colored races, is evident from the pictures on the tombs in Egypt, dating back, it is alleged, beyond his period, and distinctly portraying these races as we find them now. Yet he tells us that Adam was the first man created; that Eve was the mother of all living; that the Ethiopic and Egyptian races were descended from Noah through Cush and Mizraim; and that the divided nations of the earth are the sons of Adam. And that the physical characteristics of the Cushite or Ethiopian were what they are now, is proven by the aphorism alluding to his skin. The same doctrine is endorsed by our Lord when he enforces monogamy by the original unity of the race in Adam and Eve, and when to fulfil the prophecies concerning Ethiopia, the distant nations, and the isles of the sea, he commanded his disciples to go forth into *all the world*, and preach the gospel to *every creature*. And we cannot think it wholly devoid of significance that the man who was chosen to aid our Lord in bearing his cross to the bloody hill was Simon of Cyrene, an African; and that one of the earliest converts to Christianity was an eunuch of the court of Candace, queen of Ethiopia.

Hence the right of these non-historic races to the salvation of Christ has been clearly recognized by Christ and his apostles, and this recognition brings after it the implication that they are descended from Adam, by the express teaching of Paul. We challenge the right to offer the salvation that is in Christ to any creature not descended from Adam, any more than to brutes on the one hand and devils on the other. It is restricted by Paul to the sons of Adam, so that whoever proves himself a son of Adam, thereby proves his right to this salvation; and *vice versa*, whoever proves by the fact that he is saved, that he has a right to this salvation, thereby proves his descent from Adam. The doctrine, therefore, of the unity of the human race is one that is essential to Christianity as Paul taught it, and hence vital to the divine origin of the Bible.

But we are told by some who call themselves ethnologists, that science has exploded this dogma, and shown that this descent of all men from Adam is impossible, and hence that we must abandon this ground, if not abandon Christianity itself. Now if it be true that the unity of the race is demonstrated to be an impossibility, we must acknowledge ourselves to be in a perplexity at least, if not an inextricable difficulty. But the wonder arises how this infant science, which has scarcely left its leading strings should be able so soon to pronounce with such dogmatic certainty on the possibilities and impossibilities of five or six thousand years ago. The very word impossibility is falling out of the vocabulary of science, since the alleged impossibilities of one year are becoming the tritest actualities of the next. When, therefore, we find this beardless science, in any of its advocates, pronouncing so dogmatically on this high and solemn question, we are ready to infer that it has not only the bold confidence of youth, but also some of its rash presumption. This inference is strengthened by the fact that so many of the first scholars of the world, who have been studying these topics for years, have been unable to perceive this impossibility, and continue to maintain this exploded doctrine. Were the question to be decided by the authority of great names, we would be perfectly contented to place the two classes in juxtaposition, and allow the decision to fall where the lustre of scientific fame is brightest and broadest. But as this could decide nothing absolutely, we are willing to come to closer quarters, and grapple with the ethnological objection directly, and we meet the averment that the specific and original unity of the human race is impossible with a flat and emphatic denial.

We wish our position here to be distinctly understood. We believe that the question of the exact origin of the different varieties of the human race is one of history rather than of physical science. Hence the real and decisive points on which it rests are first: Has the Bible definitely pronounced on this subject? and, secondly, Is the Bible inspired of God, and therefore a reliable history of facts? Both these points we believe to have been clearly proved, and hence the whole weight of the Christian evidences must be set aside before the unity of the race can be demonstrated to be untrue. It is however alleged as an objection to these evidences that science has shown this unity to be impossible. All therefore that we are bound by the laws of disputation to do, is to make out a simple case of possibility, and the whole weight of the

substantial to substitute in its stead? Though the vision of distant water, which oft delights the fancy of the famishing emigrant over the great western desert, be but a mere optical illusion; yet if he is beyond all hope of any real slaking of his burning thirst, the illusion is harmless as it is delightful. Grant then that the landscape of lake, or running stream and overhanging shade which gleams a paradise before his enraptured sight, is all the trick of the deceptive *mirage* which will ever recede before him and vanish at last into thin air; still it is no high act of benevolence to inflict upon his eager though jaded spirit a display of your superior knowledge of meteorology in demonstrating that all is false and unreal. If there is yet hope for him—if in some other quarter you have found a spring—nay, even a stagnant pool, at which the intense cravings of his thirst may be satiated; then indeed spare not;—in mercy to him dash in pieces the vain deception, that he waste not his little remaining energy in pursuit of a phantom. But if you have no other hope to set before him, and his doom is inevitable, then in mercy let him go on undeceived. As nature fails—as one after another the springs of life dry up, let the beautiful illusion still feast his imagination; as reason now totters on her throne and the wild dreams of delirium rush thick upon him, let them be pleasant dreams of bliss;—let him lave his soul in the cooling delusion, till the eye, glazed in death, heed no longer the glare of the fiery sun; and the cries of his thirsty appetite have been hushed forever. Why come to torment him with your prosy disquisitions of the reflection and refraction of the atmosphere, as though begrudging him the single moment of bliss which relieves the inevitable horrors of his condition? As well should a physician, in order to settle a difference of opinion between himself and a dying patient, undertake by an *ante-mortem* demonstration, by the scalpel, to correct the error of his patient, and establish his own superior judgment in the diagnosis of disease.

It is not unimportant to have multiplied illustrations on this topic; since this not only is the hinge on which this controversy in great part turns, but the faith of thousands has become unsettled, from this very error of supposing it enough to discredit Christianity, that difficulties may be suggested in regard to it.

If then man must have a religion, and if, in the opinion of skepticism, Christianity is not the system to meet his wants, let skepticism devise some other scheme. Has this been done? It is

not intended here to argue in the abstract, the question of the possibility or impossibility of any satisfactory scheme of religion independent of a revelation; but simply as a matter of fact and history to reason from what *has been done*. If, after having employed the highest powers of a long line of philosophers, embracing the most gifted of the race, during a period of five thousand years, the problem of a religion for mankind has not yet been solved, it is very safe to infer that it cannot be done. I propose therefore to take a comprehensive and summary view of the answers which have been given by the most enlightened of those who have not known, or knowing, have rejected Christianity, to the inquiries which the spiritual constitution of man naturally prompts him to make in regard to his relation to God, and his own future destiny.

The question, "What is man to believe concerning God?" and "What duty does God require of man?" is one which, in the nature of the case, must interest every human being, who has ever reflected at all. A rational being with the mementoes of the evanescence of his present existence everywhere around him, and with the sense of ill-desert for wrong-doing ever within him, must naturally ask, whither am I going? Is the present life all of my existence? and shall this thinking, feeling principle within me perish with the body? or reaches it onward to another life? If so, then what is the nature of that life to come? What relation has this present to the future life? Shall that be a life of joy or sorrow? or shall it be a mere abstract existence incapable of any of the sensations of pain or pleasure that belong to the present? Does the relation I sustain to the being who hath made all things—and of whom I conceive, not only as a Maker and a Father, but as a Judge—affect the question of my future life? If so, is he favorable or hostile to my happiness? If not favorable, how may he be appeased? and on what conditions will he pass over guilt? To all such questions the gospel offers a full and direct answer, in terms which the most ignorant may comprehend. Its answer in general is—the Judge has made known his will and declared the terms of pardon. An atonement for sin has been made, by which is furnished a reason for which he can without derogating from that purity and justice, which you ascribe to him, regard with favor even creatures who have sinned. There is a future life, to which the present is but a preparatory state, and, in that life, eternal joy or eternal sorrow shall be the destiny of every

man, according as he may have received or rejected the offer of mercy.

Now to this answer infidelity demurs on various grounds; either that there *could* have been no such revelation from heaven, or if so, there is no sufficient evidence that it has been made; for however strong the testimony in behalf of the Bible as a revelation, it is still insufficient to counterpoise the anterior improbability that such a revelation should be made, the incredibleness of its statement of facts, and the insuperable difficulties which reason finds attending its doctrines.

We turn then, for a more rational and satisfactory answer to the inquiries of the human soul, to the teachings of philosophy, and in order to deal fairly and candidly with the system of skepticism, select only from the purest and noblest of its teachers. Let us, in imagination, then, follow some earnest and thoughtful inquirer in search of a religion which shall satisfy the wants of his nature, resolved in the spirit of a true eclecticism to gather from the best lights of every age.

It has been a favorite topic of declamation with our skeptics to exhibit the lofty heights of theoretical and practical religion to which the ancients attained without the aid of Christianity, as an evidence of what may be done in the way of choosing a religion of nature for men. Voltaire goes so far as to claim for ancient philosophy, not only the glory of originating a theory of religion superior in some respects to Christ's, but speaks in most complimentary terms of the pagan religion of antiquity as "containing a morality common to all men of all ages and places; and festivals which were no more than times of rejoicing, which could do no injury to mankind or to the morality of their votaries." It will be but fair then to allow our inquirer the advantage of the light to be obtained from the ancient as well as the modern philosophy.

Let our inquirer turn first then to the ancients with the inquiry, "What of God?" Tradition back to the remotest time instructs him that there is such a being to be revered. He is not now however in search of tradition, but of the clearer and more profound views of the most philosophic thinkers. "God," answers Pythagoras, "is the Universal Mind diffused through all nature; and the human soul but a spark stricken off from him as the great source of life." "God," answers Anaxagoras (and the answer is delivered amid the plaudits of his age), "is the Infinite Mind, which planned the motion and order of all things." "God,"

says Plato, "is the Maker and Father of the universe." But if now the inquirer proceed a step farther and ask, what is the nature of God? the relation in which God stands to us his creatures? all is vague and obscure. Socrates, who speaks most intelligibly of all concerning the care and providence of God, seems to conceive of him as a mere superior God, with hosts of inferiors through whom he administers human affairs. Plato seems to limit his omnipotence, and to ascribe a co-ordinate and co-extensive jurisdiction to an Infinite Spirit of evil, while the various schools represent God as hardly a personal Being at all, but a mere *principle* pervading the universe.

In answer to the still more practical inquiry, Does God exercise a providence over the affairs of men?—a question which according to Cicero, lies at the foundation of all religion—the utterances of ancient philosophy are still more vague and confused. Setting aside the scoffing of Epicurus, who banished God from any concern with the world which he has made, Cicero himself, who had the advantage of all previous speculations, and who wrote a treatise of the nature of God, regards the question of a Providence as a matter yet unadjudicated. And even Pliny laughs at the absurdity of supposing, that Divinity should take upon himself so troublesome a ministry as the care of human affairs. Among those even who maintained the doctrine of a Providence, as Epictetus informs us, it was a matter of high dispute, whether his care extended only to heavenly things, or also to things pertaining to this earth; and even those who held the latter opinion contended for nothing farther than a providence over generals, without extending to individuals. According to the Stoics—the most virtuous and intelligent of all the sects—God himself, in the exercise of this providence, is governed by an iron Fate, or Destiny, which controls his actions.

In reference to the immortality and future destiny of the soul, nothing can be more uncertain and contradictory than the utterances of the most enlightened writers of antiquity. The notion of the immortality of the soul, which they confessed to have been the most ancient and universal belief of mankind—so far from becoming more definite and certain, with the advance of philosophy, was really obscured if not entirely subverted. Whole schools, as the Cynics and the Epicureans, held that the soul died with the body; and others who talked most sublimely of the immortality of the soul, the larger portion founded their faith on the assump-

tion that the soul being an emanation from Divinity, and a portion of the general soul of the world, shall therefore not perish but be "re-absorbed," as Seneca expressed it, "into the ancient elements." The very position on which Plato mainly founds his celebrated argument, destroys in effect this personal existence of the soul after death—"Of necessity," says he, "the soul is an un-generated, and therefore an immortal thing." Socrates, notwithstanding his elevated and consoling speculation of the nature of the soul, declares as the result of all his reflections, "whether a better state follows the present is known only to God." Cicero, who, in spite of the affectation peculiar to the new Academy—which eschewed all positive opinion—speaks with something of the confidence of a philosopher in his learned treatises on this subject, yet in familiar letters to friends expresses himself doubtfully and inconsistently—ofttimes declaring death to be the end of all things. Seneca, who undertook the task of administering to the world consolation in sorrow, has no higher consolation to offer at the death of a friend, than the poor sophism—"aut beatus aut nullus."

In short, the noblest utterances of ancient philosophy on the whole subject of God, and man's relation to God and a future state, so far from enlightening and confirming the popular faith, surrounded the conception of God with an obscurity, which in effect tended to banish the idea from the popular mind. While they seemed to admit the existence of such a Being, they at the same time banished him from all direct practical control of the affairs of man. Those of them who have made themselves immortal by their philosophical demonstrations of the immortality of the soul, in effect obscured and subverted the popular faith in this doctrine. On the subject of a future retribution, the very same authors promulgated the most opposite opinions. Nay, Plato himself, the great expounder of the theory of retribution, absolutely rejected this notion as a practical faith for the people merely on the ground of political inexpediency.

Such then are the elements of the great results of ancient teaching, out of which must be framed a system of faith, which shall meet the wants of humanity, in lieu of the system of the gospel which infidelity proposes to reject. Is there anything here which a true philosopher would be willing to substitute in the popular mind, for the sublime and simple faith of the gospel, which teaches one God, a Father and Ruler—one Saviour—God manifest in the

flesh—one Divine Spirit which moves upon the soul—one kind Providence which numbers even the hairs of our head—a life after the death of the body which shall rectify the inequalities of the life that now is;—and a hope of abiding in his “presence where there is fulness of joy, and at his right hand where there are pleasures for evermore.”

