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ARTICLE I.

THE COUNCIL OF APOSTLES AND PRESBYTERS AT JERUSALEM.

The Acts of the Apostles is the first chapter of the history of the Christian Church, the transition chapter from the history of the Church under the Jewish dispensation to the history of the same Church under the Christian dispensation. Although not designed to teach ecclesiastical polity, yet the principles and precedents furnished therein by apostolic precepts and practices are so numerous and specific, that it alone would be sufficient to reveal the constitution of the Church, if there were access to no other inspired writings. Notwithstanding the fact that the voice of inspiration was never heard beyond the first century, yet the advocates of Prelacy and Congregationalism appeal alike to the testimony of the post-apostolic age in support of their respective systems. Thus Mr. Litton, of the Episcopal Church, quoted by Bannerman in his "Church of Christ," makes the remarkable statement that the claims of Episcopacy are strong so long as the appeal is to the post-apostolic age, and become weak only when the appeal is made to Scripture. Canon Venables, in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, article *Episcopacy*, furnishes the following still more explicit testimony to the same effect: "It may be desirable here to remove the confusion which may be produced by

the ambiguous use of the word 'Bishop.' . . . In its fundamental sense of an 'overseer,' 'inspector,' it was not originally a term of office at all. When it appears as such in the New Testament, it is simply synonymous with presbyter, the same officer of the church being called indifferently by one or the other name." After establishing that fact by the ordinary Scripture proofs, thereby indirectly testifying to the scripturalness of Presbyterianism, he frankly admits, "Any conclusion, therefore, drawn from the use of the term bishop in the New Testament, as to the existence of the episcopal office, would be fallacious," claiming for Episcopacy nothing more than "traces in apostolic times." Concerning its divine origin, he speaks unequivocally: "Do we intend that Episcopacy stands on the same level as Baptism and the Lord's Supper as a direct ordinance of Christ? . . . Though asserted as an unquestionable fact by many learned defenders of Episcopacy, we may safely assert that there is not a trace in the New Testament." To the same effect are the admissions of Dr. Lightfoot, Dean Alford, Dean Stanley, Canon Farrar, and Edwin Hatch, A. M., Bampton Lecturer for 1880. So Congregationalists have appealed to the testimony of Mosheim, that every local church in the post-apostolic age was independent. If deemed necessary, Presbyterianism might appeal as confidently as any to the post-apostolic age. Clement of Rome, Chrysostom, Jerome, Theodoret, as well as the historian Gibbon, affirm that for the first centuries presbyter and bishop were synonymous. That the government of the Church was essentially Presbyterian for several centuries, is the only explanation of the conflicting testimony of Church historians: one party magnifying the authority of Presbytery in the post-apostolic age into Episcopacy, the other magnifying the liberty of Presbytery into Independency. The time is coming when these testimonies of the "fathers" must be abandoned as props to support weak and tottering ecclesiastical systems. So much pious fraud has been practised, such as "Isidorian Decretals," "Ignatian Epistles," etc., which is now being exposed by the searching criticism of this age, as to cause loss of faith in uninspired testimonies. The Scriptures must be made the sole basis of any ecclesiastical system. That system of theology or

ecclesiology, and that only, must stand, will stand, ought to stand, which can be established by Scripture. Not Scripture in the sense of Dr. Wayland: "The New Testament, all the New Testament, nothing but the New Testament;" but Scripture in a more comprehensive meaning: the Bible, all the Bible, nothing but the Bible. The destruction of every system unscriptural, and consequently not *jure divino*, is the subject of prophecy. It was a prophecy, uttered by the Founder and Head of the Church, as yet still unfulfilled, though none the less certain: "Every plant which my heavenly Father hath not planted shall be rooted up" (Matt. xv. 13). It matters not how men may build upon expediency, how beautiful their fabric, how successful their building according to worldly judgment, though it have but one defect, if it only lack scriptural support, it is a fundamental fatal defect, an house built on a foundation of sand.

Truth is ever consistent with itself; so perfectly consistent, that, given a few principles, these necessitate certain other correlative principles, forming a complete system. It is by virtue of the reliability of this fact, that the comparative anatomist can construct the entire skeleton of an extinct animal from the merest fragment of a bone. The records of science furnish illustrations where such men as Professors Owen, Kaup, and Cuvier, from fragments of bone or tooth, have restored the entire skeleton of extinct species, and subsequent discoveries corroborated the correctness of their conclusions. In like manner, deny predestination, and consistency requires denial of sovereignty of God, divine foreknowledge, special providence, limited atonement, human inability, sole efficiency of the Spirit in regeneration, and final perseverance of the saints. One stitch dropped from the web of divine truth, rends it in twain, or warps the whole according to the bias of perverted human judgment. It is on the same principle that, given the record of this Council or Synod at Jerusalem, it is possible from it to ascertain the constitution of the Church. The principles of ecclesiastical polity therein contained necessitate certain other corresponding correlative principles, which, taken together, form a well articulated system, and being tested by Scripture for confirmation, becomes impregnable against every assault.

The Church is indebted for this Council to the false teachers of circumcision. Just as the sneers of the Jews, "This man receiveth sinners," gave to the Church and the world the beautiful parable of the prodigal son, so the Church is indebted for the Council to the heresy, "Except ye be circumcised after the manner of Moses, ye cannot be saved." It is the tendency of human nature in every age to attach great value to external ordinances or humanly devised means. "Except ye be circumcised," is but a tie linking the human nature of the apostolic age with the human nature of the present, which is still making similar demands for carnal ordinances: Except ye be immersed according to our mode, ye are not baptized; except ye be confirmed by a bishop in the line of apostolic succession, ye cannot receive the Holy Ghost; except ye be absolved by a priest, or anointed with extreme unction, "ye cannot be saved"! These three demands, legitimate successors of "Except ye be circumcised," etc., though varying in degree, and only the last attaining unequivocally the alternative of "ye cannot be saved," yet agree in one thing, virtually unchurching all other communions on earth except their own, and thereby casting considerable doubt on the prospects of others entering the kingdom of heaven in glory. Inordinate stress laid upon an outward ordinance is *prima facie* evidence of its human origin, or human corruption of the divine. Under the pressure of such teaching, the Council at Jerusalem becomes a necessity for the suppression of error and vindication of truth. It is immaterial who were "they" that appointed the delegation, consisting of Paul, Barnabas, and Titus (Acts xv. 2; Gal. ii. 1, 7), to carry the case to another court, whether parochial Presbytery or classical Presbytery of several churches affected by the teaching, or whether "they" yielded to the demand of Paul, Barnabas, and Titus for a hearing before a Council of apostles and elders at Jerusalem. The trouble arose at Antioch: a delegation from thence obtained audience (Acts xv. 12) before the body of apostles and elders, who came together for the express purpose of considering the matter (Acts xv. 6). A debate was held (verse 7); a decision was reached; and the decrees were published, not

simply at Antioch, but delivered to all the churches to keep (Acts xvi. 4).

