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THE SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW.

VOL. XVI.—NO. 1.

JULY, MDCCCLXIII.

ARTICLE I.

SLAVERY, AND THE DUTIES GROWING OUT OF THE RELATION.

[At the first meeting of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the Confederate States of America, in December, 1861, a committee, consisting of the Rev. Drs. James A. Lyon, C. C. Jones, and T. Pryor, was appointed "to prepare a pastoral letter on the subject of the religious instruction of the colored people, to be submitted to the next General Assembly." For satisfactory reasons, the committee did not report to the next General Assembly; but the Rev. Dr. Lyon submitted this Address to the General Assembly of 1863, which recently held its sessions in Columbia, S. C. It was referred to a committee, which recommended the adoption of the following resolution:

Resolved, That this address be recommitted to the Rev. Drs. Lyon, J. Leighton Wilson, and Palmer, Mr. G. J. S. Walker, Mr. D. A. Davis, and Judge J. N. Whitner, to consider the subject-matter of the same, and report to the next General Assembly; and that in the meantime they are authorized to publish the address of Dr. Lyon in any way they may think best; and further, that the report they may propose to submit to the next General Assembly be printed in advance of the meeting, for the use of the members."

The resolution was adopted; and in accordance with the desire of this committee, the address is now published in the Southern Presbyterian Review, that the important matters involved in it may be maturely considered before the meeting of the next General Assembly.—Eds. S. P. R.]

VOL. XVI., NO. I.—1

DEAR BRETHREN: The providence of God has, in a remarkable manner, committed to the people of the Southern States the entire interests, physical, moral, intellectual, and religious, of the black race in our midst. This we regard not only as a great responsibility, but also as a high privilege, thus to be made "workers together with God," in evangelizing, developing, and elevating a whole people, which have been, by the manifest interposition of the Almighty, transplanted from their own land of darkness and degradation, where nature is not propitious to civilization and mental development, to this favored land of promise—this home of light and liberty, and, infinitely above all, of a pure Christianity.

Recent events in our nation's history seem plainly to indicate that we, as a Southern people, shall be relieved from every obstacle and embarrassment that has hitherto stood in our way, and shall be no longer hindered in the faithful and efficient discharge of the duty, and the enjoyment of the privilege, of ameliorating and elevating the condition of the slave population. To call your attention to this great subject, which is now absorbing the attention of the civilized world, and to encourage you in the discharge of your whole duty in relation to it, is the design of the present address.

The word of God promises explicitly that the whole world shall be given to Christ for "His inheritance." It even particularizes the fact that "Ethiopia shall stretch out her hands unto God." It also sets forth the means by which this glorious end is to be accomplished, viz., that those who have the Gospel shall carry it to those who have it not: "Go ye into all the world, and preach the Gospel to every creature." But, in the case of Central Africa, it might seem that the Creator had imposed a bar in the way of this command being carried into effect by the white man: from the fact, in the first place, that the physical

conformation of that continent, unlike Europe and other countries, is unfavorable to the intercommunion of civilized nations. It is mainly destitute of harbors and inland seas and gulfs and great rivers, and consequently does not invite the commerce and trade of Christian lands, which is often a forerunner of the Gospel. And in the next place, the climate has, after repeated trials, proved fatal to the settlement of white colonies in that region. So that, but for the specific declaration that "Ethiopia should stretch out her hands unto God," we might have concluded that Africa was an exception to the gracious promise. But the mysterious and wonderful providence of God, whose knowledge is unsearchable, and whose ways are past finding out, instead of sending the Gospel to the African, brings the African to the Gospel!

The whole history of the introduction of the African into this country evinces an overruling providence. In saying this, however, we do not intend to justify the means, so far as human motives and agency were concerned; for these, no doubt, were characterized by avarice, cruelty, and a disregard of the laws of humanity. But, notwithstanding the wickedness of the instrumentalities, God meant it, as in the case of selling Joseph into Egypt, to accomplish some great design in the advancement of His kingdom, and the fulfilment of the promise made to Ethiopia. The goodness and wisdom of Providence are illustrated in turning the curse into a blessing, and in causing the wrath of man to praise Him.

We have no sympathy whatever with "the African slave trade." We have no good reason to conclude that the ban placed upon it by the most Christian and civilized nations—our own amongst the foremost—is unjust or impolitic. We can find nothing in its history that will justify it, so far as human motives and agency are concerned; although candor compels us to admit that, at the beginning of this traffic, Christian sentiment, in relation to it, as to many

other evils that have since been condemned in proportion as the popular mind has been enlightened and elevated by the principles of the Gospel, did not view it in the same light in which we now view it; and consequently it is but just to impute their fault more to the darkness of the age, and the low state of popular moral sentiment on the subject, than to the purpose of the individuals actually engaged. But whilst we palliate the moral obliquity attached to the agency that a former age had in this trade, on account of the defective moral sentiment on the subject, we could not now look upon the renewal of the custom with the slightest tolerance. It is not only a sin against the laws of God, both natural and revealed, but it would be a great detriment to the institution of slavery itself, as it now exists amongst us. Even in the light of political economy, to say nothing of the moral aspects of the case, it would prove an egregious error.

When we take into consideration the vast number of blacks already in the country; the ratio of their natural increase; and the limited extent of the climate and soil that make their labor profitable; it is manifest that a sound political economy does not demand the annual influx of raw savages to swell the millions already here.

Moreover, when we take into the account the additional fact that a slave is productive and valuable in proportion as he is civilized and cultivated, it is evident that the constant introduction of a savage and barbarous element into that which is partially civilized, would not only be unjust to those who are here—since that kind of discipline made necessary by this savage ingredient would be inappropriate and cruel to those who had been long here and were semi-civilized—but it would, as it were, dilute and depreciate the whole. So that what might be gained in numbers, (supposing that a gain, which it is not,) would be lost in intrinsic value.

Still further, the effect of annually transporting multitudes of savages into the country would be, not only to diminish their intrinsic value, but to depreciate their marketable price. This, in turn, would work disastrously to the older States, where neither the climate nor the soil is favorable to the production of slave labor; but whose chief interest in the institution is in the rearing and training slaves for those States where their labor is valuable.

Again, "the whole scheme proceeds on a political blunder. Capital and labor, with the slave owner, are not distinct. The slave is 'the money' of the master, and is as really capital as he is a laborer. To reduce his value, therefore, is not simply to cheapen labor, it is also to diminish capital; consequently the country would be no richer by the importation." So that, in the light of political economy alone, no good, but only evil to the institution, could result from the re-opening of the African slave trade.

Moreover, the measure would greatly damage the institution in a domestic and social point of view. The scriptural aspect of slavery is, that "it is domestic and patriarchal. The slave, when this is practically the case, has all the family pride and sympathies of the master. He is born in the house, and bred with the children. The sentiments which spring from this circumstance, in both master and slave, soften all the asperities of the relation. They secure obedience on the part of the slave as a sort of filial respect; and at the same time engender kindness and sympathy on the part of the master as a kind of paternal affection. All these humanizing elements would be lost the moment we cease to rear our slaves and begin to rely upon a foreign market."

But suppose it was to our advantage, in a mere mercenary point of view. What if it did increase our national power? What is that, in the estimation of a Christian, or of a true philanthropist, in comparison with the immorality and the

wickedness of the traffic? If you re-open the trade, you will not only buy slaves in Africa, but you will, by proxy, *steal men!* “And while the Bible allows the one, it condemns the other. It is nothing to the purpose to say, (what is doubtless true enough,) that it is, after all, for the benefit and advantage of these very men to be stolen. ‘We may not do evil that good may come.’ We can afford a pecuniary loss, if that were necessary; or a political disadvantage; but we can not afford to *put the Bible against us.* We can not afford to sanction an unnatural traffic. We might regulate the traffic after it reached our shores. We might even reform *the middle passage*; but we could not regulate the trade as it would operate in Africa. There it would be the fruitful cause of war, and bloodshed, and seditions, and man-stealing.”

This deliverance on the subject of the “African slave trade,” we have thought it expedient to make, not so much for the benefit of our own people, or of the Southern States—for we feel perfectly safe in saying that, in our judgment, there is not one in a thousand, within the entire boundary of the slave States, who would not be invincibly opposed to the re-opening of the traffic—but we make it in Christian charity and forbearance, in order to remove suspicion and prejudice from the minds of Christians abroad, and the civilized world at large.

Whatever may have been the degree of moral obliquity attached to the original introduction of the African into this country, it is certain that we, as a people, are in no respect implicated or responsible. It was thrust upon the colonies, not only without their consent, but in defiance of their protest. So far, therefore, as we are concerned, the existence of the black race in our midst is purely providential; and we are to be held responsible only for the manner in which we discharge the duties growing out of the relation. The illegality of the origin of the relation, in past ages, and by another people, who entailed it upon us, does

not vitiate the righteousness of the relation as it now exists. "The wisdom of ages has concurred in the justice and expediency of establishing rights by prescriptive use, however tortuous in their origin they may have been." The fact that English and American domain was originally seized by the conqueror, does not vitiate the justness of the rights of the present occupants; no more does the injustice of the African slave trade, by which the slaves were at first introduced into this country, affect the righteousness of the relation as it now exists. The only questions, therefore, for the Christian now to determine are, in the first place, whether the relation itself is a justifiable one; and second, whether he is faithfully discharging the duties growing out of it.

As to the lawfulness of the institution of slavery, in itself considered, disconnected from its abuses, we scarcely deem it necessary to discuss it. Like the existence of God, it is taken for granted from beginning to end of the Bible. It is clearly authorized by the Old Testament Scriptures, even in the moral law; and repeatedly recognized by Christ and His apostles, in the New Testament, both in precept and parable. Disconnected, therefore, from its *abuses*, which are not necessary to its existence, it is manifestly a Bible institution, and consistent with the highest type of piety and practical godliness.

In the light of providence, the Scripture sanctions on this subject are abundantly confirmed and illustrated. Slavery has been incorporated with the history of the race, ever since, if not before, Noah pronounced the curse upon the descendants of Ham. It belongs, in some form or shape, to the normal condition of civilized society; and is essential to the progressive development and highest civilization of man. It has existed in all past ages; and will continue to exist for ages yet to come. It is incidental to a state of sin and depravity. Were all men pure and holy and just, industrious, virtuous, wise, and free from

pride, vanity, and indolence; and willing to act well their part, and to do that for which each one was by nature fitted; then there would be no need of slavery, in the common acceptation of that term—that is, for the superior to control the inferior, contrary to his will—for in that event each would promptly and cheerfully fill the exact place for which he was qualified; and humanity would be developed, and the race elevated, as a natural and necessary result. But in a state of sin and misery, slavery becomes necessary, not only as the less of two evils, which would be a sufficient justification, but as the only means to the progressive development and elevation of human nature and the attainment of the highest civilization. Not that one class is to be depressed while the other is elevated; but all rise together. The slave, like the parasitic plant that rises with the oak, is elevated with and by the master. Nay, we hesitate not to affirm that slavery comes short of its legitimate end, fails to exercise a humanizing and refining effect upon the character of the master, which does not at the same time develop and elevate the slave. The master and the slave necessarily rise or fall together. Brutal treatment of the slave will, by an inevitable law of nature, make a brute of the master; whilst humane treatment will, by the operation of the same law, ennoble the master. “In watering, he himself is watered.” “Whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap.” We conclude, then, that as the race of man is in a fallen, depraved condition, and that we have every reason to believe that it is the design of the great Creator that man, by His helping grace, shall recover from this fallen state, and rise to a high degree of culture and civilization; that slavery, in some form or shape, is, in the existing state of things, essential to the attainment of this end; and will continue to be necessary, until Christianity gains such ascendancy over the minds and hearts and lives of men—all men—as to bring the entire race under the absolute and delightful control of the spirit and principles of

the Gospel. Then slavery will, as a natural result, cease; not that one man will not serve another, but all minds and hearts being completely under the control of Christianity, there can be no antagonism of will; since what will be the unselfish right of the one to require, it will be the pleasing duty of the other to perform.

As, therefore, slavery, in some form or other, does exist, will exist, and must exist in the present condition of humanity, the next question that demands our consideration is, to determine what kind of slavery it should be—what kind will most accord with the laws of nature and the spirit of Christianity. In the first place, it is not the subjugation of the superior to the inferior, of the civilized to the savage, or the cultivated to the uncultivated; no good, but only evil, could result from such an incongruous and unnatural relation. The laws of nature do not sanction it, and therefore it can not exist, except from the force of accidental circumstances, and for a limited time. In the next place, it is not the slavery of one equal to another equal—a figment of the fancy, which has had much to do in creating a mistaken and morbid sentiment on this subject in the minds of many honest but deluded people: no good could result from such a relation. In cases where the minds and morals of men are equally developed, where there is an equal amount of culture and equal ability, both natural and acquired, then, in that event, there would be a manifest incongruity and injustice in the one enslaving the other, or holding him in bondage. It is true that it sometimes happens that an individual of the black race may be enslaved to an individual that is, in fact, his inferior. But this is the exception to the rule; it is his misfortune; he must, nevertheless, share the condition of his class. There is no intrinsic injustice in it; no more than there is in a subject's rendering obedience to a ruler that is his inferior in fact, or than there is in a child's obeying a parent less wise than himself. But that kind of slavery recognized in

the Bible, established by the laws of nature, and sanctioned by the experience and wisdom of ages, is the subjection of an inferior race to a superior, of a savage to a civilized people, of a barbarous to an enlightened and cultivated nation, so that, and in order that, the one may be elevated by the other. There is no law of God, either natural or revealed, that will justify slavery, where the benefits and blessings growing out of the relation are not reciprocal. Such is the character of negro slavery in this country. It is the subjection, not of a superior, not of an equal, but of an inferior to a superior race, of a savage and semi-savage to a civilized, of a degraded and idolatrous to a Christian people.

The most favorable condition of the black man, on this continent, is that of servitude. For this state he is eminently qualified by nature, being constitutionally kind, affectionate, imitative, and contented. He would be utterly incapable of taking care of himself, as facts do but too sadly prove, in the midst of a superior people, who had no interest in his person. There is no law, social or civilized, that can alter the case. He is semi-savage, and therefore is not fit for that kind of government suited to the white man. What, therefore, shall be done? Shall we discriminate in our legislation against him, and confide the execution of those discriminating laws to civil officers, who have not the slightest interest in him; and for whom they have not the slightest social sympathy, but, on the contrary, a decided natural repugnance? This would be cruel. Can any thing better be done, taking human nature as it is, and the inferior character of the African as it is? Does Christianity suggest any thing better than that which God in his providence has done; that is, to place this savage and semi-savage under a governor who will have a substantial interest in him; not only in his labor, but in his life, health, morals, and personal welfare—a master who will, from the nature of the case, feel a social sympathy for him, and who will,

withal, be held amenable to popular sentiment, the rules of the church, (if he be a member,) and to civil law, for the manner in which he exercises that government? This, beyond all dispute, is the best form of government for the African in this country. Is it not also best for the white man? The question is not, whether a free state had better introduce the African, or some other inferior and savage people, and make them slaves; but, on the supposition that the African, or any other inferior and barbarous people are already in the country, and a component and inseparable part of the population, whether it would not be best for both parties that the relation of master and servant should exist between them? We have seen that it is best for the black man; is it not also best for the white man? And here we do not propose to discuss, in the light of political economy, the mere dollar and cent aspect of the case, so far as the interest of the white man is concerned. Doubtless, the mere hireling relation between master and servant, misnamed "free labor," would redound to the pecuniary interests of the former. This view of the case, which ignores the interests of the laborer, and the very existence of the negro as a component part of society, may commend itself to the sordid stock-jobber and the so-called utilitarian, with whom a dollar and cent interest is the only end to be attained by the rich at the expense of the poor. But this view of the subject is infinitely beneath the consideration of the ambassadors and followers of the Lord Jesus Christ, and even of the high-toned philanthropist, whose highest aim is, not to coin the most money in the shortest possible time, but to alleviate human sufferings, develop human nature, and elevate the race of man, by storing the common mind with intellectual and moral riches. With this view of the subject, it is plain, that where a superior and an inferior race dwell together in the same community, it is better for both parties, and the ends of humanity will be more effectually attained, by the existence,

in law as well as in fact, of the relation of master and servant; for in that event, capital and labor would not be antagonistic, as in the mere hireling relation, but combined in the same interest. So that it will be to the interest of the master, in the absence of any nobler motive, to look after the personal welfare of the operative. And this, prompted at first, it may be, by selfishness, will, by the very laws of his nature, develop and cultivate mutual attachments, and all those softening, refining, and ennobling affections that spring from and cluster around the domestic relation. The most favorable condition, therefore, for the black man, as a race, to be in on this continent, is that of servitude. This, in the event that the mutual obligations growing out of the relation are fully and faithfully discharged, instead of degrading, elevates him, and identifies him with the intellectual, moral, and social status of his master. We have no difficulty whatever in concluding that the relation of master and servant, now existing in this country between the white man and the black, is a justifiable one. It only remains for us to inquire, in fearlessness and Christian candor, whether the obligations and duties growing out of the relation are faithfully discharged.

The time has been—and up to a very recent date—when, owing to our relations to the North, where, from a misguided and morbid, though sincere fanaticism, on the part of some, and a pestiferous and wicked spirit of agitation on the part of others, it was difficult for the ambassadors of God, and the propagators of Gospel truth, to investigate the subject of slavery, point out its abuses, and proclaim the law of God on the subject; so difficult, indeed, that many shrank from the performance of the duty, and but few had the moral courage to do it. Moreover, this state of things furnished a pretence, to such as did not want to know or to do their duty, to turn a deaf ear to the admonitions of the few who ventured, in faithfulness, to proclaim it. But God, in His adorable providence, has freed us from this em-

barrassment; so that *now* there is neither excuse for not proclaiming, nor pretence for not hearing, the truth in relation to this great subject. And if nothing else is to be accomplished by the dreadful convulsions, both civil and ecclesiastical, through which our country is passing, but to remove the obstacles and prepare the way for the more perfect development and evangelization of the black race committed to our care, we shall have abundant reason to magnify the goodness and wisdom of that providence which can turn the curse into a blessing, and cause the wrath of man to praise Him. Let us, therefore, honestly inquire what our duty is in relation to this all-absorbing subject, in order that we may, by God's helping grace, discharge it, whatever may be the cost or obloquy of so doing.

Were we to regard the slave simply as an *animal*—existing only in time—not possessed of a moral and intellectual nature like ourselves—not immortal—then the obligations growing out of the relation would be the same in kind as those existing on the part of man towards the domestic animals, and would be fully discharged, on the part of the master, by looking after the health and physical welfare of the slave; for the laws of God, both natural and revealed, forbid man from wantonly inflicting pain upon, or diminishing the happiness of even the brute beast. And he who does it, not only perverts the prerogative that God has given him over the lower animals, thereby sinning against nature, but he brutalizes himself. But when we remember that “God hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth,” (Acts, xvii : 26,) and that consequently the black man is only a less fortunate and an inferior variety of the same species with ourselves; possessed of the same nature, physical, moral, and intellectual; being in the same sinful, fallen condition, subject to the same moral laws; having the same Saviour, the same hopes, and the same eternal destiny (Gal. iii : 28) with his master, then it is evident that the obligations on the

part of the master assume infinitely a higher character; rendering it imperative upon him to regard and treat his slave, not as a brute, but as a MAN; endowed with a man's attributes, and subject to a man's destiny; and as a fellow-traveller to the other world, where they are to meet again, not in the capacity of master and slave, but as sinners saved by grace. Hence the relation is not of small import. It is a very sublime and responsible one, equal, in all respects, to that of parent and child; or, if there be any difference in the degree of responsibility, it is in favor of the servile relation, in that a child is a minor only for a limited time, whilst a slave is a minor for life.

There are evils and abuses connected with slavery, as it exists in this country, not necessary to its existence; nay, even a detriment to the institution itself; known to all, acknowledged by all, and regretted by all good men, who have the good of the institution at heart, which must be reformed before African slavery amongst us will come up to the Bible standard. Let us correct these evils and reform these abuses, and then we shall have, not only the pleasing consciousness of having done our duty before God, but we can defend the institution against the wily assaults of the world. But we can not defend its *abuses*. We can not defend it in those features where it is against the Bible. And this has hitherto been an element of weakness. Here its enemies have had the vantage-ground, and will continue to hold it in this great strife, until we by reformation drive them from it. They have seized upon the abuses of slavery; they have magnified its evils, and represented them as essential characteristics of slavery itself, and an unthinking world has believed them! Let us, therefore, with a courage and a candor which should characterize not only the ambassadors and servants of the living God, but which are admirable in any character, resolve to do our part towards removing those confessed evils, reforming those acknowledged abuses, and making slavery what it ought to be, in

the light of the Bible; and thereby acquit our own consciences before God, and wrest from our adversaries their chief and only effective weapon in making war against the institution.

Slavery ceases to be a justifiable relation, when the advantages growing out of it are not mutual. There is no law of God, natural or revealed, that will justify one human being, however superior in natural and acquired endowments, in deriving a selfish advantage from the wrong which he himself inflicts upon another human being, however inferior. This is abhorrent alike to the instincts of humanity and the golden rule of the Gospel, which requires us to do unto others what we would have others to do unto us, in like circumstances. The law of Christ is, that we should do unto our servants "that which is just and equal," whilst they should render unto their masters faithful and cheerful "obedience."—(Col. iv : 1; Eph. vi : 5-9.) Mutual advantage, therefore, whether viewed in the light of the Gospel, or judged of by the irrepressible instincts of humanity, is essential in the idea of a justifiable slavery.

The original endowment bestowed upon man, of "dominion" over the earth in all its varied kingdoms, was not intended that he should depress or thwart the purposes of nature; but, on the contrary, that he should develop nature in all her kingdoms, according to the laws originally impressed upon them. In this way, and in this way only, will man's "dominion" redound to the honor and the glory of the Creator. Surely, it was not the design of God, in bestowing upon man "dominion," that he should exercise that high prerogative in opposition to nature and adversely to her laws; but in harmony with the laws and propensities with which the kingdoms of nature were originally endowed. Man, therefore, would but pervert his high prerogative, in trying to depress the rose into a thistle, the horse into the donkey, or a man into a brute. In this he would sin against nature, and be found fighting against

God. But to draw out, nurture, elevate, and ennoble the attributes that God has bestowed, in embryo, upon his creatures, is to exercise the original grant of dominion, according to righteousness; which will increase, and not diminish, the beauty and happiness of creation. If these principles are true in their general application, they are, *a fortiori*, true in their special application to the relation existing between master and slave, who have a common origin, a common nature, and a common destiny. Any course of treatment, therefore, which does not develop the slave in the very line and channels in which God designed him to be developed, is wrong; and especially that treatment which tends to blast the affections which the Creator has placed in the bosom of man, thus perverting the design of God, in the constitution of man, is not only wrong, but intolerably wicked; and is injurious both to the master and the slave. It is a great fallacy to suppose that any one of the true interests of slavery requires a violation of the laws of God. It is always best to do right; and never justifiable to persist in doing wrong, because rectification would be attended with temporary inconvenience. This is not only abhorrent to sound morals, but it is an error in political economy. The experience of the world has found that "honesty is the best policy," in all things. That "we may not do evil that good may come," is, in the long run, as true in politics as in morals—in our relations to men, as well as in our relations to God. Therefore we conclude that it is a dictate of worldly wisdom, as well as of piety towards God, for us, as a church, and as a Southern people, whose special mission it is made, by an overruling Providence, to take care of slavery, and to make it redound to the honor and glory of God, and the happiness of our fellow men, to correct its abuses, remove its evils, and bring it up to the Bible standard. With this end in view, we respectfully direct your serious attention to the following considerations.

The law of God, both natural and revealed, makes it obligatory upon the master (Gen. xviii : 19) not to depress, but to cultivate the slave, develope his attributes and affections, intellectual, moral, and religious, in the exact line in which God designed humanity to be developed; in order that the slave may be elevated, not equal to, but *pari passu* with his master. Consequently, the very same kind of instruction, the same natural relations, the same moral development, the same social affections, and the same religious ideas applicable to the cultivation of the white man, are equally applicable to the development of the black. It is not meant that the same degree of culture, under existing circumstances, is as applicable to the black man as to the white. This would be inappropriate to his condition as a slave. But that the slave, nevertheless, should be developed in every attribute of his nature, to a degree consonant with his condition as a slave; and should bear a relative proportion to the development of his master. The ignorance and imbecility of an intellectual being is an evil, in every aspect in which it may be viewed. Consequently, it is the duty of the master to remove this evil, and to cultivate his slave. And this culture, whilst it developes the conscience, enlarges the mind, and improves the capacity of the slave for religious enjoyment—which should be a sufficient inducement with all true philanthropists—at the same time (contrary to the narrow views of the sordid utilitarian) enhances the value of the slave, and ennobles the institution.

Every creature of God is improved by cultivation, and is thereby rendered more useful and productive of good. Even a tree is made more fruitful, and a flower more beautiful, by cultivation. Every bird and beast is improved by a similar process. Much more is a human being made useful by increasing his capacity to think and to reason. In proportion as the head is stored with knowledge, the hand becomes skilful in execution. A slave educated to the

practice of some trade, or handicraft, is the more valuable on that account. A laborer educated to think, to plan, to execute, is better capable of ploughing, sowing, ditching, draining, building, making implements of husbandry, taking care of property, and the performance of every species of work, than he could possibly be in the absence of such education. A smart slave is more valuable than a stupid one. So that culture, in modern as well as in ancient times, instead of diminishing, increases both the intrinsic and marketable value of the slave.

Moreover, it follows, as a natural consequence, that the more intelligent a slave is, and the greater his capacity to reason, the more contented he is with his servile condition, provided he is treated correctly, and the less likely to engage in insurrectionary and unlawful enterprises, since he is the more capable of perceiving, not only the hopelessness of such dangerous and futile attempts, but the undesirableness of success, even were they feasible. It is the ignorance, and not the intelligence of slaves, that is a just cause of fear.

Still further: it is perfectly manifest that in proportion as a slave's conscience is cultivated in accordance with the principles of the Bible, the less likely is he to become a criminal. So that, in every aspect of the case, it is clearly to the advantage of the institution that the slave should be elevated from his savage condition, civilized and Christianized; or in other words, developed and cultivated in accordance with the laws originally impressed by the Creator upon the nature of man. If this, in the course of time, should elevate the black man to a moral and intellectual equality with the master, and eventually set him free, then it will be a natural and just result. It is God, through the operation of His own laws, and not man, that does the deed; and, consequently, it should be a cause of gratification to every true philanthropist. What God hath put asunder, let not man join together.

As to the best method of carrying into effect the principles here advocated, we presume not to prescribe any specific course. We would suggest, however, that, as far as practicable, the whites and the blacks worship God together in the same assembly on the Sabbath. If the instructions from the pulpit are plain and simple, and illustrated to the easy comprehension of all grades of white people, they will be, in a good degree, intelligible to the black people; or, where this is impracticable, as it doubtless is in many instances, let the harangues addressed exclusively to the slaves not consist of ridiculous anecdote, and passionate appeals only to their emotional nature; but let them be largely characterized by substantial instruction, addressed to their intellectual faculties. The mind of man is developed and enlarged by thinking; and it is truth, not feeling, that constitutes food for thought. That kind of preaching, therefore, that will inject into the mind of the slave new ideas, and furnish him with the material for thought, is the kind best calculated to develop his intellect and improve his heart. Next to preaching, and especially in the absence of it, let the slaves, as far as practicable, be collected every Sabbath day into catechetical and Bible classes, and instructed in the principles of the Christian religion. And let every master feel bound to do this himself, or to provide for its being done. The pious and intelligent overseer who should perform this duty would double his influence with the slaves, and be worthy of double hire. And let the household servants be made to attend family worship, at least every Sabbath morning; and let that worship be short and simple, remembering the words of the Saviour, that we are "not heard for our much speaking."

As to the literary instruction of slaves, we do not advise that, in their present condition, they be sent to schools and academies. But we do earnestly recommend that all those statute laws prohibiting the teaching of slaves to read be repealed; since, in the first place, if there ever was a neces-

sity for them, it does not now exist. Instead of an undue tendency, on the part of masters, to enlighten and to cultivate their slaves, which needs to be restrained by legal enactments, the tendency is just the other way. In the next place, there should be no legal disability in the way of a master's increasing the capacity and value of his slave by teaching him to read and write, thus qualifying him the better to superintend his farm or his factory; or for giving religious instruction, if need be, to his other servants. Still further, the laws in question have accomplished no good, in fact, even supposing the keeping the slave in ignorance to be a good; since, doubtless, as many have been taught to read and write subsequently to such legislation as previously; so that the laws are, practically, a dead letter. Moreover, such legislation, whatever may have been the motives of those who first inaugurated it, or their misjudgment as to its necessity, was unwise, not only because it failed to accomplish any good end, but because it furnished a palliation for the conduct of such as wanted an excuse for not instructing their slaves; since it could be easily perverted into a design to depress the slave, and keep his mind in darkness; which is alike contrary to the principles of Christianity and the spirit of the age. It is, therefore, justly odious; and furnishes to its enemies a plausible pretence for charging upon the institution itself the necessity of perverting the laws of nature, by depressing the slave, and keeping his mind debased in ignorance, in order to its safe and profitable existence; which is, as we have attempted to show, the very opposite of the truth. There is something anti-protestant and peculiarly offensive in the idea of a fellow-man—for in Christ Jesus the master and the slave are one—being forcibly hindered from learning to read the word of God. Therefore, as it is a Christian duty to "avoid the appearance of evil," and a dictate of genuine philanthropy to disabuse the minds of our fellow-men of painful prejudice, let all those prohibitory enactments—so

unnecessary in fact, so opposite in their appearance to the principles of the Gospel, so contrary to the spirit of the age, and so easily misrepresented to the disparagement of the institution—be expunged from our statute-books; and let there be no legal disability in the way of a conscientious, law-abiding master giving to his slave whatever instruction may enhance his value and usefulness, and promote his growth in grace and the knowledge of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ.

Absolute authority ought always to be combined with the patriarchal relation, in order that the domestic ties engendered by this relation may mitigate the tendency to severity on the one part, and insubordination on the other. It is impossible for an owner of slaves to feel any thing more than a mercenary interest in them, if he but rarely, and then only for a brief period, mingles with them, but leaves them wholly subject to the control of hired overseers, who are themselves liable to move and to be removed at any day; who, in fact, frequently change their places, and who, of course, from the very nature of the case, can not feel any personal interest whatever in those over whom they exercise a brief but unrestrained control. In such cases as these, it is clearly impossible for either masters or slaves to comply with the apostolical injunction. It is, therefore, not Bible slavery. So long as the master lives in the midst of his slaves, or within convenient distance from them, so that he can visit them often, mingle freely with them, become intimately acquainted with them individually, and allow them to become acquainted with and attached to him, then those domestic ties will be developed on either side, which soften the asperities of the relation, and make it a patriarchal institution, such as is recognized by the Bible.

The evil alluded to is a growing one, and of great magnitude. In proportion as slaves increase in numbers, and lands wear out in the older States, there is a tendency ou

the part of masters to remove to large towns and cities, or to send their slaves to new and more fertile regions, thus leaving them under the absolute and exclusive control of overseers, whose greatest recommendation, in many instances, consists in making large returns of the proceeds of slave labor. This is wrong; it is not in accordance with the precepts of the Bible, nor the dictates of an enlightened and elevated humanity. Let, therefore, the owner of slaves live with them, or near them, so that he can frequently visit and mingle with them, hear their complaints, lend a listening ear to their sorrows, sympathize with their afflictions, and comfort them in their distresses; thus being a father to them, whilst they will be to him as children. Such is the slavery sanctioned by Christianity.

The evil just alluded to suggests another, which increases in proportion as *absenteeism* increases; an evil more and more felt by large slave owners, who are under the necessity of leaving their slaves to the unrestrained control of overseers. We refer to the want of sufficient protection, in our legislation, to the persons and *lives* of the slaves. It is a part of the moral law that "thou shalt do no murder." And the word of God is emphatic in its utterance, that "whosoever sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed." And the experience of the world has confirmed the wisdom and the righteousness of this divine mandate. The neglect of its sanctions never fails to generate evils. The laws of the land should accord with the injunctions of the Bible on this, as well as every other subject. Hence a sufficient and absolute protection should be extended, by law, to the persons and lives of all men alike; and especially to the lives of slaves, since they are forbidden by law to defend themselves against the assaults of white men. But the law of the land does not extend a sufficient protection to the lives of the slaves, in that it restricts the testimony that may be brought to bear for their protection.

A jealous overseer, a low, malicious white man, or a drunken, infuriated master, may take the life of a slave, without any just cause, and that, too, in the presence of any number of other slaves, and yet, if the deed be witnessed by no other white man, there is no legal evidence against the murderer; and the law allows him to go unpunished. This is an outrage against both the laws of God and the instincts of humanity, and cries to heaven for correction. It is an evil that grows in proportion as slaves increase, and are placed in large numbers upon distant plantations, under the exclusive control of hired overseers. Such circumstances of relation can not, from the nature of the case, inspire even a good overseer with the solicitude of real ownership. How much less, then, the wicked overseer, without the fear of God or man in his heart, who feels, as is too often the case, no other than a hireling's interest in the helpless beings over whom he exercises absolute dominion. This is a very great evil—felt, no doubt, more sensibly in the newer portions of our country than in the older—which needs immediate correction. The rejection of slave testimony was, doubtless, a wise precaution when the African was first introduced into this country, a rude savage, without the knowledge of God or His laws. And even yet, it would not be safe nor proper that the testimony of slaves should, under any circumstances, be taken as *direct* evidence against a white man, however mean and low that white man may be, since he may, notwithstanding, be a master. But two hundred years' association with the white man, and discipline under the benign and elevating influences of the Christian religion, have, as might be expected, wrought a great transformation in the moral and intellectual character of the African. He is far from being the rude savage that he was on his first arrival. He is semi-civilized and Christianized. So that the considerations which, in a former age, were eminently wise and appropriate, in providing a salutary precaution against receiving the

evidence of slaves in courts of law, do not now, in the present advanced stage of Christian culture and civilization of the black race in our midst, possess the same weight. Consequently, we would respectfully suggest to the wisdom of our legislators the propriety of receiving the testimony of slaves in murder cases; not as direct evidence—but as equivalent to *circumstantial* evidence—that is, for what it is really worth, when corroborated by other legal evidence. This would, to a great extent, mitigate the evil referred to; since it would subject the slayer of a slave to the necessity of standing a trial before the legal tribunals of the land, and to the risk of being convicted; which would serve as a great restraint to the propensity, too often indulged, to take the life of a slave, influenced by passion, fear, or hatred.

And in this connexion we would testify against the practice, too prevalent in many localities, of unauthorized assemblies taking the law into their own hands, and inflicting summary punishment upon slaves for capital offences, without the forms of law. The fact that several individuals, of their own free will and accord, combine to do this, instead of one, makes it none the less unlawful. The plea, that prompt and summary punishment is necessary, in order to inspire a salutary terror into the minds of slaves—even supposing it accomplished the end designed, which may be doubted—is more than overbalanced by the damage done to the majesty of law by such lawless procedure. It is a very great evil for any community to feel that the *law* is not a sufficient safeguard and protection to person and property. “We may not do evil that good may come.” Obedience to law is a Christian duty. And just in proportion as society submits to the spirit and the forms of law, and yields to its dictates implicit obedience, in that degree does law become a wall of defence to society. But to break through the forms of law, without absolute necessity, is a dangerous precedent. It weakens its power, disarms its

authority, and is the entering wedge, first to anarchy, and next to despotism. Therefore we earnestly dissuade from participation in extra-legal proceedings in the execution of the death penalty, or the infliction of great bodily punishment, transcending the measure prescribed in the word of God.

But perhaps there is no dereliction connected with negro slavery, as it exists in this country, fraught with more evil, whether viewed in relation to the happiness and moral character of the slave himself, or to the interests of the institution as such, than that of ignoring, in our legislation, the marriage and domestic relations amongst slaves. This is, indeed, a crying and a damaging evil, that sets at defiance the precepts of the Bible, the dictates of nature, and the moral sentiment of humanity. There is no law of God more clearly and repeatedly promulgated, in both natural and revealed religion, than that constituting the marriage and the domestic relations. There is no institution, human or divine, so efficient in developing the various attributes of man's nature, and, consequently, in yielding so much unalloyed happiness, as that of the family, as God constituted it. The relations of husband and wife, parent and child, next to our relation to God in filial love and Christian faith, are calculated to develop and cultivate traits and amenities in the nature of man, without which humanity is defective, and unproductive of true happiness. The family is a school which God has established, in which we are trained to be better men, better rulers, better subjects, better masters, better slaves, better neighbors, better friends, and better Christians. Hence it is impossible, from the very nature of the case, to civilize, elevate, and Christianize a savage people, in the absence of the conjugal and domestic ties. The whole Gospel can not be preached to a people in that condition. It would be a mockery alike of the moral law and the precepts of Christianity. To make the

attempt would be to regard and treat the slave as a brute, and not as a man. And yet, it is not worth while to attempt to disguise the fact that, however much humane and conscientious individuals may attempt to respect the marriage and domestic relations, as existing between their own slaves—and we are happy to testify that multitudes do—yet, nevertheless, the laws of the land, for which we are all and every one responsible, wholly ignore the marriage relation as existing among slaves. There is nothing in our legislation, so far as we know, that recognizes marriage between the slaves; or that prohibits fornication, adultery, bigamy, incest, or even rape amongst them. This is an outrage upon the laws of God, both natural and revealed, except on the presumption that the slave is not a man, but a *brute*, with a brute's propensities, a brute's nature, and a brute's destiny. These evils, it is true, may be mitigated by the conscientious, Christian master, to some extent; but it is only a mitigation; since no one can prevent the domestic ties from being sundered at the will of the unfeeling or unfortunate master, the creditor, the executor, or the law commissioner. And the fact that this violation of God's law is done by human law, does not relieve our consciences, or extenuate our guilt, in the least, from the fact that we, the people, are the makers of law. Did we live under a despotism, had we no part in the framing of laws and the establishment of government, then our responsibility for this and other evils in our legislation would not be so great. Nevertheless, as the ambassadors, not of an earthly potentate, but of "the King of kings and Lord of lords," we are commissioned and bound to tell law-makers, rulers, and governors, their duty, whether they will hear or whether they will forbear. But our government is a popular government, and every freeman is a sovereign; and all are responsible alike for the laws, and the manner in which they are executed. Consequently, no citizen who has a right to vote, or even to speak the truth, can free

himself from the responsibility attending the legislation of the land, until he has exerted all his influence, in every lawful way, to make it accord with righteousness.

The evils growing out of this dereliction in our legislation are of great magnitude, and two-fold—*negative* and *positive*. It not only diminishes the amount of happiness that the merciful Creator designed should grow out of the holy estate of wedlock, but, like the violation of every other law of nature, it inflicts positive suffering, and adds greatly to the sad lot of human woe. It not only embarrasses the development of the slave, as a human being, but it dwarfs and brutalizes his moral and social nature. It not only diminishes his value as an efficient, trustworthy servant, but it increases the expense of managing him, and especially of rearing his offspring. So that such unrighteous dereliction in our legislation is alike a sin against God, and a detriment to the best interests of the institution of slavery.

“It is not good that the man should be alone,” said the merciful Creator, on the morning of the wedding-day of the father of our race; and therefore provided for him a help meet for him, suitable for him, the complement of his nature, and they twain were one. For this cause “a man must leave father and mother”—the dearest friends that he has on earth—and “cleave unto his wife.” Solomon says, “whoso findeth a wife, findeth a good thing, and obtaineth favor of the Lord.” In the Old Testament prophecies, God represents the relationship existing between Him and His people as the relationship of parent and child. And when His people are regarded in their collective capacity as a Church, the relationship is represented as a *marriage*, spoken of under the figure of husband and wife; showing, by implication, that the one relation, that existing between husband and wife, is as natural and binding as that between parent and child. In the New Testament the very same view of the subject is repeatedly set forth. Paul runs a par-

allel between the union of Christ with His Church and the union of husband and wife. The Saviour says, "Have ye not read that He which made them at the beginning made them male and female, and said, For this cause shall a man leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife: and they twain shall be one flesh? Wherefore, they are no more twain, but one flesh. What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder."

The family, therefore, is a divine institution; and is essential to the development of certain attributes and affections in human nature, and the perfection of humanity. There are certain germinal elements in the constitution of man, which require the genial influences of the domestic relations to cause them to spring forth in beauty, and bear the rich fruits of joy. In the absence, therefore, of this divinely constituted institution, human nature can not be developed in the manner designed by God. It consequently becomes abnormal, and unproductive of that degree of human happiness which is man's natural right. The union of one man and one woman in the sacred ties of wedlock; drawn together by the bonds of a pure love; fused into one by the glowing warmth of a genuine and ever-increasing affection; their lives from henceforth to run in the same channel, having a common heart, a common life, a common interest, common joys, common sorrows, common fears and hopes and destiny; in short, a common being in all that pertains to time, is productive of the highest and purest happiness that belongs exclusively to earth. This law of man's nature—the natural right to the happiness flowing from it—no power on earth can frustrate, without setting at defiance the clearly revealed laws of God. But, lamentable as the fact is, and however much to be deplored, this holy institution, as existing between the slaves, is wholly ignored by the laws of the land. There is no law, in any State, so far as we know, that recognizes marriage between the slaves, or that condemns any of the vices

growing out of the relation of the sexes as perpetrated between the slaves. In this respect, therefore, our legislation does not conform to the principles of Christianity, nor to the dictates of nature, but is a sin against both; and, as a natural consequence, is attended with evils of immense magnitude. It is alike a sin against heaven, and a damage to the institution of slavery itself. Whenever human legislation is contrary to the dictates of nature, to say nothing of revealed religion, then we may be sure it is wrong, and will sooner or later inevitably result in evil.

It is wrong, in the next place, because it does a great injury to the slave himself. It suppresses conjugal affection; it perverts the growth of wedded faith; it weakens parental attachment; it sunders filial ties; it obliterates kindred bonds; it ignores wedded virtue; it opens the way for wandering desire; in short, it brutalizes the slave, and prevents him from being developed and elevated in that way in which God designed man to be developed. He can not, therefore, become a perfect man, with a man's heart, a man's affections, and a man's natural enjoyments. This would be a grievous wrong done to any human being, but most of all to the slave; since, from the very nature and necessity of his servile condition, he is cut off from those enjoyments resulting from the acquisition of property, the aspiring for fame, the pursuit of knowledge, and the cultivation of his mind. The only sources of enjoyment left for the slave—and considering his condition, they are all-sufficient—are to be found in the bosom of the family, as God ordained it, and in the worship of the Creator. To adulterate these fountains of the slave's enjoyment, is to deprive him of his natural rights—the rights that God designs him to enjoy—and to inflict upon him the greatest possible injury. This no earthly power can do with impunity. God himself will sooner or later avenge his own laws.

It is, furthermore, a serious damage to the institution itself. This might be expected, from the fact that the experience of the world proves that no genuine interest is promoted by the violation of God's revealed laws, or the thwarting the purposes of nature. It is as bootless as it is wicked, to attempt to frustrate the designs of the Almighty, and to put asunder what God hath joined together. To nullify the domestic relations between the slaves is such an attempt, and consequently is attended with damage. It depreciates the slave, and renders him less capable of being a good and efficient servant. Every creature of God is depreciated by being depressed in its development, and especially a human being. The more completely a slave can enter into all the feelings and sympathies, into all the anxieties, hopes and fears, joys, sorrows, and inner life of his master, the better adapted is he to become a faithful and an efficient servant. The slave that is a parent, with a parent's affections, can the better appreciate a parent's wants, fears, and anxieties. The slave that is a husband or a wife can enter into the sympathies of that relation. The slave who feels the attachments of family and kindred ties, can the more perfectly sympathize with his master in those relations. In short, in all respects, in proportion as a slave is developed as a human being—as a man—in that degree is he the better capable of serving his master, and consequently is the more valuable.

Moreover, it is easy to comprehend how our present legislation, or rather the dereliction of our legislation, leaves the slave without strong family bonds to attach him to any one place or family. Hence he is not so unlikely to run away as he would be if he felt the strong attachments of family, and knew that he could not form new so-called marriage relations when and where he pleased, without being guilty of a state offence subjecting him to legal punishment. But, on the contrary, let the marriage relation be established between the blacks, according to the dictates of natural

and revealed religion, and let the slave be bound by family ties, conjugal love, parental affection, and filial and kindred attachments, and he becomes, in proportion to the strength of these ties, a fixture to the soil, and an interested party in the good order of society. Thus bound by nature's bands, the slave will not be so likely to make his escape to other regions, leaving such attractions behind him. With such interests in the good order of society, he will not be likely to engage in insubordinate schemes and insurrectionary enterprises, which would devastate his home, and sunder the dearest ties of nature. Therefore, the family constituted amongst the slaves, as God designed it should be, will serve as a hostage for the good behavior of its several members, and act with more potency than all "fugitive slave laws," in bringing the fugitive back to his home.

Once more: let the marriage and domestic relations between the slaves be established by law; let chastity and wedded faith be recognized as virtues, between the blacks as well as between the whites; let purity be esteemed a grace, and impurity a stigma, on the part of the black as well as the white females; and let the law defend them in the maintenance of virtue; and then our female slaves will be, in a great degree, shielded against the contaminating influence of beastly white men. The evil alluded to is enormous and dangerous, both in its influence upon the bond and the free. It degrades the white man, socially and intrinsically, and in a way that can never be remedied. And, what is worse, it destroys confidence, on the part of the slave, in the virtue, integrity, and moral bearing of the white man; and disarms him of his moral power to elevate and Christianize the slave. It is, also, dangerous to the safety and well-being of society; since, if the low, beastly offender in this species of crime suppress and eradicate those natural affections implanted by God Himself in the heart of a parent for his offspring, he thereby distorts his own nature, becomes abnormal and monstrous, and not a

suitable member of a well-ordered, homogeneous society. Or, if he yields to the impulses of his nature, and feels that attachment to his hapless offspring which nature's laws require, he must of necessity, in that degree, become inimical to the institution of slavery itself, and therefore a dangerous member of society. So that, in either aspect of the case, the perpetrator of such degrading crime is a bad citizen, and ought to be so regarded by law. The establishment of the marriage relation by law—thus making it as permanent and as honorable between the blacks as between the whites—would tend, in a great measure, to obstruct this degrading and dangerous evil.

It would, moreover, obviate another great abuse, illustrated in the advantage which the heartless and cruel mercenary has over the conscientious and Christian master, who is often subjected by the former to ruinous sacrifice in selling, or exorbitant extortion in buying a servant, in order to prevent the ruthless separation of husband and wife, or parent and child.

There is no abuse of negro slavery that is so abhorrent to the common sentiment of mankind, and that so effectually cuts us off from the sympathy of the civilized world, as the non-recognition, by the laws of the land, of the marriage and domestic relations, as existing between the slaves, and the evils necessarily growing out of it. This is something that will enlist the sympathies of all men, since all, even the poorest and lowest, can appreciate the sacredness and value of the domestic ties to human happiness, and the extreme wretchedness of having them forcibly sundered. Let us conform negro slavery to God's natural and revealed laws, and then the world will listen with patience to our defence of the institution. So that, in every aspect of the case, it is manifestly to the interest of slavery itself, as well as obedience to the laws of God, to recognize by statute law the marriage and domestic relations as existing between the slaves. This, whilst it may, in its be-

ginning, be attended in some instances with inconvenience, and possibly pecuniary loss, yet will soon become easy of execution, and greatly enhance the real value and dignity of the institution.

But suppose it did require sacrifice, and a great one, what is that in comparison with the value of doing right? Is not the approbation of our own consciences, the sympathy of the wise and good amongst men, and the favor of God, worth more than all other considerations, even in this life? But, especially when we remember that we must render an account at the bar of God, and look back on this subject from some stand-point in eternity, how then will mere sordid convenience appear in comparison with having done our duty? By no possible construction can it be made to appear that the true interests of slavery require a violation of the laws of God. It is always best to do right, whatever may be the temporary inconvenience or the apparent sacrifice of so doing. This is the wisest maxim for even men of the world to follow. But with the Christian, whose duty it is to "deny himself, and take up his cross and follow Christ"—who, if he is not willing to forsake father and mother, son and daughter, and all that he hath for Christ, is not worthy of Him—there can not be a moment's hesitation. Nay, it is absurd to speak of pecuniary interest being set over against Christian duty; or of personal inconvenience on the part of the followers of Christ, in reforming evil, and in refraining from doing wrong. It is no sacrifice for a Christian to conform his life and actions to the principles and requirements of the Gospel. The greatest sacrifice a Christian can make is to do wrong. Sin is the greatest calamity.

Finally, as the slave is a religious being, he can not be properly developed in the absence of religious ideas and instruction. This is another of his *natural* rights, which can not be withheld without sinning against nature's laws.

Religion makes him a happier man, and a better slave. Being naturally religious; having implanted in his mental and moral constitution, as all other men have, certain attributes and capacities, designed exclusively by the Creator for the exercise and enjoyment of religion; it follows that religion is as essential to the proper development, growth, and expansion of the mind and soul of the slave, as wholesome food is to the health and growth of his body. If this natural appetite for religion is fed with Bible truth, the mind and heart of the slave will be properly developed. But if this divinely prepared truth is withheld, then the mind of the slave will be filled with error, delusion, superstition, and silly vagaries, that will distort the moral character of the slave, render him miserable where he ought to be happy, and in some instances dangerous, misled by his delusions and hallucinations. That master, therefore, who does not provide for the religious instruction of his slaves, hinders their development as human beings. He is, consequently, guilty of injustice and cruelty—sins against nature—and will sooner or later suffer the righteous penalty.

Slaves without religious instruction are not so valuable as those who have had it. They are harder to govern, devoid of moral principle, less truthful, and less trustworthy. It is very easy to understand how that slave whose mind is imbued with the principles of the Christian religion is more contented, respectful, obedient, industrious, honest, conscientious, and truthful, than the one who has not been thus trained. No one can doubt that the slave whose conscience has been cultivated according to the precepts of the Gospel, who has been taught to believe in a future state of existence, in a final judgment, and rewards and punishments for the righteous and the wicked, is more valuable than one whose mind remains in heathenish darkness and superstition. This is evinced on the block, and in the market, by the higher price paid for the religious

than for the irreligious slave. So that it is for the pecuniary interest of the master, in the absence of any nobler motive, to provide suitable religious instruction for his slaves.

But even were it a dead expense, in a *pecuniary* point of view, that is no excuse for the neglect of a solemn Christian duty. God did not, by His providence, transplant the African from the darkness of heathenism, and commit him to us, in order that we should still keep him in darkness, and derive benefit from his detriment. No; it is the purpose of the Almighty that the advantage shall be mutual; and that the African shall be by us evangelized and elevated in the scale of humanity. It is, therefore, the inflexible *duty* of every owner of a slave to provide for him wholesome religious instruction. He is as responsible before God for his slave as for his child; and in one aspect, more so, since a child is a minor only for a limited time, whilst a slave is a minor for life; therefore the master's responsibility ends only at the grave of his slave. He who will not relieve the physical ills, and provide for the bodily comfort of his slave, is thought worthy of public scorn and detestation. But how much more odious is that master who, from sordid motives, or infidel apathy, will not provide for the religious enlightenment and spiritual welfare of the soul, the immortal part of his slave? Fearful will be the responsibility, at the inexorable bar of a just and holy God, of those masters who enjoy the fruits of the toil and sweat of their faithful slaves, and yet make no provision whatever for their spiritual welfare.

In conclusion, dear brethren, let us, with the Bible in our hands, resolve that, with God's helping grace, we will discharge our whole duty with regard to this great and all-absorbing subject, to which the eyes of all christendom are now turned. We have hitherto labored at a disadvantage in defending negro slavery as it exists amongst us, from

the fact that it has been encumbered with certain confessed evils and abuses, condemned by the letter and spirit of Christianity, which the world has mistaken for the necessary characteristics of slavery itself. Let us correct these abuses, which are not only contrary to the teachings of the Bible, but detrimental to the interests of the institution itself, as we have already shown, and elevate slavery up to the Gospel standard, and then the prejudice now arrayed against it, in the minds of Christians abroad, and of great and good men every where, will subside. There is a natural repugnance in the breast of civilized man against *tyranny*; but there is none against the *domestic* relations. Let us, therefore, make slavery, by law, the patriarchal institution that is recognized and sanctioned in the Bible, and it will appear in entirely a different and a milder light to the eyes of the civilized world than that in which it now appears. And let us not mistake our responsibility on this subject; and through fear, and a time-serving policy, excuse ourselves from prompt and decided action, with the delusive plea that we must *wait* for a suitable time—"a more convenient season"—before we move in this matter. There never was a more suitable time, or convenient season, to move and take a step upward on this subject, than the present, when the eyes of the whole civilized world are turned upon it; and all ears are open to hear any utterance that may be made in reference to it. Let us not sit still, and expect the world to get, of itself, into a temper to be reformed. This would be absurd; nay, more; it is wilful and wicked delusion. How is the world ever to get into a temper to be reformed, if the Church and people of God do not bring them to it? The very design of setting up an organized Church in the world, and the true mission of the Christian as a member of it, is that it shall be the aggressive agency, in the hands of God, of regenerating the world, and restoring it to its allegiance to the Lord Jesus Christ. The disciples of Christ are to lead the van, and to be the

“salt,” the “leaven,” the “light,” that are to dissipate the darkness that invests the minds of men, and expurgate the evils with which society is infested. And this is to be accomplished simply by proclaiming the TRUTH, fearlessly, earnestly, boldly, kindly, and perseveringly, in the name of the Lord God, whose “ambassadors” we profess to be, and of his Son, the Lord Jesus Christ, whose “disciples” we call ourselves. This is the great instrumentality which God has promised to bless. “So shall my word be that goeth forth out of my mouth; it shall not return unto me void; but it shall accomplish that which I please; and it shall prosper in the thing whereunto I sent it.”

“The grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, and the communion of the Holy Ghost, be with you all. Amen.”

ARTICLE II.

THE DOWNFALL OF THE UNION.

We presume there is scarcely a man to be found, either in the Federal or in the Confederate States, who does not regard the dissolution of the United States Government as a great evil, in itself considered. The idea of a great government, and of a powerful people, has ever been captivating to the human mind. This idea of grandeur and power has been the ruling idol of conquerors and their followers, in every age. The Englishman, however humble his sphere, boasts that the sun never sets upon the British Empire, and prides himself on being an Englishman. The power and glory of France is the idol of the Frenchman. Each one loves to boast of the heroes and achievements of

his country, feeling ("*quorum magna pars fui*") that he is a part of it. This feeling is natural and powerful. It is necessary to the unity, the strength, and happiness of a people. It is the feeling of patriotism. It is akin to that holy feeling, the love of a child for its mother, and like it will suffer long, and endure much, before it can be extinguished. Implanted in man by his Creator for the wisest and best of purposes, that of uniting in friendly ties those who inhabit the same soil, it has in every age been abused by demagogues and tyrants, for the wicked purpose of robbing and oppressing the people.

No people ever naturally possessed a greater share of this feeling than the people of the South. It was with no ordinary degree of pride that they looked at the extent of their territory, the greatness of their rivers and lakes, the grandeur of their forests, the diversity of climate, the variety and fertility of soil, their vast mineral resources, the extent of their seacoast, with so many bays and inlets, and the rapid increase of their wealth and population. Nor were they forgetful of their achievements in war, of their power by land and sea, the magnitude and extent of their commerce, and their prospects of future greatness. Their orators, their statesmen and warriors, were ever foremost in vindicating the national honor. With money and men, the Southern people were ever ready to maintain their common country's honor, and to defend it, without regard to the sacrifice. They did the greater part of the fighting, and paid the greater part of the expenses, while the Northern people reaped the greater part of the advantages. Yet of all this they never complained. They did it cheerfully, inspired by their lofty spirit of patriotism.

What, then, has led to the separation of the South from the North? what, to this ferocious war of invasion by the North against the South? Is this the end of that government, once the pride of every American; that model government, demonstrating the capacity of man for self-

government, hurling its thunders at the despotic governments of the Old World, and threatening by its example and influence, by its declaration of rights and its proclamations of freedom, to usher in the great political millenium, when kings and emperors shall be hurled from their thrones, when the oppressed shall all go free, and the ransomed millions celebrate the world's great jubilee? Is the great United States Government among the things that have been? Is it numbered with the republics of old? Shall we say of it as of Troy—"Troja fuit!"—it was? Has it proven to be an *ignis fatuus*, alluring men from the path of peace and prosperity into the fens of death and desolation? Was it a meteor that shot athwart the political horizon only to attract the gaze of the world, and leave behind it a deeper gloom?

View it in what light we may, it is a mystery, in the providence of God, the solution of which is designed for the instruction of man and the glory of God. To the solution of this mystery we propose to devote some remarks. We believe in a future millenium, both religious and political, for they are inseparable. We believe in a spiritual reign of Christ upon earth. But we are not of those who believe in what is called the personal appearance and reign of Christ, and that the millenium is near at hand. Nor do we believe that it will be brought about by any new dispensation, or miraculous means. We believe the present dispensation and means already instituted fully adequate, when the providence of God has fully prepared the world for the coming of the millenium. This will not be until man has exhausted the cup of iniquity to its very dregs; until the race has experienced the bitter fruits of sin in all its various forms, and, thoroughly convinced of its utter depravity and folly, shall cast itself, in humility and faith, upon God. Governments will have no stability, self-government will have no existence, and there will be no freedom, until the world shall understand what is meant by the

declaration: "If the Son, therefore, shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed;" and again, "Blessed is the nation whose God is the Lord."

If we turn to the politician, and ask him what has brought about the separation of the South and the North—if he is a Southern man, he will tell you, that by high tariffs the North has built up her manufactories; by a monopoly of the carrying trade she has built her shipping, enriched herself by bounties on her fisheries; and, aided by these, she has transferred the trade from the South to the North, and established her commerce by controlling the capital and the exports of the South; that, by robbing the South annually of millions, she has been enabled to make canals and build railroads, and increase her population; that to increase her tariffs and bounties, she has for years employed all the arts of legislation to deplete the public treasury, by making vast appropriations to internal improvements, distributing the surplus revenue, and giving away the public lands. She has systematically increased her power by holding out inducements to immigration, to fill up the territories with so-called "free States;" to weaken the South, she has opposed the admission of slave States, and even resolved to lessen the number of those already existing; to this end, she has fomented the spirit of abolitionism as much as possible; and that finally, having obtained a majority by uniting all the elements of opposition, she elected Abraham Lincoln upon the Chicago platform, which was a palpable subversion of the Constitution, and a virtual subjugation of the South; and that nothing remained for the South, but either to submit to a despotism established for her ruin, or to separate from the North, declare her independence, and maintain her rights, at every cost; that the North having resolved upon the subjugation of the South, determined to accomplish by the sword what the South refused to let her do by the ballot-box.

If we turn to the statesman, and ask him for a solution of the mystery, he will tell us about the importance of maintaining proper checks and balances of power in a government extending over a territory of such vast dimensions, embracing such a variety of soil and climate, and such a diversity of pursuits. He will tell us how difficult it is to prevent the danger arising from conflicting interests. He will point to the ordinance of 1787, and the Missouri compromise, as establishing sectional lines, which sooner or later must end in sectional conflicts, and the separation of the sections.

If, now, we turn to the philosopher for a solution, he will descant upon the fundamental principles and the various forms of government, and their adaptation to different people. He will tell us of the various prejudices and passions which endanger the stability of government. He will remind us of the influence of wealth and luxury in enervating the people, increasing their pride and selfishness, smothering public spirit and patriotism, destroying the love of liberty, ending in the corruption of public morals, and finally, the overthrow of government. He will, perhaps, instance Greece and Rome; tell us of their patriotism, public spirit, and energy, in the early days of their republics; the decay of all these, and their consequent overthrow, and the establishment of despotism.

All these accounts may be true, but they do not solve the mystery. It may be said that the United States Government was very different from the ancient republics; that the people are very different; that these existed in the days of paganism; that we are Christians; that we live in a more enlightened age—one in which education is general, newspapers, books, schools, colleges, and seminaries of different kinds exist—one of railroads and telegraphs, furnishing every facility for the diffusion of knowledge; that it is an age of art and science, revealing in the air, the earth, and the waters, what were once mysteries. It may,

then, be asked, if it be possible for the experiment of free government to be made under more favorable circumstances? If not, then the important question forces itself upon us: If republicanism, regarded as the only free government, is, under the most favorable circumstances, a failure, has man the capacity for self-government? If republican governments be assumed as models of free government, then history replies that a very small portion of the human race have, at any period of the world, given any evidence of the capacity of man for self-government. If we inquire to what extent self-government really and practically exists in republican governments, the proportion of those actually exercising self-government is greatly diminished. If, then, according to the Declaration of Independence, "all men are created free and equal, and endowed with certain inalienable rights, among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," it is most remarkable that so very small a portion of the whole human race have ever inherited their birthright. It is still more remarkable that the Northern people, under the pretence of carrying out the above doctrine of the Declaration, should wage war upon the Southern people, and engage in destroying "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," by way of preserving them. All these considerations, instead of solving, only serve to increase the great mystery, and all the causes as yet assigned for the separation of the South from the North, and the waging of a most unnatural and unjust war by the latter against the former, are but proximate causes.

We shall now attempt another solution of the mystery. We are not a nation of atheists; and it need not be proved that there is a God; that He is unchangeable, and a being of wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth. Nor need it be proved that He governs all His works; that His government is perfect, being a revelation of His attributes, as is creation itself, and in perfect harmony with

them ; that He will not punish the innocent ; and that whatever calamities befall a people, are consequences of sinning against Him. Further, between the sins and the punishments inflicted, there is an intimate connexion, viz., that of cause and effect. We shall attempt to point out some of these sins.

I. In the very origin of the United States Government, the perfect law of God, the decalogue, containing the moral law, was not only ignored, but principles were promulgated which are directly opposed to the moral law. These were set up as fundamental ; became the prevailing sentiments of the people, and very extensively influenced all legislation. We assumed as self-evident truths that all men are created free and equal, and are entitled to "certain inalienable rights, among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." We taught that men are rightfully governed only by consent, and that civil government is a matter of compact. We laid down these broad assertions without any definition, limitation, or restriction, as fundamental truths, as axioms in government. The discovery of their falsehood and absurdity, and the attempt to define, limit and restrict them, have been matters of an afterthought, and without authority ; every one having put his own construction upon them. We need not now stop to show the infidel origin of these doctrines, or to show what have been their legitimate results in France. It is enough to show that they are directly opposed to the law of God, and that, again, we are witnessing their necessary consequences.

The moral law is founded upon truths directly opposed to the so-called "self-evident truths" of the Declaration. All men are created under, or subject to the moral law, and that law makes them subject to the laws of the land, and hence government is an ordinance of God. It derives all just authority from the government of God. The moral law contains the fundamental principles of all good government. It enjoins the duties incumbent upon all men, and

thereby defines and secures the rights of all. There can be no violation of rights, unless the moral law is violated. It does not leave men to be governed by their consent. It demands obedience, and punishes disobedience. All law is founded upon existing relations. The duties which we owe to God are founded upon the relation which we sustain to Him. Those which we owe to our fellow-men are founded upon the relations which we sustain to one another. These are various. Some are relations of superiority, some of equality, and others of inferiority. We find especially mentioned those of parents and children, of husband and wife, of masters and slaves, or servants—just such as Abraham had, born in his house, or bought with his money—and those of neighbors. Thus we have all the family relations upon which is founded family government, which is first in order, and the most important of all. It is that into which, and under which, every human being is born. All authority rightly exercised over man by man, is delegated by God. The moral law, as expounded in the Bible, is the true charter of all human governments. The family government is, of all, the most absolute; and this results from the absolute dependence of the child upon the parent, and the superior capacity of the parent to provide for, protect, and govern the child. Thus, instead of being born free, every one is born under the most absolute government. From this he passes into that of the state, at such an age as the state may judge him capable of conducting himself under the laws of the state. He must be trained up and qualified for the state government. His right, therefore, to pass from the family into the state government, is founded upon the supposition of his fitness to pass from the one into the other. Thus man's right to self-government is founded upon his capacity for self-government. Beyond this, he has no right. Slavery is the next most absolute form of government. It is another form of household government, and next in importance to it. It is

founded upon the same great principle, that of dependence on the one hand, and superiority on the other; the incapacity of the slave to provide for, protect, and govern himself, and the capacity of the master to do these for him. Among the most enlightened and intelligent portion of the human race, more than one-half of the population consist of minors, and on an average, at least one-half of man's existence is one of minority, during which he is under the most absolute government. If such is the government which God has ordained for the greater portion of the most intelligent and enlightened races, during more than half their existence, why should it be thought unreasonable or unjust that the same absolute government should be ordained for those savage tribes who never, so far as the capacity of self-government is concerned, pass from a state of minority? Now this is precisely the case with the tribes of Africa. For more than three thousand years they have never passed from a state of minority. They have never been capable of instituting laws and government, in any proper sense; have never been able to provide for, protect, and govern themselves. There have, indeed, arisen among them superstitious usages and customs, making their wretched life more wretched still, but nothing like government administered upon any principles of right and justice. Barbarian chiefs have cut their way by violence to a kind of supremacy over the hordes they have controlled. But their normal condition is that of servitude. It is proven by their history for more than three thousand years, and by experiments made, under the most favorable circumstances, to enable them to exercise self-government. Nor will Liberia, in the end, prove any thing to the contrary. The idea that the negroes are capable of exercising a higher degree of self-government, by maintaining a republican form of government, than the most enlightened and refined nations of Europe, can find a resting-place only in the brain of a fanatic. Whether slavery could ever have arisen in

an unfallen world, is a question of no practical moment. It has arisen among a fallen race, is one of the modes of human government, and as such, has received the divine sanction and authorization. No censure is pronounced upon it in the Old Testament or the New; and it is recognized equally with the family and the state; the duties which belong to it are enjoined, as it respects both masters and servants; and no word is said or written of its being a sin or an evil to be abated, or to come to its end in any future age of the Church or the world. It has, therefore, a divine sanction throughout the Scriptures. Many Abolitionists have, therefore, rejected both the Bible and the God of the Bible. From the remarks already made, the reasons for instituting it are manifest. The family government, although the most absolute, is of all others the most perfect, the most important, and productive of the greatest amount of blessings and happiness to the human family. Next to it is that of the household government connected with domestic servitude. It brings the ruler and the subject directly together. It identifies their interests, and excites mutual sympathies. It establishes new relations, creates new duties and obligations, and opens a wider field for the exercise of the social, moral, and intellectual feelings. Hence the self-sacrificing devotion with which even delicate females attend upon their sick servants. Next to their own offspring, they are part of their household, with whom they have been associated, perhaps from infancy. Hence, too, the remarkable instances of devotion on the part of servants to their masters. No such interest is felt in the hireling or his family. In the hour of sickness or want, these are either turned over to the poor-house, or left to the cold charities of the world. No poor-houses are needed for the slaves in the South. And whatever may be their vices, such is the watchful care over them, and the restraints of the household government, that fewer of those crimes that fill jails and penitentiaries with criminals are committed by

them than by any other class of society. So far as slavery has existed in nations having the true religion, the design of a merciful God has been too evident to be mistaken. Among the Hebrews, it probably brought more men of heathen birth into a saving acquaintance with God and his truth, than any system of propagandism the ancient Church put forth. And he must be blind who does not see that, though not thus designed by man, the system of modern slavery, as existing here, was meant by God to be a great moral machinery to separate the heathen from their idols, and from the degrading customs, manners, and vices of idolatry, transferring slaves from brutal and savage to humane and civilized masters, removing them from the obscene rites and ceremonies of degrading superstitions, and placing them amid the influences of civilized life, as the most effectual means of converting them from a savage to a civilized state, and from the superstitions of idolatry to the worship of the true God. The four millions of slaves in the Southern States possess a greater amount of intelligence, piety, and happiness, and contribute more, by their industry, to the progress of humanity, than the sixty millions in Africa. Thus African slavery in the Southern States has proven to be, in the providence of God, a great moral agency, accomplishing more in civilizing and Christianizing the heathens of Africa, than all the missionary efforts of Christendom have done for that people. The reason is obvious. It makes the heathen support and civilize himself, while he is brought under the transforming influence of the Gospel. Though the human agents have had none but selfish ends in the transfer of these servants to a Christian land, the results, unintended by man, have been wonderful, in the providence of God. It has shown itself to be in accordance with the constitution of man and the laws of God. Man's development, whether physical, intellectual, or moral, is through the exercise of his faculties. Man is to live by the sweat of his brow. He is also to *strive* to

enter into the kingdom of heaven. Yet he is saved by grace, and not by works. The African lives in violation of the laws of God and of human progress. But the religion and philanthropy of the present day, sadly impregnated with infidelity, says, Clothe and feed the savage to civilize him, and preach to him to convert him; but do not separate him from his idols, from the companions of his idolatry, from the obscene, the cruel, and degrading rites of his superstitions; do not interfere with his ease by requiring him to work; do not violate his rights by subjecting him to the restraints of law; rather let him go naked and feed upon the most loathsome food, than compel him to labor for such clothing and food as are used by civilized people. To place him under such laws and restraints as his savage nature requires, is slavery—is such an injustice that, if the Bible sanctions it, it must be rejected; and if the God of the Bible has authorized it, we must make another God; for “all men are created free and equal.” How true it is that God seeth not as man seeth. The most remarkable phenomenon of the present century is, that the greater portion of the civilized world should worship an imaginary, indefinable something which they call liberty, and should engage in cutting one another’s throats to secure this imaginary thing, of which scarcely any two have the same idea.

The learned German, Lieber, in his treatise on Civil Liberty, has entered into a labored attempt to define, or rather to explain, what civil liberty is, for he seems to doubt about its being a definable term. He comes, however, to the conclusion, that “it is rational to speak of ancient, mediæval, or modern liberty, of Greek or Roman, Anglican or Gallican, pagan and Christian, American and English liberty.” The learned author has discovered quite a variety of *liberties*. For if they are all the same, it is not very rational to speak of them as of so many different kinds. If we will discard infidel philosophy, and come to the Bible

and reality, we may arrive at some truth, both profitable and practical. Liberty simply means doing as one pleases. Every one has the right to do as he or she pleases, just so far as he or she may please to do right, but no one has a right to do wrong. Right implies a rule of acting. The moral law is that rule in all civilized nations. That law is applicable to all the relations of man. It is the duty of every man to observe that law, and, so far as self-preservation and the well-being of society is concerned, to compel others to observe it. God enjoins this upon him, and thus human government is an ordinance of God. The law of self-preservation and self-interest prompts men to enforce this injunction. It is the duty of every man to assist in arresting the murderer, the robber, or thief, and to restrain the liberty of those who do not choose to do right. The duty of individuals is varied by the different relations they sustain. All those relations are right and proper which are recognized by the moral law. Among these is that of master and servant, or slave. Every one is free just in so far as his will is in harmony with the moral law—so far as he chooses to do his duty. The servant who does his duty freely, is just as free as his master; and more free, if the master does his from compulsion. True freedom is peculiar to no condition of life. The moral law presupposes all the various conditions of life. It knows of no inalienable rights, except that of doing right. It demands obedience, without any reference to the consent of man. The declaration that “all men are created, or born, free and equal; that they are endowed with certain inalienable rights, among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness;” and the dogma that man can only be rightfully governed by his own consent, as received and understood by the great mass of the people, are subversive of every precept in the decalogue. Infidel in their origin, they are practically atheistic—ignoring the divine government—and incompatible with the existence of all government. They assert

equality in opposition to that inequality and diversity which constitute the relations upon which the moral law is founded. They assert a freedom in opposition to that state of subjection to law in which man is born. They claim for man a liberty without any reference to his depravity and incapacity for self-government; and assert that to be inalienable which is to be acquired only as the reward of intelligence and virtue, and which history proves to be attainable only by the most enlightened and virtuous. They demand for human laws the consent of man, instead of the authority of God. The *right to do right* includes all the inalienable rights of man.

The moral law, summarily expressed in the decalogue, is the only perfect and authoritative rule of action. It is founded upon the constitution of things which God has established. It embraces all the relations of human beings, as established by God himself. To assert that any of these relations is sinful, is to assert that God is the author of sin. To set up abstract principles as self-evident and fundamental principles of government, which are incompatible with the constitution of things, and with the relations which God has established, and upon which the moral law is founded, and by which the divine government is directed, and subordinate to which all human governments should be regulated, is to sap the foundations of theology, morality, and all good government. In vain may it be alleged that abstractions can do no harm. Abstractions, when true, are the great universal truths which must govern men; when false, they are most pernicious. Did time permit, it would be easy to point out the connexion between the political and theological heresies of the present century. That Adam could not be the representative of his posterity, because they were not there to give their consent, "the great principles of human nature," which, according to Barnes, are paramount in authority to the Bible, the "higher law doctrine," the "bone theology" of Harriet B. Stowe, the

“intuitive theology” of Theodore Parker and others, the demand for an anti-slavery Bible and an anti-slavery God, are all the outgrowth of these self-evident truths in the Declaration of Independence. Abolitionism, Fourierism, Communism, Woman’s-Rightsism, Free-Loveism, and Mormonism, and Agrarianism, too clearly betray their paternity to require any remark. They have all had their share in bringing about a general state of corruption in religion, morals, and politics, and in paving the way for a great revolution. None but a demoralized, and almost demonized people could have been led into one of the most terrible wars waged against equal, free, and independent States, who asked only to be let alone; a war which, however distinguished by calling it a war for the Constitution, the Union, the Stars and Stripes, is one of murder and plunder.

Nor have we in the South been free from guilt in this matter. We, too, ignored the moral law as the only correct charter of human rights and duties. We endorsed the same falsehoods and political heresies. We joined in the shout to the infidel goddess of Liberty. We pronounced slavery an evil, but excused ourselves on various grounds, such as that we were not the authors of it, and that its removal was impracticable: not considering that in our fallen world, and to this class of men, it might be, and is, a positive good. It did not seem to have occurred to us that the Bible is the only rule of faith and practice in all matters. We did not accept the institution of slavery as an ordinance of God, and we neither defended it nor regulated it as such. We tried it by the tenets of an infidel philosophy, and the sentiment of a civilized world, perverted by the same. If slavery is wrong, then is the Bible wrong. Many Abolitionists have had logic enough to see this, and have rejected the Bible. But this does not help them out of the difficulty, for the Bible is in harmony with the constitution of things, with the diversity of relations actually existing. If they reject the Bible, and the God of the Bible, they

must also reject the God of creation. In short, they must land in atheism, and join Satan and the fallen spirits in their rebellion against God and the divine government. And these are the ranks into which the isms of the North have brought, to so large an extent, the people of the North. Under the delusion of contending for the rights of man on the part of some, and the lust of power and plunder on the part of others, they are engaged in a war in which they are violating every precept of the decalogue. Before them there is a most fearful retribution.

We, the people of these Confederate States, by the appointment of days of fasting and prayer, and thanksgiving, acknowledge the divine government. Surely the failure of every government set up in opposition to the divine government, should admonish us of the sin and folly of attempting to establish a government upon any other principles than those of the moral law. What precept is there in the decalogue which we can reject, without endangering the stability of government? Who can tell the amount of moral and political corruption and degradation produced in the United States by the open and public violation of the Sabbath? Who can say how much influence open and public profaneness and vulgarity have had in producing a contempt for law and government, and leading to deeds of lawlessness and violence? What has caused our people of the South, at any time, to have any misgivings as to the justice, safety, and permanence of our domestic institution, but the fact that we did not receive it as an ordinance of God, and regulate it as required by the moral law—by the Bible? What has brought upon us our present calamities, but a disregard of the moral law in our government? The psalmist has declared, “Blessed is the nation whose God is the Lord.” Solomon has said, “Righteousness exalteth a nation, but sin is a reproach to any people.” Who will assert the contrary? That the Lord reigns, that He is the ONE LAWGIVER, that the divine government is supreme; that

all human governments must be subordinate to the divine, that all infidel theories, axioms, and philosophy on government must be rejected, and the Bible be received as the only rule of faith and practice in law and government, is the great truth which must be acknowledged and accepted, before there can be stability in government or peace among men, we most solemnly believe. It would seem that the present contest was designed to scourge the so-called Christian and civilized world for the infidelity incorporated and mixed up with governments. France and England, as well as the United States, have rejected the Bible as the great charter of human rights. They have imbibed the philosophy of infidelity, and fanatics have come up among them like the frogs of Egypt. It will bring upon them, as well as upon the United States, the judgments of God. When Christendom has abandoned its idols; when men have ceased impiously to assert what God ought *to be* and *to do*; when they humbly acknowledge that they are born the heirs of depravity and the slaves of sin; that the only way to freedom and happiness is conformity to His laws; that the relations which God has established are all proper and right, and all equally compatible with freedom and happiness; that the forms of government can bestow upon men neither the one nor the other; and that the observance of the moral law, involving all the duties and obligations of men, and securing all their rights, shall be supreme; then, and not till then, may we expect "peace upon earth and good will toward men." We see no reason why the relation of master and servant may not continue as long as the world stands. Most assuredly it will, so long as there are inferior races, whose normal condition is that of domestic servitude, and whose incapacity for establishing and maintaining government unfits them for any other condition. It is the decree of God, that all men shall be under law and government; and that all laws and governments shall be subordinate to the divine government, and He will over-

throw and destroy them until they are thus subordinate. The institution of domestic servitude is, like that of the family government, one of His own appointment, designed for the civilization of the heathen. The Coolie system is one of heartless piracy, seizing upon the labor, and rejecting the obligations and duties of domestic servitude. It provides for neither the young, the sick, nor the old. It has nothing in it to call forth the sympathies of the master, or create attachment on the part of the slave, misnamed apprentice. It must result in the accumulation of paupers and criminals. Its only result is to produce degeneracy and increase human suffering. And this is the system that infidelity and hypocrisy would substitute for that of domestic servitude, ordained of God to mitigate the sufferings of human beings, by placing them under the household government, as best adapted to their improvement and happiness.