Nay, the ancient philosophers themselves were far from desiring to substitute their own speculations for the faith of the masses, even absurd and inconsistent as they held that faith to be. They universally answered the question, “How is God to be worshipped?” by referring men to the religion of their country, their oracles and priests. Many of the most eminent of them, as Plato, purposely veiled their instructions in an obscurity impenetrable to ordinary thinkers. Cicero held it to be absolutely unlawful to declare the mysteries of the Supreme God to the vulgar. And however just might have been their views of religion, this could not in the nature of the case have furnished mankind with a religion. It might easily be shown, if time permitted, that a religious faith can never found itself on mere speculations, however just. The teacher of religion must teach “*by authority*, and not as the scribes.” Having no authority to enforce their instructions, the people at large concerned themselves little about their profound speculations. Some authority from heaven is essential to enforce the attention of men. It is evident, moreover, that the mere reasonings of philosophy, however just, cannot offer no practical ground of religious consolation and hope. They may amuse the light-hearted students of the Academy, but not console the sorrow-stricken and conscience-stricken inhabitant of a world of sin. The spirit disappointed with the vanities of life—the heart broken at the sepulchre of some heart-idol—the soul filled with dismay at the stern approach of death, are not in a frame to follow out the subtleties of philosophy, and comprehend the certainty of its conclusions, however just.

Many of the ancient philosophers themselves, as if conscious of this difficulty, never referred inquirers who asked after instruction in practical religion, to their own disquisitions. Cicero enjoined upon every man to worship God according to the religion of his country. Plato, in the Republic, declares that, what God Supreme is, and how he is to be worshipped, is best left to the Oracle at Delphos.

Indeed, so far from aiming to recover the masses from the super-

stitutions of this popular idolatry, the ancient philosophers, with singular insincerity, encouraged their superstitions. It is a notorious fact, that in the contest between Christianity and idolatry, the philosophers were the principal supporters of Paganism. They prostituted their genius and learning to make idolatry in all its forms respectable. They allegorized the monstrous fables of the poets so as to give them a semi-philosophic currency. Indeed, they hesitate not to defend even the stupid animal worship of Egypt, as containing under an obscure veil the highest wisdom. With such proofs before them of the insincerity of their great intellectual leaders, no wonder the masses of the people should treat their speculations with contempt. Nor was this want of confidence in the speculations of philosophy peculiar to the masses of the people. To say nothing of the professed skeptics, the new Academy, embracing Cicero himself, held nothing to be certain—nothing to be positively affirmed. Without any of the affectation of the new Academy, Socrates, with true humility, affirmed: "This only I know, that I know nothing." All intelligent men complained of the uncertainty of all knowledge. Diodorus Siculus openly charged the Greek philosophy with leading mankind into perpetual doubt even in regard to the plainest truth. It is needless to add that in this state of the case, no sincere inquirer could look to this quarter for light in the great matter of religion.

Having thus seen that the ante-Christian philosophers, notwithstanding the frequent reference to them in such a tone of triumph, offer no relief to the difficulties of infidelity in devising a religion for mankind, we now inquire whether the *anti-Christian* philosophers of modern times, though having the advantage of the labors of their predecessors, as well as of much light borrowed from Christianity itself, have yet, after near 2,000 years, devised any system of instruction for those who inquire what man is to believe concerning God—what duty God requires, and what destiny has in store for man? And both because this investigation must be very brief, as well as because it is our purpose to allow infidelity the advantage of exhibiting only its most enlightened and illustrious efforts of reason, I shall confine this view to a few of the most remarkable schools of philosophy since the revival of learning. What then have those who rejected Christianity as the religion for human nature proposed to substitute in its stead?

If there be any more rational theory of religion to be found on which the soul of man in its natural eagerness to know something

of its relation to the universe and its destiny may stay itself, it ought certainly to be found here.

Lord Herbert, with whom the list commences, admits fully the absolute necessity of a religion for men; and having rejected the Christian notion of a revelation from God as unnecessary, boldly undertakes to construct a system in its stead. That there is a God who is to be worshipped with acts of piety and virtue; that there are sins for which if men would be pardoned they must repent; and that there are rewards and punishments in a future life;—are the articles of faith, which do in his view constitute a creed for a universal religion—sufficient for all the wants of the human soul. I cite this creed not only as that which comes historically first in the series of modern infidelity, and is therefore important; but because also it is in itself a full admission of the theory of the whole subject by which it is proposed here to test infidelity, to wit: that some faith is necessary for man, and that the philosophy which rejects Christianity, is to be held justly responsible to furnish man with a religion in its stead. In regard to this creed there is time here only to observe, first, that it is liable to all the objections which lie against Christianity as a system of dogmatism: secondly, that it is too vague and indefinite to answer any practical purpose for the great mass of men: thirdly, that it is impossible to *prove* the certainty of its articles, and therefore it rests on the ground of mere authority—and that the authority of Herbert, which is at least no higher than that of Christ—though Christ be shown to be a mere man—and lastly, because the creed has been in part, if not utterly repudiated, by the greater lights who have succeeded Lord Herbert in the work of enlightening the world by philosophy. Passing by this mongrel creed which has been rejected alike by Christians and philosophers, imagine now a man of ordinary intelligence, setting out most devoutly to consult the several oracles of philosophy which have been set up since that period for the guidance of men, asking, what is God? What is man's relation to him? What is to be man's destiny after the death of the body. Applying first to Bolingbroke, he is told to believe "that there is one supreme all-perfect Being—the eternal—the original cause of all things and of almighty power. But we must not ascribe to him any moral attributes, or deduce moral obligations from those attributes; or be guilty of the blasphemy of talking of imitating him. That this God made the world at first, and established the laws of the system, but now

has no more concern with its affairs—except so far perhaps as relates to collective bodies. As to the soul and its destiny—the soul is not distinct from the body, and therefore perishes with it. While it is of great use to believe the impression of immortality and of rewards and punishments hereafter—yet the whole thing is a fiction. That finally Reason discovers to man a law of nature founded in the human system and clear to all mankind.” But lest the inquirer shall be too curious, he is gravely informed not to expect too much. “Theists concur in ascribing to God all possible perfections; *yet they will always differ when they descend into any detail, and pretend to be particular about them, as they have always differed in their notions of those perfections.* Thus the only answer given is in substance, that there is a God of *all possible perfection*, but what those perfections are, is a question of detail about which philosophers differ. That men ought to believe, as men, and as a matter of expediency, that the soul is immortal, and that there are pains or pleasures in store for it hereafter, while as philosophers, they must perceive that this faith is mere humbug. From Shaftsbury such an inquirer would soon turn aside, deterred on the one hand by his tone of dogmatic contempt, and on the other by his declaration that all religious faith, beyond belief in the existence of God, is unnecessary. Nor will he be disposed to tarry long among the disciples of the school of French materialism, who denying “angel or spirit”—under the influence of a philosophy which makes matter the source and origin of all thought—with Voltaire doubts the existence of God himself, and utterly repudiates immortality for man—or with D’Alembert declares a God *unnecessary*. From such philosophy he shrinks back, as doing violence to the noblest impulses and instincts of his nature.

Imagine then an ordinary, though sincere and earnest mind, coming at length upon the “bristling formulas of the absolute” among the lofty-soaring idealists of modern Germany, where he finds a whole empire centred upon the investigation of three problems—The existence of God and his nature—The universe—The freedom and destiny of the human soul. He inquires first of Kant, and receives for answer in substance—Man has a conception of God—yet scientifically speaking, this conception cannot be regarded as anything else than the generalizing power of our own reason personified. Of course, he inquires here no further; for though he still feels eager for light on the subject of God and

the soul, he is dismissed to consult the "categorical imperative." and while he is assured that the answer of that oracle will declare to him the three truths—the existence of God, the liberty of man, and the immortality of the soul—yet no light whatever dawns upon his conscience, as to how from this existence of a God and the immortality of the soul to infer his relation to God as happy or unhappy forever. He turns now to Fichte: "You ask of God," says the philosopher, we have no conception of him save as the subject of thought, conceived of as absolute; all that we see in looking out upon the universe is the reflex of our own activity—the objectified laws of our own being. The "I" is the only object in the universe. "Self" is the absolute principle of all philosophy. "I" am the Creator of the universe. "I make it to realize my own self-development. The *thinking of the mind* is the active existence of God; so that man and God are identical. I then am God." With what horror will our plain inquirer turn from this—to him at least—unintelligible jargon? We may well imagine him to exclaim, "Is philosophy thus after attaining its sublimest heights, recurring again to the monstrous idolatry of ancient Paganism?"—"Changing the glory of the incorruptible God into an image like unto corruptible man?" "I," a man—am God? "The thinking mind is his active existence?" Then the philosopher who thinks thus sublimely is the highest of all developments of God! Nay, is not this conception worse than the ancient Paganism? For though that made man God, yet it chose the highest conception and attribute of man. In Jupiter it worshipped power—in Apollo, manly strength and beauty—in Venus the concentrated charms of woman! But we, after the advance of so many ages of improvement, must worship as our highest form of God, a little pipe-smoking high-Dutch philosopher! In contempt he turns next to Schelling as the antagonist of Fichte and of more "spiritual" views. Here he is told that before and independent of the existence of the wor'd, God is the undeveloped, impersonal, absolute essence from which all things proceed, but tending to personality in the production of the universe. Still more puzzled, he turns to Hegel and is told, "God is a mere process, ever unfolding, realizing himself in the human consciousness. God is the dialectic process of thought. In another aspect God is nature coming to self-consciousness—the absolute idea. Hence he exists only in knowledge. Therefore he can exist only in man. Or by another process assuming the truth which is ob-

vious, that "something and nothing are the same"—then God is nothing. Our inquirer, though still more puzzled, has at last this consolation, that here at length are two philosophers for once infinitely near an agreement. Rousseau complained that he found no two philosophers ever to agree, but that each one constituted a sect to himself. Here, however, are two between whom the difference is "the mere ghost of a departed quantity." One works out the conclusion, that the very highest development of God is a high-Dutch philosopher—the other decides, in infinitely close approximation to this, that God is nothing at all.

Or perhaps, now attracted by the imposing title of Eclecticism assumed by the more modern French philosophy, and imagining that here is truth in the grand collection of all the good things of all systems, he turns toward this quarter his inquiries, and in answer to the question, what we are to believe concerning God? he is told that God is the spontaneous Reason, the first and last principle of all things. Reason is literally a universal revelation. It is the mediator between God and man. It is the very "word made flesh." God thus everywhere present, returns to self-consciousness in man. In short, the divine nature is a simple Pantheism. I need not refer to other instances of the French school; for whatever variations and controversies the various sects may have had among themselves, all alike are characterized by their scoffs at all veneration for a personal Divine Being—and by their rejection of almost every idea of spiritual duty—and by substituting the mere vague idea of nature for the living God. Though the revolutions in French philosophy have been both as numerous and as remarkable as the revolutions of French politics, the results of them have been as far from promoting real truth, as have the political revolutions of promoting real personal and civil freedom.

Or if he turn away in disgust from these highest developments of philosophy in Europe, and seek with fond hope some light from the more practical labors of American thinkers—here too, to his surprise, he finds among those "professing themselves to be wise" the same dim and indefinite conceptions of the whole subject. In their effort to relieve Christianity—for which they profess the highest regard—from the incumbrances of superstition, they have gone from step to step in the work of improving their systems of "Rational Christianity" until, with singular diversity of view, they have propounded a jargon of strange conceits concerning God and the soul of man, which has all the wildness and extrav-

agance of the German which it imitates, without any of the dialectic acuteness and profuse learning which saves the German from utter contempt.

We make our inquiry of this oracle for some comprehensible and consistent truth concerning God with the less confidence, for that some of its priests give us notice in advance that in their esteem "consistency is *no* jewel;"—nor do they give in to the vulgar delusion that to make one's self understood is at all praiseworthy. "A foolish consistency," says Mr. Emerson, "is the hobgoblin of little minds. With consistency a great soul has nothing to do." "To be *great* is to be *misunderstood*. Socrates, Jesus, and Luther, were all misunderstood." Accordingly we find these marks of greatness in all their utterances concerning God and the duty man owes to God. An emasculated Christian philosophy, falsely so called, pipes ever in romance of "God in the air,"—in the hills—in the canvass and pencil of the painter. Whether God is a personal being, or the mere substratum of all things, seems not yet "understood." As to any duty which we owe to God, or with what affections of heart we shall worship,—these are obsolete ideas. "Purity of heart and the law of gravitation will yet be found to be identical." As to worship—"All nature is a temple of worship; and he who produceth any phenomena in nature is a true worshipper of God. "Laborare est orare." Work is worship. "All true work is sacred; in all true work, *were it but true hand labor, there* is something of divineness."* The world had heard before of the "dignity of labor;" and orators and poets had in figures of speech ascribed a sort of divinity to the labor of man, when contemplating it as harnessing up the lightning to run an express over continents; or as annihilating time and space by the agency of steam; or even in compelling the earth, by her mysterious processes, to yield the fruits which fill man's garner. But it will hardly be a doctrine "understood," much less felt to be in accordance with the feelings of a sincere inquirer after God, that mere bodily, or even mental toil, is the fittest worship he can offer the Creator and Father of all. Nor will such a man be likely to perceive the "consistency" of holding that "labor is worship" with the fact, that while indeed labor not only elevates and dignifies man, and supplies the wants of the needy, yet it is labor also, which moulds the false keys, and forges the false bill, and fills the world with base and

* Carlyle.

deceitful wares ;—no very acceptable acts of worship surely, to a God of purity and justice.

