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I.

INSPIRATION.

THE word Inspiration, as applied to the Holy Scriptures, has gradually acquired a specific technical meaning, independent of its etymology. At first this word, in the sense of God-breathed, was used to express the entire agency of God in producing that divine element which distinguishes Scripture from all other writings. It was used in a sense comprehensive of supernatural revelation, while the immense range of providential and gracious divine activities concerned in the genesis of the Word of God in human language was practically overlooked. But Christian scholars have come to see that this divine element, which penetrates and glorifies Scripture at every point, has entered and become incorporated with it in very various ways, natural, supernatural, and gracious, through long courses of providential leading, as well as by direct suggestion, through the spontaneous action of the souls of the sacred writers, as well as by controlling influence from without. It is important that distinguishable ideas should be connoted by distinct terms, and that the terms themselves should be fixed in a definite sense. Thus we have come to distinguish sharply between Revelation, which is the frequent, and Inspiration, which is the constant attribute of all the thoughts and statements of Scripture, and between the problem of the genesis of Scripture on the one hand, which includes historic processes and the concurrence of natural and supernatural forces, and must account for all the phenomena of Scripture; and the mere fact of Inspiration

His positive statement then is :

"There is a sin of the race in which we all as members of the race participate, which already lays the foundation of a universal need of redemption, but is not yet our personal guilt. This sin of the race has the character of that which is morally culpable or evil, but is not yet decisive of the final worth or fate of man. The members of the human race are on the other side, also appointed to personal responsibility, and there is also a personal guilt, which is not the effect of the sin of the race and has not a universality referring to all alike, although it makes them from a new side to be in need of redemption, and also induces a common guilt. The final value and the ultimate fate of the individual is dependent upon personal decision" (p. 159).

This position our author endeavors to establish by giving to the race and the individual, Creationism and Traducianism their relative significance. He insists that "the individual is not a mere manifestation of the race. God turns a particular creative thought and act of the will to the origin of every individual man" (p. 160). In the relation between the sin of the race and the guilt of the individual, he distinguishes three stages in the development of the individual. (1). That of Individuality before the awakening of moral self-consciousness. Here there may be logical and physical imputation, "but personal moral guilt and punishment is here still inconceivable, because infants are not yet actual persons, but only potential, as it were, punctual existence of future personalities" (p. 167). (2). The stage of moral subjectivity.

"The degree of wickedness depends essentially also upon the clearness and purity of the consciousness of the goodness to which it opposes itself; hence it is impossible that the will which antagonizes God and the idea of guilt should reach their absolute height and decisiveness on the merely legal stage where goodness has not yet given its highest revelation of itself. And even on this account, so far as punishment is concerned, the subject is here, if indeed punishable, yet not yet ripe for the absolute judgment, because it is itself still in process and in a condition of relative indecision; in other words, it is not yet irredeemable, but is still prior to the proper *Krisis*. First the absolute, that is, complete personal guilt, involves in itself also the subject's liability to absolute damnation, yet is in itself already judged" (p. 173).

(3). The stage of personal free decision. In order to this decision it is necessary on the objective side

"That goodness be placed before the eyes in its full clearness and truth, not merely as the voice of conscience, or as *γράμμα*, but in its clearest and most attractive form, as personal Love, in order that the decision for or against it may have decisive significance; subjectively, moreover, there must be added alongside of the recognition of this goodness the full freedom of decision from one's own personality" (p. 174). "This subjective and objective possibility of free decision has now been given by God through Christianity as the absolute religion, and also on this account this is the religion of freedom" (p. 175). "The incarnate personal love is the completely revealed goodness. The appearance of Christ urges, therefore, irresistibly to decision for or against him, and at the same time renders free decision possible in spite of original sin" (p. 175). "So long as the Gospel, which must come to all before the judgment, has not yet come internally near to man, accordingly also has not been rejected, he may indeed already receive the predicate of punishable, and remain also without Christ in a state of increasing unblessedness, but neither final condemnation, nor indeed the contrary, is yet applicable to him; he is, as it were, in a provisional condition; the estimation of his entire worth or unworthiness is not yet ready for award; moreover, *ἀμαρτία* is not yet *ἀποτελεσθεΐσα*; but it must come to the *Krisis* and with the sundering of that which was previously mingled, the necessary and the free; man, in moral and religious respects, enters on the stage of Personality, as distinguished from that of simply bearing the character of the race" (p. 176).

In this way our author seeks to overcome the difficulties that press upon us in connection with the relation of the sin of the race to human freedom and suffering. The proposed solution is in many respects attractive as it is profound and subtle, but not a few new difficulties arise in connection with the throwing forward of the decision with reference to the great majority of our race into the field of Eschatology. We wait for the completion of the system, where many questions here excited may receive their answer.

C. A. BRIGGS.

THE FOUNDATIONS OF FAITH. Bampton Lectures for 1879. By HENRY WACE, M.A. 8vo. pp., with Notes, 399. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. 1880.

Hardly anything is more needful, just at present, than a thorough discussion of the nature, the justifying grounds, the objects, and the influence of Christian

Faith. The most urgent reason for such discussion is found, not so much in the present tendencies of certain scientific classes, but rather in the unsettled and somewhat despondent attitude of what may be called popular thought. While some scientists are disposed to regard such faith as a sentiment merely, devoid of scientific quality, and therefore unworthy of anything more than a passing recognition, their position and needs, however much they may command sympathy, are of less moment everyway than those of the much larger class to whom allusion has just been made. There are many people, not scientific in either vocation or modes of thought, who, while holding on to their belief in divine things, are still unable to give even to themselves a *reason of the hope* that is in them. Many persons of this class are less concerned with questions respecting the sublime objects of faith, than with faith itself viewed as a spiritual emotion, and considered in its relations to the hope and the salvation with which it is associated. Others are embarrassed by the apparent varieties in faith, by the multiplicity of the objects on which faith reposes, by the singular variations in the action and effect of faith upon the soul. In some instances a deep, undefined feeling of unrest disturbs the consciousness of trust, draws off the flow of spiritual sensibility, and even seriously undermines the character. The number of persons answering this description more or less fully is much larger than is generally supposed, and there is reason to fear that this number is increasing, and is likely to increase.