In the end of this contest the wickedness and folly of man will be seen, and the wisdom and goodness of God will be vindicated. Let us do our duty to all men, vindicate our institutions, defend our rights, and feel assured that the Judge of all the earth will do right.

ARTICLE III.

DOES CHRIST REQUIRE THAT BAPTISM SHALL
BE ADMINISTERED BY IMMERSION?

A reply from a Pastor to an inquirer sincerely desiring to know what duty requires him to do.

MY DEAR SIR: Your communication is before me. In it you express the hope, that the great change which fits you for membership in the Church of Christ has been effected in your heart by the grace of God. You state that your mind is laboring under difficulties concerning the mode in which Christ requires you to receive the ordinance of baptism, and express a purpose to investigate the subject candidly, until you shall become satisfied that you have discovered what duty requires you to do. In the prosecution of your purpose, you have presented certain questions which you request me to answer. Your determination to investigate is commendable, and I wish it were more common among those whose minds do not possess that amount of information on this subject which would enable them to form an enlightened judgment. The questions you present are proper rather as preliminary to the main questions, than as being directly connected with them. They are eminently proper at the commencement of your inquiry, and the answer to them will tend, I hope, to dispose your mind favorably towards the further investigations to which your purpose will lead. In all such questions, truth should be our only aim, and its cause need never fear a candid search, however thorough. My sincere desire is to know it myself, and to teach it, and it alone, to others. In the answer I shall give to your inquiries, it can no more be my true interest to lead you into error, than it can be yours to embrace error under my false

teaching. Let us each, therefore, weigh well both what we teach and what we receive.

I. Your first question is, "Ought we to be influenced, in forming our judgment of the mode in which Christ requires us to receive the ordinance of baptism, by what is said to be the ludicrous appearance presented by the subjects of immersion as they come dripping from the water, or by what is said to be the frequent occurrence of incidents giving ground for remarks inconsistent with the solemnity and sacredness of the ordinance?"

The answer to this question seems perfectly plain. Ridicule can never be rightly regarded as a test of truth. The most sacred things have been ridiculed, and the most vile eulogized. But the ridicule heaped upon that which was sacred did not change its character or detract from its merit, and the eulogy pronounced upon that which was vile did not mend its morals or purge away its vileness. Ridicule is no evidence that that which is ridiculed is wrong, nor is eulogy any evidence that that which is eulogized is right. The mere fact that ridiculous remarks are made concerning the appearance of persons who are the subjects of immersion, as they come from the water, should hinder no one from receiving the ordinance in that way, if such reception is actually required. Nor is the fact that it is often inconvenient, and attended with trouble, to be regarded as a good reason for changing the form of the ordinance, if it is a settled point that Christ requires it to be administered by immersion, and in that way alone. If it can be shown that such is his requirement, no amount of ridicule, and no amount of inconvenience attending its administration, can authorize any change in its form. This much we cheerfully concede. But at the same time we claim that if Christ has not positively enjoined its administration in that form, the fact that it does seem calculated to excite some degree of mirth, where only serious feelings should occupy the mind,

is a valid objection to that mode of administering it, when other modes, having equal or greater claims to divine authority, are free from that objection. If Christ has appointed an ordinance which may be administered in such a manner as will not expose it to ridicule, and will not be liable to become productive of incidents tending to excite mirthful feelings in those who witness it, we have no right to burden it with a form of administration which is productive of occurrences tending to excite such feelings and call forth such remarks. That the mode of baptism by immersion is prolific of such incidents, is evident to any one who has been a frequent attendant at such places. And if occurrences tending to excite mirth are seen, the levity of deportment and feelings which is so often witnessed in the attending audience, will be inevitable. In addition to this, it has often appeared to me that in administering immersion to females there is, at times, an approach to indelicacy, undesigned by either party, but arising necessarily from the circumstances of the case. If such occasions can be avoided without violating the law or impairing the significance of the ordinance, a proper sense of propriety would lead to such administration of it as would avoid them. We are not at liberty to shrink from duty to avoid reproach; but at the same time it is wrong to perform duty in such a manner as will provoke reproach unnecessarily, when it can be as well or better performed in a manner which will not expose it to that objection. Where it can be done, we are to discharge our duty in such a manner as not to let "our good be evil spoken of." We have no right to add burdens to the cross, in order that we may claim especial merit for fidelity and courage in meeting and bearing them. Thus far, then, our minds may rightly be influenced by this objection. If we are satisfied that Christ has appointed immersion as the form in which He requires us to receive baptism, we are not at liberty to decline it. But if we are not satisfied that such obligation

binds us to receive it in that manner, we may rightly prefer another mode.

II. Your second inquiry is, "Does not the fact that such objections are made by the opponents of immersion, justly expose them to the charge of shrinking from it on account of the humiliation to which they must submit in receiving baptism in that manner?"

I am gratified that I have an opportunity of meeting this charge, as I am aware it is one which is often brought against us, though less frequently now than formerly. The advocates of immersion are by no means sparing in dealing out denunciations against us for shrinking, as they say, because of improper motives, from that for meeting which with great courage and self-denial, they very liberally commend themselves. Perhaps we would not be so suspicious of their motives in condemning us, were they a little more sparing in commending themselves. I must say, that the manner in which I have invariably heard our fault in this matter presented by them, in dark contrast with what they claim as their own shining virtue, has impressed me with the opinion, that they were not so much pained by our short-coming in duty as they were pleased with the opportunity which it gave them to present themselves in shining contrast with our failure. I venture to assert that no man has ever heard them condemn us, in any public place, without either expressing or plainly implying a commendation of themselves for practising the virtue in which they represent us as so deficient: Those who refuse to receive immersion are represented as refusing to receive it because they are too proud to submit to a form of baptism which has in it so much that is humiliating. Those who do submit to it in that form are commended for their courage and fidelity in exhibiting before the world so bright an example of Christian humility. Now, if their charge against us can be shown to be just, I have not a word to say, in the way of complaint, against the severity

with which we are condemned. But if it is wholly without foundation, as I think it can be clearly shown to be, their denunciations rather excite suspicions of a want of charity in them than they do of humility in us.

Their charge is that we shrink from submission to baptism by immersion, because the ordinance, in that form, is too humiliating for us to bear. Your inquiry is: Do we not justly expose ourselves to this, by advancing such objections against immersion as are referred to in your first inquiry? Let me ask, where is the ground on which they base this charge? What is the evidence that we shrink from it, through unworthy fear of the reproach connected with it? And in what does the great humiliation of baptism by immersion consist? This is a question we have often asked of those who so freely reproach us with the charge of pride, but have never yet received an answer. With a sincere desire to judge candidly and righteously, we are bound to say that we can discover nothing in it whatever of the nature of Christian humility, more than is to be found in any other mode of making a public profession of faith in Christ. On the contrary, we assert our belief that the manner in which the subjects of immersion are paraded before the crowds who come to witness the exhibition, has a tenfold greater tendency to cultivate pride than humility. What must be the effect of being drawn out before a crowd to submit to what they are taught is an act of humiliation which it requires great courage to meet? I am greatly mistaken if the weakness of the human heart can, under such circumstances, escape the temptation of applying to itself quite liberally the flattering unction of self-commendation for possessing such an amount of Christian courage as is necessary to meet boldly the humiliation which they are taught is so closely connected with the act they are about to perform. Were there any real humiliation in the act, it would be different. But there really is none. The subject may suffer some discomfort, and be

made the mark of some silly witticism from the irreverent crowd; but what is all that? Is every discomfort an act of great Christian humiliation? No man can live the life of a consistent Christian, who does not, hundreds of times in an ordinary life-time, submit to far greater trials than that of immersion, without ever once thinking that there is any especial humiliation in what he is doing. An act of true Christian humility will always exert a healthful influence on the heart. But the evil in this case is, that they who submit to immersion are taught to believe that the act of submitting is itself an act of humility, when in truth it has nothing of that nature in it. The consequence of this false teaching is, that they form an erroneous opinion of the nature of Christian humility, and attribute to an outward act that virtue which belongs to the internal state of the heart, and to it alone. Man's whole religious history shows that the outward acts of the body, even where great and long-continued pain is required, are easily performed. It is to obtain the internal conformity of the mind to the will of God, which constitutes the great difficulty. There is always, therefore, great danger, when any outward act or form is unduly brought forward into a prominence to which it has no just claim, and the outward compliance with it is insisted upon as a matter of great importance. The danger is, that the human mind will rest satisfied with compliance with the outward form, while it fails to discover the superior importance of that obligation which requires the inward conformity of the mind of which the outward form is only the symbol. We think, therefore, that they who so severely censure us for unworthily shrinking from a form to which we believe they attach undue importance, are themselves in great danger of falling into the grievous error of formalism. True enough, we refuse to receive immersion as the only lawful form of baptism; but we assign reasons for our refusal, which, in all honesty, we believe fully justify us in the course we take. We do not believe that Christ has

commanded the ordinance to be administered in that particular way, and in it alone; and as that form of administering it is liable to what we think are serious objections, and is found so unsuitable to the condition of many pious professors of religion that it must be either changed to some other form or omitted, and is also found so unsuited to extreme northern climates that it is impossible to practise it in them during a large part of every year, as will be seen in my answer to your next inquiry, we think it is better to choose a form of administering it which is suited to all to whom Christ directed it to be administered. The form which we adopt we believe to be that which the Scriptures teach, and that which most appropriately teaches what the ordinance is intended to represent. Our lives show all the evidence of true religion which is shown by those who so severely condemn us as failing to meet the requirements which faithfulness to our vows of consecration demand. Our minds are as clear and as capable of judging as those who hold the opposite opinion. It can not be that there is any thing in the act of immersion from which we shrink. We have shown a willingness to obey commands of Christ far more trying than this. There are those among us who would not count their lives dear, if required to lay them down in the service of their Master. And shall they be told that they shrink because they are unwilling to submit to the humiliation of immersion? There are those among us who give a good testimony in every trial to which they are exposed, and shall they be told that they are ashamed to meet that reproach of the cross which immersion requires? Never was there a charge more utterly unfounded. Does not the language which the advocates of immersion often use when making these charges against us justify us in thinking that, in the estimation of many of them, submission to immersion is the main burden of the Christian cross? And are they not in danger of substituting humiliation of the body, by subject-

ing it to what they are pleased to regard as a humiliating external ordinance, for humiliation of the soul, by subjecting it to the authority of God, and accepting salvation through Christ, without any claim to merit of its own ?

It can not be necessary to pursue this subject farther. A charge made without any fact on which it can rest, supported by nothing but assertion, can require but little to be said in refuting it. Until they can show us something in immersion which requires Christian self-denial greater than any other form of publicly professing Christ, they can claim no merit in submitting to that which we refuse. And until they can show a want of fidelity and courage in us in bearing the cross of Christ, and meeting its reproach, they can have no just ground for charging us with shrinking, through unworthy motives, from that which we believe Christ has not commanded. I am happy in believing that this charge is now much less frequently made than in former times. It is my impression that few, if any, except those grossly ignorant on the subject on which they speak, will venture at this day to bring it forward against us. We may, therefore, leave it, with other calumnies, to die under the happy influences of that increasing light which we trust is rising on our world.

III. Your third inquiry is, "To what extent should we be influenced, in forming our judgment of the mode in which Christ appointed baptism to be administered, by what are stated to be the inconveniences of immersion, especially its unsuitableness to the condition of those in feeble health, and to those living in northern climates?"

This inquiry I regard as presenting matter of more importance than those to which our attention has been already called. Did the inconvenience amount to nothing more than the petty annoyance of unpleasant feelings from wet garments, it might pass with little notice. In many cases, however, it becomes a very serious question, and rises to the importance not only of inconvenience, but of pro-

hibition from the privileges of the ordinance. In ascertaining what act Christ requires to be done in fulfilling his command, we may certainly claim for Him the right to have His command interpreted in such a manner as will render all its parts consistent with each other, and with the end for which it was given; and, therefore, that that which was commanded to be done shall be suited to the condition of those to whom the act was directed to be applied. To suppose that Christ would appoint an ordinance, and then select the class to whom He would direct it to be administered, and yet make it of such a character that it would be found wholly unsuited to a part of that class, would be an imputation on His wisdom and consistency, which can not be permitted. In interpreting His command, we are therefore bound to receive as the act commanded one which we can regard as proper to be applied to all those to whom His command requires it to be administered. And no act which it would be manifestly improper to administer to any part of them, can be the act which He appointed. In determining to whom His ordinance is to be administered, we have but one guide, His word. By the command of Christ, baptism is to be administered to all who profess their faith in Him, with repentance for sin. By the terms of this command, no condition in which men are placed debars them from their privilege. It would seem passing strange that Christ should issue a command, in one part of which He instructs His apostles to administer baptism to all who credibly profess their faith in Him, and in the other part of the same command instructs them to administer it in such a form that a large number of these must be debarred from the privilege of receiving it. Many cases occur in which persons make a profession of religion when sick, and with little, if any, hope that they will ever recover. In not a few cases, the probability is that they may linger for months, or even years, confined to their rooms, or even to their beds. If they believe on

Christ, according to His instructions, they have a right to receive baptism, and His ministers are commanded to administer it to them. If, then, they are also commanded to administer it by immersion, they must administer it in such a way as will, in many cases, endanger the life of the subject. Should a physician be called to administer medicine in a case of extreme sickness, and knowing the condition of his patient, should so administer to him as to take his life, he would be guilty of high crime, by the laws of all civilized communities. Should a minister of the Gospel administer baptism so as to destroy the life of its subject, he would be equally guilty. To present the point I am urging in a clear, practical light, let me state a few cases which bring the issue of this question fairly before us. The first case I will present occurred in my own ministry. The commencement of my ministerial life was in a county in the western part of Virginia, having a thin population, scattered along the valleys, between mountain ridges. At the Court-House was a small village, where I had one of my regular appointments. Among the attendants on my preaching at this place were two sisters, who were said to be members of a different branch of the Church from that with which I am connected. They were spoken of uniformly as consistent Christians, and, by their deportment, maintained a reputation for piety which was unquestioned. They attended my communion seasons, and, on invitation to the members of other churches, united in celebrating the Lord's Supper. Having, after a time, made a change in my field of labor, that point was visited only occasionally. On all these occasions, those two sisters were regular in their attendance at the place of preaching, and at the communion table. Passing through the village once, I designed making a stay of only a few hours, but was providentially detained, so that I was under the necessity of spending the night there. In the afternoon I was told those two ladies were ill, and designed calling to visit them, but

was prevented by other engagements. Having determined to call and see them in the morning, before leaving the place, I retired to rest. About midnight, I was waked by the gentleman with whom I lodged, who told me that those ladies had just learned that I was in the village, and desired that I would visit them immediately. I went to their home, and found them very low, but perfectly rational, and in a state of mind entirely comfortable on every subject except one. After full and satisfactory conversation, one of them addressed me thus: "Now, sir, if you are satisfied with the evidence which we have given you of a saving change in our hearts, we have one request to make of you. We have been in communion with the church with which we have been connected for several years; but, through our own negligence, have never informed our minister that we have not been baptized. We have but a short time to live, and do not feel willing to die in the continued neglect of a duty commanded by Christ. We have no expectation that baptism will of its own virtue do us any good, but feel that it is a neglected duty which we desire to discharge before life closes. Will you baptize us, and give us the satisfaction of knowing that we have complied with the command of Christ, before we close our eyes on life?" The case appeared clear, and without hesitation I told them I would; and there, after the hour of midnight, as Paul and Silas in the prison at Philippi baptized the jailor and his family, so I, in the family room of the county jail, baptized the jailor's daughters. One of them lived only a few days, and died in peace; the other lingered a few weeks, and then, with great comfort of mind, followed her sister into the unseen world. Neither of them left their room until they were carried out by those who carried them to their graves. But little comment on this case is needed. Did I judge rightly in believing that the command of Christ made it my duty to baptize these two ladies? In deciding this question, I had no right, and no need, to look to any thing but my

commission. That commission gave me two things to do—preach the Gospel and administer baptism. It specified distinctly to whom each of these acts was to be done. Preach the Gospel to every people; administer baptism to those who believe. Under this commission, I had no more right to withhold the administration of baptism from any part of those who gave satisfactory evidence of belief in Christ, than I had to withhold the preaching of the Gospel from a part of those to whom God, in His providence, had sent me. No clearer evidence of faith in Christ could be produced in any case than that which was presented before me. I have given the narrative in full, for the purpose of placing this point beyond question. If any case could occur in which my commission would make it my duty to administer baptism, it was here before me. This no man can pretend to deny. But what I was required to do, I was required to do by the command of Christ. Did Christ require me to do an act wholly unsuited to the condition of those to whom it was to be done? If His command in my commission required me to immerse them, humanity required me to disobey it. This charge against Him we can never permit. The act which my commission required me to do must certainly be proper to be done to those to whom He directed me to do it. That act could not be immersion, and it must be such other application of water to the subjects as suited their condition. If this is not the case, then we are bound to make the charge that Christ appointed an ordinance, and specified the class to whom it was to be applied, and yet made it of such a nature as was wholly improper to be applied to many of the very class to whom he directed it to be administered. This can not be.

But let us take another case. The occurrence I am about to state took place many years ago, in the city of Richmond, during the ministry of Dr. John H. Rice. I have it from unquestioned authority. There was laboring

in the city at that time a Baptist minister, whose name, also, was Rice. In his pastoral services he was called to visit a man in a state of extreme sickness. After a time the invalid obtained a comfortable hope of pardoned sin and reconciliation with God. As was natural, he desired to unite himself with the people of God by the bond of visible connexion with His Church. Here was a difficulty. To form that bond, the man must be baptized. But, according to the opinion of the Baptist minister, baptism was immersion, and nothing but immersion. But to immerse the man would take his life. He earnestly desired to be admitted into the Church of God, and partake of the emblems of the broken body and shed blood of the Saviour before he died. But he could not be immersed; that was settled. The dilemma was an awkward one. The man applying for admission into the Church gave satisfactory evidence of saving faith in Christ. He earnestly desired the privilege to which his faith entitled him. What right had the minister to withhold it from him? In obedience to Christ's command in his commission, he had preached the Gospel to this dying sinner. In obedience to that Gospel which he had heard, the sinner had professed his faith in Jesus Christ, and now asked that the minister would perform the other act enjoined in his commission. Did Christ, in the commission of this minister, command him to baptize those who believed; and yet, when this dying sinner, through his preaching, had believed, did he find that the command of Christ was of such a nature that he could not do the other thing which it enjoined? According to the opinion of the minister, here was a case in which a man was entitled to the privilege of baptism, by a profession of faith with which he was satisfied, but the ordinance to which he was entitled was so unsuited to his condition that it could not be administered. By the instructions of Christ he had no right to withhold it, but by the voice of humanity he was forbidden to

administer it. No wonder he felt so embarrassed, by an opinion which led him into so unpleasant a dilemma, that he made a very awkward shift to get out of it. His expedient was amusing. Rice the Baptist calls upon Rice the Presbyterian, and takes him with him to visit the sick man. After full and satisfactory conversation, Rice the Presbyterian, thinking that this was a case in which his commission as a minister of Christ made it his duty to administer baptism, and thinking that the ordinance appointed by Christ was, in its nature and form, suited to the condition of all those to whom He directed it to be administered, baptized the man, and Rice the Baptist administered the communion to him. It is not my business to reconcile the contradictions between the man's act and the fundamental principles of his creed. My object is to show that the supposition that Christ commanded the administration of baptism by immersion, and in that way alone, involves a contradiction, in all such cases, between the different parts of the command. But to suppose that Christ has issued a command in which one part does, in any case, come in conflict with another, is an imputation on His character which can not be tolerated.

But let us take another case, as I find it quoted from the "Christian Index," a Baptist paper published in the city of Macon. It is so exactly in point, and so full of instruction, that I present it with only a few remarks by way of comment. The statement, I learn, is made by a Baptist minister. I give it in his own words. "A sick soldier came home, and invited the minister to visit him, to whom he related his feelings, and requested baptism. The minister informed him that he was unable to submit to it, and tried to satisfy him that the will would be taken for the deed. This did not satisfy the sick man, and he requested baptism by sprinkling, remarking that he wished to approach as near real baptism as possible. The minister, therefore, in his own language, administered the ordinance

by pouring." This statement argues its own case so strongly, that I do not know that I can add any thing to the force with which the simple facts present themselves. Several questions, however, occur to my mind, which are worthy of being pondered: 1st. When Christ commanded His disciples to baptize those who made a credible profession of faith in Him, did He make any exceptions which would authorize them to withhold the ordinance from persons in the condition of this sick soldier? 2d. If he did not make any such exceptions, by what authority do they act in refusing it when so urgently requested? 3d. Is it reasonable to believe that Christ would appoint an ordinance for the reception of members into His Church, which His ministers, in the exercise of their commission, would discover to be so unsuited to many of those making a profession of their faith that they would feel compelled, by motives of humanity, to withhold it from them? 4th. Is it not much more reasonable that we should believe that Baptists have made a mistake in their interpretation of the command of Christ, than that we should believe that Christ has appointed an ordinance which is wholly unsuited to the condition of many of those to whom His command directs it to be applied? It will be noticed that both in this instance and the previous one the persons applying for baptism were acknowledged to be entitled to it, by giving satisfactory evidence of that saving change of heart which is the only condition required by Christ. It will be noticed, also, that the only hindrance, in either case, was the weakness of the bodily condition of the applicant. Here, then, we have the point distinctly set forth, that when the grace of God had prepared these two men for receiving the ordinance of baptism, the manner in which that ordinance is administered by Baptists was found so unsuited to the condition of those acknowledged as its proper subjects, that it could not be administered. Now I ask you, is it probable that a form of the ordinance

which would be found unsuited to its proper subjects would be appointed by Christ? I can not believe that the Head of the Church would admit the penitent sick into His Church in heaven, and deny admission into that on earth, when they earnestly desire the privilege. The anxiety of these sick persons to be admitted into the Church, is nothing more than is common in such cases. Are we compelled to believe that Christ has forbidden His ministers to admit them? But if they are commanded to administer baptism by immersion, and in no other way, then are they commanded to withhold the rite of admission from all who are in a state of health too feeble to bear that ordinance. This I can not believe.

But the cases of sick persons are not the only cases which present the difficulty I have stated. There are many conditions in which men may be placed, when, according to the command of Christ, it would be the duty of His ministers to administer baptism, and yet if it must be administered by immersion, and in no other way, it must be omitted altogether, without any authority from Christ for omitting it. There are extensive tracts of country affording no natural facilities for immersion. Men may be travelling through them, and may believe on the Lord Jesus Christ: where is the authority for postponing baptism until they shall pass into a region such as will permit it to be performed by immersion? Men may be converted to Christ in prison: where is the authority for postponing baptism until they can come out and be immersed? So of all other cases of the same general character. The ordinance was evidently instituted with the intention that it should be applied to men in all conditions in which they should be placed. But in addition to this, there are whole districts where immersion is so unsuitable to the climate and condition of the people, that it can not be applied in any case without great inconvenience, and its general application is an absolute impossibility. In ex-

treme northern regions, the rigor of winter extends over nine months of the year. During this period, the cold is so intense that immersion in the open air would be attended by instant death. Their only material for building houses is frozen snow. Their only means of warming them is an oil lamp. Water for domestic purposes is obtained by melting snow over their lamps, and over them their cooking is all done. The ministers of Christ are commanded to go into that country and preach the Gospel. When men there believe on Christ, it becomes the duty of His ministers to baptize them. Are they required to immerse them? What would be necessary for this? First, a vessel of sufficient size to immerse a man in must be obtained. It is questionable whether the whole resources of the country would furnish such a vessel. Their domestic wants never demand one so large. But suppose it to be furnished, what is still wanting? They must melt a sufficient quantity of snow over the lamp; and as they have no large vessels for that purpose, it must be accomplished by melting as much as the small vessel used will contain, as many times as will be necessary to fill the large one in which the immersion is to be performed. But were this all, perhaps it could be accomplished, and although the difficulty and inconvenience would be great, yet they might be overcome. It must be remembered, however, that the cold is so intense, even in their snow houses, that the thermometer stands many degrees below the freezing point, and to accomplish the desired purpose, they must have the means not only of melting the water in the small vessel, but of keeping it from freezing in the large one. I do not believe that the utmost resources within their reach would enable them to do it. Their mode of life is simple; their family utensils are small, and such as they can carry from place to place, as they move about in search of food; their country is barren and frozen, and they are abjectly poor. Were they to attempt such a

thing, with the best means they could procure, the water in the large vessel must become solid ice before a sufficient quantity could be melted in the small ones used for that purpose. Let any advocate of immersion imagine the difficulties which he would have to encounter in immersing a subject under the circumstances under which a Greenlander must do it, or even with no greater degree of cold than that which often prevails along the northern border of the United States during the rigor of winter. Let him imagine himself in a snow hut, surrounded by his subjects, waiting, not for the moving of the water, but for its melting. He has no fuel for warming but an oil lamp. He has no vessel for heating but a copper bowl. His bath for immersing is ready. He has filled his bowl, and placed it over the lamp. Slowly it sinks, until it is melted and poured into the bath. Again it is filled and melted. But the cold is intense. His shivering subjects are watching the tedious process with chattering teeth. He takes the second bowlful to empty it into the bath, when, alas! he finds the first is solid ice. Now, I ask any man of common sense and reason, if he can honestly say that he believes the merciful Saviour of men has commanded any man either to immerse or be immersed under such circumstances. I am not ignorant of the fact that the advocates of immersion claim that, practically, they have no serious difficulty on this score. The Rev. Mr. Willet, from Wisconsin, is quoted as saying, at one of their recent anniversaries: "Than Wisconsin, there is not a nobler field for Baptists. He had led them up out of the rivers when the thermometer stood ten degrees below zero, with icicles four or five inches long hanging from their heavy whiskers. But they looked good as they came up, and their faces shone." Let any man capable of judging say whether these are the words of a man in the possession of his sober senses; or are they not plainly those of one who has delivered himself over to the power of a delusion? Can

such declarations have any other effect than to shock the senses of all sober-minded people, and convince them of the necessity of resisting the system which leads to such extravagant absurdities. I will not say that ministers could not be found strong enough in enduring cold to do what he says he has done. Nor will I say that there are not some who might be found able to bear immersion in weather so intensely cold. But how many men are there in the membership of every denomination of Christians who could not bear it? And how many ministers are there, even in the Baptist church, to whom it would be an absolute sacrifice of life to be required to administer the ordinance under such circumstances? And how long could any man continue to perform such service?

You notice that the ground which I have been contending for is, that as the ordinance which Christ appointed was intended for all, so the form in which it was appointed to be administered was suited to all. And the objection I have been urging against immersion is, that it gives to the ordinance of baptism, which was intended for all, a form under which it can be administered to only a part. This I contend is plainly a violation of the appointment of Christ, who must, in consistency with Himself, have given to His ordinance a form in which it would be proper for His ministers to apply it to each individual of the whole class to whom he directed it to be applied. And, even admitting that there may be some ministers whose constitutional vigor enables them to administer baptism by immersion in the intensely cold winter climate of Wisconsin, and that there may be some subjects who are able to bear the administration of it in that form, yet how many ministers, and how many subjects, are there who are not able to bear it? I suppose I hazard little in expressing the belief that fully one-half the members of every church would be kept out of it by the conscientious sense of the superior duty of protecting their lives, were they compelled to be admit-

ted by receiving the ordinance under such circumstances as this minister informs us he had administered it. And unquestionably a very large number of the ministers of every church would be debarred from the privilege of discharging that part of their duty which requires them to baptize those that believe, were they compelled to do it in the open air, with the thermometer ten degrees below zero. Is it, therefore, reasonable that we shall be required to believe that Christ has appointed for those living in that climate an ordinance by which they are to be admitted into His Church, to which perhaps not more than one-half can submit, and which a large portion of His ministers can not apply to them, except in mild weather? It would certainly be passing strange that a thing so remarkable should be done, and yet that no intimation of it should be given, either by Christ, in His original appointment of it, or by His inspired apostles, in their administration of it. But if this objection applies with force to the climate on the northern border of the United States, where the cold is ten degrees below zero, much more strongly will it apply to regions farther north, where, for a large part of the year, it is fifty degrees below zero. But let it be remembered that Christ has not given one set of directions for one climate, and another set for a different climate. If He has commanded to immerse in the pleasant climate of Palestine, He has commanded to immerse in Greenland. And if He has not commanded to immerse in Greenland, He has not commanded to immerse any where. But if such a command, with the limited resources we have supposed, would amount to a prohibition of the ordinance during all the severely cold weather of the winter, along the northern border of the United States, it would amount to a prohibition of it during at least nine months of the year throughout all the inhabited part of Greenland, and in the whole extent of country bordering on the Arctic ocean. Suppose a man believes on the Lord Jesus at the commencement of

winter ; suppose his health is declining, and he and every one else is satisfied that before the long winter shall have passed and the short summer shall have come, he must close his eyes in death ; and suppose he earnestly desires to be admitted into the Church of God on earth, to bear his testimony publicly, in the way that God has appointed, by a public profession of faith, and by having placed upon him the seal of that public profession, and of his covenant with God, by the ordinance of baptism : I ask if the kind Saviour has made the ordinance which is to admit members into His Church of such a nature as must shut this man out ? Has Christ made the nature of that ordinance, which was appointed to be the public seal of the admission of disciples into His Church such that in some climates it must debar them from the privilege of making a public profession during three-fourths of every year ; and in some cases must cut them off entirely from the inestimable privilege for which their hearts yearn, but which they can never hope to enjoy, because, before the long lingering winter shall roll away, and the short summer, with its pleasant warmth, shall come, wasting disease will have finished its work, and they will have been carried out of life, without being permitted to perform a duty which they earnestly desired to perform, and to enjoy the inestimable privilege of uniting with the children of God on earth, in that ordinance which is the memorial of the Saviour's great work in the redemption of their souls from death ? Has Christ, then, made the ordinance which was to be the seal of their admission into the Church in all such cases, the very means, and the only means, of keeping them out ? For you will perceive that nothing but the supposed nature of the ordinance prevents their entrance. They have given all the evidence of faith and repentance that Christ requires. Were the nature of the ordinance of baptism such that it could be administered to them, there would be nothing to hinder their admission into the Church. But if the command requires rigidly that

it must be by immersion, then it can not be administered at all in such cases; and we have the unaccountably strange fact fixed upon us, that Christ has appointed an ordinance, and made it the duty of His ministers to apply it to all who believe in His name, under all the circumstances in which they can believe, and in all the climates in which they can live; and yet He has made the ordinance of such a nature, that in some climates it can not be administered during three-fourths of every year, and to many of those to whom He directs it to be applied, it can not be administered in any climate, without endangering their lives. I can not conceive how one thing can contradict another more flatly than this contradicts all our opinions of the perfect consistency and harmony of the several parts of the commandments and doctrines of the Saviour with each other. But this hard conclusion is a necessary consequence from the supposition that Christ requires baptism to be administered in all cases by immersion.

I have extended my remarks on this subject much beyond the bounds I had supposed a proper statement of the case would require, and yet I have only brought them to the conclusion which a just view of the facts involved in the statement required. In answering your inquiry, how far these objections to immersion should influence your mind in deciding the question whether Christ has appointed that as the mode in which the act of baptism shall be performed, I would say that I can not see how we can escape the conclusion, amounting to almost certainty, that He has made no such appointment. Yet whilst I say this, I say also, with all candor, that it is your duty to examine directly the question whether He has made such appointment. That question you should examine thoroughly. Should you desire any aid which it may be in my power to give, it will afford me pleasure to assist you. There are several questions which will claim your attention. You are aware that the advocates of immersion state confi-

dently that Christ does positively require it, and however plausible these objections may appear, yet they are only objections against a plain positive command, and can not set that command aside. Your duty is to examine whether such a command has been given; and if it has, whatever objections may be urged against it, it must be obeyed. All that I intend by what I have said is, that, from the view of the case presented, strong presumptive evidence exists that no such command has been given. Your duty is to examine the grounds on which the advocates of immersion rest their claims, and see whether they prove that such a command exists.

ARTICLE IV.

DR. THORNWELL'S MEMORIAL ON THE RECOGNITION OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE CONSTITUTION.

The history of this document is as follows: At the Augusta Assembly the Committee on Bills and Overtures, consisting of F. McFARLAND, R. H. CHAPMAN, J. H. THORNWELL, J. A. SMYLIE, A. H. CALDWELL, T. R. WELCH, L. TENNY, and R. B. WHITE, Ministers, and F. JOHNSON, J. H. DICKSON, T. C. PERRIN, J. BONNER, and J. MONTGOMERY, Ruling Elders, recommended to the Assembly for their adoption, as Overture No. 7, a memorial by Dr. THORNWELL, on the recognition of Christianity in the Constitution. At the same time several other Overtures were brought forward by the Committee. Dr. CHAPMAN moved that Overture No. 7 be immediately taken up, and the following conversation is all that was put on record in the "Assembly Reporter" of the day as having taken place:

"Dr. CHAPMAN said: The Committee were unanimous in favor of it. I would move, if the paper pass, that we sign it as an entire body, and direct our Stated Clerk to send it to Congress.

"Dr. WHITE objected to the immediate consideration.

"Mr. NASH. I cordially approve of Dr. Chapman's motion, and I don't see what we can hang a debate upon. If we wish to speak on the state of the country, we can spend the night at that. But I think it will be put without debate, and unanimously adopted.

"Dr. BOCKOCK. It will be of no use to send that paper to Congress. It will do no good, but a great deal of harm, and would turn out one of the Secretaries if passed.

"Dr. PRYOR. Let us adhere to the regular order of business. That last paper is a very grave one, and we are not ready to pass the paper *sub silentio*—for we are not prepared to adopt.

"MODERATOR. The motion before the house is, 'Will the Assembly take up Overture No. 7?'

"Dr. CHAPMAN. My only desire for the Assembly to take up this subject now was to save debate—to save the time of the Assembly; so that, as this document was long, we could pass on it while its logic was fresh in our minds. That paper deserves to be unanimously adopted by this body. It is of all mysteries the greatest, that God should have so long borne with a nation that utterly disowned him!

"Dr. THORNWELL. I hope Brother Chapman will withdraw his motion. If this paper is to be adopted at all, it should be done with cordiality. We ought to allow brethren to consider this subject.

"Dr. CHAPMAN. I withdraw my motion, and move to make this the special order for to-morrow evening, at 7, P. M.

"This was agreed to."

"In the evening the special order was called up.

"Dr. THORNWELL then said: I have a remark or two to make. It is now late in the session, and the principles embodied in that paper demand a full and long debate, and it would not be possible now to have such a discussion. If we had time to discuss it freely, there would be no material difference of opinion, because they are the principles of our Confession of Faith. I wish to state, in justice to myself, that the paper was not brought forward on my own private motion, but at the recommendation of the Committee. If this paper is adopted, it should be done with unanimity and cordiality, and as that appears impossible without a long discussion, I beg leave to withdraw the paper from the files of the Assembly.

"Dr. ADGER. It has been objected to this paper, that even if we should present it, it could do no good, for it would be at once

cast out of Congress. Now, sir, I happen to know a very influential member of that Congress, and not a Presbyterian, who expressed the hope that such a paper as this would be presented to the Confederate Congress, and I know that from the deference which would be paid to that member, if for no other reason, this paper would at least be entertained with respect.

"Mr. NASH. The only object which could be obtained by presenting this paper would be this: Even should we fail, we would have done one of the most sublime acts which the Church could perform. It would be preaching the Gospel in high places with emphasis. If the Gospel is not well received, are we on that account not to preach the Gospel?"

"Dr. THORNWELL. I do not think that, under the circumstances in which we are placed, the Assembly is prepared to do justice to the subject. And therefore I hope that, as a personal favor to myself, I may be allowed to withdraw this paper from the files of the Assembly.

"Leave was granted."

It will be seen, therefore, that the paper was withdrawn by its author, not because of any debate had upon its merits, neither yet from any doubts he entertained about its principles, but from his feeling that in order to insure their adoption with cordiality and unanimity, a long and full consideration of them would first be necessary, which was impossible at that late period of the meeting.

At the earnest request of two Ruling Elders from Georgia, this paper was produced at the late Assembly, and is now published, in compliance with the wishes of many members, for their deliberate examination, and that of the whole Church.

JOHN B. ADGER.

MEMORIAL, ETC., ETC.

The petition of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the Confederate States of America, now met and sitting in the city of Augusta, in the State of Georgia, to the Congress of the Confederate States of America, now met and sitting in the city of Richmond, in the State of Virginia, respectfully sheweth :

That this Assembly is the supreme judicatory of those Presbyterian churches in the Confederate States which were formerly under the jurisdiction of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States; that it comprises ——— presbyteries, ——— synods, and ——— members; that it represents a people devotedly attached to the Confederate cause, and eminently loyal to the Confederate Government. The changes which your honorable body has made in the Constitution of the United States, and which have been ratified and confirmed by the various States of the Confederacy, have received the universal approval of the Presbyterian population of these States; and none have been more grateful to God than themselves for the prudence, caution, moderation, and wisdom which have characterized all your counsels in the arduous task of constructing the new Government. We congratulate you on your success. But, gentlemen, we are constrained, in candor, to say that, in our humble judgment, the Constitution, admirable as it is in other respects, still labors under one capital defect. It is not distinctively Christian. It is not bigotry, but love to our country, and an earnest, ardent, desire to promote its permanent well-being, which prompts us to call the attention of your honorable body to this subject, and, in the way of respectful petition, to pray that the Constitution may be amended so as to express the precise relations which the Government of these States ought to sustain to the religion of Jesus Christ.

The Constitution of the United States was an attempt to realize the notion of popular freedom, without the checks of aristocracy and a throne, and without the alliance of a national church. The conception was a noble one, but the execution was not commensurate with the design. The fundamental error of our fathers was, that they accepted a partial for a complete statement of the truth. They saw clearly the human side: that popular governments were the

offspring of popular will; and that rulers, as the servants, and not the masters of their subjects, were properly responsible to them. They failed to apprehend the divine side: that all just government is the ordinance of God, and that magistrates are His ministers, who must answer to Him for the execution of their trust. The consequence of this failure, and of exclusive attention to a single aspect of the case, was to invest the people with a species of supremacy as insulting to God as it was injurious to them. They became a law unto themselves; there was nothing beyond them to check or control their caprices or their pleasure. All were accountable to them; they were accountable to none. This was certainly to make the people a God; and if it was not explicitly expressed that they could do no wrong, it was certainly implied that there was no tribunal to take cognizance of their acts. A foundation was thus laid for the worst of all possible forms of government—a democratic absolutism—which, in the execution of its purposes, does not scruple to annul the most solemn compacts and to cancel the most sacred obligations. The will of majorities must become the supreme law, if the voice of the people is to be regarded as the voice of God; if they are, in fact, the only God whom rulers are bound to obey. It is not enough, therefore, to look upon government as simply the institute of man. Important as this aspect of the subject unquestionably is, yet if we stop there, we shall sow the seeds of disaster and failure. We must contemplate people and rulers as alike subject to the authority of God. His will is the true supreme; and it is under Him, and as the means of expressing His sovereign pleasure, that conventions are called, constitutions are framed, and governments erected. To the extent that the State is a moral person, it must needs be under moral obligation; and moral obligation, without reference to a superior will, is a flat contradiction in terms. If, then, the State is an ordinance of God, it should acknowledge the fact. If it

exists under the conditions of a law superior to all human decrees, and to which all human decrees behave to be conformed, that law should be distinctly recognized. Let us guard, in this new Confederacy, against the fatal delusion that our government is a mere expression of human will. It is, indeed, an expression of *will*, but of will regulated and measured by those eternal principles of right which stamp it at the same time as the creature and institute of God. And of all governments in the world, a confederate government, resting as it does upon plighted faith, can least afford to dispense with the supreme Guardian of treaties.

Your honorable body has already, to some extent, rectified the error of the old Constitution, but not so distinctly and clearly as the Christian people of these States desire to see done. We venture respectfully to suggest, that it is not enough for a State which enjoys the light of divine revelation to acknowledge in general terms the supremacy of God; it must also acknowledge the supremacy of His Son, whom He hath appointed heir of all things, by whom also He made the worlds. To Jesus Christ all power in heaven and earth is committed. To Him every knee shall bow, and every tongue confess. He is the Ruler of the nations, the King of kings, and Lord of lords.

Should it be said that the subjection of governments to Jesus Christ is not a relation manifested by reason, and therefore not obligatory on the State, the answer is obvious—that duties spring not from the manner in which the relation is made known, but from the truth of the relation itself. If the fact is so, that Jesus Christ is our Lord, and we know the fact, no matter how we come to know it, we are bound to acknowledge it, and act upon it. A father is entitled to the reverence of his son, a master to the obedience of his servant, and a king to the allegiance of his subjects, no matter how the relation between them is ascertained. Now, that Jesus Christ is the supreme

Ruler of the nations, we know with infallible certainty, if we accept the Scriptures as the word of God.

But it may be asked—and this is the core of all the perplexity which attends the subject—Has the State any right to accept the Scriptures as the word of God? The answer requires a distinction, and that distinction seems to us to obviate all difficulty. If by accepting the Scriptures it is meant that the State has a right to prescribe them as a rule of faith and practice to its subjects, the answer must be in the negative. The State is lord of no man's conscience. As long as he preserves the peace, and is not injurious to the public welfare, no human power has a right to control his opinions or to restrain his acts. In these matters he is responsible to none but God. He may be atheist, deist, infidel, Turk, or pagan: it is no concern of the State, so long as he walks orderly. Its protecting shield must be over him, as over every other citizen. We utterly abhor the doctrine that the civil magistrate has any jurisdiction in the domain of religion, in its relations to the conscience or conduct of others, and we cordially approve the clause in our Confederate Constitution which guaranties the amplest liberty on this subject.

But if by accepting the Scriptures it is meant that the State may itself believe them to be true, and regulate its own conduct and legislation in conformity with their teachings, the answer must be in the affirmative. As a moral person, it has a conscience as really and truly as every individual citizen. To say that its conscience is only the aggregate of individual consciences, is to say that it is made up of conflicting and even contradictory elements. The State condemns many things which many of its subjects approve, and enjoins many things which many of its subjects condemn. There are those who are opposed to the rights of property and the institution of marriage, yet the public conscience sanctions and protects them both. Now what, then, is this public conscience? It is clearly the

sum of those convictions of right, that sense of the honorable, just, and true, which legislators feel themselves bound to obey in the structure of governments and the enactment of laws. It is a reflection of the law of God; and when that law is enunciated with authoritative clearness, as it is in the Scriptures, it becomes only the more solemnly imperative. And as the eternal rule of justice, the State should acknowledge it. Considered in its organic capacity as a person, it no more violates the rights of others in submitting itself to the revealed will of God, than a Christian, when he worships the supreme Jehovah, violates the rights of an atheist or idolater. What the State does itself, and what it enjoins upon others to do, are very different things. It has an organic life apart from the aggregate life of the individuals who compose it; and in that organic life, it is under the authority of Jesus Christ and the restraints of His holy word.

That in recognizing this doctrine the State runs no risk of trespassing upon the rights of conscience, is obvious from another point of view. The will of God, as revealed in the Scriptures, is not a positive constitution for the State: in that relation it stands only to the Church. It is rather a negative check upon its power. It does not prescribe the things to be done, but only forbids the things to be avoided. It only conditions and restrains the discretion of rulers within the bounds of the divine law. They are, in other words, a limitation, and not a definition of power. The formula according to which the Scriptures are accepted by the State is: Nothing shall be done which they forbid. The formula according to which they are accepted by the Church is: Nothing shall be done but what they enjoin. They are here the positive measure of power. Surely, the government of no Christian people can scruple to accept the negative limitations of the divine word. Surely, our rulers do not desire that they shall have the liberty of being wiser than God.

The amendment which we desire, we crave your honorable body to take note, does not confine the administration of the State exclusively to the hands of Christian men. A Jew might be our Chief Magistrate, provided he would come under the obligation to do nothing in the office inconsistent with the Christian religion. He is not required to say that he himself believes it, nor does he assume the slightest obligation to propagate or enforce it. All that he does is to acknowledge it as the religion of the State, and to bind himself that he will sanction no legislation that sets aside its authority. The religion of the State is one thing: the religion of the individuals who may happen to be at the head of affairs is quite another. The religion of the State is embodied in its constitution, as the concrete form of its organic life.

Your honorable body will perceive that the contemplated measure has no reference to a union or alliance betwixt the Church and the State. To any such scheme the Presbyterians, and, we think we can safely venture to say, the entire Christian people of these States, are utterly opposed. The State, as such, can not be a member, much less, therefore, can it exercise the function of settling the creed and the government of a church. The provinces of the two are entirely distinct: they differ in their origin, their nature, their ends, their prerogatives, their powers, and their sanctions. They can not be mixed or confounded without injury to both. But the separation of Church and State is a very different thing from the separation of religion and the State. Here is where our fathers erred. In their anxiety to guard against the evils of a religious establishment, and to preserve the provinces of Church and State separate and distinct, they virtually expelled Jehovah from the government of the country, and left the State an irresponsible corporation, or responsible only to the immediate corporators. They made it a moral person, and yet not accountable to the source of all law. It is this anomaly

which we desire to see removed ; and the removal of it by no means implies a single element of what is involved in a national church.

The amendment which this General Assembly ventures respectfully to crave, we have reason to believe is earnestly desired, and would be hailed as an auspicious omen by the overwhelming majority of the Christian people of these Confederate States. Is it not due to them that their consciences, in the future legislation of the country, should be protected from all that has a tendency to wound or grieve them? They ask no encroachments upon the rights of others. They simply crave that a country which they love should be made yet dearer to them, and that the Government which they have helped to frame, they may confidently commend to their Saviour and their God, under the cheering promise that those who honor Him He will honor. Promotion cometh neither from the east, nor from the west, nor from the south. God is the ruler among the nations; and the people who refuse Him their allegiance shall be broken with a rod of iron, or dashed in pieces like a potter's vessel. Our republic will perish like the pagan republics of Greece and Rome, or the godless republic of the United States, unless we baptize it into the name of Christ. Be wise now, therefore, oh ye kings; be instructed, ye judges of the earth; kiss the Son, lest He be angry, and ye perish from the way, when His wrath is kindled but a little. We long to see, what the world has never yet beheld, a truly Christian republic, and we humbly hope that God has reserved it for the people of these Confederate States to realize the grand and glorious idea. God has wooed us by extraordinary goodness; He is now tempering us by gentle chastisements. Let the issue be, the penitent submission of this great people at the footstool of His Son.

The whole substance of what we desire, may be expressed in the following or equivalent terms, to be added to the section providing for liberty of conscience :

Nevertheless we, the people of these Confederate States, distinctly acknowledge our responsibility to God, and the supremacy of His Son, Jesus Christ, as King of kings and Lord of lords; and hereby ordain that no law shall be passed by the Congress of these Confederate States inconsistent with the will of God, as revealed in the Holy Scriptures.

ARTICLE V.

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF COLUMBIA.

The third General Assembly of our Church in the Confederate States of America was very justly said by its able and dignified Moderator, Dr. Lyon, as he was about to declare its dissolution, to have "despatched a large amount of business with exceeding harmony." The body began its work with thirty-nine ministers and twenty-one elders present, and it comprised a very good representation of the talents and character of our Church. Its eminent success in the despatch of well-done work, we suppose should be ascribed in part to the ability and zeal of its officers, but also largely to the fact that, until near the close of its sessions, it met but once a day. The committees thus had abundant opportunity to prepare their reports with care. Elaborated in private by the few, the many found it easy to agree upon their adoption.

Speaking of the adoption of the reports, we would take occasion to say how heartily we concur with those who criticise the ecclesiastical rule that all reports must first be

accepted before they can be adopted. We never could see the use of this preparatory step. Was there ever presented, or could there ever be presented in our Church courts, such a report as is not fit to be accepted? We have often seen the Assembly refuse to adopt, but never, to our knowledge, did it have occasion to reject a report as unsuitable to be received from one of its committees. We call this an ecclesiastical rule, because, so far as we know, it is not followed in other parliamentary bodies. Surely we do not need, amongst Presbyterian ministers and elders, any such special protection for the dignity of the body.

The narrow compass to which we are compelled to restrict our remarks on the Assembly, requires us to pass over entirely some of its proceedings that are of great interest. We shall comment on a few of its acts as briefly as possible. Under the former head we place the opening sermon of Dr. Kirkpatrick; the subject of the charter; the revision of the hymn book; the visits of the delegates from the Associate Reformed Church and the Independent Presbyterian Church; the pastoral letter on the religious instruction of the negroes; the transfer of the Columbia Theological Seminary; the overture of Mr. Coit, respecting Christian baptism; the overture of East Hanover Presbytery, respecting a union of Old and New School Presbyterians in the Confederate States; and the temporary consolidation of the four executive committees.

EDUCATION OF INDIGENT CANDIDATES.

The overture from Lexington Presbytery, proposing the reconstruction of the Assembly's scheme regarding the education of theological students, has not, so far as we know, been spread before the public eye, nor did we hear it read. The committee on bills and overtures reported favorably upon it; and the committee asked for by the Presbytery to review the whole subject, with the hope of discovering some better way of carrying forward this work,

was appointed. Their names are as follows: J. R. Wilson, J. N. Waddel, George Howe, and John Miller, ministers; J. T. L. Preston, ruling elder. From the reports and the debate on this subject, we gather that two points were prominent before the mind of the Assembly. One, the question of what has been called a class ministry; and the other, the question whether the General Assembly or the presbyteries can the better manage the dispensing of needful aid to indigent youth who feel called to preach the Gospel. Upon this latter point our own minds are perfectly settled. The Constitution gives to the presbytery the power of examining and licensing candidates for the ministry, and of ordaining, installing, removing, and judging ministers; and to them would, therefore, seem most naturally to belong the whole care of these young men. The General Assembly's powers regard those matters which are not local or individual, but concern directly the whole Church. The aim of our constitution manifestly is to give in charge to presbyteries only those affairs which sessions can not so well oversee, to synods only those which presbyteries can not so well oversee, and to the General Assembly only those which synods can not so well oversee. Now, it may be best for the Assembly to control theological education, considered in its general aspects, as in the direction of the seminaries; but the individual candidate, it seems clear, ought to hold all his relations to the presbyteries or sessions.

Upon the other question we shall not express such decided opinions. It is clear that our future supply of ministers depends upon the training of pious young men for the Gospel ministry. Where parents can afford the expense of this education, they ought to consider, and, so far as we have observed, they do in general consider it their privilege to be at this charge. But where a pious youth is indigent, who feels that he is called, and gives evidence that he is called to preach the Word, the Church ought to provide,

and may well provide for his wants, while he is preparing to serve her in the ministry. She is not bound to do this on principles of justice, for, of course, there can be no reward before there be service. But she is bound to do it on the principle of charity, and she may well do it on the principle of its being to her manifest advantage to educate this future minister. Yet there are, doubtless, some practical evils incidental to the Church's management of this work of charity. Some mercenary parents, who have the means of educating their sons, may, through covetousness, cast their offspring upon the bounty of others. Some unworthy young men may occasionally be the recipients of the Church's aid. Some poor youth, from a mere selfish wish to better his worldly condition, may once in a while grasp at the offer of a liberal education at the public expense. Some improper dispositions may be nurtured in the minds of some of our candidates, from the fact that they are taken up and supported by the Church before they are able to render her any return of service. Perhaps, in some cases, it would be better for the individual to have to earn his own bread while he is receiving his education, and to get into the ministry only through his own independent efforts. But our experience and observation lead us to the belief that all these are but exceptional cases. And we do not expect that the able committee appointed to review the whole subject will find it possible to make any essential changes for the better in the present arrangements. It is an ancient institute of God's Church to provide silver and changes of garments, and a place to dwell in that shall not be too strait, and also to set on the great pot and seethe pottage for the sons of the prophets.

We can well imagine, however, that whatever incidental evils do occasionally manifest themselves, must be both more numerous and more aggravated where it is the highest court of the Church that undertakes to manage

such individual matters, than where they are left to the disposal of sessions or presbyteries.

SUPERANNUATED MINISTERS.

An overture from the Presbytery of Mississippi requested the Assembly to provide a fund for such ministers, to be placed in the hands of the committee of Domestic Missions. Prof. Lane, of Hopewell Presbytery, also overtured the Assembly for the same object, including with it the widows and families of deceased ministers, the funds to be in charge of the trustees of the Assembly.

This second overture evinces an earnest and most commendable zeal on the part of its author for the relief and comfort of God's aged and worn out servants and their destitute families. His plan of operation is well considered, and thoroughly matured in all its parts. The committee on bills and overtures seemed to think, however, that there are some preliminary questions which ought to be settled by the Assembly before it could enter upon any plan of operations in this matter. One of these was, whether an invested fund is preferable to annual collections; and another, whether the Assembly or the respective synods should undertake the work. They recommended the reference of the whole subject, in all its bearings, to a committee, who shall report to the next Assembly, and that said committee should consist of C. W. Lane and D. Wills, ministers, and E. A. Nisbet, Washington Poe, and W. L. Mitchell, ruling elders. Their recommendation was adopted.

There can be no doubt that this is a subject which demands consideration. It is attracting attention in more than one synod, and in different forms is forcing itself on the attention of the Church. And yet it is equally evident that no plan of action hitherto proposed meets with the hearty approbation of our ministers themselves, or of our people. There is a serious doubt whether it is a matter

that calls for any permanent endowment. This kind of provision is tolerated in some cases, but not cordially approved in any case, by many of the most earnest and sagacious amongst us. If the instances which call for the proposed relief are numerous enough to demand a provision from the whole Church, then the permanent fund desired might have to be a very enormous one to furnish the requisite amount of interest. A few thousand dollars a year would not suffice—we must invest by millions. Moreover, it is to be questioned whether this is a matter which the Lord expects us to provide for in this way. He did command the twelve to feed the five thousand in the desert place, but then He designed to manifest His own boundless riches and resources in the miraculous use of their five barley loaves and two small fishes, which otherwise had been totally inadequate. Is not this a case in which all we could gather would, without His miraculous blessing, be as those few loaves and small fishes; and in which the only adequate capital is that capital of Christian sympathy and love, ever living and ever active, by divine grace, in the bosom of God's people.

We must all have often noticed what a bungling thing legislative charity is apt to be. Whether it is Church or State which is, in its organized capacity, called to relieve human distress, it will very probably be inadequate relief, sometimes unjustly, sometimes unwisely, and sometimes unfeelingly administered. Of course we do not say that charity, which is a very complex term, is only for individuals or the deacons of the Church to administer. We do not say that there is no form of charity to which the judicatories of the Church in their organized capacity can be called. Even the General Assembly, as such, must undertake foreign missions, for example, which is just one of the highest forms of charity. But we say that we are not prepared to vote for a system of public charity to disabled ministers and to their destitute families, to be estab-

lished by our General Assembly. We are not prepared to vote for such a scheme to be undertaken by any of our Church courts, but most especially not by the General Assembly. It is no part of their powers or duties, as laid down by the constitution; nor are they, in the nature of things, a suitable body to undertake such individual concerns where no general law could be made to apply to all cases, and each individual case must be separately decided.

We consider the method of action proposed to be of doubtful influence upon the charity of the Church. Funded investments, many insist, are unfavorable to charity. But whether this be so or not, it does appear to us that a great Church fund, designed to sustain the large classes in question, and counting its revenues by hundreds of thousands of dollars, would be apt to work no advantage to the Church's poor but faithful servants. Is there no danger that some congregations might draw encouragement, from the very success of such an undertaking, to continue starving their minister all through his term of service, with the idea that when he shall get old, or if he shall leave a helpless family, here is an inexhaustible fund upon which he or they may be cast without any reproach falling thereby upon themselves?

But it will be said that it is not charity to support a superannuated minister, nor yet the destitute family of a deceased minister. We reply, it is so represented generally by its advocates; for they appeal to sympathy and to pity, and it is pictures of distress by which they would move the Church to action. But truly it is, indeed, no case of charity, and ought not to be made such by bringing it before the whole Church. It is the demand of justice which ought to be urged in favor of a minister, or the family of a minister, who has worn himself out in the service of the Church upon a very inadequate support. But who ought to pay the debt? Is it the whole Church, or the particular church or churches that have received the

unpaid labor? If you ask the needed relief from those who did not directly receive the service, it can only be upon the principle of charity.

We hold that the most potent remedy for the evil in question would be for the Church to act justly by her ministers, and give them an adequate support. The presbytery has this remedy largely in its hand. It is made its duty, by the constitution, to examine every call, and judge of the stipend promised. If the stipend be inadequate, it is a sin for the presbytery to take steps towards the installation, because they make themselves a party to the wrong that is doing. Let the Church first comply with justice, and adequately support her ministers, and then all the occasional cases for real charity that might still arise amongst their families, it would be very easy to have relieved upon the sacred principle of charity. If it be urged that many of our churches can not give an adequate support to their ministers, the answer is easy: Let the Presbytery's or the General Assembly's committee of Domestic Missions be applied to for help. It would be the very life of these committees to have such applications multiplied.

REVISION OF FORM OF GOVERNMENT AND BOOK OF DISCIPLINE.

In reference to this matter, we have only to state that the committee on nominations, inadvertently, of course, left out the name of Judge Shepherd, who had been made a member of the revision committee by the first Assembly. Correctly given, therefore, this committee is as follows: J. B. Adger, R. L. Dabney, B. M. Smith, E. T. Baird, T. E. Peck, and B. M. Palmer, ministers; W. P. Webb, T. C. Perrin, W. L. Mitchell, J. G. Shepherd, and W. P. Finley, ruling elders.

COMMISSIONERS TO THE ARMY.

One of the most important results of the Assembly's deliberations was their arrangements for the better supply

of the army with the word of life. Certainly, nothing that came before the body elicited more interest than this matter. And we trust that the Master is about to crown our plans and efforts with His peculiar blessing. The committee of missions are vigorously exerting themselves, with the aid of the commissioners, to procure as many chaplains and temporary missionaries as possible for the service of our noble soldiers, both in the east and in the west. The Lord also is graciously pouring out His Holy Spirit in peculiar measure upon various divisions of the army. Here, indeed, is a bright omen for the future. This Confederate people are not to be destroyed. Our young men are not to return home, when the war is over, corrupted in morals, to be a curse to their own communities. God is dealing with our soldiers and with our country in great love and mercy. Let us take encouragement to supply to the utmost of our ability their spiritual wants.

In the use of that individual freedom which this journal accords to every one of its contributors, without exception, we consider it proper, having undertaken this review of the Assembly, that, with great deference to the Assembly and their able committee who recommended the arrangements above referred to, we should say that we consider the language which they have used respecting the commissioners to the army somewhat open to criticism. In the first place, the expression adopted, "that we proceed to establish the office of commissioner," is unfortunate, for it might be understood to signify that the Assembly has actually set up a new office-bearer in the house of God, which we are sure no man in the Assembly designed doing. Again, it is to be regretted that the word "employ" was used, as it might be interpreted in the sense of the commissioners' having some authority over the ministers who go to the army; whereas we are confident that was not the design of the Assembly, as, indeed, the term which precedes, and also those which follow that word, show this was not the idea

of the committee who presented the report. They say the commissioner is to "welcome and employ other ministers on temporary visits to the army, and to give them opportunities of usefulness." This whole sentence, taken together, signifies, to our mind, very clearly, that the commissioner is simply to help the visiting brother to get at his work of preaching to the soldiers as quickly as possible, seeing that his visit is but temporary. Yet the term "employ," taken by itself, is capable of being, and actually has been, interpreted in the offensive way above indicated. Again, it would have been well, perhaps, to have made it still clearer than it is, under number two of the commissioner's powers, that he has no independent authority whatever with regard to placing chaplains in the army, but is merely designed to be the organ of communication between the individual minister and the colonel of the regiment.

We should hesitate much more to make these criticisms, but for the fact that the executive committee of Domestic Missions, as they are represented in their late circular, seem to have understood the Assembly in the sense which we personally consider so objectionable. They say that missionary laborers in the camps and in the hospitals "may obtain appointments to this work by making application to the executive committee or to the commissioners in the field, accompanying their applications in all cases by the recommendation of their presbyteries, or, where that is impracticable, by the recommendation of one or two well-known members of the presbytery. Individuals may be commissioned to labor for the summer months only, either as army missionaries or in hospital labors, if it is not possible for them to engage for a longer period."

This language is an official commentary by the executive committee upon the Assembly's action. According to this commentary, a minister that seeks to labor in a hospital or

camp is to receive his appointment either from the committee or from the commissioner, indifferently. Does not this imply that the full powers of the executive committee in the case belong to the commissioner? Nor is it given to him only in the case of a presbytery's recommending the minister, for he may appoint without any presbytery's voice at all. Nor is it only where a very brief term of labor is concerned, but also where the time of service is indefinite.

We understand that the appointments of the commissioner are always to be reported to the committee for confirmation, and that they issue to the minister his commission. But the appointment is, in the first instance, made by the commissioner alone. He exercises this power of his single will, and the committee must confirm, or else annul, an appointment already made for them. It is, in fact, a veritable appointment which this officer makes, and nothing is left to the committee but to issue the written evidence of it. The point of objection, of course, is not that bad appointments will be made, but that any appointments at all are authorized to be made by one man. The power of appointment is delegated by the Assembly to the executive committee, and they have no right to transfer the delegation to any other parties, and especially not to any single individual.

We are all familiar with the idea of commissions, which differ from a committee, in being empowered not only to inquire, but also to execute, subject to the revision of the court appointing them. They are, as Stewart of Purdivan expresses it, "a mere delegation of executive, not determining power." They are not the court itself, acting in the person of some of its members, for that would make it the same as the quorum, neither yet is it the court *ad interim*, as has sometimes been said, for then a regular, that is, technical, appeal would lie against the decision of a presbytery's or a synod's commission, the

same as against that of the court itself, which no one ever imagined. But the commission is just a committee with extraordinary powers; not simply inquiring, like ordinary committees, but acting in the name of the Church. The Waldenses have a commission which carries into effect the decisions of their Synod during the intervals of its meetings. The General Assemblies of the Church of Scotland, since 1690, have generally named commissions before their own dissolution, to act in particular matters remitted to them, and to attend to the general interests of the Church, subject to review by the next Assembly. Our own early American Presbyterian Church was much in the habit of using commissions, though gradually they passed considerably into disuse. The old Boards, however, were all of them, and our own executive committees are all of them, just commissions, with powers limited severally to a specific object.

Now it is to be observed, in respect to these commissions, that they have always consisted of a number of ministers and elders—the quorum of the Scotch commission of Assembly being twenty-one. The same principle necessarily holds, though with less force, of course, in respect to the ordinary committee. They are the creatures of courts which are expressly ordained to exercise all their powers jointly. The very object of such courts is, that one man may not rule alone in God's house. It is the ordinance of Christ, by His apostles, that the Church be regulated through bodies of rulers, and not through single rulers. And so our Confession of Faith declares, that “the Church is to be governed by congregational, presbyterial, and synodical assemblies;” in other words, by the sessions, the presbyteries, (including the synods,) and the General Assembly. Such being the nature of all Church power of rule, it is seemly that the ordinary committee resemble in this particular the court that appoints it. The Church of God, from the beginning, has suffered untold misery and

evil from prelacy, and our Church may well be jealous of the same. It is seemly that she never should pass that power of will which, in its very nature and design, is joint power, into the hand of one man. We say it is Presbyterian doctrine and practice not to appoint committees of one. Stewart of Purdivan expressly says: "But the commission consisteth of both ministers and elders, without which no ecclesiastical judicatory or committee thereof can be lawful;" and he says, also, that a single minister acting by himself, as the delegate of a presbytery, "wants the stamp of ecclesiastical authority." (See Book I., Title XV., § 29.)

Accordingly, Presbyterians every where recognize two keys of the kingdom of heaven—the key of doctrine, and the key of discipline—the one in the hand of the teaching elder, and the other in the hands of a body of ruling elders. Accordingly, also, Presbyterians hold to two kinds, and but two kinds, of Church power; the power of teaching, which is several, and the power of ruling, which is joint. Under Presbyterian church government, one man teaches; but, under that government, one man never rules. It is prelacy whenever one man undertakes to do, or is allowed or appointed to do, any act of ruling the Church by himself.

Now, what kind of power is that which, according to the committee, is to be exercised by the commissioner to the army? Part of his work is to preach, which is perfectly legitimate—it is several power, and pertains to him as a minister of the Word. But partly his duty and his power is to rule these, and to do it singly. He is, according to his sole discretion, to locate one brother in this camp, and another in that hospital. What is this but governing and ruling in the Church by one man? He has the appointing power of a whole commission in his single hand. He is to be the superior of his brethren, and this is not presbyterian, but prelatic. It is impossible that our Assembly should deliberately and designedly give any such power as this to

one man. They did not do it. The committee misinterpret the Assembly. One circumstance proves this unanswerably—they said not one word to the commissioner about his making any report to them. Their committees and commissions all report, because it is ruling power that is committed to them; and the court must revise what they do, because the power lies in the court. But all they designed this commissioner to do was to go and preach himself, and assist other preachers to find fields of labor, either for short or long periods; and accordingly they said nothing about any report, for none was expected.

There is but one plea on which the committee can defend their interpretation of the office, and that is, that the army is a field for the labors of the evangelist, properly so called. But we deny that this is the fact. The army is in our own country, and, as it were, in the very bosom of the Church. The commissioner will find other ministerial brethren all over the army, and churches all around him, wherever he goes. There was no call, therefore, for the evangelist proper, who goes forth beyond the limits of the settled church-state; and, being an extraordinary officer, established of the Lord on purpose to found churches where they are not, of course carries with him, and in his single hand, the full powers of the presbytery. And that in the view of the Assembly there was no call for the evangelists in the army, appears in their refusal to substitute, on Dr. Wilson's motion, the name evangelist for the one chosen.

The "superintendent," and the "visitor or commissioner," of the Scotch Kirk, at its first setting up, from 1560 to 1580, it may be said, perhaps, is very much the same as the commissioner appointed now by our Assembly. It would be an unlucky comparison for any one to make. That office of superintendent, or commissioner, has been the cause of many reproachful charges of a modified pre-lacy against the First Book of Discipline. No one would now go beyond the Second Book of Discipline for prece-

dents, back to the incompletely developed Presbyterianism of the period of the First Book, which Stewart of Purdivan calls the "Infantile state of this Reformed Church." Although Hetherington so indignantly affirms that "the superintendents had no one thing in common with prelates," we can not but hold, from the description of the office in the First Book, that it did confer a partial episcopacy upon all who filled it. But we have no zeal to prove that this long-extinct office savored of prelacy; there has been, it must be confessed, and it is declared by Hetherington himself, a great plenty of that abomination at many periods of Scotch Church history. We are quite willing to let McCrie's testimony go unchallenged when he says: "In the examination of those whom they admitted to the ministry, they were bound to associate with them the ministers of the neighboring parishes. They could not exercise any spiritual jurisdiction without the consent of the provincial synods, over which they had no negative voice." But here is an office, alleged to be established by the Assembly, in which one brother is empowered to employ other equal brethren under him, and without any voice of an ecclesiastical judicatory or any commission of ministers and elders thereof directing or controlling his doings; is to determine, at his sole discretion, the places where his equal brethren may or may not labor, and so is to rule both them and the Church through them, singly and alone, which is to make him a diocesan bishop. We should, indeed, be sorry to believe that our General Assembly, after demolishing so completely the whole system of Boards, chiefly on the ground that they were a dangerous infringement of the powers of a free Church, should have deliberately or designedly violated, in this fashion, our constitution, and departed from the fundamental principles of our divine polity.*

* Both in 1644 and 1697 the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland were under the same necessity laid recently on ours, to arrange for send-

TESTIMONY RESPECTING THE CHRISTIAN SABBATH.

On this subject Col. Preston presented resolutions which were adopted unanimously. They expressed the conviction that God is now asserting amongst us His supremacy as "Governor of the nations," and that no nation can prosper that sets aside "the statutes of Jehovah." And upon the ground that some of our statesmen, impressed with these views, are seriously meditating the repeal of the Sabbath mail laws, they testified against the national sin of Sabbath violations, imploring Congress to put away from our young nation this cause of divine anger. They referred strongly to the Sabbath, as being "the solemn court-day of our sovereign King," whose blessing, "as Lord of the Sabbath, the nation's voice was pleading for." In connexion with these resolutions, Col. Preston read a letter from the late lamented Gen. Jackson, the last lines, probably, which that Christian hero ever wrote, in which he refers to Messrs. Chilton and Curry, members of Congress from Alabama, as favoring the repeal of the Sabbath mail laws, and mentions that Mr. Curry, a stranger to himself previously, had just written him a letter on the subject, in which he had expressed the conviction that divine laws could be violated with impunity neither by governments nor individuals. Gen. Jackson expressed the opinion that the present was an "auspicious moment for such action, as the people are looking to God for assistance."

NATIONAL RECOGNITION OF CHRIST'S SUPREMACY.

The passage of Col. Preston's resolutions was used by Col. Walker as a suitable opportunity to ask leave for the

ing a constant supply of ministers from time to time to the army, relieving each set at proper times by fresh appointees. They had also to furnish regular chaplains to be settled in the regiments. This latter work they arranged to have done either by the presbyteries or their own commission. The former business was put into the hands of their commission.

reading of a document presented by Dr. Thornwell to the Assembly at Augusta, upon which he offered three resolutions, adopting the memorial as the deliverance of this Assembly, requesting other Churches to unite with us in its great object, and appointing a committee to present it to the Confederate Congress. Subsequently he amended the third resolution, so as to provide that the committee should publish the memorial, and correspond with other ecclesiastical bodies relative to it, and to act with them in bringing it before Congress.

Prof. Peck moved to make this subject the special order of the day, for to-morrow, at eleven o'clock. No man was dearer to him than the author of the memorial, but he should be compelled to vote against its adoption.

Prof. Lane moved to refer to a committee, to report upon it to the next Assembly.

Dr. Kirkpatrick opposed this motion, for we had never been in a more favorable condition for such action as was proposed in the memorial. The mind of our whole people was become Christian. The secular papers were speaking of Jackson as the exponent of the South's confidence in God. We have at last a President who will acknowledge our position in relation to God. At the last Assembly a memorial in regard to the proper observance of the Sabbath in the army was adopted, though many thought it would do no good. It had been sent to the President, and not a month elapsed before orders were issued enjoining the very things we had desired, and often in the express words of the memorial. The evangelical churches represent seven-eighths of the people of this land, and if they will unite together the change can be effected.

The motion prevailed, and when the subject came up the next day, Mr. Atkinson said it had always seemed to him one of the strangest things that a nation as truly Christian as any upon the face of the earth, should not be professedly Christian. Nor is it enough that we should recognize the

God of paganism, but we must recognize the God of the Bible. No man is a Christian who does not believe in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, as revealed in the Scriptures. Of course, however, no union between Church and State is admissible. The people of Virginia, who have suffered from such a union, for this reason feel an extreme aversion to any thing looking that way. But in avoiding one error, we should beware of its opposite. He was astonished at the extreme timidity of this body, the representative of a Church which has been accustomed to unfurl the standard of truth in the face of every foe.

Mr. Miller said he thought it "wise not to oppose this measure as certainly mistaken, but only as *doubtful*, because, though our instincts are now strongly against it, yet it is fresh and novel, and further reflection might lead to a change of mind; and because, also, this more moderate course will take with us more of the Assembly.

"The measure is doubtful, first, in its principle; secondly, in the paper it proposes to make use of, viz., this memorial; and, thirdly, as a measure to be passed by this particular Assembly.

"I. The act itself of inscribing a sentence recognizing the Christian religion upon the Constitution of the Confederate States, is doubtful in its principle, because:

"1st. It is not clear in its *pertinency*. The Constitution is a directory for building and working a government. Government is a police, a mere sword-bearer. It is not to dig canals, or enrich manufacturers, or erect churches. At least, if it is, the mass doubt it. The Constitution of South Carolina, where the influence of the honored framer of this memorial has been felt for years, has no recognition of Christianity. Whatever of this sort may fairly regulate the working of constitutions, may properly be taken for granted. Constitutions generally do not set out with the obligations of truth or respect for the people, or the sacredness of international rights. Our Book of Discipline

has no formal recognition of Christianity that I remember, nor has the Constitution for Columbia Seminary, that we adopted yesterday. There is no necessary disrespect, therefore, in leaving it out.

“2d. It is not clear in its *significance*. Does it mean that the majority of our people are Christians? That is a historical fact, not a constitutional principle. It may be true to-day and false to-morrow. Does it mean the government must enforce Christianity? The very memorial that is proposed denies that. Does it mean that the government must not disturb religion? The Constitution provides for that already. And when gentlemen say that the act we have just passed about Sunday mails involves all that this memorial would, they forget that running Sunday mails violates conscience, and we are already protected against that by the Constitution of the Confederate States.

“3d. The act proposed is not clear in its *usefulness*. It is too easy a thing to be of much value as a service to God. The vilest Christian nations that ever lived have done the most of it. The Jews, at the period of their worst corruption, made broad their phylacteries, and wrote texts of Scripture upon their foreheads and upon the posts of their doors. And at this point a great ethical fact comes in, true of all Christendom, that communities are not ruined by a bad government so much as by a bad Church. It was so in Boston. It was so in Paris. It was so in early times on the eastern borders of our Southern States. A corrupt parish system led to the infidelity of Jefferson, and men of that school. Governments do not go to pieces, or even abandon Christianity, at their own instance, but upon the decay of the Church: and therefore the importance of invigorating Christianity, and carrying it to our armies and our frontiers, rather than of inscribing it upon the Constitution of the Government.

“H. This paper is doubtful. It is too long, and too much in detail, too rich in the profusion of genius, to express the

opinion of any large body of men. A plainer mind would have produced one that we could all more nearly have united in. There are minor sentences to differ about. It says, 'All just government is the ordinance of God.' I believe that all government is the ordinance of God; and that that government in respect to which Paul taught this doctrine was the government of Nero, the vilest in any land. It says, 'Government is a moral person;' and then, on the basis of this highly figurative expression, builds an argument. All moral persons have conscience. Government, therefore, must have a conscience. Conscience must have a law. And that law, in the case of governments, may as well be the Christian religion. Is that a good metaphysical argument, one that we will trust ourselves to in what ought to be like the papers of Louis Napoleon, a terse and clear utterance?

"And then, in respect to this divine law for government, does that interfere, as this paper declares, (practically, and as respects their liberty, *quoad* the government, to judge for themselves,) with the supremacy of the people?

"The paper declares the 'godless republic of the North,' to be a fresh instance of how nations perish that neglect to recognize Christianity. But does the framer forget that we were of that republic but a few months ago? Is South Carolina under the same condemnation as the North, and far on towards ruin, because, as a sovereign republic, she has no such recognition?

"The great beauty of this paper, as its advocates point it out, viz., that it unties an ancient difficulty, by showing that a State may have a religion, though it may not have a church, is, we are bold to say, the unsoundest part of its reasonings. In these respects our religion is a church. It is a very narrow church. In all the creed-imposing features of a church, it is one of the most aggressive character. All that most intellectual and influential body of men who deny the divinity of Christ, and all those who serve the

pope, and who exclude the Bible, it directly excommunicates. It would be more oppressive than some establishments of Church and State, because they occurred, as in catholic Britain, for example, among a unanimous people; but we, in our day, would have to impose our creed, as trinitarian and protestant, upon many forms of dissent. Is it fair? If the majority grew prelati- c, and believed the apostolic succession to be as necessary to salvation as the divinity of Christ, would it be fair to put that into the Constitution? Does the proposed appeal to Congress comport with what is already in the Constitution, or with the preamble of our form of Government, which labors so with the idea of perfect liberty of conscience."

The remainder of Mr. Miller's speech we necessarily exclude, and the more readily, as it related to the minor question, whether this Assembly was prepared to adopt.

Prof. Peck said, "It appears to me—

"1. That there is an impropriety in the Assembly's making use of the paper before them, a paper which had been presented to a preceding Assembly by its lamented author, and by him withdrawn; that, for all we know, his views might have undergone some change, and he might not now approve, if he were living, the use we are making of it. But even if this were not so, it is unbecoming in a body like this to present to the Confederate Congress a paper which is not the offspring of its own mind, and therefore not capable of being fully expounded and defended.

"2. That, in considering this question upon its merits, we should lay aside all prejudice arising from the association of certain views with the name of Jefferson, notoriously an infidel; for the principles embodied in his famous bill for establishing religious liberty were earnestly contended for, years before, by the Presbytery of Hanover, and urged by petition, memorial, and remonstrance, upon the legislature of Virginia.