But whilst the developments of modern skepticism have been chiefly in the direction of a transcendentalism which professes to seek only more “spiritual” views ; and claims to have published a new and improved edition of Christianity, far more profound and spiritual than the old ; there has grown up side by side with this form of infidelity, another form more dangerous because more congenial with the tendencies of the age, and more palpable to the perception and comprehension of ordinary men. As a consequence of the remarkable extensions of the facts of physical science and of the applications of powerful and far-reaching generalizations to these facts when discovered, certain impulsive and ill-balanced minds, as in all periods of great mental excitement, seized with a wild fanaticism of science, and overleaping the barriers which reason and nature have set to limit the progress of human knowledge, have devised a sort of *Religion of Science*, in the character of whose Divinity the physical sciences are very strongly represented. One of these sects renders its religious homage to a God who appears to be conceived of, as an Almighty inventor and machinist, who having devised and put in motion a mere physical universe, has retired to a distance ; and as from some infinite eminence, contemplates with eternal complacency the smoothly moving wheel-work. Another sect, advancing as they suppose a degree or two higher, seem to conceive of God as of some great self-absorbed mathematical professor, forever establishing the great laws of physics, and superintending their practical operation in the physical universe. Whilst a third sect, holding it to be by no means a sufficiently exalted and sublime view of the nature of Divinity, to attribute to him any present concern with such trifles, conceive of him, as having merely acted at first in some past eternity, and glorified himself in giving its first impulse to the laws of nature, and then retired to await the *development* of these laws in the production of the physical universe ;—as some ancient capitalist having invested his means in productive stocks, retires at his ease to contemplate with ever-increasing pleasure the development of an ever-accumulating wealth. All these views alike banish God practically from the universe. They with mock reverence exalt him to a throne ;—but it is a throne shorn of its glory in a solitary and silent eternity. They profess most piously to believe in

God's existence, while the attributes of the existence which they ascribe to him, make it practically no existence at all. So far as relates to the character of that Being in whom man as a moral creature feels any interest;—so far as concerns Religion in the sense of something that is to enlighten the understanding, relieve the conscience, and elevate the moral nature;—this philosophy is literally “without God in the world.” Indeed, teaching as it does that man himself is but the higher “development” of mere animalism;—that originating at first in some fortuitous chemical experiment in which electric currents passing through matter have somehow organized an *animalculum*;—that thence starting in an infinite progress of transmigration, the animalculum becomes first a reptile—then the reptile a four-footed beast—and then the four-footed beast an ape—then the ape a man—then the man an Aristotle, a Bacon, a Laplace or a Newton;—this philosophy needs no God for its man in this life, nor any immortality for him in a life to come.

But let this suffice. It would be wearisome to detail the almost infinite catalogue of systems of minor note,—and profitless as wearisome. Nor need we care to exercise the privilege which the laws of war would justify, and in imitation of infidelity when attacking Christianity, array against our adversaries the fooleries of every insignificant skeptical sect that has burlesqued the name of infidelity. We have so far, in this search for a theory of religion to substitute for Christianity, endeavored to give infidelity the advantage of its best and highest efforts, unembarrassed by the follies of confessed failures. And notwithstanding this, the very mention of anything like *unity* as essential to any article of religion, is the keenest satire on skepticism. We have a right to demand, however, what creed can be gathered from this mass of opinions? If we are to select one, which is the true one? If we become Eclectics and select from all, on what principle make the selection? who is able to do it? We have a right to ask the question—and from us, it comes with infinite force and emphasis. Who is right, of all these innumerable sects of philosophy? How is the world to believe you, before you have first made at least some show of agreement among yourselves? Christians have drawn out the teachings of their religion into *creeds*—logical and consistent articles of faith—and with all their apparent diversity of opinion on other topics they at least must be admitted to agree on the fundamental points—of God—His relation to man—and

the destiny of the human soul. Let us see then in brief what sort of a creed on these vital topics we can glean from the philosophy on which infidelity relies instead of inspiration. Volney, the priest of Philosophism, pretended in imitation of Christians to form into a catechism the articles of infidel belief. We but follow a high example, therefore, in the endeavor to condense into this form the opinions which we have been considering.

Q. "What is God?" ANS. God is a name, the idea to be attached to which is not yet definitely determined. Our wisest teachers differ;—some holding that it denotes a mere *power* which first gave impulse to the universe; others regard the word as the name of a spirit that pervades all nature; others again as a mere logical symbol for the abstract and indefinite, ego—the infinity of the "I-hood."

Q. "Is not God then a Personal Being?" ANS. There have been those, both among the ancients and the moderns, who have so held. But as the light of modern philosophy has guided men into higher regions of speculation, this notion is becoming obsolete and left to the unscientific and superstitious vulgar—yet it must be confessed that some of our wisest men have earnestly held it.

Q. Does God concern himself with human affairs? ANS. This is a matter of speculative opinion. Some of our greatest teachers have held that *chance* directs all things. Others hold that *Fate* and *Destiny* rule the universe. Many, however, have argued most ingeniously for a rational jurisdiction of Providence. Of this class again, some hold the Providence to extend only to great affairs, while others contend that if Providence control not the small affairs, He cannot possibly control the greater. Some conceive of this jurisdiction as exercised personally, but most of the modern great men regard it unphilosophical to hold to any Providence, exercised in any other manner than through the agency of laws established from the very first.

Q. What of the human soul and its existence after this life? ANS. This is a merely speculative matter concerning which wise men must necessarily differ. The simplest theory on this subject, and that which is attended with the least difficulty, is *that there is no soul*. In this opinion, too, men of the most opposite philosophy, as the Materialists and Transcendentalists, seem in effect to agree. Another view of the subject perhaps equally simple, is that the question itself is one beyond the pale of true Philosophy. Thus one of our great lights has said, "The mومن doctrine

of immortality is separately taught, man is already fallen. No inspired man ever condescends to these evidences.* Yet it must be admitted that the most refined and subtle of the doctors in past times have taught that man has a soul, and that this soul is *perhaps* immortal. As to the relation of the future to the present, there is no certain opinion—nor can there be, owing to the uncertainty as to the nature of the soul. The prevailing tendency of opinion, however, is at present in an opposite direction from the views of the last age. Then the soul was conceived of as but the central point of acuteness and sensibility in a congeries of organs; its impulses of good and evil, were supposed to be secretions of the ganglia and the brain; and Cabanis demonstrated by the scalpel the process by which the vibrations of the nervous system were transformed into thought and emotion. At present the inclination of philosophy is rather to regard the term “*soul*” as a figure of speech—the representative of a popular “myth,” and though spoken of by the world at large as a real existence, the term as used by the more eminent philosophers denotes the mere allegorical drapery of an imaginary idea!

Such would be a specimen of the modern catechism of reason. Perhaps however the very conception of such a formula will be treated with disdain, as an antiquated and obsolete fashion of giving expression to religious faith; as restraining free inquiry in an age of “progress;” and as tending to trammel and embarrass the efforts of reason to enlighten mankind. If then we may not require of Infidelity such a “Confession of Faith”—drawn out into formal propositions from its sources of knowledge,—we may at least ask for the “Bible” of reason. Imagine then, that,—in a manner analogous to the collection into one volume of the writings of some thirty different authors of different eras, which Christians reverence as the revelation from God and the source of all their formulas of Faith, we have collected into one volume the theological teachings of the several philosophers who have united in rejecting Christianity. And in order to give Infidelity every possible advantage in the comparison, and the least possible embarrassment on the score of consistency, we will not demand of it any “Old Testament” in writings of an ancient era of civilization. Give us a “New Testament” embracing the modern golden era of philosophy;—a volume for the guidance of the world in theology embracing only the last and highest results of the speculations of a thousand

* Emerson.

Bible as a positive testimony on the point remains unimpaired. We are not bound to show how the varieties of the race have actually arisen, or what are the causes now or formerly at work to generate them; for this is the proper province of science, and not of theology. If however we should be able to show by admitted facts and principles of science that it is not only possible but probable that the varieties of the race have had a common origin, in a single pair, we pass beyond the absolute necessities of our position of defence, and construct an independent argument in favor of the scriptural record, the value of which will be in precise proportion to the strength of the probability we may be able to establish. With this explanation of the exact position we occupy, we are willing to meet the ethnological objection on its own chosen ground, as a matter of simple science.

As man possesses a physical constitution precisely analogous to that of the lower animals, it is perfectly fair for us to argue from the laws and capabilities of the one, to the laws and capabilities of the other. If then we shall find on examining the lower tribes that they have a tendency to assume the same diversities of appearance that we see in the different families of man, in cases where they are known to have had the same original parentage; if we find a test of common origin always co-existing with these diversities also existing in the different varieties of men; if we find constant and variable causes producing the changes in the lower tribes of the same origin, which we see in the races of men, we will of course not be at liberty to infer that as to the one, which we know would be untrue as to the other. We propose then to show by an induction of particulars, from the most recent and authentic sources, that there is nothing in the diversities of physical feature appearing among men, which the law of variation, as it is found to exist in other departments of animal life, as well as in the natural history of man, does not permit to consist with origin from a single and common source; and hence nothing in these diversities which renders it impossible for all the families of man to have descended from a single original pair, according to the teachings of the Bible.

When we take up this question as one of Natural History, it amounts simply to this: Are the diversities appearing among men, as to their physical or intellectual peculiarities such as to prove that they are different species, having different origins, or only such as to prove that they are different varieties of the same species, having the same origin?

The word species is often loosely used to mean any class of individuals possessing characteristics in common. In zoology, however, it has a fixed and definite sense. This sense is not an arbitrary invention in the nomenclature of science, but a permanent fact ordained in the very constitution of organic life. A species is simply a tribe of living things descended originally from the same common parentage. The fact that puts them in the same species, is, descent from the same original stock. Now, as this fact cannot always be ascertained historically, Nature (by which term in this discourse we always mean the God of Nature) has left a mark by which this can always be ascertained. This mark is the power of permanent reproduction. Like always produces like, and not unlike. That, therefore, which proves the descent of the offspring from the parentage, is the power of producing and perpetuating an offspring in all essential respects similar to that parentage.

That this is not a position assumed for the sake of maintaining our argument might be shown at any length by reference to acknowledged authorities in science. Two of the latest and highest in the departments bearing on this question will suffice. Dr. Latham, President of the Ethnological Society of London, and confessedly one of the first Ethnologists of the age, in his book on the Natural History of the Varieties of Man, just issued, sums up the principles and facts of this science in a series of aphorisms, three of which we will quote. "XXII. A protoplast is an organized individual capable (either singly or as one of a pair) of propagating individuals, itself having been propagated by no such individual or pair." XXVI. "A species is a class of individuals, each of which is hypothetically considered to be the descendant of the same protoplast, or of the same pair of protoplasts." XXVII. "A multiplicity of protoplasts for a single species is a contradiction in terms. If two or more such individuals (or pairs), as like as the two Dromios, were the several protoplasts to several classes of organized beings (the present members being as like each other as their ancestors were) the phenomenon would be, the existence in Nature of more than one undistinguishable species, not the existence of more than one protoplast to a single species." Pp. 563-4. London, 1851.

Sir C. Lyell in his *Elements of Geology* has presented the same views drawn from his department of science. In the thirty-seventh chapter of this work he sums up the conclusions which

he regards as established by geology on this question, the sixth of which is as follows: "From these considerations it appears that species have a real existence in nature, and that each was endowed, at the time of its creation, with the attributes and organization by which it is now distinguished." Seventh Edition, p. 585. His other conclusions are in precise accordance with those which we shall now present in regard to species and varieties.

There are two great facts that characterize the actions of nature in regard to the different families of living things: the one is the great flexibility and adaptability of the law of resemblance within certain limits; the other is, the rigid, inflexible permanence of that law beyond these limits. The final causes of these facts or laws will be obvious on a moment's reflection.

The first law is essential to the very existence and advancement of human society. The earth contains many varieties of climate, soil, and surface, and the precise physical constitution adapted to one place would be very unsuitable to another. Hence, either the more useful races of animals and plants must be confined to their original locality; or a new creation must take place whenever a new country is to be settled; or there must be in organic life a power of adaptation by which it shall conform to the new circumstances in which the possessors of it may be placed. The necessities of man, however, demand that certain animals and plants should be domesticated, and trained to the various uses for which they may be needed, and that they be capable of transportation with him in his various migrations. Now, if the peculiarities of each species were unchangeable, domesticity and migration would be impossible. The dog, the horse, the sheep, and the hog, must remain in their original wildness, and the many useful varieties of these important races be unknown. The plants, fruits, and grains, must be confined to the countries to which they were indigenous, and be incapable of improvement by cultivation. The incentives and rewards of human industry and skill, arising from the wonderful improvements that may be made by cultivation, and acting so powerfully upon the civilization and advancement of the world, would be wholly wanting. Therefore, to accomplish the obvious purposes of God in peopling the earth, there must be this *nisus formativus* in organic life, by which the various tribes of living things may be adapted to the circumstances of their position and the wants

of man, and by which a stimulus may be given to the active and inventive faculties of social and civilized life. It is this fact, or tendency in organic life, which gives rise to those endless varieties of different species which we find everywhere existing, especially in the more settled and advanced states of society.