This volume is a helpful and valuable contribution toward the correction of such popular tendencies, and toward the justifying and restoration of true religious faith. The opening Lecture contains an admirable definition or analysis of faith in general, showing its presence and function even in the natural religions, and exhibiting its universal quality and its immense power as a factor in the life of the race. It presents also a cogent plea for the revival of the principle of faith as a moral force, and for the consequent restoration of that regard for true and right authority in the sphere of religion, which genuine faith tends always to induce. This is followed by an interesting discussion of the relations mutually subsisting between faith and conscience:—conscience revealing by an inner law the reality of those sublime sureties on which faith is fastened;—faith, in turn, acting upon the conscience, and making more vivid and potential the moral rules by which conscience is controlled.

Proceeding from this general basis, the author advances to the discussion of the relations of faith to Revelation; emphasizing especially the witness to the fact of such Revelation, and to its character and work, which comes from the exercise of rational trust in what is therein revealed. There may be room for considerable differences of opinion as to the extent of this testimony, and especially as to the use that may be made of it as an argument for Revelation itself. But there can be no question as to the internal and personal corroboration thus furnished, or as to the vast accession which the internal evidences for the Bible receive not only from what our Symbols call “the heavenliness of the matter, the efficacy of the doctrine, the majesty of the style,” and so on, but also from the deep responsive confession and song of the truly believing soul. What they describe as “full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divine authority” of the Word, as it is a work of the Spirit, is also in every case a product and result of spiritual faith.

Christian Faith, justifying itself as a principle in human nature, and resting specifically on Scripture, is further presented in its main varieties, yet in its essential unity. These varieties are four in number: faith under the old covenant, faith as required by Christ, the faith of the early Church, and faith as developed in modern times—especially in and through the Reformation. These varieties reveal themselves under a law of development; Old Testament faith

passing into the higher sentiment of belief and trust in Christ; this sentiment, growing in some sense into a broader belief, or completer trust, under Apostolic nurture; and this, in turn, after the long night of torpor under the Papacy, assuming still another shape through the revival of both Scriptural doctrine and spiritual life under Luther and his successors. "Faith is the cardinal word of the Reformation."

The concluding Lecture discusses, with much force, the variations of faith as manifested in Protestantism, the remedy for such variations proposed by Rome in the conception of an infallible Church, and the true ground and basis of that "unity of the faith" to which we are taught that all believers will finally "come." The author regards Protestantism, in its revolt from the Papal error, and in its loyalty to Scripture, which, as he says, "the Napoleonic genius of Calvin erected into supreme authority," as having come too much under bondage to theological systems, and consequently to have fallen into remediless diversities in both belief and organization. Whether he suggests any adequate remedy in his closing references to the faith of the Church of England, or to the action of the Church Universal in the authoritative unifying of faith, may be questioned. The discussion, as a whole, deserves thoughtful study; and the notes appended to the lectures, constituting nearly half the volume, afford valuable help to the student.

E. D. MORRIS.

DER MONOTHEISMUS DER OFFENBARUNG UND DAS HEIDENTHUM. Religionsgeschichtliche Studie. Nach H. Formby aus dem Englischen bearbeitet und mit Noten versehen von Dr. CORNELIUS KRIEG. pp. viii., 368. Mainz: 1880.

Rev. Henry Formby, an English Benedictine, is the author of "Lectures on Ancient Rome and her Empire over the Nations," 1876; "Monotheism from the Hebrews the primitive Religion of Rome," 1877; "A Compendium of the Philosophy of Ancient History," 1878; "Ancient Rome and its Connection with the Christian Religion," 1880,—the first two of which works we suppose to have supplied the impulse and the basis to the work before us.

A remark made by Mr. Formby in one of his works is quite as true after his ingenious endeavors as it was before: "This remains as a province of study which has still to be conquered for the cause of faith." Early Roman history is re-written in the interest of Papal Rome. Each of the four great nations which, before Rome held wide empire in the world—Assyria, Babylon, Persia, and the Greece of Alexander and his successors,—was commissioned to preserve the monotheistic faith of primitive and patriarchal times. The Hebrews were providentially employed to help each of these nations to the fulfilment of its commission. To establish these preliminary propositions requires much violent wresting of received history. To "faith," however, this is no hard task.

Now Rome cannot have received a less honorable commission, in the execution of which it must have been aided by a like contact with the same favored and chosen Hebrew people. This must have been in the time of Numa, for several generations after whose reign Rome was more true to the monotheistic faith than the Hebrews of Solomon's own days. Our common beliefs in regard to regal Rome have all been derived from unreliable authorities, and modern criticism has only confounded the confusion and exaggerated the error. Faith has a victory to win both over the critics and over the Roman historians themselves.

The monotheistic faith which Rome must have had must have been substantially borrowed, and must have been borrowed from the Hebrews; at all of which nobody should be surprised (Krieg, p. 17). A series of phenomena must appear common to Jerusalem and Rome, and that as the fruit of their common