Was it a Council? The primitive Church so understood it; and without it for a warrant and model for similar assemblies, the Church would have been utterly powerless to protect itself against Arianism, Apollinarinism, etc. The *Encyclopædia Britannica*, though alluding to Councils as "pitched battles of Church History," admits their value and even necessity for suppression of heresy and crystallisation of the truth. The Church of every age and every sect, whether heretic or orthodox, understood this assembly as the first Council of the Church. If ever there was an opinion in ecclesiastics, which could claim a "*quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus*," the Council theory can. Truth is not converted into error, nor yet vitiated, nor even impaired, because many heretics have understood and advocated it as truth. Nor does the fact that the record of Acts xv. can be read through Prelatic and Congregational glasses as well as Presbyterian, alter the fact of its being a Council. The Bible itself can be read through Papal, Protestant, Calvinistic, Arminian, Presbyterian, or Prelatic glasses. The glasses do not alter the truth of the Bible, but simply affect our understanding of it. The world also can be viewed through any kind of glass, and the variety is neither in us nor the world, but in the glass. The very fact, therefore, that no matter through what kind of ecclesiastical glasses this assembly at Jerusalem is viewed, there is still revealed a Council of some complexion, determines the fact by the very best evidence that it was a Council without determining its nature.

Various opinions have been entertained with respect to the nature of this Council, its constitution, jurisdiction, authority, and how far it furnishes a precedent and pattern for the Church in after ages. Whether is it a model and warrant for similar Councils, or whether does it stand alone and solitary in the history of the Church? Every shade of opinion has had its advocates, from its being held to be an inspired infallible Council, with absolute power and authority to abrogate, annul, alter, amend, and enact law for the Church at will, down to regarding it as a mere voluntary association, having no warrant to convene except its

pleasure, and no power except to proffer friendly advice. It matters not what opinion is held, it will vitally affect our ideas of church government. It is the keystone in any system of Church polity. If the Prelatic interpretation of this Council be destroyed, the Prelatic system falls to the ground a mass of rubbish. Undermine the Congregational theory, and there is no warrant for any voluntary association, giving advice. If it be not a higher court, according to Presbyterian theory, it would be difficult to exhibit any warrant for higher court than the Presbytery of Antioch, which laid hands on Paul and Barnabas, and commissioned them to the foreign missionary work, or the Presbytery of Lystra (?), which ordained Timothy. The Confession of Faith is correct in citing Acts xv. as its Scripture warrant for Presbyteries, Synods, and Assemblies. Congregationalists object to this being any warrant for the higher court of appeal, because not corroborated by other cases. It is sufficient to reply that, having the Jewish ecclesiastical system as a basis, one well authenticated, inspired, apostolic precedent needs no other concurrent support. Presbyterians have yielded this case on opposite grounds, because Presbyterianism ought not to be based on one passage of Scripture, and there is much better warrant for higher courts elsewhere in Scripture. Let them produce the testimony, and exhibit more explicit Scripture precepts or examples. Yielding passage after passage to opponents of Presbyterianism, because other Scripture can be trusted to reveal the truth, will rob the truth by degrees of every vestige of support.

The multitude of theories which have prevailed in regard to the nature of this Council are reducible to three, according to the threefold classification of Church polity—Prelatic, Congregational, and Presbyterian. These are the only elementary systems. Independency, sometimes classified as a fourth, is not a system distinct from these three, but may, as an accident, modify either, though inherent only in the Congregational; so Papal and Episcopal are but the extremes of Prelacy. All other systems are but variations, modifications, or combinations of the three simple elementary forms. Consequently, this Council at Jerusalem must have been :

I. Either an inspired and infallible Council, with absolute power to alter the law of Christ for the Church at will;

II. Or, exactly the opposite, only a voluntary association, having no power, but advisory;

III. Or, something intermediate between them, a representative assembly, acting by virtue of a divine constitution, under guidance of the Holy Spirit, convened as a higher court, to hear appeals, interpret and apply the law of Christ. Each system, to a certain extent, stands or falls with the above.

I. It could not have been the first, because inspiration was not needed to determine a case which had *already been determined*, both by inspiration and the providence of God, admitting the Gentiles into the Church without circumcision. If inspiration had been needed, there was no necessity to search for the mind of the Spirit at Jerusalem among the apostles. Was there not an apostle at Antioch, one "not a whit behind the very chiefest," who could have given an inspired utterance? Being himself "the Apostle of the Gentiles," was he not possessed of the mind of the Spirit, touching the very class for whose sake he is specially called to be an apostle? There could have been no necessity for a college of inspired apostles, unless it be claimed that the inspiration of a collective body is more authoritative than the inspiration of an individual. But the very nature of inspiration is a denial of the latter assumption. If guided by human wisdom, then a "multitude of counsellors" might be required for safety. But from the very nature of inspiration, what God reveals to one man is as authoritative as if revealed to an assembled universe. The authority imparted by inspiration consists in the person speaking, the Holy Ghost, and not in the number who are made the medium of communication. * If the latter statement be erroneous, then the inspiration of the Epistles of Paul and all Scripture must be impugned, because uttered through the medium of single individuals. When has inspiration ever chosen a multitude to become the vehicle of conveying truth? What fundamental truth of the inspired word was revealed by a college of apostles, or by any other multitude? If inspiration be claimed for this Council, it would necessitate its influences also being imparted to all the "elders,"

who were associated with the apostles. But the Scriptures afford no warrant whatever for such a supposition. A Council half inspired and half uninspired would afford no guarantee whatever that the inspired utterances would prevail to the exclusion of the uninspired. The uninspired element would weaken the force of the inspired. If, however, to avoid that difficulty, it be claimed without any Scripture warrant, that the elders were also inspired, a still more insuperable difficulty obtrudes itself requiring solution. If guided by inspiration, every utterance must have partaken of the inspiration, else how shall we discriminate between the inspired and uninspired utterances? How could there have been "much disputing"? Does inspiration ever contradict itself? Inspiration is never given, except to reveal the will of God to men; but if every utterance of the Council were inspired, it follows, then, that a part of the revealed will of God has never been recorded, and is lost to the world. The very method of procedure is a denial of the inspiration theory. If the apostles and elders coming together to consider the matter, was in reality in order to consult the oracle of inspiration, there could have been no disputing, no difference of opinion. The truth would have been revealed simultaneously to the whole assembly. Or, if one person in the number had been made the vehicle of conveying it to the others, no sooner had he spoken than there would have been universal assent. The very opposite, however, were the facts of the case. It was only after "much disputing," consulting the word of God in the prophecies concerning the Gentiles, and the providence of God in admitting them without circumcision, that a conclusion was reached *in accordance with the mind of the Spirit*. But, does not the Council claim inspiration in that expression, "It seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us," etc.? The very union of their own names with that of the Holy Ghost forbids the theory of inspiration. What, then, must be understood by the expression, "It seemed good to the Holy Ghost"? In other words, how did they learn what "seemed good to the Holy Ghost"? Not by a new revelation of the Spirit, but manifestly by consulting the inspired utterances of prophecy touching the Gentiles (Acts xv. 15-18), interpreted by the providence of God