But the second law is equally important. If this capability of variation were unlimited, the peculiarities of each species must at last be wholly obliterated. If the different species could amalgamate without limit, and produce new species partaking of the characteristics of both races thus commingled, in process of time the existing species must become hopelessly confounded, the peculiarities that fit them for their various positions in the scale of living things be lost, and the earth become a scene of organic confusion. Indeed, had this law not been always in existence, the various species of domestic animals, at least, would long since have disappeared and become completely blended into some strange and nondescript monstrosity, as wild as a sick man's dream. To prevent such a calamity nature has set up an impassable barrier between the different species, so as to prevent their permanent intermixture. It is this fact that establishes the conditions of hybridity. A hybrid individual may be produced between two different species but never a hybrid species, for the hybrid is barren, and cannot perpetuate its kind. And although, in two or perhaps three cases (those of the buffalo and cow, the China and common goose, and some species of ducks), where the species are nearly related, the power of reproduction exists in the hybrid, it is so feeble as not to extend beyond the second or third generation. The race becomes extinct, and hence the hybrid is incapable of establishing a new species. Recent anatomical investigations show that an actual barrier is produced in the hybrid making the power of propagation impossible. And universal observation shows that there is between different species an invincible repugnance to union, so that death is often the result of attempts to bring them together. No new species then can be produced by art or accident, for the attempt to produce it will always end in barrenness. The law of organic life is, that each creature shall propagate its own kind and not any other. It is also a significant indication of the strength of this law, that mules, or hybrid plants and animals, very rarely occur in a wild state. They are usually the result of domesticity or specific culture, in which the action of nature is forced by man, and in such

cases her displeasure is evinced by the sterility of the unnatural product. Were it necessary, we could give a page of hybrids between different species, which, in spite of every effort to the contrary, have been found absolutely sterile. The fact, then, that hybrid individuals are barren, and hence, that hybrid species or races can never be formed, furnishes us with a clear and certain criterion of species and varieties. If we find the power of permanent reproduction existing between any two classes, we know that they are only varieties, and belong to the same species. If they belong to the same species we infer that they had the same origin, for we have seen that the production of a new species is impossible.

The application of these views to the question before us is obvious. We know that the different races of men freely and permanently amalgamate. This phenomenon has frequently been seen, and new races possessing the power of permanent reproduction have frequently been formed, and are now in actual process of formation. The fertility of the mixed races of men, therefore, proves them to belong to the same species; and, unless man be an exception to all other races of living things, or unless there is specific historical testimony to establish the contrary, proves that these races have had a common and a single origin.

The most strenuous attack that has ever been made on this long-established doctrine of natural history, has been by Dr. Morton of Philadelphia. In an essay on the hybridity of animals in its relation to the unity of the human races, he affirms that hybrid races, with the power of permanent reproduction, are capable of being formed; and hence that this is not the criterion to determine separate species. He brings together an imposing array of alleged facts to sustain this position. But this array has not imposed on Dr. Bachman, however it may have on Dr. Morton. With a far wider knowledge of both the science and the literature of the subject than even his learned and we may now add, his lamented opponent, Dr. Bachman has taken up these facts *seriatim*, and shown with the clearness of demonstration, that some of his statements are not authentic; that others are disproved by positive countervailing testimony; that others are so vague and indefinite as to establish nothing with certainty; that others prove the very position which he attacks; and that in no case has it been proven that a hybrid race or species has been produced or perpetuated. This is done with a searching thorough-

ness and minuteness of refutation that leaves literally no ground for the theory to rest upon, and establishes the sterility of hybrids and the impossibility of hybrid races beyond all successful contradiction.

The views that Professor Agassiz has recently thrown out, are only in partial conflict with this general doctrine, and hence need not be examined in this immediate connection.

Here then we might rest the argument for the unity of the races, as an established point of natural history, and demand proof that man was an exception to the rest of the animated creation. But we are willing to waive this advantage, and investigate those difficulties that lie in our path, which however do not press peculiarly on our position.

The great difficulty in the way of admitting the unity of the human race, is the number and marked character of the existing varieties. It is alleged that these varieties are so broad, so permanent, and so ancient, that we are forced to the conclusion that the different families had different origins. Let us then examine the law of varieties as it exists in the other forms of organic life, and ascertain whether it leads us to this conclusion. If we find that no such widely-marked and permanent varieties appear in them, this difficulty will be formidable to the theory of unity. But if we find in tribes that are known to belong to the same species and to have had the same origin, varieties appearing as broadly marked, and as indelible as those of the human race—varieties which when once produced put on the permanence of species in their characteristics,—then it will follow that the existence of similar varieties, similarly marked, in the human race, can be no valid proof of either diversity of species or diversity of origin.

We have already remarked that it is a law of Nature that varieties be produced within the same species, and that to this beneficent law we owe much of the comfort and improvement of our race. These varieties are sometimes accidental, originating without any known cause. A striking instance of this law of accidental origin is found in the otter breed of sheep. In 1791 one ewe, on the farm of Seth Wright, in Massachusetts, gave birth to a male lamb, which, without any known cause, had a longer body and shorter legs than the rest of the breed, with the fore-legs crooked. This peculiar form rendering it unable to leap fences, it was resolved if possible to propagate this accidental variety. This was accordingly done, and the breed received its name

from the resemblance of its bodily form to that of the otter. A race of swine with solid hoofs arose in Hungary, in the same way, and recently the same singular variety has made its appearance along the banks of the Red river in our own country, without any assignable cause.

But varieties are more frequently formed from causes acting uniformly and regularly, such as climate, food, habit of life, etc., in the states of wildness and domesticity. Whilst we are unable to say what the precise mode of action is, the general fact is clear, that where animals are subjected to any new circumstances such as these, there is an instant effort in Nature to accommodate herself to these circumstances, and if there is sufficient constitutional energy to endure this struggle, the result is a change in the physical peculiarities which are adapted to the change in the outward circumstances. This is the great law of compensation that runs through all organic life, and is one of the most mysterious and beautiful in the economy of Nature. It is the great analogue to the adaptive susceptibilities of the social world, which illustrates the wonderful correspondences that we find running through all the manifestations of that dread and glorious mystery—LIFE.

It is difficult to trace our domestic animals to their original stocks, owing to the remoteness of the period of their subjugation by man. The original types, in many cases, seem to have disappeared, the necessity for their continued existence no longer remaining. The oxen, horses, goats, etc. which we now find wild, are more frequently derivations from the domesticated varieties, than types from which those varieties were originally derived. But the transition from domesticity to wildness furnishes us with a standard by which to judge of the changes effected in the contrary transition; and although it is doubtful whether the original type is ever entirely restored in such cases, yet we have, at least, an illustration of the law of variations, and the tendency in organic life to put on new characteristics when subjected to new influences.

Happily for our purpose we have a series of authentic experiments, made on a scale sufficiently extended to afford us the finest possible illustration of this great law. The Spaniards, when they discovered this country, found none of the domestic animals existing here which were used in Europe. They were accordingly introduced, and escaping and straying from their owners, they have run wild in our vast forests for several centuries. The result has

been the obliteration of the characteristics of the domesticated animals, and a reappearance of some of the typical marks of the wild state; and a generation of new and striking characteristics in accommodation to these new circumstances.

The wild hog of our forests bears a striking likeness to the wild boar of the old world. The hog of the high mountains of Paramos resembles the wild boar of France. Instead of being covered with bristles, however, as the domestic breed from which they sprang, they have a thick fur, often crisp, and sometimes an under-coat of wool. Instead of being generally white or spotted, they are uniformly black, except in some warmer regions, where they are red, like the young pecari. The anatomical structure has changed, adapting itself to the new habits of the animal, in an elongation of the snout, a vaulting of the forehead, a lengthening of the hind legs, and in the case of those left on the island of Cubagua, a monstrous elongation of the toes to half a span.

The ox has undergone the same changes. In some of the provinces of South America a variety has been produced called "pelones," having a very rare and fine fur. In other provinces a variety is produced with an entirely naked skin, like the dog of Mexico or of Guinea. In Colombia, owing to the immense size of farms and other causes, the practice of milking was laid aside, and the result has been that the secretion of milk in the cows is, like the same function in other animals of this class, only an occasional phenomenon, and confined strictly to the period of suckling the calf. As soon as the calf is removed, the milk ceases to flow, as in the case of other mammals.

The same changes have taken place in other animals. The wild dog of the Pampas never barks as the domestic animal does, but howls like the wolf; whilst the wild-cat has in like manner lost the habit of caterwauling. The wild horse of the higher plains of South America becomes covered with a long, shaggy fur, and is of an uniform chestnut-color. The sheep of the Central Cordilleras, if not shorn, produces a thick, matted, woolly fleece, which gradually breaks off in shaggy tufts, and leaves underneath a short, fine hair, shining and smooth, like that of the goat, and the wool never reappears. The goat has lost her large teats, and produces two or three kids annually. The same changes have been produced in geese and gallinaceous fowls. A variety has sprung up, called rumpless fowls, which want from one to six of the caudal vertebrae.

The same varieties have sprung up in other parts of the world. The fat-tailed sheep of Tartary loses its posterior mass of fat, when removed to the Steppes of Siberia, whose scant and bitter herbage is less favorable to the secretion of adipose matter. The African sheep has become large like a goat, and exchanged its wool for hair. The Wallachian sheep has put on large, perpendicular, spiral horns, and in like manner become clothed with hair. Some also have four, and even six horns. The wild horses of eastern Siberia have the same anatomical differences from the tame ones that we noticed in the case of the swine; and culture, climate, and other causes, have produced the widest varieties—from the little, shaggy pony of the Shetlands, that scrambles up the Highland crags like a goat, to the gigantic steed of Flanders, or the Conestoga of Pennsylvania, which will sometimes drag a load of four tons on the level ground. Whether the dog and the wolf are of the same species, is a question about which there is some difference of opinion among naturalists; but there is a very general agreement that all varieties of the dog must be referred to one species. Between these there is the widest difference—from the gigantic St. Bernard that will carry a frozen traveller to the convent, the shaggy Newfoundland with his webbed feet and his aquatic habits, and the scentless and almost tongueless greyhound; to the little lap-dog that nestles in a lady's arms, the nosing foxhound whose scent is almost a miracle, the ratting terrier, and the naked Mexican dog that has an additional toe. The cow presents the most diverse varieties—from the little Surat ox, not larger than a dog, to the humped and long-eared Brahmin cow, and the gigantic prize ox that will weigh two tons. The domesticated fowls and pigeons have assumed varieties enough to fill a page, some of them of the most diverse character, varying from the largest size to the most dwarfish, and possessing every peculiarity compatible with the preservation of the species, in the feathers, the form, the wattles, and the psychological traits and habits.

From this brief summary of facts, which might be indefinitely extended, we may infer the law of variation in animal life, as to its extent. Within the limits of the preservation of the type of the species, the widest variations may occur in anatomical structure; in external properties, in the color of the skin, in the color and texture of the hair, in the features, and in the psychological habits; and these peculiarities once produced may pass into permanent

varieties, which shall assume all the indelibility of species. And this remarkable fact may be observed, that the nearer the animal approaches to man in its associations and habits, the wider the range of variation. The dog, who is man's companion and imitator, more nearly than any other animal,—who hunts with him in the forest, watches with him over the flock, lies down by his fireside, and shares his food,—has, perhaps the widest range of variety. So the roots and grains that are most used by man have the most varieties. The potato has more than one hundred varieties; and Dr. Bachman relates that he saw at one warehouse, more than one hundred kinds of wheat. The fact then stands broadly out, that the widest varieties may occur among animals that are known to belong to the same species. Hence, when we come to man himself, and find varieties existing that are widely different from each other, we see in the range and extent of these varieties nothing which this law of variation in the lower tribes declares to be at variance with the position that these races all belong to the same species and possess the same origin.

But the law of variation we find as clearly marked in its permanence, as we have found it in its extent. The general fact is, that varieties, when once formed, never return to their original type, if left to themselves. They may be changed into new varieties, by being subjected to new circumstances; but if left alone, they will perpetuate their own characteristics, and not those from which they have departed. The motto of nature is *nulla vestigia retrorsum*. The stream never flows backward to the fountain. The variety may have been produced by accident; but once produced, it puts on the unyielding tenacity of a species. It may pass into a new variety, but this will rarely if ever be the exact type of the original species. Some varieties of the dog have been in existence for centuries, and their precise origin is lost in the past. These varieties have necessarily assumed all the tenacious permanence of species, to have maintained for so many years a distinct existence. The final cause of the permanence of varieties is identical with that of the permanence of species. The same beneficent reasons which demand that the valuable properties of a species should not be lost by the extinction or amalgamation of that species, also require that, when a variety has been called forth by peculiar circumstances, that variety should be permanent.

If, therefore, we find that the varieties of the human race remain permanent, although the climatic or other influences under which

we find them may be changed; if we find that the black, red, and white races continue to propagate their peculiarities, although their original geographical positions should be exchanged, we find in this fact nothing which is at variance with the law of varieties, as we have just found it to exist in the lower tribes.