“3. That the principles of this paper were, for the most part, eminently sound, and stated with the luminousness for which the lamented author was so remarkable; especially, that the statements in regard to the precise relations of the word of God to the State and Church, respectively, were all that he could desire; that for the Church, the word of God was a positive law, and the Church’s power strictly ‘ministerial and declarative,’ both in the sphere of faith and of manners; while for the State, the Scripture only operated in a negative way, as a check upon reason and the light of nature, which were the positive rule by which the civil magistrate was to be guided; that to propose, therefore, as this memorial proposes, to insert a clause in the civil constitution by which the supremacy of the Son of God should be acknowledged, made the memorial contradict itself, since it asked the civil power to accept the Bible as a positive guide, and, *pro tanto*, to usurp the functions of the Church. All that the paper could ask, consistently with its own statements concerning the relation of the Bible to the State, was that Congress would do nothing inconsistent with the revealed fact of the supremacy of Christ. This is what the Assembly has just done, in its overture touching the observance of the Sabbath.

“4. Further, that the argument used on this floor for this addition to the Constitution, to wit, that we do not recognize the true God unless we recognize the Son, if it proves any thing, proves that we should recognize the Holy Ghost also.

“5. That one effect of such a change would be to exclude all honest unbelievers from our civil councils. No man can say ‘Jesus is Lord, but by the Holy Ghost.’ (1 Cor. 12: 1.) This would land us in the doctrine of the fifth monarchy fanatics. If it should be said that upon the same ground all acknowledgment of God would be excluded from the Constitution, since no man can truly acknowledge God without the Holy Ghost, he would

answer that there is a revelation of God through the very condition of man's moral nature, and that this recognition is sufficient for the purposes of civil government; and we are bound to make this recognition, because the civil government is an ordinance of God, the Creator and moral Governor for the whole human race. But to make a distinctive doctrine of revelation a part of our fundamental law, would operate like all other religious tests—it would fill the land with hypocrites.

“6. Lastly, to do what this memorial proposes, is to make the civil magistrate a judge in matters of faith, and thereby to bring us back to the ages of superstition and cruelty, when the burning of the bodies of saints was an ‘act of faith.’ Give the magistrate this power, and no man can tell how it will be exercised. Insert one article of a Confession of Faith in the fundamental law, and you may have, in the course of time, a Confession as large as that of the Westminster Assembly, and by no means as sound.”

This last head of remark, Prof. Peck has said to us was in his mind when he spoke, but he did not bring it out precisely as here written down.

We have been at pains to procure from their respective authors these brief notes of their speeches in opposition to the paper, from a wish to gratify and instruct the Church, and also because we love free discussion. The paper of Dr. Thornwell, subsequently withdrawn by those who introduced it, is recorded elsewhere in this number of our journal; and we propose now to submit to our readers a few observations on this important subject.

We do not design to maintain that the Assembly ought to have adopted this paper; for, however successfully it might have been vindicated from all the objections brought against it, (including those two mutually opposite ones, that it had too much and that it had too little logic in it,) still we confess to a sympathy with the idea of Dr. Lyon, that it does not become the Assembly to petition Congress

upon any subject.* It is every way more suitable for the Church to utter simply its testimony, and then let the citizen or citizens present all needful memorials. Moreover, it is now too late to appeal to Congress for any changes of the Constitution. No change in that instrument can be effected, except the concurrent voice of three States first demand a convention of all the States for the purpose of amending it. What might have been accomplished with comparative ease when first proposed by Dr. Thornwell, will now be found well-nigh impossible. Yet truth is mighty, and her triumphs are all the greater in proportion to their difficulty.

In the first place, we insist that the State has a life and being and responsibility of its own. To a certain extent it is a moral person. The proof is ample.

1. The nations, in proportion as they are or have been free, do claim, or have claimed this attribute as belonging to them. Their constitutions, whether written or unwritten, assert it for them. The sovereignty they challenge is an attribute of life, and belongs only to a person. Hence the fierceness of every free nation's defence of its liberties. The life of not even an individual will be surrendered by him tamely, and the life of a State can not be forcibly taken away, if ever, except after a terrible struggle. Even Poland ever and anon still shows signs of life. Our own States of this Confederacy refused to give up the life that is in them, and become merged into one great consolidation, and hence the tremendous contest that is now waging. It speaks in tones of thunder that these States have, in a certain clear and distinct sense, a personal being which they never will surrender.

2. The nations not only make this claim for themselves, but generally acknowledge it when made by others. This is the outrage which we maintain that England and France

* Religion and Politics—S. P. R., Vol. XV., page 596.

have committed against these Confederate States. In 1776, the States of the late Union declared themselves free, sovereign, and independent States, and set up a confederacy in which this attribute of each State was carefully reserved. In 1778, France entered into a treaty with them, acknowledging these attributes. In 1783, Great Britain did the same. Nothing has since occurred to destroy their freedom, sovereignty, or independence. But France and England now decline to acknowledge these attributes in us, but still ascribe them to the States that make war upon us. This is the outrage committed by them. The keen sense of it felt in all our bosoms, is the proof that we know these States to have a life and being of their own, entitling them to separate and independent standing and action.

3. The actions that nations perform show that they are moral persons. It is the State that makes the constitution and the laws, that coins money, that prohibits or commands, that punishes or defends, that makes war or peace. It is the people as such, the people in their collective capacity, through representatives, that do these things, and not the separate individuals of the people. These are the actions of the nation, and in these acts no distinction of individual can be made. And these acts of the nation have a moral character, by which they can be judged, just as the acts of individuals have. And the wisdom and justice, or the sin and folly of these acts affect good and bad amongst the people, those who agree to them and those who object to them, in many cases equally and alike. It is the nation that is acting, and the individual is swallowed up in the whole body.

4. Accordingly, there is such a thing as national character, different in different nations. The terms English, French, Spanish, suggest different qualities. There was such a thing as American character. There is such a thing

as Yankee character, and such a thing as the character of our own Confederate people.

5. God regards the nations, whether they are free or subject to a monarch, as having a life and responsibility of their own. The powers that be are His creatures, moral persons that He hath ordained. It would be perfectly vain for any one to try and eliminate from the Bible this idea of national responsibility as separate from that of individuals. It runs through the whole texture of the book. It sets before us a King of kings and a Lord of lords, who makes them and all other civil magistrates His ministers of justice for the time being. It addresses the kingdoms continually as persons, and it threatens and it promises them as such. It also records the punishments and rewards which, as such, they received. God is the Lord of the nation as well as of the family and of the Church. One might as well deny the life and being of the Church as of the State. It can no more be questioned that the Almighty is the judge of the nation than of the individual. Nor can it be denied that His judgments upon the nations, as such, are usually visited upon them during that mortal career which exhibits them in their organic unity.

It may be objected to this argument, that it can be carried out in such a way as to prove every kind of corporation to be a moral person, and to have a life and responsibility peculiar to them. If any one choose so to do, we make him heartily welcome, and bid him good success in the endeavor. We have no fear that corporations of any sort will ever become unduly alive to their moral responsibility.

In the second place, we maintain that, the State being under moral obligations, should acknowledge the fact to herself and to all men. If God be her King indeed, it is impossible that she should not be bound publicly and officially to recognize Him in that character. Mr. Miller maintained that it was not *pertinent* for the State to acknowledge her King in her constitution. If there be any more

suitable place or form for the acknowledgment, let him grant that she ought to make it there and so. But it is withholding from the Almighty what is due to Him, when the State, which is His creature, does not somehow officially acknowledge Him and pay Him homage. We complain that England and France are unjust to us, because they refuse to recognize us as sovereign. This is just what we do to God; and the impulse of every believer's heart is, to inquire whether there may not be some connexion between the two refusals of recognition.

Amongst all the exercises of moral responsibility, the highest is to pay homage to God; and we insist, therefore, that, whatever else the State, as a moral person, may neglect to do, she must not fail to recognize her God.

But it is objected that this will unite Church and State. By no means. Let us not, in our well-founded and just zeal against any such union, more hurtful always to the former than it can be to the latter, run to the other extreme, and deny to the State her moral character and responsibility to God. The three societies which God has ordained, the Family, the Church, the State, are each supreme in its own sphere, and quite independent of one another; but they are coördinate, and God is their common head, and each is bound to worship and pay Him homage.

Mr. Miller considers it a fallacy to say that the State may have a religion without establishing a church. And his answer to it is that our religion is a church, and a very narrow and aggressive church at that. Very true. Does the paper propose that the Constitution recognize *our* religion? The fallacy is with himself, and it lies in his not distinguishing between what must be the religion of the individual citizen, as embodied for him in his particular church, or form of Christianity, and that solemn official recognition of the King of kings which is due to Him from the people in their collective capacity.

It is objected, again, that it would not be fair to Jews, Unitarians, and others, to have the State acknowledge Christ. We answer, it is a question of conscience, for the Christian people of this country, whether their Government, in the guilt and punishment of whose sins they must bear their share, shall refuse due homage to Him who ordained it as His creature. It is impossible to make it other than a question of conscience for Christian people, because, acknowledging the State to be endowed by the Creator with moral responsibility, they can not deny its duty to recognize Him who gave it being. It is conscience, then, against conscience, and the majority must rule.

The hinge on which the whole question turns is, we conceive, the moral personality of States. If they do possess that attribute, they may not innocently refuse to recognize the King of kings. On the other hand, if they are not bound to recognize Him, it must be because they have no life and being and responsibility of their own, apart from the individuals who compose them. One of these two positions must be true, and the other false, for they are opposites. Nor can the two views be combined together. If the State is not a moral person, and has no conscience, and no God, but deals only between man and man, in the relations of this life, as a mere police, then, of course, it is right for her not to acknowledge Christianity at all. But then, she must not bow to the power of Christianity in the least, nor aim to confine her laws to such as comport with Christianity. Then it was wrong to have the very name of God introduced at all into our Confederate Constitution, for there may be some atheists amongst us; and whether there be or not, the State has no relations at all to God, and it is not pertinent to refer to Him in any way whatsoever. Then, too, no oath must be exacted in any court of justice, or of any man elected to public office, for why regulate by law such appeals to God, when the State, whose business it is to make laws, can not know any thing about God? Then,

also, there must be no punishment of blasphemy, or adultery, or polygamy; for without the Scriptures it had not been known that these are criminal; and then, moreover, capital punishment could not stand upon its true basis, as a positive enactment of Him who created man's life, and accordingly it must be abolished in deference to the numerous objections brought against it from anti-Christian quarters. Thus we must have either a godless or a Christian republic.

Upon this principle of the State's responsibility to God were based the resolutions of Col. Preston, respecting Sabbath mails, which the Assembly unanimously adopted. Jehovah, the supreme Governor, asserting now His supremacy over the nation; the Sabbath, the solemn court-day of our sovereign King; Sabbath violation, a sin of the nation; the nation's voice pleading with Congress for the blessing of the Lord of the Sabbath; these are the expressions employed in those resolutions. The immortal Jackson quotes members of Congress, expressing the conviction that neither nations nor individuals can sin against God with impunity, and that hero says: "Now is the time to persuade the State to acknowledge in this way her fealty to God, for now she is feeling her need of His help." All this was unsuitable, if the State has no life of her own, and is not a moral person. It is true, there is another form of objection to Sunday mails, viz., that the Christian postmaster's conscience is thereby violated. That is bad enough, but it affects only the few who are postmasters. The great objection to Sunday mail laws is, that by them our country and our Government are made to violate God's law. Our representatives, by those laws, bring sin upon us, and put the Bible against our young Government. Now, if this be a violation of the conscience of every considerate Christian amongst us, so it ought to be that his country is made to refuse the recognition of the King of kings. The same Scriptures which command the Sabbath

to be kept holy, also command that all nations, as well as individuals, should acknowledge the authority of Jesus.

The weightiest objection to the paper, it will probably appear to most persons, is that one which Prof. Peck made under his third head of remarks. The thinking of that gentleman, it is well known, is clear and vigorous and profound. With great respect, we suggest to him whether, after all, the inconsistency with itself which he finds in the memorial does not depend upon a misconception of his own. Had he whom we both loved so well but survived to this day, no one knows better than Prof. Peck with what masterly power he could, perhaps, have replied to this and to every other objection brought against the memorial; for he never investigated any great question slightly, and never publicly committed himself to views that he had not fully matured. For ourselves, we are persuaded that it was only the occasion which he lacked at Augusta to have commended the sublime doctrine of his paper to the judgment of all his brethren, and the heart of the whole Church.

Let us see, now, in what Prof. Peck agrees with the memorial, and in what he differs from it. Its statements in regard to the precise relations of the word of God to the State and Church, respectively, were all that he could desire—for the Church it is a positive, and for the State a negative law. But to propose what the memorial proposes is inconsistent with itself, for it asks the State to accept the Bible as a positive guide; which would be to put itself into the position of the Church, and a usurpation of her functions. All that the paper can properly ask of the State is, to do nothing inconsistent with the revealed fact of Christ's supremacy. Thus Prof. Peck finds the logic of the paper at fault, and points out a fatal defect in its course of argument. But let us revert to the statements of Dr. Thornwell, which Prof. Peck says that he cordially approves: "The formula according to which the State accepts the Scriptures is, that nothing shall be done which they forbid;

that according to which the Church accepts them is, nothing shall be done but what they enjoin." The point here is, that the State can not infringe upon the conscience of any man, so long as it does not put itself into the Church's position, and undertake to carry out all the positive injunctions of the Word. Every man's rights of conscience are safe, so long as the State leaves him to believe what he may, and to worship God as he thinks right, only refraining herself from doing any thing which the Word forbids. But is it not plain that, if the State accept the Scriptures at all, even in this negative way, (as both Prof. Peck and Dr. Thornwell agree that she ought to do,) she does *ipso facto* make an acknowledgment of Christianity as her religion. Prof. Peck says: The State may have a religion, nay, must have a religion, and that religion Christianity, but its office must be simply to check the ruler whenever reason and the light of nature are a positive guide. This is all that Dr. Thornwell maintains. But does not this imply that the ruler first recognizes and acknowledges the authority of the Author of Christianity? Prof. Peck agrees with the memorial, that the Government may *actually* accept the Scriptures, but he says that for it to do so *in words* would be monstrous. Rulers, he says, have no right to do any thing forbidden in the Bible, *for the reason* that it is Christ's word, who is King of kings; but for them to put into words the ground of their conduct, and confess that Christ is their King, would be impious usurpation of the Church's functions. He would not object to asking Congress not to do any thing inconsistent with the revealed fact of Christ's supremacy, but he shrinks from the idea of the Christian people of this Confederacy saying, in their organic law: "Nevertheless we, the people of these Confederate States, distinctly acknowledge our responsibility to God, and the supremacy of His Son, Jesus Christ, as King of kings and Lord of lords, and hereby ordain that no law shall be passed by the

Congress of these Confederate States inconsistent with the will of God as recorded in the Holy Scriptures.”

There is, we must insist, therefore, no ground for impugning the logic of the memorial. It does not contradict itself. To declare that the Word is a negative rule for States, is not inconsistent with insisting that they should acknowledge it as such a rule. Nor would the State which acknowledges Christianity as her religion, and the Author of Christianity as her King, thereby put herself into the Church's position, and undertake to do all the things which the Word enjoins. Before Christianity can become either a negative rule for the State or a positive rule for the Church, it must be acknowledged by each in that relation. This is all the memorial desires from our rulers on behalf of our country. We only seek to have our newborn Government, the creature of His peculiar providential power and goodness, acknowledge officially that it is His minister, to do nothing which His word forbids. And we desire that the Government may do this for itself, and not for the individual citizen; discharging simply its own duty in the premises, as a moral person, responsible to God, and not undertaking at all to guide any man in the discharge of his own individual duty to Jehovah.

We conclude by reiterating the grand and solemn statements of the memorial. God's revealed will is the true supreme, and should be so acknowledged. If that be not recognized by the State, it can acknowledge no sense of moral obligation and no feeling of the eternal principles of right, for these are nothing except as they stand related to the will of the one living and true God. If the acknowledgment of His will as supreme law be not the very foundation-stone of a constitution, it is bereft of all vital power or binding force. If there be no God distinctly acknowledged by the people, they will then be a God to themselves. The will of the majority must then become

the supreme law, and any constitution prove itself a dead letter. God is now showing what this denial of His claims by a people highly favored and blessed can work amongst them. Oh! may it be given to the remnant of these States, whom He is saving from the terrible gulf, to know their God, and to acknowledge their King.

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ARTICLE I.

CHURCH AND STATE.

The fundamental relations implied in the distinction between “the things which are God’s, and the things which are Cæsar’s,” have been recognised, more or less clearly, from the beginning of the history of our race. These relations are that of man to man in a state of society, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, that of man to God. They have been designated by different names, and have been the objects of divers kinds of legislation, according to the diversities of age and country; but, whether known by this name or that; whether, in practice, partially separated or totally confounded, the relations themselves have been, and could not but be, apprehended. The relation of man to man would force itself upon the notice by the necessities of every day’s existence; the relation of man to God would be developed in the operations of conscience, arraiging the offender before an invisible tribunal, and pointing him to a coming retribution. Yet it cannot be denied that in reference to few objects of human thought

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have attempts at articulate exposition been more unsuccessful than in reference to this; or, that the wisdom of the wisest man has still more signally failed, by any kind of political machinery, to realize perfectly the theories which make the most plausible approximations to the truth.

It is only in modern times, indeed, that the philosopher has undertaken to grapple with these relations, with a view to the practical separation of the spheres of the temporal and the spiritual, the civil and the ecclesiastical, the Church and the State. In the ancient forms of civilization, in its leading types, the Oriental, the Greek, and the Roman, we look in vain for any discrimination between these powers. In the East, the cradle of the human race, and the seat of vast empires, where the patriarchal idea and the patriarchal sentiment pervade and mould the whole fabric of society, the monarch is not merely the highest religious functionary, but a divinity, the object of worship to his subjects. In Greece, the cradle of philosophy, and the scene of the proudest triumphs of speculative thought, we find a similar, though not so complete an identification of the civil and the religious. The miraculous subtlety of Aristotle was as unequal to this discrimination, as it was to the discovery of the fact and the necessity of a physical creation *ex nihilo*. Among the Romans, whose extraordinary genius for government made them the masters of the world, we find a still larger infusion of orientalism than among the Greeks, and far less of a speculative tendency; and consequently, a more complete confusion of the relations which belong to man as a sojourner on earth, with the relations which belong to him as the subject of a supreme invisible power. In illustration of this point, we take the liberty of quoting a paragraph or two from an Essay on Roman Legislation, by that able lawyer and accomplished scholar, Hugh S. Legaré, of South Carolina. We offer no apology for the length of the quotation, as it is the legislation of Rome, more than all other causes combined, which has determined

the posture of all Christendom for ages upon this great question:

“The legislation and history of Rome are altogether unintelligible without a distinct apprehension of the causes, the extent, and the consequences of this extraordinary influence—[the influence of the class of the hereditary priests and jurists of the Republic, the *ulema* behind the throne greater than the throne itself.] All nations are governed more by manners and opinions than by laws, and the Romans above all other nations. But their manners and opinions were formed and directed by this *caste* of lawyer-priests, an institution quite oriental, transmitted to them through Tuscany, at once by inheritance and by education. ‘In every part of their annals, from the earliest struggles of the *plebs*, in the freshness and vigor of youthful health and enthusiasm, under their immortal tribunes, down to periods of degeneracy and servitude, the same spirit is everywhere visible. Religion, law, subordination, or all these names in one, *discipline*, civil and military, at home and abroad—‘this was their sorcery.’ Created to teach the law to all coming time, they regarded it with instinctive awe, approached its oracles as those of their Gods, and yielded to it a devoted, yet magnanimous and enlightened obedience. Hence it was that revolution after revolution occurred; that the assemblies of the *Curia* were superseded by those of the Centuries, and these in turn overshadowed by those of the tribes; that the veto of a single tribune, clothed himself in no armor but that of religion, (inviolable, *sacrosanctus*,) could bring on universal anarchy by preventing all elections, and leaving every office vacant; that repeated secessions of the *plebs* to the mountain appropriately called *sacred*, or to the Janiculum, took place; that for centuries together the story of Roman politics, omitting the wars altogether, is, in the hands of Livy, and even of Dionysius, by far the most thrilling and sublime of historical romances; and yet that, in the midst of so many elements of disorder and violence, not one drop of blood was shed in civil war, and the glorious commonwealth,

‘Rising in clouded majesty, at length,
Apparent queen, unveiled her peerless light.’”

Again, speaking of the *libri rituales*, (to the Romans what the Mosaic ritual was to the Hebrews,) Mr. Legaré says,

after Festus: "They teach the rites with which cities are to be founded, and altars and temples dedicated; the holiness of the walls of towns; the law relating to their gates; how tribes, wards, and centuries are to be distributed; armies organized and arrayed; and other, the like, things relating to peace and war." Then adds: "We see the same influence extending itself over the very soil of the Roman territory, and making, in the technical language of their augury, one vast temple of it. It was consecrated by the auspices; it could become the property only of one who had the auspices, that is, a patrician or *Roman*, properly so called; once set apart and conveyed away, it was irrevocably alienated, so that sales of the domain were guaranteed by religion, and it was sacrilegious to establish a second colony on the place dedicated to a first. Auspices could be taken no where else but on some spot which *they* had rendered sacred. The city, by its original inauguration, was also a temple; its gates and walls were holy; its *pomerium* was unchangeable, until higher auspices had suspended those under which it was first marked out. Every spot of ground might become, by the different uses to which it was applied, sacred, (*sacer*,) holy, (*sanctus*,) religious, (*religiosus*.) To the assembly of the *Curia*, the presence of the augurs was, of course, indispensable; that of the *Centuries* could not be held, unless the augurs and two pontiffs assisted at it, as it was dissolved instantly at their bidding, on the occurrence of any sinister omen. The first *agrimensor*, says Niebuhr, was an augur, accompanied by Tuscan priests or their scholars. From the foundation of the city, the sacredness of property was shadowed forth in the worship of the god Terminus, and that of contracts protected by an apotheosis of Faith. In short, the worthy Roman lived, moved and had his being, as the Greek writers observe, in religion."

We have, as yet, made no allusion to the history of the Old Testament, because, while, as to its subject, it belongs to the East, it is, as to its origin, the word of God, and

therefore cannot be expected to contain any merely philosophical views upon this or upon any other question; and further, because the dispensation which it is its main purpose to reveal and to illustrate, was altogether peculiar, and was designed to be temporary. But the very fact that it contains the history of an oriental people, makes it specially instructive, if found to present or to imply views of the connexion of the civil and ecclesiastical powers different from those generally prevailing in the East. And the additional consideration that we have, in those venerable records, the primæval history of our race, will furnish an ample apology, if any apology be necessary, for a brief notice of it.

We learn, then, that the whole race was once confined to the limits of a single family, and that all the intricate and manifold relations of human society, which have been developed in the progress of civilization, once lay here in the germ. The family was the nursery both of the secular and the spiritual power. But these powers were combined in the person of the *paterfamilias*, who was both king and priest, governing and ordering his household in regard to the things of this life, and instructing them and leading them in the knowledge and worship of God. In process of time, even after the visible church had been formally set up in the family of Abraham, we meet with that mysterious person, Melchizedek, who was at once king of Salem and priest of the most high God. In him the powers of these twin ordinances of God, the Church and the State, appear still united, but discernible as distinct and separable. Then, under the institute of Moses, we find the sacerdotal functions given to a separate order of officers, and the whole ministry of the tabernacle to a particular tribe; while the elders, the representatives of the patriarchal system, seem to have continued the exercise of civil functions. We do not pretend that there was an entire separation of the secular and the spiritual. It is possible that the synagogue,

with its mingled jurisdiction over civil and ecclesiastical affairs, may even then have existed, as that jurisdiction was based on the patriarchal principle upon which the whole Hebrew commonwealth was organized. But we assert that we have here in the books of Moses, what we find no where else in the East, a class of high and honorable functions in the matter of divine worship, with which the highest officer in the State dared not intermeddle. It is certainly a striking circumstance that, in a theocracy like that of Israel, its public forms should recognise, to so great an extent, the distinction between civil and sacred functions. As a theocracy, it could not easily admit of their entire separation; and it must be borne in mind, that as the State was organized with a view to the interests of the Church as supreme, if any argument be drawn from Judaism in support of the union of Church and State, it is rather in favor of the ultramontane than of the Erastian theory. In this respect, paganism presents a strong contrast to Judaism, in giving supremacy to the civil. But in both, as also in Mahometanism, the two powers are so combined that their history cannot be separately written. There is no history of the synagogue, or the mosque, or the pagan temple, as there is of the Church.

So thoroughly rooted had the union of the two powers become by immemorial custom and tradition, in the thinking, feeling, and entire life of mankind, that there can be little doubt of the wisdom and love of that dispensation by which the Christian Church was exposed, almost from the beginning of its existence and for the first three hundred years of its career, to the bitter persecution of the civil power. The line was thus clearly drawn between God and Cæsar, and it was demonstrated that the Church could live not only without alliance with the State, but in spite of all its power and hate. But no sooner did Cæsar profess himself the friend of Christ and His cause, than the old idea of union was revived, and Cæsar assumed once more the

exercise of power in the Church of God. Then came the reaction of the human mind, too violent to rest in the centre of truth, and swinging to the opposite extreme; still holding to the union, but making the civil subordinate to the ecclesiastical. The popery of Hildebrand, of Innocent III, and Boniface VIII, was the Nemesis of the Erastianism of Constantine, Theodosius, and Justinian. The doctrine, however, of these emperors was only the old Roman doctrine of the first centuries of the republic, with the change of Christianity for paganism. After the desperate struggle between the popes and the emperors, which kept the world in an uproar during the middle ages, came the earthquake of the Reformation. Even that great revolution did not dissolve the union of Church and State. It continued to exist, in some countries, as in Germany, Holland, England, and even in Scotland, to hinder the progress and mar the purity of the work of God, and in others, as in France, to extinguish it almost altogether.

It was in the Church of Scotland that the independence of the spiritual power was first proclaimed in modern times. John Erskine of Dun declared to the Regent Mar, "There is a spiritual jurisdiction and power which God has given unto His Kirk, and to them that bear office therein; and there is a temporal jurisdiction and power given of God to kings and civil magistrates. Both the powers are of God, and most agreeing to the fortifying one of the other, if they be rightly used." Andrew Melville dared to say to King James: "There are two kings and two kingdoms in Scotland; there is King James, the head of the Commonwealth, and there is Christ Jesus, the King of the Church, whose subject James the Sixth is, and of whose kingdom he is not a king, nor a lord, nor a head, but a member." (Stuart Robinson's Lecture before Maryland Institute, p. 18.) "For the space of more than a century," says Mr. Robinson, "this noble army of the martyrs attested the spiritual freedom of Christ's kingdom, in the face of every

effort of Cæsar to crush out the truth. But the seduction and arts of power at length accomplished what the violence of power could never do; and in the act of settlement of the Scottish kingdom under Queen Anne, the only testimony for this great truth was silenced, and in consequence, the Scotch church of the eighteenth century degenerated even to the point of spiritual death. Nothing could more forcibly illustrate the power of current and generally admitted error in blinding the eyes of intelligent men against the plainest results of their own principles, than the fact that, when the slavery of the Church to the power of the State could no longer be endured, and the memorable exodus of the Free Church of Scotland occurred, even then Chalmers and his compeers could not go all the length of the apostolic idea of church freedom; but clung, as indeed their disciples still cling, to the idea (while they practise voluntarism) that the State should support the Church; as though it were possible for the Church to depend upon the State for support, and still be independent."

Such being the history of the case, it ought not to create surprise, if the public mind, even in the freest and most enlightened nations of modern times, should not appear to have a clear comprehension of the principles which control this subject, or that, in practice, there should be so great a neglect of those principles. Momentary glimpses of the truth may be discerned along the ages, even in the darkest ages, under the pressure of persecution, when the weak were compelled to take refuge from brute force under the ramparts of sound principles; but the light which shines clearly in the darkness is lost again in the blaze of recovered power, and the persecuted of yesterday are the persecutors of to-day. Decrees of councils, bulls of popes, rescripts of emperors, decisions of jurists, opinions of publicists, dogmas of the civil and dogmas of the canon law, all conspire to join together what God has put asunder—the things that are His and the things that are Cæsar's. And now, in

the middle of the nineteenth century, and in America, we who have been accustomed to boast that it was our mission as a people to teach the world the truth upon this subject, have witnessed among ourselves, if not the revival of the maxims of the canonists and civilians, at least the adoption of measures which can only be acquitted of atrocious wickedness and folly by the truth of those maxims. "So far," says Vattel, "as religion is seated in the heart, it is an affair of the conscience, in which every one should be directed by his own understanding; but so far as it is external and publicly established, it is an affair of the State." It is upon this maxim that the officers of the usurper at Washington have proceeded, when they have dragged from their pulpits and banished from their churches the ministers of Christ, because their prayers sinned against political orthodoxy, either in the way of omission or of commission. And on the other hand, the Church, forgetting that her power is strictly a power only to declare and do her Master's will, as revealed in His word, has usurped the functions of the State, and fulminated its curses against all who hold the heresy of State sovereignty. Then, among ourselves of the Southern Confederacy, there are those who seem ambitious to revive the absurdities of the Fifth Monarchy fanatics, and to exclude from the councils of the State all except the saints; and others, who speak as if a particular form of religion were destined to be the religion of the Southern Confederacy, or, at least, of its army and navy. And doubtless there are among us, as in the old Union, tender-conscienced atheists also, who are shocked at the recognition of a God at all in the administration of the government.

All these facts go to show the importance of standing and looking for the old paths, that we may walk therein. The revolutionary temper of the public mind prompts us to look for something new; but we want nothing new. We are not Jacobin destroyers, despising the wisdom of

the past; but like William the Silent and the Dutch, like Hampden and Sidney and Somers, like Washington and the glorious fathers of the first war for independence, it is our mission to "maintain" and to restore. We need no new principles; but we do need to review and to remember the old, to refresh ourselves and renew our youth at the fountain of truth. This is our apology, for asking the attention of our countrymen once more to the principles which constitute a true theory, or an approximation to a true theory, of the connexion of Church and State. We say an *approximation* to a true theory, because there is room for doubt whether a scientific expression can be given to the nature and limitations of either Church or State, so clear and so sharply defined as to afford rules of universal application. One of the factors of the problem still waits for a thorough analysis and construction; and the political history of this country would seem to demonstrate that we do not comprehend the nature of the State. But we may approach the truth by considering the points in which the Church and the State agree, and then the points in which they differ.

I. The Church and the State agree in these three points: 1. That they are ordained of God. 2. That they are ordained for His glory. 3. That they are ordained for the good of mankind. These statements will not be disputed by any of our readers; and we shall not stop to argue them.

II. They differ in the following points:

1. That the State is an ordinance of God considered as the creator, and, therefore, the moral governor of mankind; while the Church is an ordinance of God considered as the saviour and the restorer of mankind. The State is ordained for man as man; the Church for man as a sinner in a condition of inchoate restoration and salvation. The State is for the whole race of man; the Church consists of that portion of the race which is really, or by credible profession, the mediatorial body of Christ.

We say that civil government is designed for man as man. We find it existing in the germ, when the race consisted of one man and one woman. The woman was in a state of subordination to the man. This subordination was not the penal consequence of transgression, as is evident from 1 Timothy, 2 : 11-14, where Paul argues that the transgression was the consequence of the violation, by the woman, of the order established by Heaven ; of her ambitiously forsaking her condition of subordination, and acting as if she were the superior or the equal of the man. If it should be asked where was the necessity or the propriety of an order implying subordination, in beings who were created in the image of God, in knowledge, righteousness, and true holiness, the answer is, that the propriety was founded upon the diversities of capacity in intellect and other endowments of human nature, which it pleased God should exist in the man and the woman. If man had not fallen, it would have been his duty still to bring up his children in the knowledge of God, and to *direct* them in the way in which they should glorify their Maker, albeit these children, by the terms of the supposition, would all have been holy and without inclination to go astray ; nay, more, in no danger at all of apostasy from God. In other words, if all creatures, because they are creatures, need direction from God, there is not only no absurdity in making some of them the instruments of directing others, but there are traces of the wonderful wisdom and goodness of the Creator in such an arrangement. Society is not an unison, but an exquisite harmony ; a grand instrument of various chords for the harping of hymns and hallelujahs to the God and Father of all. Even among the unfallen angels, we have reason to believe, there are thrones, dominions, principalities, and powers—order in the form of a celestial hierarchy. Man having fallen, however, and the love which constituted the very spirit and temper of his mind having given place to enmity, something more than *direction* was now necessary.

He needed *restraint*—his appetites must be bridled and coerced. The law of the two tables, which, in his state of innocence and uprightness, had been written upon his heart, summarily, in the *positive* form of *love*, must now be written externally, in detail, upon tablets of stone, and in a *prohibitory* form—"thou shalt *not*." And in reference to the second table, which prescribes the duties growing out of the relations of man to man, it became necessary that overt acts of transgression, which were not only morally wrong, but injurious to society, should not only be discountenanced by prohibition, but restrained and prevented by punishment. Hence arose a government of force.

The case, then, stands thus: In any condition of our race, the social nature of man must have given rise to the secular power. In a state of innocence, it would have been simply a *directing* power, a constitution designed merely to carry out and fulfil, without confusion, the blind instincts or impulses of love, love of self and love of "neighbor." In a fallen state, it has become, of necessity, a *restraining* and *punishing*, as well as a directing power. But in both conditions and in both forms, it is an ordinance of God, "the author of the constitution and course of nature." It is the nature of man to exist in society, and society is necessary to his existence. But society cannot exist without order and law of some sort. Therefore, government is as necessary to man as society, and, for this reason, is as natural to man as society. It may not be an *original* endowment of man, but it is *natural*; and if natural, then the ordinance of God. The perception of distance by the eye is not an *original* endowment of man, but the organ is so constituted that, in the course of time, it necessarily acquires it; and it is, therefore, *natural* to man, and therefore the ordinance of God. Civil government, then, is a branch or department of the moral government of God, the creator and ruler over man. God governs man by mechanical laws, by chemical laws, by vital laws, and He governs

him by civil laws. He who leaps from a precipice, or drinks a glass of poison, and dies, dies under a law of God which *executes itself*. He who murders his brother, and dies on the gallows, dies under a law of God, *executed by the hand of man*. In all these cases, death is a penalty inflicted by God for the violation of a rule of His government, physical or moral.

Once more: If this be a just view of the subject, civil government is a great *moral* institute, not a mere expedient of human sagacity and wisdom for the prevention of evil. It is this low, wretched, utilitarian view, which has contributed its full share to the ruin of the late United States government, in which the criminal law was fast becoming as pure an affair of utilitarian regulation as the civil. But the government of God, as creator, is a government of justice; and the civil magistrate, who is His minister, servant, *διακονος*, has no right to inflict any punishment which justice does not sanction, and is bound to inflict the punishment which justice requires. This remark is made for the sake of one important inference, and that is, that every civil government on earth is bound explicitly to recognise its responsibility to God as the moral governor of mankind. It is perfectly monstrous that the power which bears the sword and assumes the awful prerogative of taking human life, either in peace or war, should not acknowledge itself to be the servant of the sovereign Lord of life and death; that the power which represents the majesty of justice, should not recognise its responsibility to Him who is the eternal fountain and standard of all righteousness. One of the sins, doubtless, for which the vengeance of God descended upon the late Federal government, was the atheism of its fundamental law; and it is a matter of devout thanksgiving unto God, that the people of the new Confederacy have had the grace given to them explicitly to acknowledge their dependence upon Him, both in their Confederate Constitution and in their Confederate escut-

cheon. We have written "*Deo vindice*" upon the flag which our noble countrymen have borne aloft on a hundred bloody and victorious battle-fields. Let us never forget that God, our "Vindex," is the punisher of our sins, as well as the protector of our rights, and the avenger of our wrongs. Let us also remember, that it is not enough to bear this solemn truth upon our banners; we must bear it upon our hearts, lest we meet the fate of those of old, who "flattered Him with their mouths, and lied unto Him with their tongues."

So much for civil government as the ordinance of God, the creator, preserver, and moral governor of mankind. The Church differs from it in this, as has been said, that it is the ordinance of God, as the saviour of men, in the person of Jesus Christ, His only begotten Son. It contemplates man, not as upright, in his original condition of innocence, nor simply as a fallen being, but as "the prisoner of hope;" or more strictly still, as the "heir of salvation," really or by credible profession. Its great function is to teach, to convince, to persuade, "to bear witness to the truth." Its triumphs are the triumphs of love; it drags no reluctant captives at the wheels of its chariot; the design of its ordinances, its oracles, its ministry, is, through the efficacious operation of the Holy Ghost, to bring its captives into hearty sympathy with its King, and so to give them a share in the glory and exultation of the triumphs of the King. It has nothing to do with the power of the *sword*; its symbol is the *keys*. Its discipline is not the discipline of avenging justice, asserting the unbending majesty of the law, but the discipline of a mother, whose bowels yearn over the wayward child, and who inflicts no pain except for the child's reformation and salvation. The authority of her King is spiritual. His voice is, "Son, give me thy *heart*;" and by the power of His Spirit, He sweetly and powerfully constrains those whom He chooses for members of His kingdom, "to call Him Lord." They who

are His, or profess to be His, have, or make a credible profession of having, the great law of love written upon their hearts, and, therefore, need more the *directing* than the *restraining* power of the law.

The difference in this point between the civil and the ecclesiastical power, may throw some light on the question which has been agitated in our church of late, as to the duty of recognising the kingly office of Christ our Lord, in the civil constitutions of the country. Christians are all agreed that Jesus, their Saviour, is King of kings and Lord of lords, not only in the sense that He is the greatest of kings, but in the sense that all earthly kings and lords are subject to His authority. But the question is, whether civil rulers derive their authority from Him, as Mediator, or whether they derive their authority from God, as moral governor of mankind. The latter seems to us to be the truth. Christ says that, "His kingdom is not of this world." This is His solemn testimony before a civil magistrate whose authority He recognises. (See John 19 : 10, 11; Rom. 13 : 1, etc.) Now, was Pilate, as a representative of the Roman government, acting as an officer of the kingdom of Christ? If so, to what perplexity are we reduced in the interpretation of such a text as John 18 : 35-37? If any authority is "of this world," it certainly is the authority of the civil magistrate. If it should be said, that as Christ is "*head over all things unto the Church,*" His supreme headship should be acknowledged by all "powers that be;" we answer, first, that it ought to be done where it can be honestly and truly done; and we doubt not that the day is coming, when all "the kingdoms of this world will become the kingdoms of our Lord and of His Christ," and "all kings shall fall down before Him, and all nations shall serve Him." But how is it now? "No man calleth Jesus Lord but by the Holy Ghost," says Paul, in 1 Cor. 12 : 1. Are there more than a very small minority of the people of the Confederate States, who are, in the judgment

of charity, persuaded by the Holy Ghost that our blessed Saviour is Lord and King? What then? Will the acknowledgment of Christ in the Constitution make us a "Christian nation?" Have not the kings of France enjoyed the titles of "eldest sons of the Church," and "most Christian kings?" What shall we say of Henry VIII and Philip II? O Christ! what crimes have been committed in thy name! No; there is no magic in the name of Christ emblazoned in our Constitution and on our banners to transform us into a Christian people. Many a foul heart has beaten under the "cross" of the Crusader; fouler far than beat under the crescent of the Saracen. To make the change proposed in our Constitution, would have one of two effects: either to make us a nation of hypocrites, or to exclude from our public service every sort of ability which was not found associated with a cordial reception of Christ as King, or, at least, with a sincere recognition of His authority. Are we prepared for either alternative? We believe that as civil government was ordained for all men, and not for the saints only; as there is a moral constitution in all men which responds to the authority of God as moral governor, and they can recognise Him as such without the saving power of the Holy Ghost; and as God, the God of nature and providence, has endowed men with capacity for government who are not Christians; all that is necessary, in the way of an explicit acknowledgment of responsibility, is the acknowledgment of our responsibility to God as the governor of nations. But we shall have more to say on this subject under the next head.

2. The next point of difference between Church and State, is in the rules by which they are to be respectively regulated in the exercise of their functions. The rule for the Church is the word of God, the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments. This is the statute book of the visible kingdom of Christ. The rule for the State is the "light of nature," or the human reason. The power of the Church

is, strictly and only, "ministerial and declarative;" the power of the State is magisterial and imperative. The Church has no power to *make* laws, but only to *declare* the law of God. All her acts of government are acts of obedience to her Head and King. The State has the power to make laws, as well as to declare them; has a legislative as well as a judicial power. Hence, the form of government for the Church, the regulative and the constitutive principles of her organization, are not matters to be determined by human reason, but to be derived from the Bible as the constitution and statute book: while, in the State, these are matters to be settled by the history and condition of political communities. The life of the State is natural, and it is left to assume an organization for itself. The life of the Church is supernatural, and God prescribes an organization for it.

If it should be asked, whether the Bible is no rule for the civil power—whether the secular magistrate may proceed, in all cases, as if God had not revealed His will in writing—the answer is: assuredly not. In the first place, the light of nature is made much more clear by the revealed will of God. For example, in respect to the justice and expediency of capital punishment for the crime of murder; the Bible not only gives its sanction to this penalty, but makes it the duty of the magistrate, as the sword-bearer, to inflict it. So also as to the lawfulness of defensive war. The sword-bearer is bound to wage such a war. According to the light of nature, interpreted by the Bible, the Quaker theory of war is not merely a sickly sentimentalism, but a rebellion against the organic law of society and government. The law of marriage is another example. In the second place, the erroneous teaching of the light of nature is rectified by the Bible. In the case of a weekly rest, for example, the word of God demonstrates that such a rest belongs to man as man, was ordained before his fall, and is necessary to his well-being. Reason and experience

have amply demonstrated the same truth, that "the Sabbath was made for man;" but it is doubtful whether the fact would have been recognised by the light of nature alone. In the third place, every man who has received this revelation is bound to accept it as a revelation from God, and to regulate his faith and practice by its authority, either in a positive or in a negative way. In some of his duties, the Bible is a positive rule; in others, it is a negative rule. Touching the whole matter of the method of salvation, the whole question as to what is necessary to be believed or done in order to obtain eternal life, the Scriptures are a *positive* guide, teaching what is to be believed or done, and *all* that is to be believed or done to that end. Touching the life that now is, the avocations necessary to sustain the being or to promote the well-being of society, agriculture, commerce, manufactures, civil and criminal laws, the man, if he be a civil magistrate, or whatever else, is to be governed by the *negative* authority of the Bible. He can do any thing which the Bible does not *forbid*. The principle contended for by Hooker and the Court party, in the time of Elizabeth, against Cartwright and the Puritans, for the regulation of the Church, though a false one for the Church, was true in application to the State,—that any thing may be lawfully ordained which is not forbidden in the Word. We say false in its application to the Church, because contrary to the injunction that "nothing be added, to the requirements of God:" the Word being a *positive* charter, and therefore signifying prohibition by *silence*. It is true in its application to the State, because the Bible is not, for the State, a *positive* rule.

Let us now, for a moment, return to the question which has been discussed, and consider it in the light of those principles. Should the supremacy of Christ, as King of kings, and the supreme authority of the Bible, be formally and explicitly acknowledged in our civil constitutions? We answer, again:

1. By all means, if it can be truly and honestly done. If all the sovereign people could say "amen," as heartily, or even as sincerely, to such an addition to the section on "liberty of conscience," as they do to the section as it now stands in the Constitution, there would be no objection to it, except that it was not necessary—that it was not an essential function of a civil constitution to make such a declaration. If the body that framed the Constitution had been able sincerely to declare, in presenting it to the States for their ratification, that they, the members of that body, had felt their responsibility to Christ as king, in framing that document, such a declaration would have been a noble testimony from individual citizens, and a happy augury for the people. But, evidently, the value of such a testimony would depend upon its *sincerity*; and to have introduced it into the constitution itself as the solemn utterance of "we, the people," when it was notorious that not one-half of the people even professed to believe it, what were this but to incorporate hypocrisy in the fundamental law? Would to God that our statesmen, who profess to be Christians, might be more courageous, as individuals, in bearing their testimony for Christ!

2. As the doctrine of the supremacy of Christ is a doctrine of pure revelation, it forms no part of the essential functions of civil government to teach it, or profess it. The supremacy of Christ is founded upon His work as a priest, for the salvation of His elect. The State is a branch of the moral government of God, as the righteous judge of all, and is bound to recognise God only in this capacity. The Church, which is the body, or professes to be the body of the saved, is bound to recognise the Saviour, prophet, priest, and king. This is her very vocation, to be a witness-bearer, and the Bible regulates her testimony and her profession. The State must not contradict her testimony; and that is all the State is bound to do. What is the definition of the Church visible, in the Westminster Confession of

Faith? "The visible Church consists of all those throughout the world that *profess the true religion*, together with their children; and is the kingdom of the Lord Jesus Christ, etc." Now, if our brethren could carry their point, the State and Church would be, at least logically, confounded; for the same definition would answer, in a great degree, to both of them. They both *profess the true religion*, that is, the revealed religion of *salvation*, with mercy, and not justice, as its prominent feature. Nor is the proposed profession of the State a meagre one. Implicitly, it is the whole Gospel; explicitly, it is as full as was the profession of the Church for hundreds of years. And if the State begins to make a profession of the Christian religion, it is impossible to predict where it will stop. The only safety for liberty and for religion, is in rigidly enforcing the maxim that the Bible is, in the sense already illustrated, a *positive* rule for the Church, a *negative* rule for the State.

But we are asked, if the State is bound to respect the negative authority of the Scriptures, where is the impropriety in her *professing* that respect? We answer, that it is one thing to be *bound* to perform a duty, and quite another thing to be *prepared* to perform it. Every man who hears the Gospel is bound to confess Christ before man; but we are in the habit of warning men against coming to the Lord's table, unless they are believers. We repeat, that the Church is the body whose vocation it is to profess faith in Christ and in His word; and any other doctrine will have the effect of confounding the Church and the State. If any legislator, or judge, or governor, chooses to profess his responsibility to Christ for his own public acts, a responsibility he really feels, let him do it. We should render our hearty thanks to God for every judicious public act of this kind. But let it be remembered that it is his own personal responsibility he is confessing, and that he is not speaking for those who feel no such responsibility.

It may be added, that we have not intended, in any thing that has been said, to deny that the State is a moral personality; that there is an "organic life," or a "public conscience," belonging to political communities. All this is freely admitted. But it has been shown, we think, that this moral personality is subject to the government of God as a government of justice, of natural justice; that this public conscience and organic life are to be regulated and controlled by the light of nature, interpreted and corrected by the word of God, when the State is in possession of that word.

The view advocated by some of our brethrep, of the personality of the State, which makes it something totally different at once from the administration at any given time, and from the whole body of the people, so that the State may be Christian while the administration and the people are Jews, Turks, or atheists, is a view which passes our comprehension. Such a theory might, with some color of plausibility, be maintained under a despotism like that of Louis XIV, of France, who boasted that he was the State. But what is the State, according to the Confederate Constitution? What is the State, according to the terms of the proposed amendment to the article on liberty of conscience? These are the terms: "Nevertheless, we, the *people of these Confederate States*, distinctly acknowledge our responsibility to God, and the supremacy of His Son, Jesus Christ, as King of kings and Lord of lords; and hereby ordain that no law shall be passed by the Congress of these Confederate States inconsistent with the will of God, as revealed in the Holy Scriptures." What can be clearer than that the State, here, is the "*people of the Confederate States?*" Not the whole mass of the population—women, children, foreigners, slaves—but the political corporation, the *populus*, the *demus*, the body of voters—a minority of the whole population. Now, of this minority a large majority are rebels against Christ. Yet this is the body,

whose religion, it is insisted, must be the Christian religion, whatever the religion or no-religion of the people may be! It is the body, at least, which must *profess* the Christian religion! Or shall we say that the Constitution itself, the parchment roll on which the fundamental law is written, is the State, whose religion is Christian, although "the people" who ordain it are not? We confess that all this sounds to us very much like the old realism of the schools, which asserted for abstract ideas a substantive existence, different from and independent of the concrete things in which they were manifested and exemplified. We say this with a veneration amounting to awe, for the memory of that great genius and noble man of God, whose illustrious name gives support to this movement for an amendment of the Confederate Constitution.

The two points of difference, which we have attempted to illustrate, between the civil and the ecclesiastical power, comprehend some others, which, although already incidentally referred to, are worthy of an articulate statement. For example:

8. The Church and the State differ in their *sanctions*, as well as in their *authority* and their *rule*. The sanction of ecclesiastical government is *moral*, appealing to the faith and the conscience, a parental *discipline*, designed for the good of the offender. Its symbol is the "*keys*." The sanction of civil government is *force*, appealing to the bodily sensibilities of the subject or the citizen; a *penal* administration, designed to vindicate the majesty of justice and the supremacy of law, with a very incidental, if any, reference to the good of the transgressor. Its symbol is the "*sword*." It is so perfectly obvious that the employment of force is abhorrent, from the whole nature and genius of the Church, that even the fiends of the "Holy Office" were compelled to profess the greatest horror of shedding the blood of heretics, and piously turned them over to the secular arm.

4. "The scope and aim of civil power is only things *temporal*; of the ecclesiastical power, only things *spiritual*. *Religious* is a term not predicable of acts of the State; *political* and *civil*, not predicable of acts of the Church." (See Robinson, *ut supra*.) The proclamation of the President in regard to days of fasting and prayer is a religious act; but then it is not an act of government. It is merely an invitation or request, addressed by a citizen in high place, to his fellow-citizens. If it were done as an act of government, it would be a usurpation of the prerogative of the Church. On the other hand, if the Church does a political act, it is guilty of a usurpation of the prerogatives of the State. Rebellion—which, by the way, is a totally different thing from revolution, the latter always implying the existence of a civil government, under whose authority the revolutionists are acting, and thereby excluding the very idea of treason)—rebellion is always a *sin*, as well as a *crime*; and a church member may be disciplined for rebellion, but the fact must first be found by the civil authority and accepted by the Church. Nothing can be more presumptuous and absurd, than the decision by a church court sitting in the city of Philadelphia, as to the allegiance of one of its members, who is a citizen of Virginia. If he is obeying the laws of the State of which he is a citizen, no power on earth can convict him of the crime either of treason or rebellion. One more illustration may be added. The act by which ministers of the gospel, as such, are excluded in some of the States of this Confederacy, perhaps in all, from civil office, is an usurpation, by the civil power, of the functions of the Church. If it be a sin, an infraction of solemn vows, for ministers to hold civil office, as we believe it is, it is, nevertheless, a sin which it is the function of the Church, not of the State, to rebuke. As to the grounds of expediency upon which this disfranchisement of ministers has been defended, we only say that the history of the world, if candidly studied, will show that the Church is in much

greater danger from the ambition, or the stupidity of politicians, than the State is, from the ambition or avarice of ecclesiastics.

But enough. The theory of Church and State illustrated in the foregoing pages is the Virginia doctrine, as we understand it—the doctrine of the Presbytery of Hanover, in their memorials to the legislature of that grand old Commonwealth, from 1775 to 1785, in which last year Mr. Jefferson's "Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom" became a law. It has been called the "American" theory; but the history of the Northern States has shown, that the current theory there, has been rather the "semi-theocracy" of New England, according to which, as Mr. Robinson observes, "the Church becomes an agency for keeping the proper party in power, a congress-managing society, a public-opinion-manufacturing society. Hence its three-thousand-clergymen's-memorial-to-Congress; its religious press devoted to Fremontism, and its treasury of religious funds to carry the election in Pennsylvania."

Whether the views expressed in this article be sound or not, there can be but one opinion among intelligent men as to the necessity of reviewing these old controversies, and of feeling, once more, for our foundations. If what we have written should contribute, in the smallest degree, to a safe and satisfactory conclusion, we shall be amply rewarded for our trouble.

ARTICLE II.

A SLAVE MARRIAGE LAW.

We accept the Address on "Slavery, and the Duties growing out of the Relation," published in the July number of this Review, as the first fruits of the new era in our discussions of that interesting topic. Embarrassed hitherto by our political connexion with the puritanical Yankees; engaged, for the most part, in fortifying the scriptural lawfulness of the institution; and struggling to secure our rights, under the late constitutional compact of union, in respect to this species of property, against the insidious attacks of our faithless associates: the abuses incident to the relation, and the remedies for them, if not virtually tabooed amongst us, have been at least subordinated to other more menacing aspects of the angry controversy.

It must be so no longer. We must look into the private management of our negroes with fresh diligence. We must subject our slave codes to a rigid inspection; criticism must be free and bold; abuses must be exposed; and the inner life of slavery reformed and restored, as far as may be, to the pattern shown us in the Bible. We ought to do this upon our distinct accountability to God, and with the best lights afforded by our own experience; not out of vain respect, as some would have us do, to the prejudices of enemies, or weak brethren, or to save fair appearances. If we begin our work from any such motives as these last, we shall do nothing but blunder. We can not hope, do what we may, to win for our cause the good opinion of the self-righteous, abolitionized people of the United States, or their yoke-fellows of England, unless we take the fatal step

of emancipation. Wrapped in the ample folds of their pride and self-conceit, these intermeddling nations realize the worst form of hypocrisy:

“Compounding for sins they are inclined to,
By damning those they have no mind to.”

“Without are dogs.” We especially of the Confederacy, who ought to know something of slavery, have committed the unpardonable sin of setting at naught their counsel and their example in this very matter. We have presumed to think for ourselves. We have presumed to prefer Moses to Wilberforce, and Paul to Beecher. That is enough. We are worse than dogs. We may now go forward, so far as any favorable effect upon them towards ourselves is concerned, to deal with our outlawed institution in our own way, as completely as if no such people were in existence.

The Address breaks the new ground well. We commend its general positions entirely. We are sorry, however, where we find so much to approve, that there should be even one thing from which we must dissent. But we deem the propositions to regulate the marriage of slaves by law, as fraught with imminent danger to that very feature of our slavery which really determines the character and destiny of the whole system: as we will now proceed to show.

Slavery, as it exists among us, is a *domestic* institution. This remark is so familiar, that we fear its significance is not felt or understood. It may be worth while, therefore, to give it some emphasis. We mean then, that the slave is, with us, the subject of family government, and not of political government. The family is his State. The master is his law-giver. He is in no sense a member of municipal society, but of the household estate. We have, it is true, somewhat abridged the master's natural power in respect to the punishment of crimes committed by the slave. Of these, at least of the higher sort, the State, through her courts, takes cognizance in like manner as of those com-

mitted by freemen. Yet even here we have not gone far, but still wisely leave the mass of small offences and misdemeanors to the mild, though summary, jurisdiction of the master. This abridgement, moreover, no matter to what extent it may be carried, is grounded upon the vindication of public justice, and the prevention of public wrongs; and can hardly be deemed a modification of the domestic character of our system. But whatever cognizance the criminal law may take of the slave, it is a principle which goes to the very foundation of the institution, and permeates its whole superstructure, that the civil code absolutely no where recognises his presence in the body politic, except as property. It accords to him no rights; it exacts of him no duties; it accepts and treats him, in all civil respects, as a grown-up and life-long child.

Now, it is evident that a legal recognition of marriage among slaves, would be the first and decisive step towards a total inversion of the relation of that class to the State and to the family. Marriage is based upon contract; and hence such a regulation would at once introduce the slave to our notice as legally capable of contracting civil obligations, and as liable to civil duties. The extent of this change may be perceived at a glance. It would amount to a revolution in the status of the slave, as great as a transfer of allegiance from one prince or state to another would effect in the condition of a free people. As great, we repeat, in theory; but practically, it would be attended with consequences perhaps incalculably greater. A transfer of allegiance in the one case might be made, as it often has been made, without a shock or a jar to the social order. We can not hope for any such quiet result in the other case. For, to remove the legal incapacity of the slave to contract, would be to overthrow a distinctive fundamental principle of domestic slavery; to confuse our jurisprudence with an illogical jargon, and to let in as a flood many of the evils of a virtual emancipation. The door once opened—the

threshold once passed—where do you purpose to stop? where can you stop, consistently with your premises? You say that not to legalize marriage is in some way to deny a natural right. Granted, for the sake of the argument. There are other things quite as natural as the affections which prompt us to marry. The right of private property, for example: the law of *meum* and *tuum* is even more deeply imbedded in human nature, and more universal among mankind, than the passions involved in the continuation of the species. What then? Must we legally accord this natural right also to slaves? Must the law authorize them to acquire property, to hold it, to alienate it, to transmit it by blood or will? Must the legislature put in motion the costly apparatus of judicial actions and remedies, to enforce their contracts and to redress their injuries respecting property? Such folly finds no advocates. It would evidently amount to a declaration of civil freedom to a person yet supposed to be held in pure bondage; and no legislator or judge could see his way clear amid the cloud of unending confusions and contradictory perplexities with which it would envelope our simple and well-ordered system. Yet a slave marriage law would, upon principle, lead us straight to this consummation.

Of course it would be useless to enact such a statute, without providing some means of enforcing its observance and of punishing its violations. Has any body thoughtfully considered the extremities which must beset the legislature in that task? Take the correlative right of *divorce*—how will you adjust that among married slaves? Some States do not allow divorce for any cause between free persons. That will never do between slaves, manifestly. They would be sure to think it is not good to marry at all, and to neglect their newly acquired legal rights altogether. We should have to moderate our legislation in this behalf, according to the profound unannulled precept of Moses, to suit the hardness of their hearts. But we have never yet

heard a wise man venture a suggestion as to what that legislation ought to be. Possibly, however, you may succeed in the frame work of a statute well enough on paper. But when you come to its practical administration in the courts, how will you avoid the difficulty of thronging those tribunals with *slaves*, as parties litigant to *civil* suits? This glaring self-contradiction can be avoided but in one way. The legislature might authorize the solemnization of marriage between slaves; and then leave all the rest—the terms of separation or dissolution of the contract—to the will or discretion of the master, as we do now. But what good could this poor contrivance do? It would still be bottomed upon the absurdity that the slave has legal capacity to contract; nor would it prevent or mitigate a single evil of our present system, for it would leave the master in full possession of his authority over his slaves—the very thing complained of.

This then, is our capital objection to a slave marriage law. We think the reasoning by which it is sustained admits of no reply. It would snap at once the tie that binds the slave to the family, and place him, as the subject of civil legislation, under the dominion of the State. From that unlucky moment we may date the decay of *domestic* slavery, until the whole fabric would totter to its base, or fall, “like the sudden downcome of a tower,” with vast and hideous ruin. *Political* slavery—for slavery of some kind is the normal condition of the negro—would supervene (if we may change the figure) with its social ulcers and rank gangrene.

Let us come now to some of those considerations which are urged in favor of a legal regulation of marriage among slaves. The most important is, that our legislative disregard of this relation is unnatural and unscriptural. This position is not stated in any distinct form of argument that we can lay hold of, but exists in the popular mind as a sort of floating imagination, and is always expressed in those

vague general terms, so convenient to reformers who are either unable or afraid to bring their projects to the touchstone of reason and truth. The position deserves the most thorough and candid investigation. If true, it consigns to infamy, along with ourselves, all those departed generations of worthy Christians, who, since the establishment of African slavery on this continent, have winked at open uncleanness and adultery over the whole land and in their very households.

Let us distinctly understand what our law does in the premises. That it does not commit any *positive* violation of nature and Scripture, will be admitted on all hands. The most that can be charged is, that in our marriage code the slave is ignored. And from this pretermission it is inferred that our legislation "sets at defiance the precepts of the Bible, the dictates of nature, and the moral sentiment of humanity." This inference rests upon the false assumption that a legal recognition is somehow or other essential to the moral validity of marriage. And this assumption is, in turn, the product of confused ideas concerning the nature of marriage, as contemplated by human law and moral law.

The former treats it as a civil institute for the welfare of society; the latter as a religious institute for the health of the soul. When the legislature elaborately prescribes what persons shall contract marriage, and at what ages; with what forms and ceremonies the rite must be solemnized; upon what terms the tie shall be impaired or dissolved; and to say all in a few words, what shall be the reciprocal rights and duties arising out of the relation; it proceeds purely upon political considerations, designed to secure, as far as may be, the peace, the order, and the increase of the commonwealth. As these objects are quite within the scope of unaided human wisdom, it is probable, if we had no Bible, our regulations would not be much different from what they are in our actual circumstances. When civil purposes fail, the end of the law for marriage fails also.

And it seems not more self-absurd to encumber the statute-book with a marriage law for cattle than for slaves, who are equally without civil capacity. But when we contemplate the marriage institution from a moral stand-point, we see it designed, in its divine origin and end, as a help-meet not so much for the citizen as for man, and less for the body than for the immortal spirit. It draws its obligations from a source infinitely higher than human authority. God himself is its author. It needs not the witness of men; God himself is its witness. It needs not the cementing ministry of magistrate or priest, but the holy joining of the Lord. The nuptial torch, though unsolemnized by legal forms, may be lighted with as pure a flame as ever burned upon the altars of lawful wedlock. *Consensus facit nuptias*, is the simple fundamental maxim in the league of marriage. Hence we conclude that there is, in moral contemplation, a wide distinction between the faithful cohabitation of our slaves as man and wife, though unrecognised in law, and a promiscuous sexual intercourse; and that such connexions, notwithstanding the want of legal sanction, are valid *in foro conscientiae*, and conformable to the word of God.

Fortunately, the sacred volume does not leave us to mere deductions, but furnishes a system of practical legislation adapted to a people conditioned as we are in respect to slavery. And it may have escaped those whose squeamish humanity is ready to belch forth its sour crudities at our polity, that Moses is in like condemnation. It seems clear that his marriage laws were framed wholly with reference to the free-born population, and ignored the slave as much as ours. Let us not be misunderstood. We meet, indeed, in the Hebrew law with allusions to marriage among slaves; but it is among Hebrew slaves, who lost in their bondage only their liberty temporarily, and none of their civil rights. They might be restored at any time to full citizenship by right of redemption, and certainly would be so restored at the sabbatical year. Moses was strictly consistent with

himself, therefore, in recognising marriage among this class. But as respects the other class, purchased of the heathen round about, who were pure bond-men forever without civil rights, and to whom neither the sabbatical year nor sound of jubilee ever brought liberty, there is no where a hint that the Hebrew marriage law comprehended them. To comment on the proof-texts, if we had space, which we have not, or ability, which we have not, would be irksome. We beg the curious, therefore, to read over the Mosaic legislation, with an eye single to this point, and judge for themselves.

This Hebrew procedure is, in a manner, gospelized to us from what we observe in the New Testament. Rome, it is known, tolerated slavery. Her iron law did not recognise the marriage relation among slaves. There was, however, a relation recognised, which the Romans called *contubernium*. It was nothing but the unauthorized cohabitation between slaves as husband and wife, *conjugium* being their term to express the lawful estate of matrimony between free persons. Now this *contubernium*, which Christ and His apostles met with in every family and country of the empire, where they went about doing good and teaching truth, is very analogous to that matrimonial state obtaining among our slaves, which, for want of a corresponding accuracy in our language, we call *marriage*. We have no single word which expresses the idea. If the relation was immoral, it was a sin second in openness and universality to idolatry only. That it has been passed over in the New Testament without rebuke or censure, must be admitted. That we do not find, in the frequent allusions to the rights and duties arising out of slavery, an intimation condemnatory of an evil so wide-spread and monstrous, can not be denied. What may we infer from this omission? It is hardly possible to answer but in one way. The relation itself was not sinful.

It is proper, in concluding this part of the subject, to observe that, when we say our law ignores the marriage relation between slaves, the assertion must be taken with some qualification. We give it, indeed, several side-wise recognitions. It is so far favored, for example, in the administration of the criminal law as to entitle the slave, in a case of homicide, to the benefit of the rule, that when a person finds one in the act of adultery with his wife, and instantly kills him, it is not murder, but manslaughter only.

Thus the *contubernial* relation, recognised by public opinion, and favored to a certain degree in law, is evidently neither defiant of Scripture nor shocking to nature or humanity. While it fits well with the normal and legal status of the slave, it gives full play to all his proper passions and affections. There is not a solace or delight known to the pure nuptial bed; there is not a joy or attachment, which the cheerful conversation of man with woman in connubial life is calculated to afford, but may find here a healthful fruition and development. And who has failed to witness frequently in the cabins of the slave as beautiful instances of conjugal love and helpfulness as ever adorned the goodly mansions of the free-born? Abuses there are, we allow—great abuses and deplorably general. Can it be shown, however, that these will be lessened in number or magnitude by the proposed experiment? What we want here is not a rambling disquisition, or an ornate encomium upon the blessings of lawful matrimony—much of which may truthfully be said of the *contubernial* state—but something like an accurate and intelligible balance struck between what we shall gain and what we shall lose by the change referred to. Let us, then, pursue the subject a step or two farther.

It is urged as another consideration for the legal recognition of marriage among slaves, that it would prevent the ruthless separation of husband and wife. It would do so, perhaps; but it would also ruthlessly fasten upon many a

family and plantation the intolerable curse of an incorrigibly bad negro, rendered more desperately vicious by the consciousness that the State had interposed to make him a fixture. There is a conflict of laws—the law of marriage and the law of property. The difficulty is to reconcile the inseparableness of the marriage relation between slaves, with the master's paramount right of ownership in them, as property. Perhaps it can be done. It is exceedingly hard to judge of the practical value of a suggestion upon so nice a point, unless we have the law in a concrete form before us, in order to compare its several provisions with each other, and test their adaptation to the end proposed. We can only say, that all we have yet heard would amount, in our judgment, but to a snare to entangle the good and conscientious master, while it would serve as a mere cobweb for the wicked and mercenary. We must reserve, however, any further discussion of the point, until something distinct and tangible is proposed by way of reconciling the conflict which we have indicated. But the truth is, this evil of separating families is greatly overrated. We are slow to believe that, in the complex machinery of human affairs, many things which look theoretically wrong work practically right. The master is armed with the unlimited power in law to separate husband and wife, parent and child; and under some undefined notion that this is wrong, without much calculation of actual results, or carrying our investigation below the surface of appearances, we hasten to conclude that to exercise this power wantonly, in spite of the tears and heart-agonies of helpless human beings, must become a debased appetite that grows by what it feeds on. The history and existing facts, as well as the true philosophy of domestic servitude, contradict this senseless theory.

Even among the Romans, whose slave code was the severest ever known to a civilized people, giving the owner the supreme power of life and death over his slave, the re-

lation was nevertheless, in the main, one of mutual kindness and consideration. Cruel abuses of this power did occur, undoubtedly; but they were not frequent, as dull fools are apt to suppose; and we believe every recorded instance is to be found in the decline of the republic, or under the empire, when the civil wars and a general profligacy of manners had demoralized and enslaved all classes of the Roman world. It was not till the reign of Augustus, that these acts of great cruelty reached such a pitch as to call for the interposition of the Senate in the *Lex Petronia*. And even at a period considerably later, when the virtuous Juvenal, who lashed without mercy the public and private vices of his countrymen, would picture an easy, jolly, happy life, he paints the condition of a home-born slave:

—————Certe modico contentus lagebas,
Vernam equitem, conviva joco mordente facetus,
Et salibus vehemens intra pomeria natis.

The philosophy of this general mildness, in spite of occasional hardships, is not profound. It is all explained by the softening influence and social intercourse of the family relation. Even the worst men, clothed with extensive arbitrary authority, are usually kind and regardful to their immediate domestics and dependents. The contrast between their public displays of monstrosity, and their humane behavior to those of their own households, presents an enigma, a psychological solecism which puzzles the student of history. It is the master of *political* slaves, maintained in irresponsible power by armed force, and standing far apart from the sympathies or the interests of his distant vassals, between whom and himself there can be none of those charities which bind together domestic society—it is such a master, indeed, who riots without a check in human suffering, and finds fresh sport in the widening circle of human woe. A bad ruler, like Nero, or Robespierre, or Lincoln, will wring more agony out of helpless humanity in a brief reign, than all the slaveholders of Rome or the Confederacy would inflict in many generations.

Let us, however, at any rate, accept the actual facts which meet our eyes daily, in reference to the evil now under consideration. We may boldly challenge the nations to compare favorably with us in this regard. Among no laboring population of the world is there so little dispersion of families. You may go out upon many of our plantations, selected at random, in every district of these States, and call around you parents and their descendants to the third and fourth generations, who have never been out of each other's sight for a week in their whole lives. There is a Christian sentiment among us—a point of honor—whose delicacy is growing every day, with respect to the separation of families; and this feeling cannot fail to assume the form and force of a general usage more potent than law.

At the same time we agree, that it would be well for the law to provide against separation in case of sales by executors, administrators, sheriffs, and other trustees. And this for two reasons: first; such sales are the cause of much the larger number of separations; since those trustees will not assume the responsibility of selling families together, without some legal security against the risk of loss. And again; as such sales take place immediately under the authority of the courts—the law being for the time the custodian of the property and standing *in loco domini*—it would be easy, as well as highly proper, to make adequate provisions for the just rights and feelings of all concerned. Nor, we may add, would this be an experiment. The Roman law enacted that, in sales of the kind referred to, slaves, such as husband and wife, parent and child, and even brother and sister, should not be separated.

There are some who seem to speak of the separation of man and wife, under any circumstances, as sinful. This involves the question of divorce, which it is not necessary to argue. It will be decisive, perhaps, with most persons, to invoke the authority of Moses, who expressly commands separation between slaves in certain cases. For our own

part, we are persuaded that it is as much the duty of the master, who is the civil law-giver of his slaves, some times to sunder the marriage relation between those unequally yoked, as it is to encourage and instruct them to form proper connexions. Undoubtedly, he who does so from mere wantonness, or interest, or any motive other than a considerate regard for the highest good of the parties, and that of the rest of his family, incurs a fearful guilt before God. But the guilt is all his own; and it is far better to let him bear it alone, if he will not repent and amend his ways, than, under a morbid tenderness of conscience for the sins of others, to seek relief for him in a scheme that promises only mischief.

Once more: To legalize the marriage of slaves, it is urged, would tend to prevent the crimes of fornication, adultery, and the like, admittedly so notorious amongst them. This effect, it is supposed, would follow, because, in that case, the law must punish such offences between slaves, as it does now between free persons.

Robert Hall has wisely observed, that the criminal indulgence of sensual passions admits but of two modes of prevention: the establishment of such laws and maxims in society as shall render lewd profligacy impracticable or infamous; or the infusion of such principles and habits as shall render it distasteful. Human legislatures, he adds, encounter the disease in the first, the truths and sanctions of religion in the last, of these methods. Now it is manifest that a marriage law will not render the vices referred to either impracticable or infamous among slaves. It will have no tendency that way. They will still mingle together and dwell by themselves as now; the means of gratification will still be as easy and abundant as now; they will still have their own public opinion and standard of propriety as now; and these causes, with others, taken together, will inevitably operate to render the statute for the purpose supposed a dead-letter. You would have to rely almost

exclusively upon themselves for the testimony necessary to conviction. Does any sane man dream the testimony could be had? Is it expected that the master should turn informer? Himself will be a greater sufferer than the slave. Every prosecution, whether followed by conviction or not, must entail some cost, loss, or injury to him; and if the law could possibly be enforced in any tolerable measure up to its numerous violations, (which happily it could not be,) we should all find slaveholding an intolerable burden and annoyance. The slave will return with the chastisement of the court upon him, to the bosom of his own society and associates, to find himself as much respected as he was before, and be jolly together over how much they were making white folks pay for the whistle. Seriously, we do not know any legislation which would more fully realize Walpole's witticism about shearing a hog—great cry and little wool. As things are now, on the other hand, if a master feels it his duty, (and all are deeply guilty who do not feel it their duty,) to restrain these vagrant practices among his slaves, a little reflection will suggest a score of methods, which he may fall upon and vary as occasions demand, far more efficient than any legislation, however stringent. The truth is, the fallacy on this whole subject lies in attributing too much virtue to law, unsupported by public manners—a capital and an incurable error among our modern reformers. Whether it proceed from vanity, or pride of opinion, or lust of power, or honest conviction, each of them, while subordinating moral agencies to a secondary importance, loudly promises that, if he can only get his crotchet embodied in the character of law, mankind may hail a new and glorious era. The event rarely or never answers to the prediction. When the reform mounts the judgment-seat, it suddenly becomes disembodied and evaporates into thin air, which none regard; or, worse still, men open their eyes to find that they have armed with the sword of justice an insupportable petty tyranny.

But we may vindicate the ground upon which we decline to punish slaves by statute law for fornication and the like from another point of view. Human laws deal with the conduct of men as altogether an affair of the present life. They take cognizance of our actions, not as sinful merely, nor as affecting our interests in another state of existence, but as directly and palpably detrimental to the social order and the common weal. Hence the principle on which we do not indict slaves for such offences is, that, when committed by that class among themselves, they are too trivial, insignificant, and remote in their effects upon the general welfare, to demand judicial notice; not but that they are still highly sinful and immoral. Take adultery or bigamy—crimes which our law views, in the superior and governing race, with an eye of severity—they sow the seeds of distrust and jealousy around the hearth-stone, and array family against family; they corrupt the sources of legitimacy, and confound the rights and property of individuals; they transmit animosities, as a legacy, from father to son; and in all their consequences, tend evidently and immediately to overthrow the peace and good order of society. But there is manifestly none, or imperceptibly little of all this in the case of slaves. The reasons are obvious. The most that usually comes of bigamy, for example, among them is a disturbance between the parties immediately concerned, which the authority of the master is perfectly adequate to quell. The evil example does not pass up into and overspread that population, whose virtues or vices give complexion to society and character to government. For the law of caste fixes a great gulf betwixt the two races. Nor, with a vigorous administration of domestic justice on the part of masters, would the evil example be so seriously felt even among the blacks. If men will still declaim upon the sinfulness of African lewdness, as a reason for interposition on the part of the State to suppress it, we can only reply that the common sense of the country must see the solid ground for the distinction here indicated.

Let us now, in confirmation, appeal to the tribunal of practical experience. We do not have to go far for a fit subject. There is the free negro. Legislation of the kind proposed has had unchecked play upon him. The law of marriage extends to him in its full breadth. With what result? He is filthy still—miserably below the average of slave intelligence and morality. Let any man who looks at reforms with a view to practical effects, consider the condition of the free negro, and the reasons for it, and he will be persuaded that a slave marriage law can do no more towards changing the morals of the lustful Ethiopian than towards changing his skin.

What then? Is there no legal remedy for the deplorable sensuality of our Africans? We fear there is none. If the instructions of the pulpit and the sabbath-school—if the salutary influences of church and household discipline fail, we have no hope elsewhere. But they will not fail. They have not failed. The past is full of their trophies. Where, in all human history, do we read of another instance of a people elevated, within so short a period, from such a depth to such a height? What other laboring population would have borne themselves so loyally in the presence of a run-mad crusade, undertaken for their enfranchisement, with every temptation to disobedience and rebellion? And so intimately has this institution identified itself, by its material results, with the wants and happiness of civilized mankind, that if it should fall under the armed assault now making upon it, there must come such distress of nations, with perplexity, as centuries have not witnessed. Indeed, African civilization in America, to the thoughtful student of events, must appear *the* transcendent fact connected with our continent since the discovery of the new world. That fact we owe to the wise neglect of the laws, to the wholesome discipline of fire-side authority, and to the transformative power of everlasting truth. Enough has been accomplished to repay our efforts. The future is hid:

“Shadows, clouds, and darkness rest upon it.”

We leave its issue with God, invoking His Spirit to inspire us with the knowledge of our obligations as the law-givers, under Him and the State, to these hopeful millions round about us; with faithfulness to discharge these responsibilities as those who must give account to our Master in Heaven; with wisdom to reject the schemes of a daring empiricism; and with resolution to keep steadily in the old paths, which is the good way.

As our object, in reference to the subject-matter contained in the Address, is singular and distinct, we might well close here. We beg, however, to say a word upon two other points.

The real objection to that dead-letter legislation which forbids us to teach our slaves the simplest elements of knowledge, it seems to us, is not stated at all, or at least with any distinctness. It is, that such legislation is an irritating and meddlesome interference on the part of the civil authority, with that salutary house-rule which has been the burden of our discussion. Indeed, here we have a fair illustration of all that we have said. If the State can properly do what she has done in those enactments, suppose she takes it into her head to turn the tables, and require us to send our slaves to school a certain number of months or years; or suppose she should command us how many hours of the day they shall work: what would men think of these propositions? Yet either of them, especially the first, would have better sense to recommend it, than that upon which we are animadverting. We know not in what considerations, or whether in any at all, these statutes against instructing our slaves originated. They are certainly not entitled to the praise accorded by Bacon to the laws of Henry the Seventh, as "not made upon the spur of a particular occasion for the present, but out of providence of the future, to make the estate of the people still more and more happy, after the manner of the legislators in ancient and heroic times." They were absurd from the start, and

are condemned alike by common sense and political economy. They have never been enforced, nor would any community submit to their execution for a moment.

The matter of further provision in our laws, for the protection of the lives and persons of slaves, is well presented in the Address. We venture to offer an additional suggestion. Some of the States, where a slave suffers death for a capital felony, make remuneration to the owner to the extent of half or two-thirds of the slave's value. This is wrong in principle, and works, we believe, as a sort of purchase of the right to kill him. In the administration of public justice, the idea of property should be excluded altogether. *Civiliter*, the slave is property—*criminaliter*, he is a person. In fact the very ground upon which either the State or the master punishes him, in any case, for crime, is that of his distinct moral personality. A pecuniary compensation to the master throws the slave's character as property into the scale against his life, and, we doubt not, often occasions an unevenness of justice. For the master, who is his natural and legal protector, no longer feels the same interest in having him defended. The law should rather, by every proper contrivance, quicken the master's zeal and energy. The slave ought to stand before the court exactly as any other person. We know it is said, on the contrary, that, where this is the case, out of a tender regard for the loss which the unfortunate owner must sustain, juries can hardly be brought to hang a slave at all. And some jurors are weak enough, it must be admitted, to be governed by such considerations. But experience shows, we think, that the weakness is not common; and, at most, it is on the safe side—the side of life and mercy.