in admitting them in uncircumcision (Acts xv. 7-11, 14). The record shows that exactly that was done and nothing more. Why demand a new revelation, when the mind of the Spirit could be learned by one ample and previously given? It was, therefore, by searching the Scriptures that they discovered what "seemed good to the Holy Ghost." If they had come together to inquire of an oracle, and "hear what God the Lord will speak," they would have published the decree simply, "It seemed good to the Holy Ghost." But if they have come together themselves "for to consider of this matter," and express their judgment as to what the Spirit had revealed in the Scriptures, they could say, "It seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us." (Cunningham's *Hist. Theol.*, Vol. I., page 47.) Any Church court can discover the mind of the Spirit in the same way, by examining the written word, and being guided by the revealed will of God. It is the testimony of Calvin, that Christ "really presides only where he governs the whole assembly by his word and spirit" (*Institutes*, Book 4, Chapter 9, Section 1). Such, without attempting to legislate for the Church, can proclaim the law as uttered by Christ in his inspired word, and say in substance, what "seemed good to the Holy Ghost" also seems good "to us." If a Church court cannot be guided to conclusions in accordance with the mind of the Spirit except by inspiration, then the opening prayer of a church court, praying for the guidance of the Spirit, becomes a mockery. If it seem inconsistent to maintain that this Council was not guided by inspiration, and yet to insist that the record in Acts xv., and necessarily the conclusion of the Council, are inspired, it is sufficient to reply that the Jewish chronicles are not inspired, but when those chronicles are quoted by inspired writers, and incorporated as part of Scripture, that which was not inspired as chronicles becomes inspired by the incorporation into the Scriptures. Neither is the Septuagint version of the Scriptures inspired; and yet when quoted by Christ and his apostles in the New Testament, the part quoted and incorporated becomes henceforth inspired. If, then, it cannot be claimed that this was an inspired Council, and, consequently, infallible, Papacy must look elsewhere in search of a model and warrant for

its pretended infallible Councils, and "*a fortiori*" must Prelacy look elsewhere for authority to abrogate the law of Christ and legislate for the Church. Even if inspiration could be claimed for this Council, that would warrant neither Papal nor Prelatic assumptions, but rather forbid them. Infallibility depends on inspiration, but as the voice of inspiration died away with the first century, no other Council can claim inspiration; and infallibility without inspiration is a contradiction. However absurd the claims of Papacy, those of Prelacy are more absurd from inconsistency. If Papacy could establish its infallibility, that would warrant it in altering or amending the laws of Christ. But Prelacy claims the authority to legislate for the Church at will, without claiming infallibility to secure wise legislation.

II. It could not have been, according to the second theory, simply a *voluntary association giving advice*, considering the *composition* of the Council, the *authority* of its decrees, and the *extent* of its jurisdiction.

1. We join issue with the Congregationalists squarely upon the *composition* of that assembly. Their argument is based upon three expressions in the record: "the multitude," of verse 12, "with the whole Church," of verse 22, and "brethren," of verse 23. It seems almost ludicrous to base an argument on verse 12, "all the multitude kept silence"! Therefore, because "the multitude" were present and "*kept silence*," they are entitled to become a constituent part of every ecclesiastical court, and *not* "keep silence"! Arguing from the silence of "the multitude" on one occasion their right to participate on every other, is queer logic! It has been well remarked that nothing more can be claimed from the presence of a silent multitude than an argument framed against Prelatic conclaves, sitting with closed doors, from which the people are unwarrantably excluded. Kunoel, Mosheim, and Neander have very forcibly argued that "the whole Church" cannot be given a literal signification, as no place could possibly contain the myriads composing "the whole Church," but that the expression must, instead, designate simply deputies of "the whole Church." But even if it be literally interpreted, the expression, "Then pleased it the apostles and the elders, with

the whole Church," etc., announced only the acquiescence of the Church. It is difficult to comprehend by what logic it can be made to appear that because the whole Church was satisfied and eminently pleased with the action of the assembly, therefore the whole Church was a constituent part of the Council. The whole battle must be in regard to the word "brethren." It might be argued that the "brethren" simply appear in the attitude of sending "greeting," which makes them no more responsible for the decrees, "ordained of the apostles and elders," than the greetings of particular individuals in the Epistles of Paul make them responsible for the doctrinal utterances of Paul in those Epistles. But upon close examination of the case, the "brethren" disappear entirely, except as synonymous with "apostles and elders." In sending up the case from Antioch, the "brethren" are not mentioned as a constituent part of the Council, whose decision is asked. It is simply said certain "should go up to Jerusalem unto the *apostles* and *elders* about this question." In giving the composition of the assembly, nothing is said of any "brethren," but simply "the *apostles* and *elders* came together for to consider of this matter." In publishing the decrees among the churches, nothing is said of any "brethren" having participated in decreeing, but simply "delivered them the decrees for to keep, that were ordained of the *apostles* and *elders*." Is it merely accidental that these two classes, and *no others*, are said to have been consulted by Antioch, to have come together to consider and to have ordained the decrees? Any lingering doubt of the case, already approaching the nearness of mathematical demonstration, is forever dissipated by the fact that the oldest and best Greek manuscripts show that the reading, "apostles and elders and brethren," is incorrect. In the oldest uncial manuscripts, there is no "and" before "brethren." The correct reading would be, "apostles and elders, brethren," making "brethren" synonymous with "apostles and elders," and comprehending both. This is the reading of the five chief uncials, regarded the oldest and best, and the chief basis of the late Revision, viz., (Σ, A, B, C, D,) Codex Sinaiticus, Codex Alexandrinus, Codex Vaticanus, Codex Ephraemi, and Codex Bezae. It is also the reading

of the Vulgate and several other inferior versions; and even of Irenæus (in the Latin). It is the reading adopted by Lachmann, whilst Neander and Alford approve it. It has likewise been supported by Meyer, De Wette, and Lechler upon internal evidence. It is marked by Griesbach as probably the correct reading. It is the reading of Westcott's and Hort's Greek Testament, which "is destined to become the classic form of the text in the original Greek." Such an array of evidence of the very highest character would have secured the admission by the Revisers of almost any other reading into the received text. It did not fail to secure their recognition, and the "and" before "brethren" was omitted, but the meaning was obscured by a false translation. *πρεσβύτεροι* is converted into an adjective, and made to qualify "brethren," giving us the unwarranted translation, "the apostles and the *elder brethren*," making the absurd statement that not *all* the "brethren" are associated with the apostles, but only those of a *certain age*, "the *elder brethren*." It is true the Revisers placed the correct reading, "Apostles and elders, brethren," in the appendix as the one preferred by the American Committee, but the false reading occupies the text, and the correct one is scarcely seen. With what authority *πρεσβύτεροι* is converted into an adjective, may be judged from the following: *πρεσβύτεροι* is employed with reference to that Council six times, five in the same chapter and once in the next. Of the six, it is translated "elders" five times, this case being the only exception. In the Acts of the Apostles, *πρεσβύτεροι* is a word of frequent recurrence, being found seventeen times, and is uniformly translated "elders," except in this one instance. Extending the research, so as to include Luke's Gospel as well as his Acts of the Apostles, it occurs twenty-three times; and besides this arbitrary exception made by the Revisers, it is an adjective but once, and that in the singular number, describing the elder son of the parable of the prodigal. If the field of inquiry be extended over the entire New Testament, besides *πρεσβυτέριον* (Presbytery) three times (Luke xxii. 66; Acts xxii. 5; 1 Tim. iv. 14), and *συμπρεσβύτερος* (co-presbyter) once (1 Peter v. 1), *πρεσβύτεροι* is found sixty-eight times; and of that number it is only four times used as an adject-

tive. Of these four seeming exceptions, one, as has been said, is in the singular number (Luke xv. 25); another is both in the singular and in a passage of Scripture regarded as spurious (John viii. 9); a third is feminine gender (1 Tim. v. 2); and the fourth is a doubtful case, with the preponderance of the doubt against its being an adjective and in favor of the translation "elders" (1 Peter v. 5). So, really, there is but one case where *πρεσβύτεροι* is used as an adjective, and that case is exceedingly doubtful. The doubt is still further increased by the use of *μειζων* (Rom. ix. 12), to express seniority. If, then, the support of the most ancient and most valuable manuscripts, and greatest critics and scholars is of any weight in determining the correct reading, it is demonstrated beyond question that the correct reading of this passage is "apostles and elders, brethren." Congregationalists utterly fail to discover any others in the composition of that assembly than "*apostles and elders.*" "The multitude kept silence," "the whole Church" simply acquiesced in the action of the assembly, and the "brethren" are only the "apostles and elders" combined.