Having thus learned the law of variation, within the limit of species, as to the lower families of animated nature, we turn to the varieties of the human race, and inquire whether there is anything in them, as to their extent or permanence, inconsistent with unity of origin and unity of species.

When we come to examine these varieties in detail, we find them to be neither so many, nor so great, as we find them in other animals confessedly of the same species, and of the same parentage. The difference between the fairest Caucasian and the sootiest African, is not nearly so great as that between the little, shaggy, Shetland pony, and the gigantic dray-horse of London; or between the soft and silky lap-dog, and the majestic St. Bernard. The differences we have already noted between the oxen, hogs, horses and goats that run wild in our forests, and the breeds from which they are known to have sprung, are far greater than we find between any two races of men on earth.

It is by means of the number, importance, and permanence of the resemblance between individuals; and, also, by the fact of their capability to unite and produce fertile progeny, that we are enabled to class them in the same species. This is the rule adopted as to all other departments of natural history, and hence the rule that should govern us here. Now, when we examine the various races of men, we find that they agree among themselves and differ from all other animals in many marked characteristics. They resemble each other in the number, the length, the position, the growth, and the shedding of the teeth; in the shortness of the lower jaw, and the obliteration, at a very early period of embryonic existence, of all trace of the original separation between the maxillary and intermaxillary bones; in the number of bones in the skeleton; in an erect stature; in the articulation of the head with the spinal column by the middle of its basis; in the possession of two hands, and they of the most exquisite mechanism; in a smooth skin, and the head covered with hair; in the number and arrangement of the muscles, the digestive and other organs; in the great development of the cerebral hemispheres, and the size of the brain compared with the nerves connected with it; in the organs of

speech, and the power of singing and laughing; in being omnivorous and using cooked food, and therefore fire; in the capability of inhabiting all climates; in a long infancy, slow growth, and late puberty; in a peculiar structure of the physical constitution of the female, in the incurvation of the *sacrum* and *os coccygis*, and consequent forward direction of the organs connected with them; in the period of gestation; in the number of young at a birth; in the times and seasons of procreation; in liability to the same diseases, the same parasitical insects and worms; and above all, in the possession of mental, moral and religious faculties, which make them subjects of the government of God, and responsible to his law, as well as capable of organized society, and the various phenomena of civilization. Now if these momentous resemblances and peculiarities do not classify the human races into one species, how can a case of species ever be made out? If all these essential resemblances, together with the capability of blending the different races and producing fertile varieties, do not prove unity of species, and, therefore, by the admitted rules of natural history, unity of origin, what conceivable facts could establish it?

But if the varieties of the human race were much more widely marked than we see them, there would be in this no insuperable objection to their original and specific unity. The same general reasons that require varieties to exist in organic life at all, demand a wider margin for them in man than in any other animal. His range of being is wider; his circumstances and necessities more varied and numerous; his destinies higher in the event of obedience, and lower in the event of disobedience, to the laws under which he is placed; his capabilities of self-culture are more expansive, that a stronger stimulus might be applied to his active powers, and hence, as a correlative fact, his liability to degeneracy, if that culture be neglected, is proportionally wide in its range; and his entire position as the responsible head of the creation demands a broader scope for change to the better, and hence by possibility to the worse, than any other animal on earth. We would therefore naturally expect a wider variation in all those characteristics that are affected by the outward circumstances in which he is placed. He inhabits every climate—from the frozen snows of the Arctics, where the reindeer perishes with cold, to the burning sands of Sahara, and the steaming jungles of the Carnatic. He subsists on every species of food—from the dripping blubber and train-oil of the Esquimaux, to the cooling fruits and simple cereals of the naked

dweller in the tropics. He adopts every mode of life—from that of the lean and hungry hunter who scours the forest and plain for his daily food, or the wandering herdsman who tends his vast flocks by day and by night on the boundless Steppe and beneath the silent stars that looked down on the Chaldean shepherds, to the peaceful tiller of the soil, the moiling artisan of the shop, and the luxurious inmate of the princely mansion. He is subjected to the extremes of civilization and barbarism—influences the most potent, as facts before our eyes demonstrate, where a few families are left for a generation or two in ignorance, isolation and poverty; and influences which cannot to any very great extent be brought to bear on the lower tribes. If then we should find the varieties of the human races broader and more indelible than those of other animals, we would find nothing, in this fact, which the causes just alluded to would not have led us to anticipate. That we do not find them much wider than they really are, is the result of that principle of resistance to external agencies with which, for obvious reasons, man as a cosmopolite has been endowed, a principle which whilst it resists the tendency to assume changes, gives a corresponding permanence to changes that are assumed, whatever be the cause of that assumption.

But, great as these influences are, we are by no means certain that yet greater may not have existed in a former age of our world's history. That the climate of different portions of the earth's surface is not now what it once was, is rendered almost certain by some of the earth's geological records. And that some of these changes of climate have taken place since the creation of man, is also a fact of high probability. Whatever was the extent of the Noachic deluge, the physical conditions that affect the human race must have been seriously modified by it. The longevity of the antediluvians, and other facts testified both by Scripture and tradition, would seem to indicate that some change occurred either in the physical constitution of the race, or the outward conditions affecting it, at that time. And although we do not believe that the human race was created in a state of infantile imperfection in any respect, or that the pliancy of individual infancy can be predicated of the early stages of the human race, yet there may have been a quicker susceptibility in forming varieties, and a stronger tenacity in retaining them then, than we find in after periods of its history. When a colony of men are separated from a parent stock, and lay the foundations of a nation, there is a stronger

tendency to assume distinctive features, growing out of their new circumstances than we find at a later period of their existence. National peculiarities, both physical and intellectual, may then be acquired in a few years which will continue for many generations. Hence, if in the early and forming stages of the human race, we should suppose a similar tendency to assume distinctive characteristics, stronger than we find at a later period, because the circumstances were necessarily different, there is nothing in this which the soundest philosophy would contradict.

But it by no means follows that no more potent agency was at work in these early ages of our history, than those which now exist in our nature, and are called out by the circumstances which demand their action. Assuming the agency of Divine Providence in the destinies of nations, the same reasons that required a dispersion of men, and the confusion of their tongues at Babel, would also seem to require their separation by physical features as broad and indelible as the distinctions of language. If then there was even an extraordinary operation of divine agencies tending to produce diversity of physical features, as the Bible assures us there was to produce diversity of languages; if these original diversities were propagated and made permanent, by the isolation and restrictive intermarriage of the respective families thus separated; and if the general purposes of God, and destinies of the race, were to be advanced by nations separated in their features as well as their language, there is nothing unscriptural or unreasonable in the hypothesis that thus some of these widest diversities may have originated. Hence, if we should be unable to state historically the precise origin of all these varieties; if there should be no known causes operating at present to produce new races, more than to produce new languages; if existing causes should be clearly ascertained to be insufficient to account for the appearance of the different races of men so early as we find them noticed in history—there would be nothing in this state of facts to shake the doctrine of the original unity of these races. If we must assert an interposition of divine power, as our opponents contend, the rules of hypothesis require us not to assume a higher cause or interposition if a lower is sufficient to explain the effect. Now, if instead of admitting, as they assert, a creative interposition of God, calling these varieties into existence from nonentity, we simply assert a directive interposition, causing different families already in existence to assume certain peculiarities which should be permanent, our hypothesis, presenting

a lower, yet a sufficient cause, is obviously the more philosophical and reasonable. Hence, were it clearly proven (which it has not been), that existing causes, or natural causes once acting more powerfully than they do at present, could not explain these effects, then, on the supposition that our race is a fallen one, and that great problems of ontology are slowly evolving in its various families; and that, like the river that went out from Eden, this mighty stream of life, though originally one, has been separated into great heads, each of which has itself become a broad river, and gone forth to compass the earth—the position that this separation and division, like that of Babel, was caused by specific divine interpositions no longer needed and no longer exerted, is, of the two demanded, the more reasonable, philosophical, and Scriptural.

But whilst we believe this hypothesis to be a legitimate one in the discussion, should existing causes be demonstrated inadequate to account for the varieties, we need not take any special advantage of it. It has not been demonstrated that these causes are insufficient, but on the contrary many facts exist which tend to prove the opposite position. The law of variations, which we saw existing in the lower tribes, is found to exist in the human constitution, as clearly as in the other departments of animal life. Permanent causes are in constant operation, and accidental peculiarities arise, from both of which sources varieties appear whose characters are deep and permanent.

It is impossible for us, in the present state of our physiological knowledge, to explain the precise mode in which changes are produced in the physical constitution, by a change of geographical location. But the fact is, that there is in the constitution of man a tendency, such as we saw in that of the lower tribes, to put on certain changes of color, hair, form, etc., when removed from one climate and locality to another, or when subjected to any great change of social habits. Whether the external condition of these changes be the chemical solar rays; the altitude or depression of the general level; the difference of geological formations; the varying agencies of magnetism and electricity; atmospheric peculiarities; miasmatic exhalations from vegetable or mineral matter; difference of soils; proximity to the ocean; variety of food, habits of life and exposure—all of which perhaps at times come in play—or other causes yet more occult—there can be no question about the fact that such causes are at work. The general fact is, that when the other physical conditions are the same, tribes living

nearest the equator and level of the sea are marked with the darkest skin, and the crispest hair. Thus, we make a gradual ascent from the jetty negro of the line to the olive-colored Arab, the brown Moor, the swarthy Italian, the dusky Spaniard, the dark-skinned Frenchman, the ruddy Englishman, and the pallid Scandinavian. When we reach the Arctic regions we find a dark tint reappearing, owing probably to the intensity of the summer's sun, the exposure of the natives, and the blackening effect of the winter's smoke in their dim and greasy burrows. When the white races are transferred to a tropical climate, there is a gradual darkening of the complexion and crisping of the hair. There is not so immediate and perceptible a change in the removal of the dark races to a cooler climate, because this deposition of a coloring pigment in the *rete mucosum* is a positive peculiarity; and the law of varieties, as we have ascertained it, is, that these peculiarities once produced become tenacious and permanent, even though the original condition of their production should be changed. The white races are more immediately affected because their color is a negative peculiarity, and hence more readily affected by the action of positive agencies. Dough may readily be changed into bread by subjecting it to heat, but bread cannot so readily be changed into dough by reversing the process—yet no man would from this fact affirm that a lump of dough and a loaf of bread may not have had the same origin. But even on these races a bleaching effect is seen after the lapse of a considerable time. The negroes of this country, where the race has been unmixed, are undoubtedly lighter in color than their kinsmen in Africa. And the Gipsies, in spite of their exposure and nomade habits, have gradually assumed a lighter tint in the cooler parts of Europe. So in the opposite direction Bishop Heber declares that three centuries of residence in India have made the Portuguese nearly as black as the Caffres.

These agencies we find acting independently of any relations of race. Races that are known historically to have had the same origin, by exposure to these influences have assumed every shade of color, and the other peculiarities that are supposed to indicate a distinct origin in the different varieties. The children of Abraham are found of every hue, from the ruddy tints of the Polish and German, through the dusky hue of the Moorish and Syrian, to the jetty melanism of the black Jews of India. The American nations vary—from the fair tribes of the upper Orinoco, mentioned

by Humboldt, to the chocolate-colored Charruas, and the black races of California, mentioned by Dr. Morton. The great Arian race includes the Affghan, Kurd, Armenian, and Indo-European of the fairest complexion, and the Hindoo, whose skin rivals in jettiness that of the negro. And the Hindoos themselves present every variety of complexion—from the fair-skinned Rajpoot, whose cheek is fanned by the cool breezes of the Himmalayas, to the swart coolies, and the coal-black fishermen, who swarm on the burning banks of the Hoogly. The Chinese Mongolians—compared among themselves, and also with the same race in adjacent countries—present the same results. The African races display the same varieties—from the red Fúlals and the yellow Bushmen, to the genuine negro of Guinea, and the broad-faced Hottentot of the southern plains. Many of the Caffres are stated by Professor Lichtenstein to be as light-colored as the Portuguese. The Gallas, a large and powerful race that inhabit northeastern Africa, and the Haïran people of Central Soudan, have physical features resembling those of the negroes, whilst their language and history indicate a Shemitish origin. A tribe also of the Berber Tuaryk—that have long been isolated in the oasis Wadraag, an island of green, in the great African desert—have not only assumed the black hue which we find in many Arabs, but even the features and hair of the negro race. This has resulted, as the history of the tribe proves, not from any intermixture of races,—a result against which their haughty pride of blood were a sufficient guarantee,—but from the physical causes that glow and sweep over those oceans of burning sand. A similar fact is mentioned by Mr. Buckingham in regard to an Arab family of the Haïran, all of whom, except the father, had negro features and hair, although it was matter of proof that no negro blood had ever mingled with that of the family. Mr. B. referred it to that tropical sultriness that broods over the valley of the Jordan, giving the tribes of that region flatter features, darker skins, and coarser hair, than others of the same family.

If we are asked what it is in the climate that produces these peculiarities, we cannot tell, any more than we can tell what it is in the climate of Africa that has made the hog black, stripped the sheep of its wool and clothed it with black hair, caused the hog and dog to lose their hair and have nothing but a black, oily skin, and made the feathers and bones of a variety of the gallinaceous fowl to become black, whilst its skin and wattles are purple. We

know too little of the mysterious chemistry of the great laboratory of nature to say how these changes are wrought ; but the facts—that they are going on in the lower tribes before our eyes, and that they have occurred and are now occurring in tribes that are known to have had a foreign origin—prove that the existence of such diversities, where we are ignorant of their rise, cannot prove a diversity of origin in the races where they appear.