ARTICLE III.

RATIONALISM FALSE AND UNREASONABLE.

No one will deny that there is a sphere within which the powers of the mind may be legitimately and profitably employed. During the darker ages of the world, when the intellect was chained by the fetters of priestcraft and trammelled by the bands of superstition, the adventurous thinker might well tremble, lest he should provoke the dreadful anathemas of the Church. But those days have long since gone by. Dungeons do not now frown upon the wildest theorist, or the most heaven-daring sceptic. The mind has been emancipated by the diffusion of a more tolerant spirit; and the restrictions which were imposed upon thought by a more unenlightened age, have all been removed. We may grant that the unbounded freedom which thought now enjoys, has opened the door for the introduction of much that is evil; at the same time, however, we may rejoice that thought is free. Once error could hide itself under the cloak of venerated forms and long-established usages; it could entrench itself behind the authority of names that it were heresy to gainsay or oppose. Now, however, it occupies no vantage ground, as once it did. The arena is open to every contestant. Error must now throw off the mask, come out into the broad daylight, and struggle for its claims with an assailant that stands upon an equal footing with itself.

And besides, one of the glories which crowns the human race, and raises it far above all other forms of earthly being, is the possession of an intellect, active, inquisitive, and aspiring—an intellect which is not content to be the passive recipient of truth, but loves to direct its steps into regions untrodden before, and discover new truths that study and

research alone can reveal. Mental activity is the very condition of our existence—a fundamental and indestructible law impressed upon our nature. Like the waters of the ocean that never rest, the current of thought is always moving.

And the constitution of all things, both without and within us, is such as to incite our minds to constant action. The realm of external nature is spread out before us in one grand and boundless prospect, and invites us to explore its trackless fields. The heavens above our heads are studded with countless orbs of light, that smile upon the astronomer in his investigations of their phenomena and their laws; and the world around us and beneath our feet teems with innumerable objects, which appeal to our love of knowledge, and open a mine of untold wealth to the explorations of the ambitious student. And even in the study of his own incomprehensible nature, man presents an attraction which can occupy the period of a life-time, and command the most intense application of all his faculties. How fearfully and wonderfully is he made! What a subject for the most profound and subtle inquiries that he can institute; consisting, as he does, of a living body in mysterious union with a living soul; invested with a personality which he can not explain; endowed with an intellect so narrow in its compass, and withal so far-reaching in its grasp; a heart so shallow in some of its aspects, and yet so deep in some of its emotions, its passions, and its affections; a will so undetermined and cowardly, yet so determined and brave; a conscience so powerless, and yet so mighty.

From the very constitution of our nature, therefore, as well as from the condition in which we are born, and the circumstances by which we are daily surrounded, we recognise it not merely as a privilege, but also as a duty, to cultivate, develope, and strengthen our various faculties, in the pursuit of truth. If mental activity is a law of our being, and we are placed in a theatre where every thing incites us

to action, we are bound by a moral obligation to educate the intellectual powers which our Creator has given us. We have no right to cast away the crown which has been placed upon our brow, and despise the dignity and honor which God has conferred upon us.

Our researches, however, must not be confined to those subjects which serve only to cultivate the taste, chasten the imagination, enrich the memory, expand the reason, or enlarge the understanding. They constitute a fine intellectual gymnasium, and are, therefore, of fundamental importance in every system of rational education; they adorn the mind with beauty and clothe it with strength; but they have no necessary connexion with our moral improvement; they must, therefore, not absorb our thoughts and engross our time. If restrained within their proper limits, they should be earnestly recommended to all who love knowledge and desire to be cultivated and wise; but they are injurious to our highest interests, when we suffer them to exert an overshadowing influence and monopolize the whole of our energy and activity. We admit that they can justly demand no trifling amount of our time and our study; we concede that they appeal to us with no less a plea than that which the visible creation urges; but after granting that, we affirm that there are other inquiries of a far more pressing kind—inquiries which plead for admission into our serious thoughts with all the earnestness that eternity alone can inspire. While we educate the intellectual, we must not ignore the moral element in the constitution of the soul. It is wrong to dissever what God has associated. It is criminal to feed the mind and starve the heart.

Within us all, there is a conscience. It reveals an inner law, to which it binds our allegiance, and the transgression of which it rebukes with its frowns and avenges with its stings. In connexion with the revelation of this law, there is the revelation of a Moral Governor, whose finger has written it, and whose majesty and authority conspire to

enforce its minutest requirements. Man, therefore, is the subject of a power that is higher than himself. In one sense, he may be the lord of this lower world; but he is not the master of himself, or the arbiter of his destiny. Like the rest of the creation, he belongs to one whose sceptre is universal—to one whose will is sovereign, and binds the heavens and the earth together in one grand, undivided, and indivisible empire.

To this Governor man bears some relation, as is attested by conscience. It becomes, therefore, a matter of the utmost importance for us to determine the exact nature of that relation, as well as to ascertain the various duties which it of necessity involves. We can not afford to tax our minds and weary our brains with the consideration of questions that are speculative, or purely scientific, yet bestow no attention upon those higher questions which make life so solemn and significant. These inquiries gather new significance from the almost universal conviction that the present is but the beginning of an endless existence. The voice that comes up from the great heart of humanity of all ages and countries, falls upon our ears like the noise of many waters, and attests the certainty of a life beyond the grave. Thither we are moving day by day, noiselessly but surely. But even there we shall continue to be under the dominion of Him by whom we are now governed. We shall still sustain to Him the same relation that we now sustain.

But what shall be the nature of that life? Shall the jarring elements of the soul be harmonized? Or shall unruly and discordant passions haunt and deform it there? Shall eternity witness the conflict that this world sees between inclination and duty? Or shall the will then move in cheerful obedience to the directions of conscience? Will the immortal spirit there enjoy a calm repose and an unmixed happiness? Or shall it experience unmitigated misery? Or will our condition there, like our condition

here, be one of mingled pain and pleasure? Questions like the foregoing are of great practical moment. They spring from the fact that man has a conscience and an immortal soul; and they relate to God and the world to come. If other inquiries are useful and obligatory, as we believe them to be, these surely must be of paramount importance. If other inquiries demand our investigation, the claims which these present are far more pressing; for they are connected not only with nature and time, but also with God and eternity.

Subjects of the foregoing kind were not esteemed trifling and insignificant by the wise men of old. Although they were enveloped in the clouds of paganism, some scattering rays of light reached their benighted souls, and enabled them somewhat to appreciate the importance and necessity of religious philosophy. It is true that philosophical speculation and metaphysical science did occupy their laborious researches, and elicit their most patient, thoughtful, and profound investigations; but we must not forget that the science of morals was cultivated as well; and that, not merely with reference to the duties which man owes to his fellow-man, but also with reference to those duties which man owes to God—thereby rising out of the sphere of morals into the higher sphere of natural religion. We do not affirm that either their ethics or their theology was correct in all, or even in the most of its details. That would be claiming too much for even the most gifted and painstaking men, who were educated under the enormities of heathenism, and were obliged to search after truth, obscured by systems of false religion, and buried under a heap of erroneous doctrines and erroneous precepts. It is enough for us to note, that man's relation to the Deity impressed them with a sense of its importance; and that they *endeavored* to answer some of the questions which that relation suggested and presented for solution.

We need not be surprised, therefore, that religious philosophy should commend itself to thinking minds in modern times, when the Scriptures have given such an impetus to human activity in every direction, and have scattered so many of the clouds which once obscured the truths of natural religion. And although this subject may fall more appropriately within the province of the theologian, it is not surprising that it has engaged the thoughts of other minds. Its intrinsic importance, involving as it does matters of vital and eternal interest, recommends it with power to serious thinkers; and the wide range which it offers, in some of its aspects, to the speculations of aspiring and ambitious intellects, insures for it a warm reception at the hands of the philosopher.

Against this, no objection can be legitimately raised. No inquiry is the property of a privileged few; much less one which is so essentially important as that which is made by religious philosophy. So far from opposing, we would welcome the labors of all who honestly endeavor to explain its intricacies and resolve its difficulties. Whatever may be the source, we would hail with grateful pleasure all the light that can be shed upon its dark and perplexing problems. Holding that our relation to God concerns us far more than our relation to nature, and that the duties which it necessitates are superior to all other duties, we would rejoice if any could enlarge the boundary of our knowledge upon topics so worthy of our earnest consideration.

We must regret, however, that so many theologians and philosophers seem well-nigh to ignore the existence of the Bible, and give human reason so exalted a position in the construction of their systems of religious philosophy. Instead of using it as a hand-maid to listen to the Scriptures, they make it mistress and the Scriptures subordinate. It is not strange that ancient sages followed the guidance of reason, and threaded their toilsome way as best they

could, through the labyrinths of error in which they were entangled. We feel a lofty veneration for those poor, benighted spirits, that listened to the whisperings of their hearts, and, under their direction, endeavored to emerge from the oppressive gloom by which they were surrounded. We deeply sympathize with the mighty intellects that struggled so hard to rise above the ignorance of their age, and ascend into the region of unclouded truth; and as we see them toiling with patience to elaborate systems which would bear the test of a universal application, we could almost wish that they had lived to see the splendors of that day whose dawn was then approaching. But instead of veneration, we indulge an unmitigated contempt for the arrogant and presumptuous rationalists of the present day. With all the sad experience of ancient wisdom before them, they discard the instructions of God's blessed word, deny their indebtedness to its inspired pages, and attempt to rush back into the mists that shrouded the minds of the wise men of old.

And of such there are many. The spirit of rationalism is abroad in the world. It has laid its reckless hand upon the temple of orthodoxy, and would drag its pillars to the ground. It has infected the schools of philosophy, and corrupted the purity of theology. It has filled the philosopher with a lofty conceit of his own wisdom, and degraded the Bible in the estimation of the theologian. It has ascended the pulpit, and preached blaspheming nonsense in the house of God. It has stood in the very presence of a crucified Saviour, and poured derision upon his dying love. In the garb of the Gospel, it has denied the very essence of the Gospel. It has seized the public press and scattered its poisonous sentiments in all directions, that it may unsettle the faith of the believer, and plunge the weak and wavering into the depths of a confirmed and hopeless infidelity.

Standing upon the pinnacle of human reason, proud, self-confident man imagines that he can gaze upon the unveiled mysteries of Deity, comprehend all the intricacies of the human spirit, and then construct a religious system which shall be simple in its details, and equal to all the necessities of our nature. The more unintelligent of mortals, (and they have included some of the lights of the world,) have felt themselves unable to evolve such revelations from their consciousness. Burdened by pressing wants, and distracted by forebodings of evil, they have received the Bible as a communication from heaven, and found their burdens removed and their forebodings hushed. They have pressed its precious doctrines to their throbbing bosoms, and found them like the balm of Gilead. They have embraced its matchless truths, and conscience has stopped its accusations; their anxious doubts have all been resolved, their fears quelled, and their tottering feet planted upon a rock as firm as the everlasting hills.

But, alas! it seems they knew not what they were doing. They were all misled by a strange infatuation. They labored under a fearful hallucination. Their fears were groundless, and they were quieted by misapprehensions. Their hopes were the offspring of a disordered brain, and their foretastes of heaven the vapory dreams of besotted enthusiasts. Those great doctrines which they accepted as beyond the discovery of reason, and revealed, philosophy pronounces false and absurd. And philosophy can speak with authority; for it has ascended to those ethereal regions, where all truth, human and divine, shines clear and unclouded in its own pure and beautiful light.

In one form or other, rationalism has long existed in the world. It certainly was not a stranger to the earth in the days of our Saviour. What were the objections of the Sadducees to the doctrine of the resurrection, but objections founded on their inability to reconcile it with some of their sentiments, which they deemed incontrovertible?

And what but the very same spirit pervades Arminianism, Unitarianism, and Universalism, to a greater or less extent?

It was, however, reserved for the last century to develop rationalism as a system, and for the human mind to extend its principles to universal application. Germany, the land of Luther, and the birth-place of the Reformation, has also signalized itself as the cradle of rationalistic infidelity. There the Bible was first unsealed, and its wondrous pages opened to the eyes of the people; and there it has been sealed again, not by the iron hand of Romanism, but by the pretentious wisdom of conceited philosophers and self-inflated theologians. Once the traditions of the Church opposed and concealed the truths of Holy Writ; now, the declarations of the Scriptures are denied and obliterated by the authoritative revelations of human reason. Germany repudiates all allegiance either to the traditions of the Church or to the teachings of the Bible. To Germany, the champions of popery and the defenders of orthodoxy are equally obnoxious. In her judgment, both are enemies to the freedom of impetuous thought, and enslave the mind by confining it to a beaten path. She rejects the historical as an element in the evidences of Christianity, and believes nothing that the soul cannot attest for itself. Her philosophers disdain to search for theological truth outside of themselves. From the depths of their own consciousness they can construct a system of religion which shall rival Christianity in simplicity, in beauty, in truthfulness, and in power. With them, the light within is so bright that they need no illumination from without.

Nay, the communications of reason are so transcendent in clearness, that they can expunge all errors from that which professes to be an external revelation, and leave behind the unadulterated truth. They comprehend the nature of Deity so thoroughly, that they can correct the caricature which the Bible gives of God. The triune Jehovah is not the living God, but the invention of a more

ignorant age—an absurdity incredible to a rational man. The atonement of Christ, in our eyes the corner-stone of Christianity, is pronounced a falsehood too monstrous to be believed; and future punishment, a relic of credulous antiquity. The essence of rationalism consists in exalting human reason to the dignity of supreme judge in all questions of a theological kind. It erects a tribunal within the precincts of the soul, and clothes it with unlimited power to test the truthfulness or falsity of any supposed revelation; and the only law by which it renders an infallible verdict, is a system of religious philosophy which man has constructed for himself. The tenets of a speculative philosophy are applied to the criticism of the Bible; and every doctrine is discarded, unless it can be reconciled to the imperious requirements of the system which reason has elaborated.

The rationalist is confident of the justness of his pretensions—so confident, that his vengeance is as cool and deliberate as it is remorseless and insatiable. He is not afraid to reject the most sacred and touching doctrines of the Scriptures, if they are unable to endure the ordeal of fire to which they are subjected. The doctrine may be invested with the most hallowed associations, and for centuries it may have been enshrined in the warmest affections of the excellent of the earth: he cares not for that; there is no soul in his philosophy; he is clothed with the majesty of the ermine, and even the Son of God himself must stand before the judgment-seat upon which he sits.

Rationalism, therefore, contains the germ of the most audacious infidelity, and is one of the deadliest and most dangerous enemies with which the Bible has to contend. In its incipient stage, we may not regard it with much apprehension. In some of its aspects, it does not reveal the results which it involves. In some of its advocates, it exhibits only a partial denial of the authority of Holy Writ, and continues to retain the most important features of orthodox theology. Yet even then, the principle that

animates it is at war with God's word; and when carried to its legitimate length, as it has been by many, it saps the foundation on which revelation rests, and leaves us no light but that which the glimmering lamp of reason gives, and no guide but that which a darkened understanding supplies.

Many devout and God-fearing men would shrink from the consequences to which rationalism logically leads them. But how can they rebut the charge of battling in the ranks of infidelity, while adhering to the sentiments which they avow and maintain? If reason is the pillar and ground of a single revealed doctrine, why may it not be the judge of all revealed doctrines? And if any concede that reason may lawfully remove one stone from the sacred building, why may not others, more sacrilegious than they, destroy the whole edifice of divine truth? To admit its claims at all, is to furnish the enemies of Christianity with a dangerous weapon.

It is sad to see that, as soon as one javelin is wrested from the hands of infidelity, it seizes another and hurls it in defiance at the heart of Christianity. One wave no sooner recoils from the rock of God's word, broken and shattered, than another rolls on. We feel no apprehensions for the safety of revelation; we are certain that it will always withstand the fiercest assaults of its bitter foes, and achieve new triumphs among generations yet unborn, and regions yet uncivilized; but it is painful to see that the enemies of the truth are still undismayed, and that they nerve themselves for the struggle, although they have been so often and so signally defeated.

Rationalism will no doubt have its day, and hereafter be numbered with the exploded follies of the past. Now, however, it rages like a rampant lion, standing ready to devour his prey. Like Goliath of Gath, it is armed with sword and spear and buckler, and comes forth to defy the armies of the living God. It has crossed the German ocean, and planted its feet upon British soil. After doing

its work of death on the continent of Europe, its bloody sword thirsts for victims in other quarters. Oxford, the seat of tractarianism, has reared an altar to its praise; and the sober mind of practical old England has been infected by its foul and corrupting breath. It has even ventured across the broad Atlantic, and raised its ensign upon the shores of the Northern States. In both the eastern and the western worlds, it numbers many names among its admirers and its advocates; and before its race shall have been run, it may number many more. But why does rationalism flaunt its banner so defiantly in the very face of inspiration? Is it merit, or impudence, that gives it such boldness? What valid plea does it urge in attempting to rob us of the Bible, and supplant it by a revelation which is written upon the soul? 'What weighty arguments does it employ while endeavoring to destroy the God of the Scriptures, and substitute a divinity that reason has disclosed? These questions mankind have a right to ask of a system with pretensions so flaming; and they must be answered, before the claims of the Bible can lose their power.

Pride, the love of novelty, and carnal opposition to humiliating facts, may gather many votaries around the shrine of rationalism. Unwilling to worship God, many may be willing to worship themselves. Dethroning Jehovah, they may enthrone reason, and bow before its altar as enthusiastic devotees. All this we can understand from our knowledge of the total depravity of the human heart; all this we can explain without abating one jot from the authority of inspiration.

Rationalism, therefore, must not expect us to yield to its demands upon the mere proclamation of its infallibility. When it raises its presumptuous head, and, like the Chaldean king of old, bids us bend the knee before its golden image, we are compelled to refuse, until our scruples can be satisfied and our objections removed. As rational beings we are bound to canvass its claims; and in doing that, we

meet with objections of so grave a character, that they destroy our faith in the whole system, and evince it to be the offspring of earth, and not the child of heaven.

I. It denies the possibility of every external revelation. Infidelity of the old deistical school repudiated the divine origin of the Scriptures. It contended that the necessities of mankind did not require the interposition of a supernatural communication; but it did not maintain that such a communication was impossible. It rejected the inspiration of the Bible; but it did not deny that God might reveal his will to mortals. Rationalism, however, is more comprehensive in its creed, and has advanced in the demands which it makes upon our faith. In one sweeping charge, it virtually condemns every book that may profess to have originated from the Ruler of the world. It requires us to believe, not merely that the claims of the Bible are spurious, but also that God can never reveal one single truth that lies beyond the discovery of human reason. The supposed revelation may be based upon such an amount of historical evidence as cannot be brought to substantiate the authenticity of any volume now extant, or the genuineness of any document that has been preserved from antiquity; it may be supported by the concurrent testimony of many intelligent witnesses, who depose that they saw the wonderful occurrences which they narrate, and heard the gracious words which they record; who write as if they were men of integrity, and could have no possible motive for practising an imposition; who are willing to encounter the scorn and derision which their doctrines provoke, and are ready to offer their lives as seals of their credibility; it may contain the prediction of future events, and after the lapse of years and centuries, these prophecies may be verified by the voice of history: yet notwithstanding all, philosophy will dispute its claims and oppose them bitterly to the end.

In affirming this, we do not misrepresent rationalism in the least. The fundamental postulate which it requires us to concede, justifies the strong assertions that we have made. The system is grounded on the proposition, that reason is unerring in its judgments, certain in its apprehensions, and infallible in its dicta; and this proposition implies that man can receive no new communication from without, and no external elucidation of any revelation within. For in both the one case and the other, the soul would not be the fountain of its own religious knowledge, as the rationalist contends that it is.

As a further corroboration of the truthfulness of what we have asserted, we may quote some of the language which eminent rationalists have used. Kant and Fichte both maintain "that no doctrine can be received on the authority of revelation, without the concurrent testimony of reason." Hegel affirms that "man has knowledge of God only in so far as God has knowledge of himself; this knowledge is God's self-consciousness; but just so is it, too, his knowledge of man; and God's knowledge of man is man's knowledge of God." Mr. Newman regards the soul as "the organ of specific information to us," respecting things spiritual; and Mr. Parker says "that there is a connexion between God and the soul, as between light and the eye, sound and the ear, food and the palate."

These quotations all bear us out in the assertion which we have already proven, that the philosophy of the rationalist denies the possibility of any supernatural communication from God to man.

Can such a position be successfully maintained? Is this rampart, behind which the new religion places itself, impregnable?

To many, the bare statement of the proposition which rationalists affirm and their system involves, would carry the undoubted conviction that its claims are unfounded. What! Require him to believe that his own narrow nature

is the storehouse of all knowledge, both human and divine?—ask him to concede that reason supplies all truth, both for faith and for practice, and excludes the idea of assistance from without? When one demands the assent of mankind to an article of faith like the foregoing, the great majority of men will refuse to yield it. They can not believe a proposition which is opposed, not merely by the sentiments that they have imbibed from education and from the early teachings of religious parents, but also by the very deepest feelings of their souls. They have often consulted the oracle within, and found it unequal to the necessities of their case. In numerous instances, it has given no response to the questions which they have propounded; and even when answers have been given, they have frequently been uncertain and unsatisfactory. Their experience, therefore, is at variance with that of the rationalist. The stand-point which they occupy, is one of conscious weakness and deplorable ignorance; and their sense of dependence compels them to believe that the all-wise God is able to enlighten them. They are so thoroughly grounded in such a conviction, that they would hardly tolerate a man who would come out boldly and advocate an opposite theory. No argument, however plausible, could be so artfully constructed, or so skilfully presented, as to drive them from sentiments which their helplessness and blindness have forced them to adopt.

We are aware that a caviller may object to the validity of an inference drawn from such considerations as the preceding. He may endeavor to break their force, on the ground that they are urged by those who have been taught from infancy to receive the Bible as an inspired volume. He may deny that such persons can be legitimately cited as witnesses, because all their prejudices are in favor of revelation. He may charge the Scriptures with having given an unnatural coloring to all the forms of their thoughts and feelings, and affirm that the false system of education

under which they have grown up, has obscured and even obliterated the intuitions of their reason.

We might retort by reminding him that all his prejudices are against the Bible; and if others are incompetent to bear witness in favor of the necessity and possibility of a revelation, because they have been corrupted by the instructions of their earlier years, he is not a competent witness against the truthfulness of a supposed revelation, because his religious susceptibilities and perceptions have been clouded and blunted by his infidelity. We might also express surprise that a book which has given such healthy impetus to human thought in every other direction, should mislead the mind in its search after religious truth.

But we will do more. We will point him to the more fortunate of mankind, who have escaped the baneful influence which Christianity has exerted. Let him glance for a moment at the systems of religion, which either have prevailed or do now prevail, beyond the range of the Bible's dominion; and let him say, if a belief in the possibility of a revelation is not an idea that pervades them all, though they may be never so diverse in their minuter details.

If the historical statements of the Scriptures are worthy of any credit, we know that the idolatry of the Canaanites and the paganism of the Babylonians and other contemporaneous nations, not only admitted the possibility of external revelations, but maintained that they had frequently been given by the national deities. They had their priests and their prophets, who were expected not only to attend to the ordinances of their worship, but also to interpret the communications of the gods. Roman mythology records the existence of the same belief among the inhabitants of the imperial city. How else can we explain the myth of the mysterious Sibyl that is enfolded in the mists of early Roman history? What were those sacred leaves but exponents of the wide-spread sentiment that the higher powers could reveal their will to the sons of earth? And the

prognostications of events, which were gathered by augurs and soothsayers from the entrails of beasts, the flight of birds, and the supernatural articulations of brutes—what were they, in the estimation of the pagan devotee, but the chosen language that was used by the gods to communicate with men, and make known their counsels to their faithful worshippers?

And what shall we say of the Delphian oracle, which was renowned over the civilized world, and consulted not by Greeks alone, but by Roman senators and by foreign princes—aye, and by Socrates himself, one of the purest, most profound, and most practical of all the ancient philosophers? In the eyes of antiquity, the Pythian priestess was the fountain of a more than human wisdom, and the foot of Mount Parnassus a consecrated spot, where pilgrims from every land might gather and consult the powers above, through their inspired mouthpiece.

Mohammedanism breathes a similar spirit, and embodies the very same idea. A belief in the possibility of an external revelation is so deeply imbedded in the structure of the human soul, that Mohammed was compelled to recognise it, and engraft it upon the religious system which he originated. When he conceived the idea of duping mankind, by constructing a religion that should secure for its author the veneration of its votaries, he could only mature it by retiring into solitude and pretending to communicate with heaven through the interposition of an angel. And while the sword was to be employed in proselyting the nations, the founder of the Islam faith deemed it necessary to the success of his ambitious designs, to urge his claims by appealing to God for the seal of his authority.

When we turn our eyes to the millions of India and China, who are yet bound by the superstitions which chained their ancestors, they unite their testimony with that of the mighty dead.

Mormonism furnishes no exception to what we have thus far discovered. The author of the Mormon Bible, as dishonest as he was designing, professed to have found it traced upon the metal plates in mysterious characters, which were interpreted by an angel. And the prophet that has succeeded him, claims that, from time to time, he is receiving new intimations of the divine will.

When we leave the civilized nations, and examine the religious belief of the uncivilized and the barbarous, who are without a written language, we note the same idea in the superstitions by which they are characterized. If we analyze their signs and their omens, they resolve themselves most naturally into symbols which the gods have selected, in order to give instruction to ignorant mortals.

From this cursory view of the past and the present, we discover one common sentiment embodied in the religious creeds of the human race. However much they may differ in the number or character of the deities that are worshipped, they are unanimous in contradicting the fundamental proposition of rationalism. The united voice of all ages and countries; the concurrent testimony of the civilized and the uncivilized; of the heathen, the Mohammedan, the Mormon, and the Christian; condemns the views which the rationalist has adopted—views upon the truthfulness of which he rests the claims of his system. The judgments of the world do not agree as to those volumes which are inspired and authoritative, and those which are not; but they do agree in affirming that the idea upon which the Bible is constructed, is not peculiar to Christianity, but common to all religions: they maintain that external revelations can be made.

Now, how shall we account for a sentiment so widespread? How did it originate and become universal? Are all men deceived? Have all ages recorded a falsehood? Shall we acknowledge that mankind has been blinded until now, and that philosophy enjoys the prerogative of correct-

ing so grave an error? Or shall we argue that philosophy is presumptuous, when it demands our assent to a proposition which is so extensively denied? No rational mind can hesitate in giving an answer. The opinion of the race, in all its varied conditions, and during all the various periods of its existence, is one; it therefore bears the stamp of a primitive truth; and we must accept it, and not the dogma of the rationalist, as the voice of God in the soul of man. We are compelled by all the laws of belief to receive it as an intuitive truth, when it comes to us supported by the testimony of all ages, countries, and creeds; and, as an intuitive truth, we plant ourselves firmly upon it and rest in safety there. Rationalism can never dislodge us. It may stultify itself; but it can never persuade an honest and well balanced mind that it is right, when confronted and contradicted by such a mass of overwhelming evidence. The sanction of learned names and erudite authority may mislead some; but the great body of mankind will believe in the intuitions of the many, instead of the vagaries of the few.

But further: If God can reveal no truth which reason cannot confirm, man can communicate to his fellow man no fact which he can not substantiate for himself.

Rationalism certainly maintains that the human mind is the ultimate standard of appeal in all questions of a theological kind; and that no doctrine can ever be binding, unless approved by it and sanctioned by its authority. But how can the principle which such an assertion contains, be restricted in its application? Why should it be confined to religious matters alone? If no testimony in behalf of the supernatural is entitled to credit, may we not rightly infer that testimony is never credible? Rationalism denies the veracity of men who profess to have been inspired, and thereby qualified to teach us truth which is undiscoverable by man; at the same time, however, it would raise no objections against their truthfulness, if they were

ordinary historians. Why does it make such a distinction? If it is lawful, nay, necessary to discard evidence in the one case, why may it not be rejected in all cases? A plain man can not understand why a witness who is trustworthy, when deposing to one fact, should be unworthy of credit when deposing to another. We are accustomed to test the validity of testimony by inquiring into the character of the witness; and when that has been established, we no longer question the trustworthiness of his depositions. We cannot, therefore, see why a man who is acknowledged to be honest, upright, and truthful, when testifying to the natural, is disbelieved when testifying to the supernatural. Philosophy may perceive a difference between the two cases, and may therefore feel justified in the conclusion which it has reached. But it must pardon less acute intellects, if they cannot see how objections against evidence in favor of the supernatural fail to be objections against evidence in general. If Moses and Paul are not to be believed, because they tell of things that lie beyond the possibility of discovery as well as comprehension, why should we believe them if they should testify to facts of a historical nature?

If, therefore, as rationalism affirms, no evidence can substantiate any theological doctrine that lies beyond the range of human reason, we contend that no evidence can prove the occurrence of a single event that has happened beyond the pale of our personal experience. And thus the world must sink, not into the depths of religious scepticism alone, but into the dark abyss of universal unbelief.

The statements of our most cherished and valued friends must be regarded with distrust, unless they can be confirmed by observations of our own. One generation may not learn wisdom by the experience of the past, for it can never know what that experience was. The principles of sound statesmanship must be confined to the age in which they originated, nay, within a smaller compass than even that. Neither virtue nor vice can be transmitted, except through the in-

fluence which they exerted on those with whom they came immediately in contact. Historians are toiling in vain, when they spend days and months over the records of the past, in order that they may separate the true from the false, and guard their volumes against the introduction of errors; for they can verify nothing that they narrate; and even if they could, any reader might disbelieve every sentence that they had written. Courts of justice are empty formalities; you can never be certain that you have a true copy of the laws that were enacted by the proper authorities; but even if that difficulty were surmounted, your witnesses might be dishonest and corrupt; and although every precaution had been taken to secure men of reputable and upright character, they might swear to a falsehood, while protesting that it was the truth.

Are we willing to adopt a proposition which leads to consequences like the foregoing? Even should we denounce the authority of the Bible, could we accept so dreary a system, which throws a cloud of uncertainty over the whole history of the past, and obscures all the present, excepting that limited portion which falls within the circle of our own contracted vision? Common sense asserts its right to be heard, when rationalism with reckless hand would sweep away the credibility of all testimony; and the verdict of common sense will condemn the dictum of a hair-brained, speculative philosophy.

The rationalist may seek to evade the force of the foregoing objection to his system, by replying that, in the nature of things, religious truth appeals to the reason for confirmation or rejection, while the knowledge of the past just as naturally depends upon well-accredited testimony; he may therefore contend, that he is obeying the laws of his constitution, when he admits the validity of evidence in support of the historical, and denies it in support of the supernatural.

To this we make two rejoinders:

1. He should remember that the position which he assigns to reason in matters of religion is controverted, and that not by a few, but by the great majority of mankind. Until, therefore, he can demonstrate that reason is really invested with the functions which he ascribes to it, he must not assume that it is, in order to disprove the objections which are raised against that very feature of his system. To do so is to beg the very question at issue, and thereby render himself unassailable by any arguments, even the most weighty.

2. If rationalism admits that facts of history may be substantiated by testimony, as it must do in attempting to defend itself against the charge of universal scepticism, we may easily prove that it involves itself in contradictions from which it cannot escape.

Every man that rejects the scheme of Pantheism, and believes in a personal God who is independent of nature, and is the great First-Cause of all things, perceives at a glance, that there are many facts connected with the universe, of as purely a historical character as any of the events which have happened under the observation of different generations—facts which it is impossible for reason ever to discover, because they are historical. For example: If God is the Creator of the universe, there certainly was a time when the work was completed. Unless all things were made at once, there was some special order in the successive acts of creating power; there was a time when the earth was first ready for the reception of those who were to inhabit its surface, and man came forth from the hands of his Maker, endowed with such faculties as infinite Wisdom saw fit to give him.

Now, unless God has less power than His creatures, (which it were profane and impious to assert,) we must acknowledge that He is able to communicate a knowledge of these things to any that He may select for the purpose. Unless Omnipotence is weaker than its handy-work, we are com-

pelled to admit that God can inform man when the world was made; what order He observed in the different departments of creation; and what was the nature of all things, when each one was finished and assigned to its proper place. To this, rationalism can oppose no objection, as long as it assents to a belief in the credibility of history. It must acknowledge that God can as well reveal those facts to man, as one man can communicate historical facts to another; and since it does not dispute the trustworthiness of all testimony, it must also grant that, in case God should see fit to make such a revelation, a witness would be as capable of testifying to the reality of that revelation, and as trustworthy in his statements, as when he affirms his knowledge of an ordinary event that has occurred before his own eyes.

If, therefore, we have a volume that professes to have been dictated by Jehovah, in order to inform us on topics so far beyond the discoveries of reason, yet lying within the province of history, rationalism must concede, that the claims of such a volume are entitled to be weighed, and that the evidence which supports them demands as fair and impartial an examination as that which is allowed to historical evidence in general.

We have such a volume—a book that professes to give a historical account of the creation, and a true record of God's first transaction with His creatures—a book, all the distinctive theology of which is based upon the supposition, that it furnishes us with a correct narrative of man's primitive estate of innocence and purity, and his subsequent lapse into sin and guilt. After many centuries, we have another volume, which professes to give us a sketch of the most remarkable personage that ever lived. Many strange and wonderful deeds are said to have been done by him; many remarkable words are said to have fallen from his lips; but most wonderful of all, it is said that, after having been buried for three days, he rose from the dead. Many witnesses affirm that they saw him after his resurrection, and

recognised him as the same Jesus that they had followed as his disciples.

All these are historical facts; and as facts, they may be confirmed by proper evidence, according to the admission of rationalists themselves. Yet rationalism denies many, if not all of them; and why? Not because there is a deficiency in the number of the witnesses; not because any thing can be alleged against their character, or their motives; but because the subject-matter of the narrative forms the groundwork of a theological system which human reason cannot approve.

See then, the contradiction in which rationalism is involved. The only way in which it could hope to vindicate itself from the charge of universal scepticism, was to admit the validity of testimony in behalf of the historical. And since there is a historical element which constitutes the basis of evangelical theology, rationalism, if true to its admissions, would be forced to acknowledge that it may be the proper subject of competent testimony. But to admit that, would be to discard its own theology; and in order that *it* may be preserved, the rationalist denies the truthfulness of historical evidence, and thereby not only contradicts his former statements, but also confirms us in what we proved before: he makes the whole past a perfect blank, and blots out all of the present that does not fall within our limited observation and experience.

Again: If we are bound to reject every religious doctrine that reason can not attest, we must also disbelieve all scientific facts which we are unable to substantiate for ourselves.

The theology of the rationalist embraces all the intuitive perceptions of the reason in matters of religion, together with all the consequences that are logically deducible from them. All these he will include among the articles of his faith; but no amount of evidence will induce him to go farther. They form the platform on which he stands; and he would not consent either to enlarge or to diminish it in

one single particular, even though a voice from heaven should seem to tell him that he was wrong.

Now, if such views are correct, when applied to religious philosophy, they must also apply, with equal correctness, to every science that is composed of intuitive principles and their legitimate consequences; and not merely to such a science, but to all sciences which are made up of facts established by observation, together with their logical sequences. If an external revelation insults the reason by offering to supplement its ignorance with light from heaven, the understanding is equally insulted when required to receive a scientific truth which it either does not perceive at a glance, or can not deduce from premises that are either axioms or the results of observation. There is a perfect analogy between the two cases; and whatever holds true of the one must also hold true of the other. If religious doctrines should be rejected, unless confirmed by consciousness, or by inferences drawn from the facts of consciousness; scientific truths must in like manner be denied, unless proved by observation, or by investigations founded on observation.

Are we prepared to place our knowledge of science upon such a basis, and accept all the results that follow from such an admission? Let us see the consequences to which it leads. There are many truths which chemists have announced as the discoveries of long-continued and laborious experiments. Few have the time, and still fewer the means, to make the investigations for themselves. Shall we therefore discredit the statements that are made by eminent men, and be sceptical in regard to the facts of chemistry, because we are not able to substantiate them for ourselves? Many of the laws of mechanical philosophy may be mathematically demonstrated, but most men are unable to prove them. Shall they hesitate on that account to receive them as scientific truths? The laws of Kepler may be understood and appreciated by a schoolboy; but situated as he

is, he cannot verify them. Shall he deny that they are the laws which govern the motions of the heavenly bodies, until higher attainments and personal observation enable him to establish them as such? Astronomers can predict with unerring certainty the eclipses of the sun and the moon for ages to come. Shall we refuse to believe their calculations, because our knowledge is more limited than theirs?

To all these questions we are bound to render a negative answer. We plainly perceive, that the necessities of our circumstances compel us to accept many scientific truths on the testimony of others, while better opportunities and more thorough scholarship would enable us to determine them for ourselves. Thus it has ever been, and thus it will ever be. So far therefore from stultifying ourselves in doing as we do, we follow the only course that befits a rational mind; and since rationalism, when rightly interpreted, enjoins an opposite course, we urge this as a third objection against a system so presumptuous in its assertions and so pernicious in its influence.

Lastly: If an external revelation is impossible, it can only be so because the internal revelation is complete and infallible. It must be both: for if it was incomplete, it might receive additions; and if it was fallible, it might be corrected. But this is not all. Since every mind is a judge for itself, the system of religious philosophy which each man constructs for himself must be complete and infallible. Behold then, the proposition to which rationalism bids us assent! We can never consent to adopt it. If the theology which reason reveals is complete, why do the systems of some of its advocates embrace so much more than those of some others? And if all are infallible, why do they present so many contradictions? One rationalist rejects the authority of one of the sacred books, while another admits it. Both must be infallible, or rationalism is a falsehood; and yet they cannot be infallible, for they contradict each

other. Mr. Emerson is a Pantheist, and Mr. Parker a Spiritualist. Both are right, for both are infallible; yet both cannot be right, for their respective systems are contradictory.

How can we embrace a system when it involves such absurdities? The incomprehensible we may believe, but the absurd never; and to make such a demand is to insult our common sense, and to ignore all the laws of human belief.

From the several considerations already presented, we are compelled to deny the fundamental assumption of rationalistic theology. If the independent conclusions of the human mind are the criteria that test the validity of a supposed revelation, they virtually exclude the possibility of any revelation at all; and if a revelation is impossible, we must condemn the judgments of all ages and countries; renounce our faith in the credibility of all historical evidence; reject all scientific truths that we are unable to demonstrate for ourselves; and acknowledge that the various antagonistic schemes of religious philosophy are all complete and infallible, and claim our acceptance with equal and irresistible power.

But we feel that a primitive truth has authority which we dare not resist; we shrink from a cheerless scepticism which consigns the past to oblivion, and the present to uncertainty; we are forced by the necessities of our condition, as well as by the example of profound and erudite scholars, to accept the discoveries of science, although we cannot verify them by investigations of our own; and by an unchangeable law of our nature, we are constrained to reject every proposition that involves an absurdity. We are justified therefore, in strenuously opposing the claims of rationalism; in denouncing it as vain, presumptuous, arrogant and pretentious; and in pronouncing it utterly unreasonable in the demands which it makes upon our faith.

And here we might stop. For if metaphysical theology is absolutely dependent upon the denial of the possibility

of an external revelation, as we have shown that it is; and if that denial involves us in perplexities and absurdities from which we cannot escape, as we have proved that it does; then we have no alternative but to charge the whole system of rationalism with waging war upon the constitution of our nature, and therefore with being false in theory, irrational, and unworthy of our reception.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

ARTICLE IV.

**REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE RELIGIOUS
INSTRUCTION OF THE COLORED PEOPLE.***

The Committee to whom was referred the subject of providing more thorough religious instruction for the colored people within the bounds of Harmony Presbytery, respectfully report, that they have given the subject their most earnest consideration, and would embody the results of their inquiries and reflections in the following statements and recommendations.

The Committee do not deem it necessary to offer any extended or elaborate argument, to show that it is the solemn duty of the Church to make ample provision for the religious instruction of such of this race as have been cast upon her care by the providence of God. This duty, it is believed, will readily be conceded by every enlightened Christian community in the land. No other rational solution can possibly be given of that singular providence which

* Presented to Harmony Presbytery, October, 1863.

brought them to our shores, and we shall be sadly remiss in our duties both to the great Head of the Church and to our fellow man, if we do not avail ourselves of this favorable turn of providence to promote His glory and secure their everlasting salvation. Nor can we satisfy our own consciences for holding them in bondage, or exacting from them the daily services we do, if we do not make some kind of compensation in the bestowment of spiritual blessings. We freely acknowledge our obligation to provide for their temporal wants; and the master who fails to do this, is not only chargeable with unkindness and injustice to his slaves, but is sure to incur the deserved censure of his fellow-men. But are we under less obligation to provide for their spiritual improvement? If a sense of duty, interest, or regard to the sentiments of our fellow-men, compels us to the performance of one class of these duties, why should a sense of justice and accountability to God not compel us to the observance of the other? But more than this. Our servants constitute a part of our households. It is only on this ground that we can find any sanction in the word of God for the institution of slavery. As members of the family-compact, they have therefore the same claims for religious instruction that our children have; and the neglect of duty in one case, is scarcely less reprehensible than in the other. Our people generally admit the justice of these claims; and the great body of them would long since have entered more heartily upon the discharge of this duty, if they had not been embarrassed by the officious intermeddling of northern Abolitionists. This source of embarrassment, it is hoped, will not exist hereafter, and one of the great ends of the bloody conflict in which we are now engaged will be entirely frustrated, if it does not result in the spiritual amelioration of our black people.

The Committee are glad to believe that the number of those among us, who look upon the religious instruction of the negroes with suspicion and apprehension, is constantly diminishing. The assumption that the stability of the in-

stitution is thereby imperilled, or the safety of the whites jeopardated, is not only contrary to reason and experience, but is exceedingly dishonoring to the Gospel of Jesus Christ itself. That Gospel, if it exerts any influence upon the hearts of men at all, promotes peace, harmony, subordination to authority, and whatever else is necessary to the peace and welfare of society. Besides which, it is simply absurd in men to go to the Bible to find a sanction for the institution of slavery, and yet be unwilling for the minds of their slaves to be imbued with its teachings on this and all other subjects of practical importance. If our colored people thoroughly understood, from their own personal knowledge of the Scriptures, just what they teach in relation to the mutual duties of master and servants, there is reason to believe that they would be happier, more contented in their lot, and would be far more faithful and cheerful in the performance of their duties. There is one aspect of this matter which your Committee could wish was impressed upon the heart of this whole country. A bitter and unreasoned prejudice exists against this institution in almost every other portion of the civilized world; and this, no doubt, is the main reason why no helping hand has hitherto been stretched out to aid us in the unequal contest in which we are engaged. So far as our Northern enemies are concerned, this prejudice does not lie so much against the institution of slavery as such, as against the blacks as a race. The natural antipathy of the Northerner to the negro, as the world is beginning to find out, is most intense, and some of the Northern journals have had the honesty of late to acknowledge that the great end of the war they are waging against us is to sweep away the black population to make room for the whites; that they are fighting the whites of the South because they serve as a bulwark to defend the blacks. Now, it is a matter of the greatest importance that our black people should have intelligence enough to comprehend this state of things.

They ought to be sufficiently intelligent, not only to understand what is the precise relationship authorized by the word of God between them and their masters, but what would be their ultimate condition, if we were to be borne down by the great odds arrayed against us—that we are resisting with all the energy God has given, a prejudice that is more injurious to them than ourselves; and that our overthrow would be their ruin. If these things were thoroughly understood by them, which cannot be the case without a higher degree of intelligence than they possess at present, they would not only be happier in their condition as servants, but in case of any future struggle for national existence, like the one through which we are now passing, instead of being a weakness, they would be a source of the greatest strength.

Your Committee are glad to learn, upon inquiry, that most, if not all, of the ministerial members of this Presbytery are, and have been, for a number of years past, actively engaged in promoting the spiritual welfare of the colored people of their respective charges. In most of our congregations, a separate service is held for the blacks every Sabbath, consisting of singing, prayer, reading the scriptures, and a sermon or catechetical instruction, or the two combined. These services, whenever regularly maintained, are highly valued by the blacks, as may be inferred from the numbers who attend them; and their good effects upon their moral and religious character will not be doubted by any one who has had opportunity to note their general deportment, or who believes in the power of the Gospel to reform the hearts and lives of men. Your Committee would not, therefore, recommend any modification or suspension of these labors, upon which God has placed the broad seal of his approbation, but they would supplement and enlarge them, by enlisting the services of the great body of Christian members in the same good work;

and to this end, they would recommend the following measures:

1. That it should be the aim of every Christian master in our Church to have his negroes attend the same place of religious worship with himself. It is not only his duty to have them instructed in the principles of the Gospel, but it should be done as much as possible under his own personal inspection. He expects his children to attend the same ministrations with himself, and it is not less his duty to see that his negroes attend the same place of worship. Of course no harsh or arbitrary measures should be employed to effect this object, but a little care and persuasion on the part of the master, it is believed, would easily secure the desirable end. The license to attend any place of worship they may choose, may not only leave them without any solid religious knowledge, but it often begets habits of the most objectionable character. The practice of employing ministers of other denominations to visit our plantations and hold stated religious meetings for our black people, is very objectionable. Our own Church should devise plans for the full and thorough instruction of all classes among us, and we ought not, therefore, to invoke the aid of other denominations to do for us what we ought to do for ourselves.

2. Your Committee would recommend again that a small chapel be erected on every plantation, where the black people may be assembled every Sabbath afternoon for religious worship, and where they may be taught hymns, portions of Scripture, and receive catechetical instruction. These services should be conducted by the master of the plantation, or some other member of the white family, or by all the members of the family capable of instructing, united. The pastor of the church should visit all these plantations in the bounds of his congregation in rotation, for the purpose of giving advice and speaking a word of encouragement to those who are en-

gaged in teaching, as well as those who are taught. It would be well also for a uniform system of instruction to be adopted in all the plantation schools of the same congregation, so that once a month, or once in three months, the pastor might examine the whole of the black congregation at the church, in relation to what they had been learning in the intermediate time. The particular hymn or hymns to be learned, the portions of Scripture to be committed to memory, and the catechetical instruction to be imparted, should be announced from the pulpit on each of the general review days. It is not only important that the minds of our colored people should be stored with this kind of knowledge, but great advantages will arise from their learning the same lessons at the same time. In this way, they would be able to unite in singing the same hymns in public worship; converse with each other on their way to and from the church, in relation to what they had been taught; and the pastor of the church would do well to make the passage of Scripture given as a lesson the subject of discourse for the intervening Sabbaths. A similar course of instruction might be adopted where our congregations are confined to towns and villages, the particulars of which the Committee need not detail. Your Committee confidently believe that if this course of instruction were systematically and efficiently carried out, it would, with the blessing of Almighty God, not only inaugurate a new and happier period in the spiritual condition of our colored people, but would impart new energy and life to our whole church, by calling into exercise all the graces and talents committed to us as a people.

3. A third measure which your Committee would recommend, is the assembling of the negroes of the plantation once a day, in the morning or evening, as might be found most convenient, in the chapel, or some other convenient room, for daily prayers. The exercises might consist of singing a hymn and prayer, or reading a portion of

Scripture and prayer, and should not be extended beyond twelve or fifteen minutes. The exercises should be conducted by some member of the white family, or where there was a suitable black man on the place, they might be conducted in part or whole by him. The time fixed for these prayers should be in the morning, when the people were on their way to work, or at night, when they were returning from their labors. On most of our plantations this would be a novel measure, and, at first, some difficulty no doubt would be encountered in enforcing it; but a little of that patience and perseverance which we claim as a denomination, would guarantee success; and your Committee firmly believe that it would, after a while, be productive of the happiest results to every plantation where it is perseveringly carried out.

4. A further recommendation is, that the domestic servants of every household should be required to attend morning and evening prayers with the white family, and the exercises should be modified as much as possible to suit their circumstances. It is greatly to be regretted that this important and obvious duty is overlooked in so many of our Christian families. As a general thing, we are scrupulous and conscientious in requiring this duty of our children; and why should we be less so in requiring it of our domestic servants? If they are permitted to loiter about the premises while these solemn and interesting exercises are going on in the white family, it will naturally beget in their minds the conviction that they have no lot or part in this great matter; and it may be worse for them in the great day of accounts than it would be if they had never known such privileges. It is not surprising that they should be indifferent, or even averse to attending these exercises. It would be so with our children, the great majority of them at least, if they were left to their own choice; and if we feel it our duty to resort to authority in one case, why should we not in the other?

5. In the fifth place, your Committee would earnestly recommend that Presbytery at once consider and adopt some measure in relation to the baptism of children of believing colored parents. In a few of our congregations this ordinance is, it is understood, conscientiously administered in all such cases; but in many of them it is entirely overlooked. Your Committee do not undertake to decide the somewhat mooted question whether the baptismal vows should be assumed by the parent or the master, though they are very decidedly of the opinion that they properly belong to the parent; but they do most earnestly insist that the duty itself should not be overlooked. It is not only an act of injustice to our colored brethren and their offspring, but it is great dishonor and neglect cast upon an institution to which the Saviour has attached the greatest importance. It is often alleged in extenuation of the neglect of this duty, that the authority of colored people over their children is so limited and uncertain that it is not proper to impose upon them the vows of baptismal responsibility. But this your Committee does not regard as a valid objection. The Church ought to do her duty in the premises. If it comes within her province, she ought to see to it that the parent is not restricted in the exercise of the proper authority over his children. If men of the world, over whom she has no control, break up the relationship that ought to exist between the parent and the child, before the latter has attained years of discretion, the sin and responsibility rest upon them, and not upon the Church. Besides which, the child is not deprived of the advantages of baptism by simply being removed from parental control. It is still a member of the visible Church, and enjoys the benefit of the prayers of God's people.

6. In the sixth and last place, the Committee recommend Presbytery to exercise all the influence they can to render sacred and permanent the marriage relation be-

tween our colored people, and especially among the members of the Church. Among the colored people themselves, the most lax views prevail in relation to this matter; but is not much of this to be ascribed to the fact that the whites have not showed the regard they ought for the sanctity of the relationship as existing among their servants? Marriage is a religious as well as a civil institution; and while the Church can exercise no authority over it as a mere civil institution, she can do a great deal to make the colored people feel its sacredness, and she ought to exhort Christian masters to avoid every thing that would lead to the severance of so sacred a tie.

Now, if these various recommendations are fully and heartily carried out, your Committee feel assured that they would be attended with the happiest results. The whites would find themselves actively and happily engaged in a work of love and mercy that has obviously been laid upon their shoulders by the hand of God; and they would soon find themselves more than repaid for all their toils and labors in the increased fidelity and cheerfulness of their servants. And the servants, on the other hand, would entertain feelings of greater self-respect, would put away many of their grovelling vices, and through these varied means, many of them would be brought to the knowledge of the Saviour, and be made to rejoice in His salvation.

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ARTICLE I.

THE CHARACTER AND CONDITIONS OF LIBERTY.

Justice and equality the only stable foundation of all natural and moral rule, and of all rights under the government of God; and as such will be maintained and defended by God, who is the hearer and helper of the oppressed.

The Scriptures everywhere authorize us to plead with God, to whom reverence belongs, for His defence of a cause which is **RIGHT**, whether that cause be personal and private, or public and national. Whether we look to Abraham, or to Jacob, or to Job, or to Moses, or to Joshua, or to the Judges, or to the kings of Judah and Israel, or to Samuel and David, or to the prophets, or to the Maccabees during the lunar night which intervened between the setting and the rising again of the sun of inspiration, we hear one and the same appeal to God; the same humble acknowledgment of personal, national, and ancestral unrighteousness

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and ill-desert before him; but at the same time, boldness and confidence in professing their righteousness before men, in protesting against the wickedness and cruelty of their enemies, and the same earnest pleading for their destruction by the interposition of the righteous Governor of heaven and earth. Thus, to quote a most appropriate and encouraging model prayer, Daniel tells us—

“And I set my face unto the Lord God, to seek by prayer and supplications, with fasting, and sackcloth, and ashes: and I prayed unto the Lord my God, and made my confession, and said, O Lord, the great and dreadful God, keeping the covenant and mercy to them that love him, and to them that keep his commandments; we have sinned, and have committed iniquity, and have done wickedly, and have rebelled, even by departing from thy precepts and from thy judgments: neither have we hearkened unto thy servants, the prophets, which spake in thy name to our kings, our princes, and our fathers, and to all the people of the land. O Lord, *righteousness belongeth unto thee*, but unto us confusion of faces, as at this day; to the men of Judah, and to the inhabitants of Jerusalem, and unto all Israel, that are near, and that are far off, through all the countries whither thou hast driven them, because of their trespass that they have trespassed against thee. O Lord, to us belongeth confusion of face, to our kings, to our princes, and to our fathers, because we have sinned against thee. To the Lord our God belong mercies and forgivenesses, though we have rebelled against him.”

And that we may quote a specimen of the common language of David and the Psalms, which were prepared and are preserved as, in their spirit and letter, our authorized forms of prayer, we are taught to say—

“Hear the right, O Lord, attend unto my cry, give ear unto my prayer, that goeth not out of feigned lips. Let my sentence come forth from thy presence; let thine eyes behold the things that are equal. Judge me, O Lord; for I have walked in mine integrity: I have trusted also in the Lord; therefore I shall not slide.

“Plead my cause, O Lord, with them that strive with me: fight against them that fight against me. Take hold of shield and buckler,

and stand up for mine help. Draw out also the spear, and stop the way against them that persecute me: say unto my soul, I am thy salvation. Let them be confounded and put to shame that seek after my soul: let them be turned back and brought to confusion that devise my hurt. Let them be as chaff before the wind: and let the angel of the Lord chase them. Let their way be dark and slippery: and let the angel of the Lord persecute them. For without cause have they hid for me their net in a pit, which without cause they have digged for my soul. Let destruction come upon him at unawares; and let his net that he hath hid catch himself: into that very destruction let him fall. And my soul shall be joyful in the Lord: it shall rejoice in his salvation. All my bones shall say, Lord, who is like unto thee, which deliverest the poor from him that is too strong for him, yea, the poor and the needy from him that spoileth him? Lord, how long wilt thou look on? rescue my soul from their destructions, my darling from the lions. I will give thee thanks in the great congregation: I will praise thee among much people. Let not them that are mine enemies wrongfully rejoice over me: neither let them wink with the eye that hate me without a cause. For they speak not peace: but they devise deceitful matters against them that are quiet in the land. This thou hast seen, O Lord: keep not silence: O Lord, be not far from me. Stir up thyself, and awake to my judgment, even unto my cause, my God and my Lord. And my tongue shall speak aloud thy righteousness and of thy salvation, all the day long."*

We may appeal, at another time, to this great cloud of witnesses, to whom we are referred as our exemplars in suffering, affliction, and patience, and as, in part, the foundation of our faith, in illustration of the much misconceived relation in which we stand to *public*, as compared with *personal* and *private* enemies, and the entirely different character of our authorized purposes and prayers concerning them; † but at present we confine our attention to that

* See all Ps. 35, 7, 9, &c.

† From the want of this distinction many Christians and ministers apply Christ's rules given for personal guidance in personal relations and difficulties, to citizens in their relations to their government and country, and to the wicked enemies of their country. They thus make Christ in the Gos-

confiding faith in God, "who executeth justice and judgment for all that are oppressed," which emboldened them while contending even unto blood and the loss of all things, for their homes and heritage, to pray for, and to expect the interposition of God's avenging and omnipotent providence.

If then, as we have seen,* the cause for which the South is now waging war, is unquestionably just and righteous, and our course dictated by a righteous and peace-loving

pel contradict Christ in the apostolical writings. (See Romans xiii, 1-8, and 1 Peter ii, 13-15.) They make it a duty to condemn such enemies as wicked, and to oppose, fight against, defeat, and destroy them, and yet we must not pray for success in doing this, and that God may do it for us, and teach us how to fight, and to fight for us. As they are seeking to destroy our country, it is the duty of every citizen to pray for, and to endeavor to secure the infliction of full retributive justice upon them, and to pray, as do the souls of our slaughtered martyrs in heaven: "How long, O Lord, holy and true, dost thou not judge and avenge our blood on them that dwell on the earth."—Rev. vi, 10. (See Rev. xi, 18; Deut. xxxii, 41, 43, &c.)

Our President has changed the character of this war, and brought upon us, we fear, God's anger, and incalculable miseries, by acting according to the personal views and feelings of Mr. Davis, the humane Christian, and not as he is solemnly bound to do, as the President and Ruler of a Government which is the ordinance of God, by whom he has been appointed **THE MINISTER OF GOD, A REVENGER**, to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil. Has he not, by his unjust clemency and forbearance, provoked the execution upon us of the "curse against those who do the work of the Lord deceitfully, by keeping back their hand from blood?" And yet this distinction is solemnly declared by President Davis, in his proclamation outlawing Butler and his officers:

"Now, therefore, I, Jefferson Davis, President of the Confederate States of America, and acting by their authority, appealing to the Divine Judge in attestation that their conduct is not guided by the passion of revenge, but that they reluctantly yield to the solemn duty of repressing, by necessary severity, crimes of which their citizens are the victims, do issue this my proclamation, and by virtue of my authority as Commander-in-chief of the Armies of the Confederate States, do order:

"1st. That all commissioned officers in the command of said Benjamin F. Butler be declared not entitled to be considered as soldiers engaged in honorable warfare, but as robbers and criminals, deserving death; and that they, and each of them, be, whenever captured, reserved for execution."

* *Vindication of the War, So. Pres. Review, Vol. XV, No. 4.*

spirit, we may, while acknowledging our guilt and the righteousness of God's judgments; boldly approach God's throne of justice and judgment, and appealing to His name, His character, His word and promises, and His acts as "made known to Moses" and in ancient times, confidently entreat and anticipate His intervention on our behalf, and that He will be gloriously "known by the judgment He will execute" upon our enemies.

Underlying, as an eternal and immutable basis, all government, human and divine, there is *RIGHT*, and a righteous equality in its application and enforcement upon all under such dominion, according to their several spheres, capacities, and responsibilities. That is *right*, and a natural, inalienable right, which is according to the rule or standard of duty imposed by the Creator upon the creature, who is made capable of, and subject to moral government; and as rights and responsibilities are determined by the natural capacity, opportunity, and position, allotted by Him who giveth to every man severally as He will, assigning to individuals the bounds of their habitation and their various conditions, as high or low, rich or poor, bond or free—so there is *equality* and liberty to enjoy rights, when the scales of justice are held in an equal hand, and things just and equal are administered to, and required from every man, according to his relative claims. This righteous equality must find its ultimate authority and determination in God's nature and providence, and in that revelation of His will which is made in the nature and necessities of man; in his sense of justice, truth, and honor; in his moral judgment of others; in the universality of laws and penalties, enforced by the combined power of associated communities, for the security of life, liberty, and property, and the preservation of peace, order, and happiness; and in the fuller revelation made of man's natural, social, and spiritual relations and responsibilities in God's inspired word.

Upon these immutable and essential principles, God has established society and made the welfare and happiness of man to depend. As justice and judgment are the foundation of God's throne and government, so are they of all right government among men. For it is no more true that, in order to live at all, men *must* live in associated communities, than that to be happy, prosperous, and exalted, God's providential diversity of natural and relative condition must be recognised and respected, and that every such society must embody as fundamental principles of union, truth, justice, honesty, honor, and mutual confidence, and the assurance that the power of all will be employed in securing faithful and impartial protection in the enjoyment of all recognised relations and rights.

This, as we have formerly seen, is the teaching of the apostle Paul, in his full inspired delineation of civil government, and of the mutual rights, responsibilities, and duties of rulers and people, considered in their *divine* aspect. (See Rom. 13.) We are here infallibly taught, what the history of the world has invariably confirmed, that civil government is the ordinance of God, and is no more voluntary or fortuitous than that of the family, nor any less dependent upon the power of righteousness for its peace and prosperity. The one no more than the other is the creation of man's wisdom or philosophy. They are both alike from and of God, and as necessary to man's comfortable residence upon the earth as is the earth to his subsistence, and requiring for propitious results as diligent moral husbandry as the latter does physical. Both are natural, social, and moral institutions, adapted to man as a fallen, sinful, selfish, and sensual being, under the dominion of Christ as a Saviour, and the dispensation of grace, and yet entirely distinct in their nature, principles, and final end, and intended to bring men into subjection, order and civilization, so as to prepare the way of the Lord, and open

channels along which the waters of salvation may flow freely, and find most ready access to every perishing sinner.

The constitution of society with diversities in rank and condition, including bond and free; and with limitation of rights, so as to secure the most perfect liberty possible to man as sinful and selfish; distinctly pointed out and provided for in God's word—a slaveocracy, God's chosen model and illustration.

Civil government is, therefore, the ordinance of God, as *the moral governor of the world*, founded upon natural principles of equity and benevolence, and having for its end the “good,” the general and equal benefit, of all its various ranks and orders, in all their diversified labors, occupations, and interests. Rulers are “God’s ministers” to the people (“*every soul,*”) for the single purpose of securing to them this “good,” by the faithful and impartial administration of the constitution and laws under which they exist, and by which they are restrained and limited as “a law unto themselves.” Their power is to be exercised so as to secure the happiness and approval of those who “do good,” by acting in conformity with the constitution and laws as they may exist, primarily in sovereign states, and derivatively in a common compact; and to execute wrath upon all those who “do evil,” by acting in an unconstitutional and illegal manner. Such is civil government as ordained by God, who, as the common Father of all, would by it secure to every man, with equal impartiality, life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and the unrestricted enjoyment of all rights pertaining to them in their several spheres and relations, as these are established by His providence, and recognised and regulated by the constitution and laws of their country. This is the final end and purpose for which civil government is ordained by God. It is, therefore, to be adapted to this end by the wise expediency of pure and disinterested patriotism, as the changing character and condition of the people may require, so as to perpetuate the

largest liberty; that is, the most secure and untrammelled enjoyment of all personal and relative rights created by God's providence, and guaranteed by the constitution and laws of the country. Government is not an *end*, but a *means to an end*. Government was made for man, and not man for government. Government was made for the "good" of man; that is, for the greatest *possible* good which is practicable, for all who are associated under it, whether high or low, rich or poor, bond or free, master or slave, laborer or ruler, male or female, young or old, unlearned, ignorant, or learned, strong or weak, in a majority or a minority. Men of every natural character and capacity, class, and condition, are thus bound to each other by the law of love, and the law of equity, written on the heart, and revealed by the common legislation and mutual judgment of mankind, under the authority of God as moral governor of the world, and the dispenser of rewards and punishments to nations and individuals.* And this is liberty, whatever may be the form, or however various the elements, of society. Whether it be a slaveocratic or a freesoil republic, or an aristocracy, or an autocracy, or a mixed monarchy, the predominating influence of these two laws, like the two great powers of nature, attraction and gravitation, will secure order, harmony, and the most unrestrained exercise of every right, in the discharge of every duty to ourselves, to each other, and to God—and THIS IS PERFECT LIBERTY. And this is God's end in the ordinance of civil government. It provides and protects liberty to enjoy and to exercise all the rights of men—of moral and ac-

* Under this natural law of God's moral government must be included the law of the Sabbath; for the Sabbath was made for man—as human—in the beginning, in adaptation to his physical, intellectual, and moral nature. As such it has been, in some form, common to men; and it is as thus naturally divine and necessary, and not as adopted and enforced by Christianity, our governments may be properly urged to acknowledge and reverence and protect it, and can consistently do so.

countable subjects of the divine government—in whatever rank or condition God has providentially placed them, and from which no ordinance of man can displace them, without overthrowing liberty and introducing anarchy, or tyranny, or the utter destruction of any existing society.

This is the highest liberty of which man is capable. It implies the highest exercise of his noblest powers and prerogatives. It presupposes an enlightened capacity to discern what are rights, personal and relative, and a conscience to exercise them, void of offence towards God and man. Rights apart from responsibilities; privileges unaccompanied by obligations to service; personal security, provision and enjoyment, independent of their diffusion in equal and impartial measure, through the entire community; is the wild dream of visionary speculation. It is to put the power of right into the hands of a madman, who will only use it in scattering around him firebrands, arrows, and death. It would be to turn every man into an Ishmaelite, whose hand is against every man, and every man's hand against him. Liberty is coordinate with law. They co-exist and characterize each other. They are inseparable. Though twain, they are one, and indispensable to a perfect condition of society; just as humanity, while divided into distinct sexes, is only complete by their re-union in the mystic bond of matrimony; and both are alike the ordinance of God, for securing to man the greatest amount of liberty and happiness. Liberty and loyalty to law, God has constituted the balance wheels by which a well-regulated government is carried on, secure from friction; or the two poles around which its complicated machinery moves in quiet harmony. Loyalty to law, and to all rights under the law; and liberty to all to act in accordance with them; this is that righteous equality which exalteth a nation, and departure from which will bring reproach upon any people. Such is man's nature in relation to society, and such is society as adapted by God to that nature. To render His

purposes unmistakably clear, God has not only given us the history of man's experiments in all the possible forms of human government, including His own theocratic republic, and the explicit instructions of the apostle Paul on the nature of civil government, *considered in its relation to God*; He has imparted an equally full 'inspired delineation of what civil government should be, *considered in its relation to human agency*, by the apostle Peter, (see 1 Pet., ch. 2,) in his general epistle to Christians in various countries; and in all ages, He assumes that every where society is made up of various classes of freemen, all of whom are to be treated with the "honor" due to their intrinsic worth and relative position, and also a class of laboring population who are slaves, and do not participate in the government. Free born citizens are considered as possessing the rights of freedom, and liberty to exercise them, which it is made their duty to do, so that they may, by influence and example, promote the public welfare, and preserve society from coming under the control of unprincipled demagogues. The liberty to exercise their rights as freemen they are to use by a conscientious conformity to every ordinance or constitution, created or framed by those entitled to do so, and in a constitutional manner.* Slaves, on the contrary, are to submit

* See Poole and Doddridge in loco. We apply, however, the terms *free* and *liberty* to civil rights, which are to be exercised under the influence of Christian motives. For just as such motives are to actuate slaves in submitting to the deprivation of *such* rights, and in *obeying even unjust and unmerciful* masters, so are they to influence those who as freemen enjoy them. The example is in the right use of liberty, as freemen having political rights, and in acting as such, and not, like slaves, by an involuntary submission to whatever government they might live under.

The iniquitous course of certain heretical and deluded men, condemned by the apostle, was similar to that of the modern Anabaptists and Covenanters; and consisted in denouncing all civil government as anti-Christian, unless it is a government of saints, and based on the principles of the Christian religion, and acknowledgment of the supremacy of Christ's dominion, and authority of the Bible. The sophistry of the argument by which some would now revive this doctrine and urge it upon our Church,

with equal conscientiousness to every constitutional law binding upon them, and both classes are to be made happy in enjoying their respective rights and privileges, and in performing their respective duties by Christian motives, and by a supreme regard to the example and conduct of Christ; and while thus delineating the human aspect of civil government, the apostle Peter re-affirms the doctrine of Paul respecting its divine origin and authority. Whatever may be the particular form of government, (*every*), if it is constitutionally organized upon principles of equity, and has for its end the common *good* of all, by securing the utmost possible liberty in the exercise of the largest possible rights and privileges, equally and impartially, to all entitled to them, then it is "*sent*" by God.

Let it be borne in mind that, in both of these divine expositions of civil government and social rights and liberty to enjoy the benefits of all, we have, as their selected exemplar, a slaveocratic kingdom—a slaveocracy—in which the laboring class are slaves, and that this is declared to be a divine ordinance, and *sent by God* for the greatest good, both of the slave and the free; and that it is declared to consist with liberty to enjoy and to exercise all the rights proper to man in a state of society. Let it be remembered that this was also the character of God's own ancient republic. Let it be emphatically taught that the greatest and most prosperous and most permanent ancient nations, embodied a large slave population; that this has been the character of every kingdom under the whole heavens from the beginning hitherto, until atheistic infidelity revived the impious doc-

lies in confounding God's recognition and authority, and law, *as moral governor in the kingdom of nature and providence*, with that of God as He is revealed in Scripture, as God in Christ, reconciling the world unto Himself.

It may be proper to say, that this argument was substantially written before similar views on this point were published in the last number of this Review.

trine of man's natural independence and absolute equality—a doctrine which hurled Satan and his host from heaven, drove our first parents out of Paradise, and filled the world with that deluge of misery and wickedness in which it is still irretrievably plunged, groaning and travailing in pain together until now. Let every one who has ears to hear, consider the overwhelming moral demonstration that a slaveocratic government may be God's ordinance, and consistent with all the rights, and liberty to enjoy them, which are now proper to man as corrupt and degraded, according to his capacity and condition, which is derived from the fact that, during the eighteen centuries of the Christian era, as it had been through all the thousands of preceding dispensations, the Church of God has always, every where, and by every sect and denomination, until the recent re-introduction from primitive antichristianism of the *higher law* doctrine of abolitionist infidelity,* sustained and defended it.

Universal testimony and experience confirm the teachings of God's word, as to man's character and incapacity in the mass for self-government and sovereign rights and unrestricted liberty, and as to the limitations necessary to that order and security which are the only foundation of equal rights, permanent liberty, and prosperous government.

God's word, like a heavenly luminary, shines amid the darkling obscurity of human reason, to guide tempest-tossed vessels in the only safe and prosperous course over the dangerous sea of national life. Experience, as developed in the fateful course of empires, like the stern-light of a ship, has confirmed the truth of Scripture, by disclosing in its wake the wrecks of nations, the floating timbers of scattered constitutions, and the bloated corpses of vain and

* This was one of the first infidel heresies against which the apostles pronounced condemnation and excommunication. (See 1 Tim., 6.)

ambitious rulers, who, wise in their own conceit, have substituted philosophy, falsely so called, for the wisdom of God, to whom alone is fully known all that is in man and how to control and to combine the hidden mysteries of his wonderful nature, so as, out of its discordant and naturally repellent elements, to constitute a prosperously united and harmonious society. What is man? Surely this is the first question in political science; for with what has that science to do but with man? with man, not as he *might* be, or as he *ought* to be, or as by philosophy, falsely so called, he is theoretically portrayed; not with man as he has been romantically associated by Platonic affections, or Utopian dreams, or the heartless abstractions of a Hobbes, or a Helvetius; not with man as he came forth from the atheistic and ferocious laboratory of the French revolutionists; but with man as he is, and as he ever, and every where, has been; as he is now, amid all the civilization, education, and refinement of the nineteenth century, and as he ever shall be, except so far as he is transformed by the renewing of his individual mind, by the transforming power of the glorious gospel of the blessed God. What does political philosophy propose to do with man? Its object is to associate men *just as they are by nature*, and to organize them into communities, states, and kingdoms; to bind them together by laws adapted to provide for every man the most perfect security in the pursuit of his own happiness and interests, that is compatible with the peace, order, and prosperity of the whole. Political science is, therefore, eminently practical. It has to do with all that comes home most directly to man's business and bosom. It has to do with man's every day wants, employments, and enjoyments. It has to take into account man's good and bad qualities; his weaknesses and wants; his desires and demands; his pride, passion, and discontent; his envy, jealousy, and ambition; his indolence, selfishness, self-indulgence, and sensuality; his licentiousness, lawlessness, and duplicity; his ignorance,

prejudice, and indifference to the rights of others; his mercenary and venal spirit; his malignant party rage and malevolent dissatisfaction with the unavoidable inequalities of rank and condition. All these characteristics are not found in every man. They are variously developed or restrained or counteracted. But that they are prevalent and predominant elements of human nature, we demonstrate by the character of all legislation; the checks and balances, restraints and punishments, and the sleepless vigilance of an all-permeating and every where present police; which have constituted the actual machinery of every society of whose existence any knowledge is preserved. Another line of demonstration is found in the recorded history, decline, and fall of all former empires, and the character and condition of those now pursuing their destiny through the transformations which have already marked their eventful career. Nor is it a less significant proof of the real character of man, that political writers of every school, from absolute despotism to the fiercest democracy, have taught that, in order to enjoy any security in society, man's natural, that is, his individual rights—if, as is denied by absolutists, he has any—are altogether, or as far as may be found necessary, given up, to be restored by his government, so far as *the general good* will allow, or its character will permit.

Even Locke restrains the theoretically assumed natural liberty of man "within the bounds of the law of nature," that is, as we have stated, the law written in his heart as a subject of the moral government of God. Liberty thus restrained is, says Blackstone, "a right inherent in us by birth, and one of the gifts of God to man at his creation." And yet such is man's present character that, in order to organize society, this natural liberty must be limited and abridged, because "legal obedience and conformity is infinitely more valuable than the wild and savage liberty which is sacrificed to obtain it." That which diminishes the natural liberty of mankind is, says Blackstone, "the law which restrains a

man from doing mischief to his fellow citizens." Society, therefore, is obliged to restrain, as has been said, "not the natural *liberty*, but the natural *tyranny* of man." Well does Burke teach that, in order to secure *some* liberty, "we make a surrender in trust of *the whole of it.*" "Why," asks Locke, "will a man part with *this perfect freedom?*" "Because," he answers, "though in the state of nature he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain and constantly exposed to the invasion of others, for all being kings as much as he, every man his equal, and the greater part not strict observers of equity and justice, the enjoyment of the property he has in this state (?) *is very unsafe, very insecure.* This makes him willing to quit a condition which, *however free,* (?) *is full of fears and continual dangers,* and join with those who unite for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties, and estates." (On Gov. ch. ix.)

Jefferson believed that men should hold on to these supposed natural rights, even in society; but that such was human nature, that a bloody revolution, like the French, was necessary every few years, in order that the oppressed minority might regain their lost possession of rights and liberty.

Mr. Calhoun, in his profound work on Government, very emphatically confirms the above testimonies. Man, as he teaches, is impelled to ordain government by his social and his selfish feelings; the former seeking gratification in association with others, and the latter in securing his own interests at whatever sacrifice of those of others, and leading, with all the inevitable necessity of the law of gravitation, to disorder and conflict between individuals. "And hence the tendency to a universal state of conflict between individual and individual, accompanied by the connected passions of suspicion, jealousy, anger, and revenge, followed by insolence, fraud, and cruelty; and if not prevented by some controlling power, ending in a state of universal discord and confusion destructive to the social state."

(Works, Vol. 1, p. 4.) Government is, therefore, as necessary to preserve society, as is society to preserve life. But, as this character actuates man under government, and leads to disorder, corruption, and abuse of power, "as all experience and almost every page of history testify," "to repress violence, preserve order, and prevent government from being converted into an instrument to oppress the rest," a constitution becomes necessary to define, distribute, limit, and protect government. But as the same "nature of man, constituted as he is," will misinterpret any constitution, and pervert and convert it into an instrument of tyranny; and as it will employ for this purpose the power of party association, sectional interests and prejudices, lust of power and of the "spoils" and patronage of power, and the all-controlling influences of universal sovereignty and suffrage, public opinion, (*so called,*) the press, the convention, the caucus, the bribe, and "log-rolling lobbyism;" a constitution, however perfect, can only be preserved, and *practically and honestly* perpetuated, by adequate provisions for the distribution and regulation of power, for the limitation of the rights of citizenship, sovereignty, suffrage, for the equal representation of all sections and interests, and for the restraint of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of government, by mutual checks and vetoes, and by the power of amending, altering, or abrogating the government, and forming another in a constitutional manner. (See p. 12, and the rest of Vol. 1, in which is traced with *fearfully prophetic foresight and warning the whole course of the corruption, decline, and fall of the United States.*)

To these authorities we will only add the concurrent views of that "profound thinker and real statesman," and freethinker in religion, Montesquieu. Though admitting, like the others, the assumed existence of natural equality and freedom, and his preference for a democratic form of government, he feels compelled to conclude that experimentally such an equality is impracticable, by reason

of the selfish injustice and rapacity of man. Inequalities must exist, in order that real equality, according to capacity, knowledge, and virtue, may rightfully direct and govern. "For example," says he, "it may be apprehended that *people who are obliged to live by labor*, (all the laboring, mechanical, and working classes of society,) would be too much impoverished by public employment, or neglect the duties of attending to it; that *artisans would grow insolent*; and that too great a number of freedmen would (as they did in the Roman empire,) overpower the ancient citizens. *In this case the equality in a democracy may be suppressed, for the good of the State.*"

Similar conclusions have been arrived at, even by the most thoughtful and profound of Northern fanatical abolitionists. Dr. Channing, amid all his rhetorical declamation about inherent and inalienable rights, was compelled by conviction of the truth, to admit that "like every citizen, he (the slave) is subject to the community, and *the community has a right, AND IS BOUND, to continue all such restraints as its own safety and the well-being of the slave demands*;" that is, the right of the community to secure the general welfare is paramount to any supposititious inherent and inalienable right of those who are slaves. "If he," (the slave,) adds Dr. Channing, "cannot be induced to work by rational and natural motives, *he should be obliged to labor*, on the same principle on which the vagrant in other (that is, Free-soil) communities is confined and compelled to earn his own bread. The gift of liberty would be a mere name, and worse than nominal, were he (the slave) to be let loose on society under circumstances driving him to commit crime, and for which he would be condemned to severer bondage than he had escaped;" "and," continues Dr. Channing, "*it would be cruelty, not kindness, to give him (and, of course, any white freeman) that which he is unprepared to understand or enjoy. It would be cruelty to strike the fetters from a man whose first steps would infallibly lead him to a precipice.*"

And now let us hear "The author of the Moral and Political Science," as Dr. Wayland authoritatively styles himself. What, according to this profound teacher, is the best form of government, and the one which may best claim to be "the ordinance of God?" "The best form of government," answers Dr. W., "for ANY people (*white or black, bond or free,*) is the best that its *moral condition renders practicable*. A people, (*or a majority of them,*) may be so *entirely* surrendered to the influence of passion, and so *feebly* influenced by moral restraints, that a government which relied on moral restraint would not exist for a single day. In this case, a subordinate and inferior principle remains—the principle of fear—and the only resort is to a government of force; and such do we see to be the fact." The *moral condition* of men is, therefore, the determiner of the best form of government for any people, and the measure by which political rights, the elective franchise, and qualification for office, are to be limited or extended, and the experience of the world is the proof. "While the moral restraints are too feeble for self-government, a *hereditary* government * * * may be as good as the people can sustain. As they advance in intellectual and moral cultivation, it may advantageously (whatever may be said about all men being born alike free and equal,) become more and more *elective*; and in a suitable moral condition, (of the whole people,) it may be wholly so; and yet, as it is better that a man should do right than wrong, *even though he be forced to do it*, it is well he should pray others (if free, or have others, if slave) to force him, if there be no other way of *insuring* his good conduct. GOD HAS RENDERED THE BLESSING OF FREEDOM INSEPARABLE FROM MORAL RESTRAINT TO THE INDIVIDUAL, AND HENCE IT IS VAIN FOR A PEOPLE (OR A MAJORITY OF THEM) TO EXPECT TO BE FREE, UNLESS THEY ARE FIRST WILLING TO BE VIRTUOUS." And so unalterable is this rule of God's moral government of men, individually and nationally, that, as Dr. Wayland proceeds to show, "the

form of government will always adjust itself to the moral condition of a people."