2. It is equally easy to demolish the voluntary association theory by an examination of the *authority* of the decrees. The language is too emphatic and unmistakable to be regarded as the language of advice. Advice may be offered, but has never yet been offered, in such terms as, "It seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us to *lay upon you no greater burden than these necessary things.*" Unless human language can be shown to have meant then exactly the opposite of its present meaning, *advice offered* and *decrees ordained* must be regarded as antipodes. Advice may be submitted for consideration, but never "delivered for to keep." "Lay upon you no greater burden," etc., and "delivered them the decrees for to keep, that were ordained of apostles and elders which were at Jerusalem," is the language of authority.

3. Still another feature of this Council does not comport with the Congregational independent theory. Does the decision affect Antioch simply? By no means. Instead of being published at Antioch simply, they are published with authority throughout Christendom (Acts xvi. 4). Recognising no frigid isolated inde-

pendency, but, on the contrary, acting on the principle of the unity of the Church, that what is binding on one is equally binding on all, the decrees are delivered to all the churches to keep. The decision of the Council affected every church as truly as Antioch. Considering the composition of the body, the authority of its decrees, and the far-reaching sweep of its jurisdiction, it could not have been a voluntary association. Congregationalism must look elsewhere for authority to enact the grand farce of giving advice.

III. If neither the first nor second theory can be accepted, let us go to the third, and view this Council as a Representative Assembly, according to the system of Presbyterianism. This follows from the nature of the destructive conditional syllogism. If truth lie between the three, to disprove two is equivalent to the establishment of the third. It may be further demonstrated from the composition, "apostles and elders," the former being teaching elders, and the latter, at least including, ruling elders, exactly the composition of every scriptural court in its normal condition. Arguments might be adduced from the *object* of the Assembly, "came together for to consider of this matter," which was a case of appeal or reference; from the *method of procedure*, the decision being reached by consulting the word of God as the sole authority; from the *authority* of its decisions, "decrees," "ordained," "delivered them the decrees for to keep," and laid upon them as a "necessary" "burden"; from its *jurisdiction*, acting not simply for Antioch, but for all the churches; from the *harmony* of this theory with the whole system of Presbyterianism; and from the concurrent support of the principles embodied in this Council by Scripture, ranging through the whole Canon. Passing by matters of minor consideration, whether James was the "brother of the Lord," or "James the Less"; whether this visit of Paul was the second or third of his five visits to Jerusalem; whether the prohibitions of this Council were the same as the Noachian and those exacted of proselytes; merely mentioning the curious remark of the acute Bengel, that the "greeting," *χαίρειν*, occurs nowhere else, with one exception (Acts xxiii. 26), except in the Epistle of James (i. 1), which indicates that his hand shaped

the address, and serves to mark it as authentic; attention is directed next to the principles of Church polity exhibited by this Council, confirmed and substantiated by appeal to other Scriptures, and serving to completely establish the Presbyterian theory of the Council.

1. Contrary to Congregationalism, this Council exhibits the government of the Church in the hands of *rulers*, and not in the hands of a mixed multitude of men, women, and children, where passion and prejudice sway alternate sceptres, or where the youngest child may hold the balance of power, and cast the deciding vote through parental tyranny or through ignorance, affecting most fundamental principles of Christianity. But instead of such anarchy, this Council exhibits the "*apostles and elders*" in the *very act of ruling*, considering and deciding a precedent, involving principles affecting all the churches. It exhibits all the churches in the attitude of recognising the authority of their rulers in the meekness of submission and the alacrity of obedience. This principle of rule exhibited, if tested by Scripture, is abundantly sustained. (1.) The *names* by which the officers of the Church are called, are the very insignia of rule, the badges of authority. The *πρεσβύτεροι* were the "rulers of the synagogue," and, according to Neander and others, were "transferred to the Christian church from the Jewish synagogue." In the New Testament, wherever *πρεσβύτεροι* occurs, only the connexion can determine whether it relates to elders of the synagogue or the church. The office and the name change place from synagogue to church, but retain the same relative significance. Interchangeable with *πρεσβύτεροι* is used *ἐπίσκοποι* (Acts xx. 17, 28), by which the same officers were called among the Gentiles. Concerning the latter title, Neander remarks: "The appellation, *ἐπίσκοποι*—overseers—over the whole Church and over all its affairs; just as in the Attic civil administration, those who were sent out to organise the states dependent on Athens were called *ἐπίσκοποι*; and just as this name seems to have become generally current in the language of civil life to denote any kind of governing superintendence in the public administration" (Neander's Ch. Hist., Vol. I., page 184). Synonymous with both is still another term, *ποιμένες*, "shepherds," signifying

two functions of teaching and ruling. "Take heed, therefore, unto yourselves and to all the flock, over the which the Holy Ghost hath made you *bishops* to *shepherd* the Church of God," etc. (Acts xx. 17, 28). A shepherd ordinarily both pastures and controls his flock.¹ (2.) Scriptural *distinctions* imply two classes, the rulers and the ruled. "He that ruleth with diligence," etc.

¹The import of "pastors"—*ποιμένες*—in Eph. iv. 11, in that enumeration of Christ's ascension gifts is in some respects difficult of interpretation. If it stood alone, there would be no difficulty in understanding it as designating teaching elders, the same as modern pastors. But when coupled with "teachers" in that expression, "pastors and teachers," the difficulty arises. If pastors be equivalent to *teaching* elders, then who and what are the "teachers"? If "teachers" are *teaching elders*, what is the difference between "pastors and teachers"? Three interpretations are mutually exclusive of each other. Establish either one, and the other two are destroyed. Destroy two and the third is established:

1. "Pastors and teachers" were either the same;
2. Or, else "teachers" meant something different from *teaching* elders;
3. Or, "pastors" meant some other than *teaching* elders.

1. They could not have been the same, because the grammatical construction shows that they are not used synonymously, but coupled together by the conjunction. Why would the apostle use two words *in the same connexion* without the shadow of a difference in meaning? There is no more reason for regarding them identical than for regarding "apostles" and "evangelists" identical in the same catalogue.