But aside from these general causes, which act uniformly and universally, there are particular agencies at work, whose action produces varieties of the most permanent kind. Prichard suggests that the races of men as to their physical characteristics, fall into three general types, found respectively in the savage and hunting tribes, the nomadic and pastoral races, and the nations that are subjected to the influences of civilization. The first have a form of skull called prognathous, indicated by a forward prolongation of the jaws, and other features ; the second, a pyramidal form of skull with a broad face ; and the third, an oval or elliptical skull. When a race passes from the one mode of life to the other, there is a corresponding change in its physical features. Thus the Turks, since their encampment on the Bosphorus, have exchanged the Tartar peculiarities for those of the Europeans ; and the negroes, during their residence in this country, have undergone a decided change of skull and physical conformation.

Other races are arising from intermixtures of existing ones. The Griquas in southern Africa have arisen from a union of the Dutch boors of the Cape with the aboriginal Hottentots, and are now a clearly-marked and permanent variety. The Cafusos in Brazil have sprung from a mixture of the native Indian race with the negroes. These varieties, though of such recent origin, have all the tenacity of other and older races. Even accidental features and malformations may be long transmitted in particular cases. A peculiar nose, mouth, or chin, will often pass through several generations of a family. A striking illustration of this is presented in the celebrated porcupine family of England, the members of which, for several generations, had their bodies covered with bony excrescences, like the quills of a porcupine, which were yearly shed, and yearly renewed. Although they intermarried with those who had no such peculiarity, yet so tenacious is nature of a property which has once appeared, that this singular kind of cuticle did not disappear for several generations. Mr. Poinsett also testifies to the existence of a spotted race of men in Mexico, a

whole regiment of whom he saw, that is known to have arisen from a mixture of Spanish and Indian blood.

Albinism is a further illustration of this law. It occurs in man, and the lower animals, without any known cause, and in the healthiest individuals. Its phenomena in the lower animals prove that it is not to be regarded as among the morbid manifestations of the physical system, but a mere accidental variety. An Albino rabbit, commonly called the English rabbit, has spread all over this country, without any variation or tendency to disease. White mice, rats, racoons, and ferrets, are also in existence. In the human races, negro as well as others, Albinos appear who are prolific and healthy to an extent which proves, that if they were isolated and mated together, there would be an Albino race of men, as we have of rabbits and other animals. Had any of these accidental peculiarities been isolated, we would have had races of men differing from the rest more widely than any we now see, which would yet not have warranted an inference that they had an independent creation. If then these greater differences would not have warranted the inference that the diverse races were of diverse origins, it is hard to see how smaller differences can demand a conclusion which would not have been warranted by the greater.

But when we examine these diversities more closely, we find the argument drawn from them against the unity of the race to be hopelessly encumbered. If they prove anything in regard to the origin of the races, they prove too much, for they would prove fifty races as readily as five. There is no one feature that can be fixed upon as a test of species. Color, hair, form of skull, etc., all exist in their widest variety among those who are known to belong to the same race, and run into each other by shades so gradual that it is impossible to draw any clear line of demarcation. Hence scarcely any two great writers on this subject have been able to agree as to the number of races—some making but three; some five; whilst some make twelve or fifteen. No dividing line can be drawn. But if such a line could be drawn clearly, it would carry confusion, as to the doctrine of species, into every department of natural history: There are as wide and permanent varieties of cows, hogs, dogs, etc., known to have sprung from the same origin, as we find in the human races; and if, for these reasons, we insist on different species of men, we must, also, on different species of these animals. This, however, would bring utter and

hopeless confusion into every department of natural history, and disregard those clear and impassable marks, which nature has placed, to distinguish one species from another. As a question then of mere natural history, the unity of the human race is clearly the doctrine of science. Unity of species infers unity of origin, by consent of nearly all great naturalists. Unity of species is indicated by the power of mutual and permanent reproduction, and is perfectly consistent with wide and tenacious varieties. As therefore the human races have this power of mutual and permanent reproduction, and as their varieties are neither as many nor as great as we find in the lower tribes of the same species, nor as we see accidentally appearing as sporadic cases in different races of men, we are at liberty to infer their original unity of species, and hence their original unity of origin.

The only other objections presenting any difficulty are those drawn from the distribution of the races, and their isolation in countries and islands that are separated by wide and formidable barriers. Our limits will not allow us to go at length into this branch of the subject; nor is it necessary, for, after all, it is only an *argumentum ad ignorantiam*. That we are unable to state with historical precision how America and the Polynesian Islands were peopled, is the natural result of the remoteness of the period when the migration occurred; and what is known cannot be set aside by unanswered queries about what is unknown. The utmost that can be demanded of us is, to suggest a possible mode by which these migrations might have occurred; and if there be any such possibility, the objection falls, for it assumes an impossibility as the only ground on which it can rest.

Dr. Pickering affirms that it appears "on zoological grounds that the human family is foreign to the American Continent." How then they came here is not a question we are bound to answer more than those with whom we argue.

That there may have been a connection by land across Bhering's Straits in former times, is a fact that the geological indications of the region, and changes now going on, render, at least, not at all impossible. But even if this were not the case, the drifting of Japanese and Polynesian canoes, with their bewildered mariners, to lands many hundred miles—in one instance fifteen hundred from their starting-place, suggests the mode in which the Pacific islands, and then the American continent, may have been peopled. And when to this we add, that the traces of a higher

civilization in ancient times, which are found in Central America, indicate the probability of superior skill and facilities in navigation among these early nations, the likelihood of such a migration, either by accident or design, becomes yet more probable. That there were nomade rovers of the sea—who passed from island to island, with their wives and domestic animals, just as the wandering races of the desert pass from oasis to oasis, and from pasturage to pasturage, on land—is a fact by no means improbable. And that some of these Bedouins of the ocean may have been driven to distant shores by the great westwardly currents of the Pacific, is a supposition which the facts already alluded to render highly probable. If it be said that all this is only an appeal to our ignorance, we answer, that so is the objection to which we reply, and the one appeal is surely as fair as the other. The objection demands an impossibility which these suppositions show does not exist in the case, and hence as an argument against our position it must fall.

These conjectures are greatly strengthened by the fact, that all tradition and history point to Central Asia as the cradle of the human race. There we find what is confessedly the most perfect type of physical feature and development, whether we term it the Caucasian, the Circassian, or the Iranian race; and as we trace the natural channels of population, we find, except where civilization has interposed, a steady deterioration until we find the physiological extremes almost to coincide with the geographical, in the Negro of Africa, the Australian of Polynesia, and the Esquimaux of America. Another fact that bears irresistibly in the same direction is, that this same spot is the native country of nearly all the animals, grains, vegetables, and fruits, that have accompanied man in all his wanderings. It is the native country of rice, wheat, maize, the vine, and nearly all of the products of the earth that man has used for his food. There also we find in their wild state, the ass, goat, sheep, cow, horse, dog, hog, cat, camel, etc., the companions and servants of man the earth over. And as we trace these animals in their dispersions, we find them assuming the same variations of form and appearance that we find in the human races, nearly in exact proportion to the nearness of their association and companionship with man. There are the same Asiatic pointings in the affinities and resemblances of language. The science of comparative glottology is yet in its infancy, but sufficient advance has been made to show the most remarkable

relations ; and as the evidence is positive, it is reliable as far as it goes, to render it probable that all existing languages have had, to some extent, a common origin. Inasmuch, then, as the dispersion of the families of the earth from a single spot, is neither impossible nor improbable ; as tradition points to a locality in Asia as that spot ; as we find in that locality what seem to be the primitive types of man, and the animals and vegetables he has domesticated,—we submit that there is nothing in the present distribution or isolation of the races, to set aside the evidence of natural history already given, that these races belong to the same species and have had the same origin.

But the most signal indication that could perhaps be given of the strength of the argument we have thus been developing, is, the recent position of Professor Agassiz, as detailed in two essays in the *Christian Examiner*. Perceiving the unanswerable mass of evidence in favor of the specific identity of the races of men, he takes a new position, and whilst admitting an unity of species, he asserts a diversity of origin. He endeavors to establish in his first article the preliminary position, that there are certain definite zoological provinces, the fauna and flora in each of which must have been created in the province itself, and not distributed thither by migration from a central point. He then maintains that each province has its own race of men, which could not have come from a single pair, but must have been created each in the province where we find it. These positions he thinks fully consistent with the Bible, which he affirms only gives the origin and history of the white race, and alludes to none other.

This is a clear abandonment of the old position on this question, and a concession of the unanswerable grounds on which the specific unity of the race has been established. The attack has been shifted to a point further back, and one which can only be properly reached by historical testimony. But we apprehend that this new position, which is however not original with, or peculiar to Professor Agassiz, will soon yield as completely to the truth as the old one, and that this great and solemn question will be one of the ruled cases in science.

His views when analyzed resolve themselves into the following positions, namely : (1.) That animals are geographically distributed in distinct and separate zoological provinces ; (2.) That they are so isolated in these provinces as to make it impossible that they could have come forth from a common centre ; (3.) That they

must therefore have been separately created in these provinces ; (4.) That man is found distributed in the same provinces ; (5.) That therefore like the fauna and flora of these provinces, each race must have been created in the locality it occupies, and could not possibly have been distributed from a common centre, or originated from a single pair. The weakness of his general position may be perceived, when it is thus drawn out in logical method ; and it will be seen at a glance that the conclusion rests on a chain of assumptions, any one of which being disproved, the chain is broken, and the conclusion falls to the ground. Let us then test the strength of these successive links, and see whether his theories rest on facts, or his facts warrant his conclusions.

It might seem presumptuous in us to challenge such high authority as that of Agassiz, who is confessedly the Neptune of modern zoology : but we may venture to suggest that the presumption is in the other direction—that even Neptune himself could not be allowed to sway his trident over the domains of other authorities ; and that a man may be a peerless ichthyologist who is neither a profound logician nor a safe interpreter ; and as he has discarded all authority in taking his position, he will be the last to demand a submission to his own mere authority, however great it may be. We shall therefore freely canvass his views, whilst, at the same time, we cheerfully recognize his eminence as a naturalist, and the manly reverence with which he speaks of the Bible and what he deems to be its teachings.

His preliminary position is, that animals are geographically distributed in separate provinces, in which the same species appears in different provinces and in different parts of the same province, at intervals that preclude the hypothesis of a common origin, and demand that of a separate creation. There is nothing in this position that necessarily infringes on any Bible truth or assertion, and our sole objection to it is, that there is no sufficient difficulty that demands it as a hypothesis, and no sufficient evidence that sustains it as a fact. The simple question to which it is at last resolved, is, whether the geographical distribution of animals may be accounted for by natural agencies dispersing them from a common centre, or whether a miracle must be assumed to account for it ; and if so, whether the only miracle that meets the case, is that of a separate creation of the inhabitants of each separate province.

We are not prepared to deny that there are great zoological

centres, each having its surrounding province whose fauna and flora are peculiar, but the sense in which this is true does not avail the new theory, and the sense in which it asserts these provinces is one in which they do not exist. The sense in which this is true, is, that there are different regions of the earth whose species are distinct and peculiar, or whose varieties are so marked as to indicate the action of local and provincial agencies. In this sense however it is of no avail to support the position that unity of species may consist with diversity of origin, for the species are diverse, and the varieties indicative of local action alone, and not separate creation. The sense in which the theory asserts such provinces, is that in which the species are the same; but so far as they are the same, the provinces are the same, and not different. And if the few facts on which the theory rests were multiplied to such an extent as to make all the species of all the provinces the same, it is plain that there would be no distinct provinces at all, and the theory must perish by the very completeness of its success. Its entire force then depends on the confounding of these two facts, which are totally distinct. Had exactly the same species been found in all the provinces there would have been no provinces, except in regard to the topographical lines of separation; and had the species of all the provinces been different, it would not have availed in this argument, where the species of the races is conceded to be the same. Let us then examine whether there are these broad and clear lines of topographical separation. It is obvious that no such lines exist, from the fact that no two naturalists have been able to agree in their identification. The provinces overlap and interpenetrate one another to such an extent as to show that the cause is to be sought, not in the creation of separate races, but in the action of local and physical causes on races already created.

The same species we grant occurs in very different localities; but in almost every case, in such localities alone as could be reached by ordinary migration. Thus we know that the domestic animals have been spread. When America was discovered none of them were found here but the dog, whose use for draught in the polar regions suggests the reason and mode of his introduction in that direction. The lion, tiger, elephant, etc., are found in Asia and Africa, but not in America, Australia or Polynesia, in the same climates, because they are separated from these regions by barriers impassable to them, and man has no motive to in-

roduce them by artificial means. The vermin that accompany man, as his scavengers—such as rats, mice, cockroaches, flies, fleas, etc.—are never found in newly-discovered islands until after they have been visited by ships; showing the mode of their introduction. Certain provinces are found equally or more favorable to certain animals than those in which man first discovered them: if then each species was created in the locality it occupies, why were not these localities peopled with them? Why was not the camel created in Northern Africa, the reindeer in Iceland, the horse in Flanders, and the hog in Berkshire, where they are found so admirably to thrive; and where we know that they have been artificially introduced? These questions are unanswerable on this theory.