In regard specially to the slave portion of a people, Dr. Wayland teaches that "the DUTY of slaves is explicitly made known in the Bible. They are *bound to obedience*, fidelity, submission, and respect to their masters; not only to the good and kind, but also to the unkind and froward; not, however, (as is equally, and all the more powerfully, true of wives and children,) on the ground of duty to man merely, BUT ON THE GROUND OF DUTY TO GOD.* The relation, responsibilities, and duties of slaves toward "their MASTERS," is, therefore, ordained and regulated, and made authoritative by God, and to be fulfilled as in his sight, and under his immediate command. Such, according to Dr. Wayland, is the teaching of God in the New Testament, whose language he quotes; and "that the Hebrews held slaves from the time of the conquest of Canaan, and that Abraham and the patriarchs held them many centuries before, this, also," says Dr. Wayland, "I grant." "I grant, also, that Moses enacted laws with *special* reference to that relation." "I wonder," he very significantly adds, by way of rebuke to his less candid Abolition friends, "that any should have had the hardihood to deny so plain a matter. I should almost as soon deny the *delivery* of the ten commandments to Moses."

We have thus established the position, that the law which constitutes the natural and necessary basis of all social and civil government among men is the moral law, summarily comprehended in the ten commandments; written in the beginning in man's heart; manifested in all man's mutual judgments, enactments, and *summary* as well as *legal* executions of justice upon his fellow men; embodied in every form of civil government; every where and at all times;

* Sometimes the manner and motive of obedience are reversed. Thus in Ps. 123, 2: "As the eyes of a maiden look unto the hand of her mistress, so our eyes wait upon the Lord," &c.

constituting that justice and judgment which are the foundation of God's throne, as the moral governor of the world, the ordainer of society, and the dispenser of natural rewards and punishments to individuals and to nations; and the rule and standard of that *righteousness* and equality which are the *price*, and the only price, at which prosperity—that is, peace, freedom, liberty, successful, happy industry, and the enjoyment of all personal, family, and social rights, privileges, and blessings—can be procured, preserved, and perpetuated. If ever any moral, or politically moral truth connected with man's conduct and history was demonstrated, this, we think, has been by every variety and form of proof; from the universal experience and testimony of men; from the rise, continuance, decline, and fall of empires; from the deductions of the wisest and most sagacious philosophers of all ages, schools, and parties; from the clear and unmistakable instructions of God's revealed word; and from the self-condemning attestations of fanatical modern Abolitionists. Even these have been compelled to come into court, and to give evidence against themselves, and against the hypocrisy, sophistry, incredulity, and infidelity of their followers and abettors.

A recognition of truth, justice, and of the rightful claims of others; obedient reverence for authority and law; a solemn conviction of the guilt and necessary punishment of crimes; a love of country stronger than death, superior to danger, and making it sweet even to die on her behalf; and all this based on a controlling sense of religious responsibility to a divine lawgiver, judge, and avenger; this will be found to have been the life, the power, the cohesive bond, the invigorating principle, and the loss of it, the decay and death, of all nations hitherto. "God and the right" is the battle cry of all modern civilization; and a government which ignores or practically denies their claims, is monstrously unnatural and doomed to inevitable perdition.

The only liberty now possible to man is the liberty of law. The only rights now inherent and inalienable to man, are those which are recognised, restricted, and regulated by the law of his nature; which is the law of his Creator, Governor, and Judge; the law which assigns to him his birth, his condition, his capacities, his relation to the family, to society, and to the state; the law which imposes corresponding responsibilities and requires correlative duties; the law which binds him in love and equity to seek and to secure the rights of all other men as they, too, are variously distributed by the common Father of all; and the law which, as surely as the laws of matter, shapes the destiny of individuals and communities, and dispenses happiness or misery, prosperity or adversity, contentment and cheerfulness, or pining misanthropy and sullen discontent, long life and the good will of others, or retaliation, hatred, and revenge.

These principles substantially recognised by our fathers in framing the Constitution—but ultimately subverted by the infidel maxims of the Declaration of Independence, and their demoralizing influence on the increasing mass of ignorant foreign citizens: the result—liberty lost, the Union broken up, and war, subjugation, and lawless tyranny. God's prophetic warning fulfilled. Exodus 34, 7, explained.

Our fathers recognised these principles, and their relation and responsibility to God.* They embodied them in their

* On occasion of recommending a fast—June 12, 1775—Congress declared that “the great Governor of the world, by His supreme and universal providence, not only conducts the course of nature with unerring wisdom and rectitude, but frequently influences the minds of men to serve the wise and gracious purposes of His providential government; that it is, at all times, our indispensable duty, devoutly to acknowledge His superintending providence, and to reverence and adore His immutable justice.” They say (March 16, 1776,) they are “desirous to have people of all ranks and degrees duly impressed with a solemn sense of God's superintending providence, and of their duty devoutly to rely, in all their lawful enterprises, on His aid and direction.” They declare the end of setting apart the day

separate governments, as free, sovereign, and independent States; and they carried them, with all their experience during their colonial, revolutionary, and confederate history, into the confederate system of government, under one common, qualified, and restricted union, entered into to provide for their common defence, promote their general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty, so long enjoyed under their separate governments, against all encroachments from other States and from other nations. By solemn compact between the several States entering into it, as it seemed to them good, certain powers only were specifically delegated, in trust, to the government of the United States; and *all others*, including, as their constitutions declare, freedom, sovereignty, and independence, with a veto power and a right to amend the constitutional compact, were reserved to the governments of the respective States as coordinate governments. In their nature and principles they

to be, "that we may with united hearts confess and bewail our manifold sins and transgressions, and by a sincere repentance and amendment of life, appease His righteous displeasure, and, through the merits and mediation of Jesus Christ, obtain His pardon and forgiveness." March 7, 1778, they recommend a similar day, "that, at one time and with one voice, the inhabitants may acknowledge the righteous dispensations of Divine Providence, confess their iniquities and transgressions, and implore the mercy and forgiveness of God, and beseech Him that vice, profaneness, extortion, and every evil may be done away, and that we may be a reformed and happy people." Another proclamation of March 11, 1780, recommends, "that we may, with one heart and one voice, implore the Sovereign Lord of heaven and earth to remember mercy in His judgment, to make us sincerely penitent for our transgressions, to banish vice and irreligion from among us, and establish virtue and piety by His divine grace." March 20, 1781, "That we may with united hearts confess and bewail our manifold sins and transgressions, and by sincere repentance and amendment of life, appease His righteous displeasure, and, through the merits of our blessed Saviour, obtain pardon and forgiveness; that it may please Him to inspire our rulers with incorruptible integrity, and to direct and prosper their councils; that it may please Him to bless all schools and seminaries of learning, and to grant that truth, justice, and benevolence, and pure and undefiled religion, may universally prevail."

were all alike, the government of the States being adapted to a community of sovereign citizens, and that of the United States to a community of sovereign States; all were alike constitutional republics, based upon the assumed virtue and intelligence of all their constituent members. To secure this, they limited and exalted the rights of citizenship and the sovereign prerogative of the elective franchise; separated the right and power of making constitutions, framing laws, and governing under the constitution and laws when made; distributed the powers of government into three coördinate, and yet independent branches; guarded the purity of elections, and restrained their too frequent and popular character; provided for free, responsible, and yet independent *representatives* of all classes and interests among the people, unrestricted and uninstructed, in contradistinction to mere instructed deputies; divided the legislative body into two houses, the one elected for two years, and the other, the Senate, removed still further from the influence of popular excitement by length of service, power of restraint on the popular Assembly, and participation in the governing or executive power of the State and country; placed supreme executive power, with the sovereign right of veto upon the combined action of both houses of the legislature, in the hands of a chief magistrate, assisted by the advice of coördinate heads of departments of the government; erected a judiciary system whose members were made entirely independent of popular or personal control, by the source and tenure of their appointment, the fixed amount of their salaries, and by their power to decide upon the constitutionality of all laws and acts of assumed extra-constitutional power; by protecting legislators and judges against all interference with their independent official rights of opinion and of action; by securing to minorities full and unrestricted power of employing every constitutional means of favorably presenting their views; by guaranteeing to every citizen the great fundamental rights of *habeas corpus* and

trial by jury; and in short, by a system of checks and balances which have made their system of government the wonder and admiration and envy of the world. It was imbued with the spirit of practical wisdom, sagacity, and knowledge of human nature, and it ignored the infidel and atheistical maxims of the absolute freedom and equality of all men, found in the Declaration of Independence—Jefferson, the promulgator of these anarchical principles of wild and savage fanaticism, being absent in Paris, and not a party to the framing of the constitution. Mr. Calhoun expresses the opinion that to plan, or construct, or reduce to practice, such a government, exceeds the power of human sagacity, has ever done so, and he thinks ever will. “For the structure, therefore, of such a system as that of the constitution and government of the United States—a political system as remarkable for its grandeur as for its novelty and refinement of organization—so wise, just, and beneficent—we are indebted *far more* to a superintending providence, that so disposed events as to lead, as if by an invisible hand, to its formation, than to those who erected it. Intelligent, experienced, patriotic, as they were, they were but the builders under its superintending direction.”* But while our constitution was “the proudest political monument of the combined and progressive wisdom of man, and a choice and peerless model, uniting all the beauties of proportion with all the solidity of strength,” experience has shown that it was fatally defective. It failed to make a due recognition of its dependence for all practical efficiency, upon the moral government and law of God. It failed to recognise the Sabbath as an institute of God’s natural and moral government, and adapted alike to man’s physical, intellectual, and moral nature. It failed to provide sufficiently against the established character of man, as a sinful and selfish being, whose nature, constituted as

* *Works*, Vol. 1, pp. 8, 78, 164, 199.

it now is, will, as unquestionably as the law of gravitation, abuse power as an instrument to aggrandize self and to injure and oppress others. It possessed no self-preserving power. Founded upon the assumption of intelligence and virtue as the only rightful basis of its sovereign rights of citizenship, it nevertheless opened the way for the too easy admission to their enjoyment, of hundreds of thousands, mostly without either intelligence or virtue, who annually poured themselves as a flood tide upon our shores from all parts of the world. It left the way open, by construction, for concentrating in the Supreme Court a power which has subordinated the courts, and through them the government of the States, to that of the United States, by a negative on all their acts; for extending the powers of Congress beyond constitutional limits, so as to allow sectional legislation; and for concentrating in the hands of the President a discretionary power, which placed at his disposal "*the spoils*," so that, according to his will and pleasure, uncontrolled and unregulated by Congress, he distributed all the honors and emoluments of government, and all offices held under it, throughout the length and breadth of the land; and in this way most effectually controlled elections, intensified political animosities, and fostered sectional jealousy and ambition, and perpetuated in the hands of a party the combined legislative, judicial, and executive functions of the government. From these causes the Constitution of the United States was rendered inefficual in resisting the irrepressible conflict of Northern and Southern interests and views, or to provide against the possibility of a sectional majority of States and people wielding the power of the electoral body, and against an overwhelming majority of the voting citizens of the country giving up a government, intended to represent the interests of *all* sections, to a factious, usurping, and tyrannical party. It did not adequately protect the sovereign character and rights of States against the sectional and antagonistic legislation of

other States, and the executive in combination with them, nor provide a remedy against their unconstitutional disregard of the authority of the Supreme Court and the sacred guarantees of the Constitution, and its fundamental State rights of veto, nullification, amendment, and secession.*

But more than all other causes of failure, and the source of all others, the constitution and government of the United States failed because the spirit of moderation, forbearance, mutual respect, concession, and compromise, which at first secured their adoption, were abandoned when the pressure of impending dangers gave place to unparalleled prosperity, and the North found itself fattening upon the slave labor it had introduced, and the various bounties, navigation laws, and protective tariffs by which it was aggrandized and the South impoverished, until lifted up with pride and bloated with pampered indulgence and intoxicating vice, its vaulting ambition overleaped itself, and fell on the other side.

It was at best, as Washington described it, "an experiment, and as near an approach to perfection as was thought

* This opinion was held by Hamilton, Madison, and many others. How traitorously and perfidiously it influenced the merely selfish and sectional New England politicians is illustrated in reference to President Adams, in Jefferson's works, vol. 4, pages 516 and 517. He (Jefferson) thus remarks:

"December 18, 1808.—The Reverend Mr. Coffin, of New England, who is now here soliciting donations for a College in Greene county, Tennessee, tells me that when he first determined to engage in this enterprise, he wrote a paper recommendatory, which he meant to get signed by clergymen, and a similar one for persons in a civil character, at the head of which he wished Mr. Adams, then President of the United States, to put his name only, and not for a donation. Mr. Adams, after reading the paper and considering, said: 'He saw no possibility of continuing the union of the States; that their dissolution must necessarily take place; that he, therefore, saw no propriety in recommending to New England men to promote a literary institution in the South; that it was, in fact, giving strength to those who were to be their enemies, and, therefore, he would have nothing to do with it.' Edited by Thomas Jefferson Randolph, Charlottesville, 1829."

This was the first egg hatched for a dissolution of the Union in 1808, by a New England President whilst in office.

attainable by human wisdom." The future was regarded by him and the fathers of the republic with anxious trepidation. The dangers to which it was exposed were to a great extent foreseen; and Washington's farewell address, in unison with the writings of his illustrious compeers, warned the future citizens and rulers of the country of those very rocks and quicksands upon which the noble ship of state, which they had with so much blood, suffering, and treasure, equipped and put to sea, has been so soon and so fatally wrecked.

The ultimate source of so speedy and unanticipated destruction of the well founded hopes of our fathers, must be traced to those maxims already alluded to, which Jefferson had embodied in the Declaration of Independence, "into which," as has been said, "was poured the soul of the American continent," melted by the fires of revolution and the white heat of the French red republicanism then illuminating the world by the blaze of its anti-monarchical and anti-christian principles, on whose bloody altar were consumed every relic of constitutional and well regulated society. The temple of our liberty was, therefore, sacrilegiously polluted, while yet fresh from the hands of its architects. Under the administration and influence of Jefferson and his followers, God was set aside, and His moral government repudiated. Divine providence, infallible wisdom, and unalterable necessity, as exhibited in the diversities of human condition, capacity, rights, and responsibilities, were, in the progress of these principles, scornfully rejected. Human nature was enthroned. Reason was deified. The voice of the people became the voice of God. The will of the numerical majority constituted the supreme law, above and beyond which there was no authoritative tribunal or retributive justice. THE PRICE OF LIBERTY WAS NOT PAID. Her claim was set aside. The bond was cancelled. The constitution was handed over gradually to popular construction and sectional intrigue. Its guards

and checks were removed. The exalted privilege of citizenship, and the sovereign right of voting, were, by every possible fraudulent device, extended indiscriminately to foreigners, who, in proportion to their ignorance and venality, were purchased by party bribes, and thus, at once, relieved from all conscientious scruples, and taught that liberty was license to secure their own interest, regardless of the public good. Trading in politics and living upon the fruits of elections, became the exclusive occupation and life of increasing multitudes, who found in the accumulating mass of foreigners, who had neither intelligence nor virtue to discern the principles of party, nor any interest, property, or position at stake on the results, abundant material on which to work. The caucus and convention gave such professional politicians opportunity to combine their strength, to forestall public opinion, to accumulate resources, to multiply agencies, and so completely to control the masses as either to discomfit or discourage and disgust the virtuous and intelligent, and bring the government of the country under their own power. The electoral college became a mere automatic registry of the results of such conventions, in the election of their chosen leader and patron. In the States these causes have led—in all except South Carolina—to the entire transformation and transference of the government. Universal suffrage has passed daily more and more from “the ancient citizens” into the hands of comparative strangers, with little capacity or intelligence, and less of patriotic sincerity. All the securities and checks against the evil of popular misrule ceased to operate. All elections were given over to the hands of the people. Even judges are now appointed by popular vote; and that they may be more completely subsidized and corrupted, their tenure of office is made annual or biennial, and their salary changeable at pleasure, and insignificantly small. The result is, that the government of our States and country has been committed indiscriminately to the mere numerical mass of

the people—a mass by nature corrupt and ready to be corrupted still more; selfish, sectional, ignorant, and prejudiced; averse to restraint; vain and conceited; envious and jealous; whose liberty has always been “licentious, fierce, and wild;” and a majority of whom, according to the most favorable testimony of the most democratic and liberal writers, and the invariable experience of the ages, will always prey upon the rest, and render life, liberty, property, and every right dear to man, “*very insecure*,” and subordinate to their acquisition or retention of power and accumulation of profits.

The final result is now before us. Liberty is gone in the United States. The avalanche of corruption, long gathering, has fallen with sudden and overwhelming destruction. It has swept before it, and buried amid its ruins, the constitution and the union, the supreme court, *habeas corpus*, trial by jury, freedom of the press, freedom of opinion, freedom of action, and freedom of religion, and every obstacle to the unlimited exercise of arbitrary military despotism. The president has become a military dictator; his mansion a palace; his attendants armed troops; his presence among the people attested by the glittering pageantry of an imperial guard; his will the death-warrant of generals and subjects; and his most puerile and egotistical speeches must be heard in abject silence, or fawning, sycophantic adulation and applause.* He has not found it necessary to abrogate or alter the “forms” of government, state or national. He has found in them his greatest strength, and the easily adapted means of riveting the chains of servility upon a crushed and abject people. Universal suffrage, in the hands of a hireling mob, has become the right arm of arbitrary power; and, as in France it has been made by Napoleon to establish the firm foundation of an imperial dynasty on the ruins of a republic, so has it enabled Lincoln to con-

* He stopped short in a recent speech, and ordered a man to prison, who had uttered a word of common ejaculation.

solidate his power by the invincible union of the mass of a corrupt and venal people, and thus to create, as it did in the decline of Rome, the worst of despotisms—the combination of tyrant and mob.* Thus overruled by force, and cajoled by promises of coming recompense in the agrarian distribution of the spoils of all *disloyal* and discontented citizens, the virtuous, intelligent, and patriotic of all parties, see themselves in the hands of a heartless tyrant, hardened into callous ferocity by “scenes which,” as Lord Brougham says, “modern ages—nay, which Christian times (*eighteen centuries*) have seen nothing to equal—a spectacle at which the whole world stands aghast, almost to incredulity,”†—a

* *The Eighteen Christian Centuries*, pp. 32, 37.

† “Whatever may have been the proximate cause of the contest, its continuance is the result of a national vanity without example and without bounds. Individuals subject to this failing are despised, not hated; and it is an ordinary expression respecting him who is without this weakness, that he is too proud to be vain. But when a people are seized with it, they change the name, and call it love of glory. Of the individual, we often hear the remark that, despicable as the weakness is, it leads to no bad action. Nothing can be more false. It leads to many crimes, and to that disregard of truth, which is the root of all offences. Certainly it produces none of the worst crimes. The man who is a prey to vanity thirsts not for the blood of a neighbor. How fearfully otherwise is it, when a nation is its slave! Magnifying itself beyond measure, and despising the rest of mankind, blinded and intoxicated with self-satisfaction, persuaded that their very crimes are proofs of greatness, and believing that they are both admired and envied, the Americans have not only not been content with the destruction of half a million, but been vain of slaughter. Their object being to retain a great name among nations for their extent of territory, they exulted in the wholesale bloodshed by which it must be accomplished, because others were unable to make such a sacrifice. The struggle of above two years, which loosened all the bonds which held society together, and gave to millions the means of showing their capacity, has produced no genius, civil or military, while the submission to every caprice of tyranny had been universal and habitual, and never interrupted by a single act of resistance to the most flagrant infractions of personal freedom. The mischiefs of mob supremacy have been constantly felt; for the calamity of national and respectable men keeping aloof from the management of affairs, has resulted in the tyranny of the multitude. To this tyrant, the nominal rulers

tyrant who now wields absolute control of the sword and the purse, the press and the polls; and they find themselves also at the mercy of a people tyrannized and flattered, who are no less cruel than himself. "O liberty!" as Madam Roland, from bitter experience, exclaimed, "what fearful crimes are committed in thy name!"

Thus rapidly has liberty, perverted and prostituted, *leaped* from licentious freedom into the arms of abject tyranny, over all the ordinary stages of faction, war, anarchy, weakness, utter weariness of mobocratic government, into the arms of an abject submission to arbitrary power. The price of liberty was not paid, and the avenging arm of outraged and provoked Deity is exacting the penalty to the uttermost farthing, from perjury, corruption, hypocrisy, tyranny, and inhumanity. God requireth the past; and though He suffereth long, and is slow to anger, yet He will make it assuredly known by His judgments, that according to His fearful threatenings so is His wrath.

"But a few years since," says the *Examiner*, "the prediction that a President would venture to abolish, or the people submit to be deprived of so cherished and inestimable a safe-guard of liberty, would have been received as the ravings of a madman. Yet we have lived to see this, and a hundred other usurpations, tamely acquiesced in by a people who boasted of their jealous attachment to constitutional

have never withheld their submission; and the press, catering for the appetites of the populace, and pandering to their passions, has persisted in every misrepresentation which might most disguise the truth as to passing events, exaggerating each success, extenuating each defeat, often describing failure as victory; while the multitude, if the truth by chance reached them, were one day sunk in despair, another elated to ecstasy, almost at the pleasure of their rulers and their guides. Nor were the falsehoods thus propagated confined to the events of the war; they extended to all things—to the measures of the government and the acts of foreign nations. The public feeling must not be thwarted; the people desired to hear whatever gratified their vanity or raised their spirits; and in this delusion must they live as long as the war lasts, and the rule is in the hands of the mob. The truth, they will never hear, because they desire to hear what is pleasing, and not what is true."

government, who flaunted the banners of republicanism defiantly in the face of the world, and arrogantly proclaimed their mission of converting the earth to the democratic faith.

"This wonderful change has been not less unexampled for its rapidity than thorough in its nature. But three years have elapsed since that people, now so patient beneath the lash, rioted in the very drunkenness of license. The most unshackled liberty, the most expansive dreams of universal emancipation, and the wildest vagaries of speculation, were regarded as the rich fruit of American institutions. The sublime theories of antiquity's sages, the grandest conceptions of the practical modern statesman, and the fairest visions of the poet, were to be eclipsed by the unequalled combination of national greatness with individual liberty, of material prosperity and perfection in the arts and sciences with public spirit and pure patriotism, displayed in the triumphant career of the model republic.

"The ancients were accustomed, in the hour of their greatest prosperity, when fortune seemed to have showered all her gifts upon them, much to fear a sudden reverse. They sought by propitiating Nemesis to avert the penalty due to happiness beyond what is allotted to mortals. The Yankees, so far from making any such sacrifice or voluntary humiliation, waxed conceited and haughty. They were dictatorial and vain-glorious, confident in their wealth and power, and anxious to impose their own will on all mankind. They forced the South to resist their aggression and tyranny, and then, in the true spirit of vulgar despotism, resolved to revenge the insult which they deemed to have been offered to their sovereign will."

Never has God more signally vindicated His law, and glorified His great and awful name. It was in answer to the special entreaty of the chosen leader and legislator of His model republic, that God revealed himself in His character of "Governor of the nations." Though His anger had been provoked to destroy His chosen people, He ordered Moses to prepare two other tables of stone, upon which God wrote the words of the moral law which were on the first. "And the Lord descended in the cloud, and stood with him there, and proclaimed the name of the Lord: Keeping mercy for thousands, forgiving iniquity and trans-

gression and sin, and that will by no means clear the guilty; visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, and upon the children's children, unto the third and to the fourth generation."

These solemn words were first employed by God when He entered into national covenant with His people, and are repeated when, after apostasy, that national covenant is graciously renewed. They constitute a divine expression of God's providential method of punishing those nations among whom He has ordained a government and established His worship. They teach us that when such nations have rebelled against Him, though He will certainly, by His judgments, chasten and reform them, He will not utterly destroy. They are entirely distinct from, and even contrary to His dealings with individuals. (*See Ezek. 33, where this misapplication is elaborately argued and removed.*) And they have no reference to God's retributive justice for spiritual sins, in a future state. They are also very merciful, and very encouraging to a guilty and afflicted people—when God's judgments are abroad in their land—to learn righteousness, and to repent and return unto Him who alone can relieve and restore, by removing the evils He had visited upon them. They may be properly rendered in the following slight paraphrase: "The Lord, the Lord God; merciful and gracious, long-suffering, and abundant in goodness and truth; keeping mercy for thousands, forgiving iniquity, transgression, and sin; who, while certainly punishing transgression and sin in those who are by no means guiltless, will not utterly destroy them and make them desolate; and delaying to visit with national judgments the iniquity of the fathers, until the times of their children, and their children's children, even to the third and fourth generation."*

* This rendering is in accordance with the original; and the context; and the prayer of Moses, in chapter 33; and with his remarkable prayer in VOL. XVI., NO. III.—80

Liberty still endangered among us by the same maxims, and their practical results and influences. Our danger two-fold—external and internal; the latter the greater and more imminent—the price of our liberty.

How faithfully has a merciful and righteous God brought upon this favored land, *after three generations of unrepented and accumulated iniquity*, and abuse of privileges and prosperity, unparalleled in the history of the world, the fulfilment of this prophecy, promise, and warning! He is an atheist who does not see the connexion between the sin and the cause; who does not know God by the judgments he is now executing upon us, and who does not perceive in them a renewed proclamation of the forgotten law of God's moral and providential government—*that liberty has its price, and that that price must be paid*—either in a righteous and intelligent conformity of government to the nature of sinful man, the lessons of universal experience, and to the teachings of the law of God, or in a tyrannous usurpation, anarchy, and blood.

Let us hope that our enemies may not be utterly destroyed as a nation, but that they may have grace given them to turn away ungodliness from them, and to seek the Lord, who can, by His wonder-working providence, revive and restore them. But our great business is with ourselves. Our liberty, as provided for under the constitution of the United States, is lost—for ever lost. In any possible event, there is—there can be—no liberty for the South under the constitution and flag of the Union. It may be regarded as the policy of our enemies, and as immutably fixed as if already announced by proclamation of their imperial dic-

Numb. 14 : 18, where *it alone* will give propriety to the use of the passage; and with facts in the history of God's national judgments being so administered, as in the case of Manasseh, Hezekiah, Solomon, and the Canaanites; with the interpretation of Maimonides; of Poole, after others; of Geddes and the Comprehensive Bible; of Haldane, who is so accurate and cautious, &c.

tator, that, if subdued, the South will be reduced to provincial vassalage, until her territory can be emptied of its present race of freemen, and then colonized and absorbed, in re-constructed divisions, into the United States. But, thank God, our independent liberty is not lost, however much endangered, and however terrible the price which, for its restoration and peaceful independence under a confederate republic, God's righteous requisition may demand. In God's name, and by God's good guidance with us, we have set up our banners, and with Him as our chosen Vindicator, we have unfurled the purified flag of freedom to the admiring gaze of earth and heaven.

Our liberty, however, though not lost, is exposed to a double danger. It is threatened by our enemies, but it is in still greater danger from ourselves. Our enemies have come against us with fire and sword. Fury is in their heart, and the malevolence of desperate, reckless vengeance hurls at us whatever missiles of destruction Europe and America can supply. The fighting material of their own twenty millions, augmented by all that large bounties and the promise of coming plunder and unrestrained riot, can collect out of the most atheistical, anarchical, and unprincipled populations of Europe, come up against us. By land and by sea, by day and by night, through summer and through winter, and in every portion of our extensive territory, we are assailed by multitudes three times as great as we can muster in defence, and armed with engines of destruction unknown in any previous wars, and beyond all former power of resistance. They fight for conquest, and not for honor; avarice, and not ambition, sustains them in their irrepressible conflict. Humiliation, bankruptcy, repudiation, and the scorn and contempt of the world, goad them on in their frantic effort to make subjugation and success repay them for the loss of glory, the destruction of liberty, and national ruin. Restrained by no laws of war, or of nations, or of God, they make the end justify

the means, and might they sanctify as right, and their tenderest mercies are horrid cruelty. The extermination of the whole race, or its reduction to vassalage, are the only alternatives before us, if we are abandoned by God, or by our own perfidious pusillanimity to prefer subjection to that heroic, unconquerable, and long-suffering endurance and sacrifice, by which alone peaceful independence can be achieved. The scales hang trembling in the fearful balance, and while eternal justice holds them in its grasp, liberty or slavery await the speedy issues.*

Are we willing to pay the price of liberty? Let us in another article inquire what that price is, and how and when it must be paid.

* In a recent speech in London, the United States Minister, Adams, "enumerated the great things which had been accomplished since the rebellion broke out. The government at that time was almost disintegrated—now it is solid and firm—able to act with vigor and effect whenever and however it pleased. The people have rallied round the government and maintained the policy of the President. They have money, they have men, and they have ideas which they mean to establish on the only true and successful conclusion of the struggle."

ARTICLE II.

RATIONALISM FALSE AND UNREASONABLE.

[*Concluded.*]

But, before we close, we have a second fatal objection to urge against the religious philosophy that makes human reason the supreme arbiter in all questions which pertain to God and to man's relation to Him :

II. For it assumes that man is able to construct a philosophy of the Deity.

“Canst thou by searching find out God? Canst thou find out the Almighty unto perfection?” Such was the question which Zophar the Naamathite, addressed to the man of Uz, and to which he did not doubt that the modesty of the patriarch's ignorance would give a negative reply; and such is the significant and comprehensive question to which rationalism must give an affirmative answer. One would think that it would shrink from so mighty an undertaking: but unchastened ignorance is insensible to its weakness, and bears a loftier front than genuine wisdom; the wise man is modest, the fool self-conceited and vain.

Rationalism is forced to maintain the possibility of metaphysical theology; it must therefore acknowledge that it is able to grasp the eternal One. The most cherished tenet of his creed constrains the rationalist to profess his ability to sound the depths of the Divine nature. Willing or unwilling, he must undertake that much; and he must not undertake it only; he must grapple with all the difficulties that he meets, and remove them, before he can evince the truth of his system, and require us to believe him. He boasts that he is competent to sit in judgment upon the merits of a supposed revelation: but how can he be competent, unless the materials of his criticism are drawn from

a thorough acquaintance with the nature of the Deity? If he is ignorant of that, he can not reject one single doctrine of a professed revelation, on the ground of its repugnance to reason.

And a partial knowledge of God will not be sufficient. If the rationalist would construct out of his own resources a theology that can be applied as an infallible test to the doctrines of a supposed revelation, his knowledge of the Divine Being must embrace a knowledge of all His attributes. For every doctrine presupposes in the Deity an attribute, upon which it rests for its justification before men. And unless we are thoroughly acquainted with all the attributes of God, how can we say that the doctrine which we question is not founded upon some of the attributes of which we are ignorant? The only exception that could arise, would be when contradictory doctrines were proposed, each one demanding our faith; yet even then, unless we understood the attribute on which one of them was based, we would be unable to say which of them should be rejected. Rationalism, therefore, is bound to exhibit the Deity in His comprehensive fulness, if its claims are well-founded; and when any one of its advocates opposes a truth of revealed religion, on the ground that it contradicts the judgments of the reason, he must convince us that reason has penetrated all the intricacies of the Divine nature. For instance; when Jowett, and Greg, and Mackay, repudiate the idea of a vicarious atonement, because, say they, it represents God as angry, and needing to be propitiated like some heathen divinity, their objections are worthless, unless they can show that the essential nature of God warrants them in making assertions so bold. When Socinus, Priestley, Newman, and Maurice, maintain that sins may be forgiven without the intervention of a substituted sacrifice, because penitence, and not satisfaction, is the condition on which we forgive our offending neighbors; they must prove that justice and forgiveness in God are the

same as justice and forgiveness in man; and that God's position as the supreme Lord and moral Governor of the universe, does not exempt him from those laws which bind us in dealing with creatures who are our equals. And when Kant confines all religious acts to the performance of moral duties, he must demonstrate that there is something in God inconsistent with the outpouring of praise, the expression of gratitude, the confession of sin, and the offering of petitions.

We have a right to exact thus much of a system, which clothes the independent conclusions of the human mind with full authority to decide upon the validity of either the whole or a part of any professed revelation. We therefore throw down the gauntlet to rationalism, and challenge it to make good its pretensions.

Now, if man is able to evolve a rational theology either from the facts of consciousness or from the deductions of reason, all its separate parts must be consistent, when viewed by themselves; and when united, they must blend into one harmonious whole. The existence of one attribute must involve no contradictions when considered by itself, neither must it conflict with the existence of another; and the actings of them all, when taken together, must present no appearance of discord or antagonism. If there is unity in the absolute nature of God, and that nature can unfold itself to the eye of man, the unity that belongs to the original must be reproduced in the likeness that philosophy is called upon to paint. It must not give us a picture indistinct and distorted, but one that is robed in the undimmed brightness of the Deity, and invested with the matchless symmetry of the all-perfect One. Our necessary conception of the Most High is that of a Being clothed with infinite perfection—perfection in His essence, His attributes, and His acts. And if that abstract conception can be elaborated into a system, the details of that system must not consist of jarring and opposing elements: they must be embodied

in propositions ; and those propositions must vindicate their consistency and their truthfulness before the bar of the understanding.

See now the mighty task which philosophy undertakes and promises to perform. It is no less a work than to fathom the mysteries of the Godhead, and thereby construct a theology, which shall faithfully portray the absolute nature of the Deity, and present it to man freed from all imperfections and purged of all defects. Is it equal to the performance of the obligations which it has assumed? Can it redeem the promise that it has made? If it can, revelation must fall. If it cannot, whatever may be the fate of a supposed revelation, rationalism at least is shown to be a monstrous and audacious falsehood.

On the supposition that the knowledge of God lies within the range of our faculties, there are but two conceivable methods by which it could possibly be obtained. We might contend that there is a peculiar power in the soul, which intuitively takes cognizance of the Divine Being. In that case the perceptions would be immediate. Like the astronomer with his telescope, the soul would then be brought face to face with the grand object of its knowledge; the eternal verities of God's nature would burst in upon its vision without effort, even as the rising sun reveals itself to the open eye; and philosophy, instead of being a discoverer, would be nothing but a merely passive recipient of truth, and simply a recorder of the revelations which it had internally received. Or, we might argue that the soul of man is a miniature representation of the Deity, and that the nature of God is only an infinite expansion of our own. In that case we would attain to the knowledge of God by inferences drawn from a knowledge of ourselves.

But whether we adopt one method of procedure, or the other, the results at which we arrive must constitute a legitimate subject of criticism. In order to be intelligible, they must be presented in the form of propositions ; and

propositions are true or false, consistent or contradictory, according to the verdict which is pronounced by the understanding. In both cases, therefore, every scheme of rational theology must subject itself to the examination of the intellect, and abide by its decisions. That is the bar before which it must always appear—the judgment-seat before which its pretensions must be tried; and if its statements should there be confuted, and its testimony jarring and antagonistic, it will surely be overwhelmed with shame and confusion of face.

Whether the rationalist contends that the soul has an immediate cognition of the Deity, or prefers to reason from the nature of the finite to that of the infinite, he must reach the conclusion that the Divine Being is the eternal, unconditioned, infinite First-cause. Such is the simplest and most comprehensive conception of the Deity that it is possible for the mind to form; and so long as we confine ourselves to the general terms in which it is expressed, and do not try to draw out and develop the ideas which they contain, we do not meet with any insurmountable difficulties. If all theology consisted in nothing but a general and exhaustive definition of God, rationalism might plausibly affirm that it had attained its end. It is true that a dim and hazy atmosphere would still hang over the whole field of its vision, and the mighty object after which it was searching, would be revealed only in shadowy and indistinct outline; but that dim outline of the Deity would exhibit no incongruity and present no contradictory elements.

It is obvious, however, that no theological system can enclose itself in language so general as that of the eternal, unconditioned, infinite First-cause. These terms may embody the living truth: but unless they can be elucidated in propositions which we can understand and demonstrate, they no more constitute theology, than the acorn constitutes the forest oak of which it is the germ. Unless they can be expanded into sentences consistent with each other, and

easy to be apprehended, rational theology is for man an impossibility. Let philosophy then, address itself to the work that is before it, and vindicate its claims to universal acceptance.

We predicate eternity of the Deity, and we cannot but do so. But what do we really mean by the term? We must not define it to be an endless successive duration. That would be to circumscribe the all-perfect One with the limitations of the creature, and it would contradict the idea that His existence is unrestricted by conditions. If we affirm it to be infinite duration without any succession, as we are obliged to do, we have a proposition whose terms are consistent, it is true, but still are intangible and absolutely unintelligible. If we endeavor to enlarge the grasp of our minds, and expand our conception of eternity into something that is positive and tangible, we break down in the effort, and are forced to resolve it into many periods indefinitely long. If one attempt does not convince us of the supreme folly of repeating our efforts, all succeeding attempts will be but a repetition of our first failure. It would seem, therefore, that, when we try to apprehend the Most High as the eternal God, so far from apprehending Him as He really exists, our finite capacity necessarily subjects His being to the laws of time. We must conceive of His existence as having no relation to time; and yet every attempt to mould that conception into a visible and appreciable form, destroys eternity, and resolves all duration into periods of time.

But that is not all. Time is just as certainly an entity as eternity. And since time is measured by succession, it must have begun with the created universe. But by an indestructible law of our minds, we are constrained to believe, that every act is bounded by an antecedent as well as by a subsequent period of duration. From this law we cannot exempt the act of creation. If, therefore, we are true to our constitution, we are driven to the conclusion that time

existed before the creation; and that is a palpable contradiction of what we know to be the case. If we fall back upon our knowledge, and, using the phraseology which we are obliged to employ, say that the period anterior to the creation was eternity, we again contradict ourselves, for eternity cannot be divided by a point of time; it can have no antecedence and sequence in its endless duration.

There is another idea with which we must grapple in constructing a metaphysical theology—that of the unconditioned. The Deity must be unconditioned, both in His being and in His attributes; for if He is conditioned by any thing, He is limited by that thing, and therefore is not infinite. Such is the abstract conception which philosophy forms, and the truthfulness of which it is compelled to exhibit, if it would substantiate its claims by giving us an image of the essential nature of God. But how soon it leads us into labyrinths from which we are unable to escape!

We cannot deny that the eternal God sustains one relation, at least, to the created universe. He is certainly connected with it as the cause with the effect; and that relation implies that His being is conditioned—conditioned now, although it was not always so. And thus a necessary conception is branded with falsehood by another conception equally necessary. If we endeavor to reconcile this antagonism, by saying that the relation of Creator to creature was voluntarily assumed, we plunge ourselves into a denial of the Creator's infinitude; for infinity implies absolute perfection, and forbids all addition to its boundless comprehensiveness.

We come now to the idea of the infinite, which is also fundamental to the system of rationalism. And when predicated of God, what does infinity mean, but the presence of all plenitude and the absence of all limitation? He must be unlimited in His being, as well as in the number and capacity of His attributes.

But if He is absolutely infinite in His being, as philosophy requires us to believe, He must be the sum of all existence. The universe, therefore, with its myriads of separate worlds, and all its spiritual and material organizations, is nothing more than a part of the Deity. To such a conclusion it must inevitably come; yet such a conclusion annihilates the premises from which it is logically deduced. It really denies the infinity of God; for the universe is composed of parts, and no aggregate of finite parts can constitute an infinite whole.

When we leave the infinity of God's being, and try to unfold the infinite number of His attributes, we enunciate propositions that destroy each other. Philosophy maintains that the number of His attributes is unlimited. But how can such an affirmation be compatible with the existence of separate attributes, as power, wisdom, and the like, which can never be united in a series absolutely without limit? Nor do we fare less badly, when we direct our attention to the infinite capacity of each one of the Divine attributes. Infinite justice, for example, must make an inexorable demand for the punishment of every transgressor; while infinite mercy will grant unconditional pardon to the most audacious rebel. Infinite power is equal to the production of all conceivable effects; yet it cannot do evil, for infinite purity forbids it.

It seems, therefore, that infinite attributes are limited in their operations by the existence of other infinite attributes. And thus it happens that the boundless nature of God, in passing through the limited faculties of the human mind, separates itself into jarring fragments, which no power of man's can unite into one coherent whole.

If we pass now to the idea of God as the great First-cause, we deny that He is the unconditioned One; for He is related to the universe as the cause to the effect. We also destroy the idea of His infinity; for infinity involves eternal perfection, and it cannot allow the assumption of

any relation whatever. If we then ascribe eternity to the universe, to save the idea of the infinite, we immediately exterminate our conception of a First-cause.

We may now see what philosophy can do towards constructing a metaphysical theology. We have allowed it an ample opportunity to display its boasted powers, and evince the justness of its pretensions. The conclusions at which it has arrived, are what we anticipated they would be. We grant that it has an abstract conception of the eternal, the unconditioned, the infinite First-cause. But if it affixes any meaning to the term, what is its eternity but a succession of indefinite periods of time? Its unconditioned projects itself into the form of the conditioned. Its infinite is divided, and becomes only a series of finite parts. The First-cause ceases to be a creator, and degenerates into a worker upon materials which He found ready to His hand. And when it mounts higher, and takes a more particular view of its necessary conceptions, and connects them together as they coexist in the nature of God, the product of its labors is a web of incongruous colors—a tissue of glaring contradictions and inexplicable absurdities; the eternal, the unconditioned, the infinite, and the First-cause, engaged in a merciless war that can only be ended by the destruction of them all.

Well may we ask, then, Can this be a faithful representation of the adorable God? If He is indeed the all-perfect One, and can be apprehended by mortals, the image upon which they gaze must reflect the beauty of its Divine original; it must be pervaded by a spirit of unity that will bind its component parts into one grand, coherent whole; and the man who looks upon it, mirrored in the depths of his own consciousness, should be able to paint its heavenly glories in more than an earthly coloring. But philosophy cannot do this. While it professes to find the likeness of God graven upon the human soul, it shows us a hideous picture, with its brightness tarnished and its features blurred

and distorted. Philosophy claims to have all the materials for constructing a rational theology; but it understands nothing of their real character; and when it attempts to unite them into a foundation upon which the structure may be raised, they are entirely destroyed by contact with each other.

We therefore conclude that human reason can never find out the essential nature of the Most High. Whenever it dares to raise the veil and intrude into the Holy of Holies, where Jehovah dwells in unclouded glory, the beauty and majesty of the Godhead withdraw; they refuse to be looked upon by mortal eye. The eternal verities of the Divine nature are mutilated and dislocated in their passage through the soul of man; and every attempt to gather them into a simple and homogeneous whole is a hopeless undertaking. Sooner might we collect the scattered fragments of the broken crystal, and fuse them into the sparkling gem that they once composed.

The conclusion which we have already reached by examining our necessary conceptions of the Deity, might also be reached if we view them in connexion with the limitations which are imposed by nature upon the human mind. Our faculties are finite in their capacities, and restricted in their range. Every distinct and positive idea is necessarily bounded. Every analysis that we make is really a limitation of the subject that we analyze. Every definition is a determination of the boundaries of the thing that we define. And every proposition that falls within the cognizance of the understanding, must consist of a predicate and a subject, which are both definable terms.

For us, therefore, who are conditioned by time, hemmed in by limitations, and acquainted with nothing that resembles a creative cause, there can be no positive conception of the eternal, the unconditioned, the infinite First-cause; and if we transcend our proper limits by attempting to grasp those mighty ideas, they elude our grasp; they lose

their boundless dimensions, and contract themselves within the narrow compass of man's finite consciousness. It cannot be otherwise. We may expand from day to day, and rise higher and higher, till we rival the intelligence of archangels themselves; but we can never escape from that inexorable law which makes it impossible for the finite to circumscribe the infinite. And when we mould our conceptions into the form of regular propositions, in order to compare them, and deduce other propositions which are their logical consequences, we meet with an instant and withering rebuke. For, in every proposition, the subject and the predicate must both be unlimited, or both limited; or one must be unlimited, and the other limited. If both are limited, the proposition that contains them may be legitimately criticised by the understanding; but it can give us no light upon the subject of the infinite. And if both terms are unlimited, or one is limited and the other unlimited, the mind can pass no judgment upon the truth or falsity of the propositions to which they belong; for every proposition that properly falls under the jurisdiction of the mind, must present terms that can be clearly defined and distinctly apprehended.

By two separate lines of argument, therefore, we reach the conclusion, that it is impossible for man to construct a philosophy of the Deity. If he makes the attempt regardless of the limitations of his faculties, he will find that he has overestimated his natural strength, and failed in the work that he undertook; and if he considers the boundaries that circumscribe his natural powers, he will at once perceive the futility of making the attempt. There is a hedge around him, which he cannot overleap—a gulf between himself and the infinite, which no human effort can bridge.

As long as rationalism holds to the existence of a personal God, it may be convicted of making false pretensions, when it claims the power to construct a metaphysical theol-

ogy. If it flies to downright atheism, there is an end, of course, to the possibility of any theology. If it adopts the scheme of Pantheism, and merges all the universe into modes of the Divine existence, its results are conflicting and altogether unsatisfactory. Pantheism even, can furnish no resting-place upon which philosophy can stand and construct a harmonious system of rational theology. Pantheism would obliterate the idea of a First-cause; but that idea is so deeply imbedded in the constitution of the human soul, that it refuses to be obliterated. It would confound eternity and time; it would carry succession into the depths of the distant past, and have us believe that eternity is nothing but an endless series of periods of duration. Such a statement we can never accept, for we know that no successive duration can ever measure that which must have been without any beginning at all. Pantheism has no place for the unconditioned in the system which it proposes for our acceptance. That conception is fundamental; but Pantheism disowns it in making all being but a development of the Deity according to a necessary and unchangeable law. And what becomes of the ideas of the finite and the infinite, in the system of the pantheist? If he believes in the finite, he contradicts the infinity of the Deity; for, since the universe is God, and is made up of finite parts, their sum cannot be infinite. If he prefers the infinite, and would sacrifice the finite, the finite will not allow itself to be sacrificed. It is indelibly stamped upon the mind; and whether he wills it or not, it will meet the pantheist in all his speculations, and incorporate itself into the terms of nearly all his propositions. If he endeavors to retain both the finite and the infinite, he involves himself in a contradiction.

Rationalism, therefore, even in the guise of Pantheism, can effect nothing in the department of theology. All its attempts will ever be abortive.

We might add another argument against the possibility of a rational theology. We might take the thunder of rationalists, and hurl it against the systems which they defend. Assuming, as we might do, that there can be but one philosophy of the infinite, we might demonstrate the impossibility of its construction from the differences between rationalists themselves. But we forbear. The discussion has been sufficiently protracted already.

It has been shown that rationalism, in denying the possibility of an external revelation, landed us in difficulties from which there was no escape. And since its truthfulness could not be established, without proving that a revelation was impossible, we were compelled to reject its pretensions as altogether unfounded. Nay more; having proved that a revelation was possible, we were enabled to take even higher ground, and demonstrate the positive falsity of every rationalistic scheme.

Our attention was next directed to an examination of another fundamental article in the creed of the rationalist—the ability of man to construct a metaphysical theology—when we proved beyond all doubt that the idea was preposterous and absurd. Thus again we were able to deny the truthfulness of all the theories that rationalism might advance.

If we now unite the two conclusions to which we have been conducted in the course of this discussion, and bring them both to bear at once upon the position of the rationalist, they will not only render it untenable, but will drive him to the position which the creed of the believer assigns to reason in matters of religion. If a revelation is possible, and a metaphysical theology is impossible, then reason can not be the supreme arbiter in questions of a theological kind. If man can construct no system of theology for himself, and God can reveal His will if He choose, it is plainly the duty of man to examine the evidences upon which a professed revelation is based, and not to subject its

doctrines to the censorship of reason. So far, therefore, from arriving at the conclusions of the rationalist, we are logically conducted to conclusions the very opposite. Instead of discarding evidence, and appealing to reason as a judge, we must reject the supreme authority of reason, and submit to the dictation of evidence.

With rationalism thus exhibited, and shown to be inconsistent with common sense and sound reason, it may well be asked, How did such a system originate, and grow, and spread so rapidly? The answer is two-fold, and easy to be given.

There seems to be a natural tendency in the human heart to run into infidelity. Every age, perhaps, has given birth to many whose opposition to the truths of revealed religion has plunged them into a denial of its divine origin. The distinctive doctrines of the Scriptures have always been repugnant to the unregenerate soul, and have always formed a target for the venomous hatred of the depraved heart. The inflexible justice of God; the guilt and helplessness of man; the certainty of eternal punishment; the necessity of an atonement; the impossibility of a sinner's renewal except by almighty power; these are truths against which sinful malice has ever loved to hurl its poisoned darts.

When rationalism, therefore, appears in a community where vital piety has yielded to a barren formalism, and makes its plausible appeal to an unsanctified soul, he is but too ready to embrace it; especially when it is sanctioned by great names and reckless thinkers, who have found it a safe asylum from the pangs of guilt and the anguish of remorse. Always opposed to the Bible, and predisposed to infidelity, he extends a warm and hearty welcome to a system that coincides with his wishes—a system that allows him to do as he likes, and to believe as he lists, by removing all apprehensions of a future retribution, and grounding him firmly in a total rejection of revealed religion. He may have some misgivings for a while; conscience may

occasionally make some friendly and pungent suggestions; but a little obstinacy will soon lull them all to sleep, and a deceitful heart rest satisfied with its own delusion. The man will then live on in perfect security, reaping the present reward of his sin in an utter unconsciousness of the deception which he has practised upon himself.

Another cause that may be assigned for the rise and progress of rationalism, is the pride of intellect with which our nature is cursed. The view which the Scriptures present of the condition of our race is humiliating to the last degree in all its aspects. The moral image of God is not the only glory of which the fall has deprived us. To lose that beyond the possibility of recovery, was to lose by far the noblest part of the heritage that God bequeathed us. But the work of ruin has gone farther than that. It embraces the intellect as well as the heart. The beauty and strength and vigor of the mind have been marred; its light has been dimmed, and a darkened understanding has followed upon the heels of moral depravity. The law of God, distinctly and beautifully impressed by His own finger upon the tablet of the soul, has not only lost its efficacy; it has been so disfigured and blurred by the tread of sin, that many of its brightest characters no unenlightened spirit can even discern. And the attributes of Jehovah, at one time so warmly appreciated by man, have ceased to be appreciated, it is true; but more than that, they have become so obscured by the clouds which sin has gathered about the mind, that no effort of reason can penetrate their dark folds and gaze upon the Deity, as He is revealed to the unfallen and the sinless.

This moral and intellectual weakness is recognised by the Scriptures as the ground on which a revelation is needed; and in making that revelation, they propose to supply the pressing wants of both the heart and the intellect. They are intended to renovate and to instruct; not only to re-stamp the image of God upon the soul, but also,

as conspiring to this end, to disclose to some extent the mighty and mysterious truths which centre in the being and attributes of God.

This humiliating aspect of our nature does not suit the ambitious wisdom of this world, which aspires too high. It makes man too dependent in the estimation of the carnal. It sinks him too low in the scale, and must therefore be rejected. It is much more gratifying to inordinate self-love, to maintain that man has an infallible guide within himself, and therefore needs no outward instructor. It is much more pleasing to an unsanctified reason, to make it the ultimate standard of appeal in questions of a theological kind. Rationalism, therefore, by raising reason to a position of dignity in which it is independent of God, appeals to one of the strongest of man's active principles. It fosters pride, and that of the loftiest kind—pride of intellect, which brooks no restraint and smiles with self-gratulation, when told that it can sweep its eye along the infinitude of God's nature, and measure at a glance its boundless length and breadth.

Why wonder, then, that rationalism should be popular, when the power of vital piety has ceased to exist? Encouraged by human depravity, and nurtured by pride of intellect, it is natural for it to number multitudes among its advocates. And when it ascends the pulpit, and by covert means endeavors to undermine the fundamental doctrines of the Scriptures before men with fallen natures, it is not strange that many should mistake its false glare for the true light, and be misled by its pernicious errors.

But its end will come. Its doom is sealed. For a season inquirers may consult its oracle, and imbibe its falsehoods. But its heartless theology is too barren, too cold and lifeless to exert a lasting influence. Men may slumber for a time, as they did during the dark ages; but a new reformation will dawn upon the world, and the nations will awake to the emptiness of the dogmas which they have cherished.

Disgusted with the dreariness of the system which rationalism offers, they will cry out once more for the good old doctrines of the Bible, which alone are adapted to the wants of mankind. Like the prodigal son, they may now be wasting their substance in riotous living; but they will yet feel the gnawings of pinching hunger, and then they will return to their Father's house.

ARTICLE III.

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEES OF CONFERENCE
OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND THE UNITED
SYNOD OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCHES IN
THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA, ON
THE SUBJECT OF A UNION BETWEEN THE
TWO BODIES.

On the 29th of May, 1801, the General Assembly, at the instance of the General Association of Connecticut, adopted the celebrated "Plan of Union," which contained the following sentence:

"And provided the said standing committee of any church shall depute one of themselves to attend the Presbytery, he may have the same right to sit and act in the Presbytery as a ruling elder of the Presbyterian Church."

In the month of May, 1837, the General Assembly passed an "Act of Abrogation," in part as follows:

"But as the 'Plan of Union' adopted for the new settlements, in 1801, was originally an unconstitutional act on the part of that Assembly—these important standing rules having never been submitted to the Presbyteries—and as

they were totally destitute of authority as proceeding from the General Association of Connecticut, which is invested with no power to legislate in such cases, and especially to enact laws to regulate churches not within her limits; and as much confusion and irregularity have arisen from this unnatural and unconstitutional system of union; therefore it is resolved, that the Act of the Assembly of 1801, entitled a 'Plan of Union,' be, and the same is hereby abrogated."

There followed the "Disowning Acts," by which four Synods, those of the Western Reserve, Utica, Geneva, and Genesee, formed under this "Plan of Union, utterly unconstitutional, and therefore null and void from the beginning, are declared to be out of the ecclesiastical connexion of the Presbyterian Church of the United States of America, and that they are not in form or in fact an integral portion of said church."

In the following year, these Synods appeared by their commissioners, and demanded seats in the next Assembly; and, on being rejected, were joined by other ministers, North and South, commissioners at the time, leaving the Assembly for the purpose, and formed another Assembly; thus inaugurating, of course, a separate Presbyterian Church.

In 1857, that new Assembly was divided by the secession of a body of Presbyterians in the Southern States, forming the present "United Synod;" and in 1861, the Old School Presbyterian Church, as it was commonly called, was also divided on the occasion of the war, and a distinct Assembly organized at Augusta. These are the grand facts that bring these churches together on Southern soil—the one, the Southern fragment of the Old School Church, driven to separation by lawless acts of their own Assembly in upholding a brutal usurpation; and the other, the Southern fragment of the New School Church, who went off with that body in 1838, though being, as all parties were even

then agreed, nearly all of them perfectly orthodox men, who went off without the slightest detrusion from the other side; who went off, not complained against, (for the most part,) but complaining; and who were complained against *after* they had gone off, chiefly for the act of going; who, in the eyes of most of us, would be relieving their chief mistake by coming back, or joining in with us in any mutually courteous way; but who, except in the instance of a few of peculiar doctrine, have been kept from doing so by objections to *us*—by objections (perhaps well-founded) to a formal individual examination, but also, to some extent, to our original “Disowning Acts,” which all their experience in respect to Boards, and in respect to fanatic peculiarities of belief, have failed to reconcile them to; and which it is not necessary that they should be reconciled to, at this late day, as a preliminary ground on which we may come together.

The union of these churches, therefore, as far as the Old School are concerned, is a subject thoroughly prepared for in history. We never detrudded this fragment. They never left us originally on any ground of an unconstitutional “Union.” We never considered them heretical. We have at all times invited them back. And if an individual examination is undignified, or a “coming over” less mutually courteous than a “union” on independent terms, we have a technical right to do either; and if there are unorthodox men, we can make them no manner of promises, it being no more possible to abdicate our disciplinary rights, even though we knew of such cases beforehand, than for either “Old” or “New” to cast overboard the discipline of the church, or to embrace a different standard of “review” for one or another of the ministrations of the sanctuary.

We mean by that, a church notoriously sound, may, with perfect technical right, effect a union with one of a similar character; but if there be sporadic cases of unorthodox belief, the new church will not for a moment suspend her

government. The red blood running through her veins will seek the health of the distant members. No *argumentum ad verecundiam* will avail, even though it be said that we knew of these eccentric cases. Otherwise the union is a curse. If it is growing larger, we perpetuate mistakes, let us forbear the union. Otherwise we are giving new citizens a franchise above the old; and if that should follow, we are inaugurating a "plan," some third of a century hence to be the *casus* of a new excision.

On the 1st of May, 1863, the Presbytery of East Hanover adopted an overture, asking the General Assembly "to take such steps as its wisdom may suggest, to bring about a union between the Old and New School Presbyterians in the Confederate States."

On the 13th, the General Assembly acceded to this request, and appointed a committee "to confer with a similar committee of the United Synod, touching the matter of a union between that body and the General Assembly."

On the 24th of July, the committees of the two church courts met in Lynchburg, and after a harmonious counsel, in which much that favored a union was made evident in the sentiments of both parties, unanimously adopted a report, which, if finally approved, will consummate this important union.

It is with a deep conviction that these brethren have committed one mistake; and that, with admirable harmony, and wonderful correctness in their statement of belief, and able gifts in inditing so sound a paper in so short a time as the first article in their intended report, nevertheless they should not present it to be adopted by the church, that we make it the subject of the present extended notice. No mortal men should have attempted such a "declaration" at a single sitting. No Presbyterian churchmen should have attempted it at all. We hope the General Assembly, with many expressions of respect for both committees, will quietly drop this *first article*. And we hope so for these

four reasons: First, that it is *unnecessary*; Second, that it is *unconstitutional*; Third, that it is *unprecedented*; and Fourth, that it will be *prejudicial to future discipline*.

We may say, for the sake of those who have not the paper before them, that the first article is one of six, (making up the original report,) that contains the whole of what the committees see fit to call their doctrinal "declaration." We may also add that the United Synod, from the nature of the case, as well as from statements repeatedly made to us, will be willing to acquiesce in such a contemplated arrangement; and also that the effect of foregoing that part will be to leave both bodies to the Confession of Faith, a symbol that they both adopt, without the medium of any ill-defined profession of belief to be improvised between it and the consciences of our ministers.

I. In pronouncing the article *unnecessary*, it becomes important, in the first place, to settle what it is. And we are reminded of that by a discrepancy on the part of its advocates, in respect to this most important particular.

On the floor of the Virginia Synod, it was defended against the very line of argument that we here intend, by calling it a "written examination." In view of the impossibility that independent bodies should be catechised in parts, this was called a general examination; and Dr. Waddel has said, "every one who wishes to belong to this new united church, is required to signify his approval of this plan of union." Now how is this? Where, in the first place, is any arrangement made for giving in their approvals? On the contrary, nothing of the sort is spoken of. The paper is to be passed in open sessions, and would be passed in the teeth of a minority.* How, therefore, is this minority, or, in fact, any one who chooses to stay at

* "Article VI.—Whenever the above written plan of union shall have been adopted by the General Assembly and the United Synod, it shall be in full force."

home, or is not a delegate, or chooses to go out of the court, or protests against the whole procedure as a usurpation of the church, to be considered as having joined the new body? Is there not something incalculably loose in this part of the committee's operation? And if anything so enormous could be conceived as that even *in foro honoris*, Old School men ought to drop quietly out of the church, because they cannot adopt this paper, who is to bring this fact to their notice? Where are they to go? Is it not hard that an old churchman should find himself expelled, because he can not think well of this few afternoons' work of the Lynchburg committees? If he will not be, then there is no examination in the case. If he will be, then it is as strictly a SYMBOL as we can dream of in any criterion we could erect.

And the committee virtually give in to this, by calling it a "declaration" of belief and a "Doctrinal Basis of Union." And in fact, Dr. Dabney, one drafter of the paper, calls it, in the "Southern Presbyterian,"* "a new formula," appeals as a precedent to "the days of Arius and the Nicene Creed," and speaks of "language adjusted with special reference to the existing differences, so that its acceptance will be a practical test of opinion."

Whatever it may be called, therefore, it is certainly an attempt at a test, and that test is either nothing, or else a thing to be enforced in adhesions to the new organization.

Now how is this necessary?

Dr. Waddel tells us:† "If we had dispensed with the rule, (*i. e.* of examination,) and then laid down no declaration of principles setting forth the true interpretation of our standards, in that case, there would have been grounds of apprehension lest unsound men might creep in among us, and then, if arraigned, they would have had us at a disadvantage.

* November 19, 1863.

† Letter from Lynchburg.

They would be able to say, I preached the doctrines of the Confession before this union, just as I do now, and you admitted me. I have a right to complain that you have entrapped me, and after receiving me into your pale, knowing my unsoundness, as you call it, you now arraign me for it. But after the plain declaration of principles laid down by the committee, no man can plead this against us."

The exact motive therefore—and that of the committee, we suppose, for Dr. Waddel had just left its sittings—was to give us a *right*, whether in the eye of order or taste, it matters not which, to discipline any preconceived case of error. Now, we boldly protest against any such idea. We declare the paper an evil on this very account, and denounce it, if it even seems the record of any such even half-entertained idea. We are opposed to any statement of our rights to discipline, because we cannot affect them. We cannot abolish them even if we would. We cannot increase them. The union clean and clear, without any breath on the judgments of the courts, is all that we can conceive. And if to-morrow the eye of the church falls on error, it can view it in no new light; else we are not Presbyterians. We must alter our constitution, or else the ministers we join ourselves to, under this new proposal, are orthodox men; or else we are unfair in our discipline, unless we deal with them precisely as with ourselves.

The other statement, therefore, that the method has been pretended in former times of adopting our symbols "for substance of doctrine," and to put an end to that, some more defined expression is necessary, we protest against on the same account. We will not sanction an error by providing against it. We will not countenance an immoral step which our whole church is known to have inveighed against, and which no man of handsome impulse, to say nothing of conscience, will repeat against us in this stage of our history, by supplying a test, as though distinctly to acknowledge that the other was unclear. We will not feed

the error. For what is the proof that our "new formula" will be any better treated? And which is wiser, our old Confession, digested after careful years, without even a word (and we are opposed to any) setting forth our horror of this "*substance of doctrine*," or an ancillary work done in a few nights of a stay at Lynchburg; done ably, but imperfectly, as such work must necessarily be; and recording itself in the history of the times as done to abate a pretext; as though that pretext could not be turned against itself; and as though providing against it, were not *per se* disrespectful to the church; disrespectful to the creed; disrespectful to their own work, which must feel the edge of just such an admitted objection; disrespectful to orthodox men, who are to have sent out to them by a majority vote the expressions of a test most extemporaneously prepared; and above all, disrespectful to the United Synod, if they be *ipso facto* entitled to the respect of being considered at the very time worthy of the union with the great body (at the South) of Presbyterian believers?

If therefore, this test *would hold*, we would regard it by all manner of means as singularly unnecessary.

II. But then, secondly, it will not hold. We mean by that it is *unconstitutional*.

Admit, for the sake of argument, that it is not a creed, and not a symbol; though that is a singular position. For even if it were a "written examination," (the very lowest ground,) it would remain on record; and is *in thesi* an established test. If it has not the creed feature, and that, as a codicil, or a thing over and on the top of the old Confession, (as Dr. Dabney expresses it, "a drawing up on the points where difference is suspected, a new formula,") we would like exactly to know what a creed feature is. But whether it be a creed or no, it is a "rule," loosely administered, it is true, or, as we shall show under the last head, not really capable of being administered at all; nevertheless an attempted "rule;" and our Book shows that nothing of

the nature of a constitutional rule is to be imposed upon the church, without the approval of at least a majority of all the Presbyteries.

Now, it may be said that this is *not* a rule enforced upon the church; and yet it *is*, beyond all question, in that part of its operation that extends to our own body. That we might have a right to treat with the United Synod, and ask *them* some questions in respect to their notions of doctrine, and to print the answers, (to give the most favorable construction of the case,) might be more plausibly insisted; but that a General Assembly should attempt a test upon itself; nay, to merge itself into a new body made up of the old and the United Synod; and that, on the basis of a formula prepared at a single sitting, its old ministers must either adhere or retire; is an act so presumptuously invalid that we wonder it could have been entertained by our very most intelligent Presbyterians.

III. We need not say that it is *unprecedented*. If it were *not*, it would not be positive proof; but that it is, should make these committees consider before they even report such a thing to their Assemblies.

An Assembly may utter a *testimony* just as a session may. It may *reprove*, and *rebuke*, and *exhort*, and, of course, do this in the matter of doctrine. It may print *homilies*, and make them, of course, as didactic as it please. It may do any thing that an individual preacher may, and yet is liable to be thundered against by another General Assembly, if, like an individual preacher, it errs from the truth. Hence all those papers that Dr. Dabney has adduced. They are pastorals, like his own sermons on Sunday morning. There are stronger ones in 1818 and 1839, which he has not adduced. They are acts and testimonies of irresponsible bodies of men, papers of Synods, in respect to which bodies there is no pretension of a power to found a test; but in no case, in the whole history of the continent, nor, as we are firmly convinced, of any other kirk or continent,

any act like that which, in those nights of July, those able committees were preparing for our Presbyterian Assemblies.

They remind one of those exquisite machines of Babbage, which, for ten million times, or, if you please, for ten thousand years, will move without the slightest aberration, and yet which, from some strange proclivity of their nature, will make just for once, and in the most unaccountable and sudden way, the greatest that can be possibly imagined.

We beg these brethren to make another report. This is a very able one, and sound to an extent we would not have been able to conceive. That a man should be able to put his pen to paper, and prepare such a test in a few excited hours, is an intellectual feat. But then, feats are not constitutions. Creeds are one thing, and high testimonies to the faith, even by assemblies, quite another. Those profounder things are impossibles at a sudden birth. And therefore, though we defend the paper, and as Virginians would be rather proud of it, yet it does fall into erroneous statement. It is not true that "the sinner has power of any kind for the performance of duty." It is not true that the atonement "leaves no other obstacle under the Gospel, save the enmity and unbelief of those who voluntarily reject it." It is not happy to talk of the "*righteousness of His sufferings and obedience (as) is the sole ground for which God pardoneth all their sins.*" If Dr. Baxter said any of these things, or even the apostle Paul, in his uninspired moments, it makes it all the more dangerous. They are true in a certain tortuous and very side sense. But that is not the way we want a symbol. We understand that one of these very committee men has published in a pamphlet that a creed ought to be produced as the fruit of a many-sided and multitudinous debating of its principles.

IV. But if this test were even taken out of the Bible, with altered language, we should consider it *prejudicial to future discipline.*

For understand: there is no grip in it. It has in some parts an edge that would arrest the finest heretic; but it can arrest nothing. Its very appearance on the walls of Zion shows that we have daubed these for the very purpose to hide some imagined difficulty. But as it is perfectly invalid, it really can do no strengthening service. It shows that we gave way to a pretext; that we felt scared from our rest by the ghost of "substance of doctrine;" that we felt in this recentest courtship, we were conceding to the bride some shamefacedness in respect to discipline, but when that awkwardness was supposed to be revealed, the new garment has done nothing to cover it. The new basis is as perfectly without force as a blank parchment could possibly be made.

But then, ever so much without force, it is powerful on the side of others. As an appeal to honor, it is omnipotent. We must undo the union, or abide by this paper, when we have once passed it. And hence, as a sound paper, all it amounts to is, we must take the heretic on both Confessions. While he stands upon the new, we must battle with him on the basis of honor. When, after long worry, we have beaten him out of it, he has nothing to do but to claim the old. It annuls discipline. In other words, it gives the heretic the right of two Confessions, while we can appeal only to one. And if in those unwary passages, he takes refuge in the thought that the sinner has *some* power to perform his duty, we can not, after long debate, bring against him its stronger clauses without his appealing from the whole, and taking refuge, where he has a right, under the shadow of the old Confession.

We believe, therefore, that the Assembly, after a most cordial expression about the ability and good spirit shown in Lynchburg, will take interest in this paper in proving how nearly agreed those leading gentlemen were; will welcome the idea of a naked and cordial union; will utter nothing about the right of the new aggregated body to dis-

cipline heretics, from the *necessity* of such a right, and from the impossibility of any Assembly deciding for or against it; will utter nothing about "substance of doctrine," because all parties know our views about such a pretext; and therefore, founding no test themselves, they will allow none from the committee, but will gently demit the first article of their report, unless it be that the two committees, as would be infinitely better, see cause to withhold that part themselves.

Meanwhile the coalescing of Presbyterians may go on, perhaps, a great deal further. And without any new trammelling expedients or unlawful tests that must be inexorably maintained, there may be a great wholesome Presbyterian body at the South, not committed inviolably to any plans, or superinduced perpetual pledges of any sort, but partaking the old evangelical life, and submitting with no peculiarity of test to the old Presbyterian authority.



ARTICLE IV.

THE PROPOSED PLAN OF UNION BETWEEN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNITED SYNOD OF THE SOUTH.

In compliance with an overture from the Presbytery of East Hanover, the last General Assembly appointed a committee to confer with any similar committee of the United Synod, touching a formal union between these bodies. The two committees accordingly held a conference at Lynchburg, Va., in the month of July last; and agreed

upon a paper which, when adopted by the Assembly and the Synod, should consummate the proposed union. The report of this conference was immediately published, under the authority of the two committees, "to prevent public misapprehension," and for "the information of Presbyteries and Synods, upon which to ground any proceedings they may deem proper." It may be supposed, therefore, to be in the possession of all who shall honor this article with a perusal; thus obviating the necessity of its reproduction in our pages, which unfortunately our want of space would in any case forbid. In our criticism of this document, we shall be careful, however, to quote fully the passages to which we may have occasion to refer, that the reader may judge of the fairness and validity of the strictures ventured.

Before commencing this unwelcome task, two preliminary remarks must be indulged upon the history of this paper since the time of its adoption by the committees of conference, evincing a degree of unfairness on the part of its advocates of which we may justly complain. Immediately upon the publication of the report, an earnest request was preferred that no discussion of its contents should be admitted into the newspapers of the church; a prohibition which seemed to close the door against all who might desire a solution of their doubts respecting the principles of so important a paper. We construed this request, at the time, not as an attempt to forestall investigation, but simply to postpone it until the report should be brought, as required, before the General Assembly at its next meeting. The design of our brethren we judged to be simply an adjournment of the whole matter in its present inchoate state; with a view to carry the discussion over from the public press, where it could terminate in no tangible result, to the ecclesiastical court to which it properly belonged, and where it would end at once in a practical decision. We could see a manifest advantage in thus preserving the church from all agitation, until the moment when that agitation would

instantly be calmed by a vote which would reveal the mind of the whole church. It appeared therefore, to us, *pro tanto*, a pledge that the subject should sleep until it could be fully and fairly ventilated upon the Assembly's floor. What then was our surprise to learn that no efforts were spared to bring this report, not only unapproved by the Assembly, but not even as yet submitted to that body, before some of our largest and most influential synods?—thus committing no small portion of the church to its support six months antecedently to the assembling of the court which alone has jurisdiction over it. It seems to us that it would have been far more graceful to allow the Assembly's committee time to submit, according to its instructions, the report of its labors, and thus to take the sense of the collective church, rather than virtually to wrest the matter out of the Assembly's hand, and to make up the verdict of the church in detail. And what shall be said of the fairness of binding over to silence all dissentients, (which silence, by the way, has been quietly assumed as acquiescence in the proposed union,) while its advocates employ the interval in so shaping public opinion through the subordinate courts, that to the General Assembly itself is left only the poor office of registering the final decision? Connected with this should be noticed the extreme sensitiveness to even the gentlest criticism, manifested by some of the framers of this report. A few brief and courteous exceptions to the phraseology of that instrument have been received with an impatience falling just one degree below positive resentment—the last infirmity we should have attributed to leading statesmen in the church. This petulance towards old and tried confederates looks strange by the side of the new-born love glowing towards new-found allies, and somewhat abates our admiration so confidently challenged for the amiable conference at Lynchburg. We hope all this may not indicate a settled purpose to force this union by a predetermined method, whatever grief may be occasioned those by whom it is disapproved.

But this naturally introduces our second ground of complaint, the disposition to treat this as a local question upon which only certain portions of the church need be consulted. Since the United Synod happens to be distributed chiefly in Virginia, Tennessee, and North Mississippi, it is intimated that any expression of opinion from other quarters will be considered obtrusive and indelicate. If those who enjoy a daily intercourse with their New School brethren are satisfied of their orthodoxy, and earnestly desire a formal union, the hesitation of others, who do not possess equal facilities for knowing, must be ascribed to the remains of party zeal which has survived the interval of five and twenty years since the disruption in 1837. But this assumption, we may as well say frankly in the outset, will not be tolerated for a moment. The fusion of a body like the United Synod into our Assembly, will affect the complexion and fix the character of the entire church through generations to come. It is, therefore, preëminently a question of public policy; which they at least are not unfitted to determine, who happen to be free from the bias of local interests and friendships. Principles, too, may be involved in the manner by which the union is effected, in which, beyond dispute, all portions of the church have an equal interest. We are not disposed, therefore, to be ruled out of the court under the cry of non-intrusion; feeling that we owe a sacred duty to the church, and her blessed Head, to see the union accomplished by a right method, if it be accomplished at all.

We proceed now with our objections to the Basis of Union proposed by the committees at Lynchburg: the first of which is founded upon the following preamble of the report:

“The General Assembly and the United Synod of the Presbyterian Churches in the Confederate States of America, holding the same system of doctrines and church order, and believing that their union

will glorify God by promoting peace, removing the dishonor done to religion by former separations, and increasing their ability for the edification of the body of Christ, do agree to unite."

Now, what precisely is meant by the clause, "*removing the dishonor done to religion by former separations?*" The reference evidently is to the schism of 1837, for no other has any thing to do with the objects of this paper. Does the committee intend this as a constructive repudiation of what are known as the Reform Measures of 1837, and of the acts and testimonies of that day, which have been steadily affirmed by the Church to the present hour? Dr. Dabney, in his elaborate defence of the committee's report, disclaims this in the most express terms:

"It is objected that when we propose the Assembly shall say, the 'union will remove the dishonor done to religion by former separations,' we imply that the men and principles of 1837 were dishonorable to religion. The only things fairly implied are, that there were separations, that those separations did dishonor religion, (it does not say which was the guilty side in them,) and that the Assembly can, by re-union, aid in removing that dishonor. Does the editor of the *Southern Presbyterian* remember how prelatists mocked at Presbyterianism for its stormy strifes, and went about proselyting our weaker members, with the invitation into their "peaceful and harmonious" fold? Has he forgotten how the decent men of the world even were scandalized by the unseemly heats exhibited by some on both sides? Has he forgotten the mourning of the purest and best, the Baxters, the Alexanders, the Rices, on the old side itself, over the dishonor of religion? A right cause may be advocated in a wrong spirit; and he would be a bold man indeed, who would affirm that none of us have been guilty of that error. Therefore we should be willing to confess that part of the guilt as ours."