2. Teachers could not be other than *teaching* elders. It is so used in the parallel catalogue of 1 Cor. xii. 28. "Apt to *teach*" is one qualification of bishop synonymous with elder (1 Tim. iii. 3, *et al.*). If it be urged that "teachers" were preachers without pastorates, the difficulty then would be, that such a hypothesis cannot bring to its aid even the semblance of scriptural support. The only class of "teachers" without settled pastorates recognised in Scripture is that already enumerated as "evangelists."

3. "Pastors" must, therefore, be employed in this connexion to designate some other class than *teaching* elders. In this enumeration of church officers, it must be used simply in the sense of *rulers*, corresponding to "governments," in the catalogue of 1 Cor. xii. 28. If the objection be raised, that *ruling* would then be enumerated first as seemingly a more important office than *teaching*, it may be said that the same order is followed in another place, "Let the elders that rule well be counted worthy of double honor, especially they who labor in the word and doctrine." (1.) In favor of this interpretation, it may be urged that *ποιμήν* is used by Greek writers in the sense of ruler. Homer frequently alludes to

(Rom. xii. 8). "Governments" (1 Cor. xii. 28). "Ruleth" and "governments" are terms which demand the corresponding correlatives, "ruled" and "governors," or else they are unmeaning and misleading. (3.) The *directions to rulers*, how to rule, imply two classes. "The *elders* which are among you I exhort. . . . Feed the flock of God which is among you, taking the oversight thereof not by constraint, but willingly; not for filthy lucre, but of a ready mind: *neither as being lords over God's heritage*," etc. (1 Peter v. 1-3). "*Elders that rule well*," etc. (1 Tim. v. 17). "*Take heed*, therefore, to yourselves and to all the flock, over the which the Holy Ghost hath made you *overseers*," etc. (Acts xx.

Agamemnon as ποιμένα λαῶν. Aeschylus calls the commanders or captains of ships ναῶν ποιμένες. Liddell and Scott, in their lexicon, recognise "govern" among their definitions as one meaning of ποιμαίνω. (2.) This is confirmed by the usage of the Old Testament. In 1 Chron. xi. 2, "Thou shalt *feed* (Septuagint ποιμανεῖς) my people Israel; and thou shalt be *ruler* over my people Israel," and in Ezek. xxxvii. 24, "And David, my servant, shall be *king* over them; and they all shall have one *shepherd*" (ποιμῆν), "ruling" and "feeding," "king" and "shepherd," are used as synonymous terms. So, also, Ezek. xxxiv. 23. "Pastors" in the prophecies of the Old Testament are simply *rulers*, civil rulers, not even religious. On "pastors" of Jer. ii. 8; xxiii. 1; Ezek. xxxiv. 1, 2, Jamieson, Fausset, and Brown, in their Crit. and Ex. Com., affirm: "Civil, not religious; princes whose duty it was to tend their people"; "Shallum, Jehoiakim, Jeconiah, and Zedekiah"; "not prophets or priests, but *rulers*," etc. Concerning "pastors" of Jer. iii. 15; xxiii. 4, the same authorities say: "Not religious, but civil rulers, as Zerubbabel, Nehemiah." On Eph. iv. 11, the same Com. remarks: "That the 'pastors' here are the superintending *rulers* and bishops or presbyters of the church, is evident from Acts xx. 28; 1 Peter v. 1, 2, where the bishop's and presbyter's office is said to be to '*feed*' (ποιμαίνω) the flock. The term 'shepherd' or 'pastor' is used of guiding and *governing*, not merely *instructing*, whence it is applied to kings rather than prophets or priests (Jer. xxiii. 4)." (3.) The New Testament employs ποιμῆν in the same sense as a *ruler*. Whilst it is the only word in the New Testament signifying "pastor" or "shepherd," there are four words translated "feed." Three of them, βόσκει, τρέφω, and ψωμίζω, signify simply "feed"; the other, ποιμαίνω, denoting the double function of *feeding* and *governing*, or *either function*. In his charge to Peter, Christ contrasts two of these; twice saying, "Feed" (βόσκει), and once "Feed (ποιμαίνε) my sheep." Trench, in his "Synonyms of the New Testament," calls special attention to this change from βόσκει,

28). These directions are not addressed to the *whole Church*, forbidding the majority from *lording* it over the minority, which would have been the case and the *danger* if all shared in ruling, but they are addressed to the *elders*. They are unmeaning, if there are no rulers, and unnecessary, if there are none ruled. (4.) The *instructions to the ruled*, concerning their attitude towards their rulers, imply such distinction. "Know them which labor among you and are over you in the Lord," etc. (1 Thess. v. 12). "Remember them which have the rule over you," etc. (Heb. xiii. 7). "Obey them that have the rule over you, and submit yourselves," etc. (Heb. xiii. 17). The very word employed to express the ruling authority of the elders (*πρόιστημι*) is the same denoting parental government of children. One of the very qualifications of rulers in the Church is experience in ruling in their

meaning simply "feed," to *ποιμαίνε* meaning "tend as a shepherd," in the sense of governing. In Matt. ii. 6, *ποιμανεῖ* is used synonymously with *ἡγούμενος*, "governor." "For out of thee shall come a *Governor* that shall *rule* (*ποιμανεῖ*) my people Israel." Three times in Revelation *ποιμανεῖ* is employed to express the act of *ruling*. In Rev. ii. 27, "He shall *rule* (*ποιμανεῖ*) them with a rod of iron," etc. In xii. 5, "And she brought forth a man child, who was to *rule* (*ποιμανεῖ*) all nations with a rod of iron," etc. In xix. 15, "And he shall *rule* (*ποιμανεῖ*) them with a rod of iron," etc. In 1 Peter v. 2, *ποιμάνετε*, though translated "feed the flock of God," etc., is really used with the significance of rule, as is evident from its being employed in that connexion synonymously with *ἐπισκοποῦντες*, "taking the oversight" (overseeing, bishoping), and in contrast with *κατακυριεύοντες*, "being lords." Recognising this fact, the Revised Testament very correctly and appropriately renders *ποιμάνετε* in this place, "*Tend* the flock of God," etc. In the sense of *ruling* rather than *feeding*, in Acts xx. 28, the plurality of elders or bishops are commanded to *shepherd* (*ποιμαίνειν*) the church. Since then, *ποιμήν* is used for either function, and even more frequently for the *ruling*; and since "teachers" in this passage (Eph. iv. 11) are used for *teaching* elders, the conclusion is not only warranted, but necessitated, that "pastors" here are *rulers*, and the expression, "pastors and teachers" designates *ruling* elders and *teaching* elders. But the fact that it is said, "He gave *some* apostles, and *some* prophets, and *some* evangelists, and *some* pastors and teachers," not repeating the word "*some*" before "teachers," shows that they are two species, *ruling* and *teaching* elders; but still they belong to one genus, *ruling elders*. Only one teaches, but both rule. Teaching is the specific difference.

family. "One that ruleth well his own house, having his children in subjection with all gravity. For if a man know not how to rule his own house, how shall he take care of the church of God?" (1 Tim. iii. 4, 5.) Such exhortations are inexplicable, if no such distinctions exist. (5.) The *plurality of officers in every church* cannot be explained on any other supposition than as rulers. "Ordained them *elders* in every church," etc. (Acts xiv. 23). "Ordain *elders* in every city," etc. (Titus i. 5). "To all the saints in Christ Jesus, which are at Philippi with the *bishops* and *deacons*" (Phil. i. 1). "Know *them* (plural) which labor among you and are over you in the Lord," etc. (1 Thess. v. 12). "Obey *them*" (plural) (Heb. xiii. 17). "*Elders* of the church," etc. (James v. 14). According to the Congregational theory and practice, but one elder is needed in each church. The government of the Church by rulers, exhibited by this Council, and supported by these five independent scriptural arguments, becomes an established principle of Church polity and impregnable.