But facts show that animals are distributed precisely in the way which is denied by this theory. Dr. Bachman gives some curious and forcible illustrations of this point. The opossum occurs in the warmer parts of North America, west of the Hudson, but in no case east of it, for it is unable to swim, and dreads the cold too much to pass round the head-waters of this stream, or cross it on the ice. The gofer is found on the southern bank of the Savannah, but not on the northern, with precisely the same soil and food, because it cannot swim. The soft-shelled turtle is found in all the streams and lakes connected with the Mississippi, even to the Mohawk and Hudson, but in none south of these until we reach the Savannah, because it travels only by water, and the streams on that part of the Atlantic slope do not connect with the northern or western waters. No eels were found in Lake Erie until the opening of the Erie canal, which gave them an inlet; they are now plenty. The red fox, which is an arctic animal, was only found as low as Pennsylvania forty years ago, then it appeared in Virginia, then in the Carolinas, and now it is more common than the gray fox. The latter, which is a southern animal, has, in like manner, migrated north until it has reached Canada. These facts show conclusively that such migrations are going on, and suggest the most easy and natural means to account for the geographical distribution of animals. The same process is going on in regard to vegetables and plants, for whose distribution, as they have not the power of voluntary locomotion, nature has furnished the most elaborate provision. Some seeds are furnished with wings to be carried by the wind; others with hooks to fasten upon the passing animal and thus be transported;

others are carried by water thousands of miles, as tropical productions have been stranded by the Gulf Stream on the shores of Iceland; whilst others are carried in the stomachs of birds and beasts many leagues from their native locality. No sooner does the coral reef become capable of sustaining vegetable life than it is supplied by some of these seed-carriers of nature. Facts on this point exist by the hundred. What conceivable need then exists for the hypothesis of a new creation, when we see the same species repeated in new localities?

The only difficulty that remains is, the occurrence of arctic plants and animals in the Alpine regions, cut off from their natural kindred. But it curiously happens that in the same review that contains the essay we are answering, there is a complete solution to this difficulty, unconsciously suggested by Professor Agassiz himself, when speaking on a different subject. He explains some of the phenomena of Lake Superior by reference to the glacial theory. Now whilst we do not pronounce on this theory, yet with its great defender, an objection which may be answered by it, will surely not be pressed. If then the bowlders and deeply worn furrows of the lake region may be explained by this theory, we ask, where is the difficulty of giving the same account of the existence of these Alpine fauna and flora? As the glacial sea receded to the pole, the arctic animals and plants that co-existed with it, would naturally remain on these Alpine heights, which were congenial to them, since they would have no inducements to change their locality. Hence where this recession of the ice-line left them isolated on these arctic islands, they would of course remain and propagate just as their kindred which receded with the glaciers to the pole. Hence, there is nothing in this requiring a new creation of lynxes, marmots, and chamois, in the regions where they are now found.

Hence if we concede the existence of clearly-marked zoological provinces, as contended for by Professor Agassiz, the facts that they run into one another by insensible gradations, that migrations are going on from one region to another, that arrangements for this mode of distribution are now in operation, suggest the likelihood that the same arrangements existed in former times, and actually effected the distribution which we find. The very same principle that requires us to suppose that the geological distribution of rocks was made by natural causes such as we now see in operation, demands that we should hold the same suppo-

sition in regard to the zoological distribution of animals. The fact on which Prof. A. seems greatly to rely that the later fossils of some of these provinces, such as New Holland, have the same peculiarities that we find in existing species, really proves nothing, but that the same or similar causes were acting in these localities then that are acting now, and determines nothing as to the precise nature of the causes themselves, whether natural or supernatural, creative or merely adaptive. The fact that we find dogs in Africa with a naked skin does not prove that dogs were created there without hair, for the same thing happens to dogs that are removed there with their natural coat. It only proves that whenever and however these dogs came there, they were subjected to the same influences that are now in operation. Thus it is also with the peculiarities of the later fossils, to which Prof. A. alludes. The same causes which will explain the distribution of existing tribes, will account for the distribution of similar tribes at any former geological epoch. But even were this not the fact, we cannot argue from the conditions of things before the creation of man to that after his creation, for with the appearance of man began the era of moral government and general law, and ceased the era of creation. The earth being designed as the dwelling-place and kingdom of man, the mode of creation at the beginning of his epoch would likely have reference to his position and wants. We may add to this, that if the recently announced discovery of a fossil kangaroo in New England be authenticated, the whole force of this argument is at once destroyed, and it is proven that the animals now peculiar to New Holland, were once distributed more widely over the earth. But even if it were demonstrated that these causes, in any conceivable mode of their operation, are insufficient to account for the effects, it will not follow that a separate creation in each locality is demanded as the only alternative. Some extraordinary agency must be supposed; but is this the only one? If a miracle must be assumed, may it not as readily have been in the distribution of these races to their present localities, as in their creation within them? Does not universal observation show that direct creation is usually the last expedient resorted to, in the attainment of any end? Now what is there to demand it as the only alternative here? We submit then that there is nothing in the distribution of animals requiring a miracle at all; and that if any such unusual interposition of divine power was needed, it is much more likely to have been in

the distribution of races already created, than in their separate and distinct creation. But we repeat it, that there is nothing in this hypothesis of separate zoological centres of creation that conflicts with the Bible in the slightest, and it might fully be admitted without affecting a single utterance of revelation. We only object to its strength because of the tremendous conclusion we are asked to hang upon it.

But suppose these three links of the chain mended, the fourth breaks with the weight that is hung upon it. Grant that there are distinct zoological provinces; that they are so isolated from each other that their fauna and flora could not have come forth from a common centre; and that a separate creation in each province is the only mode of overcoming the difficulty,—we find that the races of men are not co-extensive and identical with these alleged zoological provinces.

One would think, from the confidence with which the learned Professor asserts the identity in the two cases, that not only the zoological provinces were clearly made out, but the limits of the races also plainly and universally ascertained. But there is no point in natural history more undetermined than this. Some make but three races, others five, others eleven, others still more; but the most remarkable fact is, that Professor Agassiz does not positively determine this point *himself*. He enumerates about a dozen zoological provinces, but not more than half that number of races. Why this significant silence? If his theory is really true, why did he not tell us what the races are, that inhabit these provinces? We shall perhaps see the reason as we examine the relations of the two distributions. This examination our limits will only allow us to make in one or two of these provinces which he has mapped out.

His first province is the arctic, with the Samoyedes, the Laplanders, and the Esquimaux. But can any one suppose that an animal so helpless as man, so destitute of natural covering, protection, and food, could originate in the bleak and inhospitable regions of the pole, where he could obtain neither clothing, fire, nor food? If we suppose him to have originated in a warmer region, and migrated thither, with his acquired knowledge and habits, these difficulties vanish; but if we suppose him created, a naked, shivering Troglodyte, amidst the eternal snows, we must pile miracle on miracle to account for his continued existence. But even if this difficulty were overcome, the Esquimaux of

America are as widely separate from the arctic races of Asia, in distance, difficulty of communication, and physical features, as the latter are from the adjacent tribes of the Mongolians, or the former from the northern tribes of Indians. Why not make an Asian arctic, and an American arctic, on the same grounds that a distinction is drawn between the southern arctic and the northern Mongolian? There is absolutely no ground in the one case that does not exist as broadly in the other. The Malay race he assigns to a natural zoological province; but what it is, he does not inform us. It cannot be limited to his tropical Asiatic province, for it extends through Polynesia to Western America, by the testimony of the most accurate observers, even those who deny the original unity of the races. The same difficulty exists in the provinces of New Holland and Africa. The Tasmanian and Alforian races of the New Holland province differ far more widely than the Malay and the Mongolian: and we have shown that Africa presents the widest extremes of variety, with every intermediate shade, from the fair races of Abyssinia to the genuine Dahomey negro. But when we come to the American provinces, the theory breaks utterly and hopelessly down. He makes four such provinces; one east, and one west of the Rocky Mountains; one in tropical America, and one in temperate South America. But where are the four races corresponding to them? Do not all recognize the same physical type in all our aboriginal tribes? Has even Professor Agassiz dissented from this? How then can the facts be cut up to fit the theory? But if we had the four races that have been created on this continent, what will we do with the Patagonians? The same questions might be asked in regard to the Papuan, Feejee, and other races, which though clearly and strongly marked cannot be referred to any distinct or definite zoological provinces.

It is abundantly evident from this brief enumeration of facts that there is no such coincidence in the geographical distribution of the races and that of the plants and animals, such as is asserted by this theory. But suppose all these difficulties removed, and yet the last step could not legitimately be taken. If the races and zoological provinces were identical, that fact clearly could not prove that each race was created in its province. All that it could prove would be, that the human races, and the fauna and flora of each province, were subjected to the same or similar influences, giving them this identity of limitation. What these influences

were, would not be determined by this coincidence of boundary, and would therefore remain matter for further investigation. Whether they were natural or supernatural would not be determined by such identity of circumscription. And if we must assume a supernatural agency, it by no means follows, that creation is the only one. The divine power might as readily have been exerted in causing these peculiarities, or in distributing these races, as in their direct creation; and if we must assert its interposition to account for the varieties, we have at least the same right to affirm the smaller and more ordinary exercise of it, that he has to affirm the greater and more extraordinary.

The fact on which he lays so much stress, that climatic conditions are not exactly coincident with the various races, will prove that climatic conditions are not the only agencies at work in producing these varieties; and nothing more. What these other agencies are, and whether distinct creation is the only conceivable one, is wholly undetermined by this fact. His remark, that the adaptations of man to his various localities must have been intentional, is true; but it does not follow from this that separate creation of each race was the only way in which this intention could be carried into effect. We grant that these adaptations were intentional, and simply affirm that they were brought about by an original susceptibility to such adaptations impressed by God on man's physical constitution; and that the same reasons for its existence at first require its existence now, and undoubted facts prove that it actually does exist. Designing man to be a cosmopolite, and to subdue the earth, he impressed him with this susceptibility, and the result is, the varieties we find in the races of the world. So far then is this designed adaptation of man to the various localities in which he is found, from proving that the varieties were separately created, it is the very fact that makes this supposition unnecessary.

We thus find this chain of assumptions to break at every link. Whilst there are zoological provinces, they are not such as to forbid their occupation by natural and existing causes; or if supernatural agency were required it is not necessitated to be in the form of creation; and if these points were reached, they would not avail us, for the races of men are not identical with these provinces; and if they were, this identity would be explicable by that adaptive susceptibility of the human constitution to conform itself to the varying conditions in which it is placed, with which

man as the destined conqueror of the earth has been furnished; and if some direct and unusual interposition of divine power must be supposed, it was much more likely to be in producing these varieties from a race already existing than in calling new ones into existence. Hence in every part of this new theory we find it more completely untenable than the old one.

There are other proofs of the original unity of the human race, the full presentation of which would exceed our limits, and hence we can only glance at them in concluding. One of these is drawn from the relations that modern philology has detected among the languages of the earth. Dr. Young has applied the mathematical calculus of probabilities to this subject, and declares the result to be, that if eight words in any two languages are found to coincide in sound and significance, the probabilities are one hundred thousand to one, that they were drawn from the same parent language; and that if the coincidences are found in more than eight cases it rises to little less than an absolute certainty. Whether this application of the doctrine of probabilities be perfectly satisfactory or not to every mind, it at least shows that a small number of coincident words compared with the entire vocabulary will be sufficient to establish an original connection between different languages. Now the researches of the most eminent scholars, after much perplexity and overthrow of former opinions, have at last reduced the more than two thousand languages of the earth to a few families, and established between these families the most undoubted affiliation. This affiliation is supported not by a few words whose similarity could be accounted for by the imitation of natural sounds, or the necessary use of the same organs of articulation, but by adjectives, nouns, pronouns, numerals, and verbs, whose sounds are perfectly arbitrary, and have no conceivable resemblance to the things they are designed to represent. This resemblance is found not only in the sounds of words, but also in their grammatical forms. Declensions and cases of nouns, conjugations of verbs with their apparatus of voices, augments and reduplications, are found, like perfect skeletons of a former organism, embedded in the languages of the most distant countries. Sometimes, as has been shown recently in regard to our American Indian languages, the most minute resemblances may exist in grammatical forms between many dialects, that have scarcely a word in common. The bony skeleton remains, whilst the more perishable fleshy integuments of mere sounds have perished.

From these facts such scholars as A. von Humboldt, Merian, Klaproth, F. Schlegel, Herder, and others, have inferred that all existing languages are derivations from one original tongue now lost. The American languages were for some time considered exceptions to this broad generalization, but the researches of Mr. Galatin, and the more recent investigations of Mr. Schoolcraft, have shown that they in like manner contain these conglomerate remains of ancient speech that indicate their connection with the same original tongue. Thus that tendency to the ascertainment of a unity in diversity, which is characteristic of all other science, is equally evinced in the young and interesting science of comparative philology.