According to this, then, "the dishonor to religion" consisted not in the principles we then avowed, and which we may be supposed still to cherish, but in the acrimonious spirit with which the controversy was conducted. Even

with this important modification of the language of the report, it is a question whether the Assembly is authorized to pronounce thus judicially upon the motives and temper of men, many of whom have already gone to render their account to Him whose sole prerogative it is to search the heart. But unfortunately this is not what the clause affirms, which attributes the dishonor to the *separation itself*, and not to its *separable accidents*. The question is not what construction can be forced upon the words, but what will be their plain and obvious import to those who shall read the record as a matter of history, and who will not enjoy the benefit of the subtle commentary which will then have been long since buried in the files of the *Southern Presbyterian* office. We are constrained to say, that whatever may have been the secret meaning in the hearts of the committee, the language is a virtual abjuration of all the principles so earnestly contended for in 1837. Should the Assembly of 1864 be prepared for this, then we object to its being done covertly by an indirection. If we sinned against our New School brethren in the measures which led to that painful schism, let us have the magnanimity to confess it openly. Instead of an equivocal clause which throws the guilt upon both parties, and leaves each free under a species of mental reservation to take as much or as little as it may please, let us with Christian frankness implore pardon of God and forgiveness of our brethren, for an atrocious wrong which has been persisted in through a quarter of a century. But we do not believe that a single presbyter in the church recedes from the position taken in 1837. As for ourselves, so far from regarding that separation a dishonor to religion, we account it one of the most beneficent and glorious reforms which grace the annals of the church. It not only saved the Old School from rapid declension into error, but if there has been, as alleged, a gradual approximation of the New School to real orthodoxy, it is due under God to the faithful testimonies of that day

which aroused them in time to recoil from the frightful abyss into which they were about to plunge. We cannot, therefore, consent to the adoption of any language, the ambiguity of which will allow the possible inference that we ignore or repudiate principles and measures for which the church should still offer her thanksgivings unto God; much less the language of this preamble, which, in its obvious import, directly impeaches and disowns them.

We have lying before us, a copy of the *Christian Observer*, the representative of the United Synod, bearing date February 13, 1862, which may possibly show how this ambiguous clause will be interpreted by certain parties in the future. In an article under the well known signature of A. H. H. B., the writer thus graciously distinguishes between the Southern Assembly, and the Old Assembly from which it seceded, touching this very matter:

“But as our Southern Old School brethren have abandoned the Assembly, whose violent and unconstitutional acts in 1837 led to the division of the Church, North and South, they cannot be held responsible for those acts. As individuals our brethren may approve of the principles involved in those acts, still the cause of the division of the church was the endorsement by the Assembly of these principles; and until the Southern Old School Assembly declare their adhesion to these principles, we shall not be justified in regarding them as, in part, the *basis* on which they rest their church. It is true, Dr. Thornwell said, in the Augusta Assembly, ‘the Assembly of 1837 is to all intents this Assembly. We stand by its declarations.’ If this sentiment should be sanctioned by the Southern Old School Assembly, then we say emphatically, there can be no union between that body and the United Synod. * * * We wish Dr. Thornwell and his brethren distinctly to understand, that we have now as deep an abhorrence of this principle, involved in the act of 1837, as we had in 1839, when we separated from Southern brethren whom we loved, and with whom, under other circumstances, it would have been a privilege to have been united until death. We do not know of a single minister in connexion with the United Synod who has changed his views on

this subject. * * * We do not ask our Southern brethren to endorse our interpretation of these acts. Nor do we ask their Assembly *formally* to announce it as a fundamental principle in their church government, that no judicatory of the church can *for any cause*, by an act of legislation, constitutionally condemn or exclude from the church, ministers or private members, without a process of trial, such as is prescribed in the Constitution of the Presbyterian Church. We did require of the Old Assembly in 1858, the declaration of this latter principle as indispensable to a union with them; and we did so because we regarded that Assembly as the successor of the Assembly of 1837, which, in our judgment, had most palpably trampled upon the great constitutional and moral right of a trial before condemnation. But as our Southern Old School brethren are confessedly seceders from their Assembly, they cannot be held responsible for the ex-scinding acts of 1837."

These remarkable sentences, which have at least the merit of being unambiguous, plainly show how the measures of 1837 are still regarded by our New School brethren. The writer declares, on behalf of the entire body to which he belongs, and the statement has been on record without contradiction, so far as we know, for two years, that no union could be formed with us if we were considered as endorsing these measures. In the overtures for union in 1858, their distinct repudiation was made an indispensable condition; and if the same demand is not made of us, it is because, by an amusing fiction, our ecclesiastical identity has been lost, and we are graciously discharged from all responsibility in the premises. Whatever individuals may think, so long as our Assembly shall abstain from formally re-affirming these obnoxious principles, it will enjoy an imputed innocence, by virtue of which the United Synod may unite with us without the sacrifice of dignity or principle. In this state of case our respected committee at Lychburg do what? Correct this error by re-affirming the reform measures of 1837? They were not desired to do that—no; but in the sixth line of the preamble of their report they

call upon the Assembly to repudiate and anathematize the separation, which was the fruit of these measures which are so bitterly reviled. It seems to us that our committee might have had the grace to refrain from aspersing our glorious past; and especially that with those published declarations from a representative man of the United Synod before their eyes, they would have abstained from placing upon the lips of the Assembly any constructive repudiation of principles still dear to the heart of the church. In vain does the committee protest, such was not our meaning. Their report goes upon the record, but not their commentary; and we begin to see the value of a test paper which requires explanation even in its preamble, and where explanations thicken upon us at every step of our advance. In vain Dr. Dabney exclaims, at Charlotte, as did Dr. Thornwell, at Augusta, "the Assembly of 1837 is to all intents this Assembly—we stand by its declarations." Dr. Boyd replies, You are only individuals; but your Assembly has formally denounced the schism of 1837 as a dishonor to religion, which is as strong a renunciation of that grand reform as I could myself desire. We sincerely hope, if this unfortunate report of the committee should be adopted by the Assembly, a protest may be so framed as to require that venerable body to define its relations to the acts of 1837 so seriously compromised in this ambiguous clause.

The cancelling of a single line will, however, remove this difficulty. But our next objection is interwoven with the whole texture of the report, in that it virtually impeaches the orthodoxy of our own church in the imputation of errors which she is required to disown. There are good reasons why the doctrinal soundness of the United Synod should be called in question, and why, perhaps, they should desire to purge themselves of these suspicions. It is notorious that doctrinal differences lay at the bottom of the separation in 1837. The Old School Assembly felt constrained to testify, in the most emphatic manner, against the

heresies of Barnes, Beman, Duffield, and others, which were rapidly infecting the church; and so imminent was the peril that, at one time, it was doubtful whether the orthodox or the heretical party would obtain the ascendancy. It is notorious, too, that the body now known as the United Synod voluntarily went out from us, and affiliated through twenty years with these errorists; separating at last from them, not upon doctrinal grounds, but upon a political question, and not until the fanatical fury of Northern radicals no longer permitted them a seat in their ecclesiastical councils. We are not unmindful of the defence set up on behalf of this procedure; that the southern wing of the New School were seduced by their sympathy for those whom they regarded as unjustly and unconstitutionally dealt with in what are known as the Exscinding Acts, and that they were never accused of participation in the heresies charged upon other portions of their body. We do not intend to discuss here the wisdom or equity of these same Exscinding Acts, since this is not at all necessary to the matter now in hand. Even admitting all that has been said and written against them, what are we to think of the doctrinal purity of men who, in their incomparable zeal for a mere constitutional safeguard or ecclesiastical right, are willing to see the truth of God turned into a lie, and the whole Gospel made of none effect through human traditions? Admitting the whole force of their defence, it is surely a strange insensibility to the preciousness of divine truth, which can induce them to sacrifice this rather than a principle, however important in itself considered, of their ecclesiastical constitution. They did prefer to homologate with men who subverted the atonement of Christ and the offices of the Holy Spirit, rather than with men the extent of whose crime, by their own showing, was simply the exercise of ecclesiastical tyranny. A conscience so exquisitely tender that it could not participate in the sin of the latter, ought to have shrunk from the guilt of the former. Had the zeal

of the United Synod been half as great for the gospel of the grace of God as for one single principle in church government, they would have withdrawn from both schools, Old and New; and would not now be required to explain the substantial difference between indifference to truth and the rejection of it. As it is, they must not complain of being judged of by the company they have kept.

It is moreover a suspicious fact, that the United Synod has never repudiated the partial and unsatisfactory subscription to the standards of the Church, which was one of the original grounds of offence against the New School party, with whom they have chosen to be identified. On the contrary, at their first meeting in 1858, they append to the declaration of their adherence to the Confession of Faith, a supplementary explanation which seems to us to recognise and to embody the fatal reservation of a subscription for "substance of doctrine." The reader may judge of the correctness of this inference by carefully weighing the import of their own language :

"In thus adopting the Confession of Faith as containing the system of doctrine taught in the Holy Scriptures, we adopt it in the sense in which we believe the Fathers of the American Church received it, to wit: not as requiring an agreement in sentiment with every opinion expressed in said Confession, but a belief in the fundamental doctrines of Christianity, and in the doctrines which distinguish the Calvinistic system from the Pelagian, Socinian, Arminian, and other systems of theology. This system we understand to include the following doctrines, viz: the trinity, the incarnation and supreme deity of Christ, the fall and original sin, atonement, justification by faith, personal election, effectual calling, perseverance of the saints, eternal happiness of the righteous, and eternal punishment of the wicked. Whilst various modes of stating and explaining these truths may be adopted, yet when they are received according to the usual way of interpreting language, and as they have been understood by the great body of the Presbyterian Church in this country, from the period of the adoption of the Westminster Confession in 1729, to the present day, the requi-

sitions of the Confession are complied with, and all such persons are to be regarded as having received as their doctrinal creed, this system of doctrines taught in the Holy Scriptures."

Observe, then, that we have not here a subscription to the Confession *simpliciter*, but a subscription with qualifying and restrictive clauses, couched in language far too indefinite to serve the purpose of a test. There is the same equivocation with the words "system of doctrine" which vitiated the subscription of New School men in 1837, and created such trouble in determining what was accepted and what was renounced. It is a subscription which does not bind to an agreement in all that the Confession contains, but only in certain fundamental doctrines, the reception of which is all that is meant by the phrase "system of doctrine taught in the Holy Scriptures." Then, apart from this restricted adoption, the Confession is not to be interpreted according to the literal and obvious import of its own terms, but according to a certain sense in which these parties believe it to be received by the body of the church; so that the appeal evermore lies from the Confession to this general sense of the church in whatever way it may be collected, instead of ascertaining the sense of the church by reference at once to its acknowledged symbols. Then, too, whilst the Confession is admitted as discriminating against Pelagians, Arminians, and Socinians, there is a studied silence in reference to the very forms of error prevalent in the New School body, except as these may be embraced in the very comprehensive clause, "and other systems of theology." Why, since the enunciation was commenced at all, in order to show in what sense the Confession was adopted, does the United Synod stop at the mention of these antiquated and well-defined heresies, and preserve an ominous silence in regard to Hopkinsians, Taylorites, &c., with whom they have been supposed more or less to sympathize? The specification of certain important doctrines

appears at first sight candid and fair; but unfortunately, writers of the class to which Dr. Beman belongs, profess to recognise these, for example, that of the atonement, as the doctrines both of the Confession and of the Bible, whilst by their interpretation we may truly complain, in the language of Mary, "they have taken away my Lord, and I know not where they have laid Him." What we desire of these brethren is a plain, straightforward adoption of the Church standards, in their simple and obvious import, without equivocation or reservation of any sort. This is the way in which we have subscribed them, and which we require of all intrants into the sacred office. This will go further to remove our suspicions than the most elaborate attempts to fence round and to define their assent, or the best balanced basis of union which can be drawn up by joint committees of conference.

We do not mean by the foregoing remarks to affirm that the United Synod, as a body, is unsound in doctrine. Against one or two of their leading men, there is a written record to be disposed of, and of them we may have to speak in the sequel. But as our Virginia brethren have undertaken to vouch for the orthodoxy of the body, we are disposed to defer to their testimony, and to hope that what they believe in regard to them is true. But we have succeeded in showing the grounds upon which that orthodoxy has been at least suspected. Now the feature that offends us in the proposed plan of union, is that it places the Old School church upon identically the same footing of suspicion with the New School, and requires the same purgation of the one that it requires of the other. The framers of the report indignantly repel the suggestion of its being a compromise between the parties negotiating. But it is too patent upon the face of the paper, to be overlooked or denied. There is an antithesis pervading the entire document, a balancing of one view against another, which points to the two parties who are to adopt the instrument as plainly

as though it were written, this is for you, and that in turn is for you. Both drink alternately of the water of jealousy, and with their hands raised to heaven purge themselves of alternate errors. Both swear, indeed, in identical terms; but in each case, the oath with one is an absolute form, and with the other an absolute reality. Thus, in the section on imputation, the New Schoolman affirms Adam's posterity to be judicially condemned on account of his first sin, and means something by it, for he was supposed before to doubt or to deny it: the Old Schoolman affirms it too, and the world knows that he is called to do so only out of complaisance to his suspected brother, for whom the ordeal was really designed. Again, the New Schoolman declares this imputed guilt to be only obligation to punishment, and not the sinfulness of the act itself, and can scarcely keep his countenance in the solemn farce of disclaiming a dogma which no one ever dreamed of charging upon him; while his more serious neighbor feels the accusation of the test which requires him to deny that imputation involves a transfer of personal character. When, again, the New Side declares the sinner to have wholly lost all ability of will to choose spiritual good for its own sake, the Old Side responds yet so that the sinner be not stripped of his moral agency and accountableness; and thus the impartial test touches with the point of a needle the alleged weakness of both. Indeed, were it not for the solemnity of the subjects involved, one might smile at the ingenuity of the committee to find in every case the necessary makeweight that shall keep the balance even. Thus, when the suspected New Light has confessed the penal character of Christ's sufferings, affording a vicarious yet true satisfaction to the justice of God, where shall an offset be found, if that poor forlorn Gethsemane doctrine be not hunted out of its obscurity—"which," as Dr. Hodge testifies, "is not found in any confession of the Protestant churches, nor in the writings of any standard theologian, nor in the recognised authorities

of any church of which we have any knowledge." Accordingly this lost, stray theory, cast as a waif upon the theological world, without a patron or a friend, is trumped up simply that the General Assembly may be brought to the confessional in some form; and so she gravely testifies that the drops of Christ's blood were not weighed in the scales of a commercial transaction. Now, greatly as we may admire the generous compassion of our brethren of the committee for the shame which must attend the confessions of a suspected party, we doubt whether this sentiment would authorize the General Assembly in staining the reputation of a church hitherto immaculate in this respect, merely to afford them company in passing through the trial. Were it a question of mere sympathy, we would cheerfully consent to alleviate the humiliation of our New School brethren; but it is a question rather of simple justice to our own body, whether by voluntary impeachment we are to soil the garments of the Church, the bride, the Lamb's wife. We are free to say that we are prepared to spare them the humiliation of any confession, rather than compel a church to share it with them, whose glory it has ever been to "contend earnestly for the faith once delivered to the saints."

Our third objection to the proposed doctrinal basis, is more fundamental, and is drawn from the quasi-symbolic character it must necessarily assume. It is a declaration drawn up by two parties, in order to show their hearty agreement and to remove suspicions and offences. Now, what does the Confession of Faith itself propose to do? What is it but a scientific arrangement and statement of the truths which are supposed to be taught in the Holy Scriptures? It serves, therefore, as a bond of union between those who agree to receive it, and is the arbiter of all differences which may emerge amongst them. In like manner, this paper is a bond of union upon those points which it professes to cover. Nay, more; it becomes a

symbol in precisely the most objectionable and dangerous form—not simply as coördinate with the Confession, but as its authorized interpretation, so far, at least, as the two cover the same ground. In effect, the appeal will always be taken from the Confession to this instrument, as its acknowledged expounder. According to the oft-repeated maxim, “the *meaning* of the Bible is the Bible,” the same may be said of the Confession: and in every trial for heresy, the parties must come back to this “Doctrinal Basis” in order to ascertain what the church has decided to be the meaning of her own standards on the topics involved. The general sense of the Presbyterian Church, in accordance with which the United Synod has declared its adoption of these standards, is happily caught and imprisoned in this immortal document; and it comes forth, whenever invoked, to settle the law of the church, and the cases to which that law should be applied. We humbly submit whether the General Assembly is competent to pass upon any such proposition, except to send it down to the presbyteries to determine whether such an addition shall be made to our existing symbols.

Various attempts have been made to escape the force of this objection. For example, it has been suggested that this written declaration is simply a substitute for the customary examination of those who seek admission into any of our presbyteries. This view gains a measure of support from the clause in the report which says, “and it is agreed that no other condition shall be required of the members constituting said presbyteries, except the approval of this plan of union.” Dr. Waddel also writes, “While the rule which has been in existence for a long time in our presbyteries, of examining all who apply for admission as to their soundness of doctrine, is not exacted at all in this plan, at the same time it is required of every one who wishes to belong to this new united church, to signify his approval of this plan of union.” Unfortunately for this theory, the

examination is of both the parties, who mutually interrogate each other—the applicant who stands before the bar of the presbytery, after undergoing its inquisition, turns round upon his challengers to show their agreement with himself. Plainly this hypothesis must be dismissed as utterly untenable.

Dr. Dabney submits another and very different construction. It is a simple “declaration touching former grounds of debate,” and is put on the footing of the countless declarations emanating from the church ever since the days of Arius and the Nicene creed. He finds justifying precedents in the various declarations against error made, about the period of the schism in 1837, by different Synods and by the General Assembly itself. The fallacy of this position has, however, been ably exposed by the editor of the *Southern Presbyterian* in the following extracts, which we give as exhausting the matter :

“We propose now to point out at least two radical differences between all the cases referred to by Dr. D. and the one before us.

The first is, that in every one of those cases quoted, the statement adopted by the church was a testimony against error, intended to define the truth on the points where heresy was to be condemned, and drawn up with a special view to that object; while the statements of the committees are intended to manifest the agreement of parties supposed to have been disagreed as to doctrine, and to prepare a basis on which both can unite. This difference in purpose and intent, in the two cases, will, by well known laws of human nature, produce a marked difference in the result. When men, in the heat of a controversial war, testify against error, they are apt to use terms strong, unambiguous, precise, and sharp to the point. When opponents set to work to agree in a creed, they carefully avoid or modify all expressions which can call out their differences, and adopt vague generalities, or ambiguities, or inconsistent statements, which, by the rule before spoken of, can be interpreted both ways.

The second radical difference between the cases cited by Dr. D. and the one before us is, that while, as already stated, the former were of the nature of a testimony against error, and simply *declara-*

tive, the latter is of the nature of law, and is *legislative*. What is proposed is essentially a compact or treaty between two churches, by virtue of which they are to unite and become one. In the former, the church spoke as a *witness* for her Lord testifying to the truth which He delivered to her trust, and condemning contrary errors. In the latter, she exercises her power of *jurisdiction*, admitting others to her fellowship on their adopting certain doctrinal statements and complying with certain other terms. In this view, we hold the action proposed to be as unconstitutional as it is unwise and inexpedient. The General Assembly, we believe, has no power to admit to the membership of the church on such terms. * * * * *

* * * The difference is as wide as that between the mere *resolutions* of one of our legislatures, and its formal *acts* and *statutes*. The fact that in the report this statement is called a 'declaration' amounts to nothing. We must look at the real nature of the action proposed."

These distinctions need no amplification at our hands. They are clear in themselves, and are forcibly expressed. No function of the church is more distinctly recognised in Scripture than that of witness for the truth. She is anointed to this express end, that in her formal teachings and in the holiness of her behavior she may proclaim the truth of doctrinal and practical religion to an unbelieving world. She is often called, therefore, to testify against error; shaping her utterance to the thought of the age, tearing away the mask from all untruth, and touching, as with the spear of Ithuriel, the foul spirits who are pouring their seductive blasphemies into the ears of the unsuspecting. These testimonies are, however, by no means to be confounded with the standards which regulate her own faith, nor with the oracles from which her inspiration is drawn. They pass away with the occasions which drew them forth, or remain as historical monuments of the conflicts which she has been called to endure. But no one knows better than the drawer of this paper, that it was not conceived as a declaration against error. On the contrary, it is upon its face a declaration that no error exists, as between these two

parties, to testify against. How then can it be placed upon the footing of those grand deliverances of the past in which heresy and falsehood have been exposed to reprobation and scorn? It is simply a form of concord, in which two parties attempt to show that they are at one. Hence we find no where in the document, the sharpness and precision of testimony which defines the boundaries of error; but instead thereof, the smoothness of conciliation, which bevels off all uncomfortable corners and angles, until not a point is left upon which a controversy can be hung.

We are driven back, then, upon our original position, that this is a pronouncement of doctrine in which the parties profess to agree, binding as soon as it is adopted by them severally, which makes it a virtual symbol of their faith; and, as we have already shewn, from the very circumstances under which it was prepared, a symbol superseding practically the Confession itself, as determining what the parties agree that standard shall mean. Under this view, we object to its adoption by the Assembly, even though, as a paper, it were perfect of its kind. Though a searching criticism should fail to detect a single ambiguity, though it should afford no room for amendment in sentiment or in style, yet, as a symbol, we would reject it as superfluous, and as trenching upon the supremacy of the standards we have already covenanted to uphold. We are not of those who are opposed to creeds. On the contrary, we believe a creed, either long or short, written or unwritten, must exist as the bond of union in every religious body. But we are satisfied with the creed we already have—a creed drawn out over the whole circle of divine truth, closely articulated and held together by the strictest logic—a creed prepared by the wisest men the Church of God has ever known, and at a period peculiarly favorable to the accomplishment of such a task—a creed wrought in the forge of abundant prayer and deliberation through a succession of months and years—and above all, a creed which has with-

stood the storms of more than two centuries, and which is bound up in the most precious associations of the people of God. Such a creed is not to be lightly added to, or taken from, and, least of all, to be superseded by a rival, surreptitiously introduced and covertly palmed upon the church. If there are parties whom our existing Confession does not satisfy, let the proposition be openly made to modify and improve it, and the church will then, at least, know what she has taken in hand; but we trust the Assembly will watch with jealous care, lest this modest declaration of agreement should be found to usurp the functions which belong only to an acknowledged and authoritative symbol.

The foregoing objections are levelled against the proposed doctrinal basis, taken as a whole: we proceed now to a more articulate examination of its several parts, and draw attention,

1. To the section upon imputation, which reads as follows:

“Concerning the fall of man, and original sin, we faithfully hold with the confession of faith, that our first parents, by their first act of disobedience, “fell from their original righteousness and communion with God, and so became dead in sin, and wholly defiled in all the faculties and parts of soul and body; that they being the root of all mankind, the guilt of this sin was imputed, and the same death in sin and corrupted nature conveyed to all their posterity, descended from them by ordinary generation; and that from this original corruption, whereby we are utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good, and wholly inclined to all evil, do proceed all actual transgressions.”

This imputation of the guilt of this sin of our first parents we hold in this sense, that thereby their posterity are judicially condemned by God on account of that sin; and so begin their existence in that corruption of nature, and subjection to wrath, into which our first parents fell by their first sin. And we mean that the guilt of their sin, which is imputed, is according to the constant usage of theology—“obligation to punishment,” and not the sinfulness of the act itself;

which latter cannot, by imputation, be the quality of any other than the personal agents."

If the last sentence in this extract is simply a caveat against the dogma that each individual of the human family personally committed the act of eating the forbidden fruit, and by an express exercise of his individual will, participated in the first sin, we have nothing to say except that a spear is hurled against a shadow. Undoubtedly, as individuals, we did not then exist: and it is a clear misconception, if not a wilful misrepresentation of the doctrine of our union with Adam, to suppose that we are transfused into him, having his personal consciousness, and individually doing his act. However useless therefore this disclaimer may be on the part of our new school brethren, we would pass it by as innocent. But when it is remembered that this language is placed upon the lips of the General Assembly, to be uttered by them as explaining the sense of our standards on this vital point, and to be cited hereafter as the authorized interpretation of the church, we cannot but inquire whether it exhausts the testimony of these standards, and gives us the whole doctrine of imputation as therein taught. Our complaint is, that the utterance is both defective and ambiguous. It is defective in that it does not bring out articulately the federal headship of Adam, which is the precise ground upon which this imputation is based. Indeed, if the reader will scan this section closely, there is not even a reference to this most important relation, except in the phrase "that thereby their posterity are judicially condemned by God on account of that sin;" which does certainly imply it, but from which it requires to be inferentially deduced. The committee does indeed quote from the Confession of Faith—but quotes from a passage in which the leading idea was to affirm the transmission of depravity by natural descent from Adam, as "the root of all mankind," rather than to state the formal ground upon which

that penalty is incurred. Other passages are passed over in silence, which distinctly affirm the federal and representative relation of Adam as being the principle which determines the imputation of his guilt to all his posterity. For example, in the seventh chapter of the Confession it is said; "the first covenant made with man was a covenant of works wherein life was promised to Adam, and *in him to all his posterity*, upon condition of perfect and personal obedience." Again, the answer to the twenty-second question in the larger Catechism testifies, "the covenant being made with Adam as a *public person*, not for himself only, but for his posterity, all mankind, descending from him by ordinary generation, *sinned in him and fell with him in that first transgression.*" We do not, of course, intimate that this vital truth is even doubted by our respected committee, nor that it is denied by the members of the United Synod. But it does appear strange that, in a section explaining how the doctrine of imputation is received by the church, there should be no explicit statement of that legal relation which our standards recognise as "*cardo causæ*," the very principle which determines that there shall be any imputation; and that in a paper which is to operate as a test of orthodoxy, it should be recognised only by an implication from which it is drawn out by a remote inference.

There have been those who admit the inherent depravity of man, but deny the strict imputation of Adam's sin as the moral ground upon which it rests. Under the operation of the universal law by which like begets its like, this corrupt nature is transmitted as a natural consequence of the Fall. If Adam had begotten a son during the period of his innocence, that son would have been born holy; but as Eve did not conceive till after he fell, the race that issued from his loins was unholy, by the same law of propagation. In consequence of the corrupt nature, thus inherited, the sinner is justly condemned; and it is only *mediately*, through this inherent depravity, he has any thing to do with Adam's

sin. Here, then, is a sense in which the imputation of the first transgression is nominally conceded, while yet it is in fact exactly denied. The orthodox belief is precisely inverted: for while that considers imputation as prior to condemnation, and, of course, as prior to inherent corruption, this theory regards depravity of nature as the cause of condemnation, and thus remotely of imputation. To guard against the possibility of errors like these, the committee should not have left at the mercy of a mere inference that important relation to Adam as our covenant head, which underlies and supports this whole doctrine of imputation. But is the committee's language sufficient to detect and expose the speculations of the United Synod itself on this subject? We beg the reader to examine with care the following extract from the *Christian Observer*, of February 20, 1862:

“ We believe (1) that Adam was so the representative of his race, that his act would determine their character. If he had continued holy, they would have been holy. But as he sinned, they, as a consequence, became sinners. 2. We believe that in consequence of this representative relation of Adam, his posterity are treated as sinners, on account of his sin—that is, are liable to suffering and death on account of his act. We do not believe that God regards the posterity of Adam as *meriting* his wrath for the sin of their original progenitor—in other words, that the ‘*moral turpitude*’ of his act is transferred to them. But we do believe that, in as much as the evils brought upon the race are an expression of the Lawgiver's disapprobation of the sin of Adam, and were thus *designed* to show his regard for his law and his determination to uphold it, they may be termed *penal* evils, or what Dr. Thornwell would call the ‘*judicial result*’ of the sin of Adam. God does not inflict these evils upon succeeding generations as an arbitrary sovereign, or simply because Adam was the head of the race, irrespective of the claims of his violated law. It is as lawgiver, determined to give the highest possible expression of his abhorrence of the sin of Adam that he can give in this world, that the Almighty brings upon Adam's descendants suf-

ferings as the consequence of his transgression. Their sufferings, therefore, are the result of the first sin, are *penal, judicial* sufferings; whilst at the same time Adam alone, their representative, is the *criminal* individual."

Here then is a confession of faith for us! "Adam so the representative of his race that his act determines their character"—this is all the imputation in the case, just the mediate imputation of Placœus in the 17th century! Adam's posterity "treated as sinners on account of his sin," which, however, only means that "they are liable to suffering and death on account of that act!" But are these evils brought upon the race as calamities only? Oh no, says Dr. Boyd, they are "*penal, judicial* sufferings"—that is, "they may be termed penal," but only as "an expression of the Lawgiver's disapprobation of the sin of Adam, and designed to show his regard for his law and his determination to uphold it!" Does not the reader see that the whole is constructive and technical throughout? Adam is constructively a representative, since the result of his sin is that his posterity are sinners—and the "evils brought upon the race" are constructively penal, because they express the Lawgiver's abhorrence of the sin of Adam, for which reason, "as the consequence of his transgression," they fall upon his descendants. Not a word here of the covenant relation of Adam to his race as their federal head, and of their undergoing a full probation in him: but only an undescribed representation of some sort, and a constructive imputation, in consequence of which they suffer certain consequences that are only technically penal. Yet the writer of this ambiguous confession has accepted the doctrinal basis of the committee, and lends it his influence that it may be adopted by the body to which he belongs—and according to his own theory, he can swallow the committee's testimony of our being judicially condemned on account of the first sin without the slightest contortion of

face; for he has only to understand it in a Pickwickian sense—a *quasi* judicial condemnation, as being the result of that first sin, and inflicted by the Lawgiver to show his disapprobation of the same. Dr. Boyd has gone through the meshes of the committee's net in the language of another, without "ruffling a single feather."

Before dismissing this deliverance of the committee, we have a word to say about the ambiguity of the disclaimer; "and not the sinfulness of the act itself, which latter cannot by imputation be the quality of any other than the personal agents." As already stated, we have no objection to this as merely disavowing the notion of personal identity between Adam and his race. In our distinct and separate personality, his sin could no more be ours than ours could be his. But, then, what does the Catechism mean when it says that, "we sinned in him and fell with him in that first transgression?" The doctrine unquestionably is that, by the appointment of God, Adam's posterity were united to him, not only by the natural tie of physical descent, but also by a moral relation of covenant headship, in consequence of which he and they were constituted a legal unit. The race was put upon its trial in the person of its representative—in the eye of the law, Adam was the race—his obedience would have been theirs by a proprietary right in it, as truly as though it had been rendered in their individual persons—and this being recognized by imputation, they would have been entitled to eternal life as the reward of the covenant. It follows, *ex equali*, that his disobedience was theirs; which, being reckoned or imputed to them, put them equally with their representative under condemnation. The act of Adam, as a public person, must belong to all those for whom he was a surety. It is theirs as well as his; not theirs as personally committed by them, but upon the principle—*qui facit per alium, facit per se*; and their title to it is as perfect and indefeasible as that of Adam himself. Imputation is the formal recognition of this title,

the judicial decree, rendered in due process of law, by which the provisions of the covenant are carried out in successive generations. We do not care to enter into any discussion upon the generic unity of the human race, nor to quarrel with those who are indisposed to press beyond the appointment of God for a reason of this imputation. All that we contend for is the recognition of the truth, that we are "in Adam *virtually* as a natural root, and *representatively* as a covenant head;" and this union in him, mysterious and inexplicable as it may be, we are unwilling even by implication to disavow. By virtue of this union, we believe, with our standards, that we "sinned in Adam, and fell with him in that first transgression;" so that there is, on our part, a true and real, not a constructive and fictitious, responsibility, for the same. Dr. Boyd is unwilling to believe that "God regards the posterity of Adam as *meriting* his wrath for the sin of their original progenitor." We do not insist upon a term so equivocal as that of merit, which, if used by us, would be understood by him in a sense different from that intended. But a holy God treats Adam's posterity only as they deserve to be treated; they are now as much entitled to condemnation and wrath through the disobedience of their head, as they would have been entitled to life through his obedience. If any object, with Dr. Barnes, that the phrase, "sinning in Adam," is unintelligible, as confounding personal acts and personal consciousnesses, we commend them to the apostle's argument for the superiority of the priesthood of Melchizedec over that of Aaron, by the fact that Levi paid tithes to him in the loins of Abraham; "and as I may so say, Levi also, who receiveth tithes, paid tithes in Abraham; for he was yet in the loins of his father, when Melchizedec met him." If Abraham's act, in paying the tenth of the spoils to Melchizedec, was the act of Levi, virtually present and acting in the loins of his father, we see no reason for scrupling to say that we sinned in Adam, as virtually and representa-

tively in him; and if the acknowledgement by Abraham, of the superior dignity of Melchizedec, was a profession of the same by Levi yet unborn, then we do not hesitate to say that the quality of sinfulness in Adam's transgression belongs in that same putative sense to his descendants.

We call attention,

2. To the portion of the same section which treats of the sinner's inability, in the following terms:

"We do also believe that because of this original corruption, men have 'wholly lost all ability of will' to choose spiritual good for its own sake, or to regenerate, convert or sanctify their own hearts. But we equally reject the error of those who assert that the sinner has no power of any kind for the performance of duty. This error strips the sinner of his moral agency and accountableness, and introduces the heresy of either Antinomianism or Fatalism. The true doctrine of the Scriptures, as stated in our confession, keeps continually in view the moral agency of man, the contingency of second causes, the use of means, the voluntariness of all the creature's sin, and his utter inexcusableness therein. It teaches that while the fall has darkened and impaired all the faculties of man's soul, and inclined his free will to evil only, it has not destroyed in him any capacity of understanding or conscience whereby the holy creature knows and serves God, and on which free agency and responsibility depend."

The feature of this paper, which makes it so fatal to the purity, and therefore to the peace, of the Church, is, that whilst it allows apparently the most innocent disclaimers on the part of our New School brethren, it does it in language so incautious as to open the door for the importation of the worst heresies that can afflict the Church of God. It thus requires a running commentary on the part of its framers, assuring us that they do not mean this, and they do not mean that, so as to render it utterly worthless as a touchstone of orthodoxy. For example, in the preceding extract, after a clear avowal of the sinner's inability to choose spiritual good, and that the Fall has inclined his free will to evil only, the committee turn round and upset

it all by the bold, unguarded denial, "that the sinner has no power of any kind for the performance of duty." Undoubtedly the two statements, in any proper sense, are contradictories. Why, then, is the latter introduced at all? Simply because the New School are afraid that a round assertion of the sinner's inability, will "strip him of his moral agency and accountableness, and introduce the heresy of either Antinomianism or Fatalism." Are we, then, to admit this implied impeachment of our standards, that without this important qualification they will take the sinner out of the moral government of God, and leave him an irresponsible agent, free from all accountability? Is not the allegation infinitely absurd, when, from beginning to end, the Confession holds every man so strictly to the law, that his only hope of escape from condemnation and wrath is through the sovereign grace of God? Is it not a wicked and wilful slander, when these very standards, besides other testimonies, expressly declare "the will of man to be endued with that natural liberty that it is neither forced, nor by any absolute necessity of nature determined to good or evil?" Are we, for a moment, to allow that Antinomianism and Fatalism are any thing else but a rejection of Calvinism on the one side, as Arminianism is on the other? Is the Old School church to purge herself of the taint of these monstrous heresies, before the purists of the New School will consent to union with her? But offensive as the language of the report was under this view, we did not construe it as any thing more than an unguarded and conflicting utterance of the committee, until we read the elaborate defence of the paper from the same pen by which it was drafted. In that unfortunate polemic, which our brother will live to regret that it was ever written, Dr. Dabney justifies the "naughty words" on the ground that they were taken from a document written by the wise and good Dr. Baxter, and adopted by the Synod of Virginia in 1836. If so, it is only another illustration how unsafe are the doc-

trinal statements of the best men, which are drawn up for the purposes of concession and compromise. But this matter is not to be decided upon any other authority except that of our acknowledged standards. "We reject the error," says the report, "of those who assert that the sinner has no power of any kind for the performance of duty;" which implies, of course, says Dr. Dabney, that the sinner has some power of some kind to perform his duty. Let us, then, lay over against this unqualified and broad language the testimonies of our standards. Amongst others, take the following: "Man, by his fall into a state of sin, hath wholly lost all ability of will to any spiritual good accompanying salvation; so as a natural man, being altogether averse from that good, and dead in sin, is not able by his own strength to convert himself, or to prepare himself thereunto." Confession, ch. 9. Again, the larger Catechism, question 25, on original sin: "Whereby he is utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite unto all that is spiritually good, and wholly inclined to all evil, and that continually." And in question 192: "Acknowledging that by nature we and all men are not only utterly unable and unwilling to know and to do the will of God, but prone to rebel against his word, * * * and wholly inclined to do the will of the flesh and of the devil; we pray that God would by His Spirit take away from ourselves and others all blindness, weakness, indisposedness, and perverseness of heart, and by His grace make us able and willing to know, do, and submit to His holy will," &c. We will not attempt to make the contrast more emphatic between these passages and the committee's report, by the use of italics, but quote them exactly as they are found in the book.

But it will be rejoined, these citations are nothing to the point, since they refer to the *moral* inability of the sinner, which the report distinctly affirms, and not to his *natural* inability, which the report as distinctly denies. Accord-

ingly, Dr. Dabney attempts at length to show that, whilst the committee rejected these terms as ambiguous and unhappy, the distinction which they express must be retained—that it is indispensable, in order to make out the responsibility of the sinner, and is implied in all the efforts of the preacher in dealing practically with the conscience. Alas! that our brother should thus “speak half in the speech of Ashdod!” Is not this the identical language in which the hereditary enemies of Calvinism have always endeavored to excite the prejudices of unthinking and uncritical men? and are not these the arguments by which the old theology of the church has ever been assailed? We venture to say that this painful embarrassment would not have been felt by our excellent brother in his theological chair at Prince Edward: but as a committee man at Lynchburg, he had a new and strange rôle to play, as the special advocate of New School opinions, and he works awkwardly in the harness. The transparent fallacy of his whole argument is exposed by a single interrogatory of the editor of the *Southern Presbyterian*, when he asks, “does not Dr. Dabney get confused between “powers” and “power?” *Acu rem tetigit*, the very core of the difficulty is reached. If a single iota served to separate the Arians and Orthodox of old, it is not strange that the letter *s* should settle this whole distinction between responsibility and ability, which seem so hard to harmonize. “Our Confession and Catechisms,” adds Mr. Porter, “while they attribute to man certain *powers* in the sense of faculties and endowments, those namely which constitute him a responsible being, deny, most categorically, the possession of any ‘*power*’ to perform his duty.” Undoubtedly, if the fall had obliterated all the faculties of the human soul, the sinner would be taken out of the category of a moral being; he would cease to be a man, and could, no more than any other brute, lie under the jurisdiction of the divine law. But what has this to do with the question, whether a fallen being, whose

original faculties are depraved by sin, has power to perform duties which can only be wrought when these faculties are sound and pure? This is the exact point under debate: it is the ability of the sinner to perform *moral acts*—and though he may possess the faculties which are essential to constitute him a reasonable and responsible being, if these are disabled by sin, then is he destitute of the very power which is required in the premises. The real difficulty lies in reconciling this responsibility with the want of *moral ability*; and the fact that the sinner continues to possess those natural faculties or “powers” which make him a man, does not afford even a proximate solution. How if the sinner be born destitute of those dispositions and habits which are necessary for duty,—can he be held responsible for his delinquency? Manifestly, if he had been originally created without this moral power, he could not be held answerable for the want of spiritual obedience: and the only solution of the difficulty is, that this inability is the penal visitation of God upon sin. Moral inability, which is all that is truly involved in the case, does not discharge the sinner from obligation, simply because it was not the original condition of man as he came from the hands of his Creator; it has been brought upon him by sin—and he is responsible for it precisely in the same way that he is responsible for the inherent corruption which produces it. We have lying before us an unpublished manuscript from the pen of the venerated Dr. Thornwell, from which we transcribe a passage as superseding all that we would say. It bears directly upon the topic now under discussion, and will be read with interest as an earnest of what is to be enjoyed when these lectures shall see the light.

“We must distinguish between inability as original, and inability as penal. Moral power is nothing more nor less than holy habitudes and disposition—it is the perception of the beauty, and the response of the heart to the excellence and glory of God—and the con-

sequent subjection of the will, to the law of holy love. Spiritual perception, spiritual delight, spiritual choice, these, and these alone, constitute ability to good. Now if we could conceive that God had made a creature destitute of these habits—if we could conceive that he came from the hands of the Creator in the same moral condition in which he is now born, it is impossible to vindicate the obligation of such a creature to holiness upon any principle of justice. It is idle to say that his inability is but the intensity of his sin, and the more helpless, the more wicked. His inability is the result of his constitution—it belongs to his very nature as a creature—and he is no more responsible for such defects than a lame man is for his hobbling gait, or a blind man for his incompetency to distinguish colors. He is what God made him; he answers to the idea of his being; and is no more blameworthy for the deformed condition of his soul, than a camel for the deformity of its back. The principle is intuitively evident that no creature can be required to transcend its powers. Ability conditions responsibility. An original inability, natural in the sense that it enters into the notion of the creature as such, completely obliterates all moral distinctions with reference to the acts embraced within its sphere. And if this had been what the advocates of natural ability meant, their position would have been impregnable. But this is not what they mean; they do not represent the natural as that which pertains to the idea and original state of the creature. In this sense, moral and natural ability are not distinguished as separate species; but the moral is the natural ability—the moral habits are the very things by which a moral creature possesses any ability to do good at all. They contend, on the other hand, that there may be the entire absence of all holy principles, of all spiritual discernment and love—and yet that the creature thus destitute of these may be possessed of power of another kind to do good, upon which his responsibility is conditioned. Upon their hypothesis, it is conceivable that a man may be originally corrupt as a creature, and yet under obligation to keep the perfect law of God. Their ability, when narrowly examined, turns out to be a mere play with the ambiguity of language, or the denial in one form of what they have affirmed in another. Sometimes it is represented as the mere possession of the faculties, and attributes of reason, intelligence and will, abstracted from any determinate states in relation to holi-

ness and sin. A being thus existing in *puris naturalibus* we have already seen to involve an absurdity—its very attitude of indeterminateness to good would be sin. It is precisely in the character of its determinations, and of them alone, that its good and evil consist. * * * * * These distinctions and evasions show conclusively that the natural ability which I make essential to responsibility, is a very different thing from that which many divines have invented as the condition on which man is responsible since the fall.

But there is another, a penal inability. It is that which man has superinduced by his own voluntary transgression. He was naturally able; that is, created with all the habitudes and dispositions which were involved in the loving choice of the good. Rectitude was infused into his nature; it entered into the idea of his being; he was fully competent for any exaction of the law. He chooses sin, and by that very act of choice impregnates his nature with contrary habits and dispositions. His moral agency continues unimpaired through all his subsequent existence; he becomes a slave to sin; but his impotence, hopeless and ruinous as it is, results from his own free choice. In the loss of habits, he loses all real power for good; he becomes competent for nothing but sin; but he is held responsible for the nature which God gave him—and the law which constitutes its eternal norm, according to the divine idea, and the spontaneous dictates of his own reason, can never cease to be the standard of his being and life. All his descendants were in him when he sinned and fell. His act was legally theirs; and that depravity, which he infused into his own nature, in the place of original righteousness, has become their inheritance. They stand therefore, from the first moment of their being, in the same relation to the law which he occupied at his fall. Their impotence is properly their own—how this can be, this is not the place to show. I am only showing that there is a marked distinction between the inability which begins with the nature of a being, and the inability which it brings upon itself by sin: that in the one case, responsibility is measured by the extent of the actual power possessed—in the other, by the extent of the power originally imparted," &c.

3. Our failing space warns us to take up the third section of the committee's report, on the atonement, as follows:

“Concerning the atonement of Jesus Christ, we hold that He, being very God and very man in one person, was our substitute under the law; that the guilt of men’s sins was imputed to him; that His sufferings were borne as the penalty of that guilt, and were a vicarious, yet true satisfaction therefor, to the justice of God; and that without this, God’s perfections would forbid the pardon of any sin. This atonement, we believe, though by temporary sufferings, was by reason of the infinite glory of Christ’s person, full and sufficient for the guilt of the whole world; and is to be freely and sincerely offered to every creature, inasmuch as it leaves no other obstacle to the pardon of all men under the Gospel, save the enmity and unbelief of those who voluntarily reject it. Wherefore, on the one hand, we reject the opinion of those who teach that the atonement was so limited and equal to the guilt of the elect only, that if God had designed to redeem more, Christ must have suffered more, or differently. And on the other hand, we hold that God the Father doth efficaciously apply this redemption, through Christ’s purchase, to all those to whom it was His eternal purpose to apply it, and to no others.”

Upon this fundamental doctrine of atonement, the utterance of the committee should have been the most full and explicit, instead of being the most exceptionable in their whole paper. The first question turns, of course, upon the *nature* of the atonement—what is it that makes the death of Christ a true satisfaction to the broken law? The uniform testimony of our standards is, that Christ, as the strict and proper substitute for his people under the law, rendered a perfect obedience to its precepts, and incurred the penalty denounced against the transgressor; which, by virtue of his federal relation to the elect, is reckoned to them as their righteousness, so that, when received by faith, they are not only discharged from condemnation, but are accepted in their persons before God. Thus the Confession, ch. 8, sec. 4—“This office the Lord Jesus did most willingly undertake, which, that he might discharge, he *was made under the law and did perfectly fulfil it,*” &c. Again, in section 5; “The

Lord Jesus, by his perfect obedience and sacrifice of himself, which He, through the eternal Spirit, once offered up unto God, *hath fully satisfied the justice of His Father*; and purchased not only reconciliation, but an everlasting inheritance," &c. The Larger Catechism, Question 49, on the humiliation of Christ—"having also conflicted with the terrors of death and the powers of darkness, *felt and borne the weight of God's wrath*, He laid down His life an offering for sin," &c. Language like this it would seem impossible to mystify. For if Christ was made under the law, and did perfectly fulfil it, one would think he must come under and perfectly fulfil the two parts of law, the precept and penalty, the union of which constitutes the formal nature of law. If He fulfilled the precept by obeying it, He must equally have fulfilled the penalty by enduring it; and this is *the obedience unto death* of which the Scriptures speak. Yet our slippery opponents, who seem to think, with Talleyrand, language an invention to conceal thought, through a subtle interpretation contrive to evade the force of all this testimony. They admit, for example, that Christ was a substitute for the guilty, that His sufferings and death were vicariously endured, that they were penal inflictions, and rendered satisfaction to the injured law and insulted majesty of God. All this is well, if the words were employed in their usual signification; but when the key to the cipher is put into our hands, it turns out that they are all to be understood in a *quasi* sense. Thus, the sufferings of Christ were not inflicted as *the* penalty threatened to the transgressor, but what was *an equivalent in effect* for it; and they are termed penal, constructively, because the demands of the law or lawgiver are virtually answered by the death of Christ, and the end of the penalty subserved, to wit, the manifestation of God's holiness, and the maintenance of His authority. That the reader may not suspect us of drawing a caricature of their views, we present an extract from A. H. H. B., in the *Christian Observer* for March 13,

1862. And we quote thus frequently from this writer, because he is an acknowledged leader in the United Synod, because he has been endorsed by his own brethren in their election of him as a professor in their projected seminary, because he has written these sentences with special reference to a union between his body and our own, and because, with these utterances yet warm upon his lips, he has accepted the paper of the committees of conference upon which we are now commenting. Dr. Boyd says :

“But it may be asked, did Christ suffer the penalty of the law? We answer, yes, if it be meant to inquire whether the sufferings of Christ had the same effect and a like value in the moral government of God as the penalty of the law. But if it is intended by the question to inquire whether Christ suffered, in kind or degree, the *exact penalty* threatened to the sinner, or whether he endured the penalty of the law in such a sense as that God is bound by his *justice* to deliver from punishment all for whom he died, we answer, no.”

He then goes on to show that the Savior's sufferings were not eternal, and that he had no remorse of conscience, to all which we agree, and that these constitute the very essence of the penalty, which we as distinctly deny. Then he adds :

“The great practical question, with reference to this point, is not whether Christ suffered *the precise penalty* threatened to the sinner, but whether his sufferings were *penal* in their nature—that is, whether they were designed by the law-giver to uphold his government by being substituted in place of the punishment due to transgressors. They were not mere chastisements; they were not intended by God simply to be instructive or symbolical, and as an illustration of patience under suffering. But the great peculiarity of the Savior's agonies was that they were a *vicarious, expiatory* offering, designed to accomplish all the ends to be secured by the infliction of the penalty of the law upon transgressors. The demands of the law or lawgiver are *virtually* answered by the death of Christ, inasmuch as all the good ends of the law, which would have been

secured by the sinner's punishment, have been accomplished by Christ's obedience and death. His sufferings therefore were literally and truly *penal* in their nature."

Literally and truly penal, indeed! When it is openly declared that they were a substitution for the penalty, and of another kind from that inflicted upon the transgressor! Can the reader fail to penetrate the fraud, which is practised by all heresiarchs, of using even to profuseness the consecrated dialect of the Church, which, by a transposition of meaning, is made to convey the very errors it was intended to disown and denounce? What have we here beyond a merely technical penalty, and a constructive and fictitious imputation? The adroitness of the argument by which this view is supported, is worthy of the subtlety in which it was invented. Put in a compact form, it runs thus: the penalty against the sinner is death—Christ did not die eternally, therefore He did not undergo the precise penalty, but only an equivalent to it. The conclusion is vitiated, however, by the quiet assumption that eternity of suffering is of the *essence* of the penalty. If this should be disproved, the whole argument falls to the ground. Now, in the Scriptures, the phrase, the wrath of God, is used with almost technical precision for the judicial displeasure of God against sin expressed in the penalty of the law. "The wrath of God," says the apostle, "is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men." In like manner, the Catechism describes the sufferings of Christ in their relation to the law, as the "feeling and bearing the weight of God's wrath." This wrath, when it terminates upon such a being as man, issues in death; as terminating upon his body, in temporal death; as terminating upon his soul, in separating it from communion with God, which is spiritual death; and since the finite creature can never exhaust that wrath, in eternal banishment of soul and body in hell. But when this wrath terminates

upon such a being as the Lord Jesus, who is the God-man, it separates between the soul and body, and cuts him off from all communion with the Father in the hour when, as a sacrifice, he passes under his judicial displeasure,—but it does not banish him forever from the divine favor. By virtue of the hypostatic union, all the dignity and glory and resources of the divine nature were carried over to the work which was wrought in the human; and a person so mysteriously constituted, who shall say that he could not bear the wrath of God in all the fulness in which it was originally expressed in the penalty? We recoil, indeed, from the profaneness which undertakes to weigh in the scales of human judgment, or to measure in the scant proportions of human thought, the awful sufferings of our blessed Lord; and it is for this reason that we reject the presumptuous dogma of our opponents, that He did not bear *the* penalty of the law. God forbid that we should attempt to lift the veil from those transcendent sufferings which once caused the rocks to rend, and broke the slumbers even of the dead! It is enough for us to know that He “felt and bore the weight of God’s wrath,” that He did undergo the Father’s judicial displeasure, to satisfy us that He did endure the essence of the penalty originally denounced against the transgressor.

How, then, does the committee propose to protect the Church against these equivocations?—by testifying that “His (Christ’s) sufferings were borne as the penalty of that guilt, and were a vicarious, yet true, satisfaction therefor to the justice of God.” But as we have seen, these parties have no hesitation in affirming these sufferings to be vicarious; alas! too much so, since Christ was not only a substitute personally for his people, but his sufferings were also substituted in the place of the penalty. They have no hesitation in affirming them to be a satisfaction, and even a true satisfaction, to divine justice; for they “had the same effect and a like value in the moral government of

God, as the penalty of the law." How, then, shall they be tied up from all evasion? We answer, most certainly not by placing in their lips the very ambiguity they desire in the clause, "His sufferings were borne *as* the penalty." We have read and admired the dialectic skill of Dr. Dabney in his defence of this favorite little particle; but must say after all, if the New School men wish a formula precisely suited to their equivocations on this point, it is kindly furnished to their hands in this significantly ambiguous sentence.

The second great question upon the doctrine of atonement relates to its *intention* and *design*: for whom was it made? Here the issue between us and the New School is open and clear. They maintain that the atonement was designed, and of course did make a true satisfaction for the sins of all men. This is so distinctly avowed, that quotations from their writings are almost needless. But that the reader may have directly before his eyes, the position assumed by members of the United Synod, the body so soon to be incorporated with ourselves, we make a last extract from their representative writer, already so profusely cited. Dr. Boyd says:

"Among the ministers of the United Synod, there are few, if any, who do not believe that the sacrifice of the Saviour was *intended* by God as a means by which *every child of Adam might be saved*." Again; "We hold that in the covenant made between the Father and the Son, the Son covenants to lay down His life in behalf of the *whole* family of man; so that every obstacle to salvation, arising from the character and government of God, is actually removed, and was *intended* to be removed, that thus every one of Adam's race might be saved."

If any one will point out the difference between this and the view of Arminians, that Christ died, not actually to secure salvation to any, but to render salvation possible to all, we will do homage to his critical discernment. And

then we will propose another riddle for solution: How, upon his acknowledged principle that Christ is a substitute for men, and renders satisfaction to divine justice by vicarious, penal sufferings, if He lays down His life in behalf of the *whole* family of man, Dr. Boyd can be saved from drifting into open and confessed Universalism? The following dreadful alternative is his only refuge:

“Whilst we believe and teach that the atonement of Christ had a general reference to mankind at large, we at the same time hold that in the covenant between the Father and the Son, *special* reference was had to those who shall finally be saved. In other words, the Father covenants to give to the Son, ‘as a reward for the travail of His soul,’ a part of those for whom He dies; that this His death may not be vain as respects the actual salvation of souls.”

Our very flesh creeps as we transcribe these dreadful words, which do not fall short of positive blasphemy. Think of it, reader; Christ receiving as His reward a part only of the souls for whom He dies! the stupendous scheme of grace barely saved from disastrous failure! Christ’s death confessed to be inefficacious, and failing of its design with reference to a part of those for whom He died! and a just and holy God twice exacting the penalty, which, though satisfied by the surety, still takes vengeance upon the principal! Is this, or any thing like this, the doctrine of our standards? Is it not plainly denied, and the definiteness of the atonement affirmed, in all those passages which speak of Christ as “*purchasing reconciliation,*” and as “*certainly and effectually applying and communicating redemption to all those for whom he hath purchased it*”—and as “*fully discharging the debt,* by his obedience and death, of all those that are justified,” and “*making a proper and real and full satisfaction to His Father’s justice in their behalf?*” Is there no distinction here as to the parties whom the atonement was made? Did He lay down His life for the *whole* family of man, when redemption is declared to be

effectually applied to all those for whom it was purchased? If so, how are we to avoid the conclusion that the *whole* family of man will be saved? It was, therefore, with a feeling of sadness, like that one feels at the grave of the dead, that we first read the following challenge of Dr. Dabney; "he demands that we shall say that Christ was *only* the elect's substitute, and bore the guilt *only* of the elect's sins—show us the place where either the Bible or Confession says so." Is it not woven into the whole texture of both? Is it not taught in the whole doctrine of substitution, and of full satisfaction to divine justice by vicarious sufferings? "I lay down my life for the sheep," says the Bible: "neither are any other redeemed by Christ but the elect only," says the Confession of Faith.

We turn then to the committee's report to hear its voice upon this important point; and lo! there is no voice, but on the contrary, a most painful and ominous silence—a silence, too, which is unquestionably intentional; for was it not the committee's object to bring the two bodies together, and here is the very spot at which differences might emerge. But would that there had been only silence! The paper, not content with silence when it should have spoken, speaks at last when silence would have been wisdom: "and is to be freely and sincerely offered to every creature, inasmuch as it leaves *no other obstacle to the pardon of all men under the Gospel, save the enmity and unbelief of those who voluntarily reject it.*" Doubtless there is a construction of this broad and bold declaration upon which the committee can subscribe it *salva fide*, and which we have not the time here to explore; but taken in connexion with the entire silence upon the question whether the atonement be in its intention definite or indefinite, there can be no doubt of the interpretation that will be put upon it as favoring the general atonement theory. Last of all, we have the limitation placed, just where the New School have always placed it, in the decree of election restricting only the ap-

plication. Thus the order is completely reversed in which the purposes of God in reference to human salvation come to be considered: God looking upon the fallen sons of Adam; determining to provide and offer them a Saviour; then electing those to whom that salvation shall be effectually applied. We will not pause to discuss the correctness of this arrangement, but content ourselves with saying that it is not the order recognised in our standards. Thus the Confession, ch. 3, sec. 6, says: "As God hath appointed the elect unto glory, so hath he, by the eternal and most free purpose of His will, foreordained all the means thereunto. Wherefore they who are elected being fallen in Adam, are redeemed by Christ," &c. This redemption being among the means by which the purpose of election is carried out, the latter must be in logical order before the former. Putting these three things together, this section of the committee's report by its very form and structure carries the Assembly over, and, so far as this utterance of the General Assembly can do it, the whole church over to the assertion of an indefinite atonement. If it should be said, the Old School body has always tolerated a diversity of opinion upon the extent of the atonement, we answer, that is altogether a different affair from the Assembly affirming a general atonement, and construing it as the doctrine of the church, contrary, as we believe, both to the spirit and letter of our existing symbols.

We have now completed our review of this important document. Some minor points might well be considered, rather as matters of inquiry than of objection. For example, whether the union of two distinct bodies, coming together by treaty, will affect the historical succession of the Assembly, or jeopard its legal privileges and rights? Whether the Assembly has the constitutional power to pass finally upon the paper of the committee, without sending it down for ratification to the Presbyteries? And whether finally it be expedient to decide a question so materially

affecting the fortunes of the church, at a time when the public mind is too distracted to give it due attention, and when from the circumstances of the country no inconsiderable portion will be shut out from a representation on the floor of the Assembly? But the discussion of points like these we leave to others. We have confined our strictures to the doctrinal basis submitted in the report; and can truthfully declare that never did we undertake a task more reluctantly, and more entirely from a sense of duty to God and the church. It will be observed, too, that we have not assailed the orthodoxy of the report, nor of those by whom it has been framed. Its authors are men who stand high in the confidence and esteem of the whole church; and those of them whom it has been our privilege personally to know, enjoy no small measure of our love. But this very esteem, which they so deservedly enjoy, renders their paper only so much the more dangerous to a confiding church, predisposed to take much upon trust from parties whom she has delighted to honor. We do not impugn the doctrinal purity of any one of them, when we assert the ambiguities of the report to be such as to render it as mischievous a document as could engage the consideration of our highest court. We believe that, if adopted by the Assembly, it will become the nest of a thousand heresies to vex the repose of the church—the source of strifes and controversies which will outlast the generation which framed and accepts it, and leading to possible separations in the future as painful as those which are now attempted to be healed. Under this conviction we have been constrained to lift the voice of warning—“*equo ne credite, Teucri!*” If the United Synod is really at one with us upon the great doctrines of grace, we will go as far as any in overcoming technical difficulties, and will by God’s grace seek to bury all past feuds. And if they are with us in faith and order, let it be ascertained by a square and unreserved adoption of our acknowledged standards, in their obvious and literal im-

port. All these attempts, by conventions and conferences, to construct platforms of union, only prejudice and retard the movement. Let us have no more of this nibbling at the Confession of Faith, and of this paring down its statements to the very minimum of orthodoxy. Let us have no more declarations of adherence to these sacred instruments, with an appendix of reservations and explanations like a codicil annulling a will. A plain, straightforward, honest subscription to the Confession and other symbols, will place the parties on ground which both understand; and there will be union, when alone union can be found, *through the truth*. We pray God that our next Assembly may preëminently be guided by the wisdom which cometh from above, which is first *pure*, then *peaceable*.

ERRATA.

Page 201, line 2: for "reverence belongs," read "vengeance belongeth."

Page 202, line 3: after "men," insert "and;" line 6: after "quote," insert "from."

Page 204, line 13: for "and to fight," read "and fight."

Page 206, line 28: for "requiring," read "require;" line 33: after "distinct," insert "from it;" line 34: for first "and," read "being."

Page 210, line 13: after "also," insert "of."

Page 234, line 11: for "cause," read "curse."

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ARTICLE I.

PURITANISM AND PRESBYTERIANISM.

Puritanism is one of those great historical facts about which men have differed ever since its rise, and will doubtless continue to differ for a long time to come. Some denounce it as the embodiment of all that is narrow, bigoted, and intolerant, whilst others exalt it as the source and champion of all true civil and religious liberty. These denunciations have acquired a fresh bitterness and frequency from the great events that are going on around us. Regarding, as many do, that form of Puritanism which is found in New England as the grand agency that has produced the terrible conflict through which we have just passed, there is no form of condemnation too severe to be applied by them to Puritanism in general, and to every thing that is supposed to have any affiliation with it. Hence the Puritan, without regard to past or present, is denounced, ridiculed, and condemned by orators, editors, preachers, and talkers, without stint and without discrimination, and in many cases without knowledge or reason. Nor is this all. Every thing that is

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presumed to have any connexion with Puritanism comes in for a share of this sweeping condemnation. This is especially true of Presbyterianism. By many, Puritanism is regarded as only one of the forms of Presbyterianism, and when they speak of the one, they mean the other. They consider the Puritans of New England as Presbyterians; and in denouncing the one system, they intend to denounce the other. Hence an odium is attached, and meant to be attached, to Presbyterianism, because of its supposed identity with Puritanism, that works seriously to its injury with the ignorant and unreflecting. It is true that this opinion is more frequently met with in private than in public, but it exists so extensively, that it is proper to furnish some corrective to it. If these two systems differ as broadly as any other divisions of the Protestant world, it is unfair to the truth of history, and unfair to those on both sides who hold to them to confound them, or to make one responsible for the acts or spirit of the other. That they do thus differ is a fact of which no intelligent theologian is ignorant; but, as many even among our own people do not know the breadth and length of this difference, it may be well to set it forth. In doing this, our object will not be to discuss the merits of either system, or decide the questions that have been raised concerning them, but simply to show that they differ as widely as any other forms of Protestantism, and that no one can therefore honestly confound them, or charge the one with the temper and conduct of the other.

There is great confusion in many minds as to what is really meant by Puritanism, and this term must be explained before any clear argument can be raised concerning it. Like the term Protestantism, it included originally those who afterwards became widely separated in opinion; and before affirming or denying any thing about Puritans, we must know what class of them is meant. Hooper, Hugh Peters, and Henry Ward Beecher, are all called Puritans, yet differ in essential respects as widely as men can differ; and before arguing about the term, we must know the class of persons included in it.

It is obvious that the Puritanism with which we have to do in

this argument is that system and sect which peopled New England, and which, under Cromwell and his contemporaries, played so important a part in old England. The Presbyterianism with which we have to do is that which exists in this country. Now these two great historical developments differ as widely as most of the diverse sections of Protestantism.

They differ in their origin. Puritanism is English in its parentage. When Henry VIII. made the Church of England Protestant, it was not because he wished to change his religion, but because he wished to change his wife. Being a Romanist at heart, he retained as much of the old religion as he could. This was distasteful to many of the real Protestants in England, who wished to purify the Church from these Romish features, especially during the brief reign of Edward VI. But little was accomplished until the accession of bloody Mary, when they were burnt, banished, and persecuted without mercy. Under Elizabeth they fared but little better, for she was probably a Romanist at heart, and treated Puritans with much more severity than Papists. During her reign there were but few disputes about Church government, except the occasional utterances of Cartwright, and others of lesser note, although many would have preferred a simpler form. The main matters in discussion were the vestments, liturgy, and oaths prescribed by law. When the Stuart dynasty took the throne, the harsh and cruel measures instituted compelled large numbers to leave the established Church, and worship in some other way. It then became necessary to adopt some form of Church organisation, and the question of Church government began to be agitated. These agitations developed the differences that existed among these primitive Puritans. In every great movement in history, there are two elements at work, corresponding with two great types of human character. There is the radical and destructive element, that seeks for a thorough and complete change in every thing, razing the building to the very foundation. There is also the moderate or conservative element, which seeks to remove only the defective portions of the building, and would retain as much as possible of the old in its construction of the new. These two elements

have appeared in every great revolution, and they manifested themselves among the Puritans. The first, or radical element, assumed the form of Independency, and although weak at first, like this element in every such movement, it gradually gathered strength by the simplicity of its principle, around which so many could rally. The second, or conservative element, assumed the form of Presbyterianism, and although strong at first, it gradually lost ground for the same reason that the other party gained it, the complexity of its principles requiring agreement on a greater number of points. These two parties united in resisting the tyranny of Charles, but they never agreed with each other. They were distinct in their origin, and in their subsequent history. The Presbyterian party was soon out-generalled by Cromwell and his adherents, and in the persecutions that followed the Restoration, was destroyed or absorbed into other forms of Church polity. The Independent, as soon as it arose, was transplanted to Holland, in part, whence a portion of it emigrated to New England in 1620, and founded New England Puritanism, whilst another portion either remained in, or returned to England, and succeeded in gaining the army in the civil war, established the Commonwealth, and became the ruling power in England for a time. This is the origin of Puritanism as it now exists in its living form in New England.

Presbyterianism in America had a different parentage, and one that is older than Puritanism by nearly a century. Presbyterianism, it is well known, was the form assumed by nearly all the Reformed churches of Europe that were allowed to act free from political influence. The French, Dutch, Swiss, Hungarian, and Scottish churches all adopted this form of polity. When they were persecuted at home, they fled to this country, and the French Presbyterians settled the Huguenot colonies of Virginia and South Carolina; the Dutch, those of New York and New Jersey, now represented by the Reformed Dutch of those States; but the great body of American Presbyterians have descended from the Scotch and Scotch-Irish, who were driven here by the tyranny of the Stuarts. This is a fact too familiar to require any proof.

Hence we see the difference of the two systems or facts, in their origin. Puritanism, as it exists here, was the transplanting of the Puritanism or Independency of England, Presbyterianism mainly of the Scotch and Scotch-Irish, as different an element from the other as the Celt from the Saxon. Puritanism was English, purely English, having all the features of that race whose history is so marked that he who runs may read it, and whose policy has been the same for generations that it is now, a policy which we forbear to discuss, or even to characterise. Puritanism is English character intensified by English tyranny, and transplanted to New England, there to enact a new chapter in the history of the great English race. Presbyterianism is Scotch and Scotch-Irish character, and has many of the features of that race that has been waging a war of resistance to English aggression from the days of Bannockburn, Dunbar, Ayrsmoss, and Londonderry, down to the exodus of the Free Church of Scotland; whose whole history has been one of struggle for Christ's crown and covenant; and who, if, as their enemies allege, they have hard and bitter elements of character, have had hard and bitter acts of oppression to develop them. Hence, whatever any one may think of these two things, they differ in their origin so that no one can fairly confound them with one another. Presbyterianism was an organised institution in Scotland a century before this existing form of Puritanism was born, and was as different from it in age, in origin, and in principle, as John Knox was from Oliver Cromwell.

We are aware that views somewhat different from these are extensively promulgated. It is asserted by many, and changes have been rung on the assertion in every form of utterance, that the great struggle which lately convulsed our country was only a renewal of the contest between the Puritan and the Cavalier, that the North is the embodiment of the spirit of the Puritan, whilst the South is that of the Cavalier, and that the English Cavalier is the father of all that is chivalric and heroic in the Southern character.

Against this assumption we enter our solemn protest, in the name of all history, as a cruel injustice to some of the noblest

names of the past. We do not desire to discuss the English Cavalier, or determine his precise place in history. But the simple truth is, that the English Puritan and the English Cavalier are both types of the same essential English character, and if we judge of both by their acts, either in the old world or in the new, either under Cromwell and the Charleses there, or under the men who burnt witches in Massachusetts, and those who fined and imprisoned Baptists and Presbyterians in Virginia, we prefer to have neither for our masters, for they have both been hard masters when they had the power. And as we protest against the Puritan assumption that he embodies all that is good at the North, so we protest against the Cavalier assumption that he embodies all that is good at the South, as specimens of the self-same English spirit which can see nothing good in any direction that does not trace its origin to England.

By what right of historic truth is this assumption made for the English Cavalier? Were the Huguenots of Virginia English Cavaliers? And must we reckon as mere ciphers in the history of the Old Dominion that gallant band in whose baptismal registers we read such names as Maury, Fontaine, Lacy, Munford, Flournoy, Dupuy, Duval, Bondurant, Trent, Moncure, Ligon, Legrand, and others, whose living representatives remain to do honor to the memories of their fathers? Were these French Presbyterians nothing because they were not English Cavaliers? And shall we reckon for nothing that sturdy stream of Scotch-Irish, which, starting from Cumberland Valley in Pennsylvania, poured its conquering tide of hardy emigrants along the Valley of Virginia, westward to Tennessee and Kentucky, and eastward to the Carolinas and Georgia? Shall we ignore that living girdle of Presbyterian valor that stood "like a stonewall" between the howling savages and the settlements of Eastern Virginia; that furnished such men as Andrew Lewis and his contemporaries; that has furnished as much of eloquence and valor as any other race in our land, in the Prestons, McDowells, Breckinridges, Campbells, Shelbys, Seviars, Browns, Hoges, Waddels, and others; that has bequeathed some of the most honored names of the past and present; that poured

out its blood in every great battle-field of our land in both Revolutions; that has given to our annals such names as John C. Calhoun, Andrew Jackson, James K. Polk, our own immortal Stonewall, and others, whose memory the world will not soon let die? Shall these men of West Augusta, where Washington had resolved to make his last stand for liberty, if defeated and driven from every other spot, shall they be held for mere ciphers because not English Cavaliers? Were the Scotch-Irish of North Carolina, who issued the Mecklenburg Declaration, and shed the first blood of the Revolution on the banks of the Alamance, ciphers? Were the Huguenots of South Carolina, who bequeathed to our history such names as Laurens, Marion, Horry, Manigault, and others, nothing, because not English Cavaliers? Were the Scotch-Irish of South Carolina, who sent to the field such elders as Pickens, Williams, and scores of others, and who sent even ministers from the pulpit who poured their blood on the battle-field in that great contest, ciphers, because not Cavaliers? And were the early settlers of Georgia, of the Gulf States, or the States of the South-west, either English Cavaliers or ciphers? Is it then fair to history, or fair to the memory of the heroic dead, to assign this monopoly of chivalry to the English Cavalier? Is it not rather a repetition of that same English spirit of boastful assumption, which, having made Plymouth Rock the blarney stone of the North, would rear a similar monument of self-laudation on the sands of Jamestown? Give, then, to Puritan and Cavalier their rightful due both of praise and of blame, as far as they deserve them. But let not the double injustice be done, that these assumptions undoubtedly do commit, of charging on the Presbyterian the sins of the Puritan, and decking the Cavalier with the hard-won honors of the Presbyterian. They all deserve both commendation and censure, for they were but fallible men. We do not pretend to assign their share to either class, but only affirm that the English Cavalier does not differ from the English Puritan by any broader line of blood or of race in his origin, than both differ from the Scotch, Scotch-Irish, and French Presbyterian, from whom have mainly come the Presbyterianism of this country.

When we come to trace these two systems in their developments, we shall find them as distinct in that development as they were in their origin. In the early struggles for religious liberty under the Stuarts, they were united, but never fully coalesced. About the beginning of the seventeenth century, a portion of the Independent party emigrated to Holland, where, encountering Dutch Presbyterianism, troubles ensued that hastened, if they did not cause, the departure of the Pilgrims to the New World. In England, this antagonism developed itself very early in the civil war that dethroned Charles. The Independents desired to make a radical reform, destroying most of the ancient institutions of England, whilst the Presbyterians wished to retain as many as possible. The Independents had a majority in the army, the Presbyterians in the Parliament. Cromwell succeeded in procuring the resignation of the great leaders on the other side, Essex, Warwick, Denbigh, and Waller, in the army, and then in purging the Parliament, until it was prepared for his purposes. Then the Parliament, under Independent control, beheaded Charles I., against the remonstrances of the Presbyterians, the ministers of London formally protesting against it. The Independents then placed Cromwell on the throne, and the Presbyterians proclaimed Charles II., and clung to him as long as his perfidy would permit them. It is well known that Cromwell hated the Presbyterians as much as he did the Prelatists, and shed nearly as much of their blood as he did of the Cavaliers. Prof. Palfrey, of Massachusetts, in his history of New England, (the latest and best work on that subject that has been issued,) says, vol. ii., p. 88, that "after the overthrow of the hierarchy, the Presbyterians were the conservative element of the kingdom;" and he traces in ampler detail than we have seen in any other author, the struggle between these two parties, and shows how intense and prolonged it became.

But as Mr. Palfrey well remarks, the true history of Puritanism must be sought in New England, and that is the history of the Independents, as distinguished from the Presbyterians. There the antagonism of two systems is strongly exhibited. In 1643, a few Presbyterians endeavored to obtain toleration in

Massachusetts for their views, but were fined and compelled to leave the country. A full account of the facts may be seen in Palfrey's work. Measures were then taken to crush out all attempts to introduce Presbyterianism, which were so successful that it has never since taken root on New England soil. It is a remarkable fact that, whilst other denominations have flourished there, there are not, even at this time, fifty Presbyterian churches in all New England, and they mainly in the Scotch and Scotch-Irish settlements, living like foreign exotics in an uncongenial soil and atmosphere.

Presbyterianism was planted in America about 1700, and an effort was made then to amalgamate these two systems. But they soon began to come into collision, and issued in the separation of 1740. After fifteen years of separation, the divided parts came together again, and a new effort at fusion was made about 1800, which, however, ended in the disruption of 1838.

As these statements may be questioned, we prefer to rest their proof on an authority that will probably be conceded as good on this question. The Rev. Joel Parker, D. D., of New York, in his history of the Presbyterian Church, written in 1844, (Rupp's Collections,) says, in speaking of the separation of 1838: "There were two parties in the Church. There always had been from the time that McKemie and his associates formed the Presbytery of Philadelphia, in 1705. The English Puritan and Scotch elements that were commingled in the (English) association formed between the Presbyterian and Congregational denominations, were transplanted into America. In this compound the Puritan influence was at first predominant. But a large share of the English immigration fell naturally into the Congregational churches of New England, while nearly all the Scotch as naturally dropped into the Presbyterian Church. Hence the Scotch element became more and more influential, as it came to bear a greater proportion to the whole body. Hence, too, the 'Old Side' and 'New Side;' and the division of 1740. These parties possessed, in their common symbols of faith, and in their common attachment to free, non-prelatical principles,

affinities of sufficient force to draw them together in some system of Christian co-operation. Yet there were differences which, like the repulsion existing between the particles of matter when brought near to one another, resisted any thing like a complete coalescence."

"The appellations 'Old Side' and 'New Side,' 'Old School' and 'New School,' have been justly complained of as an arrogant claim on the part of those terming themselves 'Old School,' and as evincing an attempt to cast odium upon their brethren, as having less reverence for Scriptural teaching, and the ancient paths of Christianity."

"The terms Scotch party, and Puritan party, cannot be reasonably objected to, because each party glories in its own ancestry in this respect."

Having thus laid down with such clearness and emphasis the existence of these two elements in the Presbyterian Church from its very foundation, Dr. P. then describes their characteristics in a paragraph, a few sentences of which may not be out of place in this connexion. He says: "The differences between these two parties in their native characteristics are pretty well understood. The Puritan is satisfied with maintaining the great leading truths of the Calvinistic faith, and is ready to waive minor differences, and to co-operate with all Christian people in diffusing evangelical piety."—"The Scotch, on the contrary, were of a more inflexible character. They, too, loved Calvinistic doctrines, and if they had less zeal than the Puritans in diffusing our religion, and in acting for the regeneration of our country and the world, they were second to no other people in these respects."

Without conceding the absolute accuracy of every statement made by Dr. Parker, the main fact is sufficient for our purpose. He affirms all that we contend for, that these two elements were antagonistic, that the attempt to amalgamate them in 1705, ended in the disruption of 1740; that the next great attempt to fuse them by the Plan of Union in 1801, resulted in the disruption of 1838; whilst the history of the Presbyterian Church in both of its great divisions since, presents a number of

facts too familiar to need repetition, that continue to evince this antagonism of principle existing in these two elements.

Thus the fact stands indelibly recorded in history, announced by Chief Justice Gibson in a celebrated legal opinion, that these two systems are "as immiscible as oil and water;" that from the rise of this type of Puritanism under Brown, Robinson, and the Pilgrim Fathers, more than two hundred years ago, in the old world and in the new, these two systems have never coalesced; and that therefore the man who in the face of all this continues to confound them, evinces ignorance, or something worse.

This antagonism is not a mere accidental thing, like the feuds of ancient times that were transmitted from sire to son without comprehending their nature. It exists in the essential principles of the two systems, so that when clearly apprehended and consistently carried out they cannot coalesce, any more than Episcopacy and Presbyterianism, or any other similar systems.

In speaking of the principles of these two systems, it must be remembered that they were more than mere forms of Church government, in their first operation. It was long after the Reformation that it was deemed necessary to separate Church and State, and hence, in the early history of nearly all the Reformed communities, there was a union more or less close of the political and religious elements that made them react on each other; so that their results were blended effects of both agencies. Puritanism in this respect had the great advantage of being removed to a new world, where it had the complete control of all its internal concerns, and could found a society on such principles as it thought right. This it did, especially in the Plymouth colony; for the early history of New England shows a difference between the Massachusetts type of opinion and practice, compared with that of Connecticut and Rhode Island, not very great, it is true, but perceptible, and a difference which may be traced to some extent for a long time in their history. If either must be selected as the purest type of Puritanism, it must be Massachusetts. This will probably be conceded by most intelligent New England men.

It must also be recollected that Puritanism in New England, in its first establishment, was not only a Church, but a State, a theocracy, in which the Bible was adopted as its code of laws, and all its civil and social institutions formed according to their conceptions of its teachings. Hence, what in another state of facts would have been merely a form of church government, became a mould for all social, civil, and political institutions, which naturally developed according to their original germ.

Presbyterianism never has had the same advantage precisely, even in Geneva or Scotland; for it has always been pressed by other systems, so as not to be able to develop itself as fully as Puritanism did in New England. But each had its clearly-defined principles, from which its history has flowed with more or less purity. We prefer to state these principles in the words of others, who cannot be suspected of framing them with any view of this argument, and shall therefore give them in the words of two able and distinguished writers, whose authority is above question.