2. Contrary to Prelacy, this Council exhibits the government of the Church in the hands, not of one man as pope, prelate, or archbishop, nor of apostles simply or apostolic successors (so-called) as diocesan bishops; nor of preachers simply, apostles and preaching elders as in conference of bishops, presiding elders, preaching elders, and preaching deacons; but in the hands of two classes of *elders*, teaching elders and ruling elders. In order to demonstrate this fact, it becomes necessary to examine the two classes who are six times mentioned in connexion with this Council, and five of the times at least as composing it. (1.) The "apostles" were present simply as "elders," combining in themselves the elements both of the teaching and ruling eldership. The proof is threefold: (a) The *fact* of their eldership is indisputable, for they call themselves "elders." "The elders, which are among you, I exhort, who am also an *elder*" (1 Peter v. 1). "The *elder* unto the elect lady and her children" (2 John 1). "The *elder* unto the well-beloved Gaius" (3 John i). (b) They are not engaged in this Council in exercising their *preaching* function of "apostles," "one sent," but are in the *very act of ruling*. Therefore it was the *ruling* function of their office which was then being exercised. The

conclusion seems inevitable, that because they are both teaching and ruling elders, and are engaged in the very act of ruling; therefore, they were present in that capacity. (c) The conclusion becomes irresistible, when it is further remembered that they did not exercise their *inspired apostolic authority*, or perform any act which had the appearance of exercising the *extraordinary authority* which belonged to the apostolate exclusively. Why allow "much disputing" in their presence if they were exercising extraordinary apostolic authority, and could have settled the question at once and authoritatively? From their not using their extraordinary ruling function of the apostolate, but the *ordinary ruling function of the presbyterate*, they could not have been present in any other capacity. In like manner, ministers in a church court are present, not as preachers of the word, but as ruling elders, because they are engaged in exercising, not the teaching function, but the ruling function of their eldership. (2.) The "elders" present in the Council were either ruling elders simply, or included some of both classes, some who were simply ruling elders, and some who were both teaching and ruling elders. It is utterly impossible to determine between the two alternatives, and it is quite as immaterial, it being necessary only to show that the ruling elder simply was present in that capacity. (a) The name *πρεσβύτεροι* has special reference to *ruling*. The *πρεσβύτεροι* of the synagogue were the "rulers of the synagogue," whilst the scribes, rabbis, and priests were the spiritual teachers. (Geikie's *Life of Christ*, Vol. II., p. 623.) Canon Farrar's effort to identify the elders of the synagogue with the "*Batlanim*," the body of ten men paid to be always present at every service in the synagogue, so as to always secure the legal number, is a complete failure, and is in the face of the testimony of the ages, the researches of scholars of all sects and shades of opinion. Wherever *πρεσβύτεροι* occurs, therefore, the burden of proof is not upon those who maintain that they were rulers to show they were not teachers, but the very opposite, upon those denying, to demonstrate that it is not used in its ordinary sense of rulers simply. (b) The *plurality in every church* cannot be explained, unless they are *ruling elders*. The previous chapter announced they "ordained them elders in

every church" (Acts xiv. 23), which must have had special reference to ruling elders; the same term being employed in the following chapter, without any indication of its being used to designate a different class, leads to the conclusion that the *πρεσβύτεροι* of the previous chapter and of this Council were identical. (c) The *distinctions* between them are proof of two classes of elders. "He that teacheth," etc., and "he that ruleth," etc. (Rom. xii. 8), clearly distinguish between them. "Let the elders that *rule* well be counted worthy of double honor, especially they who *labor in the word and doctrine*" (1 Tim. v. 17), recognises two classes of elders. (d) The *burden of rule* is laid upon the elders of Ephesus (Acts xx. 17, 28), in the exhortation of Paul, at the very time when Timothy was preacher at Ephesus (1 Tim. i. 3). (e) The *use of the word* *πρεσβυτέριον* (presbytery) is further evidence of the ruling eldership. Occurring but three times in the New Testament (Luke xxii. 66; Acts xxii. 5; and 1 Tim. iv. 14), though translated presbytery but once (1 Tim. iv. 14), twice it refers to a Jewish court undoubtedly composed of ruling elders simply (Luke xxii. 66, and Acts xxii. 5), and when used with reference to an ecclesiastical court of the Christian Church, without any indication of a change of designation, the conclusion is irresistible, that it must have contained at least some who were ruling elders simply. Having then established the fact that the distinction between the two classes of elders existed, the fact that there was a plurality at Jerusalem in the local churches, which necessarily included some of this element, is proof positive that the *πρεσβύτεροι* of the Council were either ruling elders simply, or included some of that class; and therefore the government of the Church is in the hands of "elders."

3. Contrary to both Prelacy and Congregationalism, this Council at Jerusalem exhibited the *parity of the eldership*. Presbyterianism is not careful to demonstrate the parity of the ministry. If the parity of the eldership be established, the other follows as an "*a fortiori*" necessity. The latter is not peculiar to the Presbyterian system, whilst the former is one of its most distinctive principles, and is plainly demonstrated by this Council in several ways. (1) In sending up the case to Jerusalem for a decision,

no superior apostolic, prelatial, or ministerial authority is recognised by Antioch higher than the presbyterate. It nowhere appears that a decision is asked simply of the apostles, whilst they by courtesy or for some other cause associated the elders with themselves. But the very opposite appears, that Antioch acknowledged no superiority of apostolic authority whatever. The record simply states that certain "should go up to Jerusalem unto the *apostles* and *elders* about this question." Why not go simply to the apostles? Why are the elders associated with the apostles in the appeal? Did not Antioch appeal to *elders* as well as apostles? Did they not appeal to both upon precisely the same equality? Is there the shadow of authority for supposing that they made any distinction between the two classes in asking a decision of apostles and elders? (2) In their coming together, is any distinction made between them? Can any discover from the record, that the apostles came armed with more authority than the elders? The narrative simply states that the "apostles and elders came together for to consider of this matter." Did the apostles come to consider and act, whilst the elders came to be spectators? If our judgment must be formed solely from the inspired record, there is no alternative but to acknowledge the manifest fact, that they came together upon equal authority. (3) During the session of the Council did any apostle or the whole number at any time by any word or act *claim* any more authority than the elders? Did any apostle *assume* any more authority? Did any apostle *exercise* any more authority than the elders? What evidence is there that the body recognised the superiority of either class? So far as the record goes, each class considered the other as peers. If it be said, that the name "apostles" always precedes that of "elders," as evidence of superior authority, it will reveal to what straits the advocates of the hierarchical system are reduced. Principal Cunningham justly characterises such argument as mere trifling: "Papists, finding it recorded here that Peter took a prominent part in the discussion, which arose on this occasion, adduce the narrative as a proof that he acted then, was entitled to act, and was recognised as entitled to act, as the vicar of Christ and the head of the Church. Prelat-