But a second fact yet more remarkable has been made probable by the same researches. It is alleged not only that these various languages must have been separated from one another or from an original speech, but that this separation was caused by some sudden and violent disruption, the evidence of which remains in the relations of these languages as distinctly set forth as the proof of the breaking of the strata of the crust of the earth by some former convulsion is seen in the broken edges of corresponding rocks that stand facing each other on opposite sides of some chasm. This is the opinion not of mere credulous bibliolators, but even of those who reject the history of the confusion of tongues in Genesis, as an oriental fiction, like Herder, and of such scholars as Sharon Turner, Abel Remusat, and Niebuhr. These men affirm that the differences between these languages are not such as would have been produced by the slow and gradual separation of a people from natural causes, but such as indicate a sudden and violent disruption of their social relations. Whether this disruption was the dispersion of Babel cannot be made out from these fossils of ancient thought, but this result of philology at least presents a most remarkable and startling corroboration, from an unexpected quarter, of the facts related in Genesis.

The bearing of these facts on the question before us, is obvious. Were the families of man diverse races, sprung from diverse origins, we would expect, in a thing so artificial and conventional as speech, to find this diversity clearly marked, and no trace of a common origin, either in grammatical forms, or in the signification attached to particular words; and we would also expect to find the most ancient languages the most rude and simple in their structure. On the contrary, we find the most marvellous resem-

blances in form and signification ; and also the most ancient languages to be often the most artificial and philosophical in their grammatical forms ; and also the repetition of these peculiarities of structure and signification in languages that are separated geographically by the widest barriers. These facts can be explained only on the hypothesis that these languages have had a common source, and that they are the conglomerate fragments of a formation which now exists only in these imbedded crystals, whose fracture and form tell the tale of their common origin and their former connection. This then involves necessarily the conclusion that these diverse families were once united in one common head, and are the offspring of one common parentage, who used this primeval and now disintegrated language.

The mode in which Prof. Agassiz attempts to evade the force of this argument is a most remarkable specimen of logic. He dismisses it with somewhat of a sneer, and deems its force broken by the simple remark, that it is as natural for men to talk as it is for dogs to bark, or asses to bray, and that one bird does not learn its song from another ; and hence we could not from the phenomena of language infer unity of origin. Now, if one bird does not learn its song from another, does this prove that one human being does not learn its language from another ? And aside from the fact that it is not natural for dogs to bark, as they never do it in their wild state, is there no difference between an inarticulate cry and the use of a set of conventional sounds to designate certain thoughts ? Does not the one imply previous arrangement and agreement, where the sounds are the same, whilst the other does not ? If we argued man's original unity from his instinctive cries, it were pertinent to refer us to the instinctive cries of animals ; but when, from the fact that the same or similar colloocations of syllabic sounds are applied by different races to the same natural objects, we argue that there must have been a previous agreement that these sounds should designate these objects, the reference to the braying of asses, etc., looks really like trifling.

Another proof of the original unity of the families of mankind may be drawn from their ancient traditions. Mr. R. W. Mackay, of the modern English school of rationalism, has published a book called the Progress of the Intellect, which has all the dulness of learning without any of its profundity, and all the malice of wit without any of its keenness. In this book he endeavors to serve up all the religions of the earth into a sort of *olla-podrida*, with

Paganism and Nihilism for spice and sweetening, and enough of Christianity to act, if possible, as salt. The savory dish thus produced, we have no disposition to deal out at any length. But there is one respect in which his efforts are not wholly useless. Gathering together with no small industry the religious traditions of different nations, he has furnished corroborations of the Scriptural record, which infidelity would have rejected, had they been presented by a Gale, a Bryant, or a Faber, as mere credulous fancies. He admits the universal tradition that points to central Asia as the home and cradle of the human race. He also presents the chaos; the darkness that covered the face of the great deep; the brooding of the Spirit of God upon the surface of the waters; the myths and traditions of various nations alluding to a primeval creation of light; the unfolding of the firmament; the order of the six days' creation and the rest of the Sabbath; the primitive innocence of man; his location in the garden of Eden; the rivers and trees of Paradise; the agency of the woman and serpent in the Fall; the sacredness of the number seven; the flood, with the ark, olive branch and dove; the expectation of a Messiah; the reign of righteousness on the earth; and of a final conflagration.

How can these facts be fairly explained? When the traveller in France finds in all its provinces traditions and representations of one man, sometimes coarse and rude, at other times exquisite and accurate, yet all retaining those lineaments that seem burnt into the memory of her people—are not these facts as absolutely decisive of the existence of Napoleon as if he actually saw the great Corsican? Were any man to attempt seriously to prove that Napoleon was only a myth, and these traditional memorials but symbols of the French ideas of glory, having no origin in some original and common fact, would he not be regarded as little better than an idiot? Yet why should that be insane fatuity in modern history, which is profound wisdom in ancient? Why should this reasoning make a man a fool when exercised about things that are well known, and a philosopher when exercised about things that are but little known? If these universal and minute memorials of Napoleon would prove his existence, at least, if we had no other evidence, must not these wide, uniform and clear traditions of early facts in the world's history prove that they also existed? Must there not have been an original ground-work of historical fact to support traditions so uniform and striking? It is not necessary to our present purpose to prove that the precise facts recorded

in Genesis are the originals from which these copies were made, although this we might show to be probable, independent of any proof drawn from the divine origin of the Bible. All that we need is simply the obvious and necessary admission that these copies must have had originals; and that these originals were the same general facts. That nations who have never had any connection in their early history should have happened to invent so many traditions so nearly alike, is, on the doctrine of probabilities, to the last degree improbable, if not wholly impossible. The most natural and rational explanation surely is, that these traditions are the old household memories of the primeval homestead, yet lingering around the scattered family, which, though sometimes clear as the recollections of the child who has tarried at the parental hearth until its scenes and teachings are written indelibly on his memory, and at others, crude and vague as the dreaming reminiscences of him who was torn away in the tenderness of undeveloped childhood, yet all point back and converge in a common family, and a common home, to which we may trace these wandering tribes of the children of men.

Not less conclusive, did our space permit its full development, is the psychological argument for the unity of the race. The great mystery in the nature of man is SIN. Like the bottomless gulf in the Roman Forum, it is a fathomless abyss whose origin none can explain, and whose yawning greediness nothing can fill but the immolation of the noblest and best that has ever borne the form of our common nature. It is this strange and fearful fact that sets man apart from all other earthly creatures in a mournful isolation of experience and history. When we go down into the depths of the human soul and search the chamber of its records for the story of this monstrous birth, we are met at the very threshold by Conscience, at once the hoary chronicler of the past, and the terrible prophet of the future, which gives us the clue to this mystery. It points us to the soiled and shattered fragments of noble powers and high affections, which once stood up in kingly erectness, each on its pedestal and throne in the human soul. It traces out in these noble ruins the record of some fearful convulsion in the past, that cast down and shivered these old and beautiful occupants of this stately Pantheon of thought and affection. It tells us that man is not what he once was, but is fallen, and has become a guilty and godless thing. Telling us thus of a fall, it tells us of an ancient unity, of a time when man was one

in the unfallen past, as he is one in the fallen present, just as unanswerably as the columns and capitals of the silent temple of the sun, tell us of a time when it once stood in the unity of a queenly and faultless symmetry beneath the cloudless skies of Palmyra. Now, these tellings of conscience are heard in every branch of the scattered family of man. The same sad proofs of brotherhood in sin and sorrow, of common parentage and common fall, of depravity transmitted by universal and hereditary taint, meet us in every race. The same wail of remorseful sorrow comes up in mysterious plaint from all; the same mournful memories of primeval purity now soiled and dishonored; the same gleaming visions of an Eden innocence that has faded away, leaving only these mute longings after its unforgotten brightness; the same dire and terrific phantoms of guilt that come forth to awe and affright; the same deep yearnings after the unseen and the eternal in the soul's deepest stirrings; and the same sublime hopes that shoot upward to the "high and terrible crystal,"—are found alike in every race of every hue. The unspeakable gift of Christ and him crucified, is as wide in its efficacy as these mournful symptoms of malady. The lofty intellects of a Pascal and a Newton, do not grasp it with a keener relish and a deeper sympathy than the besotted Caffre in the lonely wilds of Africa, or the crouching Pariah in the steaming jungles of India. The Cross is that wondrous talisman that calls forth from every adventitious guise the universal manhood and brotherhood of the races. And when the lowliest African is "born again," in that heavenly birth that links into a new and holier unity the fallen descendants of the first Adam, he is found to exult with as pure a gladness as the honored heir of the proudest and noblest blood. O! it is this blessed fact that stands in lofty and indignant rebuke of that cold and cruel philosophy that would wrest from the humble and the oppressed the only boon that is beyond the grasp of an unfeeling avarice. And this whole class of facts, pointing back as it does so unerringly, to some great spiritual disruption in the psychological history of our race, proves that there was once a time and place in the history of that race when they were one in that primeval and unfallen brightness from which they have so sadly and widely lapsed.

And now shall we give up this great truth of the universal brotherhood of man, around which throng such masses of evidence, because of the few flippant questions which a finical philosophy may think unanswered? Shall this mighty thought that

thrilled even a Roman audience, in the memorable words of Terence, this thought that has fired the hearts of the martyr spirits of the world in their weary toils for an erring race, this thought that underlies the whole enterprise of Christian missions, that brought Jesus Christ from heaven and carried Paul to the ends of the earth, be abandoned because one man's skin and hair do not resemble another's? Shall the trifling points of difference that exist between the races of men be allowed to prove that as to the human species, which they are not allowed to prove as to any other species of living things? Shall the pictures of black races on Egyptian tombs be held to prove their separate creation, when the fact that other races, equally distinct in all their peculiarities, are there found depicted, is not held to prove the same thing in regard to them? Is there not something unspeakably cruel and heartless in thus cutting loose these hopeless and unfortunate races from all the sympathies of a common brotherhood in the family of man; in robbing them of the most priceless blessings that are left them in their barbarism, a birthright in Adam and a hope in Christ; and making their very degradation, which should move our sympathies to act for their relief, the pretext for a fresh outrage the most monstrous and atrocious? Rob these feeble and helpless nations of their beautiful lands where they repose in happy indolence; rob them of their gold and silver and gems that they have gathered from their rivers and mountains; rob them of their little worldly substance and their humble homes; for these things affect not their highest rights, and their loss may be repaired: but oh! rob them not of their parentage in a common ancestry, the only fact that is left to encourage us to labor for their elevation; rob them of everything else, but rob them not at least of hope; and consign them not in their neglect and misfortune to that hopeless orphanage of degradation, which, by cutting them off from their heritage in the blood that flows from Adam, must also cut them off from that richer heritage which they may obtain in the blood that flows from Christ. Tell us not that these results are not necessary to the position we are opposing, when even an Agassiz, with all his high moral feeling, scruples not, as the consequence of his doctrine, to denounce those noble and expansive charities that would girdle the earth with Christian churches as mere "mock philanthropy," and idle efforts to contravene the settled arrangements of Providence.

No. We will not give up yet the great truth of the common

brotherhood of humanity; we will not disown our hapless, unfortunate brother because he has become a wandering outcast; we will not abandon the hopes we cherish that these scattered families shall yet be restored to some of the homestead privileges which they have forgotten. These prodigal wanderers shall yet hear a voice that shall awaken the memories of a blessed home that is lost, and shall kindle the hopes of a more blessed home that is to be found. The dreams of an unforgotten Eden shall yet be embodied in the better paradise of the future, when they shall come from the north and the south, the east and the west, and shall sit down in the kingdom of God. The cannibal Zealander shall come blending in the harmlessness of the dove before the cross; the fierce Malay, the wild Camanche, the gigantic Patagonian, and the gentle islander of the sea, shall all come together at the feet of Jesus, with hearts that shall throb and thrill with the claspng love of a common origin, a common trust and a common destiny. The grovelling Bushman, the squalid Esquimaux, and the crouching Hindoo, shall arise from the dust of their degradation, and stand forth in the lofty erectness of a manhood in Christ Jesus. The sublime dreamings of Plato, the rapt numbers of the Sibyl, the vague longings of philosophy, the high visions of poetry, and above all, the magnificent pictures of revelation, the exulting strains of Isaiah as he gazed on the gorgeous future, the deep sympathies of Paul as he felt the throes of the travailing earth that mutely longed for the manifestation of the sons of God, and the higher, grander gazings of the lonely seer of Patmos as he saw the gatherings to the great day of God Almighty, and heard the voice of many waters, and the voice of mighty thunderings, and the voice of a great multitude, saying, Alleluia, for the Lord God omnipotent reigneth,—all these shall be fully and gloriously realized in that future when the scattered and divided nations shall be gathered into the glorious sonship of God, and the unity that links them to Adam in one direction, shall receive its bright counterpart and fulfilment in the noble unity that links them to Christ in the other. It is because we believe the unity in the one direction to be the condition of the unity in the other, that we so earnestly contend for it. And it is because we believe that this cold, heartless, Cain-like theory, that would discard the brotherhood of the unfortunate and degraded because of their misfortune, must cripple the energies of those who labor for this magnificent hope of the future, that we lift up against it a protest

so earnest and emphatic. And it is because we know that this selfish monopoly of the blood of Adam shall melt away before the blaze of this future Sabbath of the earth, that we now so confidently predict its overthrow, and anticipate the time when it shall not only be believed that God hath made of one blood all nations of men to dwell upon the face of the whole earth, but when in the fusing brightness of these Sabbatic scenes of the future, the touching and beautiful prayer of Christ shall receive its broadest and grandest fulfilment, "Neither pray I for these alone, but for them also which shall believe on me through their word; that they all may be ONE, as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us." Even so, amen, and amen.