Prof. Palfrey, (himself a Puritan,) in his history of New England, (vol. ii, p. 40,) in describing the system adopted by the Pilgrims, says, "It had no element of resemblance to presbytery or prelacy. It was pure democracy installed in ecclesiastical government." Such then was the essential principle of Puritanism.

Sir James Stephen, a member of the Church of England, in his Lectures on the History of France, p. 415, speaking of the Presbyterian system, as adopted by the Huguenots of France in 1559, says: "A great social revolution had thus been effected. Within the centre of the French monarchy, Calvin and his disciples had established a spiritual republic, and had solemnly recognised as the basis of it, four principles—each germinant of results of the highest importance to the political commonwealth. These principles were—first, that the will of the people was the one legitimate source of the power of their rulers; secondly, that power was most properly delegated by the people to their rulers, by means of elections, in which every adult man might exercise

the right of suffrage; thirdly, that in ecclesiastical government, the clergy and laity were entitled to an equal and co-ordinate authority; and fourthly, that between Church and State, no alliance, or mutual dependence, or other definite relation, necessarily or properly existed."

Here then, from sources that will not be questioned, are the differences in the essential elements of the two systems. The one is a pure democracy, like that of Athens, the other a representative republic. The one is a government of the existing numerical majority, whose decision is final; for Independence recognises no court of appeal that can reverse the action of the congregation. The other is a government of tribunals, with appellate courts above to correct the errors of the judicatories below. The one is a government of the individual will of the majority; the other, a government which necessarily involves a fixed and written constitution, by whose terms its complex system of tribunals is constructed. The one has not, and cannot have any fixed creed, as this would interfere with that liberty and responsibility of the individual will, which is its cardinal feature. The other has had from the beginning a fixed creed, whose leading articles of faith have changed but little since its first establishment. The one is mainly negative, denying much, but affirming little, as a system, leaving that to the individual. The other is positive, affirming more than it denies, and requiring assent to these affirmations as a condition of association with it. This feature had its origin in the facts that gave birth to the two systems; the ground of controversy in the one case being very narrow, only demanding a protest against certain features of the English Church; the other being much broader, as it was a conflict with the Church of Rome, covering the whole ground of the gospel.

Now the fact to which we call special attention is, that the one system, in its very structure, implies the fallibility and weakness of man, by making so many provisions to correct and restrain it, whilst the other does not. We believe that in this fact we find a germinant principle of great importance in the development of the two systems. The system which implies that man is a fallen,

fallible creature, needing restraints and correctives, even in his regenerate condition, requiring a system of checks and balances of the most guarded kind, will tend to produce a type of theology, philosophy, and individual character conformable to this idea. The system on the other hand, which is based on the opposite idea, implying that the depravity and feebleness of human nature is not such as to require such correctives, will tend to generate an opposite type of theology, philosophy, and personal character. And we need hardly state, that New England theology and philosophy have developed precisely in this direction: a fact which cannot be accidental, but seems thus to flow from the germinant idea of the Puritan system of Independency, when it is allowed to work itself out quietly and undisturbed by antagonistic influences. We need not dilate on this development, as it is familiar to every intelligent student of modern thought. So on the other hand the theology and philosophy of Presbyterian communities have developed exactly in the line of the germinant idea involved in its general system.

As to the type of personal character developed by the Puritan system, we prefer to present it as delineated by a Puritan hand, who does it with the most admiring love. Prof. Porter of Yale College, in his Premium Essay on the Puritan and Jesuit systems of education, thus delineates the Puritan who is the fair and legitimate development of the system, (p. 15):

“Puritanism did not spring into being at once, for it was not the device of man. It was developed by gradual advance, and a continuous growth, for it was the work of God. The movement commenced with the Reformation. * * The Lutheran, however, was not a Puritan. * * * The Huguenot was not a Puritan. * * * The English non-conformist was not wholly a Puritan, for he but half understood his own principles. * * * The New England pilgrim had not entirely worked out the problem of applying his master principles, nor did he fully understand the spirit he was of.” “The freedom and independence of the individual man characterised the Puritan. * * * It was not however a lawless freedom, but a liberty implied in that separate responsibility

which each individual man holds to himself and to his God. The Puritan must judge of a law to know why he must obey it. No authority or organisation steps between himself and his conscience. Hence he stands or falls for himself; he is independent in his bearing, self-relying in his character, and marked by his own individuality. This, not because he scorns the restraints of society or of law, but because he is overmastered by a restraint that is higher; not that he despises authority, but that he reverences so deeply the authority that is highest of all. This feeling of responsibility leads him to a personal and thorough investigation, an investigation which is not content till it has tested every question at the highest tribunal. He calls in question every truth, not because he is sceptical by nature, but that he may distinguish the True from the False. He must examine all truth. He questions his own being, and powers of his own soul, the existence and character of God, the authority of conscience, the reason of this or that duty, the evidence of divine revelation, the genuineness of the text, the exactness of its meaning. He calls in question the tenure of magistrates, the right by which they bear the sword, and the use or abuse of power intrusted to their hands." "As the condition of man is ever changing, so in his view should organisations change. For this reason the Puritan believes in no fixed institutions to be retained as petrified memorials of the past, but in those which are ever growing into a more perfect life." "Hence is he by nature a reformer. He is intent upon changing old laws, old institutions, and old habits, that they may meet new exigencies, and new character of those for whose benefit they exist."

Without indorsing the absolute accuracy of this delineation in every particular, we may accept it as fair, and at least without any design to depreciate its subject. It then gives us the result of Puritanism as a mould of individual character, and through that, of social and civil life, and presents it as a system of Individualism. It seeks to cut the individual loose from all control of both Past and Present, that would trammel his will, and to exalt the personality to a position of paramount authority. It is the

principle of individual responsibility pushed to its utmost extreme. This principle is a vital one of Protestantism; but where it works unchecked, and in connexion with an implied theory of human nature that elevates its natural powers and goodness, it must lead to the rejection of much that is valuable in the opinions and institutions of the past, to an exercise of the liberty of private judgment that will generate endless diversities of opinion, and branch out into innumerable schools and *isms*; to an unsettled state of opinions in philosophy, religion, and politics; to a general drawing of every thing to the decision of the suffrage of the majority, and a popularising of every political and religious institution. This we find to be the fact in the religion, philosophy, and politics of New England, and of those communities in which New England influence prevails. It will also tend powerfully to develop individual energy, to produce a jealousy of individual rights, to promote popular education, and to stimulate popular advancement. Its grand defect is the lack of those checks, restraints, and elements of stability and permanence that are so needful in every enduring state of society, as all history teaches, and which, if furnished at all, must come from sources extraneous to the system itself. It is precisely here that it differs from Presbyterianism, which furnishes these conservative and restraining influences, and acts as a centripetal force to counteract the centrifugal tendency of the other system. Hence, whilst these two systems were antagonistic, they were not necessarily mutually destructive; and could that antagonism have been wisely adjusted and balanced, the result might have been a progress at once safer and faster than either could have produced if acting alone. Such has not however been the case, and the result has been evil.

But as our object is not so much to discuss either system, as to show that they were essentially different in their nature, we need not pursue this line of thought at any further length. Enough has been said, we presume, to convince every candid mind that these two systems differ as widely from each other as either of them differs from Episcopacy, or any other form of ecclesiastical government. Hence to confound them, as many

do, and to hold the one responsible for the acts, temper, and tendency of the other, is to evince a complete ignorance of both that disqualifies for any intelligent judgment.

Having endeavored thus to show this difference, we are now at liberty, in conclusion, to rebuke some of the denunciations of Puritanism that are occasionally met with in public and private. In many cases, it is a secret dislike of that earnest, faithful piety that is thought to be identified with Puritanism, and a covert utterance of the malign feelings of infidelity. In other cases, it is a sectarian trick, that would disparage one set of religionists by the abuse of another, supposed to be nearly related to them, and thus exalt its own party or sect. In other cases, it is a sheer ignorance of the whole matter, and the adoption of catch-words and names, the meaning of which is not understood. The primitive Puritanism of England was not a faultless thing, but had some defects that may easily be seen and easily caricatured. But that man knows little of the history of English and American liberties who does not know that we owe them largely to the courage, sufferings, and endurance of the early Puritans. And whilst we are disposed to believe that had the Presbyterian party retained the final ascendancy instead of the Independent under Cromwell, the history of that great struggle might have been so different that the Restoration would not have been demanded by the English people, yet it is very certain that we owe to the Puritans of Cromwell a debt of gratitude that the world has been reluctant to pay. Had the Cavalier party succeeded in completely crushing their opponents, as they desired, and a Stuart dynasty been fastened upon England, the history of the last two hundred years had been a very different one, and one that no friend of civil or religious liberty can regard with any satisfaction. Hence to load the early Puritans with indiscriminate abuse, as is so often done, is to evince either an ignorance of the history of the past, or a feeling that is still more blameable. And in regard to the modern Puritans, whilst we have yet graver objections to urge against them than can be brought against the original Puritans, we apprehend that but little will be gained in dealing with them

by blind and indiscriminate abuse, such as that to which we have adverted.

There are many points that we have omitted, or touched but lightly in this investigation, which a fuller discussion of either system considered apart, would have brought out more fully. Our object has been mainly to show the falsehood of much of the current cant, and some of the sectarian tricks of the present time, and to furnish hints for a fuller investigation. There is a wide and deeply interesting field of examination in regard to the effect of forms of Church polity, especially when closely connected with civil and political institutions, on the development of theology, philosophy, social and individual character, that is almost unexplored, and which yet awaits a master pen for its complete elucidation. If any hints we have given shall turn those who are capable of such investigations to this field, it will unfold the true philosophy of history concerning many facts with which we have to do at this time, as no other line of exploration will be able to do, and will add a contribution of inestimable value to our general literature. We hope that some able hand, having the requisite leisure, may do it for these two great phenomena in modern history, the Puritanism of old and New England, and the Presbyterianism of France, Switzerland, Hungary, Holland, Scotland, and America.

ARTICLE II.

SAINT PAUL'S VISION OF VICTORY.

In such times as those in which we live, greater supports than ordinary are required by the children of God. And those greater than ordinary supports are provided for them in the treasures of the divine word. They enjoy those supports in proportion as those treasures of the rarer and richer and more

recondite descriptions, are unlocked to them by a providence, a prayer, an experience, a beam of the illumining power of the Spirit of the Lord, however or whenever imparted.

We know that all things work together for good to them that love God, to them who are the called according to his purpose. It is not asserted that all things, in all their workings, especially in their separate workings, promote the good of the elect. For then there would be nothing with which to wage a conflict, nothing over which to be conquerors. But it is asserted that all things, considered as in co-operation and concert, promote the good of God's chosen people. Each of the individual things which are enumerated—tribulation, distress, persecution, famine, nakedness, peril, sword—is an evil thing in and of itself. But as these things are embraced in the great scheme of redemption, as they take place in a world which is not an orphan and atheist world, but is governed by the sovereign power of God; and as they have all been touched by that controlling power of God which is exerted because there is a scheme of redemption, and whose purpose and object is that all things shall bend to that scheme of redemption, therefore, contrary to their original and direct nature, these things work together for good to the lovers of God.

There is another list of things, not in their nature friendly: death, life, angels, principalities, powers, things present, things to come, height, depth, and every other creature. This latter list includes the former, and much more besides. The former was a muster-roll of enemies upon the arena of time, and of things seen and temporal. The latter is intended to bring together into the sublime vision, all things which may affect the destinies of an immortal soul. The former things—tribulation, persecution, peril—may be regarded as specifications under the head of one or two of the latter—life, death. And the grandeur of the victory will begin to appear, if it be true that the second list is a list of heads, each containing many particular things, over which God's people shall triumph by God's blessing. The former, or particular list, is a list of positive foes. The latter is a far deeper and grander list of things in which the sirens of

temptation dwell. In the first place, the apostle exhibits the march of the power of God through all human destinies: For whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the first-born among many brethren. Moreover whom he did predestinate, them he also called; and whom he called, them he also justified; and whom he justified, them he also glorified. Here is a chain which runs from before the foundation of this world, till after the termination of this world: from foreknowledge, before the process of human salvation began, to glory eternal, after the process of human salvation shall be consummated in heaven. It bears a light along all the paths of salvation, in company with those whom God foreknew, going with them through the intermediate stages of appointment to conformity with Christ, of effectual calling, of justification, and thence to that final victory and glory, which it is the main object of the context to foreshow. And it substantially affirms that they are the same persons who go through all these successive gates, one after the other, on the way to heaven. Every succeeding process is affirmed concerning those who were the objects of the immediately preceding process. It attends all who enter, all the way; and affirms them, at every step, to be the same persons whom we just before saw at the earlier stage. It is a great misfortune to any soul to be trained to feel prejudice against these teachings of God's word. Some think the true reading is, "predestinate conformed to the image of his Son." They say that the verb "to be" is in italics in the English Bible; and that that shows it is not in the original. And it is true that the words "to be" are not in the original. But it is a mere grammatical ellipsis, which the English translators have supplied with entire propriety. It is hardly to be supposed that any mind which undertakes faithfully to interpret Holy Scripture, could be satisfied with saying that men are predestinated to be conformed to the image of Christ, after they have already been so conformed. That is a post-destination; and a contradiction in terms. If it be further alleged that men are predestinated to salvation after they are conformed to the image of the Son of God, it is replied, *first*, that the power

which conforms them to Christ, is expressly placed after predestination: "Whom he did predestinate, *them* he called and justified." It is replied, *second*, that a predestination after conformity, begins *in the middle*, where it ought not to begin; and not *at the beginning*, where it ought to begin, and the true does begin. And it is replied, *thirdly*, that it is impossible to show how the elect became conformed to the image of Christ, before they were justified. Such a thing is not in Saint Paul's statement of the processes of salvation. It is a mere evasive expedient, and does not require further attention. It is a part of some other strange gospel.

Now, all these processes in the work of man's salvation are distinctly attributed to God himself. He foreknew them. He predestinated them. He called them. He justified them. He glorified them. The chain is as distinctly "bound around the throne of the Eternal" as language can bind it. That is not all. The eternal God is represented not only as having hold of the chain at that end which runs back into the gray abyss of the past, but as taking hold of it anew at every step. He is present to give the call, the justification, and the glorification. He attends as a present God all along the line of the career of his people. This is indeed a very pure ecclesiasticism. We do not have to search for divine authority, by supposing the validity of doubtful acts, through dark and distant ages; or to reach the ratifying hand of the Lord by relying on the most complete of earthly uncertainties; or to trust in traditions, ordinations, and successions, for eighteen hundred years, in a chain very often dipped in the deepest moral depravity of Christendom. But the Spirit of God is the living and present executor of affairs in his own Church. He is a present and not an absent God. The grace displayed in calling, justifying, and sanctifying sinners, is immediately from God at every step, and is invested with direct and immediate divine authority. He calls. He justifies. He glorifies. The theory of derivation by succession is a mummy which men assert to have been a living being in the days of the apostles. The Church system of the Scriptures is a life, a soul, a spirit, the breath of the Spirit of God, at the present time.

Now the plain reason why all things work together for good to them that love God, is, that all things have been, by heavenly hands and heavenly power, wrought into the scheme of salvation, from the early aurora of foreknowledge, to the full meridian of ultimate glory. Many things are in their nature inimical to the lovers of God. In the Old Testament, and in the New, it is written, and the children of God have often had to take up the lament, For thy sake we are killed all the day long; we are accounted as sheep for the slaughter. As fearful a thing as it is, and as luridly as the light of heaven, and the eyes of the Lord Jesus Christ, will one day flash upon it, yet it is a thing sometimes done upon that earth upon which Christ died that man might live, that those who love him are killed for his sake. And it is because the course of this world is, in and of itself, opposed to the Lord Jesus. Else, without an enemy, there could not be that VICTORY of which he afterwards speaks. But that power of God which conducts the work of salvation, and upholds the frame of nature till redemption be completed, is laid upon all things. Christ is head over them all to the Church. The Spirit of God lays his power upon them every one, and safely leads every one of his children through them all. The power which the divine Spirit throws over them, is as all-embracing as the great magnetic currents of the earth, or as the currents of gravitation through the universe. It is a universal providence, causing all things to work together for good to them that love God. It is also a particular providence attending the fall of a sparrow, the decoration of the lilies of the field, and the winter repasts of the birds of the air. In its vastness, it measures and maps out the dizzy tract of Oriental history, sketching and figuring, under emblems of the different parts of a man's body, or different wild beasts rising from the sea, the Assyrian, the Persian, the Grecian, and the Roman ages. It sings the "burdens" of Babylon, of Damascus, of Egypt, and of Tyre; the "dooms" of Dumah, and Ariel, and the crown of pride, and the land shadowing with wings. In its minuteness, it touches the shaking of a viper from his arm by the apostle Paul, and the leaving of a cloak and some parchments at Troy, and

his vision of a shadowy and beckoning man of Macedonia, inviting him to Europe. In its vastness, it comprehends the series of seals, and trumpets, and vials of the Apocalypse "dark with brightness all along," disclosing the destinies of modern nations, till the new Jerusalem descends from God out of heaven, as a bride adorned for her husband.

The scheme of redemption commenced at the very beginning—"before the foundation of the world." The power of God has therefore from the beginning been laid upon all things, even those most hostile to grace and to God, in a most wise and powerful bounding, ordering, and governing them, in a manifold dispensation, depriving them, or any of them, of any power, when they touch the scheme of redemption, to alter or abolish, to destroy or to harm it in any wise whatever.

All gloom, all despondency, all unbelief are in their nature atheistic. The spell and charm from God compelling things which would otherwise be adverse, to work together for good to them that love him, must embrace all things, if it embrace any thing, because it is from God himself. He announces himself every where in nature, by wonderful fitnesses, and adjustments, and adaptations of moral and material things, which seem to say he was here but now, and is just gone away. Rhythmic numbers, and measured proportions, and laws which almost speak his name aloud, announce him every where. The traces of his hand in nature are forever fresh and recent. He wrought yesterday, he will-work to-night in silence. The intelligent eye to-morrow will

Through worlds and races and terms and times,
See musical order, and pairing rhymes.

This universal presence and power of God is on behalf of his people wherever it appears. And if God be for us, who can be against us? If, then, this is no atheistic world, howling fatherless through its annual orbit, and if the power of God is both general and special, vast and minute, and if the traces of the presence of God are as clear and legible in men's spiritual histories, and experiences, and inner life, as they are in the

material world, who and what is the other power, of which we are to be afraid, finding it to be against us?

Three things appear as possible evils. First, the failure of the gifts of God to the souls of his chosen people—such gifts as may be needed, and on the occasions on which they are needed. But all probability that gifts will be withheld, is forever removed by the fact that the greatest of all gifts has already been bestowed: He that spared not his own Son, but delivered him up for us all, how shall he not with him also freely give us all things? A second possible evil is the falling of the elect into new condemnations as they go through the deep waters of this life. This is met by the fact that, in the plan of justification brought to light in the gospel, the justifying act is an act of God: Who shall lay any thing to the charge of God's elect? It is God that justifieth. Who is he that condemneth? And the third possible evil is that at some critical period of our existence, and of our trials, and of our soul's need, it may come to pass that there shall be found to be in heaven no one to intercede with the Disposer of events on our behalf. But the Intercessor is immediately exhibited, and the path which he trod through the grave and the resurrection, to reach his place above: It is Christ that died, yea rather, that is risen again, who is even at the right hand of God, who also maketh intercession for us.

If God has given his own Son to die for us, if God has provided the means of justifying sinners by the precious blood of Jesus, if he has raised Jesus triumphantly from the tomb, if he has exalted him to the place of power at his own right hand in the heavenly places, to be the perpetual and divine High-priest interceding for his people, how can it be for a moment supposed that with Christ, he will not also freely give us all things? He has given us the great propitiatory sacrifice,—his own Son,—to justify us; will he withhold from us grace to continue in a justified state? He raised Christ from the dead by his mighty power; will he withhold from us the same mighty power to raise us to newness of life in Christ Jesus? He has exalted our divine Redeemer to be also our perpetual Intercessor; will he let that Intercessor plead in vain, when asking for that very grace

to be faithful, which is the thing we chiefly need? How can it be for a moment supposed, that having delivered up his own Son, having made that Son a victim of the law, and for a time the subject of even ghastly death itself, and then having recognised that Son as lawful Intercessor above, he will withhold from those who are chosen in the Son, awakening grace, grace to believe in Christ, self-denying grace, persevering grace, grace sufficient for them through life, and grace for the final victory over all enemies?

What has already been done in pursuance of the wonderful plan, clearly shows how certain to be done is that part of it which as yet we see not, which is hidden by the veil of mortality that dims our sight, and which yet remains to be done. But we are not to be carried to the skies on flowery beds of ease; not to be translated to heaven from the castle of indolence; not to make our way to unspeakable glories, without great struggles; not to go from a flower-garden, but from a battle-field; nor from the piping times of peace, but from fierce spiritual wars, hardly-fought fields, and divinely-bestowed victories. The lovers of God have always met with opposition in the world: "As it is written, For thy sake we are killed all the day long; we are accounted as sheep for the slaughter." The quotation comes from a psalm which throws into light from the golden days of the fathers of old the memorable fact that they got not the land in possession by their own sword, neither did their own arm save them, but thy right hand, and thine arm, and the light of thy countenance, because thou hadst a favor unto them. It is not to be pretended that it is a good thing in itself, to be accounted as sheep for the slaughter, or to be killed all the day long; or that tribulation, or distress, or persecution, or famine, or nakedness, or peril, or sword, are in themselves things either good or friendly to the children of God. Nor is it to be pretended that death and life, and angels and principalities and powers, and things present and things to come, and height and depth, have no tendency in themselves to separate us from the love of God; or that victory is easy, and can be won by any unaided arm that ever lived. But the precise thing that is said, is that a secret

omnipotence proceeds from God, and flows over all things, and among all things, and through all things, depriving each of them severally, or all of them together, of all power whatever, to separate a single soul from the love of God; and confirming our souls into a thorough and complete certainty on this great point by a consideration of all the grand facts already recited, and already having occurred, by the extreme preciousness of the gifts already bestowed, and the manifest purpose of the divine mind to give the plan of salvation a thorough and complete execution. In all things we are to obtain the VICTORY. We are indeed to be MORE THAN CONQUERORS; not indeed through our own strength, but through Him that loved us, and through that secret exercise of omnipotence, every where, over all things, depriving them of the power to separate us from Christ, or, in their combined result, to produce any thing else but our good.

DEATH separates us forever from the prizes and treasures of this world; separates us from the love of living men, even those who have been dearest to us in this life; separates, for a time, our very souls from our bodies. At first view, it looks as if it separated us from every thing; as if it entirely terminated our being; as if it cut us sheer off from all work, device, knowledge, or wisdom; as if it sent us irrevocably into the hideous kingdom of nothingness. Sometimes he is a fearful dragon, having a sting; sometimes he is a warrior-knight, riding on a horse of paleness; sometimes the king of all ghastly terrors, which stride in gloom and darkness around the gate of departing human life. But the dragon with the sting, the pale warrior-knight, the king of terrors, is restrained by the power of God from separating a single soul of one of God's chosen people from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus our Lord. Such is the uttered word of God; and the facts sustain it fully. The love of God in the soul, is stronger than death or the grave. We are told that if we believe not that Jesus is the great Anointed One, we shall die in our sins. Death, then, will not separate between our souls and their sins. Death will no more separate the saints from the love of God. Death never does separate the soul from its own moral character. When we come to look a second time,

and more attentively, at death, the first appearance, as if it separated us from every thing, has changed. Sometimes people meet death in deep, submissive tranquility. Sometimes they are overawed by their approach to the pure and holy majesty of God. Sometimes they are quite absorbed with the splendor and glory of visions which they seem to behold somewhere near to them. Sometimes they look forward, and cry, "Glory!"* Sometimes they say, "O how beautiful!" The love of God is *in the soul*. Its seat is in the immortal part of the nature of man. And it is not the soul which is dying. It is only the dissolution of the bond which binds the soul to flesh and blood which is taking place. The soul is "secure in her existence." She turns away from earthly things, springs across the fearful abyss, clears the congregation of the dark and shadowy terrors on the shore, attains the shore of the better land, and has borne with her the love of God as a part of herself. There is nothing like separation. That love is the moving principle which leads her bravely, cheerfully, hopefully, joyfully on. The visions of the high, eternal shore, of the pure, perfect, and immortal forms of things, and of the holy and eternal lights that sleep on things in that world, make the love of God doubly precious, pure, and strong. Dragon with the fiery, envenomed sting! most terrible of things which are feared among men! in every such scene thou art vanquished! The children of God are more than conquerors over thee, through that Son of God who is also Son of man. Thou goest forth, no doubt, conquering and to conquer those who obey not the gospel of Christ. But among the chosen of God, thou goest not forth any longer thus. Thy sting, O fiery dragon, has been extracted. Thy crown, king of terrors, is faded. Thy form is dim; thine own countenance pale. Among those who are the called according to God's holy purpose, thou canst do no mighty works. Thou mayst dissolve, for a while, the mystical union between soul and body, for that is a union in material nature; but thou canst not separate a single soul from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus our Lord. For that is another mystical union of a higher, purer nature; of which one party is divine, and of which the other party, though in

themselves mortal and perishing, are no victims of death, because they are "members of his body, of his flesh, and of his bones." And there, around the bed of the dying saint, where the eyes of carnal men see nothing but thee, Pale Rider, there indeed, art thou conquered, and more than conquered, by the overleaping love which binds the redeemed soul to its Redeemer.

Nor shall LIFE be able to separate us from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus our Lord. Of course, life embraces tribulation, distress, persecution, famine, nakedness, and peril. And these things include hours of very sore temptation. But life also fairly embraces temptations of the opposite description, times of temptation from prosperity, as well as from adversity. Life embraces times of smooth sailing, happy auspices, abundance of the good things of this world, good name, and high and unassailable immunity from peril. And these things are often found to be even less friendly to the love of God than tribulation, and distress, and peril. It is on this side probably that life includes the keenest temptations. But on this side, life will not be able to separate us from the love of God. For, if we consider God's plan from of old to save his chosen people; if we look at what has already been done; if we consider what a gift it was when God freely delivered his Son up for us all; what a power it was which he exercised when he raised up Christ from the dead, and what a grant it was to the cause of his redeemed people when he set up Christ on the right hand of the majesty on high, ever to live as our Friend, our Advocate, our Intercessor, we must come to the conclusion from consistent reasoning, to which we are here brought by this authority of the inspired word, that even life, on its fair side, will not prevail to undo us. It must be plain to every understanding how unsound it is, and how frivolous, to tell us here that life and death cannot separate us from the love of God, but that we can separate ourselves; that these things cannot separate us, *if we remain faithful*; but that these things will separate, if we are not ourselves faithful. But that is the very question in hand, whether we ourselves shall be faithful. That is the only matter of any importance on the subject. To make the apostle leave that point, of our own

fidelity, out of view, is to accuse him of empty and tantalizing nonsense. Every one sees at once that that is the very point aimed at all through the chapter—that point that the carnal mind is enmity to God, and is not subject to his law, neither indeed can be; and so could not remain in subjection and persevere in that state, if it were even once in it. But that the spiritual mind is a different thing; has the Spirit of God dwelling in it; has within a source of life; is led by the Spirit of God; is an heir of God; has the Spirit to bear witness within it; and to intercede for it with unutterable groanings. The very leading and grand idea of the whole passage is, that the true child of God is so much under divine influence in every way, that he does not desire to separate himself from the love of God, and that nothing can separate him, against his own will, and against God's will. What can be said on the other side? Does that powerful arrangement to save souls, planned before the foundation of the world as a remedy for the fall of man, fail after all to embrace the main thing, that is, the grace to keep man's heart and will true and faithful to God? Is the very point of danger—our own fidelity—mockingly and derisively left unguarded? Has God, in the treasures of his gifts, no grace to “make and keep us pure *within*?” Can Christ's intercession bring down no help for the inner man, that we may persevere? Can not God himself lead us freely along the whole of the narrow way? Is the certainty of his perpetual and eternal holiness any cause to call in question the freedom of the will of the Son of God?

To every one of these questions the answer is entirely clear. The powerful arrangement to save souls, planned before the foundation of the world as a remedy for the fall of man, does *not* fail, after all, to embrace the main thing, which the mutability of Adam and Eve in Paradise shewed to be the main thing, namely, grace to keep man's heart and will true and faithful to his God. The very point of danger, the fidelity of the renewed heart, is *not* mockingly and derisively left unguarded and unprovided for. The treasures of the divine grace embrace this grace chiefly and specially, the grace to make us pure within,

that is, regeneration,—and the grace to keep us pure within, that is, sanctification and perseverance. Christ's intercession for us, has for its object this point chiefly, as it is personal love, and not a mere abstract love. Clearly, God can and does lead us freely along the whole journey of the narrow way, our preservation from falling being in a rational course, and by the use of means. And clearly, no beings in the universe can be more perfectly free of will than the adorable Son of God, and the spirits of just men made perfect in heaven, though they are absolutely under the full and undisputed dominion of holiness, and purity, and love, and are absolutely and forever secure from falling into sin.

Many-sided Form, who lookest every way, and goest every where, basking in every mild sunbeam, cooling thyself in every fragrant west wind, sitting round every fireside, trampling with thick-falling step every crowded city, sailing in every sea-going vessel, holding consultation in every council chamber, shouting upon every battle-field, mistress of a thousand curious arts, possessor of all terrestrial secrets, traveller in all human pathways, LIFE! where goest thou, or where goest thou not, to work? Thou spreadest temptations for the children of God on earth, at sea, in air, in the stars, in the realms of nature, in those of thought, and in those of imagination. Thou temptest men from early dawn to the late hours of night, by the light of the sun, and by that of the moon and stars, in the outward and in the inward world, by the appetites, the passions, and the reason. Thou streamest in all thy carnal power down the currents of this world. Thou hast a charm for souls whose depth outmeasures all earthly things. But work where and as thou wilt, Life, thou wilt be able to separate not a single one of the chosen children of God from the love that is in Christ Jesus.

Having taken the measure of our earthly existence in one of its dimensions—life and death—the apostle next looks through the separating veil which interposes between us and the spirits in the immutable and eternal state. Nor angels nor principalities nor powers shall be able to separate us. Neither shall the angels of common rank and dignity; nor those whose more exalted nature

and gifts have invested them with positions as conspicuous as principalities among men; nor those who "excel in strength" by the possession of divinely given powers. Holy angels do not desire to accomplish such a fearful purpose, for it is they in whose presence in heaven there is joy over one sinner that repenteth. Neither shall the angels which kept not their first estate, but left their own habitation, and who now roam this world seeking to devour souls, be able to separate the children of God from the love of God. Some of these fallen spirits must still be very powerful. No doubt they lost, by their sin and fall, much of that pure immortal vigor which moral rectitude had given them. They have lost much of the force of nerve and power of wing with which a sound conscience endowed them; much of that high and dauntless moral courage which the light of God's countenance bestowed. But the word of God represents them to be still foes, not to be despised for skill, ingenuity, and daring. One of them is called the god of this world. Another, or the same, is spoken of as the prince of the power of the air. Others still, as principalities, powers, the rulers of the darkness of this world, spiritual wickednesses in high places. They deceived and ruined Adam and Eve, and with them their posterity. They pushed and inflamed the world before the flood to such a pitch of wickedness as to bring down that awful perdition of the flood upon them. They drove guilty Sodom on to its fiery doom. They disputed with Michael the archangel about the body of Moses, probably with the design of corrupting many generations of the Hebrew people with the idolatry which would proceed from haunting the shrine where the ashes of the great lawgiver were interred. They stood at the right hand of high-priest and prince, in the days of old, to resist him when he interceded for the people. They sorely pierced David's soul with sin. They dragged down Solomon's glory into grievous darkness. With ever-ready foot and willing wing, they rioted in the chambers of the souls of such priests as Hophni and Phinehas, such kings as Jeroboam and Ahab. They hurled the chosen people into captivity. They filled the air, in those dull ages which rolled away between the two

Testaments, with the clash of swords and the clank of fetters. Seven of them beclouded and poisoned the soul of one woman of Magdala. A legion poured themselves into the afflicted spirit of a man of Gadara. Abroad over the earth they revelled in the spiritual ruin of the soul of man. The demon of lust inflamed souls in the high places of idol religion, and on the thrones of kings. The demon of murder danced in the abundance of assassinations, conspiracies, and proscriptions. The demon of ambition bade the drum beat and the trumpet sound to arms over the civilised world. When Christ came, they assaulted him with deep and fiery temptations, in all probability much more real and sharp than a cursory reading of the narrative supposes. One of the apostles falls temporarily under Satan's sifting power. Another of them tells us that we need the whole armor of God to encounter these spiritual wickednesses. He enumerates the girdle of truth, and the breast-plate of righteousness, the shoes of the preparation of the gospel of peace, the shield of faith, the helmet of salvation, the sword of the Spirit, and then all prayer and supplication in the Spirit. And this great array of spiritual weapons, and the midnight anxieties, and the noonday doubts, and the protracted conflicts of many a soul, show the combat to be a fearful reality. It is a great wonder that these mighty and malicious beings are not able to separate the children of God from his love, by some ingenious device, some cunning plot, some artful contrivance stretching from age to age, some transformation of fiends into angels of light, some inflaming of the carnal nature of man into open hatred of all holy things, some deep moral intoxication of a whole race, some fearful blinding of the eyes of a whole generation to truth, duty, right, holiness, justice, humanity. But they are not able to do so. The children of God who may be found to exist among all doomed races, at the pouring out of all vials of doom, will find all the applicable promises fulfilled to them in every time of trial. The reason is, that a scheme was laid before the foundation of the world for their salvation. An omnipotence which touches all things, every where, executes that scheme. When wrapped in the folds of that omnipotence, all

things work together for their good. And if it be denied that such a holy, wise, and powerful bounding and governing of all things, in all their workings, so as to keep them within limits, to deprive them of power to hurt the security of his people, and to cause them to work together in their final result, for the good of the chosen, is a legitimate part of omnipotence; it may be replied that, without such power, he would neither be supreme as Prophet, as Priest, or as King; nor supreme in the natural, or in the moral, or the spiritual universe.

Next we have another measure of our whole being, by another of its dimensions: Nor shall things present, nor things to come be able to separate us. In the category of time, all things for us are comprehended in the past, the present, and the future. The past did not separate us from the love of God. It brought us into it. In the past, God spared not his own Son, but delivered him up for us all. In the past, Christ died and rose again. In the past, Christ ascended up to his place of intercession on high. In the past, we were appointed to salvation, called, and justified. In the past, the apostle had had, and we have had, many sharp tribulations which did not separate us from the love of God. In the past, life, and angels, and principalities, and powers, and all of every category that had any foothold in the past, did not separate us. The past, then, contains only auguries of good. It has witnessed the extinction of the hopes of many a mere professor of religion. But it has never witnessed the separation of the soul of one single true child of God from the love of God. It has witnessed their being foreknown, their election, their justification, their conformity to Christ. There is the same reason for hoping and believing that we shall persevere in the future, as there was for such a hope when the past was future. Nothing but the grace of God has kept us faithful to our God and to ourselves heretofore. There is that same power promised and pledged to us, for that same thing hereafter. If it has been adequate heretofore, where is the ground on which it can be expected to prove inadequate hereafter? The opinion of one great and influential leader of opinion, on this chapter of the Romans, is this: "The whole of

the preceding discourse will show that every thing here is *conditional*, as far as it relates to the ultimate salvation of any person professing the gospel of Christ; for the promises are made to *character*, and not to persons, as some have most injudiciously affirmed."* If it be true that every thing here is conditional, as far as it relates to the ultimate salvation of any person professing the gospel of Christ, if there be no promise to Christians personally, that they shall have grace to be faithful to the end, then it is probable that the eye which does not see such a promise here, does not see such a promise any where. Then, according to that view, there is no such promise of our persevering in the love of God, any where to be found in Scripture. If, then, these promises are conditional, the condition on which they depend is to be performed by the human will, unaided by a promise, or by grace conferred according to a promise. Then "the ultimate salvation of any person professing the gospel" depends on a capricious, or accidental, exercise of the human will, which no promise can reach, no gift of grace can touch, no divine omnipotence can secure. And if this conditional scheme were true, this very passage of Scripture, of all others, is rendered senseless and nugatory; for the great object of this passage is the security of believers. What a great parade the apostle is making on the subject of the security of believers here, according to this scheme of interpretation, when, after all, their security depends on things not here alluded to! In fact, the whole goes to show that every thing here is *unconditional*, as far as it relates to the ultimate salvation of every true child of God. The promises are *not* made to *character*, but directly to persons. If they were made to character, they would be of no avail to any Christian to assure him that God's grace would help him to be faithful. But that is obviously the chief aim of the passage. The evidences that these promises are personal, and not to *character*, appear all along the current of the discourse. The persons intended in it, are those who truly profess Christ, and not those who make an empty profession. They are called

* Dr. Adam Clarke.

“them that love God, who are called according to his purpose;” “those whom he foreknew;” “those whom he predestinated to be conformed to the image of his Son;” “those whom he justified;” “those whom he glorified;” “God’s elect;” “us” who are inseparable from the love of God. A mere unconverted “professor of the gospel of Christ,” has no promise at all, in this or any other connexion that we know of, in the Scriptures. A true child of God has in this place the most positive, personal, and unconditional promises of victory over all enemies. And a species of divine grace which is unable to keep the children of God faithful to the end, is not that grace which is the subject of this passage. It is not the grace of any of the promises. It is not the grace which we need in the conflict of life. It is not the grace promised in the inspired word of God. It is not the grace whose promise is cheering to the tried believer. It is not the grace which Christian hearts universally seem taught of God to expect at the throne of grace, and for which they all ask at that throne.

So we may stand within the door of the present, and look out upon the whole fearfully seething and boiling springs, and fountains, and currents of things to come, and retain our full persuasion that things to come will not be able to separate us from the love of God. And the reason is, not that things to come are any more friendly to the children of God, in their intrinsic nature, than the things past were; but that the secret omnipotence of God, in pursuance of a very ancient, and very deliberately formed, and very sublime plan in reference to the elect, has touched the things to come, as it has all other created things, and taken away their power to turn away the hearts of the children of God from the love of God. And that their election is long before *character*; that *character* proceeds from election, in fact; as well as for other ideas advanced here by the apostle, we have at least one very conclusive testimony from the lips of our blessed Lord himself: “But ye believe not, because ye are not of my sheep, as I said unto you. My sheep hear my voice, and I know them, and they follow me: And I give unto them eternal life; and they shall never perish, neither

shall any pluck them out of my hand. My Father, which gave them me, is greater than all; and none is able to pluck them out of my Father's hand."* None but a prophet's vision can see things to come, in all the various and unexpected forms and shapes which they may wear, when they shall arrive at their existence and due place within the bounds of time and space. And it was a problem to be solved by the Divine mind itself alone, what should be the effects of things to come upon the perseverance of the children of God in his love. But it is by the sovereign omnipotence of God over all things, that power is taken from them to overcome the children of God. And it is by the unsearchable omniscience of God, exercising itself in the most immense, yet the most minute, the most wide and general, yet the most special and particular of all the deeds of the providence of God ever foretold on the pages of prophecy, that that future restraining omnipotence of God over all future things is here announced. Not one single child of God is ever to be beguiled away from his love, either at murderous Jerusalem, or at beautiful Damascus, or at shrine-worshipping Ephesus, or suicidal Phillippi, or at learned Athens, or at elegant Corinth. Unknown strange things to come, shall not prevail with a single soul, brought to Christ by me, Paul; or one brought to him by any other of the apostles of the Lord; or one brought to him by his ministers of any other age; over none brought to him in these eastern climes, and realms, and places; and over none brought to him in any other climes, realms, or places.

After that view of our nature which lies in the category of existence, as death and life; that view comprised in the category of the influence of superior orders, as angels, principalities, and powers; and that view expressed in the category of time, as things present and things to come; there is, to be perfectly exhaustive, another still, the category of position, of elevation or depression, of high or low: Neither height nor depth shall be able to separate us from the love of God.

It may be that the language is primarily strictly physical and

* John 10: 26-29.

material. But it is natural to think of man's spiritual prosperity, his wearing of the robes of the imputed righteousness of Christ, his procession through deliverances, and triumphs, and divinely bestowed glories, as above the earth, as pictured and resplendent in the height above, as things with which the realms of light are yet to be figured and adorned. And if any of the triumphal processions, and gorgeous visions of the Bride of the Lamb, arrayed in white, should be permitted, even then, just before the day of judgment, to draw us away from the love of God, vain would be all the past scenes which that love had given us eyes to behold.

It is natural to think of final doom as in the depths below. There would be fearful visions to be seen in the abyss, day by day, had we eyes which were not fettered by the laws of the material world. The tumblings of guilty souls into ruin, the wailings of the spirits in prison, the lurid atmosphere, and the hideous forms of that world,—of which this world may be something of a type, in those years and months when battle, and malice, and rapine, and desolation reign in it—might peradventure separate us from reason, and sanity, and the love of God at once, if they were not now hidden from our view. And if the chariot which shall bear our spirits up to God, shall, in its final exode from this world, go in sight of those fearful scenes of the abyss, it is not in vain that a promise from God should span that abyss also: That depth shall not separate us from the love of God.

If height be such a power in the government of God, as that which once caught the apostle to the Gentiles up to the third heavens, to hear unutterable things, and to be puffed with spiritual pride; or if depth be such a power as plunges men's spirits down, from day to day, to converse with gloomy forebodings, and to walk with the damned in imagination, or to try in vain the power of a mortal mind to endure "the eternal blazon" of that dark world: neither shall be able to separate one single one of the children of God from his love. And no other creature shall be able to effect that separation, because he that appointed them to salvation, and who called them here

below, and spared not his own Son, but delivered him up for them all, and who justifieth them, and has in many ways expressed his purpose to glorify them, is the eternal God, out of whose hands nothing can pluck them.

There is a custom much in vogue on some occasions, of throwing off the whole authority of these things as being in the revealed word of God, by saying that they are contradictory to other Scriptures. The Scriptures to which they are said to be contrary are such as this: Whosoever will, let him come, and take the water of life freely. The plain inference is that the objector thinks the divine Spirit *did very wrong* in revealing both predestination and free will. And had he been such a spirit as that of the objector, he would not probably have revealed both these two things as he has done. Now, either the divine Spirit has inspired men to write contradictory things, one of which is necessarily false, or else they are not contradictory. But the only thing the objector has a right to say, is that these things do not appear to him to be reconcilable. Of course what *appears to him* to be reconcilable, and *what is* reconcilable, are not always the same thing. The plain truth of the matter is that the decrees or purposes of God embrace the acts of man's free will. Those acts are parts of God's decrees. That is the way in which the Scriptures treat them. That is the clear and proper philosophy of the subject. They are the links in the chain of appointed events in human life and human history. There is no other kind of a chain of events in religious life but one connected by free causes. When a man says that free causes cannot produce infallible results, he speaks simply as a materialist, and is forgetful of the action of spirit upon spirit. Nothing is clearer in Scripture than that the acts of man's will are both entirely free and appointed of God. The acts of Joseph's brethren in selling him into Egypt; the acts of Judas and Pilate in betraying the Lord Jesus, and delivering him to be crucified; the acts of as many as were ordained to eternal life, in Antioch in Pisidia, in the days of Saint Paul, in believing the gospel; and the acts of those in the days of Saint Peter, who stumbled at the word, being disobedient, whereunto also they

were appointed, were all evidently free, and as manifestly appointed of God. So also are all the acts of all men, both free and appointed of God. Every answer to prayer is a case of God's putting his own appointed will into execution by means of free agents. So is every act of providence. So is every fulfilment of prophecy. Indeed the whole staple of the representations of human destinies by human genius, is found in the divine appointment of events on the one hand, and the free human fulfilments of destiny on the other. They all go upon the two wheels of divine destiny and human freedom. Such are believed to be the dramas of the three illustrious Greek tragedians. Such are all the deeper of the dramas of Shakspeare. Such must every true picture of life be, in order to be felt to be true and exhaustive. The tendency of the objection is utterly to subvert the government of God over men. And it is armed with no more forcible weapon than the weak assumption that all divine things must be level to every prejudiced mind.

But it is often affirmed that such exhibitions of the safety of God's chosen people have a tendency to lead them to loose neglect, or to bold presumption. We firmly believe that the proper way to deal with this objection, is a simple denial, and an appeal to the facts. The difference in the effect of cordials on the regenerate, and on the unregenerate mind, is the point involved. Grant that these powerful cordials do highly intoxicate the unregenerate mind, which has been betrayed into a vain and empty profession of faith in Christ. We concede nothing whatever to that consideration, as a reason for withholding the cordials which they need, from the true children of God. That vain and empty profession ought, if possible, to have been avoided. The distinction between the regenerate and the unregenerate condition ought to have been carefully unfolded, and faithfully maintained. There would then have been little need for that *fearful tenet*, the final apostasy of God's true children. God's people are extremely sensitive to danger, easy to be warned, generally in a state of trial, and often terrified by the fiery darts of the adversary. For Christ's sake they are accounted as sheep for the slaughter, and are killed all the day

long. They therefore manifestly need the strong cordial of these great and precious promises, to keep them from sinking into despair, as from time to time, they obtain fresh flashes of the peril of the great pilgrimage. Those cordials, it has pleased God, the Holy Spirit, to decide that they ought to have; and they have them accordingly; as they certainly need them all. These precious assurances belong not to any who do not see in their lives, and their spirits, the evidence that they are children of God. If others apply them to their own intoxication, it is an abuse for which, as far as we can see, the word of God and the true use of it, are in no wise responsible.

A precious vessel floated in air before the entranced eyes of the knights of the Round Table, in the middle ages, which was said to contain the real blood of the Lord Jesus, caught in a hollow jewel, and thus borne through the ages and the climes. But it was another vision which the entranced eyes of the holy apostles saw, to cheer them in their arduous labors, in that adulterous and sinful generation. It was the vision of a precious book, a mighty volume, inscribed thickly with the names of the saints. It was "the book of life of the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world." In it were written the names of persons, souls, ransomed sinners, blood-washed saints; and not merely the names of characters. Saint Paul saw, by inspiration, the names of "Clement and other his fellow-laborers," inscribed therein. Around it clustered thick and ample rays of power and glory to prevent the erasure of any name from its awful pages. To be therein inscribed was the prize for which they strove. And around that book, they saw all the storms of death and life, and angels and principalities and powers, and things present and things to come, and height and depth, and every other creature, rage in vain, to erase a solitary name, even that of the lowliest child of God, from its record.

ARTICLE III.

THE RELATION OF STATE AND CHURCH.

What is the Relation of the State to the Church, is the great unsolved problem of the age.

To many careless thinkers, if thinkers they may be called, this subject may have little or no importance. And to these same persons, the forms of government and other political questions, may appear to be of the utmost importance. Liberty is a theme upon which all are fond of descanting, and upon which those who know the least, can rant the most. A desire for true freedom is the noblest aspiration of the human heart; but in the corruption of human nature, it degenerates into a love of licentiousness, and a state of enmity to the laws of God. Ignorant of what constitutes true freedom, man, in every age, has been struggling for a liberty as imaginary as it is unattainable. Ignorant of the very end to be attained, it is not strange that he should mistake the means, and always fail; ever struggling for a state of freedom and happiness, and ever living in a state of slavery and wretchedness. The few have lived in wealth and power; the many in poverty and slavery. The most despotic governments have been the most permanent: while the most free have been the most short-lived. The former have been numerous, while the latter have been few and far between. The people most free and happy, are those living under republican forms of government. In these the people are said to govern themselves. This is called free government. History shows that free government has been confined to a very small portion of the human family, and to nations the most enlightened, as were the Grecians and Romans among the ancients. Where these ancient republics flourished, where freedom reared her temple, where philosophers and statesmen worshipped at her shrine, where orators eulogised her, and poets sang her praise, despotism has long since waved her sceptre and clanked her

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chains. France, maddened by long years of oppression, both civil and ecclesiastical, and, frantic with imaginary ideas of liberty and equality, trampled on the crown and sceptre of royalty, banished the ecclesiastical dignitaries, overturned the altars of God, profaned the temples of religion, deluged the land in blood, and when her delirium had exhausted itself, sank back to her former condition. Her republicanism, purchased at immense cost, was short-lived. The opinion of Napoleon, the greatest hero and statesman of the age, that France was incapable of free government, was fully verified by the result.

The American colonies, after seven years of war, threw off the British yoke, and became free, sovereign, and independent States; united, as such, under the style of the United States, formed, as such, a common government, and adopted a constitution, prepared by the ablest statesmen of the age. This government was formed under the most favorable circumstances. They possessed a large and fertile territory, remote from the influence of surrounding nations, had the history and experience of the past, with all the advantages of Christianity and education, of arts and science. They enjoyed an unparalleled progress in wealth, population, and prosperity. The government of the United States was regarded as the highest achievement of human wisdom, and as the best the world had produced. And yet it had in it the seeds of dissolution. It could not withstand "the irrepressible conflict," emanating from the love of power and plunder in the heart of treason. A century has not passed away since its origin; but the government of our fathers, as it was, is no more. Its name and its shadow remain, but the substance is gone. The States are no longer what they so positively declared themselves to be in the articles of Confederation, and the formation of their respective constitutions, *free, sovereign, and independent States*, possessing all the power, rights, and jurisdiction, not expressly delegated to Congress. Congress no longer acts upon the principle, that it possesses only delegated powers, exercised by the consent of the people of the respective States, who created it, and from whom all its powers were derived.

From all this we conclude :

1. *That sinful man, by his own wisdom, is not capable of establishing and maintaining free or self-government.*

In proof of this, we allege the fact, that, as yet, he never has succeeded. He has tried every form of government, from that of absolute despotism to that of unrestrained democracy. He has blended religion and politics, uniting Church and State, sometimes making the former subordinate and subservient to the latter, and sometimes the latter to the former. At other times, he has endeavored to discard religion from all civil and political matters. And still he has failed to determine what are the elements of freedom and stability in government. The great problem of human freedom and happiness remains unsolved. The relation of the State to the Church is another great problem still unsolved. And strange as it may seem, we think the solution of the one involves that of the other. How important, then, their solution, to every interest of man, both for time and eternity. Our faith is not shaken in the promises of God. We believe the period will come, however remote it may be, when "the kingdoms of this world shall become the kingdoms of our Lord;" "when kings shall be nursing fathers, and queens nursing mothers of the Church." Then, and not till then, will the freedom and happiness of man become triumphant and universal.

That all men, when they reflect at all, desire such a state, we cannot doubt, without calling in question the character of man as a rational being. But men have sought for freedom and happiness in every direction but the right one. They have looked to the forms of government, but all in vain. A brief analysis of government demonstrates this. The functions of government are three: making, explaining, and executing laws; the legislative, the judiciary, and the executive. It matters not whether these functions are performed by one or many, provided they are wisely and justly done. Good laws, rightly explained, and justly executed, make a good government. Such is the corruption of human nature, that it is deemed unwise to put too much power into the hands of one man. It is thought best to

distribute the functions of government, by investing different persons with the power of exercising its several functions. The executive is not permitted either to make or explain laws. The judiciary cannot make or execute them. The legislative can make laws, but neither interpret nor execute them. By this means, these several powers are supposed to be checks upon one another. An additional check is to render all these functionaries dependent upon the will of the people, and amenable to them. But with all the checks and balances human wisdom can contrive, no government has as yet combined freedom and stability. The English government has approximated more nearly to this than any other. But it is far from the perfect attainment of either one or the other.

Many look to the general intelligence of the people as the great requisite to free and permanent government. This is a very important element. But the general intelligence of no people has ever been sufficient to secure the freedom and stability of government; and we do not hesitate to say, it never will be. History shows that despotism has been established upon the ruins of free government in the golden age of intellectual development. The liberties of Greece perished while the eloquence of Demosthenes, that prince of orators, was still ringing in her ears. The liberty of Rome went down, while the eloquence of Cicero, her world-renowned orator, and the strains of her most famous bards were lingering around the temple of freedom. The hopes of the republic of France were extinguished, not by intellectual, but by moral darkness. Not intellectual, but moral darkness and corruption have destroyed the freedom of the people in every age.

We are forced to the conclusion that no amount of advancement in mere intelligence, will secure the freedom and happiness of a people, or the stability of government. The monsters of the French revolution were not wanting in intellectual development. They were, however, wanting in all the moral elements essential to good government. Hence there has been a conviction in the minds of men in every age, that there exists an inseparable connexion between religion and government.

RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT.

In every age and nation, religion and government have been intimately associated. By the great majority of mankind, the culture of religion has been deemed essential to the existence of government. This has been especially so among the most enlightened nations, which have made the greatest progress in government and civilisation. "We" says Cicero, "have surpassed all tribes and nations in piety as in religion, and in this one wisdom, that we have perceived all things to be ruled and governed by the divinity of the immortal gods." Ranke, speaking of the multitude of tribes settled around the Mediterranean and its coasts, and as far inland as known, observes, "The independence they enjoyed was not merely political: in every country a local religion arose; the ideas of God and of divine things became, as it were, appropriated to certain places; national deities of the most diversified attributes occupied the world; and the law obeyed by their votaries became inseparably identified with that of the State. We may venture to assert that this intimate union of religion and state, this two-fold freedom, which was shackled only by the light obligations imposed by community of blood, had the largest share in fashioning the character of antiquity." *Ranke's Hist. Popes*, chap. i. Up to the time of our Saviour, religion and government, in every nation, were intimately associated. All regarded the sanctions of religion as essential to the existence of government; even the sceptical philosophers deemed it necessary for the common people.

Our Saviour first proclaimed, "My kingdom is not of this world;" and upon this declaration, set up his kingdom. Only a few centuries passed away, until Christianity extended her conquests over the throne of the Cæsars. The Church became powerful, wealthy, proud, and corrupt, seized upon the temporal power, and became a kingdom of this world; exercising both civil and ecclesiastical authority, and establishing a politico-religious tyranny unparalleled in the world's history.

The next phase in the world's history is the great struggle in opposition to this ecclesiastical despotism. This was the struggle

of centuries, of the political against the ecclesiastical, and of Protestantism against Roman Catholicism. Popes crowned or deposed kings at their pleasure. Sometimes kings put down one pope to set up another. These conflicts have passed away. Ecclesiastical supremacy is no longer recognised. But the declaration of our Saviour, "My kingdom is not of this world," is neither practically understood nor acted upon. Church and State remain allied together in most governments.

If we ask, Can government exist independent of religion? the history and experience of the world will answer, No. If we ask, Shall the State support religion, and shall there be a union between Church and State? a large majority of the world will reply in the affirmative; and the ablest writers and statesmen will advocate such a union. It is only a few years since the great struggle occurred in Scotland, between the advocates of a Church establishment and the friends of a free Church. In May, 1843, Dr. Chalmers, with four hundred and seventy clergymen, and their adherents, *seceded* from the Church Establishment, and founded the Free Church. Near about the same time, Mr. Gladstone, not satisfied with "Paley's Defence of the Church," published a book, the object of which was to show, "that the propagation of religious truth is one of the principal ends of government as government. He would not fine, imprison, or torture heretics, but he would exclude them from all political offices, and subject them to various disabilities. The historian, philosopher, and statesman Macaulay, has refuted his positions in a masterly manner. Yet he is careful to have it understood that he is no opponent of the Church Establishment, and takes the ground, that the propagation of religious truth is not the *primary*, but the *secondary* object of government. When the question is asked, What religion shall be established? he gives in to the answer of Bishop Warburton, viz., that of the majority.

Vattel, a standard author on the Law of Nations, regards the influence of piety and religion upon a nation as so important as to require a separate chapter. The excellent remarks of this writer deserve the consideration of all legislators and statesmen.

He remarks, "Enlightened piety in a people is the firmest support of lawful authority; and, in the sovereign's heart, it is the pledge of the people's safety, and excites their confidence. Ye lords of the earth, who acknowledge no superior here below, what security can we have for the purity of your intentions, if we do not conceive you to be deeply impressed with respect for the common Father and Lord of men, and animated with a desire to please him."

"We have already insinuated that piety ought to be attended with knowledge. In vain would we propose to please God, if we knew not the means of doing it. But what a deluge of evils arise, when men, heated by so powerful a motive, are prompted to take methods that are equally false and pernicious. A blind piety only produces superstitious bigots, fanatics, and persecutors, a thousand times more dangerous and destructive to society than libertines are. There have appeared barbarous tyrants who have talked of nothing but the glory of God, while they crushed the people, and trampled under foot the most sacred laws of nature." Again he says, "Religion consists in the doctrines concerning the Deity, and the things of another life, and in the worship appointed to the honor of the Supreme Being. So far as it is seated in the *heart*, it is an *affair of conscience*; but so far as it is *external and publicly established*, it is an *affair of State*." "The establishment of religion by law, and its public exercise, are matters of State, and are necessarily under the jurisdiction of political authority. If all men are bound to serve God, the entire nation, in her national capacity, is doubtless obliged to serve and honor him."

It will be seen that there are several respects in which we object to the views of Vattel. At present, we shall not stop to criticise them. To the question, What religion shall be established? he replies as Bishop Warburton and Macaulay: "That which shall have the approbation of the majority, shall be received and publicly established by law; by which means it shall become the religion of the State." He then discusses the difficulties which may arise from the opposition of the minority.

In the United States, the Gordian knot is cut by ignoring the subject of religion as much as possible. In our political institutions, the Bible, Talmud, and Koran are equally ignored; except that the Bible is used in administering oaths. Christianity receives no particular recognition, the Decalogue is unnoticed, Christ, the Mediator, is not named, nor even Jehovah acknowledged as the supreme Ruler of the universe. Our constitutions are negatively infidel and atheistic. From one extreme, that of bigotry and persecution, our statesmen have rushed into the other, that of infidelity and atheism. The pernicious and dangerous effects of this negative infidelity, are seen in the licentiousness and fanaticism so prevalent in the United States. An open warfare has long been waged upon religion and morality; in attempts to do away with the Sabbath; to expel the Bible from public schools; to exclude religious men and religious influence from literary institutions; in the establishment of infidel clubs and Tom Paine celebrations; in Sabbath drinking and gambling saloons and theatricals; in the propagation of false and licentious ideas in regard to human liberty; ignoring the divine government and under the name of the "higher law," deifying the blind instincts of depraved humanity. To what else could all this lead; but to the manifestation of human depravity in a variety of pernicious *isms*?

Mormonism comes forth with no other credentials than the lying legends of stupid and wicked impostors; and with no allurements save the gratification of the vilest lusts. And yet, in this nineteenth century, and in this land of Bibles, churches, and Sabbath-schools; without the sword wielded by the prophet of Mecca, she enlists her thousands, lays hold of a large territory, tramples on the Constitution and laws of the United States, discards the civilisation of the age, defies the government, and rears up a new Sodom. All this has been done in the name of religion, and no preference could be given by the Constitution to one religion over another. Congress had no moral standard by which to determine the merits of Mormonism. If she robbed the Gentiles of property, she claimed divine authority for it. If she established the most degrading and pernicious form of polygamy,

it was in the exercise of religion. What could a government do that discarded all interference with religion? The Bible sanctions domestic servitude in the history of the patriarchs, in the decalogue, in the civil institutions of the Israelites, and in the precepts and instructions in the gospel; but there was a "*higher law*" than the Bible to set aside its teachings. Utah was poor. She had no aristocracy to excite envy and hatred, no wealth to reward the toils and dangers of the plunderer, and no laurels to be won by military chieftains.

We have made this exposition of our own government and people, because it is regarded, and probably is, the best that human wisdom can devise without the aid of Revelation. It may, therefore, be considered as demonstrated, that, on the one hand, self-government, or freedom, and the union of State and Church, are incompatible, and that, on the other hand, a government which ignores the Bible, cannot bestow freedom on the people, and at the same time possess stability. History further proves that a union of Church and State, as in England, constitutes a better and more permanent government than one which is negatively infidel.

THE HARMONY OF HUMAN AND DIVINE GOVERNMENT.

The Creator of the universe has established his government over all the works of his hands. The physical world has its laws, all founded upon certain relations, and adapted to its subjects. Chemistry discusses the laws which govern atoms in changes ever going on in the compositions and decompositions of physical bodies; Astronomy, the laws of the solar system; Vegetable Physiology, the laws of vegetable life; and Animal Physiology, those of animal life. The violation of these laws is invariably attended with destruction. The existence of society and government is founded upon the moral law. The violation of moral law is destructive to society and government to the extent of its violation. *Government is not founded upon religion.* The almost universal belief that religion is essential to the existence of government, is the result of con-

founding morality and religion. This, too, is the cause of many errors in the theological world. Here, too, is the source of all the difficulties which have arisen as to the relation between State and Church; the conflicts between civil and ecclesiastical power, the union of Church and State, alike injurious to both; the bigotry, intolerance, and persecution, and bloodshed. Out of this confusion of morality and religion, grow many errors and many perplexing questions, relating to the liberty of conscience, of speech, and of free discussion; also, in regard to the extent to which obedience is due to civil law. The analogy of nature, the history of the human race, and the teachings of the Bible, all go to prove that the freedom and happiness of any people, and the stability of government, depend upon its being in harmony with the divine government. The moral law is the constitution, the fundamental and cardinal principle of this divine government. This moral law is immutable for two reasons: first, because it is a transcript of the divine perfections, revealing the character of its author; and, secondly, because it is founded upon fixed and unalterable relations, viz., those of the Creator to his creatures, and of the creatures to one another. The necessity for it arises out of the sinful condition and the social relations of man, and is therefore the same as the necessity for all human government. The design of the moral law is two-fold. First, as a rule of action, like the tree of knowledge, of good and evil, teaching man the difference between right and wrong, and guiding him, in proportion as he observes it, to freedom and happiness, or dooming him to the opposite, in proportion to his neglect of it. In the second place, it reveals to him his true condition as guilty and condemned—a hopeless sinner in the sight of God—his utter inability to keep a perfectly holy law, and his need of deliverance from sin and misery from a divine source. It is the mirror which reveals his moral deformity, and the desperate malady of his disease, sin; and the necessity of a divine Mediator and Redeemer. Hence the apostle (Gal. iii. 24, 25,) speaks of the office of the law as that of “a school-master to bring us unto Christ, that we might be justified by faith.”

As the necessity for the moral law and human government is the same, so is their design the same.

ALL GOVERNMENT IS AN ORDINANCE OF GOD.

We have shown that the moral law and human government have the same origin and the same design; the one as well as the other is an ordinance of God. Paul says, (Rom. xiii. 1-7,) "Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of God. Whosoever, therefore, resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist shall secure to themselves damnation, (*i. e.* judgment or condemnation.) For rulers are not a terror to good works, but to the evil. Wilt thou then not be afraid of the power? do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise of the same: for he is the minister of God to thee for good. But if thou do that which is evil, be afraid; for he beareth not the sword in vain; for he is a minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil. Wherefore ye must needs be subject, not only for wrath, but also for conscience' sake. For for this cause pay ye tribute also: for they are God's ministers, attending continually upon this very thing. Render therefore to all their dues: tribute to whom tribute is due; custom to whom custom; fear to whom fear; honor to whom honor."

The whole context shows government, here called an ordinance of God, to be in harmony with the moral law. We cannot, for a moment, suppose that God, having by a divine constitution of things, made man the subject of an immutable law, as we have shown the moral law to be, should ordain any government violating it. All governments, to a greater or less extent, teach and enforce the moral law: otherwise they would be destructive to society, and could not exist. Just in so far as they teach and enforce the moral law, they are ordinances of God. All authority to exercise government is derived from God, under the moral law. Every moral being is created under that law, bound by his constitution, by duty and by interest, to teach and enforce it. It is, therefore, the duty and interest of man to establish

government for this end. God has ordained that he should. But man has no authority, and no right to violate the moral law, either in the manner of establishing or exercising government. Nor is it the duty of any man to obey human, when opposed to divine authority. For we are bound to obey God rather than man. As it is the duty of every man, as a moral and accountable being, to teach and enforce the moral law to the extent of his influence, so it is the duty of every man to maintain the moral law, both in the establishment and exercise of government. He owes this to God, to himself, and to his fellow-creatures.

It is the mission of the State to teach and enforce the moral law :

1. Because it is the charter of all the rights which God has given to man. No right can be withheld, and no wrong inflicted without some violation of the moral law. A strict observance of the moral law, would secure all the rights, all the freedom and happiness to which man is entitled, and of which he is capable; no matter what may be the form of government. Hence God has ordained no particular form of government; but has left it to the wisdom of man to establish such forms as seem best adapted to the condition of the people, and the ends of government itself. A correct exposition of the moral law would be the best system of moral philosophy that could be given to the world. Moral science would present a systematic view of moral precepts with their proper application and illustration. Moral philosophy would discuss the relations upon which the law is founded, presenting the reasons of its existence. There is more or less error in every system of moral philosophy which men have attempted to establish, taking simply the light of nature or reason for their guide. These errors become interwoven with political systems, and result, sometimes in the overthrow, and always in the injury of government. If, instead of the false teachings contained in the moral philosophies, so called, and taught in schools and colleges, and incorporated in the Declaration of Independence, and propagated from the rostrum and the pulpit, and by the press, both political and religious, "as self-

evident truths," to which the authority of the Bible itself must yield, the Decalogue or moral law, as explained and illustrated in the Old and New Testaments, had been incorporated in our Constitution and declared to be the basis of government, and the supreme law of the land, abolitionism, and the Protean forms of radicalism and fanaticism would never have gained the ascendancy, deluged the country in blood, and disgraced the name of Christianity and civilisation by a war which has subverted the liberties of the people, by the establishment of a central and party despotism.

In a government recognising the supreme authority of the moral law, demanding no rights which it does not sanction, and idolizing no deity of licentiousness under the name of liberty, the subjects of freedom and slavery could have produced no political agitation, much less a war of desolation, ending, as all the omens at present would seem to show, in a central despotism.

2. Because, in every government, there must be a supreme authority some where, an ultimate tribunal. It must be an authority which cannot be called in question. No human authority will be recognised as such. Morality, we have said, is the basis of all government. The Decalogue, contained in the Bible, and illustrated in the Old and New Testaments, is the only perfect moral code known to man. It claims the homage, and receives the sanction of all men, whether Jew or Gentile, whether learned or unlearned. The man who objects to it, must be pronounced morally insane; and, therefore, unfit to have any share in the affairs of government.

3. Because the moral law is the only basis of free government. It claims to come from the Supreme Ruler of the universe, and brings with it the most satisfactory credentials. It places all men upon a level as subjects of the divine government, defines their rights, not according to some imaginary equality which never has existed and never will exist, but according to their several stations and relations; and demands the execution of judgment and justice, in truth and righteousness, clothing its demands with all the sanctions of a holy, omniscient, and omni-

potent Judge, from whom there is no escape, either in time or eternity. It does not propose to alter the constitution, or reverse the present order of things; to declare that man, born under the law, and subject to law according to the circumstances of his birth, is free, and can be governed only by his own consent; that the king and the beggar, the philosopher and the fool, the servant and his master, are either intellectually, politically, or socially equal. Such absurdities and falsehoods were left to be divulged by insane fanatics, whose doctrines are alike incompatible with both human and divine government.

4. Because the ends of government will never be fully attained until human government is in harmony with the divine; and this will never be, until the State fulfils her mission by teaching and enforcing the moral law. Then will the freedom and happiness of man and the stability of government be secured. Then will the grand design of all human governments be accomplished, when they shall become teachers, propagators, and supporters of the moral law, revealing the sin and condemnation of the world; and leaving the sinner, slain by the law, to search for a remedy in the gospel of Christ. For the law is a school-master to bring us to Christ, that we may be justified by faith. It is thus that all human governments will become subordinate to the divine, and made to contribute to the extension of Christ's mediatorial kingdom. It is only thus that kings can become nursing fathers, and queens nursing mothers to the Church.

For be it known, that the mediatorial kingdom of Christ, with the new creation in Christ Jesus, is the greatest and highest manifestation of God's glory; that creation, the whole of the present constitution of things, the nations, the kingdoms and empires, arts and sciences, manners and customs, the laws and governments, are subordinate to the mediatorial kingdom of Christ; and this, with all that is subordinate to it, to the manifestation of God's perfections and glory; and that all things will be so overruled as to accomplish the end of their existence.

THE RELATION OF THE STATE TO THE CHURCH IS THE SAME AS
THAT OF THE LAW TO THE GOSPEL.

The necessity for the law grows out of the moral condition and social relations of man, and its design is two-fold: First, to secure the peace, freedom, and happiness of nations; and secondly, to prepare man for the reception of the gospel, and for that real, most exalted, and only permanent peace, freedom, and happiness which are to be found only in the kingdom of Christ. All the aspirations of man for freedom and happiness are designed to lead him to the kingdom of Christ, where alone they can in reality be found. All that the law can bestow, is only the shadow of that which the gospel can alone bestow. The world does not yet appear to understand the declaration of the gospel, "If the Son shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed." John viii. 36.

Lieber, in his work on "Civil Liberty," after filling several pages with the various attempts of learned authors to define the terms, *liberty* and *civil liberty*, has himself attempted a definition, and made a most signal failure. When the learned have such vague ideas of *liberty*, it is not strange that the great mass of mankind should idolize an imaginary deity, under the name of Liberty, and become intoxicated with visionary blessings of freedom. Fanaticism is fruitful in such idols and visions of imaginary things. It is at best a species of mental derangement, shrewd and logical enough in reasoning from false premises, eloquent in words and dazzling enough in tropes and figures to wield an influence over the unthinking populace. What else have been all the rhapsodies on the subjects of *liberty*, *fraternity*, and *equality*, in France and this country, but the insane effusions of fanaticism? And in what have they resulted, but in aggression upon the rights of others, resulting in war, bloodshed, and the establishment of despotism? Every struggle for liberty without knowing what it is, must result only in evil. The truth confronts us in the history of every nation, that people have put themselves into the hands of tyrants, and enslaved themselves in battling for a freedom imaginary and unattainable. Fanaticism,

in every age the scourge of the world, only knows how to destroy, not how to build up.

The first step toward the attainment of liberty, is to know in what it consists. The word suggests a simple idea, viz., to do as one pleases, to act as *I will*. It is therefore the harmony of a man's actions with his will. And it is neither more nor less. The angels are perfectly free, and yet they are subject to a holy law which they perfectly obey. They do precisely as they will; their chief delight being to do the will of God. This is a freedom unattainable by man: "Because the carnal mind is enmity against God; for it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be." Rom. viii. 7. The will in perfect harmony with the law, is perfect freedom. The design of the gospel is to remove the enmity of the carnal mind, and to bring it into harmony with the law of God; to deliver it from the dominion of sin, and restore it to the freedom of holiness. This is the freedom spoken of in John viii. 36. It is the freedom enjoyed by angels, and will be that of the redeemed.

Liberty, we have said, consists in doing as we please. What are the limitations to this? In relation to the law of God, no man is permitted to violate it without incurring its penalties. Nor is a man permitted to violate the laws of the land. The existence and good of society will not allow it. So far as a man approves of the laws, and it is his pleasure to obey them, so far is he free. All political freedom is at most only partial. All conflict between a man's actions and his will, is so much restraint upon his liberty; so is violence done to his will; as when he is forced by any threatened pains or penalties to take an oath of which he does not approve. One of the greatest outrages upon liberty is found in compulsory oaths. What the moral law permits, and what it prohibits, is the extent and the limit of human authority. All human legislation forbidding what the moral law permits, or requiring what it forbids, is a usurpation of man's rights, and a violation of his liberty. It is a violation of conscience, if it prohibits the performance of duties required by the moral law.

The liberty of speech and of the press ought to be determined

by the same standard. The whole subject of slavery was one to be determined, not by false political axioms, the offspring of infidelity, or by the "*higher law*," the instinct of corrupt humanity, but by moral law as taught and illustrated in the Old and New Testaments. The fact that the moral law is in part founded upon the relation of master and servant, in the sense of slave, as the whole history of domestic servitude among the Israelites, and the relative duties enjoined most fully in the New Testament demonstrate, proves that domestic servitude is a form of government ordained of God. From this it follows that all interference with this institution was a usurpation and a violation of the moral law. A war for the purpose of abolishing it, was an aggressive and wicked war. All these evils have resulted from the establishment of government upon principles at war with the divine government.

Observing this great defect in the government of the United States, and the consequences resulting from it, the late and much lamented Dr. Thornwell introduced a memorial into the Southern General Assembly in 1861, with a view to an amendment to the Constitution of the Confederate States, recognising Christ, the Mediator, as King of kings, and as the supreme Ruler of the nations. It was withdrawn by its mover on the appearance of opposition. It could not, and ought not to have been adopted. It embraced an article of the creed enjoined in the gospel. The moral law, and not the gospel, is the basis of civil government. While the law and gospel are intimately related, they are entirely distinct. What this relation is, has been shown.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE LAW AND GOSPEL.

The law consists of precepts to control the actions of men. It has no control over any thing which cannot be defined and proven. Whatever control it has over motives and feelings, is only in so far as these are open and manifested by outward acts or expressions. Thus, killing with malice aforethought is murder. This malice, however, must be manifested by some act or expression, rendering it susceptible of proof. The gospel, on

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the contrary, consists of a creed, of a faith controlling the feelings and affections. So far as the law attempts to control these, its operation is indirect, through the control of the external actions. The gospel aims at the outward acts, through faith controlling the affections. It would purify the fountain, so that the waters shall of necessity be sweet. The law is founded upon man's present relations, looks to the existence and welfare of society, to the life, property, and rights of man as a member of the community; and has respect only to the things that are temporal. The gospel aims at the establishment of a spiritual kingdom, composed of members born of the Spirit, created anew through faith in Christ Jesus, and sanctified by a belief of the truth; created anew, not by, but unto, good works. It aims at the restoration of fallen man to the image of God; at bringing his perverted will and corrupt affections from a state of enmity to the law of God into harmony with it; at the deliverance of man from the bondage of sin, and his restoration to the liberty of the gospel. Whilst it is true that "godliness is profitable for all things, having promise of the life that now is, and of that which is to come," (1 Tim. iv. 8,) the gospel relates not so much to the things which are temporal as to those which are spiritual. Our Saviour said, "My kingdom is not of this world." The context shows the meaning of this declaration. This kingdom does not consist of civil or political power, as do the kingdoms of this world. He claimed no right to wield the sword of the warrior, even in self-defence. His kingdom is in this world—its members, its officers, its instrumentalities, and its operations. But as members of his kingdom, they exercise no functions, civil, political, or military. Its members are spiritual. It is aggressive, and aims at the conquest of the world; but the weapons of its warfare are not carnal, but spiritual.

The Church is the visible organisation and representative of this kingdom. Its mission is to proclaim the gospel of Christ, to convince men of sin, and persuade them to be reconciled to God through Christ. Its officers are ambassadors for Christ, who in his stead are to beseech men to be reconciled to God.

The very idea of religion precludes all idea of force. It is the harmony of the human with the divine will. It is a voluntary condition of the moral feelings. The only force or power at all applicable in religion, is moral and spiritual. Hence, all attempts to propagate religion by the sword, by instruments of torture, by dungeons, disabilities, or persecution of any kind, are as absurd as they are wicked. They are the weapons of a carnal warfare, the instrumentalities of Satan. Matters of creed, of faith, feeling, and affection, whether religious, moral, or political, cannot be controlled by acts of violence and oppression.

Whatever relation Church members may sustain as citizens of the State, whatever offices they may hold, whatever duties may devolve upon them as such; the Church, as a Church, must not interfere or meddle with civil or political matters; except it be in defence of her rights and privileges as a Church of Christ. The political resolutions and proceedings of the Presbyterian General Assembly of the North, at its meeting held at Pittsburg, 1865, show a sad state of apostasy from the kingdom of Christ, which "is not of this world." It virtually converted itself into a political body, proclaiming political creeds, and adopting political measures to enforce them, exhibiting the same intolerance, stupidity, and wickedness manifested by the fanatical party now dominant.

On the other hand, the State has no right to interfere with the Church, to dictate, in regard to its creed, the organisation of its ecclesiastical bodies, the form or matter of its prayers, sermons, or ordinances; to shut or open churches, or to say who shall or shall not preach. All such acts are gross usurpations of power, which belongs to Christ as the Head of the Church, to be administered through the proper officers of the Church. Such usurpations are treason against both God and man. They were common in the dark ages. Who, five years ago, would have supposed that such outrages upon religious liberty would ever be committed in the United States?