ists, finding that several centuries afterward the notion was broached that James was appointed by the apostles Bishop of Jerusalem, profess to get scriptural evidence of this fancy in the prominent part which *he* took in the discussion. There is not in the narrative a trace of any *superiority in office or jurisdiction* on the part either of Peter or of James; so that the substance of the Popish argument is virtually this: Peter spoke first, and therefore he was superior in authority and jurisdiction to the other apostles; whilst the prelatist argument is: James spoke last and gave shape to the decision of the Council, and therefore he was diocesan bishop and as such superior in some respects even to the apostles. This, of course, is sheer trifling." (Hist. Theo., Vol. I., Chapter 2, Sec. 1.) (4) In publishing their decrees, did the apostles send them forth in their own name as their act and by their authority? On the contrary, associating the elders with themselves, and causing it to read, "apostles and elders, brethren," they acknowledged the parity of the eldership by issuing the decrees in their united names as by equal authority, wiping out even the distinction of names, and gathering both into one class of "brethren," exhibit the opposite spirit of those claiming superiority over their "brethren in the Lord." (5) In delivering the decrees to the various churches scattered throughout Christendom, did they lay them upon the churches as ordained by apostolic authority? Did they recognise any difference between the two classes constituting the Council? On the contrary, it is the positive statement of the Scripture, that the decrees were "ordained of the apostles and elders," equal authority being accorded to the elders as to the apostles. Considering these five facts, which could not have been merely fortuitous, that Antioch appealed to "*apostles and elders*" as upon equality, that "*apostles and elders* came together," as upon equal authority, that they acted together as upon equal authority, that they issued their decrees in their united names as by equal authority, that the decrees were delivered and received by the churches as "ordained of the apostles and elders" in equal authority, the conclusion necessitating the parity of the eldership is irresistible.

4. Contrary to Congregationalism this Council exhibits the

unity of the Church. If not upon the principle of unity of the Church, then upon what principle does a Church Council convened at Jerusalem decide a matter affecting Antioch simply? If it were a local matter, why should any other place than Antioch be the scene of the conflict? To answer that because the trouble originated at Jerusalem, and the teachers came from thence, therefore it must be carried back, will not satisfy inquiry, unless we could believe that the apostles and elders could not settle the matter by assembling at Antioch. Jerusalem was not troubled by the matter, but Antioch was. If an effectual settlement of the matter, as is alleged, had determined the place, then Antioch would certainly have been the place. That, however, is a matter of little importance, compared with another feature of this Council demonstrating the Church's essential unity. It is the *jurisdiction* of the Council, which the Congregationalist cannot explain upon any other theory than the underlying principle of unity. Did they publish the decrees simply at Antioch? "As they went through the cities they delivered them the decrees for to keep," etc. (Acts xvi. 4.) They are no more binding on Antioch than on Christendom! If the jurisdiction of the Council extended to all the churches, upon what principle other than the unity of the Church? Tested by Scripture, which is the interpreter of Scripture, the Church's unity is still more manifest. (1) The use of "*Church*" in the singular, comprehending the whole, manifests its corporate unity. Such unmistakable evidence is borne by one passage in the Revised Testament, that it alone would be sufficient to establish the fact. "So the *Church* throughout all Judea and Galilee and Samaria had peace being edified," etc. (Acts ix. 31, Revised Testament.) The twelfth chapter of 1st Corinthians is an elaborate argument to demonstrate the unity of the Church, which has the advantage over every other argument, that it is inspired; but if the Church's unity be denied, that argument becomes a mystery. Arguing the fact from all having the same spirit, illustrating it by the unity of the human body, it closes with the assertion, "Now ye are the *body* of Christ and members in particular. And God hath set some *in the Church* first apostles, secondarily prophets,

thirdly teachers, after that miracles, then gifts of healings, helps, governments, diversity of tongues," etc. (1 Cor. xii. 27, 28.) If it be objected that this language applies to the invisible Church, the reply is, that the invisible Church, *as such*, needs no "apostles," "prophets," "teachers," "miracles," "healings," "helps," "governments," and "diversity of tongues;" these things are for the visible Church. If to this it be objected that the two cannot be separated except in thought, at least the part of the invisible which is still in the visible, that would *necessitate* predicating unity of the visible as well as invisible. If it be claimed that 1 Cor. xii. 28, applies to the local church, it may be answered, that God had not set "apostles," "prophets," etc., in the local church of Corinth. (2) Such *figures* are employed, representing the unity of the Church, that they become unmeaning when that principle is eliminated. Eph. ii. 19-22 presents the Church as a state, a family, and a temple; but a temple is not a building of independent disconnected parts. The Church is the body of Christ (1 Cor. xii. 27). But though every organ, muscle, bone, and sinew of the body were collected *disconnected* in a mass, they would not constitute a body. The Church is the kingdom of Christ. But a kingdom of absolutely independent clans or provinces would be an anomaly. If it be claimed that such expressions, "temple," "body," and "kingdom," refer to the invisible Church, then the reply is, if the invisible Church has essential to its very being a unity, the visible Church which approaches nearest the ideal must exhibit a visible unity. To the support of the latter truth may be adduced the testimony of Dr. Thornwell: "The relation between the two is so close, that it is unwarrantable to predicate unity of the one and the want of unity of the other. The visible or professing Church approaches perfection, as it seeks to realise the invisible or spiritual. The two ought to coincide, and the purity of the outward is determined by its approximation to the inward. A Church, therefore, which cannot realise a visible unity, and thus aim to coincide with the invisible Church, is self-condemned; and any constitution which does not recognise this fact, is convicted of being unscriptural. This principle of the unity of the Church lies at the foundation of the

Presbyterian polity, and all its peculiarities are designed to bring this out, and give it formal expression. It is singular that the only two bodies which claim to realise this unity are in the deadliest antagonism—each charging the other with being Antichrist. They are the Church of Rome and the Presbyterian Church. Rome does, in a certain sense, give unity to the Church. She compacts all its parts. There is no stronger outward representation of unity than is furnished in her system of government. There is, however, this marked difference between the two cases: the Church of Rome undertakes to exhibit the body in its unity with an earthly head—to exhibit Christ as well as his members; the Presbyterian Church exhibits in visible unity on earth the body only, and connects it with a heavenly Head. The Bishop of Rome claims to be the head of the Church. He alone who is in communion with him is a member of the Church, and consequently a member of Christ. Now, he must be either a real and true head, or a symbolical and typical head. If the former, then as a body cannot have two real heads without being a monster, the headship of Christ is displaced. If the latter, then, as the body must partake of the nature of its head, the Church is a symbolical and typical body, and the reality of the Church is destroyed" (Thornwell's *Col. W.*, Vol. IV., pages 135 and 136). In regard to the method of realising and exhibiting this unity of the Church, Dr. Thornwell affirms: "That unity is realised by representative assemblies. The government of the Church is not intrusted to individuals nor to the mass of believers, but to Councils. . . . These constitute a bond, which brings all the parts together into unity, and gives the Church the property of indefinite expansibility. . . . It is worthy of note how all Churches have practically acknowledged the representative feature of Presbyterianism. Episcopacy, for example, has its General Conventions, in which, in the attempt to realise unity, the parliamentary principle is grafted upon the system. Congregationalism has its Councils, the existence of which is a tribute to the importance of the representative principle. Even the Pope, on occasions of great emergency, calls Councils to decide disputed questions. We are but carrying out, then, a principle, the prac-