In Missouri, a provost marshal presided over the organisation of a Presbytery, admitting or rejecting members upon political

principles. In the same State, a most infamous oath has been required of ministers of the gospel, or they are prohibited from preaching. A letter written from St. Louis to a friend in Aberdeen, Miss., says, "Our State prison is filled with preachers, and the noblest men of the land. A glorious record to go down to posterity!" Gen. Wood, under the direction of Major-General George H. Thomas, issued an order suspending the bishop and clergy of the diocese of Alabama, and closing all the Protestant Episcopal churches in the State; simply because the bishop, on the 20th of June, directed the clergy not to read the prayer for the President and others in civil authority, until the blessings of civil government should be restored to the State. All the Episcopal churches were taken possession of by the soldiers of General Thomas. To destroy or take possession of churches has been a common thing, wherever fanaticism reigned. These are specimens of the high-handed tyranny, of the intolerance, and religious persecution which have been quite common in this land of boasted liberty. We used to turn to Europe and to the dark ages for examples of political and religious intolerance and persecution; but we can now find abundant examples in our own age and country. It is the duty of the Church, in the name of the great Head of the Church, to protest most solemnly against all such usurpations. What right has a military officer to say whether men shall pray or not, or to say when or how they shall pray? What right has he to suspend ministers of the gospel, close churches, and deprive the people of their religious rights? Men cannot pray as others may choose to dictate. Prayer is the offering up of the desires of the heart to God for things agreeable to his will. If the utterances of the heart are not in the words, it is only profane mockery. To ask knowingly for things contrary to the will of God, is wicked presumption. We cannot pray for the prosperity of the wicked, or the success and triumph of tyrants. During the great revolution through which we have just passed, many have been greatly perplexed as to their duty in prayer. Our Saviour thus teaches us, "Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them that despitefully use you,

and persecute you." The context shows that our Saviour is inculcating that spirit of universal benevolence which must characterise every holy being. He assigns the reason, viz., "That ye may be the children of your Father which is in heaven: for he maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain upon the just and unjust." Some have supposed these teachings to be at variance with many passages in the prayers of the Psalmist. Such a conclusion is the result neither of profound reflection nor of deep piety. All Scripture is given by inspiration of God; and is all consistent, one portion with every other portion, when rightly understood. Those very passages which appear inconsistent, are the best interpreters of each other. But their proper interpretation requires that, by generalizing, we arrive at the great principles which serve to guide us in our exposition. For the prayers of the Psalmist against his enemies, see Ps. lviii., lix., lxi., lxxxiii. Others might be referred to, but these will suffice. In all the passages which may be selected from the psalms, there is nothing more terrible to the wicked than 1 Cor. xvi. 22, "If any man love not the Lord Jesus Christ, let him be Anathema-Maranatha." The first petition in that model prayer given us by the Lord Jesus is, "Thy kingdom come." This teaches us to pray for the success of all agencies, instrumentalities, and means employed in advancing the kingdom of Christ. It necessarily implies a desire and prayer for the defeat and overthrow of all impediments to the coming of his kingdom. The second petition is, "Thy will be done in earth, as it is in heaven." The same heavenly Father, "who maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and unjust," executeth justice and judgment among the nations. How terrible the judgments of God are, is shown both in revelation and providence. However severe they may be, they are displays of his justice; to which with profound reverence we must say, Amen, "thy will be done." While it is enjoined upon us in the exercise of universal benevolence, to love our enemies, there are certainly many limitations to the precept. We cannot and are not required to love devils. Nor are we required to love sinners

as such. We should love the souls of men, and desire their salvation. God so loved the world in its sinful and lost condition as to send his beloved Son to die, the just for the unjust. Christ first loved us and gave himself for us. So ought Christians to wish and pray for the salvation of sinners, and the well-being of all men; and to pray for all in authority, that they may be led to love mercy and do justice. At the same time, it is right and proper to pray that the wicked, and especially wicked rulers, may be arrested in their career, that tyrants and oppressors may be punished; and that truth, justice, and righteousness may triumph. It is moreover the duty of all Christians to be consistent, to make their actions and all their influence conform to their prayers. It is a mockery to pray that God would give us wise and good rulers, and then assist in putting bad men into office. The overthrow of all governments has been the result of putting bad men in power. History will show that the people of every nation are as free as they are fit to be. That fitness must consist in the moral elevation of the people. There must be such a standard controlling public opinion, that unprincipled demagogues will have no influence; that none but men of high moral character, men of known integrity, will control the affairs of government. There must be a great reformation, both in State and Church. The distinctive sphere of each must be defined. They must be kept entirely distinct. And yet, in discharge of their respective duties, there must be perfect harmony. In fulfilling their respective missions, they must aim at the same great end, the purity, the peace, the freedom, and happiness of the people.

THE MORAL LAW.

We have said that not *religion*, but *morality* is the basis of civil government. We have all along referred to the decalogue, contained in the Bible, as the only perfect summary of moral law. Law always implies a law-giver. Perfection in the law, implies perfection in the law-giver. This implies, at least, three things—perfection in knowledge, justice, and power; knowledge in framing the law, comprehending its full extent and impor-

tance; justice in assigning proper rewards and punishments; and power to execute it with the utmost certainty. A perfect moral law can only emanate from God. The decalogue is complete, as a moral law, in all essentials. It consists of two parts, logically connected. The first part brings before us the Law-giver, with the relations which we sustain to him as the Creator and one Law-giver; and demands our supreme homage. It guards us against substituting any thing for him, or forming any false ideas of him. It claims profound reverence for his name and attributes, and forbids all disrespect or want of reverence. It claims a portion of our time for the contemplation of our relation to him, and the study of our duties. All this forms not only an important but essential part of a moral system. We cannot admire the wisdom of those who would exclude the fourth commandment from the moral law. To acquire a knowledge of the law, is necessary to obedience, and therefore, to study the law is a part of the obedience due to it.

The second part of the law presents us with a summary of the duties which we owe to our fellow men; being founded upon the relations which we sustain to them. These two parts, the first consisting of four, and the second of six commandments,—the first founded upon our relation to the Law-giver, and the second part, on the relations which we sustain to one another,—make one complete whole. Every commandment in the decalogue is a logical and essential part of a perfect moral law.

We wish this to be distinctly understood. We wish to expose that great error so prevalent among men, in excluding the first part of the decalogue from the moral law, and placing it under the head of religion. No man should be regarded as a moral man who violates any one of the ten commandments. It is very common among men to speak of a man as a moral man who pays no regard to the first part of the moral law, and to regard him as a religious man, if he respects the Sabbath, and is free from profaneness. The observance of the moral law is *moral*ity, and not *religion*. Angels live in obedience to the law. They are perfect *moral* beings, but not *religious* beings. Man, before the fall, was a moral being, and had he kept the law, he would

have been justified and lived by the *law*, not by FAITH. The term religion, from "*religo*," to bind back, is strictly applicable only to the condition of fallen man, brought back to a state of allegiance to God through the mediatorial work of Christ. The law and morality go together; the gospel and religion. The law is for the State, and the gospel for the Church. The State cannot exist without the law; nor the Church without the gospel. The law prepares men for the gospel; the State should indirectly prepare them for the Church.

We have shown in what the law consists, and we have shown that it is the mission of the State to teach and enforce the law. Obedience to the law is to be considered in two respects: obedience in acts, outward and external; and inward or spiritual obedience, the homage of the heart. The former is all that the State can enforce. Its authority extends no farther. This secures the ends of government, protects the lives, the persons, and property of men, and secures the peace and good order of society. Love, says our Saviour, is the fulfilling of the law. But the affections are beyond human power. Over these the State can have no authority. It is the mission of the gospel to change the heart, and control the affections, to lead men to love God and obey the law because they love him and delight in his law. Here is the co-operation of the law and gospel, the one by restraint—by external force; the other by an inward influence, enforcing obedience to the law; both conducing to the same end. It is the mission of the State to teach and enforce it outwardly, and of the Church to teach and enforce it inwardly; the one formally, the other spiritually; the one operating through fear, the other through love. Man, under the one, is a slave; under the other, he is free. He is no longer "under the law, but under grace." Rom. vi. 14. We have defined freedom to be the harmony of a man's will with his actions, and that these must be in harmony with the law, and that all laws and government should be in harmony with the divine law and government.

We remark next:

That the condition of fitness must precede a state of freedom,

and must be continued in order to perpetuate freedom. Neither forms of government nor acts of legislation can make a people free who are not fit to be so. The bear or the tiger may be uncaged and unchained, but this will not alter the nature of either. The idea of legislating, governing, coercing, or forcing men into freedom, is one of the political quackeries of an insane fanaticism. In France, during the "reign of terror," they equalized men by the guillotine. It was left for the immortal sages of the radical party to discover the freedom of coercion, *involuntary freedom*, established by swords and bayonets, by oaths and dungeons.

The only fitness which can establish and perpetuate free government is *moral fitness*. Morality is its only basis. The decalogue is the only perfect and authoritative code of morals. It justly demands the homage of all men. It has a sphere entirely distinct from religion. It interferes with the creed of no religious denomination. At the same time, it is a rule of action for men of every creed, and excludes from the temple of God the devotees of licentiousness and superstition. It is a test of creeds, enabling us to know their truth or falsehood. By their fruits ye shall know them. The State cannot recognise any thing as religion which violates the moral law. The government had no right to punish the Mormon for his creed, but it had a right to punish his immoral acts.

How shall the liberty of the people of these United States be restored and perpetuated?

We answer, by a reformation both in State and Church. The State must fulfil its mission, teach and enforce the moral law, in all its parts. The Church must fulfil its mission. The one must secure formal, and the other spiritual, obedience to the law. Moral fitness must be required of every one in office. "When the righteous are in authority, the people rejoice: but when the wicked beareth rule, the people mourn." Prov. xxix. 2. The first step is to remove from power all immoral men. The next is to make the State an example, as well as a teacher, and supporter of morality. So long as the government, as such, is an open violator of the moral law, it is a demoraliser of the

people. All who, by their votes and influence, countenance and support an immoral government, are participators in its guilt. Whenever we urge obedience to the moral law, especially to the first part of it, we shall no doubt hear the old cry raised of "a union of Church and State." We have drawn the line of distinction between morality and religion, and between State and Church so clearly, and defined their separate spheres of action so plainly, that, we think, such a cry will only serve to expose the hypocrisy and wickedness of those who make it. Let the Church stand aloof from all party political associations, and combine all her efforts to bring all laws and government into harmony with the divine government. It is the duty of every Christian not only to pray, "Thy kingdom come," but to use all his influence to make all the kingdoms of this world subordinate to the kingdom of Christ. When we speak of the Church, it is in no sectarian sense. We include Christians of every denomination. Sectarianism has impressed the image of the world upon the Church. The State has had its party demagogues, and the Church its sectarian wranglers; the one as pernicious to the State, as the other is to the Church, and both governed by like motives. The stars are separate and distinct bodies, each occupying its own position, and moving in its own sphere; yet all pour forth their mellow light, and the mingling and blending of their rays constitute the beauty and glory of the night. The rays of color are all diverse, yet, when blended together, they form the light. The law and the gospel, State and Church, are all distinct; so are the different denominations of the Church; yet the great mission of all is the same, to establish "peace upon earth, and good will toward men;" to redeem man from sin, slavery, and suffering, and secure for him purity, freedom, and happiness. To this great end, let the law and the gospel, the State and the Church, send forth all their separate and distinct influences, yet all harmoniously uniting and blending in the accomplishment of the same great end, the establishment of the millenium upon earth—the reign of peace and righteousness. Away with ambitious, unprincipled demagogues, party politicians, word-jugglers, political quacks, and

sorcerers, who corrupt and deceive the people, while killing them to keep them alive, enslaving them to make them free, desolating them to enrich them, torturing them to make them happy, and instead of uniting them by love, bind them together with iron fetters.

Away with sectarian wranglers who worship the images of rites, forms, and ceremonies, saying "Lo! here is Christ"; while the cross, revealing the love of God and Christ, is eclipsed by the drapery of religion; and that charity or love without which all professions and all externals in the name of religion are nothing, is forgotten, and, in its stead, envy, jealousy, and strife engendered. Let the State, reformed, be guided only by the law from Sinai, and the Church know nothing save the gospel from Calvary.

CONCLUSION.

We have now shown the utter failure of man in all attempts to establish and perpetuate free or self-government.

We have exposed the great error of the world in confounding morality and religion, and making the latter the basis of government, leading to a union of Church and State, to the destruction of both civil and religious liberty.

We have exposed the opposite error of excluding morality with a view to separate Church and State, and its disastrous results to freedom.

We have observed that nations are just as free as the great majority are capable of being; that fitness for freedom must precede its establishment; that forms of government and acts of legislation cannot make a people free.

We have maintained that the only fitness for freedom is not intellectual, but moral.

We have maintained that human governments must be in harmony with the divine; that the moral law is the basis of all good government, and that the relation of the State to the Church is the same as that of the moral law to the gospel; that it is the mission of the State to teach and enforce the moral law; while it is the mission of the Church to teach and inculcate the

gospel; that while they are entirely distinct, their harmonious action conduces to the same great end; that we must look to their united influence for the establishment of freedom and happiness; that there must be a reformation in both State and Church; and that to this end all Christians, good men and patriots, should pray and exert all their influence.

ARTICLE IV.

LIFE AND TIMES OF BERTRAND DU GUESCLIN :

A HISTORY OF THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY.

By D. F. JAMISON, *of South Carolina. In two volumes. Charleston:* JOHN RUSSELL: MDCCLXIV.

This beautifully printed and classical book is truly a cenotaph, alike of the lamented author and of the shortlived but noble country, in whose service, and for whose sake, he died. So long and closely associated was General Jamison in the minds of all his friends with the toils and hopes which culminated here, that one cannot name the work without calling into vivid remembrance that thoughtful, earnest face, whose habitually melancholy expression was as habitually penetrated by kindness, friendship, and domestic affections; that slender frame, somewhat bowed by feeble health for many years, and of late stooping under the burden of public responsibilities—a burden which could scarcely be borne, but which could not be shunned; that voice, pleasant when heard, but so subdued and unsonorous as to perpetuate the impression made by the reticence and abstraction whose place it took.

For a man so recluse in his temper, and even in his habits, Gen. Jamison's public influence was singularly large and permanent: to be accounted for only by the fact that his careful mind, and his comprehensive study of history and politics, had made

him the "guide, philosopher, and friend" of men more aggressive, more externally energetic than himself. Through them—until the few signal closing scenes—through them, rather than by his own voice or personal action, did his patriotism and sagacity make themselves felt. Then, indeed, in those last tragic years, the justness of his mind, and the eminent virtue of his political life, were every where acknowledged and incessantly employed. Great duties, in rapid succession, were thrust upon him. These were as diligently discharged as they were nobly accepted. The surge of the deadly epidemic, finding him at his post, swept him thence immediately to the grave—his last thoughts turning to the loved ones whose faces he was not permitted to behold again in the flesh.

Upon a mind, originally of considerable force, he conferred the habits and tastes of the scholar. Literary research was perhaps more entirely his delight, and brought him a more unalloyed satisfaction, than to any other man among us. His conversation was enriched with apt quotations from good books, including the best of Books; and imbued with a serious—often a religious—spirit. Though not a member of the Church—restrained from open profession by excessive sensitiveness to the responsibility involved, and by the shrinking of a timid conscience from the possibility of unworthy entrance there—there is little reason to doubt his genuine piety. They who knew him most intimately remit him to the heavenly rest with the most confident hope.

Of the book before us, it must be said that it was the pleasure and the toil of his maturer years. Every effort was cheerfully made to secure needful information from the highest sources. The libraries of both continents were diligently examined, and the facts obtained as nearly as possible at first hand. And we learn, with pleasure, that its claims to confidence and respect are frankly acknowledged in Europe already; and that it is admired and praised in France as an authority upon the subject whereof it treats.*

* It is reported that the Emperor has ordered the work to be translated into his own tongue.

Besides the claims of its eminent author to our especial regard, the "Life and Times of Bertrand du Guesclin" has another impressive adventitious interest. It is the only solid literary production of the South during the memorable four years of the late war. Running the gauntlet of the blockade twice, it left these shores as the gloomy skies began to brighten, and returned to find the clouds of the last catastrophe already risen in the air. Truly an orphan child! it had gladdened but a moment the eyes of its author, when those eyes were closed on all things earthly: and the country of his love, to whose honor he offered it, a willing and precious tribute, outlived him but one little half year.

And it is a coincidence worthy of remark that the time of the book is one of the most memorable periods of civil war in Modern History. Features that recall our own annals meet us continually. Men of the same race, of the same language, even of the same name, were engaged on opposite sides. Men were held in cruel dilemmas, by reason of the penalties impending on either hand. Towns taken and retaken; country held and stripped by alternate armies—by the Black Prince or Bertrand—by Henry of Trastamara or Peter the Cruel—by Charles the Dauphin or Charles the Bad; sorrow, famine, and corroding fear; are the mournful outlines of the story here told.

We gratefully acknowledge the progress God has brought about for us, even as regards civil war, in one respect: the effusion of innocent and helpless blood. The atrocities of that age are almost incredible. The town of Quonquefon is "taken, pillaged, set on fire, and *the inhabitants put to the sword*," (p. 25, vol. i.) The history of the war of the succession to the Duchy of Brittany, "for the most part, is a painful record of towns and castles taken and retaken, of hamlets and villages pillaged, of churches burnt, of *men, women, and children slain without mercy*."

But passing over other and inferior enormities, and one that blackens the fair fame of Bertrand du Guesclin himself,* the

* The massacre of Benon. Vol. ii., p. 194.

crowning horror is the sack of Limoges, the crime of Edward the Black Prince :

‘As the besieged were taken completely by surprise, the Prince passed without resistance over the broken wall a portion of his troops, who immediately ran to the gate, cut the iron fastenings, and broke down all the barriers. Swollen with dropsy, but deaf to every sentiment of pity towards the inhabitants of the doomed city, Edward caused himself to be conveyed through the gates, accompanied by the Duke of Lancaster, the Earls of Cambridge and Pembroke, the Lord d’Angle, and the great body of his army, who were instructed to spare neither life nor property within the walls of Limoges. This brutal order was carried out to all its fearful consequences before the eyes of the prince, who looked, unmoved by pity or remorse, on the awful spectacle of men, women, and children butchered in cold blood by his stern followers; and when the wretched victims, in their agony, threw themselves at his feet, crying out to him, ‘Mercy, gentle Sire!’ he turned a deaf ear to their prayers, and suffered the horrid butchery to go on unchecked. ‘I do not know,’ says Froissart, ‘how they could not have had pity on the poor people, who were guilty of no treason; but they paid more dearly for it than the great masters who had committed the offence. There is no one so hardhearted,’ he continues, with a just indignation, ‘who, if he had been in the city of Limoges, and been mindful of God, would not have wept tenderly at the great mischief which was done there: for more than three thousand persons—men, women and children,—were seized and put to death that day.’” Vol. ii., pp. 132, 133.

No work like this is found among the deeds of the late war; though even this concession awakens an indignant thought of cities shelled at night, (as Petersburg,) or on the Sabbath, (as Chattanooga,) without warning. But for the rest of the evil record—pillaging, burning, deliberate destruction of food,—it may be said in a word that the fourteenth century was born again in the nineteenth.

Not to dwell longer on these sore points, however, let us look a little more closely at the book itself. It is not a history, in the current modern sense of that term; and the tests which are justly applied to those statelier fabrics of modern philosophical thought, would be out of place here. It partakes more of the type of the chronicle—the class in which Froissart, Ayala, and Nangis are found: a species of dioramic writing, where minute

details are not impertinent, but appropriate. The various parties introduced, converse, exclaim, eat, drink, in your presence, without derogation from the proper dignity of the presenter; yet it is at his discretion to arrest the personal exhibition, and enrich his pages with reflections as profound and large as those to which history itself attains.

Thus we have frequent dialogues of dramatic force and vividness; incident as minute and picturesque as the Flemish painters affect. And again we pause, in the turbulent theory of wars, raids, deaths, victories, to gather wisdom, to compare the ages, to add ancient to "modern instances," and to collect, along the paths of history, the lessons of retribution or of mercy. Thus we have an interesting comparison of the English with the French, (vol. i., p. 123); a mournful but just reflection upon the fate of "insurrections of the populace," (*ibid.*, p. 130); a striking, though not entirely satisfactory view of duelling, viewed in its social, rather than its moral relations, (*ibid.*, p. 140); an account of the Art of War, as then known and practised, (*ibid.*, p. 209); and a rich series of ably drawn "characters" of the personages who take part in the drama—of which it will suffice to mention those of the Black Prince and his father, Edward III.; (vol. ii., pp. 261, 263.)

We know not where to find an equally large collection of such judgments, as just in thought, as candid and judicial in expression, as those which adorn these pages. They are not portraits, like Motley's, for the sufficient reason that the plan adopted involves the actors' drawing their own portraits; their words, whether hasty or measured, the expression flitting across their features, their deeds, good and bad, have been already set down; and now, at last, they come up simply for sentence. This is all these characters intend; and this they accomplish.

It is time, however, to say a word of the hero of the book. He is, indeed, the hero of his century, its most consummate production, the flower of that tough and thorny aloe. The memorials of its vices are in some measure visible there; but its best graces are seen as resplendent in no other man of that age, as they are seen in Bertrand du Guesclin.

He was "the son of a poor knight," as he sometimes said; his *banned* son; despised, humiliated, sneered down, denied even a seat with his father's other children at the table. With what a flavor of poetical justice we contrast the boy taking his lonely dinner on a stool, (i. p. 4,) with the Constable of France, risen above the heads of all his fellow-subjects, seated by the king's side, at his own table! (ii., p. 139.) True, he was fortunate in his foils. To have matched and baffled Prince Edward and the Duke of Lancaster in war; to have stood firm in his truth and chivalry, while opposed to such a bloody and treacherous creature as Peter the Cruel; to have been planted as the mighty pillar of the shaken State, on which King Charles should lean as his sole dependence: these are glories to which the circumstances were almost as necessary as his worth and his power. But these very combinations would have ruined him, had he been any less a man, and born king of men, than he was. And there is a thread of happy retribution running through his story that lights it up amid a thousand environing glooms of faithlessness and blood. His open-handed generosity, which bids fair, as it seems, to ruin him, finds its reward in the rush from every quarter to pay his ransom, when taken prisoner. From the landlord of the poor way-side inn to the King of France, and even the Princess of Wales, the wife of his enemy, and his jailor, every noble heart exults in adding what it can to heap up the wealth that shall deliver the deliverer. His unswerving loyalty won at last the absolute confidence of Charles the Wise, the most suspicious of kings—excepting only Louis XI., who trusted no man, because he was true to none; and who was duped, accordingly, from the beginning to the end of his reign. Nor must we fail to add, that having been a marvel of humanity through this long life of combats and violence, when compared with the kindest warriors of his age, it was his lot, appropriately, to die calmly in his bed, surrounded by his friends, and consoled by the offices of his religion. Yet was he a conqueror, even in his death; for "the garrison of Chateau-neuf-de-Randon, who had sworn to deliver up their fortress to him alone, hearing of his death, issued out of the castle, with the captain at their head, entered the tent where

the body of the late Constable was lying, and deposited the keys of the castle on his coffin." (Vol. ii., p. 312.)

"Thus," remarks his historian, "passed away the spirit of an earnest, loyal, and brave man, who found work for him to do in this world, and who did it with his might."

The eminent "*religiosity*"—to borrow Carlyle's word—which characterises that age of crimes, that wide welter of blasphemy, treachery, lust, and murder, suggests a closing remark. Kings "hear mass" and armies pray before battle; solemn oaths are sworn to enforce all sorts of engagements; religion, and its sacredest words, are in every man's mouth: and yet it is a horrible, godless, brutal age. As we contemplate it, we are constrained to feel that a religion cannot be spiritual and sensuous too.

It is a maxim among physicians that the blood cannot do its best work in more than one class of organs at once. If you demand its services in the brain, you must spare it from the stomach; and *vice versa*. And this rule of physical life seems to hold also with respect to the mental. The æsthetic and the spiritual powers are not only not the same, but they are vitally diverse; and to give supremacy to the one, is to wrest it from the other. Thus, a religion that speaks clamorously to the eye and to the ear, is, for that very reason, silent to the heart. It kindles into transient ecstasy the shallower emotions; but to do so, is to drain from the life-centre to the surface. It operates upon perception at the expense of reflection.

It follows, therefore, that the moral and religious standard of such a church must be low; must ever run lower. The sensuous is the parent of the sensual.

We are aware that these truths are not new. Vital truths, at this late day, can hardly be so. But they are ever newly needful; in this, as in the fourteenth century. How fearfully strong is the set of the tide, even now, from the spiritual to the sensuous, from the informal to the ritual! How great the craving, and with how many, for sounds and sights, in worship, that will arrest the attention and charm the sense; while the heart, if it could make itself heard, would whisper, as in ancient time,

“The Lord is in his holy temple: let all the earth keep silence before him!”

There is greatly needed a thorough dissection of that false philosophy of the religious life, by which the practices, the thoughts, the language, of mankind are so seriously affected; and this, not necessarily in any sectarian interest, but because of the incessant tendencies every where from the plain, arduous right to the showy, easy wrong. Isaac Taylor's "Natural History of Enthusiasm" opened the discussion; but he neither went deep enough at the beginning, nor came near enough to the surface at the conclusion, to do the work he undertook—to describe, and by describing effectually to discountenance, "fictitious piety."

This, however, is a digression. We return for a moment to the work before us. It would have been a great delight to render thanks to the author of this excellent book for the pleasure and instruction it has afforded us: but far better is he, as he is! He is gone, we will not doubt, into that realm where the offices of human friendship are unnecessary, and where the voice of human praise of a human brother, would be indeed a strange and unwelcome interruption. But to the living we gladly commend it, for its refined thought, its transparent diction, its stores of pleasant lore and judicious reflection. Even its hero, wild as are his ethics, and stormy as was his life, is not unworthy to furnish at least a point of departure for the purposes of aspiring and gallant youth to-day. Let such a man resolve within his heart, "I will be no less truthful, earnest, brave, than was he who thus glimmers out upon me from the darkness of five hundred years ago." But let him add a nobler covenant to this: "By the grace of God, the gospel light, which now irradiates the world, shall not be lost upon me. I will learn the power of gentleness and spiritual wisdom. I will seek a better work than steadying a tottering and wicked throne, or hurling a bloody tyrant, whose breath is in his nostrils, from his seat. Be it mine to serve the Immortal King; to breathe his spirit, and to advance his cause. Let me strive to put down wickedness within me and without; to bind up men's wounds, to comfort the sorrowing and broken-

hearted; to make ignorance, superstition, and vice spread their dusky wings, and vanish with the vanishing twilight of man's day. So shall my sleep be sweet, and my life fruitful; so shall my blessings be as royal as my Master is divine."



ARTICLE V.

NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN VIEWS OF THE
PROVINCE OF THE CHURCH.

The last time we had occasion to express ourselves in these pages on the subject of instructions from the courts of the Church to her members relative to their duty to the government, was when we took occasion to retract, in some sense, a previous utterance. In July, 1861, immediately after the breaking out of the war, we had maintained that the General Assembly, which met that spring in Philadelphia, was not only at liberty to speak of the war, but was bound to declare itself respecting such a great wrong, pregnant with so many and such sins and curses. The error of that body, we said, was not its speaking, but its speaking in the wrong way; for it condemned whom we judged it should have justified, and it justified whom we judged it should have condemned. But we insisted that it must justify and must condemn, when such appalling sin was in process of commission. Further reflection, however, carried on as best we might in the midst of all the excitements of that period, led us in the ensuing October number to modify this language, and we then confessed (using Calvin's expression regarding the doctrine of election,) how "involved and intricate" we found the question of the Church courts' power and duty in the premises.

There seems, indeed, some inherent perplexity in this subject,

arising out of the fact that behind the moral question of duty, there often lies a political one which yet may seem to the fallible court to be no question at all. The duty of obedience to government is a clear one, and every Church court is bound to enforce it, just as it must enforce the duty of children or servants towards parents or masters. But there the proper parties to whom obedience is due are always and easily known, whilst it is not always clear who is the Cæsar that has a claim on our loyalty. But it may appear clear to the members of the fallible court; and in such a case it would seem to follow that the court has a right, nay, is under obligation, to testify to the duty that flows out of this lawful authority which it thus clearly recognises. For how can the Church forbear to warn and to exhort her children to do their whole duty, as well of the second as of the first table of the law? She may not handle anything political, but here the political requires no handling. It is obvious and plain. That is all settled before she begins to consider the case. And the matter which she takes up and handles is a clear case of duty to magistrates which is not political, but ecclesiastical and moral. If, for example, the General Assembly at Philadelphia, in May, 1861, perceived nothing doubtful in the claims of the United States government upon the seceded States; if those States and their people were in its view all in rebellion against just authority justly exercised, then such rebellion being sinful, that Assembly could not but regard it a just subject of ecclesiastical censure. The case was as clear in this sense to the whole Assembly, except Dr. Hodge and those who protested with him, as any case they had ever decided. Nor did they undertake to handle any political question at all. They verily believed that they were deciding only what was ecclesiastical in the highest and truest sense. It was, in their apprehension, just as when a church member is adjudged to be guilty of adultery or theft. In such a case, the court that so judges him acts upon a previous judgment, which may, however, be incorrect, as to the lawfulness of the claim of those against whom it concludes him to be an offender. That previous judgment is upon the secular question whether those persons were indeed the one of them his wife,

or the other the owner of something stolen by him. Synods may not handle secular matters; yet, when they lie thus at the bottom of things ecclesiastical, it is very difficult, and might almost seem impossible to avoid acting upon previous conclusions respecting them.

If, on the other hand, in secession decreed already with one voice by the people of South Carolina, and lacking only the formal vote of the Convention, the Synod of South Carolina, (met at Charleston in November, 1860,) discovered a movement in defence of the sacred rights of constitutional freedom, which duty to God, to the nations, and to posterity, required should be defended from the dreadful hazards to which they seemed to be exposed—if all this appeared to the Synod to be only a moral and religious question, a question of duty on the part of the members of their churches to the State which sheltered and protected them, as well as claimed their first allegiance, then it became to them an ecclesiastical matter of the greatest moment, clearly within their province for decision and for action.

Now we say, these courts, being fallible, are always liable to err in supposing that to be only a religious and moral question which is yet a doubtful political one, outside of their proper sphere of action as courts of Jesus Christ. And this is all the more likely to take place in times of profound excitement of the public mind, when the passions of all are roused to an uncontrollable height.

It is the universal conviction, we believe, of Southern Presbyterians that the General Assembly met at Philadelphia in 1861, did thus err; for its action in the "Spring" resolutions took for granted as correct a certain political theory of the Constitution of the United States, which yet had been denied and rejected by thousands of American citizens all over the country, from the very formation of the Constitution. This doubtful theory taken for granted, a declaration of political sentiments was made, and made for the whole Church represented by the Assembly, and thus, practically, a new term of church membership and communion was enacted and set up, so far as the Assembly could do such a thing. But the record of that As-

sembly's political deliverances did not end, but only began here. In 1862, Dr. Breckinridge's paper, which was adopted by an overwhelming majority, undertook to instruct the government respecting the policy it ought to pursue towards the South; decided the question of the structure of the government as "national"; and made the Church a subject of the State by its language concerning the "loyalty of the Church" and the "loyal Presbyteries and Synods," as if the Church of Christ owed loyalty to any but to her sole Head. Again, in 1863, the Assembly, by another overwhelming majority, proclaimed to the world its union with the government, declaring, on behalf of the Church, that the United States, one and undivided, was its country; their rulers, its rulers; their government, its government; and their flag, its flag. Moreover, in accordance with this declaration about the flag, they allowed and encouraged the trustees of the church where they were meeting to raise the United States flag over the building. Again, in 1864, the Assembly, with almost entire unanimity, decided what was the object of the war on the part of the South, viz., to found an empire on the corner-stone of slavery; and also gave judgment that emancipation was necessary for the preservation of our own liberty and independence. And finally, in 1865, the Assembly set up new terms of Church fellowship and ministerial communion, applicable, however, not alike to both North and South, but only to the latter. The body placed its own opinions of the war and of slavery on a level with the rules of Christ concerning admission into his fold. Having, in 1863, declared itself the creature of the government, and so dethroned the Lord Jesus, now, in 1865, it seems disposed to make disloyalty to its new head, viz. Cæsar, the synonym of all sin.

Thus we find this Church court, through a series of years, persevering in the utterance of political decrees, and reiterating and intensifying, as the war rolled on, its testimonies of loyalty, not to Christ, but to a head upon the earth. The thing is not done once, in the heat of passion, or through inadvertency, but it is done over and over, deliberately, and of set purpose.

When we turn to the Synod of South Carolina, and undertake, after an interval of over five years, to examine the deliverance it gave in 1860, which has been so much criticised,* we think it must strike every candid person that it was the *intention* of the Synod not to handle any thing but what was ecclesiastical. An express disclaimer is made of any right to take up political questions. And what was said by the Synod relative to secession, was spoken expressly in regard to the religious aspect of it, as that step was demanded, in the Synod's judgment, by duty to God, to our slaves, and to posterity. If the Synod erred, it was in conceiving of secession in that aspect; there certainly does not appear in the deliverance any manifestation of the intention or the claim to handle what is secular or political. Nor do the subsequent Minutes of the Synod, in the following years of the war, record any reference at all to political questions, or exhibit any handling of secular affairs.

And how has it been with the General Assembly set up in the States which seceded? At their first meeting in Augusta, they set forth articulately their views of the necessity of a "rigorous exclusion of the questions and passions of the forum from the halls of debate," and they traced to the neglect of this clear and plain duty by the Assembly at the North, the necessity which had arisen for the ecclesiastical separation. And every direct act of that Assembly, since that time, has been in accordance with the principle thus enunciated. It is true that twice in the narratives, there are expressions which some might signalize as inconsistent with the principle of rigorous exclusion above referred to. One of these cases was in 1862, at Montgomery, where the narrative speaks of the fact that our congregations were in "cordial sympathy with the people of the Confederate States" in their great struggle, and that the churches generally in our connexion "were deeply convinced that this struggle

* NOTE. It is due to historical truth to state here, in contradiction of many statements made on the subject at the North, that Dr. Thornwell was not present at this meeting of Synod, and of course has no responsibility whatever for its action now under consideration.

was not alone for civil rights and property and home, but also for our religion, for the Church, for the gospel, and for existence itself," and then proceeds to say, "The Assembly desires to record, with its solemn approval, this fact of the unanimity of our people in supporting a contest to which religion as well as patriotism now summons the citizens of this country, and to implore for them the blessing of God in the course which they are now pursuing." Here was a solemn testimony encouraging Church members to persevere in what the Assembly believed to be the course of duty. These Church members were supporting the government under which they lived, and the government of their choice and affections, during a most fearful assault upon it from without, and to the Assembly at Montgomery it seemed to be proper to stimulate the zeal and hopes of their people in the arduous duty due from these people to their Cæsar. There is surely nothing political or secular here—no committing of the Church represented by the Assembly to the policy of any administration; no instructions or advice to government respecting the course it should pursue; no decision of the true nature of the government, or of any other constitutional or political questions; no declarations about the Church's loyalty to Cæsar; no adoption of any flag for the Church; and no setting up of any new terms of Church or ministerial fellowship, based upon conformity to any merely human notions about politics or other secular affairs. Upon the plain question of duty to the powers that be, this Assembly uttered itself, as it supposed was proper, in giving instructions to its flock.

The other case was in 1864, when the Assembly at Charlotte, speaking in their narrative of *the spiritual welfare* of our slaves, and the duties we owed to them, expressed its "conviction of the divine appointment of domestic servitude." Is their anything strange or unheard of in that sentiment? Is that a new idea amongst those who receive the Christian Scriptures? "We hesitate not to affirm," proceeded the Assembly, "that it is the peculiar mission of the Southern Church to conserve the institution of slavery, and to make it a blessing both to master and to slave. We could not, if we would, yield up these four millions

of immortal beings to the dictates of fanaticism, and to the menaces of military power. We distinctly recognise the inscrutable providence which brought this benighted people into our midst, and we shall feel that we have not discharged our solemn trust until we have used every effort to bring them under the saving influences of the gospel of Christ." Was there anything very bad in all this? And this is every word which the Assembly said. Slavery, as opening to us a missionary field of four millions of souls, to whom we were bound to preach the gospel, was an institution having moral and religious aspects of the most conspicuous and manifest importance. In reference to this sense of the term *alone* was the Assembly asserting anything respecting it. Fanaticism was dictating that the tie which bound us to this people and them to us—which tie constituted the peculiar obligation that rested on us, and also gave us the peculiar opportunity we enjoyed of discharging the obligation—fanaticism was dictating to us that that tie should be dissolved, and military power was threatening to enforce the dictate. The Assembly, considering that tie the institute of a beneficent, although mysterious Providence, which had brought already, and was still bringing great good out of this relation; and considering it simply and purely an utterance of infidelity thus to denounce as essentially and necessarily evil what God's word clearly sanctioned; which infidelity, however disguised, the Church of Christ was bound to oppose;—the Assembly, so considering, testified at Charlotte in her narrative, that we had no right voluntarily to cast off the obligations God had imposed on us in this relation, and yield up to every kind of injury and suffering these people committed to our care. In this aspect of their language, which is manifestly its true and proper aspect, it was no political, but a religious utterance. And in this aspect of the institution, slavery was to the Church, indeed, a sacred and solemn trust, as the Assembly represented it. God, in his providence, did commit this trust to the Southern Church, to take care of it, to "conserve" it, that is, as the dictionaries define that word, *to keep it sound and safe*, nay, to improve it, and make it more and more a blessing to both master

and slave, and never to give over our efforts to bring all these immortal beings under the saving influences of the gospel of Christ.

Besides these two utterances, made thus incidentally in two of its narratives, there is absolutely nothing in the whole proceedings of our Assembly, during all its five sessions, which at all resembles a "handling of what is not ecclesiastical."

As to the proceedings of other Church courts at the South, we have very little positive knowledge, except that a member of the Synod of Georgia, quite competent to speak, informs us that his Synod have carefully abstained, all through the war, from touching anything political or secular. We will take it upon us, however, to say that it is not probable any of these Synods or Presbyteries have erred in this manner, for it is fair to judge those from whom we have not heard directly on this subject, by the Presbyteries and Synods of South Carolina and of Georgia, about which we are well informed. And without any such specimens to judge by, we might reasonably suppose they would all alike take especial pains to avoid the very error which led them to break away from the Northern Assembly, and set up a Church of their own.

Such is the true history, so far as we are able to give it, of the conduct of Southern Synods and Assemblies touching non-ecclesiastical affairs. Dr. Hodge, in the October number of his Review, makes very strong charges against us relative to this matter. Speaking of ecclesiastical bodies which had freely expressed themselves, "Even the special advocates of the spirituality of the Church," he says, "who professed to have washed their hands of all secular concerns, have been the most pronounced in their opinions, and the most vehement and pertinacious in advocating them." (P. 627.) "Synods pledged themselves to the support of the new Confederacy, and in short the whole Church South was possessed and animated by what its members regarded the spirit of patriotism and loyalty, to the almost entire exclusion, as it appeared to their Northern brethren, of the spirit of the gospel." (Pp. 646, 647.) And in the July number, "Southern Presbyterian Synods and General

Assemblies, to the great sorrow and chagrin of their Northern brethren, have been among the foremost in the assertion of extreme Southern doctrines, and in the manifestation of sectional jealousy. * * * * Such is our poor human nature." (P. 506.) Now, we do not lay claim to any exemption for our Southern Church from the frailties of our poor human nature, but we have to acknowledge sins and imperfections enough that really do belong to us, without having fastened upon us what are not truly ours. And seeing that, so far as we know or believe, the Southern Church courts have been free from this particular fault, whilst Northern Synods, by Dr. Hodge's own showing, (October number, p. 644,) and the Northern Assembly, according to his own protest, have flagrantly erred in this particular, it does seem rather too bad that we should be held up by Dr. Hodge as shocking our immaculate Northern brethren with our excesses in this regard. This brings to our recollection how the Doctor, in his eulogy upon President Lincoln, solemnly declared that "Since the death of Christ, no such dogma stains the record of any ecclesiastical body" as the statement we quoted above, from our Assembly's narrative at Charlotte! Alas, for "our poor human nature," when a great and good and wise man, and minister, could allow himself, carried away by the fervor of his political zeal, to say of such a statement as that, "It is enough to humble the whole Christian world to hear our Presbyterian brethren of the South declaring that the great mission of the Southern Church was to conserve the system of African slavery"! (July number, p. 439.) Surely it is not worthy of Dr. Hodge to visit upon his Southern Presbyterian brethren this injustice of isolating a particular expression, and forcing upon it a meaning contrary to that of the whole passage which they wrote. And surely it is equally unworthy of him to commit so great an injustice upon truth, as to hold up to the scorn of the Christian world a paragraph expressing sentiments so sound, so true, so Christian, as this whole passage sets forth.

It is very strong language which Dr. Hodge employs. What our Assembly at Charlotte said, is not only not sound, nor true, nor Christian, but it is a stain upon our records, and a stain

unparalleled by anything in the records of any ecclesiastical body since the death of Christ! Dr. Hodge is somewhat given to this kind of *dicta*. He loves to speak for the whole Church in all ages, and by broad and sweeping assertions of this sort to crowd down opposition to his views; although it is not often that he has allowed himself to be quite so extravagant. There was a council that decreed the refusal of the cup to the laity. And there was another that established seven sacraments, auricular confession, and the apocrypha. There were councils which enacted image-worship, and denounced penalties on all who should maintain that adoration is due only to God. And there were councils which decreed the extirpation of heretics with fire and sword, and carried their decree into execution in numerous cases. All these, and others like these, were dreadful stains upon the records of the Church. But not one of these was equal to the stain which disgraces the Assembly at Charlotte, in its conservative declarations respecting the relation of master and slave: that solemn trust which was not to be voluntarily surrendered, but on the contrary was to be maintained, and also kept from degenerating into a curse, nay, to be improved and made a blessing, while in the use and employment of all the advantages it afforded, untiring efforts were to be made on behalf of those immortal beings, to bring them all under the saving influence of the gospel! Surely Dr. Hodge, the judicious, the moderate, the sober, was under some strange hallucination, under some mighty spell, when he could express himself with such inconsiderate heat!

But how stands the matter of the Christian Church's relation in all past ages to the particular subject of slavery? Is this the first and only time that the Church of Christ was ever known to assume the conservative attitude regarding slavery? Does Dr. Hodge intend to be understood, in this very strong expression, as saying that the Church of Christ has in all ages set herself in unqualified opposition to that institution? We could not have supposed it possible for Dr. Hodge to forget so completely what of course he knows so well, that the very contrary is the truth. One high authority tells us, "Slavery subsisted a

long time in the bosom of Christian society, without any great horror or irritation being expressed against it.* Biot, in his prize essay, says "No Christian writers of the first three centuries speak of the abolition of slavery as a consequence of Christianity."† Babington, in his Hulsean prize essay, says, "It is evident that the early Christians did not consider servitude as in the abstract improper. This, indeed, scarcely requires proof, inasmuch as it has just been remarked that even martyrs possessed slaves. * * * * * Nay, more, the infant Church gave little encouragement to manumission. (1.) The apostolic constitutions distinctly assume that a Christian will retain his slaves in his service. (2.) Ignatius tells bondmen and bondwomen not to wish to be made free at the expense (of the Church) lest they be found the servants of lust."‡ The same writer says, "It must occasion no surprise to discover that all civil and ecclesiastical authority from the time of Constantine downwards, sanction slavery."|| He says of the first two centuries of the Christian era, that "the propriety of slavery was not called in question, nor were manumissions even encouraged."§ He quotes Theodoret as "maintaining that slavery has been on the whole beneficial to man in his fallen state," and naming in connexion with Theodoret, Augustine, Chrysostom, Gregory Nazianzen, Jerome, Basil, Ephrem the Syrian, Leo the Great, and others, he says, "Not one of the writers above mentioned even hints that slavery is unlawful or improper."** Isidore of Pelusium, not giving his own counsel, but paraphrasing the apostle Paul, advises slaves if they might be made free, nevertheless to prefer slavery.†† In like manner Chrysostom says,

* Guizot, *Civilis. en Europe*, Lect. vi., p. 14, ed. 1828.

† *De l'Abolition de l'Esclavage ancien en occident. Examen des Causes Principales, &c.* Paris, 1840: p. 26.

‡ Babington's *Influence of Christianity in promoting the Abolition of Slavery in Europe*. Cambridge, 1846: pp. 22, 23.

|| *Ibid.* p. 25.

§ *Ibid.* p. 179.

** *Ibid.* pp. 26—29.

†† *Lib. iv. : Epist. 12.*

“On this account the blessed Paul, when giving them (slaves) the best counsel said, ‘Art thou called being a servant? Care not for it; but if thou mayest be made free, use it rather,’—that is, abide in slavery.”* And Jerome, Theodoret, and others of the fathers, took the same view of the apostle’s meaning. Indeed, as Babington remarks, this sense, it must be confessed, suits the context admirably, not to add that the original particle commonly signifies not “if” but “although.”†

But what we have referred to so far, are, for the most part, but the sentiments of individuals in the early Church, while Dr. Hodge’s strong assertion relates to “ecclesiastical bodies.” Let us point, then, to the Council of Gangra, in the fourth century, which deposed Eustathius for “teaching slaves, under pretext of religion, to withdraw from their masters’ service,” and pronounced “anathema upon all such.” The Magdeburg Censurators say of this case, “To alienate slaves from their masters was judged to be a sin, and worthy indeed of excommunication; witness the case of Eustathius, who was deposed by the Council of Gangra, because he took away slaves from their masters.” They quote Socrates thus: “Under the pretext of piety, he also seduced slaves from their masters.”

Let us refer to the Council of Agatho, in the sixth century, which decreed that “The slaves of monasteries might never be emancipated, since it was unjust that the monks being obligated to daily toil, their slaves should enjoy ease and freedom.”

Let us refer to the Council of Jena, in the same century, which decreed the same law in the same words.

Let us refer to the Council of Seville, in the seventh century, which said “The freedmen of the Church, becoming proud, are ordered to be remanded to slavery.”

And let us refer to Canon 70, of the Excerpts of Egbert, Archbishop of York, “To an abbot or monk, it is not lawful to set free a slave of the monastery. For it is impious that one

* Chrysostom’s *Introduct. to Homily on Philemon.*

† Babington, p. 15, note.

who has not conferred wealth upon the Church should bring her loss."

The originals of these quotations may be found in the note.* These are a few specimens of the ancient Church's action respecting slavery. They have cost but little research, and, we are sure, could easily be multiplied. We submit that Dr. Hodge's allegation does not bear examination. He spoke too fast, and his words were over strong. He was unjust to his brethren in distorting their language, and then exaggerating the crime he had constructively fastened upon them. But he is not sustained in his loose declamatory condemnation of us by the records to which he has himself appealed. The Christian Church did indeed contribute powerfully to the abolition of slavery; but it was indirectly, and still more, it was slowly and gradually. Her position always was *conservative* on that question, as was our Assembly's at Charlotte, for which Dr. Hodge now joins with radicals in their hue and cry against us. Babington says it took *one thousand years* of the constant influence of Christianity upon society to cause strict personal slavery to *begin* to

* "Si quis docet servum pietatis prætextu dominum contemnere et a ministerio recedere, et non cum benevolentia et omni honore domino suo inservire, sit anathema." Concil. Gangr. Can. 61. Binius, Tom. i., fol. 158.

"Servos ab heris suis abalienare, peccatum judicabatur et quidem excommunicatione dignum. Testatur id exemplum Eustathii, qui a synodo Gangrensi ideo quod dominis servos abstulisset, depositus est." Hist. Eccles. Magdeb. Cent. iv. Cap. vi. 260 F.

"Mancipia vero monachis donata, ab abbate non liceat manumitti. Injustum enim putamus ut monachis quotidianum rurale opus facientibus, servi eorum libertatis otio potiantur." Concil. Agath. Can. 56. Binius, Tom. iii. 716 E. See also Concil. Epaon. Can. 8. Binius, Tom. iii. 726 B.

"Liberti ecclesie superbientes ad servitium revocari jubentur." Spalensis Concilii ii. Actione 8. Hist. Eccles. Magdev. Cent. vii.

"Abbati vel monacho, monasterii servum non licet facere liberum. Impium est, ut qui res Ecclesie non contulerit, damnus inferat." Excerpt. Ecqb. Archiep. Ebor. Can. 70. (A. D. 750.) Spelm. Concil. Tom. i., p. 265.

disappear in most parts of Europe.* One may discover the proofs of the Church's moderation upon this subject scattered every where along the track of her records. And when we ascend to the very beginning of her history, we find the inspired apostle, in 1 Tim. vi., writing about slaves and slavery in the same conservative strain, and indeed commanding Timothy to withdraw from communion with all who would not consent to "wholesome words," that is, his *conservative* teachings upon this subject. We submit now to Dr. Hodge, whether the Church of God, the Bride, the Lamb's wife, as represented by the Assembly at Charlotte, being chargeable with no other fault than expressing herself after Paul's conservative fashion on this subject, he was warranted in accusing her, before God and man, as having uttered a dogma, the like of which stains the records of no ecclesiastical body since the death of Christ.

As to the statement of Dr. Hodge, made upon "credible information," that the "pulpits of the South rang perpetually with political harangues, *i. e.* harangues designed to fire the Southern heart in the great struggle," (October number, p. 646,) we are free to say that we are satisfied Dr. Hodge has been misinformed. There may have been some political preaching by some few of our brethren during the war, but we believe there was far less of it in the case of any one of them than Dr. Hodge's information would signify. For be it remembered that all sides agree that the duty of loyalty to acknowledged government may be enforced by the pulpit as also by the Church courts. And so, if our brethren were led to hold up before their flocks the duty of obeying and supporting the *de facto* government under which they lived, and which they acknowledged to be also their government *de jure*; if they preached patience under privations, and hope in God amidst discouragements, and patriotic zeal in defending homes and firesides against the invader; if they expounded God's word as it sanctions slavery, and taught their people to commit the cause they were maintaining against a radical infidelity in humble prayer to his wise, and

* Hulsean Prize Essay, p. 180.

sovereign, and merciful arbitrament; we do not see that any part or all of this can be condemned as a preaching of politics. Speaking, however, of the Southern Presbyterian pulpit in general, we feel very confident that it did not ring with any other sound than the preaching of the Cross. To what extent could this be asserted with truth of the Presbyterian pulpit at the North? Has not the good Doctor been too ready to judge the Southern pulpit, of which, personally, he could know nothing, by what he knows to be true of the Northern? We make no assertions, but we very strongly suspect that just by so much as his account of the Southern pulpit is a very gross exaggeration of what perhaps existed to some degree amongst us, by so much does it fall short of describing the fiery and bloodthirsty spirit of a large part of the Presbyterian ministry at the North. How many of them could plead that the nearest approach which they ever made to political preaching was to urge their people to defend their country from invasion, and support their government in a purely defensive war?

There was one error, however, into which we acknowledge that some Southern ministers sometimes fell, not so much in our own, as in some other churches. It can not be doubted that Southern ministers, as well as other Christians, for the most part, believed honestly and earnestly in the justice of the Southern cause. The error of some was in allowing themselves to receive the popular idea, and to encourage that idea amongst all Christian people, that God must surely bless the right. They forgot how frequently it seems good to his infinite wisdom and sovereign pleasure to suffer the righteous to be overthrown. This lesson, taught by all history, both sacred and profane, they could not receive in its application to a cause which seemed to them so pre-eminently just. Here, in their view, was a cruel, unjust, and wicked war of invasion upon free States, and they sister States also, urged on, in great part, by an infidel fanaticism. They took it for granted that the Almighty would never allow such a cause to triumph. They prayed fervently for the success of the Confederacy, and they never doubted that their prayers would be heard. They stimulated the hopes and the

zeal of their flocks in the service of their government, and in preaching, as they were authorised to preach, this plain duty, they left no room for any to question but that, faithfully performed, God must and would crown all with success. It was an error. God had revealed no promise on which faith could rest. The patriotic duty to be done, was to be done under the distinct acknowledgment that the result was with God alone, who called to that duty, but had not revealed his own plans or purposes. The consequences of this error have, we apprehend, in many instances been hurtful. Many, both in the army and at home, both male and female, both professors and non-professors of religion, have been tempted to doubts about the whole doctrine of divine providence. They know there was earnest prayer, and united prayer, and importunate prayer, and that there was also confident trust and expectation. Yet all has been disappointment inexpressibly deep and dark. The sad heart turning away from man, is tempted sorely to turn away from God also, as one who hath mocked. These are distressing consequences of a serious error, which may God mercifully forgive and overrule to his glory.

Returning to the main topic of this article, we think it appropriate just here to remark, as evincing the perplexity which appears to be inherent in the question, that Dr. Hodge now seems to make it the only fault of the Assembly of 1861, in the Spring resolutions against which he protested, that the body did not act as became the representatives of a divided constituency. He quotes (*Review for October*, p. 636,) what he had said on the Assembly's floor, viz., that he would cheerfully vote for that paper if offered in the Synod of New Jersey; and declares (p. 644) that most of the signers of his protest had voted, in their respective Synods and Presbyteries, for still more stringent resolutions, because the people there had no political question to decide, and all which the Synods and Presbyteries required the people under their charge to do, was what the word of God commanded them to do, viz., to be loyal and obedient to the government. He adds that when, in 1862, the Assembly represented the loyal or non-seceding States, it was perfectly competent for that body to

adopt the paper presented by the Rev. Dr. R. J. Breckinridge, and it was perfectly consistent in him to present that paper, although he had severely denounced the action of the preceding Assembly. "All this," says Dr. Hodge, "seems to us so perfectly plain, that it is a matter of surprise that it ever should be called into question."

Now we are well aware the distinction is just, which is drawn here betwixt the Synod and the Assembly. What in the former is only the inculcation of the duty of loyalty to the acknowledged Cæsar, may yet be in the latter the setting up of new conditions of Church fellowship where the members of the body are divided betwixt two Cæsars, whilst the Assembly undertakes to speak in the name of all who belong to it, and to put into their mouths the language of loyalty to one Cæsar. But what does not "seem to us so perfectly plain" is how Dr. H. could be willing for the Synod of New Jersey to use the language of the Spring resolutions, and declare its obligations as a Synod to perpetuate the integrity of the United States, and to uphold the Federal government in the exercise of its functions; or to profess as a Synod, its unabated loyalty to the Constitution. Nor does it seem to us perfectly plain how he can consider it altogether proper for the Assembly of 1862, although entirely homogeneous, to give instructions to government about crushing the rebellion, or to decide the question of the government's being "national," or to put the Church under the State by talking of her "loyalty."

Another illustration of the perplexity which seems to belong inherently to this question is, that we find a profound and learned writer like Dr. Hodge, after all that he has spoken and written on this subject, now maintaining (Review for October, p. 647,) that he may "heart and soul" embrace the "national cause," and advocate "national principles," not only in the pulpit and in the religious journals, but also in the Church courts; also that it is a "new theory of the Church," and a "false principle," which would deny his right to do this; and still further, that this new theory of the Church is the twin sister of secession; is as dead as secession is, and that both may be

allowed to pass into oblivion together. Dr. Hodge's zeal against what he calls the "new theory" is very lively, and leads him to make some curious statements regarding it. For example, on page 645, he says, "In opposition to the principles above stated, Dr. Thornwell, in the Assembly of 1859, presented a new theory"; and on the next page, that this new doctrine as to the office of the Church was originated to keep slavery out of the Assembly, and was so fiercely advocated after the war began, to keep the Church from throwing herself on the side of the government and the Union. Moreover, as above intimated, he ascribes this new theory to Southern men, and says it would be very difficult to find a single advocate of it who is not a pro-slavery man, and an ardent sympathiser with the South. But if the reader will turn to the *Princeton Review* for 1848, pp. 424-6, he will find recorded there a full and articulate statement of this "new theory" as adopted by the General Assembly of that day, and as the *Review* also tells us, "on motion of Dr. Krebs, unanimously." Nay, the reader need only turn to his Confession of Faith, chap. xxxi., sec. 4, and he will find the new theory, so called, there written down by our fathers briefly, but with full and complete distinctness and force.

This "new theory" of Dr. Thornwell's, as the *Princeton Review* itself records his remarks spoken in the General Assembly at Indianapolis in 1859, was "one upon which he had long acted and deemed of immense importance. It was that the Church of God is exclusively a spiritual organisation. Her mission was to promote the glory of God, and the salvation of men. She had nothing to do with the voluntary associations of men for various civil and social purposes that were outside of her pale. Ever since he had been a member of the Church he had believed this, and contended for this, and had steadily resisted associating this Church with outside organisations. The Lord Jesus Christ had never given his Church a commission to be identified with them. She had no mission to become entangled with the kingdoms and the policy of this world. The question of colonization is a question of worldly policy. It is a question upon the merits of which he wished not to speak, but no man

will say that Jesus Christ has given to his ministry a commission to attend to the colonization of races, or to the arrest of the slave trade, or to the mere physical comforts of man. It is not the business of the *Church* to build asylums for the insane and blind. Her mission is to bring men to the cross—to reconcile them to God through the blood of the Lamb—to imbue them with the spirit of the Divine Master, and then send them forth to perform their social duties—to manage society and perform the functions that pertain to their social and civil relations. The Church has no right, no authority to league herself with any of the institutions of the State, or such as have for their object mere 'secular enterprises. 'Render to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's,' but let the Church of God lend her energies directly to the accomplishment of her own high and glorious mission. He was willing that Church members should try to do good through any agencies that their consciences may approve, but he wished the Church, as such, to keep herself to her specific work. As the Church of Christ, he desired her to know neither rich nor poor, high nor low, bond nor free, to know neither east nor west, north nor south. 'Let the dead bury their dead,' was the mandate of our Lord to his Church, and the very moment you undertake to implicate this Church with any of the powers of the earth, you endanger her efficiency. At this very General Assembly, we have declined identifying ourselves even with the American Presbyterian Historical Society. We had voted it out. We had voted out the Temperance societies, and he would have the Assembly vote out all the societies of this world, and keep to her proper sphere, and let the societies keep to theirs, and do good in their own way, without asking the Church's co-operation. It is this principle that he deemed absolutely indispensable to the Church's purity and success in her peculiar mission." Dr. Thornwell proceeded to describe the glorious spectacle which our Church was at that hour presenting to the country and to the world. She was "standing pre-eminent, the great conservative power of this land, the great bond of union, and witness for the truth, because the only voice she uttered was the word of God. Sir, the salt that is to save

this country is the Church of Christ—a Church that does not mix up with any political party, or any issues aside from her direct mission. Like the ocean, she purifies even by her agitation, whilst acting within her bounds and banks. But like the ocean, too, if she break beyond them, nothing can be more destructive or desolating. Let the Church work on at the very foundations of moral and spiritual influences, which are the foundations of society. Let her do her appropriate and appointed work, and she will sanctify the world. But let her go out of her sphere, and affect interference with the temporalities of men, and she will fail. Whenever she forgets that her mission is to bring men to the cross and to salvation, she comes down from her high vantage ground. Whenever the Church speaks at all, she must speak in the name of the Lord, and she must speak what the Lord bids her.” “Show me,” said he, “that the Lord Jesus Christ has commanded the Church to engage in the business of transferring men from one place to another, and I will yield and unite in the effort. But until you convince me that this is the business that the Head of the Church hath committed to her, I must earnestly resist any proposal to identify her with such business.”

Such was this “new theory,” *so-called*, of the Church’s sphere which Dr. Thornwell propounded in the Assembly at Indianapolis. Of course, it is manifest that when he speaks of “the Church,” he means the Church courts. The doctrine is, (as expressed by the General Assembly of 1848,) that these courts were “ordained by God for spiritual purposes, and must not be made subsidiary to the schemes of any associations founded in the human will, and liable to all its changes and caprices. These societies must make their appeal, not to Church courts, but to Church members.”

Now, this clear and just statement of the true nature and functions of the Church, Dr. Hodge asserts to be a new theory. He pays too high a compliment to secession and the Southern mind, when he declares it to be the twin sister of the one, and the child of the other. It is the offspring of eternal truth, the revelation of God in his holy word. Would God that the Church

to which Dr. Thornwell addressed such words of wisdom and of truth, had held fast by these ancient moorings! Would God that his prophetic warnings to her had not been so fully and so sadly realised!

Dr. Hodge makes bold to assert that the "new theory" is "so palpably unsound and untenable, that it was rejected by a unanimous vote in the Assembly of 1860"—the very first one after that into which Dr. Thornwell had succeeded in introducing his "new and startling doctrine." Let the reader compare with this allegation, the official record of the Assembly's action referred to. (See p. 44, Minutes for 1860.) It is as follows:

"Overture No. 32, several memorials and overtures referred to the Committee relating to Colonization, Temperance, the Slave Trade, &c.

"The Committee recommend the adoption of the following resolution, viz.:

"*Resolved*, That while the General Assembly, on the one hand, disclaim all right to interfere in secular matters; and on the other, assert the right and duty of the Church, as God's witness on earth, to bear her testimony in favor of truth and holiness, and against all false doctrines and sin, wherever professed or committed, yet in view of the often repeated action of the Assembly in reference to the subjects above referred to, it is inexpedient to take any further action in relation thereto. Adopted unanimously." Here the Assembly "votes out" as Dr. Thornwell expressed it, all secular affairs. This is one part of the "new theory." Here also, the Assembly asserts its duty and right to be God's witness on earth to testify for all his truth, and against all false doctrine, for all holiness and against all sin. This was the other part of the "new theory." So that here we have the whole of it, set forth in plain words. Yet Dr. Hodge has the hardihood to assert that this was "a unanimous rejection of the new theory as palpably unsound and untenable." Because the Assembly, (inconsistently perhaps,) refers in a general way to its past deliverances as harmonious and sufficient, Dr. Hodge ventures to declare roundly that they rejected as "palpably

unsound and untenable" a doctrine articulately expressed in both parts of the very overture they adopted.

This is very similar to his other allegation, that the doctrine of the Church's spiritual nature was held and stated by Dr. Thornwell in such a "restricted" sense as to prevent her from testifying against all sin, and for all righteousness. (Review, October, p. 645.) The reader can judge for himself how far restricted was the sense Dr. Thornwell attached to the term *spiritual* on the occasion of his speech at Indianapolis. Were it needful, we could easily prove, from his other writings, that Dr. Hodge's representations on this point are altogether unjust. Dr. Thornwell's doctrine was none other than what Dr. Hodge himself frequently declares, but the latter is not at all times consistent with his own positions.* He has no fixed principles upon the

*NOTE.—For example, Dr. Hodge in one place says :

"The limits assigned to the power of Church courts are all determined, directly or indirectly, by the word of God. Deriving all their authority from that source, they can rightly claim nothing but what is therein granted. As they are Church courts, their authority is confined to the Church. It does not extend to those that are without. It follows, also, from the same premises, that being Church courts, they must be confined in their jurisdiction to Church matters. They have nothing to do with matters of commerce, agriculture, or the fine arts, nor with the affairs of the State. They can only expound and apply the word of God to matters of truth and duty, and to the reforming of abuses, or to the discipline of offences. They may make orders for the conduct of public worship, and the administration of God's house.

"With regard to the proper sphere of the Church's action, we have the plain and easily applicable rule derived from the nature of the Church, and the design of its institution. It is the company of God's professing people, together with their children. It was instituted to teach, maintain, and propagate the truth. Every thing, therefore, which is without the sphere of the divine teaching, is foreign to the Church. Every thing to which that teaching applies, is within her legitimate cognizance. Whatever may be proved to be false by the word of God, the Church is bound to denounce as error. Whatever the Scriptures declare to be truth, the Church is called upon to urge on the faith of all who can hear her voice. And in like manner, she is authorised and bound to press upon the consciences of men, whatever the law of God pronounces to be morally right, and to warn them against whatever the same authority declares to be morally wrong." Review for October, pp. 642-3.

Here Dr. Hodge himself very fully and clearly enunciates the "new theory." But a few pages afterwards, excited by his zeal against the "originators and advocates" of this same new theory, he declares they had been "forced to abandon it," for Dr. Thornwell himself, and the pulpits of the South generally, had preached politics, and the Southern Church papers

subject, but veers about with the varying winds which blow upon him. His position has been one of great difficulty, having, as he once wrote to a Southern friend, "an audience at the North also, to please." To speak to two different and differing congregations, one before, and the other behind a man, gathered together at the same time, and yet address both acceptably, is indeed a hard task; and it has exceeded all Dr. Hodge's acknowledged powers. We believe he will be held responsible, in great part, by posterity, for the Church's swinging loose from her former safe and sure ground. His celebrated "Assault upon the South, and Defence of Anti-slavery and Abolitionism," as Dr. C. C. Jones well termed it, published first in his Review for January, 1861, and afterwards distributed by thousands of copies in pamphlet form, had all the importance which its author claims for it, (Review for October, pp. 628-9,) in dividing both the Church and the country. He has, time and again, of late years, sowed plentifully of the seeds of radicalism, and already begins to reap his harvest.*

and Synods had erred in the same way. Then, (forgetting in his great earnestness, what he had written a few pages before,) he proceeds:

"We do not blame those brethren for violating a false principle, and disregarding their own erroneous theory, but we protest against their condemning in others what they justify in themselves. If they may preach and write to prove that slavery is a 'divine institution,' we may endeavor to prove that it is a 'low state of civilisation,' from which the slaves should be elevated and delivered as soon as possible. If they may, heart and soul, embrace the Southern cause, and advocate Southern principles in the pulpit, in Church courts, and in the religious journals, we may do the same for the national cause and national principles. There is, however, no room for debate on this subject. This new theory of the Church is as practically dead, (except for the purpose of faction,) as is the theory of secession, and both, as Siamese twins, may be allowed to pass into oblivion together."

* NOTE.—We append here, by way of note, for the gratification of our readers, another comprehensive and beautiful statement of the doctrine of the province of the Church, as held by Dr. Thornwell, taken from a report which he presented to his own Synod in November 1851. A comparison may thus be made conveniently with Dr. Hodge's statement of it in part first (but not part second) of the preceding note, and the complete identity of the two statements discovered.

"What, then, is the Church? It is not, as we fear too many are disposed to regard it, a moral institute of universal good, whose business it is to wage war upon every form of human ill, whether social, civil, political, or moral,

We have freely criticised Dr. Hodge's October article. He made very free with us, Southern men and Southern Presbyterians, our opinions, conduct, situation, prospects; very free with one of us, especially, who, though dead, yet lives and speaks, whose immortal teachings can never die, and whose name and memory are all the dearer to us, for the injustice and the unkindness which he has received from the Northern Presbyterian Assembly, and the Northern Presbyterian press. But, at the same time, this October article of Dr. Hodge, on some points, attracts us strongly to him. We agree very cordially with much that he says upon his fifth topic. The contents of pp. 642-3, and also of pp. 647-651, we very heartily and earnestly approve. And so we also cordially accept what he declares about the union of the churches, pp. 651-53. But, besides these points of agreement betwixt us, the general character of

and to patronise every expedient which a romantic benevolence may suggest as likely to contribute to human comfort, or to mitigate the inconveniences of life. We freely grant, and sincerely rejoice in the truth, that the healthful operations of the Church, in its own appropriate sphere, react upon all the interests of man, and contribute to the progress and prosperity of society; but we are far from admitting, either that it is the purpose of God that, under the present dispensation of religion, all ill shall be banished from this sublunary state, and earth be converted into a paradise, or that the proper end of the Church is the direct promotion of universal good. It has no commission to construct society afresh, to adjust its elements in different proportions, to rearrange the distribution of its classes, or to change the forms of its political constitutions. The noble schemes of philanthropy which have distinguished Christian nations; their magnificent foundations for the poor, the maimed and the blind; the efforts of the wise and good to mitigate human misery, and to temper justice with mercy in the penal visitations of the law; the various associations that have been formed to check and abate particular forms of evil, have all been quickened into life by the spirit of Christianity. But still, it is not the distinctive province of the Church to build asylums for the needy or insane; to organise societies for the improvement of the penal code, or for arresting the progress of intemperance, gambling, or lust. The problems which the anomalies of our fallen state are continually forcing on philanthropy, the Church has no right directly to solve. She must leave them to the providence of God, and to human wisdom, sanctified and guided by the spiritual influences which it is her glory to foster and cherish. The Church is a very peculiar society—voluntary in the sense that all its members become so, not by constraint, but willingly; but not in the sense that its doctrines, discipline, and order are the creatures of the human will, deriving their authority and obligation from the consent of its members. On the contrary, it has a fixed and unalterable constitution; and that constitution is the word of God. It is the kingdom of the Lord Jesus Christ. He is enthroned in it as a sovereign.

the article is such as excites our sympathy. He is on trial by his own brethren. He has been "widely and severely censured," (p. 656,) and this article constitutes his apology and defence. Dr. Hodge has enemies in his own Church, (also the most bitter foes we have,) who have even threatened his ejection from the chair he has filled so long and so ably, and who would like to destroy his Review. It pains us to hear him compare the latter to a "ball and chain" which he carries, and the "discontinuance of which would be to him a great relief." Notwithstanding many misconceptions and misrepresentations of us, his article nevertheless contains, as does also his July number, many kind expressions towards the South. Dr. Hodge still differs with us strongly, and deals out unstintedly his condemnation of our course, and yet the general impression which these articles make upon our mind is, that his heart still pulsates with a brother's

It can hear no voice but his; obey no commands but his; pursue no ends but his. Its officers are his servants, bound to execute only his will. Its doctrines are his teachings, which he, as a prophet, has given from God; its discipline his law, which he, as king, has ordained. The power of the Church, accordingly, is only ministerial, and declarative. The Bible, and the Bible alone, is her rule of faith and practice. She can announce what it teaches; enjoin what it commands; prohibit what it condemns, and enforce her testimonies by spiritual sanctions. Beyond the Bible she can never go, and apart from the Bible she can never speak. To the law and to the testimony, and to them alone, she must always appeal; and when they are silent, it is her duty to put her hand upon her lips."

We add to the above, another statement of this "new theory," taken from a report presented to his Synod in 1861, ten years after the foregoing.

"This Synod is clear that the provinces of Church and State are entirely distinct, and that the Church as much transcends its sphere in pronouncing upon questions political, as the State transcends its sphere in dealing with matters ecclesiastical. The Church, it is true, is to declare and enforce revealed truth, and, among other duties, she is to enjoin obedience to the powers that be. But when the question arises, who and what those powers are, and how far obedience must be carried, the Church must remit the answer to the civil tribunals of the land, and to the dictates of the individual conscience. She has no commission from her Lord to declare what form of government any people shall adopt, how long they shall continue to maintain it, or under what circumstances they shall change it. Her members, as citizens, may and should take an active part in all discussions of the kind; but her courts, as authoritative tribunals of Christ, must be as silent as their Master. General principles she may, and must announce, the eternal principles of the moral law; but their concrete application to political constitutions and political changes, does not fall within the limits of her power."

love. We can truly say that we reciprocate his kind feelings, whilst we cannot shut our eyes to many things in these articles which we consider inconsistent and erroneous.

In drawing to a close, we shall be pardoned for making two short digressions from our main topic. Dr. Hodge tells us, p. 639, that as long ago as 1836, and in the years subsequent, he expressed the opinion that sudden and general emancipation would be disastrous to the blacks as well as to the whites. On p. 657, he tells us that as slavery was the cause of "the rebellion," and the South constantly refused reasonable terms, the President was right in emancipating all slaves within military lines, and the government right in demanding the entire and final abolition of slavery. This seems to us to signify that he accepts a fatal disaster for the blacks, in order to secure the punishment of the "rebellious" whites. And yet, if we mistake not, the chief ground of the eulogy of President Lincoln, published by Dr. Hodge, in his Review for July, (after having been delivered, as we understand, from several Presbyterian pulpits by him,) was the unspeakable boon to humanity of which he was the author in this very deed. As for ourselves, we retain all our former opinions respecting slavery. It was a kindly relation on both sides. It was a good institution, although some abuses were connected with it which demanded reformation, and would have been reformed had the South been let alone of her persecutors. But, whatever be our judgment of slavery, and whatever we may think of emancipation, we accept the latter as a fact accomplished. Slavery was an anxious trust to Southern Christians. Most conscientiously we studied its duties, and most earnestly we sought to solve the problem of its future. It occupied ourselves personally as no other question did for thirty years and more. Our Northern brethren claim a commission from the Almighty to solve the great problem, and they accordingly have abolished the institution. We cannot dispute their claim, nor are we so disposed. They have taken upon them a responsibility which, in some important respects, rids us of ours. The freedman is robbed of his old confidences and affections. His "best friends" now are strangers from a distance, who seek, at

least many of them, to set him against those he once confided in. Alas for him, neither for this world, nor for that which is to come, can his former master be, for the present, of much service to the freedman. It is a great work the North has assumed to do. Let them gird themselves for the mighty task, for to God must they answer it, if they fail in its accomplishment. In all sincerity we can and do pray that, in all they undertake for him which is for his real good, they may succeed and not fail. We believe this to be the sentiment of the Christian South. We still love the negro. He had powerful claims upon us before the war; his conduct all through that struggle, and even up to the present time, notwithstanding the many temptations to which he has been, and still is exposed, has added greatly to their force.

In like manner, we accept the failure of secession, as manifestly providential. The overthrow of that just cause made evident not so much the prowess of its foes, nor even their prodigiously superior resources, as it did the direct hand of the Almighty. Yes! the hand of God, gracious though heavy, is upon the South for her discipline. Dr. Hodge says, in his article on President Lincoln, p. 455, that the South is "humbled in her own eyes." Well, if the South were but humbled under God's mighty hand, in the true sense of the expression, we might well thank the Lord for his grace so given. And well may the North tremble, if all that has occurred has taught her only pride and self-confidence, censoriousness and severity towards brethren. But whatever may be true on this subject, it is not true that the South is ashamed of the war, or penitent for her noble, though unavailing, defence of constitutional liberty.

We close this article by reiterating our cordial acceptance of what Dr. Hodge says respecting the reunion of the Churches upon the pages indicated above. Schism being a sinful thing, we are bound to desire ecclesiastical reconstruction, if it can be consistently and properly acquired. We re-echo, with deep solemnity of feeling, Dr. Hodge's words, "If reunion be prevented merely by alienation of feeling, it will be a poor excuse in the day of judgment to have refused fellowship with Chris-

tian brethren, because of hatred towards them." In all sincerity we aver that this is not our case. We were forced to part from our brethren by their forsaking the old and right way of keeping the Church separate from the State, and we are obliged to continue apart, because more and more this grievous error has been developed amongst them. But we do not hate them. Their errors are hateful to us, but not their persons. Besides this difficulty in the way of reunion, there are some others. One is their attitude on the subject of slavery—a rationalistic and practically infidel attitude,—for they have set up a morality better than the Bible's, and are impugning the perfectness of Christ's conduct and doctrine. They claim to be more righteous than God, and wiser than his word. Still another is the relation they persist in maintaining between the Church and other organisations appointed to act in her stead. They seem wedded to a denial of the Church's right and duty to do, herself, her own Master's work. God's good providence has delivered our Church from this thralldom. We should sin, were we not to stand fast in the liberty wherewith Christ has made us free. Upon all these three important matters we seem to be called, as a Church, to give a testimony. We must stand in our lot, and bear witness to the truth, as it has been committed to us.

Mrs. [unclear]

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THE SOUTHERN

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CONDUCTED BY

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IN

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In consequence of the extreme difficulty of procuring paper, we have determined to issue, for Vol. XVI., six quarterly numbers of 100 pages each, instead of four of 150 pages each. The last number of this volume will appear, therefore, in October, 1864, and the first of Vol. XVII. in January, 1865. We hope, by this extension of time, that we may be able to procure enough good paper to continue publication without interruption. We will do all in our power to prevent even temporary suspension or advance in the price of subscription, notwithstanding the greatly increased cost of material and labor, looking confidently to our friends for all the aid they can render us.

Through no fault of ours, the preparation of the promised portrait is still delayed. But we repeat that it will be prepared and sent to our subscribers as soon as possible.

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Mrs. A. C. Brown

THE SOUTHERN
PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW,

CONDUCTED BY

AN ASSOCIATION OF MINISTERS,

IN

COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA.

Vol. XVI.

APRIL, MDCCCLXIV.

No. 3.

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Owing to insuperable difficulties, no number of the Review could be published in January last.

In the first number of this volume, (July, 1863,) it will be remembered that we expressed a determination to issue six quarterly numbers of 100 pages each, instead of four of 150 pages each; and added: "we will do all in our power to prevent even temporary suspension, or advance in the price of subscription." But it has been impossible to procure paper of suitable quality to enable us to execute our purpose; and the cost of material and labor has advanced so far beyond what could have been foreseen, that we have been compelled to content ourselves with the publication of four numbers instead of six. We will therefore issue but one more number to complete Vol. XVI.

The first number of Vol. XVII, as heretofore announced, will appear in January, 1865; from which time the new terms of subscription (five dollars per volume) will take effect.

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Vol. XVI. MARCH, MDCCCLXVI. No. 4.

COLUMBIA, S. C.

PRINTED AT THE OFFICE OF THE REVIEW.

1866.

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The appearance of this number of the REVIEW has been delayed far beyond the appointed time. It would not interest our readers to give a detailed account of the causes of this delay. The office at which the last four volumes were printed was utterly destroyed by General Sherman, as well as every other printing office in Columbia; and we confess, when we promised that Volume XVI., No. 4, would be issued "early in 1866," we did not anticipate so many difficulties in fitting up an entirely new office, with every thing necessary to print in a suitable style. The Conductors of the REVIEW have never for a moment thought of discontinuing it; and we see no reason for supposing that there will be any further interruption.

During the rest of this year, we expect to publish all the numbers of Volume XVII., at intervals of six or eight weeks; and then to begin Volume XVIII. with the year 1867.

We appeal to our patrons for their aid in sustaining this periodical. We hope they will all forward their subscriptions at once. And will not those who are in arrears remit the amounts due without delay?

Notwithstanding the advance in the cost of labor and materials, and the heavy specific tax on Reviews, we have determined—contrary to the advice of many of our friends—not to increase the price of subscription. If those in arrears will pay promptly, and all our friends will make a vigorous effort to increase our subscription list, we can go on without loss.

Volume XVII. will contain at least 600 pages.

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