tical necessity of which is recognised by all Churches, but which is inherent in the very nature of the Presbyterian system alone" (Thornwell's Col. W., Vol. IV., pages 136, 137, and 138). The *Encyclopædia Britannica* bears similar testimony to the completeness of the Presbyterian system of Councils. "It is of course in the Presbyterian Churches that Councils have received their most systematic development, and without claiming infallible authority retain the most extended powers as legislative, administrative, and judicial. In the Church of Scotland, the regular gradation of kirk Sessions, Presbyteries, Provincial Synods, and General Assembly of representative ministers and elders, supervises and regulates all the functions of the Church, and forms a compact balanced system of constitutional government. In non-Presbyterian Churches, Synods have various degrees of deliberative or decisive authority. Even now the reorganisation of the synodical system of the United Protestant Church of Prussia is regarded both by churchmen and by statesmen in Germany as one of the ecclesiastical questions of the day" (*Encyclopædia Brit.*, ninth ed., Vol. VI., page 512). If it be argued that the Council at Jerusalem could not have exhibited the unity of the Church, because all the apostles were not present, and very few of the churches are supposed to have been represented (perhaps only Antioch and those in and near Jerusalem), it may be answered that a quorum of a court as truly realises unity as if every church in existence were represented by delegates.

5. Contrary to Congregationalism, this Council exhibits the *right of appeal*. This principle is inseparable from the unity of the Church, and either one established is proof of the other. If, then, the unity of the Church has been established by Scripture, the right of appeal follows as a correlative principle, and *vice versa*. It matters not what may be the difference of opinion as to the nature of the appeal to apostles and elders, whether a specific case was carried up, some supposing it to have been that of Titus from Gal. ii. 3, 4; or whether the Council was asked merely to give an "*in these* deliverance"; it matters not whether the church of Antioch, parochial or classical Presbytery, or Paul, Barnabas, and Titus, appealed to apostles and elders for a de-

cision, the evidence still remains in favor of an appeal, complaint, reference, or overture of some nature. The record is too plain to be "explained away." The heresy existed at Antioch, the delegation was appointed to lay the matter before the apostles and elders, they came together to consider the matter, the delegation was heard, a debate occurred, a decision was rendered, and a delegation appointed to publish the matter at Antioch. These are the facts furnished by the inspired narrative, which may be variously interpreted, but can never be so obscured that the multitude of Bible readers will fail to recognise the fact of some kind of appeal, furnishing a precedent, according the right to the humblest member of the Church to be heard at the bar of the highest tribunal of the Church. Nor is this the limit of Christian privilege. There exists even a higher right, in the case of injustice, of carrying the case from the earthly court to the heavenly, and appealing to the Head of the Church himself, as the martyred Huss is alleged to have done, when, condemned to the stake by an ecclesiastical court that, contrary to the law of Christ, had usurped the jurisdiction of Cæsar, and wielded the sword, he summoned his judges to meet him at the judgment bar of Christ, to answer the charge of murder, within less than an hundred years.

6. Contrary to the Charybdis of Prelacy on the one hand, and the Scylla of Congregationalism on the other, this Council exhibits the *word of God as the sole basis of any ecclesiastical deliverance*. The apostles and elders were governed by no traditions on the one hand, nor human wisdom and expediency on the other. They dared not attempt to legislate, in the sense of making law, for the Church of Christ. That would have been to usurp the authority of Christ, who alone is the Church's Law-giver. On the other hand, they dared not fail to exercise their "*jure divino*" church power to prohibit the recognised badges of idolatry, for that would have been unfaithfulness to Christ, who called them to be rulers in his Church; and the liberty of conscience guaranteed to Gentiles might have been by them converted into idolatrous licentiousness in conformity with the prevalent heathen practices. Nothing lay within the province of that Coun-

cil but to consult the written law, the revealed will of Christ, and apply the principles therein contained to the question under consideration. But they certainly acted as if it was their province to interpret, apply, and enforce Christ's law. Synods and Councils may not think to change the law of Christ, or legislate for the Church, but there must be some authoritative court to apply the principles of that law to each particular case. Whilst not interfering with the right of private judgment, yet ecclesiastical Councils may not permit licentiousness in word or deed. The only safety for church courts between ecclesiastical tyranny and ecclesiastical licensing of wickedness is speaking where the word of God speaks, and being silent where it is silent. If, then, one wishes greater liberty of private judgment than the word of God allows, or wishes to rob the word of its force by an unnatural and unwarranted construction, he must seek such licentious liberty in other communions. No man has the right to plead conscience or the right of private judgment to the subverting of law and order. Christ, who has given law to the Church, has also given authority to the rulers, assembled in the courts of his house, to enforce that law. Liberty of conscience and dissent of judgment are possible only where Synods and Councils have erred by violating the law of Christ. As that Council at Jerusalem inquired the mind of the Spirit by appeal to the Scriptures, so no church court can ordain, forbid, or enjoin anything whatever, unless it can exhibit as its warrant a "Thus saith the Lord," or an inference therefrom both good and necessary. This Council at Jerusalem answers the question how the Church can obtain the mind of the Spirit after revelation has ceased to guide unerringly. It furnishes a model and warrant for the Church in like circumstances. It is a precedent which should guide every church court in all its deliverances. The Ariadne clue, which alone is sufficient to guide the Church safely through all its labyrinths of difficulties and mazes of doubt, is prayerful dependence on the Spirit to discover in the written word what "seemed good to the Holy Ghost." Only when that which "seemed good to the Holy Ghost," also seems good to the Church, is there safe ecclesiastical action. Any church court, acting by virtue of a divine constitu-

tion, guided entirely by the precepts of Christ, and depending on the influence of the Spirit, can use the language of the Council, "It seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us." These principles exhibited by the Council at Jerusalem are also the principles of the Presbyterian system, the principles of *jure divino* Church government, the principles sustained by the word of God, the principles which shall yet triumph in the name of eternal truth.

S. L. MORRIS.



ARTICLE II.

THE NATURE OF PHYSICAL CAUSES AND THEIR INDUCTION.

In our previous sketch of the History of Inductive Reasonings, we found that the chief (and the difficult) question, the great problem of this species of logic, which continually emerged, was this: How does the inference seemingly made from the some, or the many, to the all, become valid for the all?

The settlement of this, as of the other fundamental doctrines of logic, must proceed upon right postulates as to psychology, and especially as to its highest branch, the original powers of the reason. In our criticism of the Sensualistic Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century, a parallel question as to the Deductive Logic is considered (see pp. 265-272). That question was the old one between the assailants and defenders of the utility and fruitfulness of the syllogism, with which the students of philosophy are acquainted. The followers of Locke, from his day to ours, have argued that, since a syllogism which concludes more in its third proposition than is predicated in its major premise, is confessedly faulty, all such reasonings must inevitably be either sophisms, or worthless, only teaching us what we must have known before in order to state our premise. Yet we saw Mill, after echoing this objection, confessing, what all men's common sense must concede, that the syllogism is the full expression to which all deductive